1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08–678. Argued October 5, 2009—Decided December 8, 2009 When respondent Norman Carpenter informed the human resources department of his employer, petitioner Mohawk Industries, Inc., that the company employed undocumented immigrants, he was unaware that Mohawk stood accused in a pending class action—the Williams case—of conspiring to drive down its legal employees’ wages by know-ingly hiring undocumented workers. Mohawk directed Carpenter to meet with the company’s retained counsel in Williams, who allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements. When he refused, Carpenter maintains in this unlawful termination suit, Mohawk fired him under false pretenses. In granting Carpenter’s motion to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with re-tained counsel and the company’s termination decision, the District Court agreed with Mohawk that the requested information was pro-tected by the attorney-client privilege, but concluded that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its disclosures in the Wil-liams case. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal, and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mohawk’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding, inter alia, that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, because a discovery order implicating the attorney-client privilege can be ade-quately reviewed on appeal from final judgment.
Held: Disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Pp. 4–13.
(a) Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final de-cisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. §1291. “Final decisions” encompass not only judgments that “terminate an action,” but also a
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“small class” of prejudgment orders that are “collateral to” an action’s merits and “too important” to be denied immediate review, Cohen, supra, at 545–546. “That small category includes only decisions that are . . . effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 42. The decisive consideration in determining whether a right is effectively unreviewable is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest”or “some particular value of a high order.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 352–353. In making this determination, the Court does not en-gage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry,” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 473, but focuses on “the entire category to which a claim belongs,” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868. If the class of claims, taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated by other means, “the chance that the litiga-tion at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,”does not provide a basis for §1291 jurisdiction. Ibid. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Effective appellate review of disclosure orders adverse to the at-torney-client privilege can be had by means other than collateral or-der appeal, including postjudgment review. Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by va-cating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence. Moreover, litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of immediate review apart from collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory appeal involving “a controlling question of law” the prompt resolution of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” §1292(b). Second, in extraordinary circumstances where a disclosure order works a manifest injustice, a party may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380. Another option is for a party to defy a disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions that, e.g., “direc[t] that the matters embraced in the order or other desig-nated facts be taken as established,” “prohibi[t] the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” or “strik[e] pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2). Alternatively, when the circumstances warrant, a district court may issue a contempt order against a noncomplying party, who can then appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the contempt citation can be characterized as a criminal punishment. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11. These es-
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tablished appellate review mechanisms not only provide assurances to clients and counsel about the security of their confidential commu-nications; they also go a long way toward addressing Mohawk’s con-cern that, absent collateral order appeals of adverse attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship. The limited benefits of applying “the blunt, categorical instrument of §1291 collateral order appeal” to privilege-related disclosure orders simply cannot justify the likely institutional costs, Digital Equip-ment, supra, at 883, including unduly delaying the resolution of dis-trict court litigation and needlessly burdening the courts of appeals, cf. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 209. Pp. 6–12.
(c) The admonition that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain “narrow and selective in its membership,” Will, supra, at 350, has acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, “not expansion by court deci-sion,” as the preferred means for determining whether and when pre-judgment orders should be immediately appealable, Swint, supra, at 48. Any further avenue for immediate appeal of adverse attorney-client privilege rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rule-making, with the opportunity for full airing it provides. Pp. 12–13. 541 F. 3d 1048, affirmed.
S OTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS, C. J., and S TEVENS, S CALIA, K ENNEDY, G INSBURG, B REYER, and A LITO, JJ., joined, and in which T HOMAS, J., joined, as to Part II–C. T HOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 08–678
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER v.
NORMAN CARPENTER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[December 8, 2009]
J USTICE S OTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 1291 of the Judicial Code confers on federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. §1291. Although “final decisions” typically are ones that trigger the entry of judgment, they also include a small set of prejudgment orders that are “collateral to” the merits of an action and “too important” to be denied immediate review. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). In this case, petitioner Mohawk Industries, Inc., attempted to bring a collateral order appeal after the District Court ordered it to disclose certain confidential materials on the ground that Mohawk had waived the attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The question before us is whether disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for imme-diate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, we hold that they do not. Postjudgment appeals, together with other review mecha-nisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and pre-
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serve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.
I
In 2007, respondent Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-trict of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U. S. C. §1985(2) and various Geor-gia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termi-nation came after he informed a member of Mohawk’s human resources department in an e-mail that the com-pany was employing undocumented immigrants. At the time, unbeknownst to Carpenter, Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04–cv–00003–HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004). Com-pany officials directed Carpenter to meet with the com-pany’s retained counsel in the Williams case, and counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements. When he refused, Carpenter alleges, Mohawk fired him under false pretenses. App. 57a–64a.
After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the plaintiffs in the Williams case sought an evidentiary hearing to ex-plore Carpenter’s allegations. In its response to their motion, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as “pure fantasy” and recounted the “true facts” of Carpen-ter’s dismissal. Id., at 208a. According to Mohawk, Car-penter himself had “engaged in blatant and illegal mis-conduct” by attempting to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker. Id., at 209a. The company “com-menced an immediate investigation,” during which re-tained counsel interviewed Carpenter. Id., at 210a. Be-cause Carpenter’s “efforts to cause Mohawk to circumvent federal immigration law” “blatantly violated Mohawk
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policy,” the company terminated him. Ibid.
As these events were unfolding in the Williams case, discovery was underway in Carpenter’s case. Carpenter filed a motion to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The District Court agreed that the privilege applied to the requested information, but it granted Carpenter’s motion to compel disclosure after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representa-tions in the Williams case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). But, recognizing “the seriousness of its [waiver] finding,” it stayed its ruling to allow Mohawk to explore other potential “avenues to appeal . . . , such as a petition for mandamus or appealing this Order under the collateral order doctrine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a.
Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Ap-peals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order within the meaning of Cohen, 337 U. S. 541. “Under Cohen,” the Court of Appeals explained, “an order is ap-pealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an important issue completely sepa-rate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 541 F. 3d 1048, 1052 (2008) (per curiam). According to the court, the District Court’s waiver ruling satisfied the first two of these requirements but not the third, because “a discovery order that implicates the attorney-client privilege” can be adequately reviewed “on appeal from a final judgment.”
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Ibid. The Court of Appeals also rejected Mohawk’s man-damus petition, finding no “clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion” by the District Court. Id., at 1055. We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. __ (2009), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.1
II
A
By statute, Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of ap-peals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. §1291. A “final decisio[n]” is typically one “by which a district court disas-sociates itself from a case.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 42 (1995). This Court, however, “has long given” §1291 a “practical rather than a technical construction.” Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. As we held in Cohen, the statute encompasses not only judgments that “terminate an action,” but also a “small class” of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed “final.” Id., at 545–546. “That small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the ——————
1Three Circuits have permitted collateral order appeals of attorney-client privilege rulings. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 479 F. 3d 1078, 1087–1088 (CA9 2007); United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F. 3d 612, 617–621 (CADC 2003); In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F. 3d 954, 957–964 (CA3 1997). The remaining Circuits to consider the question have found such orders nonappealable. See, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F. 3d 746, 749–750 (CA10 1993); Texaco Inc. v. Louisi-ana Land & Exploration Co., 995 F. 2d 43, 44 (CA5 1993); Reise v. Board of Regents, 957 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA7 1992); Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F. 2d 159, 162–163 (CA2 1992); Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F. 2d 642, 643–644 (CA Fed. 1991).
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final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 42.
In applying Cohen’s collateral order doctrine, we have stressed that it must “never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Digi-tal Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s] mod-est scope”). Our admonition reflects a healthy respect for the virtues of the final-judgment rule. Permitting piece-meal, prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, under-mines “efficient judicial administration” and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a “special role” in managing ongoing litigation. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 374 (1981); see also Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 436 (1985) (“[T]he district judge can better exercise [his or her] responsibility [to police the prejudgment tactics of litigants] if the appellate courts do not repeatedly inter-vene to second-guess prejudgment rulings”).
The justification for immediate appeal must therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of defer-ring appeal until litigation concludes. This requirement finds expression in two of the three traditional Cohen conditions. The second condition insists upon “important questions separate from the merits.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 42 (emphasis added). More significantly, “the third Cohen question, whether a right is ‘adequately vindicable’ or ‘effectively reviewable,’ simply cannot be answered with-out a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement.” Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 878–879. That a ruling “may burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment . . . has never sufficed.” Id., at 872.
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Instead, the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some particular value of a high order.” Will, 546 U. S., at 352–353.
In making this determination, we do not engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry.” Coopers & Ly-brand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 473 (1978). Rather, our focus is on “the entire category to which a claim belongs.” Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 868. As long as the class of claims, taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated by other means, “the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,” does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under §1291. Ibid. (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 529 (1988) (alteration in original)).
B
In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s privilege-waiver order satisfied the first two conditions of the collateral order doctrine— conclusiveness and separateness—but not the third— effective unreviewability. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that collateral order appeals are not necessary to ensure effective review of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege, we do not decide whether the other Cohen requirements are met.
Mohawk does not dispute that “we have generally de-nied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; see also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Coo-per, Federal Practice and Procedure §3914.23, p. 123 (2d ed. 1992) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (“[T]he rule re-mains settled that most discovery rulings are not final”). Mohawk contends, however, that rulings implicating the attorney-client privilege differ in kind from run-of-the-mill discovery orders because of the important institutional interests at stake. According to Mohawk, the right to
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maintain attorney-client confidences—the sine qua non of a meaningful attorney-client relationship—is “irreparably destroyed absent immediate appeal” of adverse privilege rulings. Brief for Petitioner 23.
We readily acknowledge the importance of the attorney-client privilege, which “is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U. S. 399, 403 (1998). By assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make “full and frank” disclosures to their attorneys, who are then better able to provide candid advice and effective representation. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981). This, in turn, serves “broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Ibid.
The crucial question, however, is not whether an inter-est is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders. We routinely require litigants to wait until after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our adversarial system. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 426 (holding an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 260 (1984) (reaching the same result in a criminal case, notwith-standing the Sixth Amendment rights at stake). In Digi-tal Equipment, we rejected an assertion that collateral order review was necessary to promote “the public policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes.” 511 U. S., at 881. “It defies common sense,” we explained, “to maintain that parties’ readiness to settle will be significantly damp-ened (or the corresponding public interest impaired) by a rule that a district court’s decision to let allegedly barred litigation go forward may be challenged as a matter of
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right only on appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff’s favor.” Ibid.
We reach a similar conclusion here. In our estimation, postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and assure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege. Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.
Dismissing such relief as inadequate, Mohawk empha-sizes that the attorney-client privilege does not merely “prohibi[t] use of protected information at trial”; it pro-vides a “right not to disclose the privileged information in the first place.” Brief for Petitioner 25. Mohawk is un-doubtedly correct that an order to disclose privileged information intrudes on the confidentiality of attorney-client communications. But deferring review until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante incen-tives for full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.
One reason for the lack of a discernible chill is that, in deciding how freely to speak, clients and counsel are unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an erroneous disclosure order, let alone on the timing of a possible appeal. Whether or not immediate collateral order ap-peals are available, clients and counsel must account for the possibility that they will later be required by law to disclose their communications for a variety of reasons—for example, because they misjudged the scope of the privi-lege, because they waived the privilege, or because their communications fell within the privilege’s crime-fraud exception. Most district court rulings on these matters involve the routine application of settled legal principles. They are unlikely to be reversed on appeal, particularly
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when they rest on factual determinations for which appel-late deference is the norm. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 434 (“Most pretrial orders of district judges are ultimately affirmed by appellate courts.”); Reise v. Board of Regents, 957 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA7 1992) (noting that “almost all interlocutory appeals from discovery orders would end in affirmance” because “the district court possesses discretion, and review is deferential”). The breadth of the privilege and the narrowness of its excep-tions will thus tend to exert a much greater influence on the conduct of clients and counsel than the small risk that the law will be misapplied.2
Moreover, were attorneys and clients to reflect upon their appellate options, they would find that litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of review apart from collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). The preconditions for §1292(b) review—“a controlling question of law,” the prompt resolution of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”—are most likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, and district courts should not hesitate to certify an interlocu-tory appeal in such cases. Second, in extraordinary cir-cumstances—i.e., when a disclosure order “amount[s] to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” or otherwise works a manifest injustice—a party may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 390 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks ——————
2Perhaps the situation would be different if district courts were sys-tematically underenforcing the privilege, but we have no indication that this is the case.
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omitted); see also Firestone, 449 U. S., at 378–379, n. 13.3 While these discretionary review mechanisms do not provide relief in every case, they serve as useful “safety valve[s]” for promptly correcting serious errors. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883.
Another long-recognized option is for a party to defy a disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions. Dis-trict courts have a range of sanctions from which to choose, including “directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” or “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(i)–(iii). Such sanctions allow a party to obtain postjudgment review without having to reveal its privileged information. Alternatively, when the circumstances warrant it, a district court may hold a noncomplying party in contempt. The party can then appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the con-tempt citation can be characterized as a criminal punish-ment. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11 (1992); Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 328 (1940); see also Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 140–155. These established mechanisms for appellate review not only provide assurances to clients and counsel about the security of their confidential communications; they also go a long way toward addressing Mohawk’s concern that, absent collateral order appeals of adverse attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship. Mohawk is no doubt right that an order to disclose privileged material may, in some situations, have ——————
3Mohawk itself petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for a writ of manda-mus. See supra, at 3–4. It has not asked us to review the Court of Appeals’ denial of that relief.
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implications beyond the case at hand. But the same can be said about many categories of pretrial discovery orders for which collateral order appeals are unavailable. As with these other orders, rulings adverse to the privilege vary in their significance; some may be momentous, but others are more mundane. Section 1292(b) appeals, man-damus, and appeals from contempt citations facilitate immediate review of some of the more consequential at-torney-client privilege rulings. Moreover, protective or-ders are available to limit the spillover effects of disclosing sensitive information. That a fraction of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege may nevertheless harm indi-vidual litigants in ways that are “only imperfectly repara-ble” does not justify making all such orders immediately appealable as of right under §1291. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 872.
In short, the limited benefits of applying “the blunt, categorical instrument of §1291 collateral order appeal” to privilege-related disclosure orders simply cannot justify the likely institutional costs. Id., at 883. Permitting parties to undertake successive, piecemeal appeals of all adverse attorney-client rulings would unduly delay the resolution of district court litigation and needlessly burden the Courts of Appeals. See Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 123 (“Routine appeal from disputed discovery orders would disrupt the orderly progress of the litigation, swamp the courts of appeals, and substantially reduce the district court’s ability to control the discovery process.”); cf. Cun-ningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 209 (1999) (expressing concern that allowing immediate appeal as of right from orders fining attorneys for discovery violations would result in “the very sorts of piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays that the final judgment rule was de-signed to prevent”). Attempting to downplay such con-cerns, Mohawk asserts that the three Circuits in which the collateral order doctrine currently applies to adverse
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privilege rulings have seen only a trickle of appeals. But this may be due to the fact that the practice in all three Circuits is relatively new and not yet widely known. Were this Court to approve collateral order appeals in the attor-ney-client privilege context, many more litigants would likely choose that route. They would also likely seek to extend such a ruling to disclosure orders implicating many other categories of sensitive information, raising an array of line-drawing difficulties.4
C
In concluding that sufficiently effective review of ad-verse attorney-client privilege rulings can be had without resort to the Cohen doctrine, we reiterate that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain “narrow and selective in its membership.” Will, 546 U. S., at 350. This admonition has acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, “not expansion by court decision,” as the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable. Swint, 514 U. S., at 48. Specifically, Congress in 1990 amended the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. §2071 et seq., to authorize this Court to adopt rules “defin[ing] when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291.” §2072(c). Shortly thereafter, and along similar lines, Congress empowered this Court to “prescribe rules, in accordance with [§2072], to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not ——————
4Participating as amicus curiae in support of respondent Carpenter, the United States contends that collateral order appeals should be available for rulings involving certain governmental privileges “in light of their structural constitutional grounding under the separation of powers, relatively rare invocation, and unique importance to govern-mental functions.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. We express no view on that issue.
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otherwise provided for under [§1292].” §1292(e). These provisions, we have recognized, “warran[t] the Judiciary’s full respect.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 48; see also Cunning-ham, 527 U. S., at 210.
Indeed, the rulemaking process has important virtues. It draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, see 28 U. S. C. §2073, and it facilitates the adoption of meas-ured, practical solutions. We expect that the combination of standard postjudgment appeals, §1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and contempt appeals will continue to provide adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose mate-rials purportedly subject to the attorney-client privilege. Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for full airing it provides.
* * *
In sum, we conclude that the collateral order doctrine does not extend to disclosure orders adverse to the attor-ney-client privilege. Effective appellate review can be had by other means. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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Opinion of T HOMAS, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 08–678
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER v.
NORMAN CARPENTER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[December 8, 2009]
J USTICE T HOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment and in Part II–C of the Court’s opinion because I wholeheartedly agree that “Congress’s designation of the rulemaking process as the way to define or refine when a district court ruling is ‘final’ and when an interlocutory order is appealable warrants the Judiciary’s full respect.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 48 (1995); ante, at 13 (quoting Swint, supra; citing Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 210 (1999)). It is for that reason that I do not join the remainder of the Court’s analysis.
The scope of federal appellate jurisdiction is a matter the Constitution expressly commits to Congress, see Art. I, §8, cl. 9, and that Congress has addressed not only in 28 U. S. C. §§1291 and 1292, but also in the Rules Enabling Act amendments to which the Court refers. See ante, at 12–13 (citing §§2072–2074). The Court recognizes that these amendments “designat[e] rulemaking, ‘not expan-sion by court decision,’ as the preferred means of deter-mining whether and when prejudgment orders should be
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immediately appealable.” Ante, at 12 (quoting Swint, supra, at 48). Because that designation is entitled to our full respect, and because the privilege order here is not on all fours with orders we previously have held to be appeal-able under the collateral order doctrine, see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), I would affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment on the ground that any “avenue for immediate appeal” beyond the three avenues addressed in the Court’s opinion must be left to the “rulemaking process.” Ant e, at 13; see ante, at 9–12 (discussing certification under 28 U. S. C. §1292(b), petitions for mandamus, and appeals from con-tempt orders).
We need not, and in my view should not, further justify our holding by applying the Cohen doctrine, which prompted the rulemaking amendments in the first place. In taking this path, the Court needlessly perpetuates a judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 8); Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 349 (2006); Sell v. United States, 539 U. S. 166, 177 (2003); Cunningham, supra, at 210; Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 884 (1994); Swint, supra, at 48; Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 498–501 (1989); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 527 (1988). The Court’s choice of analysis is the more ironic because applying Cohen to the facts of this case requires the Court to reach conclusions on, and thus potentially prejudice, the very matters it says would bene-fit from “the collective experience of bench and bar” and the “opportunity for full airing” that rulemaking provides. Ante, at 13.
“Finality as a condition of review is an historic charac-teristic of federal appellate procedure” that was incorpo-rated in the first Judiciary Act and that Congress itself has “departed from only when observance of it would
3
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009)
Opinion of T HOMAS, J.
practically defeat the right to any review at all.” Cobble-dick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 324–325 (1940). Until 1949, this Court’s view of the appellate jurisdiction statute reflected this principle and the statute’s text. See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945) (holding that §128 of the Judicial Code (now 28 U. S. C. §1291) limits review to decisions that “en[d] the litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment”). Cohen changed all that when it an-nounced that a “small class” of collateral orders that do not meet the statutory definition of finality nonetheless may be immediately appealable if they satisfy certain criteria that show they are “too important to be denied review.” 337 U. S., at 546.
Cohen and the early decisions applying it allowed §1291 appeals of interlocutory orders concerning the posting of a bond, see id., at 545–547, the attachment of a vessel in admiralty, see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombi-ana Del Caribe, S. A., 339 U. S. 684, 688–689 (1950), and the imposition of notice costs in a class action, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 170–172 (1974). As the Court’s opinion notes, later decisions sought to narrow Cohen lest its exception to §1291 “‘swallow’” the final judgment rule. Ante, at 5 (quoting Digital Equipment, supra, at 868); see generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Live-say, 437 U. S. 463, 467–468 (1978). The Court has ad-hered to that narrowing approach, principally by raising the bar on what types of interests are “important enough” to justify collateral order appeals. See, e.g., Will, supra, at 352–353 (explaining that an interlocutory order typically will be “important” enough to justify Cohen review only where “some particular value of a high order,” such as “honoring the separation of powers, preserving the effi-ciency of government . . . , [or] respecting a State’s digni-tary interests,” is “marshaled in support of the interest in avoiding trial” and the Court determines that denying
4 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER
Opinion of T HOMAS, J.
review would “imperil” that interest); Digital Equipment, supra, at 878–879 (noting that appealability under Cohen turns on a “judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judg-ment requirement,” and that an interest “qualifies as ‘important’ in Cohen’s sense” if it is “weightier than the societal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment principles”). As we recognized last Term, however, our attempts to contain the Cohen doctrine have not all been successful or persuasive. See Ashcroft, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8) (“[A]s a general matter, the collateral-order doctrine may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic and the strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen”). In my view, this case pre-sents an opportunity to improve our approach.
The privilege interest at issue here is undoubtedly important, both in its own right and when compared to some of the interests (e.g., in bond and notice-cost rulings) we have held to be appealable under Cohen. Accordingly, the Court’s Cohen analysis does not rest on the privilege order’s relative unimportance, but instead on its effective reviewability after final judgment. Ante, at 8–12. Al-though I agree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion, I see two difficulties with this approach. First, the Court em-phasizes that the alternative avenues of review it dis-cusses (which did not prove adequate in this case) would be adequate where the privilege ruling at issue is “particu-larly injurious or novel.” Ante, at 9. If that is right, and it seems to me that it is, then the opinion raises the question why such avenues were not also adequate to address the orders whose unusual importance or particularly injurious nature we have held justified immediate appeal under Cohen. See, e.g., Sell, supra, at 177. Second, the facts of this particular case seem in several respects to undercut the Court’s conclusion that the benefits of collateral order review “cannot justify the likely institutional costs.” Ante,
时间:2003年2月3日作者：来新夏(南开大学教授) 来源:光明网 近二十年来，中国近代史的研究，确有着某些显著变化。于是有人认为，这与海外史学理论及方法越来越受到中国研究者的重视并被广泛应用有关，甚至有积极作用。我不完全同意这种以偏概全的看法。我没有读过几本海外史学理论的书，可以说不懂海外的史学理论，因此，我只就所读过的为数不多的海外中国近代史的著作和论文而理解到的一些研究方法，简略地谈一点个人的看法。 任何事物没有绝对的纯，既有积极作用，也必然带有负面影响。有些当时看好，但过段时间也许发现其不足与弱点；有些一时似乎难以理解和接受，但逐渐感到有足堪回味的内涵，例如对海外的中国近代史方面的著作，八十年代国门初开时，对一切新鲜的东西，包括没有看到过的海外中国近代史著作都以羡慕仰望的态度来接受，而忽略了选择；但是到了九十年代就不同了，有了批判精神，对海外的东西不是一味接受，而是懂得寸有所长，尺有所短的道理，善于取长补短，这就是一种进步。我对待海外中国近代史研究方法的态度和出发点，就是如此。 我国从改革开放以来，由于学术交往日多，比较容易接触到海外学者和资料，看到过去不可能看到或很少看到的港台地区以及美、日、加和欧洲等国的中国近代史著作和论文，遂使中国近代史学者打开眼界。这是能够了解海外中国近代史研究方法的必然前提，从而才有可能让我们从他们的研究成果中了解其方法，并逐渐能选择对我们有所启示和值得吸取的地方。因为这个论题比较大，难以进行全面完整地论述，我只想举几个例证来说明我的粗浅看法。 史源是研究历史者必须随时注意发掘和开拓的重要方面，中国的史学传统是重视史源的。清代乾嘉史家在利用官书、正史之外，还用六经、诗文集、金石碑版和谱牒等作为新史源；近代的史学家梁启超、陈垣等都很注重新史源的探求与开发，梁启超在其名著《中国历史研究法》正续编中，都很看重扩大史源的问题。陈垣先生甚至明确标举“史源学”这一学科专称，并以之教授学生，使学生能得到研究历史的“金针”。但是，近几十年，这一优良传统被破坏，由于屡屡地批判“唯史料论”，随意乱贴正确理论的标签，好做放言高论，“出思想”成为某些人不亲自动手做学问的时髦流行语汇。于是奉行者照方抓药，随意抓几条现成的史料，填充成文，几已成为习惯性动作，致使史学研究领域飘荡着一股空疏学风，史源开拓很少有人问津。而海外若干学术机构却建立了有关中国学术的这样那样的研究中心、研究所和协会等等来搜集资料，开辟新史源。90年代前后，我在国外看到这一现象，颇多感触，如斯坦福大学的胡佛研究所所搜集、收藏的“红卫兵”小报，比较丰富完备，应当说这是研究“文革”历史的重要史源库；哥伦比亚大学图书馆的口述资料库，我曾去查阅过北洋人物的口述资料，虽然有些需要甄选考订，但终不失为研究近现代人物的重要史源，《顾维钧回忆录》就是根据其所藏顾氏口述资料翻译而来的，唐德刚教授撰写李宗仁、胡适的传记也曾以此为重要史源之一。纽约州有个规模不大的大学图书馆集中全力收藏了越战资料，成为研究越战的一大史源。有些海外学者为了研究中国近代史的某一专题，不惜远涉重洋，到中国来寻求史源，美国宾州大学讲座教授林蔚为了研究北洋军阀时期的直奉战争，几次来中国访求口碑与文字资料，与中国研究北洋军阀史的学者交谈商榷。另有一位一时想不起名字的美国学者，为了研
The American Court System 美国法院系统 2.The Federal Court System 联邦法院体系 The federal court system is basically a three-tiered model consisting of (1) U.S. district courts (trial courts of general jurisdiction) and various courts of limited jurisdiction, (2) U.S. courts of appeals (intermediate courts of appeals), and (3) the United States Supreme Court. 联邦法院体系模式基本上由三个序列组成（１）美国联邦大区法院（拥 有普遍管辖权的初审法院）和各种各样的有限管辖权的法院，（２）美国联邦上诉法院（上诉仲裁法院）和（３）美国联邦最高法院。 Unlike state court judges, who are usually elected, federal court judges—including the justices of the Supreme Court—are appointed by the president of the U.S. and confirmed by Senate. All federal judges receive lifetime appointments (because under Article 3 they ―hold their offices during Good Behavior‖). 与州法院法官通常由选举产生不同，联邦法院的法官——包括最高法院 的大法官们——是由美国总统提名，由参议院批准。所有的联邦法官都是终 身制（这是由美国联邦宪法第三条―他们品行端正因而受任终身‖所规定的）。 a. U.S. District Court 美国联邦区法院 At federal level, the equivalent of a state trial court of general jurisdiction is the district court. There is at least one federal district court in every state. The number of judicial districts can vary over time, primarily owing to population changes and corresponding
[键入文字] 白先勇：父亲受拿破仑启示提出“以空间换时间” 白崇禧(1893 年3 月18 日—1966 年12 月2 日)，字健生，回族，广西桂林人，中华民国陆军一级上将。新桂系中心人物之一，与李宗仁合称李白。北伐战争时，率广 西军队攻至山海关。北伐成功后，和蒋介石及其他地方势力多次开战，抗日战争爆发后，二人动员广西的军队抗击日军，合作指挥多场大战，屡有胜果。抗日战争胜利 后，白崇禧担任中华民国国防部长。国民党败退台湾后，白崇禧于1966 年在台北病逝。 口述者简介 今年是中华民族抗战胜利70 周年，白崇禧是国民政府指挥抗日战争的重要将领。近日，白崇禧的儿子白先勇在南京就父亲和自己的抗战经历接受了南方都市报记者的专访。白先勇(19 3 7 年8 月16 日- )，台湾当代著名作家。白崇禧第五子。从小酷爱文学，童年在重庆生活，后随父母迁居南京、香港、台湾。台湾大学外文系毕业后，留 学美国艾奥瓦大学。1965 年取得艾奥瓦大学硕士学位后，白先勇到加州大学圣塔芭芭拉分校教授中国语文及文学，并从此在那里定居。他在19 9 4 年退休。代表作有短篇小说集《寂寞的十七岁》、《台北人》、《纽约客》，散文集《蓦然回首》，长篇小说《孽子》等。 不久前，我在台湾世新大学作了抗战讲座，并和齐邦媛先生一起回忆了我们童年、 青少年时代抗战的情况。在现场，有几位90 岁高龄的老人唱抗日歌曲，包括《松花江上》、《万里长城》等，很感人的。听到这些歌曲，一下子回忆都回来了。 父亲研究了拿破仑入侵俄国的战争，提出“积小胜为大胜，以空间换时间，以游击战辅助正规战，与日本人作长期抗战” 抗战是中华民族对抗异族入侵的一场圣战，军民一体，不分党派。这是20 世纪中华民族对抗外族入侵最大的一件事。从历史上看，牺牲的数字是数千万(注：中国人民抗 1
1 Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GARY SWARTHOUT, WARDEN v. DAMON COOKE MATTHEW CATE, SECRETARY, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION v. ELIJAH CLAY ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 10–333. Decided January 24, 2011 P ER C URIAM. I California’s parole statute provides that the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it determines that . . . consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3041(b) (West Supp. 2010). If the Board denies parole, the prisoner can seek judicial review in a state habeas petition. The California Supreme Court has explained that “the standard of review properly is characterized as whether ‘some evidence’ supports the conclusion that the inmate is unsuitable for parole because he or she currently is dangerous.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1191, 190 P. 3d 535, 539 (2008). See also In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241, 1253–1254, 190 P. 3d 573, 580 (2008); In re Rosen-krantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 625–626, 59 P. 3d 174, 183 (2002). A Respondent Damon Cooke was convicted of attempted first-degree murder in 1991, and a California court sen-tenced him to an indeterminate term of seven years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. In November 2002, the board determined that Cooke was not yet suitable for parole, basing its decision on the “especially cruel and callous manner” of his commitment offense, App. to Pet.
美国是英、美法系国家。独立前，原13个殖民地基本沿袭英国的法律传统，又根据各自需要自立法令，自成司法体系。独立后，1787年美国宪法对司法权作了原则性规定，1789年美国国会颁布的《司法条例》规定了联邦法院的组织、管辖权和诉讼程序，逐步形成了现有的司法制度。美国司法制度的主要特点有：贯彻三权分立的原则，实行司法独立；法院组织分为联邦和地方两大系统；联邦最高法院享有特殊的司法审查权，等等。 司法组织法院组织复杂，分为联邦法院和州法院两大系统，适用各自的宪法和法律，管辖不同的案件和地域。联邦法院系统由地方法院、上诉法院和最高法院组成。联邦地方法院是审理联邦管辖的普通民事、刑事案件的初审法院，每州根据本州人口多少，设立1～4个地方法院，法官 1～27人不等。联邦上诉法院分设在全国11个司法巡回区，受理本巡回区内对联邦地方法院判决不服的上诉案件，以及对联邦系统的专门法院的判决和某些具有部分司法权的独立机构的裁决不服的上诉案件，法官 3～15人不等。联邦最高法院是联邦法院系统中的最高审级，由1位首席法官和8位法官组成，其判决为终审判决，并享有特殊的司法审查权（见（美国联邦最高法院）。州法院系统极不统一，一般由州初审法院、州上诉法院和州最高法院组成。州初审法院是属州管辖的一般民事、刑事案件的一审法院。州上诉法院审理不服州初审法院判决的上诉案件。州最高法院是州的最高审级。此外，还有国会根据需要通过有关法令建立的特别法院，如联邦权利申诉法院等。法官实行不可更换制、专职制、高薪制、退休制。美国没有统一的行政法院，行政纠纷案件除由普通法院审理外，各独立机构也有权受理和裁决（见美国独立机构）。 美国检察机关与司法行政机构不分，联邦总检察长即司法部长，为总统和政府的法律顾问，监督司法行政管理，在联邦最高法院审理重大案件时，代表政府出庭，参加诉讼。检察官受司法部领导，配属于各级法院。 诉讼程序民事诉讼程序采用辩论制,独任审理;部分诉讼,特别是侵权诉讼等由陪审团裁断,法官判决。刑事诉讼程序的特点是：联邦和若干州保留大陪审团审查重罪起诉的制度；非法取得的证据不得采纳；广泛使用审判前的“答辩交易”;辩护时,民事案件中的原告、被告律师，刑事案件中的公诉人和被告律师相互对抗争辩，法官不主动调查，仅起“消极仲裁人”的作用。 司法审查制度作为联邦原则正式确定，始于1803年联邦最高法院的“马伯里诉麦迪逊案”。首席法官J.马歇尔代表法院认为,“违宪的法律不是法律”,“宪法取缔一切与之相抵触的法律”，明确宣布国会1789年颁布的《司法条例》第13条违宪，从而确立了法院拥有审查国会通过的法令的职权，逐步形成司法审查制度。这一制度成为维护统治秩序，实行权力制衡的一种政治手段，以后为许多国家所仿效。美国的司法审查权由普通法院，主要
子部分A—概述 192.1 本部分范围 (a)本部分依据外部大陆架陆地法案(美国联邦法典第43部第1331部分)所定义的术语规定的管道设施和天然气运输的最低安全要求，包括外大陆架范围内的管道设施和天然气的运输。 (b)本部分不适用于: (1)开采碳氢化合物或把开采的碳氢化合物进行初次分离，脱水，或对其进行其它处理的每 座出口法兰上游的海洋管道，下游更远的设施为先。 (2)下列区域以外的天然气的陆上采集。 ①任何城市，城镇或乡村结合部或非结合部界线以内的区域。 ②指定的任何住宅区或商业区，如小区、商业或购物中心、或社区开发地界。 (3)墨西哥湾入海口内的天然气的陆上采集。第192.612 款规定的情况除外。 (4)只把石油天然气或石油天然气/空气混合物输送到下列位置的所有管道系统。 ①少于10个用户，如果系统任何部分均不位于公共场所内；或 ②仅有一个用户，如果系统完全位于该用户的土地上(无论该系统的某个部分是否位于公 共场所内)。 (5)外大陆架上游的某个点，天然气开采商的运营责任正是从此点开始移交给管道运输商的。192.3 定义 以下为在本部分所用相关词的定义。 “局长”指研究和特殊计划局局长，或运输部部长委派其为代表，授权其处理有关事宜的任何人。 “配气管道”指管道，而不是集气管道或输送管道。 “暴露的管道”指管顶凸出于水深不到15 ft(4.6 m)的海床之上（按平均落潮水位测定值）。 “气体”指天然气、易燃气体、或有毒或腐蚀性气体。 “集气管道”指从当前的开采设施，向输送管道或干线运输天然气的管道。 “墨西哥湾及其入海口”指从墨西哥湾海岸和其朝向大海的入海口的平均高水位标志的水域(不包括河流、潮汐滩涂、湖泊和运河)，包括水深达15 ft(4.6 m)的领海和外大陆架（按平均落潮水位测定值）。 “对航行造成危胁”，按本部分之目的，指埋设在水深不到15 ft(4.6 m)的海床之下的、管顶覆盖层小于12 inch(305 mm)的管道（按平均落潮水位测定值）。 “高压配气系统”指在某个配气系统中，干线管道内的气体压力高于向用户送气的压力。 “管段”指在毗连压缩机站之间、在压缩机站和储气设施之间、在压缩机站和截断阀之间、或在毗连截断阀之间连续运行的输送管道。 “列出的规范”指在本部分附录B第一部分中列出的规范。 “低压配气系统”指在某个配气系统中，干线管道内的气体压力与向用户送气的压力实际相等。 “干线”指作为一条普通供气源，为一条以上的送气管道供应天然气的配气管道。 “最大实际运行压力”指正常运行超过1年期间所生成的最高压力。 “最大允许工作压力(MAOP)”指管道或管段可以在本部分规定的压力下来工作的最高压力值。 “自治区”指某个州的某座城市、县城、或任何其他政治区划。 “海上”指沿美国海岸部分一般落潮水位线以外，该部分直接与公海相接壤，以及内陆水域朝海界限标记线以外。 “运营商”指某个专门从事天然气运输的人。 “外大陆架”指下沉陆地法案(美国联邦法典第43部第1301部分)第II部分所定义的、位于朝海方向的所有下沉陆地，和位于适航水域之下、陆地区域以外的所有下沉陆地。这些陆地的下层土壤及海床属美国所有，并受美国所管辖和控制。 229
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首例中国法院判决在美国的承认与执行案 1994年2月24日，经罗宾逊公司介绍，三联实业公司与卓诚公司（罗宾逊公司的亚洲代理经销商）在中国宜昌签订了买卖合约。按照合约，三联实业购买罗宾逊公司R-44直升机一架，加上在中国的安装和试飞费，总计29.3万美元。没想到这架直升飞机一上天便折戟。1994年3月22日15时45分，三联实业公司安排R-44直升机进行首次载客，但起飞六分钟后，这架崭新的直升机就坠毁于重庆丰都境内的长江主航道上。机上3名游客遇难身亡，飞行员受伤获救。中国民用航空中南管理局出具的事故调查报告结论是，“导致这起事故的直接原因很可能是机械故障，与生产质量有关”。 2001 年1 月，三联公司和平湖公司在中国湖北省高级人民法院（“湖北高院”）提起诉讼（“中国诉讼”），要求被告罗宾逊公司承担因产品质量事故造成的直升机损失以及其他经济损失赔偿。该诉讼程序中的传票、诉状、出庭通知等相关文件于2004 年2 月送达至被告罗宾逊公司，但罗宾逊公司并未出席其后的开庭审理，也未申请延期诉讼或采取其他措施。同年12 月，湖北高院在罗宾逊公司缺席庭审的情况下作出判决（“中国判决”），支持三联公司和平湖公司的诉讼请求，判决罗宾逊公司向三联公司和平湖公司支付总计2000 多万元人民币的损失赔偿金及相应的利息。为了使中国判决得以执行，2006 年3 月，三联公司和平湖公司委托金杜律师事务所，并在具有相关专长的美国律师的协助下，在美国联邦法院加州中部地区法院（“联邦地区法院”）提起关于承认和执行中国判决的请求。 经过长达三年多的双方争辩及法院审查过程，美国联邦地区法院于2009 年8 月作出判决，同意承认与执行本案的中国判决。三联公司和平湖公司由此将获得总额约650 万美元的赔偿及相应的利息。罗宾逊公司不服，于当年10月向美国第九巡回法院提起上诉；2011年3月，美国联邦第九巡回法院驳回了上诉请求。2011年6月底，罗宾逊公司履行相关赔款义务。
美国法院体系概览 上海申一企业法务总网 2013-03-06 13:27:22 作者:张烨来源:原创美国法院体系划分为联邦和州两大系统。 一、联邦法院系统 美国联邦法院管辖的案件主要为：涉及联邦宪法、法律或国际条约的案件，一方当事人为联邦政府的案件，涉及外国政府代理人的案件，公海上或国境内供对外贸易和州际贸易之用的通航水域案件，不同州之间、不同州的公民之间的争议以及州政府向他州公民提起的诉讼等。 美国联邦法院可分为普通法院和专门法院。普通法院分为三级，从下到上分别是：地区法院、上诉法院、最高法院。 1. 联邦地区法院（District Court） 每个州至少有一个地区法院，较大的州可能设2至4个地区法院，全国50个州共设有89个地区法院；另外，哥伦比亚特区、波多黎各、美属维尔京群岛、关岛、北马里亚纳群岛各设1个地区法院；一共94个联邦地区法院。 2．联邦上诉法院（Court of Appeals） 美国的50个州、首都华盛顿特区及境外领土被划分为13个司法巡回区，设有13个巡回上诉法院。其中11个巡回法院由数字命名，其余两个法院分别是哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院和美国联邦巡回上诉法院。 （1）联邦巡回上诉法院（华盛顿DC） 该上诉法院与其他12个上诉法院地位相同，但其管辖的地理范围涉及全国，管辖的案件限于审理由各联邦地区法院及有关联邦独立管理机构转来的涉及专利、商标、版权、合同、国内税收的案件，以及索赔法院和国际贸易法院的判决。 （2）哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院（华盛顿DC） 华盛顿哥伦比亚特区 （3）第一巡回上诉法院 (波士顿) 缅因州 马萨诸塞州 新罕布什尔州 波多黎各 罗得岛州
《美国统一继承法典》概述 周强刘晓星 美国是一个联邦制的国家，法律制度实行的是双轨制，即联邦颁布的法律和各州颁布的法律。由于诸多原因，各州所颁布的法律极不统一，因而常常引起相互间的法律冲突。为了克服这种现象，自本世纪初以来，美国一些非官方机构在致力于统一美国各州法律的问题上作出了很大的努力。迄今为止，已制定了大量的统一法律规范供名洲采角或立法参考，其中有些法律规范已为各州采用或修改采用，‘发生法律效力。一九六八年八月美国州法律全国统一委员会和美国律师协会批准的《美国统一继承法典》(以下简称法典)就是在统一美国各州继承法律制度方面起着重要作用的一部示范性的法典。该法典的特点是:内容详尽，立法精巧，实体法与程序法紧密结合，法典既保留了各州原来实行的普通法中的一些继承制度，又兼收了罗马法的一些原则。所以，自该法典获批准以来，巳有十几个州采用或在不同程度上修改后采用。 法典共有三百零四条，主要内容如下: 一、无遗嘱继承。 无遗嘱继承，是指被继承人死亡时未立遗嘱，其遗产依无遗嘱继承的法律规定转移给无遗嘱继承人。 l、无遗嘱继承人的范围和顺序:法典规定，配偶、子女、父母、兄弟姐妹、祖父母、外祖父母均为无遗嘱法定继承人..对配偶、子女、父母的定义，法典又作了特殊的规定。对配偶的规定中指出，凡与被继承人离婚或与被继承人的婚姻宣告无效的人，得到或同意在本州尚未被承认有效的与被继承人离婚或宣告他们婚姻无效的最终判决的人，同意法院依被继承人提议作出的离婚或宣告他们婚姻无效的判决的人，均不属于被继承人的配偶。子女是指有权根据法律规定通过无遗嘱继承从与其有血缘关系的父母处取得遗产的一切子女。但继子女和非婚生子女不包括在内。父母是指在子女无遗嘱死亡时，有权根据无遗嘱继承从与其有血缘关系的已亡子女处取得财产的人。但继父母不包括在内。 由此可见，法典真接规定的无遗嘱继承人的范围，要比原来各州所规定的范围小得多。由此法典规定，无遗嘱继承人的继承顺序是:(1)子女、(2)父毋、(3)兄弟姐妹、(4)祖父母、外祖父母。被继承人的配偶未列入任何具体的顺序，由法律另行单独规定继承权。 2、遗产继承份额.法典采用法定份额和同一继承人均分遗产的混合制度。所谓法定应继份额，是指法律对某些继承人的应继遗产份额直接作出规定。相同顺序继承人均分制，是指享有法定份额以外的其他同一顺序继承人依照法律的规定平等地分配遗产。 享有法定份额的人，包括配偶和未成年的子女以及未独立生活的成年子女。配偶的法定遗产份额，是在被继承人没有第一、第二顺序无遗嘱继承人的情况下，继承全部遗产，如在被继承人留有父母的情况下，先继承五万美元的遗产后，再继承剩余遗产的二分之一，如在被继承人留有子女的情况下，先继承五万美元的遗产后，再继承剩余遗产的二分之一卜在被继承人留有亲生子女，但该子女并非与生存配偶所生的子女时，则生存配偶只能继承遗产 的二分之一。此外，法典还废除了某些州实行的寡妇产和鳏夫产制度，而赋予生存配偶选择权和取得宅园特留份、
清华大学经管金融硕士导师履历介 绍 李稻葵 金融系弗里曼讲席教授 CV下载 办公室舜德楼128 个人简介 研究成果 研究项目 李稻葵，清华大学经济管理学院弗里曼讲席教授(MansfieldFreemanChairProfessor)，清华大学经济管理学院中国与世界经济研究中心(CCWE)主任，中国人民银行货币政策委员会委员，全国政协十一届委员会委员。1985年作为清华大学经济管理学院首届本科毕业生获学士学位，1992年获得哈佛大学经济学博士学位。他主要研究领域为发展经济学、公司金融、国际经济学、中国经济。讲授课程包括中级微观经济学，经济发展、国际经济学、中国经济等。 他负责的学术研究项目有教育部社会科学司的《中国高校哲学社会科学发展报告》子课题——“经济学”部分；清华大学文科建设处的清华大学中国与世界经济；清华大学科研院的中国经济与大国发展战略研究、清华大学中国与世界经济论坛（系列）；2005年1月至2007年1月国家自然科学基金委的加入WTO后的经济发展战略：跨国经济计量比较研究。目前他正在从事的项目包括“人民币国际化道路研究”。 他发表的著作有《逼出来的大国崛起》、《国外高校社会科学研究进展报告2009》、《国外高校社会科学研究进展报告2008》、《大国发展战略》、《亚洲金融危机后的中国》、《中国经济学2005》。期刊论文有《欧洲债务危机:预判与对策》、《“二次房改”的财政基础分析》、《明代GDP及结构试探》、《我国现阶段初次分配中劳动收入下降分析》、《国际货币体系新架构:后金融危机时代的研究》、《V型反弹，资产泡沫与新宏观分析框架——金融危机后宏观经济形势分析与展望》、《GDP中劳动份额演变的U型规律》、《宽财政，紧货币——后危机时代中国经济结构调整分析》、《美元M2紧缩诱发世界金融危机：金融危机的内外因论及其检验》、《货币政策须对冲市场情绪：理论模型和政策模拟》、《人民币国际化：计量研究及政策分析》、《最新金融学理论前沿－2006－2007国外金融学研究文献综述》、《中国参与国际金融新格局的政策分析》、《双轨制推进人民币国际化》、《中国经济为何偏好FDI？》、《Thesoftbudgetconstraintofbanks》、《FDI与自主研发能力》、《中美贸易顺差:根本原因在哪里》、《TheSoftBudgetConstraintofBanks》、《中国非国有企业研究文献综述》、《InstitutionalEntrepreneurs》、《PoliticalConditionsforReform:ChinaVS.EasternEuropeRevisited》。 李稻葵1989年5月担任世界银行中国社会保障体制改革研究项目顾问；1992年8月1999
美国法典 第42卷公众健康与福利 第55章国家环境政策法 （1969年制定） 第4321条国会的目的宣言 本法的目的在于：宣示国家政策，促进人类与环境之间的充分和谐；努力提倡防止或者减少对环境与自然生命物的伤害，增进人类的健康与福利；充分了解生态系统以及自然资源对国家的重要性；设立环境质量委员会。 第4322条至第4330条（原文略） 第一节政策与目标 第4331条国会国家环境政策宣言 鉴于人类活动对自然环境一切构成部分的内在联系具有深远影响，尤其在人口增长、高度集中的都市化、工业发展、资源开发以及技术日益进步所带来的深远影响，并鉴于恢复和保持环境质量对于全人类的福利与发展所具有的重要性，国会特宣布：联邦政府将与各州、地方政府以及有关公共和私人团体合作采取一切切实可行的手段和措施，包括财政和技术上的援助，发展和增进一般福利，创造和保持人类与自然得以共处与和谐中生存的各种条件，满足当代国民及其子孙后代对于社会、经济以及其他方面的要求。 为执行本法规定的政策，联邦政府有责任采取一切切实可行、并与国家政策的其他基本考虑相一致的措施，改进并协调联邦的计划、职能、方案和资源，以达到如下目的，即国家应当：1．履行每一代人都作为子孙后代的环境保管人的责任； 2．保证为全体国民创造安全、健康、富有生命力并符合美学和文化上的优美的环境； 3. 最大限度地合理利用环境，不得使其恶化或者对健康和安全造成危害，或者引起其他不良的和不应有的后果； 4 保护国家历史、文化和自然等方面的重要遗产，并尽可能保持一种能为每个人提供丰富与多样选择的环境； 5谋求人口与资源的利用达到平衡，促使国民享受高度的生活水平和广泛舒适的生活； 6．提高可更新资源的质量，使易枯竭资源达到最高程度的再循环。国会认为，每个人都可以享受健康的环境，同时每个人也有责任参与对环境改善与保护。 第4332条机构合作报告；提供资讯；建议；国际与国内的合作国会授权并命令国家机构，应当尽一切可能实现： 1．国家的各项政策、法律以及公法解释与执行均应当与本法的规定相一致。 2．所有联邦政府的机关均应当： (1)在进行可能对人类环境产生影响的规划和决定时，应当采用足以确保综合利用自然科学、社会科学以及环境设计工艺的系统性和多学科的方法。 （2）与依本法第二节规定而设立的环境质量委员会进行磋商，确定并开发各种方法与程序，确保在做出决定时使得当前尚不符合要求的环境舒适和环境价值。能与经济和技术问题一并得到适当的考虑。 （3）对人类环境质量具有重大影响的各项提案或法律草案、建议报告以及其他重大联邦行为，均应当由负责经办的官员提供一份包括下列事项的详细说明： ①拟议行为对环境的影响； ②提案行为付诸实施对环境所产生的不可避免的不良影响； ③提案行为的各种替代方案； ④对人类环境的区域性短期使用与维持和加强长期生命力之间的关系； ⑤提案行为付诸实施时可能产生的无法恢复和无法补救的资源耗损。在制作详细说明之前，联邦
一个刚退伍的老兵,一天夜里起床上厕所时,发现老伴没有睡在身边,枕头掉在木头地板上,然后很疑惑的他走进厕所发现了马桶上有一件很小的绿色衣服,当场就被吓死了,请问為什麼? 关键字提示：老兵枕头绿色衣服（不是其他顏色） 2 七点十二分 一名男子很惧怕坐飞机,但是由於工作的关係不得不乘坐飞机在各国间出差往来。他每次都对於时差现象特别不适应，有一次他来到了一个跨洲的国家后，下飞机后看了一下手錶，显示的是早上七点十二分，他随后就哭著自杀了，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：跨洲的国家七点十二分 3 钥匙 一名保险推销员下班后去超市买过耶诞节送给女友的礼品，他最终买的是一个刻有月亮图案的纯银掛件。出超市后，他看见一个小姑娘在路边哭泣，就过去看怎麼回事，突然发现那个小姑娘胸前有一串钥匙。第二天，警方发现小姑娘全身赤裸地死在街边，试分析原因。 关键字提示：保险推销员全身赤裸 4 半张相片 女孩和男孩恋爱很久，当初是男孩先追求的女孩。女孩过生日了，男孩送给她一个音乐盒，虽然是旧的，但女孩十分高兴。不久后有一天，女孩不小心把音乐盒摔坏了，发现里面夹这一张只剩半截的旧相片，上面很模糊地像是一条狗的影像，女孩马上吓死了，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：旧的音乐盒半张相片一条狗的影
有一个孩子，他的父亲是名英国医生，他的母亲是一名日本的英语教师，他从小就因為自己是混血儿而倍感自豪。有一天他翻开母亲上课準备的讲义，发现里面有一张很久前的便条纸，上面画了一面英国国旗，没涂顏色，他立刻回家刺杀了父亲，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：医生英语教师国旗没涂顏色 6 MSN头象 一名有前科的男子刚从警局回家，他由於某件杀人事件而三不五时地被召唤去警局盘问，但由於证据不足被释放了。回家后他和往常一样打开了MSN聊天，忽然发现一名网友的头像是一件骯脏的黑色西装，他马上衝出去，到街上买了一件相同规格，但是顏色為白色的西装。 试分析原因。 关键字提示：骯脏的黑色西装白色的西装 7 可乐的味道 一个在运动中骨折的患者（女性）康復出院了，家里庆祝并大摆宴席。喝饮料的时候，患者的哥哥说今天的可乐怎麼味道有点怪，然后患者的父亲和母亲也喝了纷纷表示可乐味道的确不对。但患者喝后坚称味道正常。患者死於当天晚上洗澡的澡盆里。為什麼？ 关键字提示：女性晚上澡盆 8.牛吃草 有一个年轻的男人，他的房子和邻居夫妇的房子中间隔著一片草坪。有一天深夜，男人被隔壁的吵架声吵醒，之后他又听到了摔东西声、砍刀子声和，过了一会，他又听到了有人撞他家门的声音，但他都没有理会，又睡了过去。第二天，他发现隔壁的男主人惨死在他家门口。推理其过程。 9.云霄飞车
美国的司法体制考察及启示 中国司法改革考察团 原载于《人民司法》2006年第7期93页 为积极稳妥地推进司法体制改革工作，科学借鉴国外和法制度的有益成分，去年10月，中国司法改革考察回对美国司法体制进行了全面考察。 美国司法体制概况 美国是由50个州组成的联邦制固家，实行立法、行政、司法三权分立制度。美国联邦司法体制主要包括法院和司法部两大体系。行使司法权的司法机构仅指法院，检察、警察和国际司法协助等执法部间均由政府所属的司法部管辖。 法院体制。 法院的设置。美国法院分为联邦法院和州法院两大体系。联邦法院根据联邦宪法和法律设立，划分为三级法院，即联邦最高法院、巡回上诉法院、地区法院。联邦最高法院由9名大法官组成，行使联邦最高司法权，有权对宪法进行解释，对行政、立法部门之间的纠纷、州与州之间的重大纠纷等作出最终裁决。联邦巡回上诉法院审理案件实行法律审，一般由3名法官组成会议庭进行。联邦地区法院审理一审普通民刑事案件，美国按照司法区设置94个联邦地区法院，是联邦法院系统中惟一实行陪审制的一级法院。联邦地区法院审理案件除个别案件要由3名法官审理外，一般只由1名法官听审或裁决。 各州法院由各州议会决定设立，在名称和结构上不尽一致，但一般划分为州最高法院、上诉法院、初审法院。与联邦法院审判程序相似，州初审法院是开庭审判的一审法院，州上诉法院和最高法院只进行法律审，对于州上诉法院审判的案件，最高法院也是自由裁量受理。 联邦法院和外联院管辖权的划分。一般而言，发生涉及到联邦法律适用的刑事案件、以联邦为当事人的诉讼、州与州之间的诉讼、州与外国间的诉讼、涉及到联邦法律适用的价值超过1万美元的民商事案件由联邦法院审理，这些案件一般只占到案件总数的5％左右。涉及到州法律适用的案件由州法院审理，数量约为案件总量的95％。联邦法院和州法院系统相互独立，互不隶属，在州法院审理的案件，当事人认为涉及联邦事务的，可以向联邦法院提起诉讼，但是否受理由联邦法院决定。 法院的司法行政事务管理体制。美国联邦法院的司法行政事务由三级法院的首席法官和其他法官代表组成的司法会议负责，具体由司法会议下属的美国法院管理局管理。各州的管理体制不同，此次考察的加利福尼亚州、康涅狄格州法院的司法行政事务由州首席法官负责，下设办公室统一负责州法院系统的司法行政事务。 法官的产生、任用与管理制度。美国联邦法院法官的产生要经历一个严格的进选审查过程。当联邦法院法官空缺或由法律规定增加法官职数时，国会议员、在职法官都可以向总统推荐法盲人选，经司法部、美国律师协会、联邦调查局、参议院司法委员会进行政治背景、个人品行、司法观点和价值取问、司法能力的评估、确认、审查后，总统从审查后的名单中提出拟任法官人选，并经参议院司法委员会举行听证会表决通过，由总统正式任命法官。总统提名法官带有较强的党派政治倾向，一般从长期追随、支持和同情本党的法官中进行提名。卡特、里 根、布什和克林顿四任总统提名的联邦法官，与总统为同一党派的占89．4％。此次考察的康涅狄格州设有专人组成的司法选拔委员会承担法官的选任工作（其中州长提名6人，议会提名6人）。当法官候选人提名后，由司法选拔委员会进行资格审查评估，由州长提名，议
目录 第一章概论 第一节证据和证据法的定义 一、证据 二、证据法 第二节美国证据法的法典化过程 一、早期法典 二、《示范证据法典》 三、《统一证据法规则》 四、《联邦证据规则》 第三节美国证据法的法律渊源 一、成文法 二、普通法 第四节证据法的目的 一、查明事实真相 二、促进诉讼效率 三、促进公共政策 四、保证诉讼程序公正 第五节《联邦证据规则》的适用范围 一、《适用联邦证据规则》的法庭 二、《适用联邦证据规则》的程序 三、不《适用联邦证据规则》的程序 第二章举证责任和假定 第一节举证责任 一、出示证据的责任 二、说服的责任 第二节假定 一、假定和推理 二、规定假定的理由 三、假定的法律后果 四、刑事案件中的假定 第三节对前提事实的确定 一、由陪审团决定的前提事实 二、由法官决定的前提事实 第三章司法确认 第一节概述 一、司法确认的定义 二、对司法事实进行司法确认 三、对法律本身进行司法确认 四、立法事实 五、背景事实 第二节对事实的司法确认
一、可以对哪些事实进行司法确认 二、与司法确认有关的程序问题 第四章证据的相关性 第一节证据可以被采纳的最低要求 一、重要性 二、相关性 三、有证明能力（不违反证据排除规则） 四、相关性证据 五、证据的有限采纳 第二节证据的种类和形式 一、证据种类：直接证据和间接证据 二、证据形式：证人证言、书证、物证以及演示证据 第三节相关性证据 一、《联邦证据规则》关于证据相关性的定义 二、为什么要确定证据的相关性 三、如何确定证据的相关性 第四节相关性证据的排除 一、相关性证据可以依据法律规定被排除 二、法官行使自由裁量权原因而被排除的相关性证据 三、因为公共政策原因而被排除的相关性证据 第五章性格作为证据 第一节概述 一、什么是性格证据 二、性格作为证据的一般前提 第二节民事案件中的性格证据 一、一般规则 二、例外情况 第三节刑事案件中的性格证据 一、一般规则 二、例外情况 第四节反强奸条例 一、一般规定 二、例外情况 第五节特定的不当行为 一、一般规定 二、例外情况 三、性骚扰案件及骚扰儿童案件 第六节习惯作为证据 第六章言词证据 第一节证人的作证能力 一、作为证人的基本条件
美国FBI犯罪心理测试题 题目是没有所谓正确答案的,题目不是判断一个人的IQ,而是判断一个人是不是心理变态,不同的人会有不同的答案.如果你的心理正常~你几乎想不到所谓的"标准答案".只要你认为正确就是答案,没有错对,如果你真的答中了那个"标准答案"那你90%就是心理变态.如果你看到题目不经思考马上可以想到变态答案,你或多或少有不同程度的变态,这些绝对不是乱编,都是FBI的心理专家写的,可以很正确测定一个人心理状态的题目。 这些测试题目你不要专门去想变态的答案,你看到题目后,不经过考虑首先得出想法是怎么样,才可以测试你自己的心理状况.不要看了标题就转牛尖的去想专门那些变态的答案,这些绝对不是IQ测试,你根本不用为了要找一个自己认为够cool的答案伤脑筋.其实那些很多题目答案对正常人来说根本就没有得解,想不到有答案就是最好的答案,如果你真想到了变态的答案不是表示你聪明,是表示你对一件事情想法与正常人有很多的出入,极很有可能心理出问题。 第一题：企鹅肉 一个男科学家回忆说：他和他的朋友去南极考察，但是他中途中了雪盲，什么都看不到。所以他们在南极游荡，最后只能生吃企鹅来维持生命。但是他朋友最后还是没有挺住，最后死了。他一个人继续走了一天，最后被救了回去。第二天他特意去企鹅店吃企鹅，但是回来后竟然自杀了。为什么？ 心理严重变态答：男孩以前曾和女友一起去北极考察，因为没东西吃，女孩把自己的肉一片片割给男孩吃，骗他说是企鹅肉，结果男孩活下来了，女孩却饿死了。多年后男孩吃到了真正的企鹅肉，终于明白当时女孩的苦心，伤心之下，自杀徇情。 第二题：跳火车 一个人坐火车去临镇看病，看完之后病全好了。回来的路上火车经过一个隧道，这个人就跳车自杀了。
1 Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JOSEPH E. CORCORAN v. MARK LEVENHAGEN, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA STATE PRISON ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 08–10495. Decided October 20, 2009 P ER C URIAM. An Indiana jury convicted Joseph Corcoran of four counts of murder. Corcoran was sentenced to death. After Corcoran’s challenges to his sentence in the Indiana courts failed, he sought federal habeas relief. Corcoran argued in his federal habeas petition that: (1) the Indiana trial court committed various errors at the sentencing phase; (2) his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment; (3) Indiana’s capital sentencing statute was unconstitutional; (4) the prosecution committed misconduct at sentencing; and (5) he should not be executed because he suffers from a men-tal illness. See Corcoran v. Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719, 726 (ND Ind. 2007). The District Court granted habeas relief on Corcoran’s claim of a Sixth Amendment violation, and ordered the state courts to resentence Cor-coran to a penalty other than death. Id., at 725–726. The District Court did not address Corcoran’s other arguments relating to his sentence, noting that they were “rendered moot” by the order that Corcoran be resentenced because of the Sixth Amendment violation. Id., at 734. The Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s Sixth Amendment ruling. Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F. 3d 703, 712, 714 (2008). Then, without mentioning Corcoran’s other sentencing claims, the Seventh Circuit remanded “with instructions to deny the writ,” stating that “Indiana is at liberty to reinstate the death penalty.” Id., at 714. Cor-coran sought rehearing, arguing that the Court of Appeals should have allowed the District Court to consider his