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原文：
Corporate Board Attributes, Team Effectiveness and
Financial Performance
A Team-Based Model of Corporate Board Effectiveness
The existing literature examining teams and knowledge-based work groups demonstrates a causal link between team practices or attributes, effectiveness, and outcomes (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Kirkman and Rosen, 1999; Marks et al., 2001). Extending on the literature regarding team effectiveness, some governance scholars have started to focus on managerial competence and empowerment arguments to help explain organizational performance differences (Davis et al., 1997; Hendry, 2002; Shen, 2003). In their seminal theoretical work, Forbes and Milliken (1999) integrated literature on corporate boards and team effectiveness arguing that board effectiveness is identified by the same criteria as many previous models of team effectiveness. Further, they suggest that the various board demographics typically used in board research, such as insider/outsider ratio, board size, and tenure, are expected to influence overall team effectiveness independently. Similarly, Sonnenfeld (2002) describes effective boards as being distinguished by ‘robust, effective social systems’ and contends that board demographics between Forbes Magazine’s (2001) most-admired and least-admired companies are actually similar. This suggests that structural characteristics in and of themselves do not differentiate between high-performing and low-performing boards. Sonnenfeld (2002, p. 106) goes on to state, ‘We need to consider not only how we structure the work of a board but also how we manage the social system a board actually is.’ This is consistent with the conclusion of Papadakis et al. (1998) that decision-specific and relationship attributes, rather than board demographics, represent the greatest influence on the strategic decision-making process.
Drawing from both the corporate board and groups/teams research, we argue that the same conditions enabling workgroups to achieve their goals should be related to corporate board effectiveness. Others have acknowledged this relationship, but in a
less explicit way (e.g. Daily et al., 2003; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2005; Sonnenfeld, 2004a). So rather than develop an original model of boards as teams, we apply previous research on the attributes of highper forming teams to boards of directors (Mohrman et al., 1995). Hence, we recognize that the relationships between group inputs, processes and outcomes depend on factors that are specific to the type of group under study and the specific criteria of effectiveness that are being considered (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Mathieu et al., 2008).
We apply a model of group effectiveness that fits within a larger framework that has dominated groups and teams research for decades (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2008). Although it has been modified and extended over the years, the basic input–process–output model (IPO) holds that contextual factors and other individual and team level antecedents ‘enable and constrain’ (p. 412) team member interactions and define team processes which in turn drive task effectiveness (Mathieu et al., 2008). In this study, we focus on team inputs using an established model derived from years of research on employee participation and involvement (Cotton, 1993; Galbraith, 1973; Lawler, 1986; Vandenberg et al., 1999). Specifically, we draw upon Mohrman et al.’s (1995) model of team effectiveness, which is based on five key attributes of highperforming groups, and has been previously applied to corporate boards (Conger et al., 2001). The key attributes highlighted in this model include: (1) knowledge that is closely aligned with the organization’s needs and requirements; (2) current and comprehensive information drawn from multiple sources and perspectives;
(3) sufficient power to reach independent decisions, as well as to evaluate and challenge the CEO; (4) sufficient incentives, typically achieved through rewards systems to align directors’ and owners’interests; and (5) sufficient opportunity and time for the board and committees to prepare for and complete tasks.
By applying this established model of group effectiveness we hope to contribute to our understanding of corporate boards in several ways. First is to empirically demonstrate that board effectiveness is related to the same team inputs that have been shown to impact group performance in other contexts. Second is to provide an
integrative framework for the existing research on board characteristics and test their relationship to actual board task performance. While many of these attributes have been examined independently for their relationships to firm financial performance, we test them together for their relationships to board performance as rated by directors themselves. In the following paragraphs, we draw on multiple theoretical perspectives to discuss each of these five team attributes and present hypotheses about their relationship to overall board effectiveness.
Knowledge and board effectiveness. Board research has long recognized the importance of directors’ abilities, judgment, experience, and knowledge to effective governance (e.g. Copeland and Towl, 1947). Coming from a resource dependence view of corporate boards, knowledge has most often been conceptualized as the stock of information or background expertise that directors possess in aggregate. These areas of expertise contribute to overall cognitive resources and enhance the scope and quality of the board’s decisions and its effectiveness (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; O’Neal and Thomas, 1996). Given that direct measurement of board knowledge is extremely difficult to obtain, various studies have used a number of different proxies as measures of board strategic and operational knowledge over the years. These include board interlocks (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998), board member functional background (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001), and board tenure (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Westphal and Zajac, 1995).
While these various measures of board knowledge are important, research also indicates that the ability to translate board knowledge into good strategic decisions depends on several moderating factors. There should be sufficient diversity among board members to promote discussion of a wide range of options (Hillman et al., 2002), the group norms and process contribute to the open airing of opinions (Sonnenfeld, 2002), and most importantly, the benefits of specific types of knowledge are context specific. For example, Carpenter and Westphal (2001) found that board experience and expertise with specific challenges facing a company (such as an unstable competitive environment or a takeover bid) improved monitoring as well as advice and counsel. This, in turn, improves firm performance in specific contexts.
Board Effectiveness and Firm Performance
Prior research on corporate governance has suggested multiple ways in which boards may contribute to organizational effectiveness (e.g. Conger et al., 2001; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). From a resource dependence perspective, effective boards strengthen ties with the external environment by generating business ties and maintaining a positive corporate image (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983). Effective boards are also thought to contribute to the development of better organizational strategies. Johnson et al. (1996) argue that effective boards allow top managers to tap the breadth of knowledge possessed by outside directors to complement the depth of firm-specific knowledge of executives. Using a collaborative approach, boards are given the ability to advise, deliver feedback, and enhance strategy formulation (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999).
From an agency/control perspective, effective boards provide a necessary check on top management (Dalton and Kesner, 1985), providing oversight and tying executive rewards to performance (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Generally speaking, boards are expected to evaluate company and CEO performance and take action when needed to protect shareholder interests (Golden and Zajac, 2001). Thus, board effectiveness across a broad range of roles, including collaboration and control mechanisms, should be related to company performance (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).
There is an extensive literature on corporate boards that has examined a number of board actions to determine whether boards are behaving effectively from a shareholder perspective, including studies of CEO compensation, the adoption of poison pills, adoption of greenmail and other anti-takeover provisions (e.g. Conyon and Peck, 1998; Frankforter et al., 2000). However, we know of no previous studies which have been able to directly measure board effectiveness from inside the boardroom in a way that might be used to directly examine the theoretical ‘black box’ between board practices or attributes and performance. Given the number of previous studies that have tied many of the aforementioned board attributes to company performance, we expect that board effectiveness will actually act as a mediator of the
board attributes–performance relationships that have been extensively studied by governance scholars.
Moreover, we suggest that examining these attributes together, based on theory derived from research on effective teams, has the advantage of potentially integrating this vast set of studies into a more coherent story of how the practices work together to support better corporate governance. For example, Roberts et al. (2005) argue that a prerequisite for effective boards is for directors to become engaged in carrying out their various responsibilities to the company. This requires a significant time commitment to learn and keep up with the various intricacies of the company’s operations and time is a serious constraint for most directors (Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Shen (2005) supports this argument but suggests that without appropriate incentives in place the likelihood of directors willingly putting in the time to adhere to their duties is low.
This mediating role of board effectiveness is implied in previous boards research although not empirically tested. For instance, Golden and Zajac (2001) show that board demography and processes significantly affect strategic change. This essentially implies that board attributes impact board effectiveness, leading to higher-quality strategic decisions and higher levels of organizational performance. Similarly, Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) comprehensive theoretical model shows how board task performance (i.e. board effectiveness) acts as a mediator, or intervening construct, between board processes and firm performance. Further, they argue that board characteristics are antecedents to task performance. Following these arguments and the many previous studies on corporate governance demonstrating the importance of boards of directors to the successful operation of the corporation (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), we propose two more hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Corporations with more effective boards will demonstrate higher levels of financial performance.
Hypothesis 2(a–e): Board effectiveness mediates the relationship between board attributes – (a) knowledge, (b) information, (c) power, (d) incentives, (e) opportunity/ time – and the financial performance of the company.
Taken together, the seven hypotheses discussed above test the comprehensive model that boards with sufficient knowledge, information, power, incentives, and opportunity/ time are more likely to be effective, and more effective boards will be associated with superior corporate performance. Figure 1 visually demonstrates the overall model.
Sample and Data Collection
To minimize the effects of method variance, each stage of the hypothesized model was operationalized using various types of survey and/or archival data. The data for some of the board attributes and the effectiveness measure were drawn from an annual written survey of the directors of all Fortune 1000 companies conducted by Korn/Ferry International, an international executive search firm, in conjunction with the Center for Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California. Data were taken from the survey of 1996 boards in which 1151 chief executives, inside directors, and outside directors responded.
Survey data were then matched with archival data on boards taken from proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES), and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which publishes detailed listings of corporate governance provisions for individual firms. The IRRC data are derived from several sources, including corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements, annual reports, and 10-K and 10-Q documents filed with the SEC. Finally, company performance data were taken from the COMPUSTAT database for years 1995–98.
In order to match the survey data with archival information, company names were recorded for as many respondents as possible using two different methods. Directors were asked to give the name of the company for the board that they described in the survey, but this question was strictly optional. Second, company names were taken from the return address on the envelopes in which the director returned the survey. Due to specific instructions on the survey, this method was only used when the respondent self-identified as an inside director of a firm.[2] This process originally identified 420 board members from 335 different publicly-traded
companies.
In cases where there were multiple respondents from the same company, one was chosen at random to represent that particular board. There were 71 companies for which there were two or more respondents. Fifty-seven of these had only two respondents, with a maximum of five directors responding from a single board. An evaluation of the inter-rater reliability between respondents from the same company was made with the 71 boards that could be identified as having multiple respondents. Paired sample t-tests indicated that one group of 71 responses could not be distinguished from a second group. Overall, directors from the same company agreed 64–84 per cent of the time, depending on the particular question. There were 39 companies for which complete data were available for all 11 items used to measure board effectiveness from two directors. Even with a small sample of repeat responses we were able to find significant association between the respondents.
Source:G. Tyge Payne,George S, Benson and David L.Finegold,2009. “Corporate Board Attributes, Team Effectiveness and Fin ancial Performance”. Journal of Management Studies,pp.11
译文：
公司董事会属性、团队效能和财务绩效
基于团队的董事会效率模型
现有研究团队和基于知识的工作小组的文献表明，团队之间的行为或属性，效能与结果之间存在因果关系（Cohen 和Bailey, 1997; Kirkman 和Rosen, 1999; Marks 等, 2001）。在团队效能研究的拓展方面，一些管理学者已经开始关注管理能力和赋能，以解释组织绩效的差异（Davis et al., 1997; Hendry, 2002; Shen, 2003）。Forbes and Milliken（1999）整合了企业董事会和团队效能方面的研究，认为董事会的有效性确定标准与以前许多的团队效能标准相同。此外，他们建议董事会人口通常在董事会研究中使用，例如内幕或是董事会人口的比例，董事会规模，以及任期，预计都将影响整体团队效能的独立。同样，Sonnenfeld（2002）介绍指出，杰出有效的董事会能作为‘稳健，有效的社会制度’，并认为福布斯杂志（2001）最欣赏和最不尊敬的公司董事会人口实际上是相似的。这就表明，其本身的结构特点并没有区分高绩效和低绩效的董事会。Sonnenfeld（2002, P106）指出：“我们需要考虑的不仅是我们如何组织了一个董事会的工作，实际上也要知道如何管理我们的一个董事会制度。”这是与Papadakis等人的结论是一致的。Papadakis等（1998）提出了这个决定的具体属性和关系，而不是董事会人口，表明这在战略决策过程的影响最大。
借鉴于对公司董事会和团队的研究，我们认为，在相同的条件下，为了使工作组实现他们的目标应该与公司董事会的有效性相联系。其他人也承认这种关系，但用的是一个不太明显的方式（例如Daily 等, 2003; Finkelstein 和Hambrick, 1996; Finkelstein 和Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2005; Sonnenfeld, 2004）。因此，不是作为一个团队开发董事会的原始模型，我们采用的是对以往高层董事会的属性的研究（Mohrman，1995）。因此，针对所研究型组和有效性正在考虑的具体标准，我们认识到，投入、过程和结果的关系受多种因素的影响。(Forbes 和Milliken, 1999; Mathieu等, 2008）。
我们采用团队效能的模型，即适合在一个较大的框架内，占据主导地位的团队几十年来的研究模型（Cohen 和Bailey, 1997; Mathieu等, 2008）。虽然经过这么多年，它已被修改，但该模型的基本内容（IPO）认为，环境因素以及其他个
人和队伍等级前提是‘启用和约束’（第412页），以及团队成员的互动过程，并反过来确定团队这激励任务的成效（(Mathieu等，2008）。在这项研究中，我们注重建立团队投入使用的模型，从而从多年的员工参与和研究中，推导参与制度（Cotton, 1993; Galbraith, 1973; Lawler, 1986; Vandenberg 等, 1999）。具体来说，我们借鉴Mohrman（1995）团队效率，这是基于五个关键属性的高层组，并已应用到公司董事会此前的模型（Conger等，2001）。在这个模型中，突出的关键属性包括：（1）知识是需要密切与组织的要求保持一致；（2）现行的观点和全面的信息，从多个来源绘制；（3）有足够的权力，达到独立决定，以及评估和挑战的CEO；（4）有足够的激励，通常是通过奖励系统达到对董事及业主的利益；（5）充分的机会，为董事会和委员会的时间来准备和完成任务。
通过应用这一团队的成效，我们希望在既定模式的几个方面作出贡献以及我们对公司董事会的理解。首先，经验表明，董事会效率是关系到同一个团队，已被证实在其他公司投入表现方面产生影响。其次，董事会特征提供了一个综合框架，研究和测试他们现有的实际董事的工作绩效的关系。虽然他们这些公司的业绩关系属性有很多已经过独立审查，但我们一起测试他们性能的关系，是作为董事会对董事本身评级。在下面的段落中，我们借鉴多种角度理论来讨论这五个小组的属性，并询问其董事会整体效益的关系。
知识和董事会的有效性。长期以来，董事会研究一直承认董事的能力、判断、经验、有效治理和知识的重要性。（如Copeland和Towl，1947年）。公司董事会从资源依赖的观点看，董事合共持有的知识作为最经常被概念化的信息或背景知识存量。这些领域的专业知识有助于整体认知资源，提高规模和董事会的决定和其成效（Hillman 和Dalziel, 2003; O’Neal 和Thomas, 1996）的质量。鉴于董事会所知，获得直接测量是非常困难的，各种研究已经使用了多年不同的代理，作为董事会战略措施和操作知识。这些措施包括董事联结（Haunschild和Beckman，1998），董事会成员的功能背景（Carpenter和Westphal，2001），和董事会使用权（Golden和Zajac, 2001; Westphal 和Zajac，1995）。
这些不同董事会的知识是重要的措施。研究还表明，董事会知识转化为良好的战略决策依靠知悉若干干扰因素而定。董事会成员之间应该有足够的多样性，能促进多种选择的讨论（Hillman等，2002年），团队规范和流程有助于意见公
开宣布（Sonnenfeld，2002），最重要的好处时具体的知识类型上下文相关。例如，Carpenter和Westphal（2001）发现，董事会成员的经验，面临公司（如竞争环境不稳定或收购）的具体挑战的专业知识以及改进监测作为指导和建议，这反过来又提高了企业在特定情况下的性能。
董事会效率与公司绩效
在此之前对公司治理的研究已经表明多种方法，董事会可能有助于组织效能（如Conger 等, 2001;Forbes 和Milliken, 1999）。从资源依赖的角度看，产生有效的董事会需要加强业务联系并保持良好的企业形象（Bazerman和Schoorman，1983）以及与外部环境的关系。有效的董事会效益也被认为有助于提高组织的战略。约翰逊等人（1996）认为，有效的董事会允许高层管理人员挖掘外部董事所具备的补充企业特有的知识深度和广度管理人员。用合作的方式，董事会给出能力和指导，并提供反馈，从而增强战略制定（Sundaramurthy 和Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999）。
从机构/控制的角度，提供了一个有效的董事会高层管理人员（Dalton 和Kesner, 1985），提供监督和必要的检查搭售行政奖励与业绩（Sundaramurthy 和Lewis, 2003）。一般而言，董事会预计公司和经营者业绩评价和在必要时采取行动，以保障股东利益（Golden和Zajac，2001）。因此，在董事会的角色，包括协作和控制机制，广泛的成效，应与公司业绩相联系。（Cohen a和Bailey，1997; Sundaramurthy和Lewis，2003）。
有一个广泛的文献在企业董事会已审查了董事会的一些行动，以确定是否有效地从股东行为的角度来看，包括总裁的薪酬，讹诈和其他反收购条款的规定（例如，Conyon a和Peck, 1998；Frankforter 等, 2000）。但是，我们不知道这已经能够从内部直接测量的方式测量董事会，而董事会效益以往的研究，可直接用于检验的“黑匣子”在董事会常规或属性和性能之间的理论。鉴于以往的一些研究已经联系了上述董事会对公司业绩的许多属性，我们预计董事会效益，实际上充当董事会属性和绩效的关系的中间人，被广泛的治理学者所研究。
此外，我们建议把这些属性集合在一起研究，那么基于高效的团队从研究得出的理论具有潜在的整合优势，这一庞大的研究将使如何协同工作的做法变成更为连贯的故事来更好地支持公司治理。例如，罗伯茨等人（2005）认为，一个有
效的董事会董事的先决条件是为公司履行各项职责。这需要大量的时间投入到学习，加上公司的业务和各种位，董事心甘情愿把时间投入、坚持自己的职责的可能性并不高。
这种董事会效能的中介作用，是隐含在以前没有实证检验的董事会研究中。例如，Golden和Zajac（2001）表明，董事会人口和进程会产生重大的战略性转变。这实质上意味着董事会影响董事会效益的属性，从而产生更高质量的战略决策和组织性能更高的水平。同样，福布斯和米利肯公司（1999）全面的理论模型显示了如何充当中间人协调委员会任务的性能（即董事会效益），或介入建设董事会与公司业绩的过程。此外，他们认为，董事会特征是任务绩效的原因。以下这些参数和以往许多关于公司治理的研究表明了董事会对公司运作的重要性，（Baysinger 和Butler, 1985），我们提出两个假设：
假设1：公司的更有效的董事会效益将展示更高层次的财务表现。
假设2（A至E）：董事会效能介于3董事会属性之间的关系——（一）知识，（二）信息，（三）电力，（四）奖励，（五）机会/时间和公司的财务表现。
两者合计，以上七个假设讨论检验的综合模型有足够的知识，信息，电力，奖励和机会，时间可能是更有效的，还有更有效的董事会与卓越的公司业绩。样品和数据采集
为了尽量减少方法差异的影响，每个阶段的操作性假设模型使用不同类型的调查或存档的数据。这些为董事会的属性和效益措施的有效性得出的数据，来自每年财富1000的所有受科恩/费里国际，国际猎头公司进行书面调查公司的董事，结合南加利福尼亚大学有效组织研究中心。数据取自1996年的董事会中，1151年行政首长，内部董事和外部董事的调查作出回应。
调查数据，然后再配上从美国证券交易委员会（SEC），预算的制度经纪系统（IBES），与投资者责任研究中心（IRRC）在董事会上提交的代理声明的档案资料，该公司出版的详细清单的企业采取董事会提交委托书档案数据个别企业管治的条款。该IRRC数据有多个来源，包括公司章程和规定，代理报表，年度报告和10 - K表和10 - Q文件，提交给美国证券交易委员会备案。最后，公司业绩数据取自1995年—1998年的COMPUSTAT数据库。
为了配合档案信息的调查数据，公司名称被尽可能使用两种不同的方法去录
用许多的受访者。董事被要求为董事会给予该公司的的名称，于是，他们描述在调查中所获得的名称，而这个情况是可选的。第二，公司名称取自在信封上的董事选举产生的调查返回地址。由于这么做要对调查作出具体说明，故这种方法只适用于当被告作为一个公司的内部董事。通过这个过程可以从335家不同的公开上市的公司中确定最初的420位董事会成员。
在档案资料那里有来自同一公司的多个受访者，从中随意选择一人代表该董事会。其中，有71家公司有两个或更多的受访者。而这中间的七分之五是只有两个受访者，其余中的一个由五名董事的单独董事会响应最大。这71家公司中，从同一家公司的受访者中做出的信用评价，可确定有多个受访者的公司。配对样本t检验表明，第一组71个回应有别于第二组。整体而言，来自同一家公司董事的64%-84%同意的时候，就视具体问题而定。共有39家公司用其完整的11项数据来衡量两个董事会的实效性。即使是一个小样本的重复的反应，我们能够找到受访者之间显示的相关性。
出处：G. Tyge Payne,George S. Benson,David L. Finegold.公司董事会属性，团队效能和财务绩效.管理研究期刊,2009(12):P11
绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译____________________________________________________________________ ________________________ Performance management-how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means,
英文文献及翻译 文献题目An Overview of Servlet and JSP Technology 文献作者Nagle ,Wiegley 题目翻译Servlet和JSP技术简述 参考人 院 (系) 专业班级 学号
1 A Servlet's Job Servlets are Java programs that run on Web or application servers, acting as a middle layer between requests coming from Web browsers or other HTTP clients and databases or applications on the HTTP server. Their job is to perform the following tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. Figure 1-1Web middleware role 1.1 Read the explicit data sent by the client. The end user normally enters this data in an HTML form on a Web page. However, the data could also come from an applet or a custom HTTP client program. 1.2 Read the implicit HTTP request data sent by the browser. Figure 1-1 shows a single arrow going from the client to the Web server (the layer where servlets and JSP execute), but there are really two varieties of data: the explicit data that the end user enters in a form and the behind-the-scenes HTTP information. Both varieties are critical. The HTTP information includes cookies, information about media types and compression schemes the browser understands, and so on. 1.3 Generate the results. This process may require talking to a database, executing an RMI or EJB call, invoking a Web service, or computing the response directly. Your real data may be in a relational database. Fine. But your database probably doesn't speak HTTP or return results in HTML, so the Web browser can't talk directly to the database. Even if it could, for security reasons, you probably would not want it to. The same argument applies to most other applications.You need the Web middle layer to extract the results inside a document.
旅游服务贸易外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
旅游服务贸易的国际竞争力：罗马尼亚的案例 引言 旅游业是唯一的可以为任何发展水平的国家提供贸易机会的服务活动。然而，它也是一个很大程度因为国家的能力和在全球经济中的表现而又有明确的利益分配不均行业，而这又需要提高自己的竞争力。 自20世纪90年代初，罗马尼亚旅游业经历了出口量，生长速率和结构的重大变化。这些不同的波动都影响了罗马尼亚在国际旅游市场上相对的竞争地位并引起了其旅游贸易平衡的变化。同时，新的和更多的错杂的欧式建筑，引起了罗马尼亚的区域旅游竞争力的显著变化。 在此背景下，本文试图提出一个框架，以竞争力和旅游贸易表现之间的关系为重点，来评估罗马尼亚的旅游服务贸易的国际竞争力。 一、国际竞争力视角：国际竞争力之与国际旅游业的相关性 国际竞争力的概念，尽管有争议，难以捉摸，但现在已经得到认可，并继续吸引世界各地的学者和决策者的关注。 到目前为止，为提高国际竞争力已采取措施，都被认为是在经济层面进行的(加瑞利，2003)通常是指一个国家生产的商品和服务，以满足国际市场的考验，并同时保持和增加公民的收入的能力(欧洲委员会，2007)。 由于竞争力最终取决于一国企业在国内和国际的市场成功，所以对竞争力的注意力都集中在企业层面的竞争力上(波特，1990)，对于此的普遍理解是指“……该公司保持，并更好的是，扩大其全球市场份额，增加和扩大利润的能力” (克拉克和盖，1998, 经济合作与发展组织，1993)。 因此，虽然广泛流传但是国际竞争力作为与国家经济和其国际贸易相关
的理论基础已经不太在学术文献进行分析。因此，一个国家国际竞争力的性质，效益和局限性仍然含糊不清(科尔德威尔，2000,克鲁格曼，1994, 1996)。 国际竞争力，是指一个国家在货物和服务贸易方面巩固和保持贸易优势相对于世界其他地区的贸易优势。 每当一个国家的经济福利通过贸易流量的增加，或通过从初始平衡状态的贸易条件的改变而增加，他的国际竞争力都会得到提高(科尔德威尔，2000)。 贸易理论表示，经济福利依赖于一个国家有比较优势的货物和服务的生产。这实际上意味着当生产符合一国的比较优势的情况时国际竞争力能得到保障。如果一国能在国际上表现良好并在出口市场竞争成功，这可能就是他们健全的国际竞争力的标志。 因此，在国际上，竞争力定义为一个经济体能够吸引其出口需求和投资供给需求的能力和在所有社会规范内提升公民生活水平的能力。这反过来又取决于宏观和微观经济政策，影响生产的经济生产率要素和经营成本的法规和制度。 一个可用的文献回顾和实证证据支持国际竞争力可以解释为在一定程度上，一个国家的出口能力这一观点(道乐和沃尔夫，1993, 格博格等. 2004)。还有就是，事实上，是出口表现和国际竞争力之间的循环关系。出口是国际竞争力的第一衡量指标。出口情况的改善会导致了一个国家的竞争力提升。这种效果是一个企业的技能，知识，创新和运用新技术并能够在一个成功的商业方式中利用技术机会等的结果。 另一方面，为了在竞争激烈的全球市场努力成功实现出口，一个国家被迫提高竞争力。更具竞争力的国家，它的经济更强大。因此，它更有能力在全球市场竞争，以吸引具有较高的知识，技能，水平人们去购买新技术等，
附录A：外文文献（译文） 跨国公司财务 有重大国外经营业务的公司经常被称作跨国公司或多国企业。跨国公司必须考虑许多并不会对纯粹的国内企业产生直接影响的财务因素，其中包括外币汇率、各国不同的利率、国外经营所用的复杂会计方法、外国税率和外国政府的干涉等。 公司财务的基本原理仍然适用于跨国企业。与国内企业一样，它们进行的投资项目也必须为股东提供比成本更多的收益，也必须进行财务安排，用尽可能低的成本进行融资。净现值法则同时适用于国内经营和国外经营，但是，国外经营应用净现值法则时通常更加复杂。也许跨国财务中最复杂的是外汇问题。当跨国公司进行资本预算决策或融资决策时，外汇市场能为其提供信息和机会。外汇、利率和通货膨胀三者的相互关系构成了汇率基本理论。即：购买力平价理论、利率平价理论和预测理论。 跨国公司融资决策通常要在以下三种基本方法中加以选择，我们将讨论每种方法的优缺点。 (1) 把现金由国内输出用于国外经营业务； (2) 向投资所在国借贷； (3) 向第三国借贷。 1专业术语 学习财务的学生通常会听到一个单词总在耳边嗡嗡作响：全球化( g l o b a l i z a t i o n )。学习资金市场的全球化必须首先掌握一些新的术语，以下便是在跨国财务中，还有本章中最常用到的一些术语： (1) 美国存托证（American Depository Receipt,ADR）。它是在美国发行的一种代表外国股权的证券，它使得外国股票可在美国上市交易。外国公司运用以美元发行的ADR，来扩大潜在美国投资者群体。ADR以两种形式代表大约690家外国公司：一是在某个交易所挂牌交易的ADR，称为公司保荐形式；另一种是非保荐形式，这些ADR通常由投资银行持有并为其做市。这两种形式的ADR均可由个人投资和买卖，但报纸每天只报告保荐形式
外文文献原稿和译文 原稿 Performance management - how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected
文献出处：Barattieri A. The mechanism of service trade liberalization[J]. Journal of International Economics, 2014, 92(1): 1-13. （声明：本译文归百度文库所有，完整译文请到百度文库。） 原文 The mechanism of service trade liberalization Barattieri A Abstract In this paper, Service trade liberalization is the key areas of the United States to promote the TPP negotiations, the United States in the negotiations are pushing mechanism of a high standard of service trade liberalization. In this paper the progress of the TPP negotiations and services trade issues important position, on the basis of the acceptance, architecture design, focus on services, regulatory consistency four aspects in the TPP uncovers the "high standards" service trade liberalization mechanism establishment. American "high standards" service trade liberalization mechanism is tailored to the interests of the United States, actually services in the service of the United States. These mechanisms are through to strengthen and promote the TPP platform, forming reversed transmission to other countries. Key words: the TPP; The United States; Service trade liberalization; High standards; Mechanism design America is the first largest exporter global trade in services, and for many years, continues to service trade surplus. Competitive advantage based on service industry and service industry The importance of promoting American exports, jobs and economic growth, the United States in the multilateral, bilateral and regional multiple layers jointly promoting service trade liberalization. In the Uruguay round negotiations, the United States has overcome many obstacles, for the first time to include the Service Trade in multilateral negotiations, contributed to the general Agreement on Trade in services (the Genre - al Agreement on Trade and Service,
财务风险管理 尽管近年来金融风险大大增加，但风险和风险管理不是当代的主要问题。全球市场越来越多的问题是，风险可能来自几千英里以外的与这些事件无关的国外市场。意味着需要的信息可以在瞬间得到，而其后的市场反应，很快就发生了。经济气候和市场可能会快速影响外汇汇率变化、利率及大宗商品价格，交易对手会迅速成为一个问题。因此，重要的一点是要确保金融风险是可以被识别并且管理得当的。准备是风险管理工作的一个关键组成部分。 什么是风险？ 风险给机会提供了基础。风险和暴露的条款让它们在含义上有了细微的差别。风险是指有损失的可能性，而暴露是可能的损失，尽管他们通常可以互换。风险起因是由于暴露。金融市场的暴露影响大多数机构，包括直接或间接的影响。当一个组织的金融市场暴露，有损失的可能性，但也是一个获利或利润的机会。金融市场的暴露可以提供战略性或竞争性的利益。 风险损失的可能性事件来自如市场价格的变化。事件发生的可能性很小，但这可能导致损失率很高，特别麻烦，因为他们往往比预想的要严重得多。换句话说，可能就是变异的风险回报。由于它并不总是可能的，或者能满意地把风险消除，在决定如何管理它中了解它是很重要的一步。识别暴露和风险形式的基础需要相应的财务风险管理策略。 财务风险是如何产生的呢？ 无数金融性质的交易包括销售和采购，投资和贷款，以及其他各种业务活动，产生了财务风险。它可以出现在合法的交易中，新项目中，兼并和收购中，债务融资中，能源部分的成本中，或通过管理的活动，利益相关者，竞争者，外国政府，或天气出现。当金融的价格变化很大，它可以增加成本，降低财政收入，或影响其他有不利影响的盈利能力的组织。金融波动可能使人们难以规划和预算商品和服务的价格，并分配资金。 有三种金融风险的主要来源： 1、金融风险起因于组织所暴露出来的市场价格的变化，如利率、汇率、和大宗商品价格。 2、引起金融风险的行为有与其他组织的交易如供应商、客户，和对方在金融衍生产品中的交易。 3、由于内部行动或失败的组织，特别是人、过程和系统所造成的金融风险。 什么是财务风险管理？ 财务风险管理是用来处理金融市场中不确定的事情的。它涉及到一个组织所面临的评估和组织的发展战略、内部管理的优先事项和当政策一致时的财务风险。企业积极应对金融风险可以使企业成为一个具有竞争优势的组织。它还确保管理，业务人员，利益相关者，董事会董事在对风险的关键问题达成协议。金融风险管理组织就必须作出那些不被接受的有关风险的决定。那些被动不采取行动的战略是在默认情况下接受所有的风险，组织使用各种策略和产品来管理金融风险。重要的是要了解这些产品和战略方面，通过工作来减少该组织内的风险承受能力和目标范围内的风险。 风险管理的策略往往涉及衍生工具。在金融机构和有组织的交易所，衍生物广泛地进行
绩效考核外文文献及翻译 外文文献 1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His or her line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. If you are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits down and talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often as you can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole process to be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; c orporate social responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would then
毕业论文文献综述 国际经济与贸易 中英金融服务贸易国际竞争力比较研究 金融服务贸易国际竞争力相关理论综述 服务贸易是以服务作为交易标的的一种贸易行为。《服务贸易总协定》(GATS)所界定的国际服务贸易是指以过境交付、境外消费、商业存在和自然人流动这四种形式进行的各国间的服务交易。该定义已成为有一定权威性和指导性的定义为各国接受。 根据《服务贸易总协定》中的服务部门清单，可以将服务贸易分为12类：商业性服务，销售服务，金融服务，娱乐服务，通讯服务，教育服务，卫生服务，运输服务，建筑服务，环境服务，旅游服务和其他服务。而对于金融服务贸易，国内外并没有确切的定义。本文将对金融服务贸易国外及国内有代表性的研究进行综述。 一、GATS与OECD对金融服务贸易的定义 根据GATS的定义，金融服务贸易是指由一成员国的金融服务提供者所提供的任何金融性质的服务。它包括两个部分：所有保险和保险相关的服务、银行和其他金融服务（保险除外），其中其他金融服务指证券和金融信息服务。 经济合作和发展组织（OECD）对金融服务贸易的定义为由金融机构提供服务的收入，或者接受付出的支持，包括得到的和付出的直接投资收益（未分配收益和利息）；从其他金融投资得到的和付出的收益（得到的和付出的利息和红利）；得到的、付出的手续费和佣金。 可见，经济合作和发展组织对金融服务贸易的界定强调了金融服务贸易交易的提供方，而忽略了金融服务贸易的消费方。金融服务贸易的发展主要是以此换取其他贸易领域的发展，而且金融服务贸易可以促进本国金融业与国际金融业的接轨，从而在国际竞争中促进本国金融业的发展。 二、国外对金融服务贸易相关研究 对于金融服务贸易研究，国外学者从不同角度出发，有不同的看法。 列为恩（1996）认为，各种金融服务可以实现五种基本功能：方便商品和劳务的交易；易于风险管理；加速资源流动；获取信息，评估企业和配置资本；提供公司法人治理。同时，更多的相关文献表示，金融中介可以降低由于信息不对称产生的管理成本（戴蒙德1984；威廉森1987）也可以对规模经济产生积极的效应。 莫施里安（Moshirian 1994）认为，金融服务贸易和制造业类似，一些基本要素赋予了
附件1：外文资料翻译译文 财务报表分析 A.财务比率 我们需要使用财务比率来分析财务报表，比较财务报表的分析方法不能真正有效的得出想要的结果，除非采取的是研究在报表中项目与项目之间关系的形式。例如，只是知道史密斯公司在一个特定的日期中拥有10000美元的现金余额，对我们是没有多大价值的。但是，假如我们知道，这种余额在这种平衡中有4%的流动负债，而一年前的现金余额有25%的流动负债。由于银行家对公司通常要求现金余额保持在银行信用度的20%，不管使用或不使用，如果公司的财务状况出现问题，我们可以立即发现。 我们可以对比比较财务报表中的项目，作出如下结论： 1. 项目之间的资产负债表比较： a）在资产负债表中的一个日期之间的比较，例如项目，现金与流动负债相比； b）同一项目在资产负债表中一个日期与另一个日期之间的比较，例如，现在的现金与一年前比较； c）比较两个项目之间在资产负债表中一个日期和一个相似比率在资产负债表中的另一个日期的比率，例如，现在现金流动负债的比率与另一个项目一年前的相似比率和已经标记的现金状况趋势的比较。 2．项目报表中收入和支出的比较： a）一定时期中的报表项目的比较； b）同一项目在报表中现阶段与上个阶段的比较； c）报表中项目之间的比率与去年相似比率的比较； 3．资产负债表中的项目与报表中收入和支出项目的比较： a）在这些报表项目之间的一个给定的时间内，例如，今年净利润可能以百分比计算今年净值； b）两个报表中项目之间的比率在这几年时间的比较，例如，净利润的比率占今年净值的百分比与去年或者前年的相似比率的比较 如果我们采用上述比较或比率，然后依次比较它们，我们的比较分析结果将获得重要意义：
一、激励理论的背景 在经济发展的过程中,劳动分工与交易的出现带来了激励问题。激励理论是行为科学中用于处理需要，动机，目标和行为四者之间关系的核心理论。行为科学认为人的动机来自需要，由需要确定人们的行为目标，激励则作用于人内心活动，激发，驱动和强化人的行为。哈佛大学维廉詹姆士研究表明：在没有激励措施下,下属一般仅能发挥工作能力的20%～30%，而当他受到激励后,其工作能力可以提升到80%～90%，所发挥的作用相当于激励前的3到4倍。日本丰田公司采取激励措施鼓励员工提建议，结果仅1983年一年，员工提了165万条建议，平均每人31条，它为公司带来900亿日元利润，相当于当年总利润的18%。由于激励的效果明显，所以各种组织为了提高生产效率，有些专家学者就开始了对激励理论的研究之中，探索激励的无穷潜力。 二、国外研究现状 国外对于激励理论有了大量的研究并获得了丰硕的成果。总体来说，可以分为两类激励理论。一类是以人的心理需求和动机为主要研究对象的激励理论，熟称“内容型激励理论”。另一类是以人的心理过程和行为过程相互作用的动态系统为研究对象的激励过程理论,它也被称作是“行为型激励理论”。 1 内容型激励理论 1.1 奠瑞的人类人格理论 这种理论认为，在面临着动态且不断变化的环境时，人们都是自适应的。它把需求分成了两种类型，即生理需求和心理需求。前者与人体基本生理过程的满足感有关，而后者所关注的是情绪上和精神上的满足感。 1.2 马斯洛的“需要层次”理论 美国心理学家马斯洛(A.H.Maslow)进一步发展了莫瑞的研究，在1954年出版的《动机与人格》一书中对该理论作了进一步的阐释。马斯洛认为人的需要可以划分为五个层次，从低到高依次为生理需要，安全需要，社交需要，尊熏需要，自我实现需要，且这五个层次的顺序，对每个人都是相同的。只有当较低层次的需要获得了基本满足后，下一个较高层次的需要才能成为主导需要。 1.3 赫茨伯格的激励—保健双因素理论 美国心理学家赫茨伯格因素理论打破了这一假设。他于1959年在《工作的激励》一书中提出了保健——激励因素理论，简称双因素理论。即保健因素和激励因素。保健因素可以用来体现高水平员工的不满意，激励因素可以用来体现高水平员工的满意度。他认为只有激励因素才能促发员工积极性,提高生产效率。 2 行为型激励理论 2.1 洛克的目标设置理论 2O世纪6O年代末，埃德温·A·洛克和他的同事们花了许多年的时间研究目标对于人类行为和绩效的效果。他们的研究导致了目标设置理论的创立并不断地得到验证，提出：指向一共同目标的工作意向是工作效率的主要源泉。他还提出了具体的设置目标的步骤。 2.2 亚当斯的公平理论 美国心理学家亚当斯(J.s.Adams)对员工受激励程度的大小与他人之间的关系进行研究，并在《工人关于工资不公平的内心冲突同其生产率的关系》(1962年与罗森合写)，《工
关于杭州中心地区服务业竞争力及其发展 战略的评价（节选） 郑建壮，中国浙江省浙江大学城市学院 江海霞，中国浙江省浙江工业大学 摘要：服务行业的竞争力是直接反映在区服务业的发展水平和潜在能力之中的。本文研究了杭州服务行业的发展现状，从中心区的角度构建了一个服务行业的评价指标体系，并分析了杭州每个中心城区服务业的可持续发展的优势和劣势。最后，文章给杭州的服务行业竞争力的提高提出了战略建议。 关键词：中心地区，服务业，竞争力 1. 引言 20世纪80年代以来，全球经济已呈现从“工业经济”转向于“服务经济”的变化趋势。服务业已成为全球经济好转的一个关键的引擎（2005年李和王），它在改善国家经济、增加就业率、调整产业结构和提高生活水平等方面的重要作用是显而易见的。一般来说一个地区的服务行业发展主要集中于中部地区，而不是郊区，因为中心区一般被视为一个城市经济发展的“心脏”，它在地理位置、交通和文化等方面都占有有利因素，不仅可增强生产要素、人口和产业聚集的力量，也有利于市场的发展。因此，中部地区正在成为服务行业的主要区域（李2007）。本文在分析杭州中心城区的服务业竞争力的基础上，进行了相关的评价，旨在寻找到一种有效的策略以提高城市的服务行业发展。 2. 服务产业竞争力的文献研究 大部分关于服务行业的竞争力的学术研究都是基于它们的地区竞争能力之上的。因此，服务业的竞争力可以简单地定义为“服务行业在竞争中获取和利用资源的能力”。国外的研究学者更倾向于特定的服务行业的竞争力分析与研究，如商业服务行业（2001年Rubalcaba和加戈）、保险业（哈德威克和窦1998）、知识密集服务（1999年Windrum和汤姆林森）。然而，在中国，学者们的研究重点则集中于一个特定的区域，而不是一个特定的行业，如中国的31个主要省份（吴2003），中国六大发展先进的省份（2004年刁、庄），中国16个主要省份（2005年苏、张）。由于很多的因素都可以影响服务业的竞争力和复杂性，大多数中国学者认为，我们应该建立一个多层次的综合评价指标体系，如“总目标指导指数”。
广东工业大学华立学院 本科毕业设计（论文） 外文参考文献译文及原文 系部会计学系 专业会计学 年级 08级 班级名称 2008级会计（7）班 学号 14010807030 学生姓名吴智聪 2012年 2 月 9 日
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中小型企业财务管理中存在的问题及其对策中小型企业在中国经济发展中发挥着重要的作用。统计数据表明，在工商行政管理局登记在册的企业中，中小型企业占了99%，产值和利润分别占总额的60%和40%。此外，中小型企业所提供了75％的城镇就业机会。可见其为中国的稳定和经济繁荣作出了重要贡献。 虽然中小型企业在国民经济中占有重要地位，对中国经济发展与社会稳定具有很重大的意义。但是，中小型企业发展的主要障碍是缺乏有效的财务管理。本文分析了当前中小型企业财务管理中存在的问题，并就改善中小型企业财务管理提出了相应对策。 1.1 中小型企业的财务管理现状 自从21世纪以来，中国的中小型企业的蓬勃发展，在经济增长和社会发展中发挥着非常重要的作用。据财政部统计数据，直到2005年底，中小型企业总数已超过1000万，占中国企业总数的99%。中小型企业提供了75％的城镇就业机会，工业企业的总产值、销售收入、实现的利得税和出口额分别占总数的60%、57%、40%和60%，上缴的税收已经接近了国家税收总额的一半。中小型企业承载着超过75%的技术革新和超过65％的专利发明，他们以其灵活的经营机制和积极创新活动，为经济发展提供了增长的最根本动力。近年来，中国中小企业的消亡率将近70%，大约有30%的中小型企业存在赤字。中小型企业应该如何建立现代企业制度，加强财务管理，并科学地进行资本运作以谋求自身的健康发展，是我们密切关注的一个问题。 1.2 中小型企业财务管理中存在的问题 ⑴财务管理理念滞后，而且方法保守 中小型企业由于管理者自身知识水平的限制，使得企业的管理能力和管理质量较低。他们的管理思想已经不适合现代企业，并且大多数企业领导人缺乏财务管理的理论和方法，忽视了企业资本运作的作用。管理者既不重视财务事，也不参与企业政策的制定和相关管理活动。因此，财务管理无法发挥其应有职能，从而导致企业缺乏现代财务管理的理念，也无从去培训合格的财务人员。 ⑵财务管理工作基础薄弱，缺乏财务监督