?
We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions from workshop participants at the 1998Stanford Accounting Summer Camp,1999Duke/UNC Fall Camp,1999American Accounting Association annual meeting,University of Arizona,Arizona State University,University of British Columbia,University of California at Los Angeles,Columbia University,Georgia State University,University of Michigan,New York University,Northwestern University,Purdue University,Uni-versity of Rochester,University of Texas at Austin,Washington University,and University of Washington,Kevin Murphy (the referee),and Jerry Zimmerman (the editor).We also appreciate the research assistance of Hung-Ken Chien.David Aboody acknowledges the support of the Anderson School at UCLA.Ron Kasznik acknowledges the support of the Financial Research Initiative,Graduate School of Business,Stanford University.
*Corresponding author.Tel.:#1-650-725-9740;fax:#1-650-725-6152.
E-mail address:kasznik }ron @https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html, (R.
Kasznik).
Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(2000)73}100
CEO stock option awards and the timing of
corporate voluntary disclosures ?
David Aboody ,Ron Kasznik *
Anderson Graduate School of Management,Uni v ersity of California at Los Angeles,Los Angeles,
CA 90095-1481,USA
Graduate School of Business,Stanford Uni v ersity,Stanford,CA 94305-5015,USA
Received 3December 1998;received in revised form 22May 2000
Abstract
We investigate whether CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around stock option awards.We conjecture that CEOs manage investors 'expectations around award dates by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news.For a sample of 2,039CEO option awards by 572"rms with "xed award schedules,we document changes in share prices and analyst earnings forecasts around option awards that are consistent with our conjecture.We also provide more direct evidence based on management earnings forecasts issued prior to award dates.Our "ndings suggest that CEOs make opportunis-tic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation. 2000Elsevier Science B.V.All rights reserved.
JEL classi x cation:M41;D82
Keywords:CEO stock option awards;Voluntary disclosure
0165-4101/00/$-see front matter 2000Elsevier Science B.V.All rights reserved.
PII:S 0165-4101(00)00014-8
74 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}100
1.Introduction
This paper investigates whether CEOs manage investors'expectations around stock option awards.Because stock options are typically granted with a"xed exercise price equal to the stock price on the award date,we hypothesize that CEOs opportunistically manage the timing of their information disclosures to increase the value of their awards.In particular,we conjecture that they delay announcements of good news and rush forward bad news.Such a disclosure strategy ensures that decreases in the"rm's stock price related to the arrival of bad news occur before,rather than after,the award date,while stock price increases related to the arrival of good news occur after,rather than before,the award.
Using information from ExecuComp and handcollected data from annual proxy statements,we infer the dates of4,426stock option awards made between 1992and1996to the CEOs of1,264"rms.We document that many"rms have a"xed schedule for awarding options to their CEOs;about half the"rms,572 "rms with2,039awards,have award dates that are nearly identical every year. Using this sample of"rms with"xed award schedules,we test our prediction that CEOs manage the timing of their disclosures around award dates. Focus-ing on scheduled awards allows us to mitigate the possibility that our"ndings are attributable to opportunistic timing of awards around company news announcements.
We conduct several tests to investigate whether CEOs manage investors' expectations downward prior to scheduled awards.Our"rst test investigates changes in the distributional properties of analysts'earnings forecasts.Prior evidence suggests that analyst forecasts largely re#ect guidance provided by management through a variety of channels.Therefore,we investigate whether forecasts issued shortly before scheduled CEO option awards are abnormally low.To do that,we estimate the empirical distribution of analyst forecast errors for our sample"rms over the1992}1996period.Consistent with our prediction, we"nd that forecasts issued during the three months prior to scheduled awards are signi"cantly less optimistically biased than forecasts issued for the same "rms during other months.This association is robust to controlling for variables which prior research suggests are associated with forecast errors,and to various speci"cation checks.Our second test focuses on share price movements around Articles in the business press also suggest that managers manage investors'expectations to increase their stock option compensation.For example,a recent article in Forbes states:&It is not at all uncommon for management to run a company to the ground.After the stock collapses they grant themselves options at the lower price.When the stock recovers they make a fat pro"t,while shareholders have taken a round trip to nowhere'(May18,1998).
Throughout the paper we refer to awards by"rms with a"xed award schedule as&scheduled awards'.
D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}10075 award dates.Consistent with our prediction that CEOs manage investors'expec-tations around option awards,we"nd a signi"cant di!erence between the pre-and post-award periods;scheduled awards are preceded by insigni"cantly nega-tive abnormal returns and followed by signi"cantly positive abnormal returns. Our third set of tests identi"es cross-sectional variation with respect to CEOs' incentives to manage investors'expectations around scheduled awards.In particular,we focus on a subsample of scheduled awards made within just a few days of earnings announcements.Because managers likely have more private information shortly before earnings announcements than shortly thereafter,we conjecture that CEOs who receive their options immediately before earnings announcements have greater opportunities to adopt a voluntary disclosure strategy that maximizes the value of their awards.Speci"cally,we predict that these CEOs are more inclined to voluntarily preempt negative earnings sur-prises,and are less inclined to preempt positive surprises.Such a disclosure strategy increases the likelihood that stock price decreases related to the arrival of bad news occur before the award,and that stock price increases related to the arrival of good news occur after the award.We presume a similar strategy is less bene"cial to CEOs who receive their options only after earnings are announced.
Consistent with our prediction,we"nd that"rms with scheduled awards before earnings announcements have,on average,signi"cantly negative abnor-mal returns over the three month period prior to earnings announcement,and signi"cantly positive abnormal returns at the earnings announcement date.The abnormal returns for these"rms are signi"cantly lower in the pre-earnings-announcement period,and signi"cantly higher at the earnings announcement date,than the abnormal returns for"rms with scheduled awards after earnings announcements.These"ndings are robust to controlling for the size and magnitude of the earnings surprise.We complement the market-based"ndings with evidence from management earnings forecasts issued by these"rms during the pre-earnings-announcement period.We"nd that CEOs who receive their options before the earnings announcement are signi"cantly more likely to issue bad news forecasts,and less likely to issue good news forecasts,than are CEOs who receive their awards after the earnings announcement.These"ndings are consistent with opportunistic timing of management voluntary disclosures around scheduled awards.
There is relatively little research on managers'self-interested behavior in response to the structure of their stock option compensation.Most closely We focus on opportunistic timing of voluntary disclosures,particularly with respect to informa-tion that would be revealed anyway(e.g.,impending earnings surprises).We do not imply that managers manage investors'expectations downward by issuing misleading forward-looking state-ments,as the legal and reputational costs associated with making these disclosures likely exceed the expected increase in award value(see Kasznik,1999).
76 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}100 related to our study is Yermack(1997)who documents that CEO option awards are preceded,on average,by insigni"cantly negative abnormal returns,and are followed by signi"cantly positive abnormal returns.Yermack interprets the stock price movements around option awards as evidence that managers in#u-ence their"rms'compensation committee to award them options in advance of favorable earnings announcements.Although our study is similar to Yermack's in that we also expect di!erences in news announcements before and after award dates,our hypotheses and research design are substantially di!erent.Most notably,Yermack's hypothesis of an opportunistic timing of awards can only apply to companies that do not award options on a"xed schedule,and is not applicable to the many companies with scheduled awards,the focus of our study.
Another major distinction between the two studies relates to types of dis-closures examined.Yermack(1997)focuses on earnings announcements,and predicts that options are more likely to be awarded before(after)positive (negative)earnings surprises.A maintained assumption underlying his analysis is that"rms'disclosures are exogenous,primarily in the form of periodic earnings announcements.In contrast,we incorporate the notion that managers use voluntary disclosures in press releases and in discussions with security analysts to e!ectively determine the timing of information releases.Our ap-proach is motivated by our desire to investigate whether CEO option awards a!ect the timing of"rms'voluntary disclosures.Focusing on"rms with sched-uled awards permits us to distinguish between opportunistic timing of voluntary disclosures around award dates and opportunistic timing of awards around news https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html,pensation consultants often argue that CEOs'op-portunistic behavior with respect to stock option compensation could be elimi-nated by requiring that options be awarded on a"xed schedule.However,we document that although many"rms have a"xed award schedule,CEOs of these "rms increase their compensation by managing the timing of their voluntary disclosures.
Although our primary focus is on"rms with"xed award schedules,we replicate all of our tests using the group of"rms with unscheduled awards.In marked contrast to our"ndings for scheduled awards,we"nd no evidence that the signi"cant stock price decrease(increase)in the period immediately before (after)the unscheduled award re#ects an opportunistic disclosure strategy.Thus, taken together,our"ndings suggest that the asymmetric stock price movements around option awards re#ect two distinct sources of opportunistic behavior aimed at increasing CEOs'stock option compensation:opportunistic timing of management voluntary disclosures around award dates for"rms with scheduled awards,and opportunistic timing of awards around news announcements for "rms with unscheduled awards.
Our study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by provid-ing evidence consistent with CEOs managing investors'expectations around
D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}10077 scheduled awards to increase their stock option compensation.Much of the prior literature on compensation-related opportunistic behavior focuses on managers'incentive to manage reported earnings to increase their cash bonuses (Healy,1985;Watts and Zimmerman,1986). We contribute also to the litera-ture on voluntary disclosure by providing evidence that top executives have compensation-related incentives to accelerate the disclosure of bad news and delay announcements of good news.The personal monetary gain resulting from this disclosure strategy provides a plausible explanation for the intriguing evidence that managers are more likely to voluntarily preempt bad news than good news,and that bad news disclosures often occur shortly before earnings announcements(Skinner,1994;Kasznik and Lev,1995).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.Section2provides institu-tional background relating to CEO stock option awards.Section3describes the data and presents descriptive statistics.Section4outlines our research design and presents the primary"ndings.Section5provides additional tests,while Section6summarizes and concludes the paper.
2.Institutional background
Stock options are generally awarded to CEOs about once a year at the recommendation of the compensation committee of the board of directors (occasionally there are multiple awards during the year).The role of the committee is to review and approve the compensation package,including any stock option awards,for the company's top executives.The compensation committee exercises discretion over the size and timing of option awards,and these parameters can vary substantially across companies and over time.
A key feature of options awarded to top executives is that nearly all of them are granted with a"xed exercise price equal to the stock price on the award date. This motivates our prediction that CEOs maximize their stock option compen-sation by managing the timing of their information disclosures around award Another opportunistic managerial behavior related to stock option compensation is suggested by Lambert et al.(1989)who document that after the adoption of executive stock option plans,"rms pay lower cash dividends than otherwise expected.Much of the empirical literature on executive compensation focuses on the link between compensation and performance measures(e.g.,Lambert and Larcker,1987;Jensen and Murphy,1990;DeFusco et al.,1990).Other studies investigate whether companies award options in accord with theories of"nancial contracting and agency cost reduction(see Yermack(1995)for a summary).
Other explanations suggested in the prior literature for why managers voluntarily disclose bad news focus on legal liability concerns(Skinner,1994).However,empirical evidence indicates it is frequently the early disclosure of bad news that triggers lawsuits(Francis et al.,1994;Skinner,1997), and that reducing expected litigation costs does not seem to result in fewer bad news disclosures (Johnson et al.,2000).
78 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}100 dates.Our prediction is further motivated by the notion that this opportunistic behavior does not appear to expose top executives to the same level of legal liability as other forms of insider transactions. While the Securities and Ex-change Commission(SEC)has established that option awards represent&pur-chases'(Rule16b-6(c)),potentially subjecting them to the&disclose or abstain' doctrine,shareholder litigation related to managers purchasing shares at a rela-tively low price are rare,and we are unaware of lawsuits involving option awards to top executives.
Beginning in1992,the SEC requires"rms to disclose in proxy statements the duration and expiration date of options awarded to top executives.These disclosures make it possible to infer the date of each option award,a key variable in our study. As described below,we"nd that many companies have a"xed schedule for awarding options to their CEOs.This allows us to test our prediction that CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around award dates,while mitigating the possibility that they in#uence their compensa-tion committees to award them options at favorable times.We limit our analysis to CEOs because they have signi"cant control over their"rms'disclosure decisions.Moreover,in most companies,other top executives receive options on the same day as the CEO,and we therefore expect them to have disclosure incentives that are aligned with those we hypothesize for the CEO.
3.Data and descriptive statistics
We collect information about CEO stock option awards between1992and 1996from the Standard&Poor's ExecuComp database and proxy statements "led with the SEC.ExecuComp provides detailed executive compensation data for approximately1,500"rms(S&P500,S&P400MidCap,and S&P600 SmallCap).The initial sample includes5,248option awards to CEOs of1,304 "rms.ExecuComp reports the expiration date of options awarded during the year,information companies are now required to disclose in their proxy state-ments.Although companies are not required to disclose their exact award dates, we use this information to infer the award dates.To validate our inferred date, we examine whether the option exercise price(also reported by ExecuComp) Prior studies that examine the association between insider transactions and information con-tained in various corporate news events focus on common stock(Penman,1982;John and Lang, 1991;Lee et al.,1992;Noe,1999).
News of CEO stock option awards remains undisclosed for several months until proxy state-ments are issued.Although companies often issue press releases related to the adoption of stock option plans,we are unaware of timely disclosures of actual option awards.Moreover,although the timing of awards might be related to compensation committee meetings,companies do not publicly disclose the date of such meetings.
D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}10079 matches the share price on the inferred date.We identify1,653option awards with a potential price mismatch.Consequently,we handcollected and analyzed information about these awards from company proxy statements.In more than half of these cases,876awards,the discrepancy results from ExecuComp reporting a di!erent grant year than the one identi"ed in the proxy statement, often because the"rm has a non-calendar"scal year.For214awards,the discrepancy between the exercise price and the share price on the inferred award date was due to stock splits and dividends.In both cases,we use the information collected from the proxy statements to update our data.We exclude the remaining563awards that we identify as reload options(521awards)or that we did not"nd in the proxy statements(42awards).We exclude reload options because reloads essentially are option exercise transactions(see Hemmer et al., 1998).We also exclude63awards relating to16"rms not found in the1996 Center for Research on Security Prices(CRSP)database,and196awards with an inferred date later than December31,1996,the last date for which we have CRSP data.Our"nal sample comprises4,426stock option awards made between1992and1996to the CEOs of1,264"rms.
Table1presents selected descriptive statistics relating to the sample of option awards.Panel A indicates a fairly even distribution over the sample period,with the exception of our"nal year,1996,for which fewer awards with complete data were identi"ed.Panel B indicates that the frequency of awards in the months of December,January,and February is greater than in other months;almost40% of the awards are clustered in these three months.Panel C shows that the mean (median)number of options granted is101,890(50,000),and that the mean (median)award value as reported by the company is$923,440($390,300). Combining the value of option awards with CEOs'cash compensation(salary and bonuses)reveals that options account for about half the total compensation. Table1
Summary of4,426CEO stock option awards by1,264"rms between January1992and December 1996
Panel A:Stock option award year
Stock option awards
Year Number%of total
199268215.4
19931,00522.7
19941,11225.1
19951,08224.5
199654512.3
Total4,426100.0
80 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}100
Table1(continued)
Panel B:Stock option award month
Stock option awards
Month Number%of total
January57112.9
February57012.9
March3267.4
April3638.2
May3728.4
June300 6.8
July288 6.5
August230 5.2
September191 4.3
October286 6.4
November3277.4
December60213.6
Total4,426100.0
Panel C:CEO cash and stock option compensation(amounts are in thousands)
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Number of options awarded4,426101.8950.00222.12 Value of option awards4,426923.44390.302,240.83 CEO cash salary4,426518.11472.92277.51 CEO cash bonus4,426444.10265.00652.25
Panel D:Frequency of option awards per sample x rm
Option awards Firms Mean Median Std.Dev.Min Max
Panel E:Option award schedules
Option awards Firms
Pattern Number%of total Number%of total Fixed award schedule2,03946.157245.2 Variable award schedule1,40231.756244.5
Other award patterns98522.213010.3
Total4,426100.01,264100.0 Panel D shows that the mean(median)"rm has3.5(3.0)awards between1992 and1996,with the number of awards per"rm ranging from1up to15.
A key feature of our research design is that we identify"rms with a"xed schedule for awarding options to their CEOs.In particular,we segment our
D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}10081 sample"rms into three groups:&"xed award schedule',&variable award schedule', and&other award patterns'.We identify a"rm as having a&"xed award schedule' when its option award dates are the same every year over our sample period. As Panel E of Table1indicates,2,039(46.1%)of the4,426awards,relating to572 (45.2%)of the1,264"rms,fall into this category.Many of these sample"rms have one option award in each of the"ve years examined,and only a few have an award in only two of the"ve years.
We classify"rms with no predictable schedule for awarding options to their CEOs into the&variable award schedule'group.These"rms have no two awards that are separated by about12months.As Panel E indicates,1,402(31.7%)of the awards,relating to562(44.5%)"rms,are classi"ed into this group.Here-after,we refer to these awards as&unscheduled awards'.This group includes201 "rms who have only one award over our sample period.Finally,the group of &other award patterns'comprises the remaining985(22.2%)awards made by 130(10.3%)"rms.Firms in this group typically have two years with the same award date,but also have a number of other awards outside that schedule.We do not include these"rms in the"xed award schedule group to avoid introduc-ing excessive noise into our analysis.
Although we take the award schedule as given,there could be systematic di!erences between"rms with"xed and variable award schedules.Because we do not know why"rms self-select into these two groups,we do not combine them in the empirical analyses.Moreover,to distinguish between opportunistic disclosure strategy and opportunistic timing of awards,our primary tests focus on the sample of2,039option awards made by the572"rms with"xed award schedules.
Table2provides descriptive statistics relating to size and performance measures for our sample of"rms with"xed award schedules.It shows that sample"rms are relatively large;the mean(median)market value of equity,MV, is$5,012($1,615)million.The mean(median)book value of equity,BV,is$1,827 ($665)million.Sample"rms'mean(median)market-to-book ratio is2.82(2.23), fairly similar to the untabulated mean(median)of3.18(1.83)for all C OMPUSTAT "rms.Finally,sample"rms are,on average,pro"table,with mean(median)net income,NI,of$286($79)million,or5%(6%)of market value of equity,and have a mean(median)annual sales growth,SALESGR,of11%(7%).
For the purpose of identifying"rms with"xed award schedules,we allow for the award dates to vary by up to a week.The inter-quartile range of number of days separating two consecutive awards in this group is363to367.
The"xed award schedule group includes21"rms that grant options to their CEOs twice,rather than once,a year,with the semi-annual dates being the same every year.The group also includes a few"rms that had option awards on the same date in each of at least three subsequent years but also had one or two awards outside the"xed schedule.We exclude the awards made by these"rms outside their"xed schedule.
82 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}100
Table2
Descriptive statistics for sample of572"rms with2,039scheduled CEO stock option awards between January1992and December1996
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. MV5,0121,61511,162
BV1,8276653,452
M
NI28679663
NI/M<0.050.060.14 SALESGR0.110.070.17 EARNVAR 1.230.50 3.15?1D/B<0.750.47 1.65 MV is market value of equity at"scal year end.BV is book value of equity at"scal year end. ASSETS is total assets at"scal year end.SALES is net annual sales.NI is annual income from continuing operations.SALESGR is sales growth measured over at least three,but no more than,"ve years.EARNVAR is coe$cient of variation in earnings,measured as the standard deviation of annual earnings from continuing operations divided by the absolute value of the mean,both calculated over the previous"ve years,provided there are at least three nonmissing earnings observations.LTD is long-term debt.MV,BV,ASSETS,SALES,NI,and LTD are expressed in$millions.The M
4.Empirical analyses
Our objective is to investigate whether top executives opportunistically man-age the timing of their information disclosures around scheduled option awards. We conjecture that CEOs maximize the value of their awards by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news.We test this prediction using two summary measures for changes in investors'expectations around scheduled awards,one based on analyst earnings forecasts(Section4.1),and one based on share prices (Sections4.2and4.3.1).We also test this prediction more directly by examining management earnings forecasts issued prior to award dates(Section4.3.2). 4.1.Analyst earnings forecasts prior to scheduled awards
The prior literature indicates that analyst earnings forecasts re#ect,to a great extent,guidance provided by management through private interviews(Lees, 1981),earnings forecasts and other statements made in press releases(Jennings, 1987;Baginski and Hassell,1990),and conference calls(Frankel et al.,1999). Previous studies also"nd that additional disclosure by management increases
the accuracy of analyst forecasts (Waymire,1986;Lang and Lundholm,1996).Thus,the distributional properties of analyst forecast errors provide a setting to assess whether CEOs manage investors 'expectations downward prior to sched-uled awards.
Prior research documents that analyst earnings forecasts are,on average,overly optimistic relative to realized earnings (see Schipper (1991)for a sum-mary).Therefore,to investigate whether CEOs delay good news and rush forward bad news,we examine whether analyst forecasts are less optimistically biased prior to scheduled awards than they are at other times.To do that,we measure the error in analysts 'consensus quarterly earnings forecast in each of the three months prior to the award month.We de "ne the forecast error as follows:
AF }ERROR G I "AF G I !EPS G P G I (1)
AF G I is analyst consensus forecast for the next quarterly earnings to be an-nounced after the award,for sample observation i .k denotes forecast month relative to award month,i.e.,1,2,or 3months prior to the award.All three monthly forecasts are for the same quarter,to facilitate comparisons among them.EPS is realized earnings per share for the quarter,and P is share price at the beginning of the forecast month.EPS and P are both obtained from I/B/E/S to mitigate measurement error related to stock splits and dividends,and to avoid inconsistencies in the de "nition of the forecasted and reported earnings numbers.
To provide a benchmark against which to assess whether analyst earnings forecasts are abnormally low prior to scheduled awards,we estimate the empiri-cal distribution of analyst forecast errors for our sample "rms.In particular,for every "rm,we de "ne each of the 60months between January 1992and Decem-ber 1996as month 0,and compute AF }ERROR for each of the three months prior to month 0.When month 0is an award month,it is classi "ed into the AWARD group.All other months,excluding the three months before and after an award month,are classi "ed into the NO-AWARD group.For our sample of 2,039scheduled awards,there are about 1,675(15,100)AWARD (NO-AWARD )months with su $cient data to calculate AF }ERROR .Panel A of Table 3presents summary statistics for AF }ERROR ,multiplied by 100for expositional pur-poses.It shows that,consistent with our prediction,analyst forecasts issued during each of the three months prior to AWARD months are signi "cantly less optimistically biased than forecasts issued for the same "rms prior to NO-AWARD months.For example,the frequency of observations with negative AF }ERROR (i.e.,the analyst consensus forecast is overly pessimistic relative to realized earnings)in the three months,two months,and one month prior to AWARD months (45.32%,46.84%,and 47.70%,respectively)is signi "cantly D.Aboody,R.Kasznik /Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(2000)73}10083
Table 3
Analyst earnings forecast errors,AF }ERROR ,measured three,two,and one month prior to month 0.Month 0is an AWARD month when it contains a scheduled CEO stock option award,and a NO }AWARD month for all other months between January 1992and December 1996,excluding the three months before and after an award month.Sample of 572"rms with 2,039scheduled CEO stock option awards between 1992and 1996
Panel A :Uni v ariate tests on AF }ERROR
Month relative to month 0
Month }3
Month }2Month }1Group N Mean %
negative
N Mean %negative N Mean %negative AWARD 1,6770.1045.32
1,6780.0846.841,6750.0547.70NO }AWARD
15,1330.2041.96
15,0950.1843.2615,1260.1545.11p -value 0.010.010.010.010.010.04Panel B :Fixed-x rm-e w ect regressions (dependent v ariable AF }ERROR )
Month relative to month 0
Month }3
Month }2Month }1Variable
Pred.Coe !.t -stat.Coe !.t -stat.Coe !.t -stat.AWARD }
MONTH
!!0.05!2.47!0.05!2.37!0.05!2.69HORIZON
#0.03 3.870.04 5.820.05 6.99 EPS
!!12.03!12.09!10.88!11.14!9.50!10.13SIZE
!!0.40!12.58!0.36!11.45!0.29!9.98EARNVAR
#0.02 2.460.02 2.770.02 3.20SALESGR
#0.44 3.500.29 2.220.16 1.17N
14,87414,84414,865Adj .R 0.360.340.33
Analyst earnings forecast error,AF }ERROR ,is measured as the analyst consensus forecast of quarterly earnings-per-share minus realized earnings-per-share,de #ated by share price at the beginning of the forecast month.AF }ERROR is multiplied by 100.In Panel A,the %negative column shows the frequency of AWARD and NO }AWARD observations where AF }ERROR is less than zero (i.e.,the analyst consensus forecast is below realized quarterly earnings).
AWARD }MONTH is an indicator taking the value of one (zero)for AWARD (NO }AWARD )months.HORIZON is number of months between the forecast month and the end of the "scal quarter to which the consensus forecast relates. EPS is seasonally adjusted change in quarterly earnings per share,de #ated by share price.SIZE is logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the forecast month.EARNVAR is the coe $cient of variation in earnings,measured as the standard deviation of annual earnings from continuing operations divided by the absolute value of the mean,both calculated over the previous "ve years,provided there are at least three nonmissing earnings observations.SALESGR is the "ve-year sales growth.The "rm-speci "c intercepts in the "xed e !ect regression are untabulated.
t -Statistics are based on White (1980)heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
84 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik /Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(2000)73}100
greater than that prior to NO-AWARD months(41.96%,43.26%,and45.11%,
respectively).
We also estimate a multivariate regression to control for forecast horizon,
earnings surprise,"rm size,earnings variability,and sales growth,which prior
research suggests are associated with analyst forecast errors.Forecast horizon,
HORIZON,is measured as number of months between the forecast month and
the end of the quarter to which the forecast relates(four months,on average).
We control for forecast horizon because prior studies document an association
between horizon and forecast bias(Richardson et al.,1999).Earnings surprise, EPS,is measured as the change in quarterly earnings per share relative to the same quarter in the previous year,de#ated by share price.This variable controls
for the association between the bias in analyst forecasts and the sign and
magnitude of realized earnings(Brown,1998).Firm size,SIZE,is measured as
logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the forecast month.
Earnings variability,EARNVAR,is the coe$cient of variation in earnings,mea-
sured as the standard deviation of annual earnings from continuing operations
divided by the absolute value of the mean,both calculated over the previous"ve
years.Sales growth,SALESGR,is the"rm's"ve-year sales growth.We include
SIZE,EARNVAR,and SALESGR because prior research documents that analyst
forecasts are more optimistically biased for smaller"rms with low earnings
predictability(Das et al.,1998).
Speci"cally,we estimate the following model:
AF}ERROR G",
$
$FIRM$G# A=ARD}MON1H G
#
HORIZON G# EPS G# SIZE G
#
EARN Panel B of Table3presents summary statistics from estimating Eq.(2).It shows that the estimated coe$cients on all the control variables have the predicted sign,and most are signi"cant.Moreover,consistent with our predic-tion and with the univariate tests,the estimated coe$cient on AWARD}MONTH is negative(!0.05)and statistically signi"cant in all three speci"cations(White (1980)t-statistics of!2.47,!2.37,and!2.69).This indicates that analyst earnings forecasts issued prior to scheduled awards are abnormally low for our D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}10085 86 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}100 sample"rms,even after controlling for other factors that vary systematically with analyst forecast characteristics. These"ndings are consistent with CEOs managing analysts'expectations downward prior to scheduled stock option awards. To complement the analysis related to scheduled awards,we replicate our tests using the group of1,402unscheduled awards made by the562"rms with variable award schedules.Interestingly,in marked contrast to our"ndings for scheduled awards,untabulated tests indicate that analyst forecasts issued prior to unscheduled awards are not di!erent from forecasts issued prior to no-award months;the estimated coe$cient on AWARD}MONTH is statistically insigni"-cant in all three speci"cations(White(1980)t-statistics0.44,0.27,and!0.18). Thus,there is no evidence that managers of"rms with variable award schedules manage investors'expectations downward prior to award dates. 4.2.Stock price changes around scheduled awards The prediction that CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around scheduled awards implies that decreases(increases)in"rms'stock prices are more likely to occur before(after)award dates.We investigate this predic-tion by examining changes in share prices around the2,039scheduled CEO option awards.Speci"cally,for each award,we calculate the cumulative abnor-mal return for each trading day over an event period beginning30days prior to the award date and ending30days thereafter.We de"ne each"rm's daily abnormal return as the di!erence between raw return and the value-weighted (including dividends)index for the NASDAQ or NYSE/AMEX CRSP"le.Our "ndings are robust to measuring abnormal returns using parameters estimated from a market model. Fig.1plots the mean cumulative abnormal return for each day for the sample of scheduled awards.It shows a signi"cant di!erence between the pre-and post-award periods.Consistent with our prediction that CEOs delay announce-ments of good news,share prices begin rising immediately after scheduled award dates.While mean abnormal return over the30-days period prior to the award is insigni"cantly negative(t-statistic"!0.05),mean abnormal return over the 30d period following the award is positive(1.67%)and statistically signi"cant (t-statistic"4.95).Although not shown in Fig.1,we"nd that the mean cumu-lative abnormal return in the post-award period continues to increase beyond To examine the sensitivity of our"ndings to the clustering of awards in year-end(recall that about40%of the awards are made between December and February),we re-estimated Eq.(2) allowing the intercept to vary across the twelve months and capture any mean month-speci"c e!ects. Untabulated results indicate our"ndings are robust;the estimated coe$cient on AWARD}MONTH is signi"cantly negative in all three speci"cations.Our"ndings also are robust to estimating Eq.(2) separately for the"rst and fourth"scal quarters. D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}10087 Fig.1.Mean cumulative market-adjusted return from!30to#30days around the dates of2,039 scheduled CEO stock option awards between January1992and December1996. the30-day period,until it levels o!at about4.0%,less than three months after the award.We obtain"ndings similar to those in Fig.1when we conduct the analysis separately for each year between1992and1996. We interpret the stock price movements around scheduled awards as evidence consistent with opportunistic timing of management voluntary disclosures. Focusing on"rms with scheduled awards enables us to distinguish between opportunistic disclosure strategy and opportunistic timing of the awards.How-ever,by de"nition,our sample comprises only years in which the compensation committee awards options to the CEO.To the extent that the decision on whether or not to award options in a particular year depends on"rm perfor-mance in that year,the positive abnormal returns documented for scheduled awards could be induced by sample selection.To provide evidence on whether such self-selection bias exists in our sample,we identify153"rms with"xed award schedules that had at least one no-award year preceded and followed by award years during our sample period.We then calculate abnormal returns for the one-year period(250trading days)around the award date,or,in the case of no-award years,around the same date as in the most recent award year. Untabulated tests indicate that the cumulative abnormal returns for award and no-award years are statistically indistinguishable.The mean(median)abnormal The stock price movements around scheduled awards could suggest a potentially pro"table trading rule.We discuss this possibility in Section5.3below. Unlike our "ndings,Yermack (1997)does not "nd signi "cantly negative abnormal returns in the pre-award period.This di !erence in "ndings likely re #ects the longer time series of data we have on "rms 'award dates,allowing us to better identify "rms 'option award schedules. return is 7.63%(}0.01%)for and 5.49%(1.63%)for no-award years;the p -value for a two-sample t -test (nonparametric)test of di !erences in means (medians)is 0.61(0.49).These "ndings do not support the notion of a self-selection bias for our sample of scheduled awards. Finally,similarly to scheduled awards,we "nd that the timing of the 1,402unscheduled awards coincides with share price movements that increase CEOs 'expected monetary gains.In particular,untabulated tests reveal a signi "cant share price increase over the 30days following the award date;mean cumulative abnormal return is 3.20%(t -statistic "6.05).Moreover,we document a signi "-cant share price decrease over the 30days preceding the award;mean cumulat-ive abnormal return is !1.78%(t -statistic "!4.98).The "nding that CEO option awards are followed by positive abnormal returns is also documented by Yermack (1997),who interprets it as evidence that managers in #uence their "rms 'compensation committee to award them options in advance of favorable news. However,such interpretation could only apply to companies that do not award options on a "xed schedule,and is not applicable to the many companies with scheduled awards,the focus of our study. 4.3.Scheduled awards around earnings announcements In this section we identify cross-sectional variation with respect to CEOs 'incentives to engage in opportunistic voluntary disclosure strategy around scheduled awards.In particular,we focus on scheduled awards made within just a few days of quarterly earnings announcements.This enables us to increase the power of our tests,particularly with respect to the pre-award period for which the stock price tests provide only weak evidence that managers advance bad news.It also allows us to further distinguish between opportunistic disclosure strategy and self-selection. Earnings announcements provide a useful setting in which to examine our prediction because managers are presumed to have more private information shortly before earnings announcements than shortly thereafter.Thus,CEOs who receive their options immediately before earnings announcements likely have greater opportunities to adopt a disclosure strategy that increases the value of their awards than CEOs who receive their options only after earnings are announced.Speci "cally,we predict that they are more inclined to voluntarily preempt negative earnings surprises,and less inclined to preempt positive surprises.Such a disclosure strategy ensures that stock price decreases (in-creases)related to the arrival of bad (good)news occur before (after)the award.We presume a similar strategy is less bene "cial to CEOs who receive their 88 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik /Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(2000)73}100 Fig.2.Frequency distribution of option award dates relative to nearest quarterly earnings an-nouncement dates for a sample of 2,039scheduled CEO stock option awards between January 1992and December 1996. We presume there are other costs and bene "ts associated with voluntary disclosures.We have,however,no reason to expect these costs and bene "ts to be systematically di !erent between "rms with scheduled awards before and after earnings announcements. We chose a two-week period around earnings announcements to mitigate confounding e !ects associated with using a longer window while still having enough observations to ensure su $cient power.Our "ndings are robust to using a one-or four-week window to de "ne the groups,and to excluding awards made within one day of earnings announcements. options only after earnings are announced;whether or not they preempt the earnings surprise,that information will be impounded in the stock price prior to their option award. We identify the timing of CEO option awards relative to earnings announce-ments by searching compustat for the quarterly earnings announcement date closest to the award date.Fig.2presents the frequency distribution of award dates relative to the nearest quarterly earnings announcement date.We "nd that the most frequent award date is the day prior to earnings announcement (5.0%),while the next-most frequent award date is the earnings announcement date (4.0%).Based on the timing of award relative to earnings announcement,we construct two groups of scheduled awards.The "rst,AWARD }BEFORE ,includes the 341awards made during the two-week period prior to earnings announce-ments,whereas the second group,AWARD }AFTER ,comprises the 421awards made during the two-week period after earnings announcements (a total of 762awards out of the 2,039scheduled awards).Awards made on the same day as the earnings announcement are not included in either group. We conjecture that AWARD }BEFORE "rms are more inclined to rush forward bad news and delay D.Aboody,R.Kasznik /Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(2000)73}100 89 Fig.3.Pre-earnings-announcement and earnings-announcement return windows for "rms with scheduled CEO stock option awards within the two weeks before (AWARD }BEFORE )or two weeks after (AWARD }AFTER )the earnings announcement date. The pre-earnings-announcement window ends prior to award date to ensure the abnormal returns precede the award.Our "ndings are robust to ending this window the day before earnings announcement for all observations. good news than are AWARD }AFTER "rms.We test this prediction using evid-ence from share price changes (Section 4.3.1)and management earnings fore-casts (Section 4.3.2). 4.3.1.Stock price changes For each option award in the AWARD }BEFORE and AWARD }AFTER sub-samples,we calculate cumulative abnormal returns over two windows,illus-trated in Fig.3.The "rst,the &pre-earnings-announcement 'window,begins the day after the earnings announcement for the prior quarter and ends at the earlier of award date and the day before earnings announcement for the current quarter. The second,the &earnings announcement 'window,runs from the day before to the day after the earnings announcement date for the current quarter.Summary statistics in Panel A of Table 4provide evidence consistent with our predictions.In particular,we "nd that for the AWARD }BEFORE group,both mean and median cumulative abnormal returns are signi "cantly negative in the pre-earnings-announcement window (!1.4%and !0.8%,respectively),and are signi "cantly lower than those for the AWARD }AFTER group (1.9%and 1.0%,respectively).The signi "cantly negative abnormal returns over the pre-earnings-announcement window for AWARD }BEFORE "rms is consistent with managers rushing forward bad news and delaying good news to increase the value of the awards they expect to receive prior to earnings announcements.90 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik /Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(2000)73} 100 Table 4 Market-adjusted returns in the pre-earnings announcement period and around the earnings an-nouncement date for "rms with scheduled CEO stock option awards two weeks before or two weeks after the earnings announcement date Panel A :Uni v ariate tests Market-adjusted returns Pre-earnings-announcement window Earnings announcement window Group N Mean Median N Mean Median AWARD }BEFORE 341!0.014 !0.008 3410.009 0.006 AWARD }AFTER 4210.019 0.010 4210.0020.001p -value 0.0020.0010.0440.017Panel B :Multi v ariate tests Dependent variable:market-adjusted returns Pre-earnings-announcement window Earnings announcement window Variable Pred Coe $cient t -Statistic Pred Coe $cient t -Statistic Intercept ?0.014 2.05?0.0010.58BEFORE !!0.032!2.87#0.007 1.86 EPS #0.736 2.77#0.188 2.05 N 759759Adj .R 0.020.01 The AWARD }BEFORE (AWARD }AFTER )group includes 341(421)scheduled CEO option awards made during the two-week period before (after)the earnings announcement.Awards made on earnings announcement dates are not included in either group.The dependent variable is cumulative market-adjusted return,measured,separately,over two windows.The "rst,the &pre-earnings-announcement 'window,begins the day after the earnings announcement for the prior quarter and ends at the earlier of award date and the day before earnings announcement for the current quarter.The second,the &earnings announcement 'window,runs from the day before to the day after earnings announcement date.BEFORE is an indicator variable taking the value of one (zero)for observations in the AWARD }BEFORE (AWARD }AFTER )group. EPS is seasonally-adjusted change in quarterly earnings per share from continuing operations,de #ated by share price.t -Statistics are based on White (1980)heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Signi "cantly di !erent from zero at the 0.05level. These inferences are further supported by "ndings for the earnings-announce-ment window;for the AWARD }BEFORE group,both mean and median cumu-lative abnormal returns are signi "cantly positive (0.9%and 0.6%,respectively),and are signi "cantly higher than those for the AWARD }AFTER group (0.2%and 0.1%,respectively). To control for the possibility that di !erences between the two groups with respect to abnormal returns around earnings announcements re #ect systematic D.Aboody,R.Kasznik /Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(2000)73}10091 92 D.Aboody,R.Kasznik/Journal of Accounting and Economics29(2000)73}100 di!erences in"rm performance,we also estimate the following model: RE1H" # BEFORE H# EPS H# H(3) where RET is cumulative abnormal returns measured over the two alternative windows,BEFORE is an indicator taking the value of one(zero)for observations in the AWARD}BEFORE(AWARD}AFTER)group,and EPS is seasonally-adjusted change in quarterly earnings per share,de#ated by share price.j de-notes sample observations. Panel B of Table4presents summary statistics from estimating Eq.(3). Consistent with our prediction and with the univariate test,the estimated coe$cient on BEFORE is signi"cantly negative in the pre-earnings-announce-ment window(t-statistic"!2.87),and signi"cantly positive in the earnings-announcement window(t-statistic"1.86).As expected,abnormal returns are positively associated with EPS in both speci"cations. Overall,these"ndings are consistent with CEOs opportunistically managing the timing of their volunt-ary disclosures around scheduled awards. In contrast to these"ndings,for"rms with variable award schedules,we"nd no signi"cant di!erences between the two groups with respect to abnormal returns in the two return windows.In particular,assigning unscheduled awards into AWARD}BEFORE and AWARD}AFTER groups similarly to the procedure used for scheduled awards,we"nd that the estimated coe$cient on BEFORE in Eq.(3)is statistically indistinguishable from zero in both the pre-earnings-announcement window(t-statistic"!0.09),and earnings-announcement window(t-statistic"1.15). 4.3.2.Management earnings forecasts We next investigate whether our inferences from the market-based"ndings can be supported by more direct evidence from voluntary disclosures made by AWARD}BEFORE and AWARD}AFTER"rms.In particular,for each of the341 (421)awards in the AWARD}BEFORE(AWARD}AFTER)group,we search the LEXIS/NEXIS News Wires"le for management earnings forecasts issued dur-ing the pre-earnings-announcement window. We review each announcement to ensure it provides either a quantitative(point,range,lower-and upper-bound)or qualitative forecast of current quarter earnings.We focus on manage-ment forecasts of current quarter earnings because our objective is to assess whether the decision to voluntarily preempt impending earnings surprises is Results are robust to controlling for"rm size,measured as log market value of equity. Recall that this window ends at the earlier of award date and the day before earnings announcement.This allows us to avoid including disclosures made by AWARD}BEFORE"rms after the award date.We identify only two forecasts issued by these"rms between the award date and earnings announcement. RTX2006正式版腾讯通（RTX）方案技术白皮书 腾讯通技术支持服务中心 2011年4月 目录 一、需求概要 (3) 二、系统概述 (5) 三、腾讯通（RTX）产品介绍 (7) 1、什么是RTX (7) 2、RTX的优点 (8) 四、腾讯通（RTX）的主体功能介绍 (9) 五、与短信的融合管理 (12) 六、与腾讯通RTX视频会议插件完美融合 (15) 1视频会议与RTX集成的原理 (16) 2、集成说明 (16) 3、即时会议： (17) 4、与RTX集成功能 (18) 七、腾讯通（RTX）与其它应用系统的集成 (19) 1、集成思路（以下皆以“办公自动化系统”举例） (19) 2、“办公自动化系统”到RTX的单点登陆 (19) 3、RTX到“办公自动化系统”的单点登陆 (20) 4、流程消息提醒 (22) 5、用户数据同步 (23) 6、RTX用户状态感知 (24) 八、部分企业用户名录 (25) 2 腾讯通方案 第 3 页 共 34 页 腾讯通技术服务中心 一、需求概要 根据用户的需求，企业级即时通讯软件――腾讯通（RTX ）从功能上来说必须满足以下要求： 1、可以在局域网内，自行架设服务器。 2、文件以及信息传输过程中必须进行加密。 3、必须有完整的组织结构，并且实名制。 4、可以由管理员自己进行用户管理。 5、可以进行即时文本信息、图片等内容的交流，支持离线收发。 6、可以在用户之间传输文件，支持离线收发。 7、可以进行语音以及视频方面的交流，并使用USBPhone 进行通话。 8、支持短信的发送。 9、界面友好，使用方便，符合国内的使用习惯。 10、 必须可以与“办公自动化系统（OA ）”进行集成。 腾讯通（RTX ）软件从应用角度看，也分为以下三个部分： 1、 腾讯通（RTX ）软件的主体功能。 通过部署腾讯通（RTX ）软件，即可以使用腾讯通（RTX ）的主体功能。可以轻松地通过服务器所配置的组织架构查找需要进行通讯的人员，并采用丰富的沟通方式进行实时沟通。文本消息、文件传输、直接语音会话或者视频的形式满足不同办公环境下的沟通需求。 2、 腾讯通（RTX ）与其它系统集成。 腾讯通（RTX ）通过开发可以与其它应用系统集成，如与“办公自动化系统(OA)”进行集成。通过集成能够实现“状态感知”、“邮件提醒”、“流程提醒”、“单点登录”等功能，可以让日常办公人员在第一时间接收到消息提醒，大大提升工作效率。 与“办公自动化系统（OA ）”集成可以实现以下功能： 状态感知 可以在OA 系统的IE 页面中展现用户是否在线，并可以点击标记直接使用RTX 的相关功能。 RTX2006快速部署方法 一、最新版本及相关资料下载 RTX2006安装包及使用手册等详细资料除了从安装光盘获取外，也可以通过如下网址下载安装或阅读： https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html,/download/RTX2006SP120070124.rar 把下载的文件解压缩到本地硬盘目录中，获得4个文件： 服务端软件RTX2006SP1Server.exe 客户端软件RTX2006SP1Client.exe 如想对RTX进行二次开发，请使用如下两个SDK开发包： 服务端SDK开发包软件RTX2006SP1ServerSDK.exe 客户端SDK开发包软件RTX2006SP1ClientSDK.exe 二、软件安装部署 本部分内容将一步一步指导您进行RTX的安装，设置部门、添加用户，本指引主要是指导用户顺利使用RTX，并不是详细的使用手册，相关手册到RTX官方网站下载。 注意：RTX只支持Windows2000以上操作系统，请确保你的操作系统符合要求。 a)安装服务器 1)双击运行RTX2006SP1Server.exe服务端安装包文件； 2)阅读说明按下一步，跳过引导页； 3)仔细阅读RTX的许可协议说明，确认后，按我同意，跳过许可协议页； 4)选择安装路径，按安装按钮，耐心等待几分钟（时间长短以系统性能而定）； 5)出现安装完成页面，按完成按钮，完成服务端软件的安装操作； b)配置组织架构及用户 1)点击开始菜单，指向所有程序，指向腾讯通，并选择腾讯通RTX管理器； 2)在左边选择用户管理组，选择组织架构页，如下图： 3)点击添加部门，输入部门名称（如开发组），按确定； 4)重复步骤3，添加多个部门； 腾讯通RTX方案 RTX 正式版 腾讯通（RTX）方案 技术白皮书 腾讯通技术支持服务中心 4月 目录 一、需求概要 ...................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 二、系统概述 ...................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 三、腾讯通（RTX）产品介绍............................................. 错误!未定义书签。 1、什么是RTX ............................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 2、RTX的优点............................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 四、腾讯通（RTX）的主体功能介绍 ................................. 错误!未定义书签。 五、与短信的融合管理....................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 六、与腾讯通RTX视频会议插件完美融合...................... 错误!未定义书签。 1视频会议与RTX集成的原理 .................................. 错误!未定义书签。 2、集成说明 ............................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 3、即时会议： ........................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 4、与RTX集成功能 ................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 七、腾讯通（RTX）与其它应用系统的集成 ..................... 错误!未定义书签。 1、集成思路（以下皆以“办公自动化系统”举例）错误!未定义书签。 2、“办公自动化系统”到RTX的单点登陆............... 错误!未定义书签。 3、RTX到“办公自动化系统”的单点登陆................ 错误!未定义书签。 4、流程消息提醒.......................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 5、用户数据同步.......................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 6、RTX用户状态感知................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 RTX客户端简明操作手册 1.客户端登录 双击桌面图标或在开始菜单中选择腾讯通RTX，将出现登录界面，如图1.1所示，用户需要在帐号和密码中输入管理员分配的帐号和密码，按登录按钮，如果是初始登录，系统还将弹出服务器设置界面，要求输入RTX服务器的地址，如图1.2所示。用户只需要在“服务器设置”下正确填写RTX服务器的网络名称或者IP地址（公司服务器地址：https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html, 在公司内、外部访问设置相同)，其余均不需填写。 图1.1 如果用户是该电脑的主要使用者，推荐将“自动登录”选项选中，那么，当开机时系统会自动为您登录RTX，可以省略输入帐号和密码的登录步骤，直接进 入RTX主界面。 图1.2 2.1个人设置 为方便企业内部人员查找，个人基本信息中的如姓名、性别、年龄、部门、职务等在帐号建立的同时一并建立，除头像外用户不能自行修改，强烈建议每位员工更换个性化头像为自己的工作照片。如图2.1所示。 图2.1 2.1.1修改密码： 通过点击RTX主窗口的主菜单中的“个人设置”项，如图2.2所示，进入“修改密码”页面。填写相应新旧密码后，点击“应用”按钮完成操作，如图2.3所示。优迈科公司的同事可以对原来的密码进行修改，沧海和凯瑞公司的用户与密码因为跟域绑定在一起，所以不能在RTX里对密码进行直接修改，如需修改密码请直接修改自己域帐号的密码即可。 图2.2 图2.3 2.1.2热键设置： 对热键的使用进行设置。 例如，默认的读取消息的热键是“Ctrl+Alt+x”，即当收到消息的时候只要同时按下这三个键则可以读取消息，不需要用鼠标去双击读取。又如，“Ctrl+Alt+p”默认的截图热键，同时按下这三个键的时候就可以截取选定的区域。 对于熟悉电脑操作的用户，使用热键操作可以很大程度上提高工作效率，RTX 正从这一角度出发，定义了方便的热键操作。如果在启动RTX的时候提示“热键冲突”，表示系统中已经有使用相同的热键操作，可以通过在如下的界面重新设置方便用户操作的热键。 腾讯通RTX视频会议管理员 操作手册 2009-8-28 目录 一、腾讯通RTX视频会议管理端操作 (3) 1.1.管理端访问路径 (3) 1.2.会议室的创建 (4) 1.3.为会议室配置用户 (5) 1.3.1.通过RTX组织架构添加会议用户 (5) 1.3.2.通过快速检索姓名，添加用户 (6) 1.3.3.批量添加会议用户 (6) 1.3.4.为用户赋予会议权限 (6) 1.4.用户在会议室权限的介绍 (8) 1.5会议日志的查看 (8) 1.6设置分级管理员 (8) 一、腾讯通RTX视频会议管理端操作 1.1.管理端访问路径 http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/RTXMeetingWeb/syslogin.aspx （注释：xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx为安装RTX视频会议服务器端的IP地址）如下图： 管理员登录帐号密码同RTX服务管理器登录帐号 （注释，RTX服务管理超级管理员必须设置登录密码） 点击登录，进入RTX视频会议的管理界面 1.2.会议室的创建 登录后主界面，首先我们需要增加会议室 （会议室相当于，现实中的真实会议室，我们可以设置会议室的相关信息，以及有权限参加本会议的人员） 首先我们点击左侧功能列表中的增加会议 进入如下界面： 在这里我们输入，会议室名称（如测试会议） 会议密码（会议密码是用来在会议中申请到主席权限的密码） MCUIP（该地址输入安装RTX视频会议服务器的密码） 最大用户数，为该会议室可以参加的会议用户人数 开始与结束时间为，（该会议可以参加的时间段，如果不填写，则该会议可以任意时间参加） 会议室状态（启动为可以使用，关闭为不能参加） 会议说明（对该会议的简单说明，如该会议是用于测试） 腾讯QQ使用说明 一、QQ使用说明（以QQ2006版本为例） 1、安装腾讯QQ软件 首先到网站https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html,/qq/dlqq.shtml上下载QQ程序，下载完毕后双击安装QQ程序。 2、登录QQ 双击腾讯QQ图标出现登录界面，输入自己的用户名和密码后点击“登录”，选择适当的登录模式后点击“确定”。 3、修改密码 点击QQ主界面上的“菜单—设置—安全设置—密码安全—修改密码”，在弹出的界面中的相应位置输入旧的密码，然后输入2次同样的新密码以及相应的验证字符后点击“继续”按钮， 二、QQ群使用说明 （一）QQ群管理员使用说明 1、群成员管理（点击QQ主界面中的QQ群，鼠标右键点击群名选择“成员管理”） a)添加群成员 点击“设置成员”，可以从我的好友中或者其他群中选择相应的成员后点击“应用”。 b)删除群成员 在成员列表中选择所要删除的成员后点击“删除该成员”。 c)添加管理员 QQ群中允许添加5个管理员，在成员列表中选择需要添加的成员后，点击“设置管理员” 按钮即可。 2、群信息维护 点击QQ主界面中的QQ群，鼠标右键点击群名选择“修改群组资料”，此处可以修改群名称、分类、群内公告和群的简介。 3、上传共享资源 双击群名，点击弹出的聊天界面上方的共享，使用右键菜单上传下载文件，或者点击左下角的上传、下载按钮。 （二）QQ群普通用户使用说明 1、加入群 鼠标右键点击QQ群下的空白地方，左键点击“查找添加群”，选择精确查找后输入所要查找的群号，点击“查找”，选择相应的群后点击加入该群。 2、修改自己的群名片 鼠标右键点击群名——左键点击“查看群组资料”——“群名片”，输入真实姓名即可改变在群中显示的名称。 3、下载共享资源 操作同群管理员。 4、聊天 双击群名，在弹出的聊天界面中的消息输入框输入信息后点击“发送”即可以群聊，如需私聊时点击相应的群成员名称即可。 RTX2007正式版 用户手册 成都睿捷通信息有限公司 2013年03月 RTX2013 用户手册 目录 第一章RTX客户端的安装 (4) 1.1 RTX客户端软件的安装 (4) 1.1.1安装RTX客户端 (4) 第二章RTX客户端的基本应用 (6) 2.1客户端用户登录 (6) 2.2个人设置 (8) 2.2.1基本资料 (8) 2.2.2详细资料 (9) 2.2.3联系方式 (10) 2.2.4修改密码 (11) 2.2.5热键设置 (11) 2.2.6回复设置 (12) 2.2.7面板设置 (13) 2.3系统设置 (14) 2.3.1基本设置 (14) 2.3.2声音设置 (15) 2.3.3文件传输设置 (16) 2.3.4办公集成 (17) 2.3.5代理设置 (18) 2.3.6服务器设置 (19) 2.4对外设置 (20) 2.5.1对外资料 (20) 2.5.1身份验证 (21) 2.5应用设置 (22) 2.5.1邮件设置 (22) 2.6主界面介绍 (23) 2.6.1用户信息栏 (24) 2.6.2快捷搜索栏 (25) 2.6.3组织架构面板 (26) 2.6.4手机通讯录面版 (27) 2.6.5最新消息面板 (28) 2.6.6您可以区域 (29) 2.6.7状态栏 (30) 2.7联系人面板 (30) 2.6.1常用联系人 (30) 2.6.2自定义组 (31) 2.6.3常用部门 (32) 2.6.4RTX群 (33) 2.6.5外部联系人 (34) 2.6.6最近联系人 (35) 2.8组织架构面板 (36) 2.7.1多功能会话窗口 (37) 红外编解码芯片YiRTX01使用说明 版本V1.1(2015-1-5) 1、性能简介 YiRTX01能学习当今市面上99%的红外遥控器并转换为串口数据输出，反之，接收串口 的数据可以通过红外二极管发送相同的红外信号。支持电视机、空调、机顶盒、风扇等遥 超宽工作电压：2.5V-5.5V； 功耗： 工作模式：≤20mA，待机模式：≤0.5uA； 封装：SO8或者DIP8； 载波频率：30KHz～60KHz； 通讯接口：UART串口数据，9600bps，1个起始位、8位数据、无校验位、1个停止位； 工作温度范围：-40℃～85℃； 数据长度：解码输出数据长度最大不超过60字节，最小20字节，不同遥控器类型输 出数据长度不一样。 应用范围：红外适配器，万能遥控器，遥控开关，智能家电，空调远程管理等。 2、接口特性 表1接口描述 引脚标识名称功能描述 1IRO红外输出红外信号输出引脚 2VCC电源电源输入，2.5V-5.5V，建议连接一个0.1uF电容到4脚 3IRIN红外输入红外载波输入脚，连接红外二极管 4GND电源地电源地 5TXD串口发送串口发送引脚 6RXD串口接收串口接收引脚 7NC空不接 8LED指示灯输出指示灯信号引脚，指示芯片的工作状态 表2电气参数 工作电压最小2.5V最大5.5V VCC=5V时 LED输出电流-最大15mA VCC=5V时 IRO输出电流-最大35mA VCC=5V时 IRIN输入电流-最大50uA VCC=5V时 工作模式功耗最小15mA最大20mA VCC=5V时 低功耗模式最小0.1uA最大1uA VCC=5V时 3、功能描述 YiRTX02上电后，需要至少10ms的复位时间，复位完成后，进入正常工作状态，上位 机或者单片机可以通过串口进行控制，包括读固件版本、读芯片ID、学习红外指令、发送 红外信号等。指示灯指示YiRTX01的工作状态，比如进行入学习模式时，LED引脚输出低电 平；发送红外信号时，LED引脚不停输出高低翻转电平直到发送完毕。IRIN引脚是红外输 入引脚，一般连接红外二极管、红外三极管输出的信号，可以检测到红外信号的载波。 4、数据格式 YiRTX01芯片采用UART通讯接口与上位机、单片机通信，数据格式为：波特率9600bps， 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 2014年1月 RTX管理员手册 目录 第一章RTX安装 1.1、安装所需软硬件环境 【腾讯RTX 客户端】 1.2、RTX服务器软件的安装 运行“RTXS2013****.exe”程序进行安装。安装过程中涉及“阅读许可协议”、“输入服务与许可证”、“安装路径设置”、“安装后使用者限定”等问题。如图1.1和图1.2所示： 图1.1 阅读软件许可协议 图1.2 选择目标目录 图1.3 设置服务端界面语言 确定了安装路径、界面语言之后，点击安装即可完成安装。 安装完成后，将会自动打开RTX服务管理器进行配置，第一次安装的默认密码为空，可以通过重新设置管理员密码进行设置； 1.3、RTX?客户端软件的安装 建议安装RTXClient之前，先完成RTXServer安装及完成其配置(详情请看下面的ＲＴＸ服务器部署)；假如已安装及配置完成RTXServer的情况下，RTXClient安装的步骤： ●获取RTXClient安装包（有如下方法） 通过RTXServer进行获取(因为RTXServer安装包会自带RTXClient)获取方法，通过ＲTX管理器中的快速部署的URL进行获取，如下图中的红色框中显示的地方； 图1.4 快速部署 在IE游览器中打开此ＵＲＬ即可看到下载客户端安装包的界面，如下图： 图1.5 快速部署网页 通过其它方式，如通过tencent的RTX官方网站或服务中心等方式来进行获取 ●运行RTXClient安装包里的“RTXC2013***.exe”程序进行安装，按默认下一步即可完成安 装。 第二章RTX服务器部署 2.1、总述 完成后，将会自动打开管理器跳到配置向导的界面让管理器进行配置；根据配置向导配置完成，即可使用RTX；部署主要包括几大部份： i)管理员的配置 ii)企业信息的配置 iii)服务器各个进程的配置（一般情况下用默认即可） iv)部门用户数据的配置 其中“”可以根据企业自身需求选择配置。 2.2、配置向导 2.2.1管理员相关配置 ●设置管理员密码 设置登录RTX服务管理器管理员密码(可选)；如不是覆盖安装，第一次安装完成后管理员的密码默认为空，为了安全起见第一步建议先设置管理员密码；点击如下图的“设置超级管理员密码”即进行设置； 腾讯通RTX使用手册 信息技术部 2008.10 1RTX客户端的安装 1.1 获取安装包 1.1.1新区 在IE地址栏输http://10.1.4.34:8012，将出现如下界面，点“下载客户端安装程序”。 1.1.2老区和分公司 有两种方法，推荐使用第一种： 1. 在IE地址栏输入tencent的RTX官方网站： http://dl_https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html,/qqfile/rtx/RTXC2008Beta01(8.0.050.201).exe ，按回车后即可直接下载安装程序。 2. 在IE地址栏输入http://12 3.127.147.80:8012， 将弹出如上图所示界面，点“下载客户端安装程序”。 1.2 安装RTX客户端 运行“Setup.exe”程序进行安装，按默认下一步即可完成安装。其中，“安装路径设置”可以由用户通过点击“浏览”按钮来选定RTX客户端在用户机器上的安装路径， 如下图,“Windows启动时自动运行腾讯通RTX客户端”必须勾选： 安装完成后，桌面和开始菜单上会添加RTX客户端的程序快捷方式，如下示例： ·桌面快捷： ·开始菜单： 2登录 2.1 新区 双击桌面图标或在开始菜单中选择腾讯通RTX，将出现登录界面，如图所示： 帐号是每个人的中文名字，密码初始为123（登录后请马上修改）；推荐将“自动登录”和“记住密码”选项选中，那么，下次开机时系统会自动为您登录RTX。 如果是第一次登录，系统将弹出服务器设置界面，如下图所示。在“地址”栏输入10.1.4.34，“端口”栏输入10000，“企业总机号”为74218676（可不输入） RTX安装部署指南 一、最新版本及相关资料下载 RTX安装包及使用手册等详细资料除了从安装光盘获取外，也可以通过如下网址下载安装或阅读：https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html,/rtx/download/index.shtml 把下载的文件解压缩到本地硬盘目录中，获得4个文件： RTX服务端安装文件：RTXSxxx.exe RTX客户端安装文件：RTXCxxx.exe 如想对RTX进行二次开发，请使用如下两个SDK开发包： RTX服务端SDK开发包软件：RTXSSDKxxx.exe RTX客户端SDK开发包软件：RTXCSDKxxx.exe 如需部署企业集群(多个RTX服务器互连），还需下载： RTX中心服务器安装包：RTXCenterSvrxxxx.exe 二、软件安装部署 本部分内容将一步一步指导您进行RTX的安装，设置部门、添加用户，本指引主要是指导用户顺利使用RTX，并不是详细的使用手册，详细手机请见《RTX管理员手册》。 注意：RTX只支持Windows2000 SP4以上操作系统，请确保你的操作系统符合要求。 a)安装服务器 1)双击运行RTXSxxx.exe服务端安装包文件； 2)阅读说明按下一步，跳过引导页； 3)仔细阅读RTX的许可协议说明，确认后，按我同意，跳过许可协议页； 4)选择安装路径，按安装按钮，耐心等待几分钟（时间长短以系统性能而定）； 5)出现安装完成页面，按完成按钮，完成服务端软件的安装操作； b)配置组织架构及用户 1)点击开始菜单，指向所有程序，指向腾讯通，并选择腾讯通RTX管理器； 2)在左边选择用户管理组，选择组织架构页，如下图： 3)点击添加部门，输入部门名称（如开发组），按确定； 4)重复步骤3，添加多个部门； 5)点击添加用户，输入帐号（如lisa、tom等）、RTX号码、姓名、手机号并分配密码，在对话 框下方为该用户选择部门，如刚才添加的开发组，按确定； 6)重复步骤5，添加多个用户； 7)记录本机ip地址，以供客户端登录（可以使用ipconfig命令查询）； 8)其它功能用法查看《RTX管理员手册》，可以上https://www.doczj.com/doc/888564644.html, 上下载。 [注1]没有找到正式许可：需要获得正式许可，请参考下面的“申请、使用许可证”章节的内容c)服务器防火墙配置 如果安装RTX服务器的机器上有防火墙，需要打开服务器如下端口： 1)TCP&UDP 8000，登录端口，RTX2011默认采用UDP 800登录。 2)TCP 8003，小文件、多人会话文件传输端口。 3)TCP 8880，大文件传输、语音视频端口。 4)TCP 8009，客户端程序自动升级端口。 5)TCP 8010，组织架构、资料照片、自定义标签等功能实现。 6)TCP 8012，快速部署端口。 d)获取客户端安装包 1)在IE输入http://RTX服务器地址:8012 2)点击网页的“下装客户端安装程序”，即可下载客户端安装包。如下图： 腾讯通RTX客户端功能及其使用说明介绍 功能介绍： 腾讯通RTX（Real Time eXchange）是腾讯公司推出的企业级即时通信平台。企业员工可以轻松地通过服务器所配置的组织架构查找需要进行通讯的人员，并采用丰富的沟通方式进行实时沟通。文本消息、文件传输（在线和离线）、直接语音会话或者视频的形式满足不同办公环境下的沟通需求。本通讯软件只适合公司内一般文件发送使用，不能代替正式文件的下发等。 设备维护部信息班经过一个多月的努力工作，完成对该软件服务器端调试，通信测试，软件注册，用户数据录入等。现腾讯通RTX软件已具备实际使用条件，希望领导、同事积极应用该软件，使各级人员更加高效的沟通，有效提高公司工作效率。 使用说明： 一、客户端软件下载 下载方式一： (1)在浏览器中输入以下地址,可直接下载讯通RTX软件及用户表到本机。http://10.25.136.55:8083/txt/txt.zip 下载方式二： 选择我公司网站http://10.25.136.43“下载中心”——“通信软件”选择下载“腾讯通软件”。 下载方式三： (1)在计算机开始菜单的附件中找到“运行”，并在 里面输入\\10.25.136.55 (2)用户名为： administrator 密码： zdlrxc (3)拷贝腾讯通RTX软件及用户表到本机。 二、安装RTX软件（单击下一步，下一步……全部勾选即可）。 三、服务器设置： 客户端软件安装完后，软件界面左下角有“服务器设置”地址栏输入： 10.25.136.55 ，端口号默认 8000不变，点“确定”。 四、对照用户表输入本人的用户账号（神华员工编号），首 次登录密码为空（建议用户及时修改个人密码，防止他人恶意篡改或非法使用），可登录腾讯通RTX软件。 （1）由于本通信软件受用户个数限制（总计用户200名），如没用账号的暂时不做调整。 （2）用户登录该软件后在“个人设置里”尽量填写详细信息，有助于其他用户方便快捷联系到您，提高本软件整体应用水平。 （3）建议使用姓名方式显示（勾选显示姓名） BatchDoc Word文档批量处理工具 腾讯通RTX视频会议管理员操作手册 2009-8-28 文档批量处理工具BatchDoc Word BatchDoc Word文档批量处理工具 目录 一、腾讯通RTX视频会议管理端操作 (3) 1.1.管理端访问路径 (3) 1.2.会议室的创建 (4) 1.3.为会议室配置用户 (5) 1.3.1.通过RTX组织架构添加会议用户 (5) 1.3.2.通过快速检索姓名，添加用户 (6) 1.3.3.批量添加会议用户 (6) 1.3.4.为用户赋予会议权限 (6) 1.4.用户在会议室权限的介绍 (8) 1.5会议日志的查看 (8) 1.6设置分级管理员 (8) 文档批量处理工具BatchDoc Word 文档批量处理工具BatchDoc Word一、腾讯通RTX视频会议管 理端操作 1.1.管理端访问路径 http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/RTXMeetingWeb/syslogin.aspx （注释：xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx为安装RTX视频会议服务器端的IP地址）如下图： 管理员登录帐号密码同RTX服务管理器登录帐号 （注释，RTX服务管理超级管理员必须设置登录密码） 点击登录，进入RTX视频会议的管理界面 文档批量处理工具BatchDoc Word BatchDoc Word文档批量处理工具 1.2.会议室的创建 登录后主界面，首先我们需要增加会议室以及我们可以设置会议室的相关信息，（会议室相当于，现实中的真实会议室，有权限参加本会议的人员） 首先我们点击左侧功能列表中的增加会议进入如下界面： 在这里我们输入，会议室名称（如测试会议） 会议密码（会议密码是用来在会议中申请到主席权限的密码） MCUIP（该地址输入安装RTX视频会议服务器的密码） 最大用户数，为该会议室可以参加的会议用户人数 开始与结束时间为，（该会议可以参加的时间段，如果不填写，则该会议可以任意时间参加） 会议室状态（启动为可以使用，关闭为不能参加） 会议说明（对该会议的简单说明，如该会议是用于测试） 文档批量处理工具BatchDoc Word BatchDoc Word文档批量处理工具 填写信息之后我们点击“提交”按钮，则该会议室建立。 1.3.为会议室配置用户 RTX2010安装使用说明 2011-12-27 说明：本部分内容将一步一步指导您进行RTX2010版本的升级安装，本指引主要是指导用户顺利进行版本升级，并不是详细的使用手册，详细内容请见《RTX使用手册》。 在安装使用新版腾讯通之前，请确认用户接入方式。如无法确认用户方式，请参考现用的腾讯通系统设置。 本文中“内网用户”是指集团济南本部园区及使用异地VPN虚拟网络，使用IP地址10.26.24.4访问腾讯通系统的用户。 “外网用户”是指集团异地园区无VPN虚拟网络或公共网络，使用原IP地址218.56.60.178访问腾讯通系统的用户。 使用中如有疑问可与集团办公室联系。RTX软件使用常见问题：点击这里 一． RTX客户端的安装 1．打开浏览器，内网用户可输入网址http://10.26.24.4:8012/，点击“下载客户端安装程序”，外网用户请点击这里下载：下载地址 2．双击下载后的腾讯通客户端安装程序，进入RTX2010客户端安装向导，按默认下一步即可完成安装。安装过程请遵循安装向导的提示，对“是否接受许可协议”、“个人化您的信息”、“安装路径设置”等等，都可以采用默认设置。其中，“安装路径设置”可以由用户通过点击“浏览”按钮来选定RTX客户端在用户机器上的安装路径，如下图所示： 客户端安装向导 3.点击下一步，阅读许可协议，选择安装路径，完成安装。 客户端安装完成 RTX客户端安装完成后，为保证组织机构及人员信息的快速同步，请点此下载“RTX客户端架构清理”程序，在未登录RTX的情况下（如已自动登录RTX的请先退出），双击运行该程序。程序运行完毕后即可登录使用RTX系统。 二、RTX客户端的登录设置 首次登录时，系统将弹出服务器设置界面，要求输入RTX服务器的地址。用户需要点击登录 RTX 2011 公网部署 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 2011年8月 目录 1、文档说明 (3) 2、RTX服务器端和客户端的主要通信端口 (3) 3、局域网外的RTX客户端如何登录RTX服务器 (3) a)RTXServer安装在托管的服务器上 (3) b)RTXServer安装在局域网内的客户机上 (4) c)RTXServer安装在代理服务器上 (5) d)设置公网IP (6) 4、远程登录 (7) a)远程登录的原理 (7) b)远程登录优点 (8) c)远程登录功能的限制 (9) d)如何启动OutSupport服务 (9) e)客户端如何使用远程登录 (9) 7、后语 (11) 1、文档说明 RTX是腾讯公司推出的企业级即时通信平台。该平台定位于降低企业通信费用，增强企业内部沟通能力，改善企业与客户之间的沟通渠道，创造新兴的企业沟通文化，提高企业生产力。RTX平台的主要功能，包括企业内部实时信息交互、视频语音、企业短信中心等等。RTX平台具有很高的实用性、易用性、可管理性和安全性。除了底层采用128位对称加密技术之外，在实际应用中，RTX可以通过员工实名制、记录对外交互信息等措施，确保企业应用的通信安全。RTX可以利用SDK和API接口扩展第三方应用，如可以开发第三方短信网关、IM监控功能、用户数据同步等功能，为企业、ISV合作伙伴提供参考的整体解决方案。 本文档将介绍公网环境下如何部署RTX2011 Formal,针对各种具体情况提供了相应的解决方案，供RTX实施人员或企业系统管理人员参考阅读。 2、RTX服务器端和客户端的主要通信端口 注：为您的网络安装一个可靠的防火墙，在任何时候，都是必要的，我们提供以下端口，就是为了让客户在防火墙下，可以安全、放心的使用RTX。请仅开通您所需要用到的端口，其他暂时闲置的端口，一定要置于防火墙之后，确保安全。 RTX服务器端所用到的端口： TCP&UDP 8000：用于客户端登录，RTX2011默认采用UDP登录。 TCP 8003：用于客户端发送文件 TCP 8009：用于客户端升级 TCP 8880：语音、视频、大于1M文件传输 TCP 8010：用于客户端取组织架构 3、局域网外的RTX客户端如何登录RTX服务器 a)RTXServer安装在托管的服务器上 如果RTXServer安装的服务器放在电信的托管机房，服务器拥有公网的固定IP地址，那么公网用户就可以通过固定公网IP登录RTX。如图1.1所示。腾讯通RTX方案
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《RTX公网部署手册》[完整版]
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