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Acer case study 宏碁案例分析

Acer case study 宏碁案例分析
Acer case study 宏碁案例分析

Draft Version

Acer Incorporated

Company profile

Bart Slob

Amsterdam, December 2005

SOMO Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations

Keizergracht 132

1015 CW Amsterdam

The Netherlands

Tel.: 020-*******

Fax: 020-*******

info@somo.nl

www.somo.nl

Contents

Contents (3)

Introduction (4)

1. Policies and business overview (5)

1.1. General characteristics (5)

1.2. History (6)

1.3. Ownership structure (7)

1.4. Basic financial information (8)

1.4.1. Sales and profitability (8)

1.4.2. Shareholding structure (9)

1.4.3. Key accounts during 2003 (10)

1.5. Characterisation of activities (10)

1.6. Main products (11)

1.7. Organisational structure (12)

1.7.1. Divisions (12)

1.7.2. Management (13)

1.8. Geographical markets (14)

1.9. Strategy (14)

1.9.1. Strengths (14)

1.9.2. Vulnerabilities (15)

1.9.3. Outlook (15)

2. Acer’s supply chain and Corporate Social Responsibility (16)

2.1. Supply chain, outsourcing and sales (16)

2.2. Corporate social responsibility and sustainability (22)

2.2.1. Policies regarding environmental issues (22)

2.2.2. Policies regarding human rights and labour rights (23)

3. Labour issues in Acer’s supply chain (24)

3.1. Acer’s supply chain in the Philippines and China (24)

3.2. International standards on labour rights (26)

3.3. Excessive working hours (27)

3.4. Wages and compensation for overtime work (27)

3.5. Health and safety issues (28)

3.6. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (29)

3.7. Women’s rights (30)

4. Summary of findings (31)

Annex 1: Structure of the Wistron supply chain in the Philippines (33)

Introduction

This company profile on Acer is part of a research project on the ICT hardware sector. In addition to this study on Acer, SOMO conducted a study on Fujitsu-Siemens, a sector study and a survey on two major production countries. The aim of the research project is:

To understand the role of manufacturers in the global supply chain, identify issues that need to be addressed and develop strategies to address identified problems in the supply chain in general;

To understand the organisation of the supply chains of two specific brand companies in the ICT hardware sector.

SOMO focuses on corporate structures and relations throughout the sector and in production, supply and value chains. The study aims to provide information and arguments for civil society organisations to feed the debate on trade and investment and corporate accountability. The ICT hardware sector study was conducted by SOMO in collaboration with research organisations in China and the Philippines.

The company profile on Acer aims to identify “critical issues” in Acer’s supply chain from the perspective of poverty eradication and sustainable development. All reports associated to the research project on the ICT hardware sector can be found on SOMO’s website: www.somo.nl.

Acer Incorporated is a leading Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of notebooks, tablet, handheld, and desktop computers from Taiwan. Acer has streamlined its operations in recent years, spinning off all of its manufacturing operations, which the company considers to be of low value. Acer has implemented a new channel business model, shifting from being a manufacturer to a pure brand company that markets and distributes its products, while leaving the actual production process in the hands of contract manufacturers. Acer’s channel business model comprises a wide net of sales services, in contrast with the direct sales approach of market leader Dell.

According to Acer, the company now sources from approximately one hundred system suppliers and primary component suppliers in Asian countries. Labour conditions at these suppliers are often appalling. In order to identify the labour issues in Acer’s supply chain, research was undertaken on the working conditions in four factories in China and one in the Philippines. All of the companies that were researched provide manufacturing services to Acer.

1. Policies and business overview

1.1. General characteristics

Incorporated

Name: Acer

Business Address: 137 Sec 2 Chien Kuo North Road, Taipei, 10479, Taiwan

Telephone: +886 2 2696 1234

Fax: +886 2 2501 9162

Internet: https://www.doczj.com/doc/a414255592.html,

Logo:

Acer Incorporated’s principal activities are to develop, market and sell computer workstations, PC servers, business desktops, computer-related components and software. Its other activities include repair services of Acer brand products, investing, financing, construction, and provision of internet, electronics services and information storage. The Group's operations are carried out in Taiwan, Europe and in the United States of America. The Group exports its products to North and South America, Europe and Africa.

In addition to being an OEM of various types of computers, Acer produces servers, storage systems, projectors, and displays. The company also provides IT support services. Acer has streamlined its operations in recent years, spinning off its manufacturing operations (now Wistron), as well as its consumer electronics and peripherals business (now Benq). It still holds stakes in both companies. Acer now outsources its manufacturing. It sells through resellers and distributors worldwide.

Acer Incorporated is part of the Acer Group. The Acer Group comprises several companies and markets a broad spectrum of branded IT products, e-business solutions and services. In addition, the group supplies multiple brands of IT products including components and software in Greater China. The Acer Group employs 7,800 people, while Acer Incorporated employs 5,600 people supporting dealers and distributors in more than 100 countries.1

1 Acer website (8 April 2005).

1.2. History

Acer founder and chairman Stan Shih designed Taiwan’s first desktop calculator in the early 1970s. The company’s precursor, Multitech International, was launched in 1976 with US$ 25,000 by Shih and four other people. In 1980, Multitech introduced the Dragon Chinese-language terminal, which won Taiwan’s top design award. In 1983, the company introduced an Apple clone and its first IBM-compatible PC. Multitech set up AcerLand, Taiwan’s first and largest franchised computer retail chain, in 1985.

The company changed its name to Acer (the Latin word for “sharp, acute, able and facile”) in 1987 and went public on the Taiwanese exchange the next year. Acer got into the semiconductor market2 in 1989 when it entered into a joint venture with Texas Instruments (named TI – Acer) to design and develop memory chips in Taiwan. In 1990, Acer’s US subsidiary, Acer America, paid US$ 90 million for Altos Computer Systems, a US manufacturer of UNIX systems.3

During the prosperous 1980s, Acer increased its management layers and slowed the decision-making process. In late 1990, the company restructured, trimming its workforce by eight percent (about 400 employees), including two-thirds of headquarters. The following year Acer began its decentralization plan to create a worldwide confederation of publicly owned companies. Acer suffered its first loss in 1991 on revenues of almost US$ 1 billion, partly because of increased marketing budgets in the US and Europe, and continuing investment in TI – Acer. The company bounced back in 1993, with 80 percent of its profits coming from that joint venture.

The Aspire PC was unveiled in 1995. In 1996 the company expanded into consumer electronics, introducing a host of new, inexpensive videodisc players, video telephones, and other devices in order to boost global market share. In 1997, Acer purchased Texas Instruments’ notebook computer business. A slowdown in memory chips sales and a financial slide at Acer America cost the company US$ 141 million, but Acer finished the year in the black.

The founder of the company, Stan Shih, stepped down as president in 1998 to focus on restructuring. The company ended its venture with Texas Instruments, buying TI’s 33 percent stake and renaming the unit Acer Semiconductor Manufacturing. The company also began making information appliances, introducing a device able to play CD-ROMs via TV sets and perform other task-specific functions. Continued losses due to a highly competitive US market caused a drop in profits for 1998.

In 1999, Acer sold a 30 percent stake in its struggling Acer Semiconductor Manufacturing affiliate to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC completed its purchase of the remaining 70 percent of the business, which was renamed TSMC – Acer Semiconductor Manufacturing the following year.) The competitive heat and the rise of cheaper personal computers took a toll in 1999 when Acer cut jobs in the US, “streamlined” operations and withdrew from the US retail market. The company intensified its focus on providing online software, hardware and support for users, launching a digital service business and a venture capital operation to invest in promising internet start-ups.

2 A semiconductor is a miniaturized electronic device, typically a computer chip for processing or memory, which controls the flow of electricity by varying the conductance between two materials.

3 UNIX is a popular operating system, developed by AT&T in 1969, that was very important in the development of the Internet. UNIX allows more than one user to access a computer system at the same time. An early version of UNIX, which was used by most colleges and universities, made Internet connections possible.

The company suffered a financial blow in 2000 when large customer IBM cancelled an order for desktop computers. Later that year, after continued losses in a slowing PC market, the company announced it would cut more jobs in the US and Germany and close an unspecified number of plants worldwide.

In 2001, the company spun off its contract manufacturing and peripherals units, and renamed them Wistron and BenQ, respectively. Acer’s restructuring activities continued the following year, when it merged with its distribution unit, Acer Sertek. Although Sertek was in fact the surviving entity, the company immediately revived the Acer name to maintain its stronger brand. In 2005, J.T. Wang succeeded the company’s founder, Shih, as CEO.4 Shih is now a member of the board of directors of Wistron. Acer Inc. still has a 32.2 percent stake in Wistron.

1.3. Ownership structure

Acer Sertek Inc. (ASI) was incorporated on August 1, 1976, as a company limited by shares under the laws of the Republic of China (ROC). ASI changed its Chinese name to its current name on January 7, 2002.

For the purpose of integrating resources, expanding business scale, and building up efficiency and competitiveness, it was resolved in the shareholders’ meetings of Acer Incorporated (AI), then the single major shareholder of ASI, and ASI held on December 17, 2001, that ASI merge with AI, retaining AI’s English name for the merged company. Upon the Effective Day of Merger, March 27, 2002, ASI issued new common shares to AI’s shareholders at the ratio of 2.5 shares of AI stock in exchange for one common share of ASI stock. After revoking the cross-holdings between the two companies, ASI accomplished the merger with total issuance of 1,727,725,303 new common shares to AI’s shareholders. Legally, ASI is the surviving company, with AI being the liquidating entity, while from the accounting perspective, pursuant to the interpretation of the ROC Accounting Research & Development Foundation regarding the criteria for reverse acquisition, AI is substantially the economic acquirer and ASI, the acquired.

AI was established and registered according to the Republic of China Company Law and the ROC Statute for the Establishment and Administration of Science-based Industrial Parks on January 19, 1981. On December 17, 2001, AI’s shareholders’ meeting resolved the spin-off plan whereby on February 28, 2002, the Company spun off its design, manufacturing and services (DMS) business from its Acer brand business and transferred related operating assets and liabilities to its subsidiary Wistron Corporation (Wistron). Wistron issued 400 million common shares (par value 10 New Taiwanese Dollars – NT$) to AI at NT$ 14.5 per share. As the company had not participated in Wistron’s capital injection during the year and continued to sell portions of its ownership in Wistron, the Company held less than 50 percent of ownership in Wistron as of December 31, 2002. Therefore, Wistron and its subsidiaries were excluded from the consolidated companies.5 In August, 2005, Acer still held 32.2 percent of Wistron’s shares. The company will continue to diminish its stake in Wistron. Analysts from the Citigroup expect Acer to sell up to 10 per cent of Wistron’s total outstanding shares in 2005 or 2006.6

4 Hoover’s company record, (8 April 2005).

5 Acer Incorporated, 2003 annual report (translation),

(7 April 2005).

6 K.W.B. Chan et al., Wistron Corp.: company report (Investext, Citigroup: 2005), p. 2.

1.4. Basic financial information

1.4.1. Sales and profitability

During the year ended December of 2003, sales at Acer Incorporated were NT$ 157.66 million (€ 3.89 billion). This is an increase of 46.9 percent over 2002, when the company’s sales were NT$ 107.35 billion. Sales of information products saw an increase of 52 percent in 2003, from NT$ 89.20 billion to NT$ 135.71.

The company derives most of its revenues in Europe: in 2003, this region’s sales were NT$ 84.39, which is equivalent to 53.5 percent of total sales. In 2003, sales in Europe were up at a rate that was much higher than the company as a whole: in this region, sales increased 96.8 percent to NT$ 84.39 million. Although the company’s overall sales increased, sales were not up in all regions of the world: sales in other countries were down 7.0 percent (to NT$ 28.01 billion).7

Sales value, fiscal years 1998 – 2004

In billions of €8

1

2

3

4

5

6

1998199920002001200220032004

On the NT$ 157.66 billion in sales reported by Acer in 2003, the cost of goods sold totalled NT$ 134.97 billion, or 85.6 percent of sales (i.e. the gross profit was 14.4 percent of sales).This gross profit margin is slightly lower than the company achieved in 2002, when costs of goods sold totalled 85.1 percent of sales.

Acer Incorporated reports profits by product line. During 2003, the itemized operating profits 9 at all divisions were NT$ 1.43 billion, which is equal to 0.9 percent of total sales. Of all product lines, 7 Corporate Information. Company research report: Acer Incorporated . , 8 April 2005.

8 Acer website (8 April 2005).

9 Operating profit: The difference between turnover (or revenue) and total operating expenses, but before interest and taxation have been taken into account.

Information Products had the highest operating profits in 2003, with operating profits equal to 0.9 percent of sales. (This product line is the largest at Acer and accounted for 86 percent of sales in 2003). In 2002, Circulation had the highest operating profits (1.8 percent of sales versus –1.0 percent for Information Products).10

Net income, fiscal years 1999 - 200411

In millions of €

50

100

150

200

250

199920002001200220032004

1.4.

2. Shareholding structure

Acer chairman and founder Stan Shih and his family (via Hong Rong Investment Holdings Co.) altogether represent the single-largest shareholder, with a total of 5.4 percent of Acer. Directors and key managers hold about six percent of total shares, leaving 94 percent as free float shares. Foreign investors and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) currently possess 34 percent of the company.12

10

Corporate Information. Company research report: Acer Incorporated . , 8 April 2005.

11 Net income: gross sales minus taxes, interest, depreciation, and other expenses. Net income can also be called net profit, net earnings or bottom line.

12 Acer Incorporated, 2003 annual report (translation), (7 April 2005); several broker reports.

5,40%5,00%

QFII and foreign 2,00%

1.4.3. Key accounts during 2003

Percentage of total net sales (%)13

Acer Germany; 16,27%

6,35%

1.5. Characterisation of activities

Acer’s major IT products can be divided into notebooks, desktop PCs, display (CRT and LCD) and others (servers, PDAs, etc.). These products belong to the core IT Business Group (ITBG), which accounts for 80-85 percent of Acer’s total consolidated revenues, and 85-88 percent of Acer’s total core business.

13

Acer Incorporated, 2003 annual report (translation), (7 April 2005).

Other core businesses include Channel Business Group (CBG, 13 percent of total consolidated revenue, 14 percent of total core revenue), and E-service Business Group (EBG, 1 percent), which offers end-to end business IT solutions. Non-core businesses include 56 percent-owned Lottery Tech and 52 percent-owned Apacer, a maker of flash-memory cards and MP3 players.

In the third quarter of 2004, notebook computers were Acer’s top revenue-contributing product, with 47 percent of total consolidated revenue. Both desktop PCs and display (CRT and LCD) account for 13-14 percent of total consolidated revenue in the third quarter of 2004. CRT products will soon be phased out and replaced by the volume ramp of LCD products in 2005.

Other IT products include server and storage, handhelds such as PDAs, and projectors. Acer is planning to offer LCD televisions too, as it believes that such products – coupled with integrated Internet connectivity – will become the centrepiece of the living room under the concept of ‘digital home’ in the near future.14

1.6. Main products

Computers

Desktop (home and business)

Notebook

Personal digital assistants (PDAs)

Servers

Tablet

Displays

Digital projectors

Monitors (cathode-ray tube and liquid-crystal display)

Plasma displays

14 Deutsche Bank, Global Equity Research: Acer. (December 2004), p. 24.

Operating revenue by products, fiscal years 2002 - 2003

In millions of €15

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Notebook PC Desktop PC Monitor / TFT

LCD Other

1.7. Organisational structure

1.7.1. Divisions

Acer Incorporated is divided in the following divisions:

Division Main functions

Holding & Investment Manage Acer's holding and/or invested companies.

Chief Financial Officer Manage Acer's finance and investments.

General Auditor Evaluate and execute plans to improve Acer's internal operations. Service Value Lab & Product Value Lab Develop innovative, customer-oriented products and services with high market value, and profitable business models.

Key Account Business Development Develop new and feasible business models, and integrate Acer's IT products and services to target the corporate account market. IT Products Business Develop and manage Acer's brand name IT products and services. e-Enabling Services Develop and manage Acer's MegaMicro e-Enabling services,

marketing, sales and after-sales services.

Channel Business Market and service multiple brands of IT products through non-Acer

branded channels.

Greater China Operations Sales and market Acer's brand name IT products and services in

Greater China.

International Operations Market Acer's brand name IT products and services in the

international markets.

Legal Draft and review contracts; provide legal consulting services and

manage Acer's IP-related rights, including without limitation the patent,

trademark, licensing and copyright rights.

15 Ibid.

functions

Division Main

General Affairs Manage the public administration, safety and service related issues. Finance & Accounting Financial planning, investment management, set and monitor budgets,

accounting issues; cash flow, credit and cost control.

Human Resources Develop and manage human resources including recruitment, training,

administration, career development, compensation and welfare, and

staff relationship.

Branding Promote Acer's brand name products through marketing

communications, public relations and advertising.

Information Technology Plan and integrate sales, accounting, inventory and asset information.

Maintain Acer's internet and intranet infrastructure.

1.7.

2. Management

J.T. Wang

Chairman and CEO

As Chairman and CEO of Acer Inc., J.T. Wang's role and challenge is to ensure the global competitiveness of the Acer brand. Since December 2000 Wang has led Acer to focus on core and profitable business.

Wang initiated a New Channel Business Model, which, according to the company, was essential for the company's turnaround and growth. The model encourages partners and suppliers to join Acer in its formula of supply-chain management and allows Acer to outsource from top-tier vendors and partners. In so doing, Acer claims to have built an efficient supply chain that provides customers with competitively priced and fresh technologies.

Acer's year 2005 financial targets were: consolidated revenues of US$ 9 billion for 35 percent year-on-year growth; profit after tax of US$ 229 million; and operating income of US $190 million for 67 percent year-on-year growth. In 2004, Acer was the world number-five ranking vendor for total PCs. In both the 2004 fourth quarter and full year, Acer became the number-three PC and number-one notebook brand in EMEA (Europe, Middle East, Africa) and Western Europe. Acer has set its goal to become a world top-three PC vendor within the next three years.16

Gianfranco Lanci

President of Acer Inc.

According to Acer, Gianfranco Lanci's promotion to the position of President of Acer Inc. in 2004 reflects the company's recognition for his “outstanding performance in the European market”, including his management style and successful channel-business model, “which may now extend to the Acer group worldwide.” Lanci joined Acer as Managing Director of Acer Italy in 1997, following Acer's acquisition of Texas Instruments' (TI) notebook division, and immediately began consolidating the channel and partner-relations at all levels. In 2000, Lanci became President of Acer Europe and began building up a strong European organisation. On becoming President of Acer EMEA in 2002, Lanci introduced a channel-business model that turned in high profits all across Europe, as well as the Middle Eastern and African markets.

In 2003, Lanci was appointed President of Acer's International Operations Business Group, allowing him to involve directly in the Americas markets. The designation confirmed Acer's acknowledgement 16 Acer website (9 April 2005).

of channel management and marketing activities, and for the role he had played for Acer's success in EMEA.

Lanci's record of results includes growing Acer EMEA's 2004 revenues by 63 percent year-on-year, and accounting for nearly 70 percent of the IT product business' total revenue. In the 2004 full year and fourth quarter, Acer became the number-one notebook and number-three PC brand across both EMEA and Western Europe. EMEA is now the most profitable market for Acer.17

1.8. Geographical markets

Percentage of total IT product revenues, from the 1st quarter of 2003 to the 3rd quarter of 200418

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

1Q032Q033Q034Q031Q042Q043Q04

* EMEA stands for Europe, Middle East and Africa.

1.9. Strategy

1.9.1. Strengths

Acer’s notebook PC market share in Europe increased to 18.2 percent in the third quarter of 2004, vs. 11.4 percent in the third quarter of 2003.

The fact that clone / regional brands are losing more market share than global OEMs supports the idea that Acer has increased its cost competitiveness versus companies that have higher Euro-based cost contents. Local European brands should be at a disadvantage against Acer because of their largely Euro-based operating expenses (about 10 percent of sales).

HP lost a larger share to Acer likely due to its higher operating overheads in Europe. Furthermore, HP’s volume may be negatively affected by Ingram Micro’s strengthened support for Acer brand products (both Acer and HP use Ingram Micro to distribute their products in Europe).

17

Acer website (8 April 2005). 18 Deutsche Bank, Global Equity Research: Acer. (December 2004).

Largely driven by strong notebook sales in Europe, Acer’s global PC market share and ranking improved to 3.6 percent and number five in the third quarter of 2004, respectively, versus 3.0 percent and number seven in the third quarter of 2003, based on estimates from the International Data Group (IDC).19

1.9.

2. Vulnerabilities

Acer’s high Euro-based sales ratio (about 65 percent of sales are from Europe), and high NT$ and US$ cost contents make the company structurally advantageous from a strong Euro trend. A strong Euro would inflate Acer’s top line and enhance its cost competitiveness versus other higher Euro cost-content competitors. As a result, some analysts believe that the recent strong Euro appreciation may have inflated Acer’s market share momentum and profitability.

According to analysts from the Deutsche Bank, Acer may not have the cost advantage in non-European markets: measured by its supply chain’s lower total operating margin and weak performance in home markets Taiwan and China. As a result, the company may face challenges in balancing its market-share and profitability objectives in non-European markets.

Acer’s expansion into new markets could dilute its profit margins and increase its risk profile as the company does not appear to have cost competitiveness in non-European markets, e.g. Acer’s US business can potentially remain unprofitable if the company pursues a below-cost pricing strategy to gain market share.20

1.9.3. Outlook

Acer’s performance in its home markets, Taiwan and China, has been weak in 2004. The company’s overall supply chain generates lower operating margin (3.5 percent in 3Q04) versus the supply chains of competitors Asustek (8.8 percent) and Dell (11.2 percent), and is on par with HP’s. The Deutsche Bank forecasts the New Taiwanese Dollar to appreciate against the US$ in 2005. Analysts think that these factors have negative implications for Acer’s expansion into non-European markets.

The Deutsche Bank expects Acer’s market share expansion to decelerate in 2005-06, after its success in Europe in 2003 and 2004. They also expect that Acer’s non-European market expansion will slow down after an initial ramp, as the company may not have the cost advantage to sustain an uptrend.21

19 Deutsche Bank, Global Equity Research: Acer. (December 2004).

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

2. Acer’s supply chain and Corporate Social Responsibility

2.1. Supply chain, outsourcing and sales

In the last five years, Acer has transformed itself from a manufacturer into a company that focuses on global marketing of brand-name, PC-related products and services. Acer’s management considers the manufacturing sector to be of little value. The founder of the company, Stan Shih, has pointed out that in the new economy, manufacturing must find ways to provide customers with Original Design Manufacturing (ODM) and global logistics services so as to increase added value.22

The “New Channel Business Model” is not only crucial to Acer's success today, but will also be, according to Acer, the company’s foundation in the global arena in the future. Acer will strive to extend its New Channel Business Model and work together with global distributors and resellers to compete head-to-head with direct-model leader Dell.

In practice, the implementation of this business model means that Acer is shifting from being a manufacturer to a pure brand company that markets and distributes its products, while leaving the actual production process in the hands of contract manufacturers. Acer’s channel business model comprises a wide net of sales services, in contrast with the direct sales approach of market leader Dell. Acer sales representatives and resellers are considered “key long-term business partners.”23 Analysts and stock brokers argue that this channel business model is not necessarily more cost competitive than the direct business model Dell uses.

Acer’s supply chain management strategy can perhaps best be characterized as a strategy of “vertical disintegration.”24 In the recent past, Acer sold majority stakes in both Wistron and BenQ. These companies were main providers of manufacturing services in Acer’s supply chains. By selling its majority stake in these companies, Acer clearly demonstrates that it intends to “disintegrate” its supply chains and focus on branding and marketing.

The strategy of vertical disintegration is quite visible in Acer’s corporate structure. In the charts on the next page, one will note that Acer retains ownership of companies related to the distribution of brand-name IT products and chooses to maintain control over companies involved in Research and Development (charts A and B). Shares in Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS) companies, on the other hand, are being sold off gradually, although in most of these companies Acer is still powerful enough to influence decision-making (chart C). The charts have been simplified and can only reflect part of Acer’s ever-changing corporate network.25

22 Acer's Stan Shih: Empowering Technology - Making Your Life Easier (news release),

(9 April 2005).

23 S. Burke, Acer Launches New Channel Business Model, CRN, 24 November 2003,

(10 April 2005)

24 For more information on this subject, read Jeffrey T. Macher, Vertical Disintegration and Process Innovation in Semiconductor Manufacturing: Foundries vs. Integrated Producers,

(9 April 2005).

25 All information has been taken from Acer’s 2003 annual report.

A. Distribution, sale and maintenance of “Acer” brand name information technology products

B. Research, development, manufacture and sale of integrated circuits and related products

C. Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS) and Original Design Manufacturers (ODM)

The vertical disintegration of Acer’s supply chain becomes even more evident when analyzing the supply chain of specific Acer products. Components are sourced from many different component manufacturers, while assembly is carried out by a small group of selected contract manufacturers. In some cases, Acer holds a considerable stake in these contract manufacturers, although it almost never owns these companies. The selected contract manufacturers are allowed to manufacture final products for Acer. It does not matter whether a desktop computer or notebook is assembled in China, the Philippines or in the Netherlands. In the end, all Acer products are sold as “made in Taiwan”. The following charts show the supply chains for two Acer notebooks: the Travelmate C110 and the Travelmate C300.

Supply chain for the Travelmate C110

Supply chain for the Travelmate C300

These charts were composed with detailed information from Acer’s CB test certificates.26 The CB certificates of Acer’s notebook computers reveal a complex web of suppliers. In most cases, one particular component can be provided by two or three different component manufacturers. A hard disk drive (HDD) for the Travelmate C300, for example, can be supplied by Toshiba or Fujitsu. This is necessary to guarantee continuous supply of critical components. If a supplier fails to provide a particular component just-in-time or on demand, the selected contract manufacturers can rely on other suppliers that are able to provide the same component. For some components, however, the contract manufacturers depend on a key supplier. If these components are out of stock, delays in delivery are likely to happen.

It is important to note that Acer actually depends on the performance of some of its competitors in the IT market. Many critical components in Acer’s supply chain for notebook computers are provided by its key competitors. Fujitsu, a company that also engages in the production of notebooks, supplies the hard disks for the Travelmate C300 and the Travelmate C110. For the same notebooks, Sony provides the DVD-ROM. Sony also produces notebooks as an Original Equipment Manufacturer. Other key competitors for Acer Incorporated in the consumer electronics market are Toshiba, Hitachi, IBM and Matsushita.27 All these companies provide components for Acer notebooks. This situation may be described as a sort of “entrepreneurial endogamy,” as companies have no alternative but to engage in commercial relationships with their industrial peers (competitors), rather than to integrate essential parts of their supply chains. Large multinationals such as Sony and Toshiba can not be labelled as pure original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), because they also provide services that are typical of component manufacturers or electronics manufacturing services (EMS) companies. Acer is a different type of company because it neither manufactures technology products itself nor produces components for other OEMs.

At the other end of the supply chain, in sales, Acer engages in partnerships with key competitors as well. In New Zealand, for example, Acer appointed Fujitsu as a “Gold Channel Partner” in 2004.28

As a whole, Acer’s supply chain and sales strategies can be characterised as indirect and very lean. Selling is done through distribution only and even large retailers are approached through the business channel, thus indirectly. Decision-making in the company can be very fast because there are few hierarchical levels.

According to analysts from the Deutsche Bank, Acer’s combined supply-chain margin (Acer-brand, Wistron-ODM and Ingram Migram-distributor) of 3.5 percent is lower vs. 8.8 percent for Asustek’s supply chain (Asustek-OEM, Synnex-distributor) but close to the 3.8 percent for HP’s PC supply chain

26 The IECEE CB Scheme is an international system for acceptance of test reports dealing with the safety of electrical and electronic products. It is a multilateral agreement among participating countries and certification organisations. A manufacturer utilizing a CB test report issued by one of these organisations can obtain national certification in all other member countries of the CB Scheme. The Scheme is based on the use of international (IEC) Standards. If some members' national standards are not yet completely harmonized with IEC Standards, national differences are permitted if clearly declared to all other members. The CB Scheme utilizes CB Test Certificates to attest that product samples have successfully passed the appropriate tests and are in compliance with the requirements of the relevant IEC Standard and with the declared national differences of various member countries.

27 (10 April 2005).

28Acer expands its corporate reach with Fujitsu, news release, 31 May 2004,

(10 April 2005).

企业国际化经营实例剖析

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姓名:万强文 学号: 0911022176 学院:商学院 学校:江西师范大学

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