Why are Buyouts Levered?The Financial Structure of Private
Equity F unds
Ulf Axelson
Swedish Institute for Financial Research
Per Str?mberg
Swedish Institute for Financial Research,University of Chicago,NBER and CEPR
Michael S.Weisbach
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign and NBER
January4,2007
Abstract
This paper presents a model of the?nancial structure of private equity?rms.In the model, the general partner of the?rm encounters a sequence of deals over time where the exact quality of each deal cannot be credibly communicated to investors.We show that the optimal?nancing arrangement is consistent with a number of characteristics of the private equity industry.First, the?rm should be?nanced by a combination of fund capital raised before deals are encountered, and capital that is raised to?nance a speci?c deal.Second,the fund investors’claim on fund cash?ow is a combination of debt and levered equity,while the general partner receives a claim similar to the carry contracts received by real-world practitioners.Third,the fund will be set up in a manner similar to that observed in practice,with investments pooled within a fund,decision rights over investments held by the general partner,and limits set in partnership agreements on the size of particular investments.Fourth,the model suggests that incentives will lead to overinvestment in good states of the world and underinvestment in bad states,so that the natural industry cycles will be multiplied.Fifth,investments made in recessions will on average outperform investments made in booms.
Practitioner:“Things are really tough because the banks are only lending4times cash?ow, when they used to lend6times cash?ow.We can’t make our deals pro?table anymore.”
Academic:“Why do you care if banks will not lend you as much as they used to?If you are unable to lever up as much as before,your limited partners will receive lower expected returns on any given deal,but the risk to them will have gone down proportionately.”
Practitioner:“Ah yes,the Modigliani-Miller theorem.I learned about that in business school. We don’t think that way at our?rm.Our philosophy is to lever our deals as much as we can,to give the highest returns to our limited partners.”
1.Introduction
Private equity funds are responsible for a large and increasing quantity of investment in the economy. According to a July2006estimate by Private Equity Intelligence,investors have allocated more than$1.3trillion globally for investments in private equity funds.1These private equity funds are active in a variety of di?erent types of investments,from small startups to buyouts of large conglomerates to investments in real estate and infrastructure.Private equity investments are now of major importance not just in the United States,but internationally as well;for example,the Wall Street Journal recently reported that private equity?rms are responsible for40%of M&A activity in Germany(WSJ,Sept.28,2004,p.C1).Yet while a massive literature has developed with the goal of understanding the?nancing of corporate investments,very little work has been done studying the?nancing of the increasingly important investments of private equity funds.
Private equity investments are generally made by funds that share a common organizational structure(see Sahlman(1990),or Fenn,Liang and Prowse(1997)for more discussion).Typically, these funds raise equity at the time they are formed,and raise additional capital when investments are made.This additional capital usually takes the form of debt when the investment is collateral-izable,such as in buyouts,or equity from syndication partners when it is not,as in a startup.The funds are usually organized as limited partnerships,with the limited partners(LPs)providing most of the capital and the general partners(GPs)making investment decisions and receiving a substan-tial share of the pro?ts(most often20%).While the literature has spent much e?ort understanding some aspects of the private equity market,it is very surprising that there is no clear answers to the basic questions of how funds are structured?nancially,and what the impact of this structure is on the funds’choices of investments and their performance.Why is most private equity activity undertaken by funds where LPs commit capital for a number of investments over the fund’s life? Why are the equity investments of these funds complemented by deal-level?nancing from third parties?Why do GP compensation contracts have the nonlinear incentive structure commonly ob-served in practice?What should we expect to observe about the relation between industry cycles,
1Ass reported by Financial Times,July62006.
bank lending practices,and the prices and returns of private equity investments?Why are booms and busts in the private equity industry so prevalent?
In this paper,we propose a new explanation for the?nancial structure of private equity?rms. Private equity?rms rely on the ability of their general partners to make value-increasing invest-ments.To do so,these managers must have su?cient freedom to be able to negotiate deals when the GP becomes aware of them.Yet,this very freedom creates a fundamental governance problem; limited partners commit capital to private equity funds with no right to sell their position or an ability to vote out the fund’s managers.2As such,governance issues in private equity funds are potentially even more problematic than in public corporations.We argue in this paper that one reason why a number of institutions commonly observed in private equity contracts arise is as partial solutions to this fundamental governance problem.
We present a model based on this idea in which a number of features of private equity markets arise as equilibrium outcomes.First,the model suggests that private equity investments should be done through funds that pool investments across the fund.Second,funds should raise some capital at the fund level,prior to discovering individual deals,and supplement fund-level capital with additional,deal-speci?c capital.This additional capital takes the form of highly risky debt,and should be raised from di?erent investors than the once who supply fund capital.Third,the payo?s to GPs should be a nonlinear pro?t-sharing arrangement similar to those observed in practice.Fourth, somewhat paradoxically,the optimal fund structure involves giving complete discretion to the GPs to undertake investments,without LPs being able to veto or otherwise interfere with investment decisions.Fifth,the model predicts that the commonly-observed pattern of investments made during busts outperforming investments made during booms on average is a natural consequence of the contracting ine?ciencies between GPs and LPs.
The model is in a sense a dynamic extension of the standard adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf(1984)and Nachman and Noe(1994),in which informed?rms raising capital from un-informed investors have an incentive to overstate the quality of potential investments and therefore cannot credibly communicate their information to the market.We assume that the GP faces two potential investment opportunities over time which require?nancing.The intertemporal element of this problem leads to a new?nancing decision for the GP relative to the static case considered by the standard adverse selection model.We consider regimes when the GP raises capital on a deal by deal basis(ex post?nancing),raises a fund of capital to be used for several future projects(ex ante?nancing),or uses a combination of the two types of?nancing.
With ex post?nancing,the solution is the same as in the static adverse selection model.Debt is be the optimal security,and GPs will choose to undertake all investments they can get?nancing for,even if those investments are value-decreasing.Whether deals will be?nanced at all depends
2Limited partners often do have the right to terminate the partnership;however it typically takes80%of the value-weighted claims of the limited partners to do so.Sales of partnership interests require the approval of the GP.
on the state of the economy—in good times,where the average project is positive NPV,there is overinvestment,and in bad times there is underinvestment.
Ex ante?nancing,however,can alleviate some of these problems.By tying the compensation of the GP to the collective performance of a fund,the GP has less of an incentive to invest in bad deals,since bad deals dilute his returns from the good deals.Tying pay-o?s of past and future investments together is in a sense a way to create inside wealth endogenously and to circumvent the problems created by limited liability.Thus,a fund structure often dominates deal-by-deal capital raising.Furthermore,debt is typically not the optimal security for a fund.Since the capital is raised before the GP has learned the quality of the deals he will have an opportunity to invest in, there is no such thing as a“good”GP who tries to minimize underpricing by issuing debt.Indeed, issuing debt will maximize the risk shifting tendencies of a GP since it leaves him with a call option on the fund.We show that instead it is optimal to issue a security giving investors a debt contract plus a levered equity stake,leaving the GP with a“carry”at the fund level that resembles contracts observed in practice.
The downside of pure ex ante capital raising is that it leaves the GP with substantial freedom. Once the fund is raised,he does not have to go back to the capital markets,and so can fund deals even in bad times.If the GP has not encountered enough good projects and is approaching the end of the investment horizon,or if economic conditions shift so that not many good deals are expected to arrive in the future,a GP with untapped funds has the incentive to“go for broke”and take bad deals.
We show that it is therefore typically optimal to use a mix of ex ante and ex post capital.Giving the GP funds ex ante preserves his incentives to avoid bad deals in good times,but the ex post component has the e?ect of preventing the GP from being able to invest in bad deals in bad times. This?nancing structure turns out to be optimal in the sense that it is the one that maximizes the value of investments by minimizing the expected value of negative NPV investments undertaken and good investments ignored.In addition,the structure of the securities in the optimal?nancing structure mirrors common practice;ex post deal funding is done with highly risky debt that has to be raised from third parties such as banks,the LP’s claim is senior to the GP’s,and the GP’s claim is a fraction of the pro?ts.
Even with this optimal?nancing structure,investment nonetheless deviates from its?rst-best level.In particular,during good states of the world,?rms are prone to overinvestment,meaning that some negative net present value investments will be undertaken.In addition,during bad states of the world,there will be underinvestment,i.e.,valuable projects that cannot be?nanced.During recessions,there not only will not be as many valuable investment opportunities,but those that do exist will have di?culty being?nanced.Similarly,during boom times,not only will there be more good projects than in bad times,but bad projects will be?nanced in addition to the good ones.The implication of this pattern is that the informational imperfections we model are likely
to exacerbate normal business cycle patterns of investment,creating a cyclicality multiplier.Thus, the investment distortions described by our model are a potential explanation for the common observation that the private equity investment process is extremely procyclical(see Gompers and Lerner(1999b)).This logic also suggests that there is some validity to the common complaint from GPs that during tough times it is di?cult to get?nancing for even very good projects,but during good times many poor projects get?nanced.
An empirical implication of this result is that returns to investments made during booms will be lower on average than the returns to investments made during poor times.Consistent with this implication is anecdotal evidence about poor investments made during the internet and biotech bubbles,as well as some of the most successful deals being initiated during busts.More formally, academic studies have found evidence of such countercyclical investment performance in both the buyout(Kaplan and Stein,1993)and the venture capital market(Gompers and Lerner,2000).
Our paper relates to a theoretical literature that analyzes the e?ect of pooling on investment incentives and optimal contracting.Diamond(1984)shows that by changing the cash?ow dis-tribution,investment pooling makes it possible to design contracts that incentivizes the agent to monitor the investments properly.Bolton and Scharfstein(1990)and Laux(2001)show that tying investment decisions together can create“inside wealth”for the agent undertaking the investments, which reduces the limited liability constraint and helps design more e?cient contracts.Unlike our model,neither of these papers consider project choice under adverse selection,or have any role for outside equity in the optimal contract.Our paper also relates to an emerging literature analyzing private equity fund structures.3Jones and Rhodes-Kropf(2003)and Kandel,Leshchinskii,and Yuklea(2006)also argue that fund structures can lead GPs to make ine?cient investments in risky projects.Unlike our paper,however,these papers take fund structures as given and do not derive investment incentives resulting from an optimal contract.Inderst and Muennich(2004)argue that pooling private equity investments together in a fund helps the GP commit to e?cient liquidation decisions in a manner similar to the winner-picking model of Stein(1997).However,the Inderst and Muennich mechanism relies on always making the fund capital constrained,which we show is not optimal in our model.Most importantly,none of the previous theoretical papers analyze the interplay of ex ante pooled?nancing and ex post deal-by-deal?nancing,which lies at the heart of our model.
The next section presents the model and its implications.There is a discussion and conclusion following the model.
3Lerner and Schoar(2003)also model private equity fund structures,but focus on explaining the transfer restric-tions of limited partnership shares.
2.Model
There are three types of agents in the model:General partners(GPs),limited partners(LPs)and ?y-by-night operators.All agents are risk-neutral,and have access to a storage technology yielding the risk-free rate,which we assume to be zero.
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure2.1.There are two periods.Each period a candidate?rm arrives.We assume it costs I to invest in a?rm.Firms are of two kinds:good(G) and bad(B).The quality of the?rm is only observed by the GP.A good?rm has cash?ow Z>0 for sure,and a bad?rm has cash?ow0with probability1?p,and cash?ow Z with probability p, where:
Z>I>pZ
Good?rms therefore have positive net present values,while bad?rms have a negative NPV.All cash?ows are realized at the end of the second period.
Each period a good?rm arrives with probabilityα,and a bad?rm with probability1?α.4 We think ofαas representing the common perception of the quality of the type of deals associated with the specialty of the GP that are available at a point in time.To facilitate the analysis,we assume there are only two possible values forα,αH which occurs with probability q each period, andαL which occurs with probability1?q each period.Also,we assumeαH>αL.Since we would likeαto re?ect possibly unmeasureable perceptions in the marketplace,we assume it is observable but not veri?able,so it cannot be contracted on directly.
Furthermore,we assume that there is an in?nite supply of unserious?y-by-night operators that investors cannot distinguish from a serious GP.Fly-by-night operators can only?nd useless?rms with a maximum payo?less than capital invested,or store money at the riskless rate.
2.1.Securities
We assume the GP has no money of his own and?nances his investments by issuing a security w I(x)backed by the cash?ow x from the investments,and keeps the residual security w GP(x)= x?w I(x).5The securities have to satisfy the following monotonicity condition:
Monotonicity w I(x),w GP(x)are non-decreasing.
4Equivalently,we can assume that there are always bad?rms available,and a good?rm arrives with probability α.
5If the GP had su?cient capital,the agency problems would be alleviated if he were to?nance a su?ciently large part of the investments himself.In practice,GPs typically contribute1%of the partnership’s capital personally. However,so long as the GP cannot?nance such a large part of investments that the agency problems completely disappear,allowing for GP wealth does not change the qualitative nature of our results.
This assumption is standard in the security design literature and can be formally justi?ed on grounds of moral hazard.6An equivalent way of expressing the monotonicity condition is
x?x0≥w GP(x)?w GP?x0￠≥0?x,x0s.t.x>x0
However,if the security issued pays o?less than the total cash?ow whenever the cash?ow is below the invested capital K,the?y-by-night operators can store the money and earn rents.Since the supply of?y-by-night operators is potentially in?nite,there cannot be an equilibrium where ?y-by-night operators earn positive rents and investors break even.Any candidate equilibrium security design therefore has to satisfy:
Fly-by-night For invested capital K,w GP(x)=0whenever x≤K.
The existence of?y-by-night operators also implies that GPs should be contractually prohibited from investing in any public capital market securities,such as stocks or options.Otherwise,there would always be some chance for a?y-by-night operator to earn a positive surplus by gambling in securities markets,so that limited partners could never break even.7
2.2.Forms of Capital Raising
In a?rst best world,the GP will invest in all good?rms and no bad?rms.Because the GP has private information about?rm type,this investment policy will not be achievable-there will typically be overinvestment in bad projects and underinvestment in good projects.Our objective is to?nd a method of capital raising that minimizes these ine?ciencies.We consider three methods of capital raising:
?Pure ex post capital raising is done in each period after the GP encounters a?rm.The securities investors get are backed by each individual investment’s cash?ow.
?Pure ex ante capital raising is done in period zero before the GP encounters any?rm.The security investors get is backed by the sum of the cash?ows from the investments in both periods.
6See,for example,Innes(1990)or Nachman and Noe(1994).Suppose an investor claim w(x)is decreasing on a region a 7This assumption also distinguishes our results from the model of Myers and Majluf(1984).In their model,a ?rm would never raise?nancing and invest in a negative net present value project,because they implicitly assume that there is also the possibility of investing in zero net present value assets with similar risk as the investment being considered,such as stocks of publicly traded companies. ?All agents observe pd. 1 state H or L ?Firm 1 arrives. GP observes firm type G or B. ?Raise ex post capital??Cash flows realized Raise ex ante capital?1 t: 023 ?All agents observe pd. 2 state H or L ?Firm 2 arrives. GP observes firm type G or B. ?Raise ex post capital? Figure2.1:Timeline ?Ex ante and ex post capital raising uses a combination of the two approaches.Investors supplying ex post capital in a period receive a security backed by the cash?ow from the investment in that period only.Investors supplying ex ante capital receive a security backed by the cash?ows from both investments combined. We now analyze and compare each of these?nancing arrangements.8 3.Pure ex post capital raising We now characterize the pure ex post capital raising solution.We start by analyzing the simpler static problem in which the world ends after one period,and then show that the one period solution is also an equilibrium period by period in the dynamic problem. In a one-period problem,the timing is as follows:After observing the?rm’s quality,the GP decides whether to seek?nancing.After raising capital,he decides whether to invest in the?rm or in the riskless asset. Given these assumptions,the GP has an incentive to seek?nancing regardless of the?rm’s quality,since he receives nothing otherwise.To invest in a?rm,the GP must raise I by issuing a security w I(x),where x∈{0,I,Z}.Also,in any equilibrium where the GP receives?nancing and investors break even,the GP cannot get anything if the cash?ow from his investment is below I. Otherwise,there will be an in?nite supply of?y-by-night operators who can earn a positive return by raising money and investing in the riskfree asset.Therefore,the security design has w I(I)=I. But this in turn implies that the GP will invest both in bad and good?rms whenever he can raise 8This is not an exhaustive list of?nancing methods.We brie?y discuss slightly di?erent forms below as well,such as raising ex ante capital for only one period,raising only one unit of capital for the two periods,and allowing for ex post securities to be backed by more than one deal.None of these other methods improve over the once we analyze in more detail. capital,since his payo?is zero if he invests in the riskless asset.A GP with a good?rm cannot separate himself from a GP with a bad?rm,so the only equilibrium is a pooling one in which all GPs issue the same security. The security pays o?only if x=Z,so the break even condition for investors after learning the expected fraction of good?rmsαin the period is (α+(1?α)p)w I(Z)≥I Thus,?nancing is feasible as long as (α+(1?α)p)Z≥I and in that case,the GP will invest in all?rms.The payo?w I(Z)will be set so that investors just break even,and the security can be thought of as debt with face value w I(Z).When it is impossible to satisfy the break even condition,the GP cannot invest in any?rms. We assume that the unconditional probability of success is too low for investors to break even: Condition3.1. (E(α)+(1?E(α))p)Z Condition3.1implies that ex post?nancing is not possible in the low state.Whether pure ex post?nancing is possible in the high state depends on whether(αH+(1?αH)p)Z≥I holds. The two-period problem is somewhat more complicated,as the observed investment behavior in the?rst period may change investors’belief about whether a GP is a?y-by-night operator,which in turn a?ects the?nancing equilibrium in the second period.We show in the appendix,however, that a repeated version of the one-period problem is still an equilibrium:9,10 Proposition1.Pure ex post?nancing is never feasible in the low state.If (αH+(1?αH)p)Z≥I 9The equilibrium concept we use is Bayesian Nash,together with the requirement that the equilibrium satis?es the“Intuitive Criterion”of Cho and Kreps(1987). 10The result only holds if we stick to the assumption that the GP is not allowed to invest in zero net present value public market securities,such as the S&P500.Above,we argued that it is optimal to disallow such investments in the presence of?y-by-night operators.However,this will no longer be true in the second period if it is assumed that ?y-by-night operators do not raise money and invest in the?rst period,since they are then screened out.But if it was anticipated that such investments would be allowed in the second period for GPs who invested in the?rst period, there would be no way to screen out?y-by-night operators.One can show that the whole market for?nancing would therefore break down in period1. High X X ΟGood ΟBad Low ()()1-H H p Z I αα+>State High ΟΟΟGood Ο Bad Low ()()1-H H p Z I αα+ it is feasible in the high state,where the GP issues debt with face value F given by F =I H H In the solution above,we assume that ?y-by-night operators do not try to raise ?nancing,or if they do raise ?nancing,that they invest in the risk free asset since they gain nothing regardless of their investment strategy.11 3.1.E ?ciency The investment behavior with pure ex post ?nancing is illustrated in Figure 3.1.Investment is ine ?cient in both high and low states.There is always underinvestment in the low state since good deals cannot get ?nanced.In the high state,there is underinvestment if the break even condition of investors cannot be met,and overinvestment if it can,since then bad deals get ?nanced. 4.Pure Ex Ante Financing We now study the polar case in which the GP raises all the capital to be used over the two periods for investment ex ante,before the state of the economy is realized.Suppose the GP raises 2I of 11 We could also have imagined period-by-period ?nancing where the security is issued after the state of the economy is realized,but before the GP knows what type of ?rm he will encounter in the period.In a one-period problem,the solution would be the same as for the pure ex post case analyzed above.However,one can show that if there is more than one period,the market for ?nancing would completely break down except for the last period.This is because if there is a ?nancing equilibrium where ?y-by-night operators are screened out in early periods,there would be an incentive to issue straight equity and avoid risk shifting in later periods.(As we show in the proof of Proposition 1,straight equity does not survive the Cho and Kreps (1987)intuitive criterion when GPs know the type of their project at the time of issuance,but this is no longer true when the security is issued ex ante.)But straight equity leaves rents to ?y-by-night operators,who therefore would pro ?t from mimicking serious GPs in earlier periods by investing in wasteful projects.Therefore,it is impossible to screen them out of the market in early periods,so there can be no ?nancing at all. ex ante capital in period zero,implying that the GP is not capital constrained and can potentially invest in both periods.12 We solve for the GP’s security w GP(x)=x?w I(x)that maximizes investment e?ciency. For all monotonic stakes,the GP will invest in all good?rms he encounters over the two periods. However,if no investment was made in period1,it is impossible to motivate him to avoid investing in a bad?rm in period2.This ine?ciency follows from the?y-by-night condition,since the GP’s payo?has to be zero when fund cash?ows are less than or equal to the capital invested. We show that it is possible to design w GP(x)so that the GP avoids all other ine?ciencies. Under this second-best contract,he avoids bad?rms in period1,and avoids bad?rms in period2 as long as an investment took place in period1. To solve for the optimal security,we maximize the GP payo?subject to the monotonicity,?y-by-night,and investor break even conditions,and make sure that the second-best investment behavior is incentive compatible.The security payo?s w GP(x)must be de?ned over the following potential fund cash?ows:x∈{0,I,2I,Z,Z+I,2Z}.Note that under a second-best contract,x∈{0,2I,Z}will never occur.These cash?ows would result from the cases of two failed investments,no investment, and one failed and one successful investment respectively,neither of which can result from the GP’s optimal investment strategy.Nonetheless,we still need to de?ne security payo?s for these cash?ow outcomes to ensure that the contract is incentive compatible. The?y-by-night condition immediately implies that w GP(x)=0for x≤2I.The following lemma shows that only one inequality has to be satis?ed to induce the GP to follow the described investment behavior above: Lemma1.For the pure ex ante case,a necessary and su?cient condition for a contract w GP(x) to induce the GP to only invest in good?rms in period1and,if an investment was made in period 1,to pass up a bad?rm in period2is given by: (E(α)+(1?E(α))p)w GP(Z+I)(4.1) ≥((1?p)E(α)+2p(1?p)(1?E(α)))w GP(Z) +p(E(α)+(1?E(α))p)w GP(2Z) Proof.In Appendix. The left hand side is the expected payo?for a GP who encounters a bad?rm in period1, passes it up,and then invests in any?rm that appears in period2.The right hand side is the expected payo?if he invests in the bad?rm in period1,and then invests in any?rm in period 12Below we show that in the pure ex ante case,it is never optimal to make the GP capital constrained by giving him less than2I. 2.Therefore,when Condition4.1holds,the GP will never invest in a bad?rm in period1.13For incentive compatibility,we also must ensure that the GP does not invest in a bad?rm in period2 after investing in a good?rm in period1.It turns out that this incentive compatibility constraint holds whenever Condition4.1is satis?ed. The full maximization problem can now be expressed as: E(w GP(x)) max w GP(x) =E(α)2w GP(2Z)+32E(α)(1?E(α))+(1?E(α))2p′w GP(Z+I) such that E(x?w GP(x))≥2I(BE) (E(α)+(1?E(α))p)w GP(Z+I)≥(IC) ((1?p)E(α)+2p(1?p)(1?E(α)))w GP(Z) +p(E(α)+(1?E(α))p)w GP(2Z) x?x0≥w GP(x)?w GP(x0)≥0?x,x0s.t.x>x0(M) w GP(x)=0?x s.t.x≤2I(F BN) There are two possible payo?s to the GP in the maximand.The?rst payo?,w GP(2Z),occurs only when good?rms are encountered in both periods.The second payo?,w GP(Z+I),will occur either(1)when one good?rm is encountered in the?rst or the second period,or(2)when no good ?rm is encountered in any of the two periods,and the GP invests in a bad?rm in period2that turns out to be successful.Condition BE is the investor’s break-even condition.Finally,the maximization has to satisfy the monotonicity(M)and the?y-by-night condition(F BN).The feasible set and the optimal security design which solves this program is characterized in the following proposition: Proposition2.Pure ex ante?nancing is feasible if and only if it creates social surplus.An optimal investor security w I(x)(which is not always unique)is given by w I(x)=(min(x,F)x≤Z+I F+k(x?(Z+I))x>Z+I 13It could be that if the GP invests in a bad?rm in period1,he would prefer to pass up a bad?rm encountered in period2.For incentive compatibility,it is necessary to ensure that the GP gets a higher pay o?when avoiding a bad period1?rm also in this case.We show in the proof,however,that if4.1holds,this additional condition must hold as well. =Z Low funding need x =Z Medium funding need x =Z High funding need Figure4.1:GP securities(w GP(x))and investor securities(w I(x))as a function of fund cash?ow x in the pure ex ante case.The three graphs depict contracts under high(top left graph),medium (top right graph),and low(bottom graph)levels of E(α).A high level of E(α)corresponds to high social surplus created,which in turn means that a lower fraction of fund cash?ows have to be pledged to investors. where F≥2I and k∈(0,1). Proof:See appendix. Figure4.1shows the form of the optimal securities for di?erent levels of social surplus created, where a lower surplus will imply that a higher fraction of fund cash?ow has to be pledged to investors.This structure resembles the structure of actual securities used by private equity funds, in which investors get all cash?ows below their invested amount and a proportion of the cash ?ows above that.Moreover,as shown in the proof,the contracts tend to have an intermediate region,where all the additional cash?ows are given to the GP.This region is similar to a provision referred to in practice as"Carried Interest Catch Up,"which is commonly used in private equity partnership agreements. The intuition for the pure ex ante contract is as follows.If the GP were to receive a straight equity claim,he would make the?rst-best investments,i.e.,take all positive net present value investments and otherwise invests in the risk-free asset.However,the problem with straight equity is that the GP receives a positive payo?even if no capital is invested,allowing?y-by-night operators to make money.To avoid this problem,GPs can be paid only if the fund cash?ows are su?ciently high,introducing a risk-shifting incentive.The risk-shifting problem is most severe if investors hold debt and the GP holds a levered equity claim on the fund cash?ow.The optimal contract Good Bad Firm Firm Good Bad P,A P,A A Firm A Firm High Good Bad Low Period 2 State P P,A A Firm Firm State Figure 4.2:Investment behavior in the pure ex ante (A)compared to the pure ex post (P)case when ex post ?nancing is possible in the high state. minimizes the losses to risk shifting by reducing the levered equity claim of the GP and giving a fraction of the high cash ?ows to investors.14 Another way to why it is e ?cient for investors to receive a fraction of high cash ?ows (and hence make their payo ?s more "equity-like")is by examining the IC constraint of the GP.When Z ≤2I,the IC constraint simpli ?es to w GP (Z +I )≥pw GP (2Z ),implying an upper bound on the fraction that the GP can receive of the highest fund cash ?ows. As the investors have to be given more rents (to satisfy their break-even constraint),it is optimal to increase the payo ?to investors for the highest cash ?ow states (2Z )?rst,while keeping the payo ?s to GPs for the intermediate cash ?ow states (Z +I )as high as possible to reduce risk-shifting incentives.While our model set up delivers an intermediate region where investor payo ?s are ?at,we believe that this is not a generic feature of more general models.In particular,if we were to allow good projects to also have some risk,this ?at region will likely disappear in favor of a more smooth equity piece given to investors. 4.1.E ?ciency The investment behavior in the pure ex ante relative to the pure ex post case is illustrated in Figure 4.2.In the ex ante case,the GP invests e ?ciently in period 1,meaning that he will accept good projects and reject bad ones.If he has access to and invests in a good project in the ?rst period,then the investment will be e ?cient in period 2as well.The only ine ?ciency is that the GP will invest in the bad ?rm in period 2in the case where he encounters bad ?rms in each period. The ex ante fund structure can improve incentives relative to the ex post deal-by-deal structure 14This is similar to the classic intuition of Jensen and Meckling (1976). by tying the payo?of several investments together and structuring the GP incentives appropriately. In the ex post case,the investment ine?ciency is caused by the inability to reward the GP for avoiding bad investments,since any compensation system that did so would violate the?y-by-night condition.In the ex ante case,the GP can be motivated to avoid bad?rms as long as there is a possibility of?nding a good?rm in the second period.By giving the GP a stake that resembles straight equity for cash?ows above the invested amount,he will make e?cient investment decisions as long as he anticipates being“in the money”.Tying payo?s of past and future investments together is in a sense a way to improve incentives to invest in only good?rms. When investment pro?ts are tied together this way,bad investments dilute the returns from good investments,motivating managers to avoid making bad investments. This logic suggests that one reason why investments are comingled within funds is that by doing so,managers are motivated to pick better investments.The one time when these incentives break down is when the?rm faces a series of bad investments.The real-world counterpart to this case is when a partnership approaches the end of the’commitment period’with a large pool of still-uninvested capital.Our model formalizes the concern voiced by practitioners today that the large overhang of uninvested capital can lead to partnerships overpaying for assets. So far we have restricted the analysis of the ex ante case to a situation where the GP raises enough funds to invest in all?rms.It turns out that this?nancing strategy dominates an ex ante structure in which the GP is capital constrained.To see why,suppose the GP only raises enough funds to invest in one?rm over the two periods.He will then pass up bad?rms in the?rst period in the hope of?nding a good?rm in the second period.Just as in the previous case,there is no way of preventing him from investing in a bad?rm in the second period.However,there is an additional ine?ciency in the constrained case,however,in that good?rms have to be passed up in period2whenever an investment was made in period1.15Thus,investment e?ciency is improved if private equity funds are not constrained in the amount of equity capital they have access to. This argument potentially explains the empirical?nding of Ljungquist and Richardson(2003),who document that private equity funds seldom use up all their capital before raising a new fund. Although the ex ante fund structure can improve e?ciency over the pure ex post case,it is clear from Figure4.2that it need not always be the case.Clearly,pure ex ante?nancing always dominates when pure ex post?nancing is not even feasible in the high state,i.e.when (αH+(1?αH)p)Z 15This result is in contrast with the winner picking models in Stein(1997)and Inderst and Muennich(2004). ?nancing is feasible in the high state,ex ante?nancing will still be more e?cient whenever: (1?E(α))2(I?pZ) ≤2(q(1?αH)(I?pZ)+(1?q)αL(Z?I)) The left hand side is the NPV loss from investing in a bad project the second period,I?pZ, times the likelihood of this happening(probability of two bad?rms in a row),(1?E(α))2.The right hand side is the e?ciency loss from ex post raising,which is that some bad?rms are?nanced in the high state(which happens with probability q(1?αH)in each period)and some good?rms are not ?nanced in the low state(which happens with probability(1?q)αL in each period).Intuitively, ex post?nancing has the disadvantage that the GP will always invest in any?rm he encounters in high states and cannot be motivated to make use of his information about investment.However,ex post?nancing also has the advantage that it is dependent on the realized value ofα,which ex ante ?nancing cannot be,sinceαis not known when funds are raised and is not veri?able,so contracts cannot be written contingent on its value. The relative e?iciency of ex post and ex ante?nancing depends on how informativeαis about project quality.If low states are very unlikely to have good projects(αL close to zero)and high states have almost only good projects(αH close to one)the ine?ciency with ex post fund raising is small.When the correlation between states and project quality is not so strong,pure ex ante ?nancing will dominate. However,even when pure ex ante?nancing is more e?cient,it still may not be privately optimal for the GP to use.The ex ante?nancing contract must be structured so that the LPs get some of the upside for the GP to follow the right investment strategy,which sometimes will leave the LPs with strictly positive rents.So,there are cases in which total rents are higher under ex ante ?nancing than under ex post?nancing,but the GP prefers ex post?nancing because he does not have to share the rents with the LPs.The following proposition characterizes the circumstances under which the GP leaves rents for the LP. and Proposition3.If p>1 2 μE(α)1?E(α)?2>(1?p)I Z ?1?I Z￠32?1p′ then the LP gets a strictly positive rent in equilibrium with pure ex ante?nancing.Otherwise,the GP captures all the rent. Proof.See appendix. a competitive rent,but rather ration the number of LPs they let into the fund. 5.Mixed ex ante and ex post?nancing We now examine the model when managers can use a combination of ex post and ex ante capital raising.In the case when managers raise su?cient funding ex ante so they can potentially take all investments,the resulting equilibrium includes bad as well as good investments.This overinvestment occurs because when the GP does not invest in a bad?rm in period1,he will then invest in any ?rm that comes along in period2,regardless of its quality.The possibility of using a combination of ex post and ex ante capital raising can limit this overinvestment in the second state without destroying period1incentives.It does so by making the GP somewhat capital constrained by limiting the funds that can be used for ex ante?nancing,and requiring him to go back to the market for additional capital to be able to make an investment. To consider this possibility,we now assume that the GP raises2K<2I of ex ante fund capital in period0,and is only allowed to use K for investments each period.16The remaining I?K has to be raised ex post,after the investments are discovered.As we show below,it is critical that ex post investors are distinct from ex ante investors. Ex post investors in period i get security w P,i(x i)backed by the cash?ow x i from the investment in period i.Ex ante investors and the GP get securities w I(x)and w GP(x)=x?w I(x)respectively, backed by the fund cash?ow x=x1?w P,1(x1)+x2?w P,2(x2)(where w P,i is zero if no ex post ?nancing is raised).The?y-by-night condition is now that w GP(x)=0for all x≤2K.Finally, we also assume that whether the GP invests in the risk-free asset or a?rm is observable by market participants,but it is infeasible to write contracts contingent upon this observation. We characterize the contracts that lead to the most e?cient equilibrium.Given these assump-tions,it is sometimes possible to implement an equilibrium in which the GP invests only in good ?rms in period1,only in good?rms in period2if the GP invested in a?rm in period1,and only in the high state if there was no investment in period1.17As is seen in Figure5.1,this equilibrium is more e?cient than the one arising from pure ex ante?nancing since it avoids investment in the low state in period2after no investment has been done in period1.It is also more e?cient than the equilibrium in the pure ex post case,since pure ex post capital raising has the added ine?ciencies that no good investments are undertaken in low states,and bad investments are undertaken in high states(if ex post capital raising is feasible). 16It is common in private equity contracts to restrict the amount the GP is allowed to invest in any one deal. 17Note that it is impossible to implement an equilibrium where the GP only invests in good?rms over both periods, since if there is no investment in period1,he will always have an incentive to invest in period2whether he?nds a good or a bad?rm. Good Bad Firm Firm Good Bad Firm Firm High Good Bad Low Period 2 State P P,A,M A,M Firm Firm State Figure5.1:Investment behavior in the pure ex ante(A),pure ex post(P),and the postulated mixed(M)case when ex post?nancing is possible in the high state. 5.1.Ex Post Securities We?rst show that to implement the most e?cient outcome described above,the optimal ex post security is debt.Furthermore,the required leverage to?nance each deal should be su?ciently high so that ex post investors are unwilling to lend in circumstances where the risk-shifting problem is severe. If the GP raises ex post capital in period i,the cash?ow x i can potentially take on values in {0,I,Z},corresponding to a failed investment,a risk-free investment,and a successful investment. If the GP does not raise any ex post capital,he cannot invest in a?rm,and saves the ex ante capital K for that period,so that x i=K.The security w P,1issued to ex post investors in period 1in exchange for supplying the needed capital I?K must satisfy a?y-by-night constraint and a break-even constraint: w P,1(I)?(I?K)≥0(5.1) w P,1(Z)≥I?K(5.2) The?y-by-night constraint5.1ensures that a?y-by-night operator in coalition with an LP cannot raise?nancing from ex post investors,invest in the risk-free security,and make a strictly positive pro?t.The break even constraint5.2presumes that in equilibrium,only good investments are made in period1,so that the cash-?ow will be Z for sure.For ex post investors to break even, they require a payout of at least I?K when x i=Z.The ex post security that satis?es these two conditions and leaves no surplus to ex post investors is risk-free debt with face value I?K. A parallel argument establishes debt as optimal for ex post?nancing in the second period in the case when no investment was made in the?rst.The?y-by-night condition stays unchanged, but the break even-condition becomes w P,2(Z)≥ I?K α+(1?α)p (5.3) The face value of the debt increases relative to the face value in the?rst period because when no investment has been made in the?rst period,the GP will have an incentive to raise money and invest even when he encounters a bad?rm in period2.To break even given this expected investment behavior,the cheapest security to issue is debt with face value of I?K α+(1?α)p . The last and trickiest case to analyze is the situation in period2when there has been an investment in period1.The postulated equilibrium requires that no bad investments are then made in period2.Furthermore,since?y-by-night operators are not supposed to have invested in period1,ex post investors know that?y-by-night operators have been screened out.Therefore, we cannot use the?y-by-night constraint in our argument for debt.Nevertheless,as we show in the appendix,an application of the Cho and Kreps re?nement used in the proof of Proposition1 implies that w P,2(I)≥I?K.To see why,if w P,2(I) To sum up,debt is the optimal ex post security,and it can be made risk free with face value F=I?K in period1,and in period2if an investment was made earlier.When no investment has been made in period1,optimal investment requires conditions on the quantity of ex post capital. In particular,the amount of capital I?K the GP raises must be low enough so that the GP can invest in the high state,but high enough such that the GP cannot invest in the low https://www.doczj.com/doc/a53212417.html,ing the break even condition5.3,the condition for this is: (αH+(1?αH)p)Z≥I?K≥(αL+(1?αL)p)Z(5.4) We summarize our results on ex post securities in the following proposition: Proposition4.With mixed?nancing,the optimal ex post security is debt in each period.The debt is risk-free with face value I?K in period1and in period2if an investment was made in period1.If no investment was made in period1,and the period2state is high,the face value of debt is equal to I?K αH+(1?αH)p .The external capital I?K raised each period satis?es (αH+(1?αH)p)Z≥I?K≥(αL+(1?αL)p)Z If no investment was made in period1and the period2state is low the GP cannot raise any ex post debt. Proof.See appendix. 5.2.Ex Ante Securities We now solve for the ex ante securities w I(x)and w GP(x)=x?w I(x),as well as the amount of per period ex ante capital K.The security payo?s must be de?ned over the following potential fund cash?ows,which are net of payments to ex post investors: Note that the?rst two cash?ows cannot happen in the proposed equilibrium and that the last three cash?ows are in strictly increasing order.In particular,as opposed to the pure ex ante case, the expected fund cash?ow now di?ers for the case where there is only one succesful investment depending on whether the?rm is encountered in the?rst or second period.This di?erence occurs because if the good?rm is encountered in the second period,the GP is pooled with other GPs who encounter bad?rms,so that ex post investors will demand a higher face value before they are willing to?nance the investment. The following lemma provides a necessary and su?cient condition on the GP payo?s to imple-ment the desired equilibrium investment behavior.Just as in the pure ex ante case,it is su?cient to ensure that the GP does not invest in bad?rms in period1. Lemma2.A necessary and su?cient condition for a contract w GP(x)to be incentive compatible in the mixed ex ante and ex post case is +K?(5.5) q(αH+(1?αH)p)w GPμZ?I?K H H >E(α)(pw GP(2(Z?(I?K)))+(1?p)w GP(Z?(I?K)))+(1?E(α))? ?p max[w GP(Z?(I?K)+K),pw GP(2(Z?(I?K)))+2(1?p)w GP(Z?(I?K))] Proof.In appendix. 项目投资收益测算报告 项目投资收益评价,在进行项目的可行性研究,投资决策,方案选择,效益评估,获利能力与财务表现的比较等方面,都要进行经济分析,目的就是从成本与效益的角度分析项目的经济指标与财务表现,以帮助决策者与项目团队得出正确的信息,做出科学的决策。 项目投资收益评价报告主要包括成本效益分析,投资收益率,投资回收期(静态投资回收、动态投资回收期),净现值,内部收益率(IRR),盈亏平衡等内容。 汇报模版: 第一章项目财务数据的测算第一节财务测算的基本内容 一、总投资的测算 二、销售收入与税金 三、销售成本 四、利润 五、项目周期 第二节财务数据测算原则 一、实事求就是的原则 二、稳健的原则 三、测算科学化的原则 四、按规章制度办事的原则第三节总投资的测算 一、总投资的构成 二、建设投资 1、固定资产投资 2、无形资产 3、开办费 4、预备费 三、建设期利息 四、流动资金 1、流动资金投资构成 2、流动资金测算 第四节成本的测算 一、成本的概念 二、成本的构成 三、折旧 第五节销售收入、税金与利润测算 一、销售收入的测算 1、产销量的预测 2、销售单价的确定 二、销售税金的测算 1、增值税 2、产品税与营业税 3、城市维护建设税 4、教育费附加 5、销售税率 三、利润的测算 第六节项目寿命期的测算 一、项目建设期的确定 二、项目经济寿命期的确定 1、按项目主要产品的生命周期决定 2、按项目主要工艺的替代周期确定 3、折旧年限法 第二章项目经济分析数据的测算第一节经济分析的基本概念 一、资金的时间价值 二、现金流量与现金流量图表 三、资金的等值换算 四、折现运算 五、基准收益率 第二节经济效益分析 一、经济效益分析的基本目标 项目投资收益测算报告 项目投资收益评价，在进行项目的可行性研究，投资决策，方案选择，效益评估，获利能力与财务表现的比较等方面，都要进行经济分析，目的是从成本与效益的角度分析项目的经济指标和财务表现，以帮助决策者和项目团队得出正确的信息，做出科学的决策。 项目投资收益评价报告主要包括成本效益分析，投资收益率，投资回收期（静态投资回收、动态投资回收期），净现值，内部收益率(IRR)，盈亏平衡等内容。 汇报模版： ^ 第一章项目财务数据的测算第一节财务测算的基本内容一、总投资的测算 二、销售收入和税金 三、销售成本 四、利润 / 五、项目周期 第二节财务数据测算原则 一、实事求是的原则 二、稳健的原则 三、测算科学化的原则 四、按规章制度办事的原则第三节总投资的测算 ; 一、总投资的构成 二、建设投资 1、固定资产投资 2、无形资产 3、开办费 4、预备费 三、建设期利息 } 四、流动资金 1、流动资金投资构成 2、流动资金测算 第四节成本的测算 一、成本的概念 二、成本的构成 三、折旧 ` 第五节销售收入、税金和利润测算 一、销售收入的测算 1、产销量的预测 2、销售单价的确定 二、销售税金的测算 1、增值税 2、产品税和营业税 3、城市维护建设税 . 4、教育费附加 5、销售税率 三、利润的测算 第六节项目寿命期的测算 一、项目建设期的确定 二、项目经济寿命期的确定 1、按项目主要产品的生命周期决定？ 2、按项目主要工艺的替代周期确定 3、折旧年限法 第二章项目经济分析数据的测算第一节经济分析的基本概念 一、资金的时间价值 二、现金流量与现金流量图表 三、资金的等值换算 ^ 四、折现运算 五、基准收益率 单片机实验板 单片机是电子工程师的基本技能之一，单片机实验板是学习单片机的必备工具之一。通过层次原理图的设计方法，以单片机实验板设计实例介绍Protel DXP的原理图到PCB设计的整个过程。 一、一款单片机实验板简介 经典单片机实验板 单片系统包括MCU组成的最小系统、各种功能的外围电路及接口。 1、89C52单片机。 2、6位数码管（做动态扫描及静态显示实验）。 3、8位LED发光二极管（做流水灯实验）。 4、MAX232芯片RS232通讯接口（可以做为与计算机通迅的接口同时也可做为单片机下载程序的接口）。 5、USB供电系统，直接插接到电脑USB口即可提供电源，不需另接直流电源。 6、蜂鸣器（做单片机发声实验）。 7、ADC0804芯片（做模数转换实验）。 8、DAC0832芯片(做数模转换实验) 9、PDIUSBD12芯片(USB设备开发,如单片机读写U盘,自制U盘,自制MP3等,还可通过此芯片让计算机与单片机传输数据）。 10、USB转串口模块，直接由计算机USB口下载程序至单片机。 11、DS18B20温度传感器，（初步掌握单片机操作后即可亲自编写程序获知当时的温度）。 12、AT24C02外部EEPROM芯片(IIC总线元件实验) 13、字符液晶1602接口。（可显示两行字符） 14、图形液晶12864接口（可显示任意汉字及图形） 15、4*4矩阵键盘另加四个独立键盘（键盘检测试验）。 二、设计任务 采用自底向上（Bottom up）的层次原理图方法绘制单片机实验板原理图及PCB。本实验板主要有CPU部分、电源部分（Power）、串口通信（RS232）部分、数码显示（LED）部分、继电器（Relay）部分、其它（misc）各部分。 同时，通过层次原理图的绘制掌握原理图绘制的众多技巧。 单片机原理图总图 三、子图绘制 下面开始各原理子图的绘制。如【单片机实验板工程】所示，建立单片机实验板工程，建立各个原理图，并把库文件加载到工程里。 层次原理图设计 一实验目的 1 掌握层次原理图的绘制方法。 2 理解层次原理图模块化的设计方法。 二实验内容 绘制洗衣机控制电路层次原理图，包括“复位晶振模块”，“CPU模块”，“显示模块”和“控制模块”。 三实验步骤 注意：在每个原理图上都设计一个模板，内容包括：标题、姓名、学号、专业年级，日期等内容。 1 新建工程项目文件 1）单击菜单File/New/PCB Project，新建工程项目文件。 2）单击菜单File/Save Project保存工程文件，并命名为“洗衣机控制电路.PrjPCB”。 2 绘制上层原理图 1）“在洗衣机控制电路.PrjPCB”工程文件中，单击菜单File/New/Schematic，新建原理图文件。 2）单击菜单File/Save As..，将新建的原理图文件保存为“洗衣机控制电路.SchDoc” 3) 单击菜单Place/Sheet Symbol或单击“Wring”工具栏中的按钮，如图1所示，依次放置复位晶振模块，CPU模块，显示模块，控制模块四个模块电路，并修改其属性，放置后如图2所示 图1 模块电路属性 图2 放置四个模块电路 4）单击菜单P1ace/Add sheet Entry或单击“Wring”工具栏的按钮，放置模块电路端口，并修改其属性，完成后效果如图3所示 图3 放置模块电路端口 5）连线。根据各方块电路电气连接关系，用导线将端口连接起来，如图4所示 图4 连线 3 创建并绘制下层原理图 1)在上层原理图中，单击菜单Design/Create Sheet From Symbol，此时鼠标变为十字形。 2)将十字光标移到“复位晶振模块”电路上，单击鼠标左键，系统自动创建下层原理图“复位晶振模块.SchDoc”及相对应的I/O端口。如图5所示。 已贴现现金流量法（Discounted cash flow，DCF） ──按资金的时间价值调整各期现金流量的投资项目评估和选择的方法。 内部收益率（IRR）净现值（NPV）盈利指数（PI） 一、内部收益率（Internal rate of return，IRR） ──使投资项目未来的净现金流量（CFs）的现值等于项目的初始现金流出量（CIO）的贴现利率，即 IRR的计算： （Interpolate） 假设某公司的一个投资项目的初始现金流出量与其后4年的现金流量如表5-2所示，则用插值法求内部收益率的计算过程为： 表5-2 投资项目的初始现金流出量及其后四年的现金流量年份0 1 2 3 4 现金流量（￥100 000）35 000 40 000 42 000 30 000 年份净现金流量15%时的现值的利率因素净现值 1 ￥35 000 ×= 30 450 2 40 000 ×= 30 240 3 42 000 ×=27 636 4 30 000 ×= 17 160 ￥105 486 年份净现金流量20%时的现值的利率因素净现值 1 ￥35 000 ×= 29 115 2 40 000 ×= 27 760 3 42 000 ×=2 4 318 4 30 000 ×= 14 460 ￥95 693 则有对应关系如下： 贴现率15%→净现值105 486 IRR→净现值100 000 贴现率20%→净现值 95 693 所以， IRR=% 内部收益率法 又称“财务内部收益率法”。是用内部收益率来评价项目投资财务效益的方法。所谓内部收益率，就是资金流入现值总额与资金流出现值总额相等、净现值等于零时的折现率。如果不使用电子计算机，内部收益率要用若干个折现率进行试算，直至找到净现值等于零或接近于零的那个折现率。其计算步骤为：(1)在计算净现值的基础上，如果净现值是正值，就要采用这个净现值计算中更高的折现率来测算，直到测算的净现值正值近于零。(2)再继续提高折现率，直到测算出一个净现值为负值。如果负值过大，就降低折现率后再测算到接近于零的负值。(3)根据接近于零的相邻正负两个净现值的折现率，用线性插值法求得内部收益率： 《电路CAD 》课程实验报告 实验名称绘制层次电路原理图实验序号实验二姓名张伟杰系专业电科班级一班学号201342203 实验日期5月5日指导教师曹艳艳组名第一组成绩 一、实验目的和要求 1 掌握层次原理图的绘制方法。 2 理解层次原理图模块化的设计方法。 二、实验设备 计算机、Altium Designer 10 三、实验过程（步骤、程序等） 1 新建工程项目文件 1）单击菜单File/New/PCB Project，新建工程项目文件。 2）单击菜单File/Save Project保存工程文件，并命名为“洗衣机控制电路.PrjPCB”。 2 绘制上层原理图 1）“在洗衣机控制电路.PrjPCB”工程文件中，单击菜单File/New/Schematic，新建原理图文件。 2）单击菜单File/Save As..，将新建的原理图文件保存为“洗衣机控制电路.SchDoc” 3) 单击菜单Place/Sheet Symbol或单击“Wring”工具栏中的按钮，如图1所示，依次放置复位晶振模块，CPU模块，显示模块，控制模块四个模块电路，并修改其属性，放置后如图2所示 图1 模块电路属性 图2 放置四个模块电路 4）单击菜单P1ace/Add sheet Entry或单击“Wring”工具栏的按钮，放置模块电路端口，并修改其属性，完成后效果如图3所示 图3 放置模块电路端口 5）连线。根据各方块电路电气连接关系，用导线将端口连接起来，如图4所示 图4 连线 3 创建并绘制下层原理图 1)在上层原理图中，单击菜单Design/Create Sheet From Symbol，此时鼠标变为十字形。 2)将十字光标移到“复位晶振模块”电路上，单击鼠标左键，系统自动创建下层原理图“复位晶振模块.SchDoc”及相对应的I/O端口。如图5所示。 图5 自动生成的I/0端口 4）绘制“复位晶振模块”电路原理图。 其用到的元件如下表1所示。绘制完成后的效果如图6所示。 表1 “复位晶振模块”电路元件列表 元件标号元件名所在元件库元件标示值元件封装R1 RES2 Miscellaneous Devices.IntLib 270ΩAXIAL0.4 R2 RES2 Miscellaneous Devices.IntLib 1k AXIAL0.4 C1 Cap Miscellaneous Devices.IntLib 33pF RAD-0.3 C2 Cap Miscellaneous Devices.IntLib 33pF RAD-0.3 C3 Cap Miscellaneous Devices.IntLib 33pF RAD-0.3 S1 SW-PB Miscellaneous Devices.IntLib SPST-2 Y1 XTAL Miscellaneous Devices.IntLib R38 VCC 电源工具栏 GND 电源工具栏 ---真理惟一可靠的标准就是永远自相符合 如何计算项目的投资收益率 项目投资的主要决策指标有三个：净现值（NPV）、内部收益率（IRR）和盈利指数（PI）。 ▲净现值是将项目在计算期内各年的净现金流量（即现金流入减去现金流出），以行业投资的平均报酬率为贴现率折算所得出的价值之和。如果净现值大于0，则说明从当前时点看，新增投资项目不仅能收回 投资，而且还能带来利润；如果净现值小于0，则说明从当前时点来看新增投资项目是无利可图的。 ▲内部报酬率就是使上述净现值等于零时的投资收益率。内部收益率越高，说明其与行业投资平均收益水平的差别越大，即新增投资项目的获利空间越大。换言之，内部收益率越高，新增投资项目承受行业投资平均收益水平或市场利率上升的能力就越强。 ▲盈利指数就是项目在经济寿命年限以内各年的净现金流量的贴现 值之和除以项目建设期各年净现金流量的贴现值之和所得到的倍数，贴现率为行业的平均收益率。如果该值大于1，说明从现在来看，新增投资项目除能收回投资之外还能为企业带来利润；如果小于1，则表明从当前时点来看，新增投资项目是无利可图的。 ---真理惟一可靠的标准就是永远自相符合 按照国内目前的评价指标体系，投资收益率指标有两种：投资利润率和投资利税率： 投资利润率=年平均利润总额／投资总额×100% 投资利税率=年平均利税总额／投资总额×100% 其中： 年平均利润总额=年均产品收入-年均总成本-年均销售税金 年平均利税总额=年均利润总额+年均销售税金+增值税 钟鼓楼所说的指标是项目可行性分析中所提到的部分研究项目是否可行的一些决策指标，这些指标中，一般以NPV最为重要，IRR>行业平均收益水平有时并不能完全说明项目可行。以上仅适用于项目财务评价，对某些项目还得考察项目的国民经济指标。 以上是作者在工作中的一点经验，欢迎指正。作者一直在工程咨询公司工作，根据编制可行性研究报告的经验，一个典型项目的技术经济指标至少包括： (1)项目总资金（含建设投资、流动资金、建设期利息等）； (2)内部收益率（IRR）； (3)财务净现值(NPV)； 实验一原理图输入方式设计数字逻辑电路 一、实验目的： 1、了解基本组合逻辑电路的原理及利用Quartus II 软件进行设计的一般方法。 2、熟悉Quartus II 原理图输入法的设计流程，掌握编辑、编译和仿真的方法。 3、掌握原理图的层次化设计方法。 4、了解Quartus II 软件的编程下载及引脚锁定的方法。 5、了解Quartus II宏功能模块的使用方法。 二、实验的硬件要求： 1、EDA/SOPC实验箱。 2、计算机。 三、实验原理 见附件《Quartus设计的一般步骤》、《元件例化和调用的操作步骤》、《QuartusII基于宏功能模块的设计》 四、实验内容： 1、用原理图方式设计1位二进制半加器半加器。 新建一个工程“HalfAdder”，选择芯片“Cyclone III EP3C16Q240C8”，建立原理图如图1-1，保存为“HalfAdder.BDF”。 图1-1 半加器电路图 编译工程。 建立波形文件，对半加器电路分别进行时序仿真和功能仿真，其波形如下： 图1-2半加器时序仿真波形，注意观察输出延时，以及毛刺的产生原因 图1-3半加器功能仿真波形 2、原理图层次化设计。 新建一工程，取名“FullAdder”；将上面设计的半加器“HalfAdder.BDF”复制到当前工程目录，并生成“符号元件”HalfAdder.BSF。 建立一个原理图文件，取名“FullAdder.BDF”，利用“符号元件”HalfAdder.BSF及其它元件设计全加器电路如下图： 用功能仿真测试全加器的逻辑功能。 图1-5 全加器功能仿真波形 图1-6是输入输出信号与FPGA连接示意图，图中用到了“拨档开关”作为输入，“LED 显示模块”显示输出值。表1-1是本实验连接的FPGA管脚编号。 商业运营项目收益测算模板说明（红色字体为变化部分，请注意） 结论数据项 当期现金净流量收入小计(B13)-支出小计(B19)+商业资产回收值(B12)（建设第1年至运营第20年） 当期净现值当期现金净流量(B22)按计租年份折现（建设第1年至运营第20年） 当期净收益收入小计(B13)-支出小计(B19)+初始投入(E4)（运营第1-20年） 考核指标项 留存物业价值运营第1年至第20年当期净收益(B24)的净现值 留存物业投入初始投入总和 留存物业净收益留存物业价值(B27)-留存物业投入(B28) 留存物业收益率留存物业净收益(B29)/留存物业价值(B27) 内部收益率（IRR）根据建设期第1年至运营第20年当期现金净流量(B22)进行计算 动态投资回收期累计净现值为正的运营年份 静态投资回收期累计现金净流量为正的运营年份 计租年份 1 234567891011121314151617181920 面积（平方米） 2 16,000 2 16,000 216,000216,0 00 216,0 00 216,00 216,0 00 216,0 00 216,0 00 216,0 00 216,0 00 216,0 00 216,0 00 216,0 00 216,0 00 2 16,00 216,0 00 216,00 216,0 00 2 16,00 216,0 00 运营年度日租金 单价 3 4667789101111111111111111111111 运营年度月租金 单价 8 4.5 126.8169.0185.9204.5224.9247.4272.2299.4329.3329.3329.3329.3329.3 3 29.3329.3329.3329.3 3 29.3329.3 自然年度租金单 价 8 4.5 95.1137.3173.2190.5209.6230.6253.6279.0306.9329.3329.3329.3329.3 3 29.3329.3329.3329.3 3 29.3329.3 年租金收入 5 ,475.6 24,640. 235,59 1.4 44,89 9.9 49,389 .9 54,32 8.9 59,76 1.8 65,73 8.0 72,31 1.8 79,54 2.9 85,36 3.2 85,36 3.2 85,36 3.2 85,36 3.2 8 5,363 .2 85,36 3.2 85,363 .2 85,36 3.2 8 5,363 .2 64,02 2.4 停车广告等其他年 收入 - 2,065.23,239. 1 4,021 .7 4,413.04,633 .6 4,865 .3 5,108 .6 5,364 .0 5,632 .2 5,632. 2 5,632 .2 5,632. 2 5,632 .2 5,632 .2 5,632 .2 5,632. 2 5,632. 2 5,632 .2 5,632. 2 自然年度其他年收 入 - 516.32,358. 7 3,434 .7 4,119.54,468 .1 4,691 .5 4,926 .1 5,172 .4 5,431 .0 5,632. 2 5,632 .2 5,632. 2 5,632 .2 5,632 .2 5,632 .2 5,632. 2 5,632. 2 5,632 .2 4,224. 1 收入小计 5 ,475.6 25,156. 537,950 .1 48,33 4.6 53,509. 4 58,79 7.0 64,45 3.3 70,66 4.1 77,48 4.2 84,97 4.0 90,995 .3 90,99 5.3 90,995 .3 90,99 5.3 9 0,995. 3 90,99 5.3 90,995 .3 90,995 .3 9 0,995. 3 68,246 .5 营运成本率35%30%30%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25%25% 营运成本及房产税 营业税 1 ,916 8,49011,38513,89 6 13,37714,69 9 16,11 3 17,66 6 19,37 1 21,24 3 22,74922,74 9 22,74922,74 9 2 2,74922,74 9 22,74922,749 2 2,74917,062 折旧 1 9,960 19,96019,96019,96 019,96019,96 19,96 19,96 19,96 19,96 19,96019,96 19,96019,96 1 9,96019,96 19,96019,960 1 9,96019,960 电子线路设计软件课程设计报告实验内容：实验七multisim数字电路原理图设计 一、实验目的 1、认识并了解multisim的元器件库； 2、学会使用multisim绘制电路原理图； 3、学会使用multisim里面的各种仪器分析数字电路； 二、Multisim10 的菜单栏 1.File菜单 该菜单主要用于管理所创建的电路文件，对电路文件进行打开、保存等操作，其中大多数命令和一般Windows应用软件基本相同，这里不赘述。下面主要介绍Multisim 10.0的特有命令： ●Open Samples：可打开安装路径下的自带实例； ●New Project，Open Project，Save Project和Close Project：分别对一个工程文 件进行创建、打开、保存和关闭操作。一个完整的工程包括原理图、PCB文件、仿真文件、工程文件和报告文件； ●Version Control：用于控制工程的版本。用户可以用系统默认产生的文件名或 自定义文件名作为备份文件的名称对当前工程进行备份，也可恢复以前版本的 工程； ●Print Options：包括两个子菜单，Print Circuit Setup子菜单为打印电路设置选项； Print Instruments子菜单为打印当前工作区内仪表波形图选项。 2.Edit菜单 “编辑”菜单下的命令主要用于在绘制电路图的过程中，对电路和元件进行各种编辑操作。一些常用操作，例如，复制，粘贴等和一般Windows应用程序基本相同，这里不再赘述。下面介绍一些Multisim10.0特有的命令。 ●Delete Multi-Page：从多页电路文件中删除指定页。执行该项操作一定要小心， 尽管使用撤销命令可恢复一次删除操作，但删除的信息无法找回； ●Paste as Subcricuit：将剪贴板中已选的内容粘贴成电子电路形式； ●Find：搜索当前工作区内的元件，选择该项后可弹出对话框，其中包括要寻找 元件的名称、类型及寻找的范围等； ●Graphic Annotation：图形注释选项，包括填充颜色、类型、画笔颜色、类型和 箭头类型； ●Order：安排已选图形的放置层次； ●Assign to Layer：将已选的项目（例如，REC错误标志、静态指针、注释和文本 /图形）安排到注释层； ●Layer Setting：设置可显示的对话框； ●Orientation：设置元件的旋转角度； ●Title Black Position：设置已有的标题框的位置； ●Edit Symbol/Title Block：对已选定的图形符号或工作区内的标题框进行编辑。 在工作区内选择一个元件，选择该命令，编辑元件符号，弹出的“元件编辑” 窗口，在这个窗口中可对元件各引脚端的线型、线长等参数进行编辑，还可以 自行添加文字和线条等；选择工作区内的标题框，选择该命令，弹出“标题框 编辑”窗口，可对选中的文字、边框或位图等进行编辑； ●Font：对已选项目的字体进行编辑； ●Comment：对已有的注释项进行编辑； ●Forms/Questions：对有关电路的记录或问题进行编辑；当一个设计任务由多个 第一部分：确定投资资金的结构 一、近3年一期损益表，并预测近一期的完整年度损益表；现时资产负债表； 二、计算购买价格及估值比率 根据投资时的EBITDA146.7（损益表）及假设的估值/EBITDA倍数7.5倍，计算确定标的收购价格=146.7*7.5=1100；现时需要偿还的有息借款300（资产负债表）、现金25（资产负债表），标的现金偿还有息负债后剩余275有息负债；公司股权价值=1100-275=825。 根据购买价格及现时销售额、EBITDA计算市销率和市值/EBITDA比。 三、设计投资资金结构 确定各类举债金额（structure1中450、300，注意100是循环信用额度，类似授信总额，不 使用无金额借入，但有手续费）及手续费（20结构化私募基金中为各类优先级份额/LP的资金金额及手续费），预计其他费用（15）；据前文已得股权价格825、有息负债300、标的账上现金25，算出需要自有投入的资本数额（基金中的劣后级或GP份额）=（825+300+20+15）-（450+300+25）=385，杠杆率为385：（450+300）=1:1.95。手续费计算如下： 将上述举债费用按假定的借款年限摊销（利润表及资产负债表预测时需要使用）： 四、完成Sources of Funds\Uses of Funds表并和签署已做Purchase Price\Transaction Multiples 表合并： 第二部分：预测未来财务数据 五、损益表和现金流量表预测前提假设条件 （一）销售收入：假设各年的销售收入增长率，一般发展稳定后销售收入增长趋缓： 实验注意事项 1.做实验前，先连接好下载线，然后才能接上电源。 2.做完实验后，先拨掉实验箱上的电源，然后才能拨下载线。 实验一：简单逻辑门 实验目的：掌握Quartus使用及基于原理框图进行FPGA开发的基本流程 实验要求：掌握Quartus使用及基于原理框图进行FPGA开发的基本流程，注意设备及人身安全，严禁带电插拔JTAG下载线，防止损坏设备 所需器材：FPGA教学实验系统，带并口的普通计算机 实验介绍：本实验是在FPGA教学实验系统上实现简单的逻辑门，例如2输入的与门、与非门、或门、异或门等，对应部分的电路原理图如图1所 示。当K0（K1）按键断开时，FPGA引脚175（173）的输入为低电 平，对应发光二极管D2（D3）熄灭，当K0（K1）按键按下时，FPGA 引脚175（173）的输入为高电平，对应发光二极管D2（D3）发光。 FPGA引脚175、173在本实验中可用作输入引脚。FPGA引脚64、 65、66、73分别接有发光二极管（LED）DR0~DR3，在实验中可用 作输出引脚，当引脚输出高电平时，对应的LED被驱动发光。这些 输出引脚可用于实现2个输入的不同逻辑功能。 图1 部分按键与LED的原理图 实验步骤： 1. 为工程建立工作目录 为了方便工程涉及到的文件的管理，以后的每一个工程，都需要为其建立专门的工作目录，目录路径中不要包含有非英文或数字的字符（例如不要包含空格或中文字符等）。请利用系统自带的“我的电脑”或“资源管理器”建立目录。在此假设在E:\work目录下建立名为mylogic_sch的工程工作目录，其目录路径为E:\work\mylogic_sch，本实验所涉及的文件都需要放置在该目录当中。 2. 运行Quartus II程序 方法1（通过开始菜单）： 实验报告 一、实验目的 1.了解protel软件基本功能及实际操作方法； 2.掌握电路原理图设计和PCB图绘制基础和技能操作； 3.掌握PCB布线和布局的技巧以及注意问题； 4.原理图元件符号和PCB元件封装编辑技能； 5.培养实际电路图绘制和动手操作综合能力； 6.自己能够绘制电路原理图并可以对PCB进行合理布局 二、实验内容 1.protel 99 SE简介 Protel 99 SE软件是PROTEL99SE汉化版，99SE是PROTEL 家族中目前最稳定的版本，功能强大。采用了*.DDB数据库格式保存文件，所有同一工程相关的SCH、PCB等文件都可以在同一*.DDB数据库中并存，非常科学，利于集体开发和文件的有效管理。还有一个优点就是自动布线引擎很强大。在双面板的前提下，可以在很短的时间内自动布通任何的超复杂线路！ 主要教我们： 1.画画简单的原理图（SCH） 2.学会创建SCH零件 3.把原理图转换成电路板（PCB） 4.对PCB进行自动布线 5.学会创建PCB零件库 6.学会一些常用的PCB高级技巧。 主要的模块： 1．电路原理图设计模块：该模块主要包括设计原理图的原理图编辑器，用于修改、生成元件符号的元件库编辑器以及各种报表的生成器。 2.印制电路板设计模块：该模块主要包括设计电路板图的PCB编辑器，用于PCB自动布线的Route模块。用于修改、生成元件封装的原件封装编辑器以及各种报表的生成器。 3.可编程逻辑器件设计模块：该模块主要包括具有语法意识的文本编辑器、由于编译和仿真设计结果的PLD模块。 4.电路仿真模块：该模块主要包括一个具有强大的数/模混合信号电路仿真器，能提供连续的模拟信号和离散的数字信号仿真。 2.电路图设计基础和操作步骤 2.1印制电路板设计的流程方框图： 电路原理图设计产生网络表印制电路板设计； 电路原理图与电路板设计实验报告 学院： 班级： 专业： 姓名： 学号： 指导老师： 河南工业大学实验报告专业班级姓名 学号 同组者姓名完成日期 成绩评定 实验题目：(一)原理图设计环境画原理图实验 实验目的： 1.熟练PROTEL99se的原理图编辑环境。 2.掌握常用管理器，菜单的使用，电气规则检查。 3.掌握元器件的调用，属性含义。 实验内容： 教材： 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4环境熟悉 2.1,2.2工具条对象，器件调用 2.3,2.4菜单使用，元件属性修改 4.2练习1---练习8 实验仪器：PROTEL99se软件 实验步骤： (1)放置元件：就是在元件库中找元件，然后用元件 管理器的Place按钮将元件放在原理图中。 放置元件时需要使用如下所示快捷键： 空格键：每单击一次空格键使元件逆时针旋转90度。 TAB键：当元件浮动时，单击TAB键就可以显示属性编辑窗口。 X键：元件水平镜像。 Y键：元件垂直镜像。 （2）连接导线。使用划线工具连接导线。 （3）放置电源，地线和网络标记。放置电源和地线标记前要显示电源地线工具箱。 （4）自动元件编号：使用菜单Tool/Annotate对元件自动编号。 （5）编辑元件属性。单击元件，在弹出的属性窗口中输入元件的属性，注意一定要输入元件封装。（6）电气规则检查。使用Tool/ERC菜单，对画好的原理图进行电气规则检查，检查完毕后，出现报 表信息，就可以进行下一步。 （7）原件图元件列表。使用Edit/Export to Spread菜单，按照向导提示进行操作。 （8）建立网络表。使用菜单Design/Netlist。 实验截图： 注意事项： 连线：从器件的端点开始到端点结束，不要多余的线， 实验报告 数字学院（院、系）数码嵌入专业3-4班Protel99se 电路设计课 学号姓名:实验日期:2012.10.3 教师评定 一、实验名称：层次原理图设计 二、实验目的： 1.掌握层次原理图的建立方法 2.掌握由方块电路符号产生新原理图的方法 3.掌握电气规则检查和网络报表的生成 三、实验内容： 层次化原理图设计的流程 四、实验步骤： 步骤1：绘制总原理图 （1）执行菜单命令“File”→“New”数据库命名为我的文件 （2）对电路进行合理的功能分块，并画出层次原理图总图 1、在文件对话框中，右击“New”，从框中选择原 理设计服务图标。 2、双击图标或单击【OK】按钮，就会建立原理图 设计文档 3、双击原理图文档图标，进入原理图设计服务器的界面。 4、执行菜单命令“放置”→“图纸符号”。 5、执行完该命令后，光标变为十字形状，并带着方块电路，在此命令下，按下 这样就定义了方块电路的大小和位置，绘制出了一个名为Sheet l的模块。 7、用步骤（5）（6）的方法，也绘制一个名为2.sch 的模块。 8、执行菜单命令“放置”→“放置图纸符号”。 9、在（8）的命令下，光标变为十字形状，并带着方块电路的端口符号，在此命令下，按下 实验报告 课程名称电子电路CAD 实验项目 Altium Designer层次原理图设计 实验仪器安装Altium Designer16.0软件的计算机 学院仪器科学与光电工程学院 专业光电信息科学与工程 班级/学号光信1601/2016010*** 学生姓名 *** 实验日期 2018年5月4日 成绩 ___________________ 指导教师赵双琦 一、实验目的： 1.进一步熟练原理图设计的技巧，熟练原理图绘制过程 2.掌握AD层次原理图的基本设计方法 二、实验内容： 1.自顶向下设计单片机应用系统的层次原理图 2.画出单片机应用系统的层次原理图 3.输出元件报表文件及网络报表文件 三、实验步骤： 1.新建原理图文件绘制如下电路图 图1 母原理图 图2 扩展存储器电路 图3 单片机系统电路 图4 扩展显示及键盘电路 在这个过程中，熟练掌握对器件库的操作、对器件放置的操作、对器件之间连接的操作（导线、总线、网络标号） 2. 元件编号管理，自动分配元件标号 3．对原理图进行电气检测及编译 4．输出元件报表及网络报表 四、思考题 1.大型系统为什么要采用层次化设计？ 答：大型系统通常设计比较复杂，采用层次化设计后可以将原理图按照某种标准划分为若干功能部分，在检查，修改时更加方便快捷。 2.层次原理图由哪两部分构成？层次原理图的设计主要有哪两种设 计方法？ 答：层次原理图由单张原理图和构成单张原理图之间关系的主图构成。层次原理图的设计主要有自顶向下设计和自底向上设计。 3.如何在母原理图和子原理图之间进行切换？ 答；在标准工具栏中单击鼠标左键可进行切换 4.如何由子原理图文件生成母原理图中的图纸符号？ 答：通过放置网络标号，使子原理图和母原理图的编号一致。 五、实验总结 通过本次实验进一步熟练原理图设计的技巧，熟练原理图绘制过程，了解AD层次原理图的基本设计方法。但对原理图设计完成后的检查错误及改正不熟悉。 PPP项目财务测算模型分析 一、财务测算在项目识别、准备、采购阶段的作用 财务测算是在合理假设的前提进行，与未来实际情况存在差异，进而影响项目实际的内部收益率。财务测算实际上是和实施方案、物有所值和财政承受能力互相依托，为政府提供参考依据，为引进社会资本和招标或磋商时设定合理标的，对项目的落地实施加以保障。 物有所值指标是现值概念，判断是否采用PPP模式代替传统政府投资运营提供公共服务的一种评价方法。财政承受能力指标是年度指标，是规范PPP项目财政支出管理、控制财政风险的定量分析方法。二者应用的场景和作用不同。 二、PPP项目财务模型要素表 PPP项目中咨询机构需要根据以上财务报表建立财务测算模型，清晰准确呈现PPP项目全生命周期存在的成本、利润、风险和项目收益情况。根据财务测算模型，编制物有所值评价报告、财政承受能力论证报告、项目实施方案以及PPP项目协议中与项目回报机制相关的财务内容。 三、不同类PPP项目测算模型的异同 （一）不同行业，PPP项目涉及的运营维护内容和成本项则不同。 （二）PPP项目投资建设形成的固定资产，项目公司拥有的资产使用权和收益权，不论折旧还是摊销，都是以投资建设形成的资产原值（包括建设期利息）为基数进行分摊，有的咨询机构忽略国家相关部门对固定资产折旧的最短年限做出规定，例如，房屋、建筑物为20年，市政道路和高速公司的大中小修最长年限等。 （三）打包类型的PPP项目，存在将经营性、准经营性、非经营性子项目分别建立现金流量表，对不同类型子项目分开进行财务可行性和政府补贴测 算。可能导致经营性项目收益未能弥补到可行性缺口补贴中，政府未能从经营性子项目中获利，却为准经营性和非经营性子项目支付大量的财政补贴。 （四）融资比例不同财务杠杆不同，导致同一项目因融资比例变化而使得项目收益高低不同，从未导致政府对项目缺乏合理的判断标准，也导致投融资比例和交易结构设计变得困难，在项目规模和融资比例两者均发生变化的情况下，项目内部回报率则变得多样。 四、PPP项目财务评价指标 我国目前项目投资财务评价指标体系是以贴现现金流量指标为主，非贴现现金流量指标为辅的多种指标并存的指标体系，PPP项目中财务评价指标主要是内部收益率、净现值和投资回收期等。 （一）利润率和内部收益率 1、概念比较 （1）内部收益率（IRR）是项目生命期内各年净现值为零的折现率。一般来说，内部收益率反应项目自身盈利能力的指标，即项目占用的未收回资金的获利能力，包含融资成本在内的真实回报率，是判断社会资本方收益是否合理的关键指标。 （2）利润率是基于权责发生制进行核算，利润和现金流产出错位，从而导致时间价值差异，不能反应PPP项目全生命周期的真实收益。 2、PPP项目内部收益率的分类： 如何计算项目的投资收益率 作者：张金富联盟会员：项目管理者联盟转载发布时间： 2010-9-21 项目投资的主要决策指标有三个：净现值(NPV)、内部收益率(IRR)和盈利指数(PI)。 ▲净现值是将项目在计算期内各年的净现金流量(即现金流入减去现金流出)，以行业投资的平均报酬率为贴现率折算所得出的价值之和。如果净现值大于0，则说明从当前时点看，新增投资项目不仅能收回投资，而且还能带来利润;如果净现值小于0，则说明从当前时点来看新增投资项目是无利可图的。 ▲内部报酬率就是使上述净现值等于零时的投资收益率。内部收益率越高，说明其与行业投资平均收益水平的差别越大，即新增投资项目的获利空间越大。换言之，内部收益率越高，新增投资项目承受行业投资平均收益水平或市场利率上升的能力就越强。 ▲盈利指数就是项目在经济寿命年限以内各年的净现金流量的贴现值之和除以项目建设期各年净现金流量的贴现值之和所得到的倍数，贴现率为行业的平均收益率。如果该值大于1，说明从现在来看，新增投资项目除能收回投资之外还能为企业带来利润;如果小于1，则表明从当前时点来看，新增投资项目是无利可图的。 按照国内目前的评价指标体系，投资收益率指标有两种：投资利润率和投资利税率： 投资利润率=年平均利润总额/投资总额×100% 投资利税率=年平均利税总额/投资总额×100% 其中： 年平均利润总额=年均产品收入-年均总成本-年均销售税金 年平均利税总额=年均利润总额+年均销售税金+增值税 钟鼓楼所说的指标是项目可行性分析中所提到的部分研究项目是否可行的一些决策指标，这些指标中，一般以NPV最为重要，IRR>行业平均收益水平有时并不能完全说明项目可行。以上仅适用于项目财务评价，对某些项目还得考察项目的国民经济指标。转自项目管理者联盟 我一直在工程咨询公司工作，根据我编制可行性研究报告的经验，一个典型项目的技术经济指标至少包括： fadd inst a b c s co 实验二 QuartusII 原理图输入法层次化设计 一、 实验目的 1. 掌握原理图文件的设计方法 2. 掌握调用模块设计原理图文件的方法 3. 掌握原理图文件层次化设计的方法 二、 实验器材 计算机与QuartusII 工具软件 三、 实验原理 1、按照原理图设计法的步骤操作，根据图1设计一个一位全加器，编译仿真通过后，把fadd.bdf 文件生成fadd.bsf 符号文件，以备在项目二中调用该符号。 2、 按图2设计一个四位二进制加法器，设计原理图前，需将1中的fadd.bdf 和fadd.bsf 文件复制到此项目目录下 四、 实验步骤 （一）设计一位全加器 1. 在D 盘下新建文件夹：D:\fadd 2. 新建项目fadd ： 1）打开QuartusII 2）File →New Project Wizard …… 3）选择项目文件夹路径：D:\fadd 4）输入项目名和文件名：fadd 5）点击“Next ”，直到最后。 3. 建立原理图文件fadd ： 1）File →New 2）选择第二项：Block Diagram/Schematic File 4. 画电路图（见图1） 1）选择器件：GND 、vcc 、74151、input 、output 。 2）连线：节点线。 3）修改输入输出名称。输入：a 、b 、c 。输出：s 、co 。 5. 保存设计图形文件。Save ：路径（D:\fadd ） 6. 点击 图标，对文件进行编译。如有错误，重复第4、5步。 7. 执行File →Create/Update →Create Symbol Files for Current File 命令，生成符号文件hadd.bsf 。 项目投资收益分析报告模板篇一：项目投资收益分析报告(超级实用) 项目投资收益评价，在进行项目的可行性研究，投资决策，方案选择，效益评估，获利能力与财务表现的比较等方面，都要进行经济分析，目的是从成本与效益的角度分析项目的经济指标和财务表现，以帮助决策者和项目团队得出正确的信息，做出科学的决策。 项目投资收益评价报告主要包括成本效益分析，投资收益率，投资回收期，净现值，内部收益率(IRR)，盈亏平衡等内容。 汇报模版： 第一章项目财务数据的测算 第一节财务测算的基本内容 一、总投资的测算 二、销售收入和税金 三、销售成本 四、利润 五、项目周期 第二节财务数据测算原则 一、实事求是的原则 二、稳健的原则 三、测算科学化的原则 四、按规章制度办事的原则 第三节总投资的测算 一、总投资的构成 二、建设投资 1、固定资产投资 2、无形资产 3、开办费 4、预备费 三、建设期利息 四、流动资金 1、流动资金投资构成 2、流动资金测算 第四节成本的测算 一、成本的概念 二、成本的构成 三、折旧 第五节销售收入、税金和利润测算 一、销售收入的测算 1、产销量的预测 2、销售单价的确定 二、销售税金的测算 1、增值税 2、产品税和营业税 3、城市维护建设税 4、教育费附加 5、销售税率 三、利润的测算 第六节项目寿命期的测算 一、项目建设期的确定 二、项目经济寿命期的确定 1、按项目主要产品的生命周期决定 2、按项目主要工艺的替代周期确定 3、折旧年限法 第二章项目经济分析数据的测算第一节经济分析的基本概念 一、资金的时间价值 二、现金流量与现金流量图表 三、资金的等值换算 四、折现运算 五、基准收益率 第二节经济效益分析 一、经济效益分析的基本目标 二、经济评价的指标和方法 1、静态法项目投资收益分析报告超级实用
项目投资收益分析报告(超级实用)
单片机实验板详细步骤--原理图设计部分
1.层次原理图设计
投资项目内部收益率计算方法
绘制层次电路原理图讲解
如何计算项目的投资收益率
实验一 原理图输入方式设计数字逻辑电路
商业运营项目收益测算模板说明及示例-房地产-
实验七multisim数字电路原理图设计
LBO投资收益测算过程
FPGA实验教程_原理图设计部分
protel实验报告
电路原理图与电路板设计实验报告
层次原理图实验报告
Altium Designer层次原理图设计Multisim实验六
PPP项目财务测算模型分析
如何计算项目的投资收益率
2.实验二 QuartusII原理图输入法层次化设计
项目投资收益分析报告模板
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