1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ALVAREZ, COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY v.
SMITH ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08–351. Argued October 14, 2009—Decided December 8, 2009 Illinois law provides for forfeiture of movable personal property used to facilitate a drug crime, permits police to seize the property without a warrant, and allows the State to keep the property nearly five months before beginning judicial forfeiture proceedings. Respon-dents, six individuals who had cars and cash seized under that law, brought this federal civil rights action, claiming that the failure of the State to provide a speedy postseizure hearing violated the federal Due Process Clause. The District Court dismissed the case based on Circuit precedent, but, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit departed from that precedent and ruled for respondents. This Court granted certio-rari to review the Seventh Circuit’s due process determination, but at oral argument the Court learned that all of the actual property disputes between the parties had been resolved.
Held:
1. The case is moot. The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal questions only in the context of actual “Cases” or “Controver-sies,” Art. III, §2, and an actual controversy must exist at all stages of review, not just when the complaint is filed, Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401. Here there is no longer any actual controversy re-garding ownership or possession of the underlying property. There is no claim for damages before this Court; there is no properly certified class or dispute over class certification; and this case does not fit within the category of cases that are “capable of repetition” while “evading review.” Only an abstract dispute about the law remains. Pp. 4–6.
2. The judgment below is vacated. In moot cases, this Court nor-mally vacates the lower court judgment, which clears the path for re-
v. SMITH
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litigation of the issues and preserves the rights of the parties, while prejudicing none by a preliminary decision. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 40. Where mootness is the result of settlement rather than happenstance, however, the losing party for-feits the equitable remedy of vacatur. U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 25. This case more closely re-sembles mootness through happenstance than through settlement. In Bancorp, the party seeking review caused the mootness by volun-tarily settling the issue contested throughout the litigation. Here, the Court believes that the presence of the federal case played no significant role in the termination of plaintiffs’ state-court forfeiture proceedings. Plaintiffs’ forfeiture cases took place with no procedural link to the case before this Court; apparently terminated on substan-tive grounds in their ordinary course; and, to the Court’s knowledge, no one raised the procedural question at issue here in those cases. This Court therefore concludes that it should follow its ordinary prac-tice and order vacatur. Pp. 6–9.
524 F. 3d 834, vacated and remanded.
B REYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS,
C. J., and S CALIA, K ENNEDY, T HOMAS, G INSBURG, A LITO, and S O-TOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and in which S TEVENS, J., joined as to Parts I and II. S TEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 08–351
ANITA ALVAREZ, COOK COUNTY STATE’S
ATTORNEY, PETITIONER v. CHERMANE
SMITH ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[December 8, 2009]
J USTICE B REYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether Illinois law provides a sufficiently speedy opportunity for an individual, whose car or cash police have seized with-out a warrant, to contest the lawfulness of the seizure. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1; United States v. Von Neu-mann, 474 U. S. 242 (1986); United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983). At the time of oral argument, however, we learned that the underlying property disputes have all ended. The State has returned all the cars that it seized, and the individual property owners have either forfeited any relevant cash or have accepted as final the State’s return of some of it. We consequently find the case moot, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instruc-tions to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950); see also E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, & E. Hartnett, Supreme Court Prac-tice 941–942 (9th ed. 2007).
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I
Illinois law provides for forfeiture of movable personal property (including cars and cash) used “to facilitate” a drug crime. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §570/505(a)(6) (West 2008). It permits a police officer to seize that property without a warrant where (1) the officer has “probable cause to believe” the property was so used and (2) a “war-rantless seizure . . . would be reasonable” in the circum-stances. §570/505(b). When an officer has seized property without a warrant, the relevant law enforcement agency must notify the State’s Attorney within 52 days of the seizure; the State’s Attorney must notify the property owner of any impending forfeiture within a further 45 days; and, if the owner wishes to contest forfeiture, the State’s Attorney must begin judicial forfeiture proceedings within yet a further 45 days. See ch. 725, §§150/5–150/6. Thus, the statute gives the State up to 142 days, nearly five months, to begin judicial forfeiture proceedings—during which time the statute permits the State to keep the car or cash within its possession.
On November 22, 2006, six individuals (the respondents or “plaintiffs”) brought this federal civil rights action against defendants the city of Chicago, the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, and the Cook County State’s Attorney (the petitioner here, whom we shall call the “State’s Attorney”). See Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Three of the individuals, Chermane Smith, Ed-manuel Perez, and Tyhesha Brunston, said that earlier in 2006 the police had, upon their arrests, seized their cars without a warrant. See Complaint ?25, App. 34a (Smith, seizure on Jan. 19, 2006); id., ?26, at 34a (Perez, seizure on Mar. 8, 2006); id., ?27, at 34a (Brunston, seizure on Apr. 8, 2006); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification ?8, at 39a. The other three plaintiffs, Michelle Waldo, Kirk Yunker, and Tony Williams, said that earlier in 2006 police had, upon their arrests, seized their cash without a
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warrant. See Complaint ?28, at 34a–35a (Waldo, seizure on Jan. 20, 2006); id., ?29, at 35a (Yunker, seizure on Sept. 26, 2006); id., ?30, at 35a (Williams, seizure in July 2006); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification ?8, at 39a. The plaintiffs added that the police department still had custody of their property. See Complaint ??24–30, at 34a–35a. They claimed that the failure of the State to provide a speedy postseizure hearing violated the federal Due Process Clause. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. And they asked the court (1) to certify the case as a class ac-tion, (2) to declare that they had a due process right to a prompt postseizure probable-cause hearing, (3) to declare that the hearing must take place within 10 days of any seizure, and (4) to enjoin the defendants’ current practice of keeping the property in custody for a longer time with-out a judicial determination of probable cause. See Com-plaint ?36, App. 36a.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Seventh Circuit precedent made clear that “the Constitution does not require any procedure prior to the actual forfeiture proceeding.” Jones v. Takaki, 38 F. 3d 321, 324 (1994) (citing Von Neumann, supra, at 249). On February 22, 2007, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. It also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The plaintiffs appealed.
On May 2, 2008, the Seventh Circuit decided the appeal in the plaintiffs’ favor. Smith v. Chicago, 524 F. 3d 834. It reconsidered and departed from its earlier precedent. Id., at 836–839. It held that “the procedures set out in” the Illinois statute “show insufficient concern for the due process right of the plaintiffs.” Id., at 838. And it added that, “given the length of time which can result between the seizure of property and the opportunity for an owner to contest the seizure under” Illinois law, “some sort of mechanism to test the validity of the retention of the property is required.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals re-
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versed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id., at 839. Its mandate issued about seven weeks thereafter.
On February 23, 2009, we granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit’s “due process” determination. The Court of Appeals then recalled its mandate. The parties filed briefs in this Court. We then recognized that the case might be moot, and we asked the parties to ad-dress the question of mootness at the forthcoming oral argument.
At oral argument counsel for both sides confirmed that there was no longer any dispute about ownership or pos-session of the relevant property. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (State’s Attorney); id., at 56–57 (plaintiffs). The State had returned the cars to plaintiffs Smith, Perez, and Brunston. See id., at 5. Two of the plaintiffs had “defaulted,” appar-ently conceding that the State could keep the cash. Ibid. And the final plaintiff and the State’s Attorney agreed that the plaintiff could keep some, but not all, of the cash at issue. Id., at 5, 56–57. As counsel for the State’s Attor-ney told us, “[T]hose cases are over.” Id., at 5.
II
The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal questions only in the context of actual “Cases” or “Contro-versies.” U. S. Const., Art. III, §2. An “‘actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974)). In this case there is no longer any actual controversy between the parties about ownership or possession of the underlying property.
The State’s Attorney argues that there is a continuing controversy over damages. We concede that the plaintiffs filed a motion in the District Court seeking damages. But the plaintiffs filed their motion after the Seventh Circuit
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issued its opinion. And, after this Court granted certio-rari, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate, taking the case away from the District Court before the District Court could respond to the motion. Thus, we have before us a complaint that seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages.
The plaintiffs point out that they sought certification of a class. And a class might well contain members who continue to dispute ownership of seized property. But that fact is beside the point. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ class certification motion. The plaintiffs did not appeal that denial. Hence the only disputes relevant here are those between these six plaintiffs and the State’s Attorney; those disputes concerned cars and cash; and those disputes are now over. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 404 (1980) (“A named plaintiff whose claim expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits until a class has been properly certified”).
The parties, of course, continue to dispute the lawful-ness of the State’s hearing procedures. But that dispute is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights. Rather, it is an abstract dispute about the law, unlikely to affect these plaintiffs any more than it affects other Illinois citizens. And a dispute solely about the meaning of a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or threatened harm, falls outside the scope of the constitutional words “Cases” and “Controver-sies.” See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477 (1990); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 241 (1937); Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895).
We can find no special circumstance here that might warrant our continuing to hear the case. We have some-times heard attacks on practices that no longer directly
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affect the attacking party, but are “capable of repetition”while “evading review.” See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 462 (2007); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). Yet here, unlike those cases, nothing suggests that the individual plaintiffs will likely again prove subject to the State’s seizure procedures. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situa-tions, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality”); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 318–319 (1974) (per curiam). And in any event, since those who are directly affected by the forfeiture practices might bring damages actions, the practices do not “evade review.” See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8–9 (1978) (damages claim saves case from mootness). Consequently, the case is moot. See, e.g., Preiser, supra, at 403–404; Mills, supra, at 658.
III
It is less easy to say whether we should order the judg-ment below vacated. The statute that enables us to vacate a lower court judgment when a case becomes moot is flexible, allowing a court to “direct the entry of such ap-propriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. §2106; see also U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21 (1994). Applying this statute, we normally do vacate the lower court judgment in a moot case because doing so “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues be-tween the parties,” preserving “the rights of all parties,”while prejudicing none “by a decision which . . . was only preliminary.” Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 40.
In Bancorp, however, we described circumstances where
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we would not do so. We said that, “[w]here mootness results from settlement” rather than “‘happenstance,’” the “losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy . . . [and] thereby surrender[ed] his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.” 513 U. S., at 25. The plaintiffs, point-ing out that the State’s Attorney agreed to return all three cars and some of the cash, claim that, with respect to at least four of the plaintiffs, this case falls within Bancorp’s “settlement” exception.
In our view, however, this case more closely resembles mootness through “happenstance” than through “settle-ment”—at least the kind of settlement that the Court considered in Bancorp. Bancorp focused upon a bank-ruptcy-related dispute that involved a legal question whether a bankruptcy court could lawfully confirm a debtor’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan if the plan relied upon what the debtor said was a special exception (called the “new value exception”) to ordinary creditor priority rules. Id., at 19–20. The parties contested that legal issue in the Bankruptcy Court; they contested it in an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s order to the Federal District Court; they contested it in a further appeal to the Court of Appeals; and eventually they contested it in this Court. Id., at 20. While the case was pending here, the parties settled their differences in the Bankruptcy Court (the court where the case originated)—including their differ-ences on this particular contested legal point. Ibid. They agreed upon a reorganization plan, which they said would constitute a settlement that mooted the federal case. Ibid. Recognizing that the reorganization plan that the Bank-ruptcy Judge confirmed in the case amounted to a settle-ment that mooted the case, this Court did not vacate the lower court’s judgment. The Court’s reason for leaving the lower court’s judgment in place was that mootness was not a result of “the vagaries of circumstance.” Id., at 25. Rather the party seeking review had “caused the mootness
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by voluntary action.” Id., at 24 (emphasis added). By virtue of the settlement, that party had “voluntarily for-feited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari.” Id., at 25. Hence, compared to mootness caused by “happenstance,” considerations of “equity” and “fairness” tilted against vacatur. Id., at 25–26.
Applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude that the terminations here fall on the “happen-stance” side of the line. The six individual cases proceeded through a different court system without any procedural link to the federal case before us. To our knowledge (and we have examined the state-court docket sheets), no one in those cases raised the procedural question at issue here. Rather, the issues in those six cases were issues solely of state substantive law: Were the cars and the cash forfeit-able or not? And court docket sheets suggest that the six state cases terminated on substantive grounds in the ordinary course of such state proceedings. In the three automobile cases, the State voluntarily dismissed the proceedings and returned the cars between 11 and 40 months after the seizures, a long enough time for the State to have investigated the matters and to have deter-mined (after the termination of any related criminal pro-ceedings) for evidentiary reasons that it did not wish to claim the cars. See Dockets in People v. 2004 Chevrolet Impala, No. 2006–COFO–000296 (Cook County, IL) (Brunston’s car returned on July 27, 2009); People v. Smith, No. 2006–COFO–000036 (Cook County, IL) (Smith’s car returned on May 5, 2008); and People v. 1999 Chevrolet Malibu, No. 2006–COFO–000288 (Cook County, IL) (Perez’s car returned on Jan. 29, 2007). In the remain-ing contested case, involving cash, the State voluntarily dismissed the proceedings after 14 months, again a long enough time for the State to have weighed the evidence and found a compromise settlement appropriate on the merits. See Docket in People v. $1,500 in U. S. Currency,
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No. 2006–COFO–000201 (Cook County, IL) (Waldo’s cash returned on Mar. 19, 2007). The disparate dates at which plaintiffs’ forfeiture proceedings terminated—11, 14, 27, and 40 months after the seizures—indicate that the State’s Attorney did not coordinate the resolution of plain-tiffs’ state-court cases, either with each other or with plaintiffs’ federal civil rights case. Cf. Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 39–40 (stating that a lower court judgment would have been vacated even though an action of the party seeking review had brought about the mootness because that action—a commodity being decontrolled by Executive Order—was basically unrelated); see also Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. 2d 125, 127 (CA8 1947).
For these reasons, we believe that the presence of this federal case played no significant role in the termination of the separate state-court proceedings. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that neither party, although aware of Bancorp, suggested the contrary at oral argument. Indeed, both parties argued against mootness at oral argument, a fact that further suggests that a desire to avoid review in this case played no role at all in producing the state case terminations. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5–11, 33–38. And if the presence of this federal case played no role in causing the termination of those state cases, there is not present here the kind of “voluntary forfeit[ure]” of a legal remedy that led the Court in Bancorp to find that consid-erations of “fairness” and “equity” tilted against vacatur. We consequently conclude that we should follow our ordinary practice, thereby “clear[ing] the path for future relitigation of the issues.” Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 40. Thus, nothing in this opinion prevents the plaintiffs from bringing a claim for damages based on the conduct alleged in their complaint. Id., at 37–40.
We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-peals and remand the case to that court with instructions to dismiss.
It is so ordered.
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Opinion of S TEVENS, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 08–351
ANITA ALVAREZ, COOK COUNTY STATE’S
ATTORNEY, PETITIONER v. CHERMANE
SMITH ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[December 8, 2009]
J USTICE S TEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree that this case is moot and join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, I would not vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Following the teaching of our decision in U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18 (1994), I would apply the general rule against vacating appellate judgments that have be-come moot because the parties settled.
Bancorp set forth the basic principles for determining whether to vacate a case that has become moot. The overriding concern is equitable: “From the beginning we have disposed of moot cases in the manner ‘“most conso-nant to justice” . . . in view of the nature and character of the conditions which have caused the case to become moot.’” Id., at 24 (quoting United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U. S. 466, 477–478 (1916), in turn quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U. S. 300, 302 (1892) (alteration in original)). The “public interest” must be considered as part of this equitable inquiry, Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26, 27, and that interest is generally better served by leaving appellate judgments intact. “‘Judicial precedents are presumptively correct
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and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants . . . .’” Id., at 26 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 40 (1993) (S TEVENS, J., dissenting)). Hence, we will typically vacate a judgment when the party seeking review has been “frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance” or “when mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below.” Ban-corp, 513 U. S., at 25. But we will typically decline to vacate when “the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action,” id., at 24, including action taken in good faith and in conjunction with the opposing party. Even when “respondent agreed to [a] settlement that caused the mootness,” it remains “petitioner’s burden, as the party seeking relief from the status quo of the appellate judgment, to demonstrate not merely equivalent responsibility for the mootness, but equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur.” Id., at 26. “[M]ootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review.” Id., at 29.
In my view, the Court has misapplied these principles. To be sure, the “settlement” between the parties in this case might be distinguished from the more conventional settlement reached by the parties in Bancorp. And we have no evidence to suggest that petitioner returned re-spondents’ property prior to the conclusion of our review with the purpose or expectation of manufacturing moot-ness. Nevertheless, petitioner’s decision to return the automobiles when it did appears to have been legally discretionary, as was the “compromise settlement” that it reached with respondent Waldo regarding her cash, ante, at 8. In light of petitioner’s purposive and voluntary action that caused the mootness—along with its failure to alert us to the relevant facts or to explain why vacatur would serve the public interest—I believe it has failed to
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carry its burden to “demonstrate . . . equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur.” Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26.
There was a third option for disposing of this case: We could have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvi-dently granted. Like denying the petition in the first place, that disposition would have preserved the judgment below. At the time we granted certiorari on February 23, 2009, petitioner had already resolved the underlying property disputes for five of the six named respondents. See ante, at 4, 8–9. It was entirely predictable that the final settlement would soon follow. Moreover, the briefing in this case has revealed a disagreement over basic de-scriptive questions of Illinois law, questions that were not passed upon below. Compare Brief for Petitioner 60–66 with Brief for Respondents 41–44. And, of course, we have no way of knowing how the District Court would have applied the Court of Appeals’ remand order, which left it great discretion to “fashion appropriate procedural relief” “with the help of the parties.” Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F. 3d 834, 838 (CA7 2008). It has become clear that the Court was overhasty in deciding to review this case; the improvidence of our grant provides an additional reason why we should not vacate the work product of our colleagues on the Court of Appeals.
I respectfully dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion and from its judgment.
The American Court System 美国法院系统 2.The Federal Court System 联邦法院体系 The federal court system is basically a three-tiered model consisting of (1) U.S. district courts (trial courts of general jurisdiction) and various courts of limited jurisdiction, (2) U.S. courts of appeals (intermediate courts of appeals), and (3) the United States Supreme Court. 联邦法院体系模式基本上由三个序列组成（１）美国联邦大区法院（拥 有普遍管辖权的初审法院）和各种各样的有限管辖权的法院，（２）美国联邦上诉法院（上诉仲裁法院）和（３）美国联邦最高法院。 Unlike state court judges, who are usually elected, federal court judges—including the justices of the Supreme Court—are appointed by the president of the U.S. and confirmed by Senate. All federal judges receive lifetime appointments (because under Article 3 they ―hold their offices during Good Behavior‖). 与州法院法官通常由选举产生不同，联邦法院的法官——包括最高法院 的大法官们——是由美国总统提名，由参议院批准。所有的联邦法官都是终 身制（这是由美国联邦宪法第三条―他们品行端正因而受任终身‖所规定的）。 a. U.S. District Court 美国联邦区法院 At federal level, the equivalent of a state trial court of general jurisdiction is the district court. There is at least one federal district court in every state. The number of judicial districts can vary over time, primarily owing to population changes and corresponding
第八课《美国联邦政府的建立》 教学目标 1．知识与能力： （1）了解美国联邦政府建立的历史背景、理解1787年宪法制定的必要性。掌握美国1787年宪法的主要内容和联邦制的权力结构、认识美国两党制的形成与发展，培养获取和解读信息、描述和阐释事物、论证和探讨问题的能力。 （2）通过比较美国总统制与英国君主立宪制之间的异同，认识民主制度因国情的差异而呈现出的多样性，通过材料获取和解读信息，进一步提高运用知识的能力。 2．过程与方法： （1）结合美国现状讲述美国联邦制发展的历史，通过学习，体会现实，反思历史，探究学习，培养发现问题，解决问题，总结应用问题的能力。 （2）通过情境创设、史料分析、角色模拟、探究学习、反思历史等学习过程，培养以全球史观、发展史观、文明史观和辩证史观分析历史的方法。 3．情感态度与价值观： （1）通过学习美国联邦制度的建立和完善，美英两国制度的对比，认识人类政治文明是在国情支配下和发展中进步的，明白政治制度的发展和完善是历史进步的必然过程。（2）培养学生从世界的、历史的、辨证的角度看待历史发展的进程，从而理解和尊重世界各地区、各国家、各民族的文化传统，认识资产阶级政治制度的历史进步性和局限性，有利于我们汲取人类各族文明成果，进一步形成开放的世界意识。 教学重难点 1．重点：（1）对美国1787年宪法中“分权与制衡”的理解与掌握。 （2）对美国1787年宪法的评价。 2．难点：（1）依据学生学生现有知识水平，对邦联制与联邦制，美国1787年宪法中“分权与制衡”的理解有难度。 （2）英国君主立宪制与美国民主共和制的比较。 教学过程 一、导入新课
提问：现在，我想问问大家，国庆节用英语怎么说？ 答：national day 讲述：是的。但是美国的国庆节并不是叫做national day，而是independence day，即“独立日”。这是因为《独立宣言》的发表只意味着美国从其过去的宗主国英国分离出来，但这与我们今天所看到的美国仍有巨大不同。从政治意义上说，今天美国政治体制的确立，并不源于独立战争，而是源于1787年美国宪法的制定。那么1787年宪法是一部怎样的宪法？它的哪些内容深深地影响着美国的发展？它又是在怎么的背景下颁布的？等等这些问题我们将在接下来的学习中了解到。（由此导入新课） 二、1787年宪法制定的背景 1.必要性：邦联制的缺陷 讲述：从17世纪起英国就在北美进行殖民扩张，实行残酷的殖民统治，这激起了北美人民的反抗，于是1775年北美13州的人民发动起义，历史上称为独立战争。那么独立初期的美国社会面临着怎样的情况呢？（引出宪法制定的下一个背景）请同学们自己阅读课本第四十页的内容、资料回放，并思考为什么华盛顿说邦联只是有名无实的空架子。 《独立宣言》正式宣告了北美英属13个殖民地的独立。独立后大陆会议对各州没有多大约束力。为了取得独立战争的胜利，大陆会议经过紧张的、延续一年多的辩论，于1777年11月通过了《邦联条例》。这是美国第一部宪法。在13个主权州全部批准后，从1781年3月1日起，《邦联条例》正式生效，大陆会议改为邦联国会。现在看看看什么是邦联制。 邦联制：是若干个独立的主权国家为实现某种特定目的(如军事、经济方面的要求)而组成的一种松散的国家联合。邦联制下各邦的权力和地位相当突出；地方自治的范围非常广；而国家中央政府、议会等权力相对薄弱。邦联制易形成整个国家机构的松散。 在这一体系下，美国实际上还是一个十分松散的联盟，存在着很多的问题。 政治上，邦联政府几乎无权，各州权利很大，没有一个强有力的中央政府。 材料：《邦联条例》规定：邦联名称为美利坚合众国；各州保留它们的主权、自由和独立；邦联只设国会作为中央权力机构；各州派2至7人为国会代表，各州
美国政府机构设置 美国政府的机构设置框架，源于美国联邦宪法。政府三个部门——立法、行政和司法三权分立，各自行使特定的职责，同时相互制约。 一、立法机关（美国国会） 联邦政府的所有立法权力被赋予由两院（众议院和参议院）组成的国会。参议院由每州出两名参议员组成，共100人。参议员任期六年，每逢双数年便举行选举，改选参议员的三分之一。参议院主席由副总统担任，但除了在表决相持不下时，副总统并是没有表决权。众议院由各州按人口比例分配名额选出，共435名众议员。美国国会设置的其他重要机构，还包括总审计署和国会预算办公室。 二、司法机关 美国的司法机关主要由最高法院、11个上诉法院、91个地方法院、以及三个有特别裁判权的法院以及联邦司法中心等机构组成。 最高法院和联邦法院的院长和法官由总统提名，由参议院批准任命。最高法院是美国最高一级法院，也是联邦宪法特别设立的唯一法院。最高法院由一位首席大法官和8位大法官组成。 每个上诉法院有3－15名上诉法官。 地区法院是联邦法院系统的基层法院，每一地区法院有1－
27 个法官。 三、行政部门机构设置 美国总统领导的行政部门分为两部分：总统的办事机构和联邦政府的各部。 （一）总统和白宫 1、总统 2、总统内阁 内阁成员由处理具体的国家及国际事务各部部长和总统指定的其他官员组成。除副总统和国务卿外，还包括13个部的部长 3、白宫“政研室” 1）国家安全委员会 主席由总统担任，其他法定成员包括副总统、国务卿和国防部长。国家安全委员会帮助总统制定有关国家安全的国内外军事、情报和经济政策。 2）总统经济顾问委员会 委员会由主席1人和委员2人组成。委员会主席也称为总统首席经济顾问。委员会的三名成员都由美国总统任命，并经参议院同意。委员会有专业工作人员19名，任期1－2年。其任务是：为总统分析全国经济情况，为制定国内外经济政策提供建议，协助总统准备提交国会的年度经济报告，为总统收集经济发展和动向的情报，评价联邦政府的各项经济政
1 Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES GARY SWARTHOUT, WARDEN v. DAMON COOKE MATTHEW CATE, SECRETARY, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION v. ELIJAH CLAY ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 10–333. Decided January 24, 2011 P ER C URIAM. I California’s parole statute provides that the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it determines that . . . consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3041(b) (West Supp. 2010). If the Board denies parole, the prisoner can seek judicial review in a state habeas petition. The California Supreme Court has explained that “the standard of review properly is characterized as whether ‘some evidence’ supports the conclusion that the inmate is unsuitable for parole because he or she currently is dangerous.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1191, 190 P. 3d 535, 539 (2008). See also In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241, 1253–1254, 190 P. 3d 573, 580 (2008); In re Rosen-krantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 625–626, 59 P. 3d 174, 183 (2002). A Respondent Damon Cooke was convicted of attempted first-degree murder in 1991, and a California court sen-tenced him to an indeterminate term of seven years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. In November 2002, the board determined that Cooke was not yet suitable for parole, basing its decision on the “especially cruel and callous manner” of his commitment offense, App. to Pet.
美国是英、美法系国家。独立前，原13个殖民地基本沿袭英国的法律传统，又根据各自需要自立法令，自成司法体系。独立后，1787年美国宪法对司法权作了原则性规定，1789年美国国会颁布的《司法条例》规定了联邦法院的组织、管辖权和诉讼程序，逐步形成了现有的司法制度。美国司法制度的主要特点有：贯彻三权分立的原则，实行司法独立；法院组织分为联邦和地方两大系统；联邦最高法院享有特殊的司法审查权，等等。 司法组织法院组织复杂，分为联邦法院和州法院两大系统，适用各自的宪法和法律，管辖不同的案件和地域。联邦法院系统由地方法院、上诉法院和最高法院组成。联邦地方法院是审理联邦管辖的普通民事、刑事案件的初审法院，每州根据本州人口多少，设立1～4个地方法院，法官 1～27人不等。联邦上诉法院分设在全国11个司法巡回区，受理本巡回区内对联邦地方法院判决不服的上诉案件，以及对联邦系统的专门法院的判决和某些具有部分司法权的独立机构的裁决不服的上诉案件，法官 3～15人不等。联邦最高法院是联邦法院系统中的最高审级，由1位首席法官和8位法官组成，其判决为终审判决，并享有特殊的司法审查权（见（美国联邦最高法院）。州法院系统极不统一，一般由州初审法院、州上诉法院和州最高法院组成。州初审法院是属州管辖的一般民事、刑事案件的一审法院。州上诉法院审理不服州初审法院判决的上诉案件。州最高法院是州的最高审级。此外，还有国会根据需要通过有关法令建立的特别法院，如联邦权利申诉法院等。法官实行不可更换制、专职制、高薪制、退休制。美国没有统一的行政法院，行政纠纷案件除由普通法院审理外，各独立机构也有权受理和裁决（见美国独立机构）。 美国检察机关与司法行政机构不分，联邦总检察长即司法部长，为总统和政府的法律顾问，监督司法行政管理，在联邦最高法院审理重大案件时，代表政府出庭，参加诉讼。检察官受司法部领导，配属于各级法院。 诉讼程序民事诉讼程序采用辩论制,独任审理;部分诉讼,特别是侵权诉讼等由陪审团裁断,法官判决。刑事诉讼程序的特点是：联邦和若干州保留大陪审团审查重罪起诉的制度；非法取得的证据不得采纳；广泛使用审判前的“答辩交易”;辩护时,民事案件中的原告、被告律师，刑事案件中的公诉人和被告律师相互对抗争辩，法官不主动调查，仅起“消极仲裁人”的作用。 司法审查制度作为联邦原则正式确定，始于1803年联邦最高法院的“马伯里诉麦迪逊案”。首席法官J.马歇尔代表法院认为,“违宪的法律不是法律”,“宪法取缔一切与之相抵触的法律”，明确宣布国会1789年颁布的《司法条例》第13条违宪，从而确立了法院拥有审查国会通过的法令的职权，逐步形成司法审查制度。这一制度成为维护统治秩序，实行权力制衡的一种政治手段，以后为许多国家所仿效。美国的司法审查权由普通法院，主要
盐池高级中学教学笔记 年月日 普通高中课程标准实验教科书〃历史〃必修1 第三单元近代西方资本主义政治制度的确立与发展 第8课美国联邦政府的建立 第一部分：教案内容 【教学设计】 学情分析： 高一年级的历史学习，是学生在高中阶段学习历史的起点，也是关键。能否树立正确的历史观念，掌握科学的学习方法，培养一定的历史思维，决定了学生历史学习的好坏。 由于宁夏中考采取思想品德、历史、地理、生物合卷，实行开卷考试，考生从历史、地理、生物三科试题中选答一科试题，导致学生对历史往往存在这样一些印象：历史是“副科”；是死记硬背，与现实联系不大；是无用之学……由于初中的基础不扎实，对于高中历史学习产生了不利影响。高中历史教材的编写采用了专题的形式，以专题为线索展现历史发展脉络，打破了时空的界限。这本应建立在学生掌握通史的基础之上。但初中历史教育的现状，决定了众多学生既对初中历史知识的掌握情况不理想，无法形成学习高中历史课程必要的知识基础；又缺乏必要的学习能力和方法的培养。采用专题的形式编写教材，这一体例对教学有以下几点不利：⑴知识系统不完整，同一阶段不同历史现象的联系不紧密；⑵专题之间的跳跃性大，新知识的学习缺少旧知识的铺垫；⑶专题性的历史内容理论性强，难度加大；⑷各模块教材之间历史知识的重复。所以教学时，一定要注意专题内知识的完整性问题，同时还要考虑本专题知识与其他专题的联系。在有限的时间里，如何深入浅出地把历史知识向学生讲述清楚，并引导他们通过学习活动有所收获，这对历史教师无疑是一个重大挑战。 针对这些挑战，在备课和上课的过程中，要注意以下几点：⑴反复推敲上课怎样开头，怎样结束。开头要激发兴趣，结束要让人回味。开头结束都力求短小精干，切忌拖泥带水。板书演示要清楚明了，重点关键要突出鲜明。⑵上课要关心每位学生，要使绝大多数都能真懂。在让学生思考、操作、讨论时，优秀生和后进生应有所区别，体现出“因材施教”。要使优秀生感到一定困难，要使后进生感到在进步。⑶要善于提出恰当的问题，要让学生有独立思考和独立操作的时间。一堂课要有动有静，有张有弛，有严肃有笑声。每一节课的最精华之处，一定要放慢速度，让学生能铭刻在心。⑷教学过程的关键是“交流—互动”。要依据教学内容和学生实际，尽可能让学生自己活动。学生的听、说、读、写、议、辩、练、评要交替进行。⑸每次上课后，要及时记下自己成功之处和不足的地方。要作“教学日记”，随时总结经验，自觉进行反思。要及时将教学经验上升到模式建构，从个别上升到一般。 教学思路： 历史课程标准：说出美国1787年宪法的主要内容和联邦制的权力结构，比较美国总统制与英国君主立宪制的异同。 重点：对美国1787年宪法中“分权与制衡”的理解与掌握。 难点：依照学生现有的知识水平，对本节知识宪法中“分权与制衡”的理解与掌握难度大；由于政治学科在高三教学中才涉及“邦联体制”与“联邦体制”，所以现在学生在理解这两个体制上略有难度。【教学目标】
首例中国法院判决在美国的承认与执行案 1994年2月24日，经罗宾逊公司介绍，三联实业公司与卓诚公司（罗宾逊公司的亚洲代理经销商）在中国宜昌签订了买卖合约。按照合约，三联实业购买罗宾逊公司R-44直升机一架，加上在中国的安装和试飞费，总计29.3万美元。没想到这架直升飞机一上天便折戟。1994年3月22日15时45分，三联实业公司安排R-44直升机进行首次载客，但起飞六分钟后，这架崭新的直升机就坠毁于重庆丰都境内的长江主航道上。机上3名游客遇难身亡，飞行员受伤获救。中国民用航空中南管理局出具的事故调查报告结论是，“导致这起事故的直接原因很可能是机械故障，与生产质量有关”。 2001 年1 月，三联公司和平湖公司在中国湖北省高级人民法院（“湖北高院”）提起诉讼（“中国诉讼”），要求被告罗宾逊公司承担因产品质量事故造成的直升机损失以及其他经济损失赔偿。该诉讼程序中的传票、诉状、出庭通知等相关文件于2004 年2 月送达至被告罗宾逊公司，但罗宾逊公司并未出席其后的开庭审理，也未申请延期诉讼或采取其他措施。同年12 月，湖北高院在罗宾逊公司缺席庭审的情况下作出判决（“中国判决”），支持三联公司和平湖公司的诉讼请求，判决罗宾逊公司向三联公司和平湖公司支付总计2000 多万元人民币的损失赔偿金及相应的利息。为了使中国判决得以执行，2006 年3 月，三联公司和平湖公司委托金杜律师事务所，并在具有相关专长的美国律师的协助下，在美国联邦法院加州中部地区法院（“联邦地区法院”）提起关于承认和执行中国判决的请求。 经过长达三年多的双方争辩及法院审查过程，美国联邦地区法院于2009 年8 月作出判决，同意承认与执行本案的中国判决。三联公司和平湖公司由此将获得总额约650 万美元的赔偿及相应的利息。罗宾逊公司不服，于当年10月向美国第九巡回法院提起上诉；2011年3月，美国联邦第九巡回法院驳回了上诉请求。2011年6月底，罗宾逊公司履行相关赔款义务。
美国法院体系概览 上海申一企业法务总网 2013-03-06 13:27:22 作者:张烨来源:原创美国法院体系划分为联邦和州两大系统。 一、联邦法院系统 美国联邦法院管辖的案件主要为：涉及联邦宪法、法律或国际条约的案件，一方当事人为联邦政府的案件，涉及外国政府代理人的案件，公海上或国境内供对外贸易和州际贸易之用的通航水域案件，不同州之间、不同州的公民之间的争议以及州政府向他州公民提起的诉讼等。 美国联邦法院可分为普通法院和专门法院。普通法院分为三级，从下到上分别是：地区法院、上诉法院、最高法院。 1. 联邦地区法院（District Court） 每个州至少有一个地区法院，较大的州可能设2至4个地区法院，全国50个州共设有89个地区法院；另外，哥伦比亚特区、波多黎各、美属维尔京群岛、关岛、北马里亚纳群岛各设1个地区法院；一共94个联邦地区法院。 2．联邦上诉法院（Court of Appeals） 美国的50个州、首都华盛顿特区及境外领土被划分为13个司法巡回区，设有13个巡回上诉法院。其中11个巡回法院由数字命名，其余两个法院分别是哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院和美国联邦巡回上诉法院。 （1）联邦巡回上诉法院（华盛顿DC） 该上诉法院与其他12个上诉法院地位相同，但其管辖的地理范围涉及全国，管辖的案件限于审理由各联邦地区法院及有关联邦独立管理机构转来的涉及专利、商标、版权、合同、国内税收的案件，以及索赔法院和国际贸易法院的判决。 （2）哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院（华盛顿DC） 华盛顿哥伦比亚特区 （3）第一巡回上诉法院 (波士顿) 缅因州 马萨诸塞州 新罕布什尔州 波多黎各 罗得岛州
第8课美国联邦政府的建立 一、三维目标 1、知识与能力 （1）掌握美国1787年宪法的主要内容和权力结构，联邦制产生发展的历史条件。 （2）理解“分权与制衡”原则，培养学生在独立思考的基础从对所学的内容进行较为全面分析、概括和理解的能力。提高阅读和通过多种途径获取历史信息的能力。 2、过程与方法 （1）结合美国现状讲述美国联邦制发展的历史，通过学习，体会现实、反思历史探究学习，发现问题。 （2）指导学生联系时代背景，从美国联邦制的内容中分析其积极作用与局限性，使学生掌握分步骤、分层次掌握运用唯物史观分析历史现象的方法。 3、情感态度与价值观 使学生认识到政治制度的发展完善是人类历史进步地宝贵遗产，进一步形成开放的世界观。 二、教学重点和难点 重点：正确评价1787年宪法；“分权与制衡” 难点：理解“分权与制衡” 三、教学过程 师：图片上显示的两个人是谁？（打出幻灯片：导入） 生：克林顿和布什 师：对了，他们这是在干什么呢？（左手放在一本敞开的《圣经》上，右手高举，向美国最高法院院长宣誓，宣誓词节录自美国宪法第二章第一节） 生：他们在就职宣誓 师：不错，哪位同学愿意来过把总统瘾，宣誓一下。（幻灯片打出材料） 生1：“我庄严宣誓我一定忠实执行合众国总统职务，竭尽全力维护、保护合捍卫合众国宪法”。 师：恩，如果美国有我们××先生做总统的话，中美关系将会有突破性的进展，台湾问题将不再是问题了。（生笑）那么刚才提到的“合众国宪法”指的是哪部宪法呢？（由次导入
新课） （一）、1787年宪法的背景 问题探究让学生带着悬念和兴趣自主学习1787年宪法产生地背景和理论来源 师：美国为什么要制定《1787年宪法》？ 生2：从17世纪起英国就在北美进行殖民扩张，实行残酷的殖民统治，激起北美人民的反抗，于1775年北美13州的人民发动起义，历史上称为独立战争，美国独立后，只是一个松散的联邦，13个州各自为政，使美国面临许多内外矛盾。 生3：1786年谢司领导的农民起义，震撼了邦联统治者。 师：两位同学回答的非常好，那么这里面有一个概念大家可能有些混淆，就是邦联制和联邦制的区别。美国现在是联邦制国家，但刚成立的时候只是一个邦联制国家，那邦联制和联邦制有什么区别呢？（打出幻灯片、实物演示）我把“邦联”比作是“一根用沙土做成的绳”，“联邦”比作是凉衣服的衣架，直观形象的解决了不是重点的难点。（形象变得比喻和实物演示是为了深入浅出的用形象生动的方法加深学生对难点的理解）。 （多媒体课件打出区别） 邦联制与联邦制的区别 ?邦联制：是国家的联合,各州的结合只是一根“沙土作成的绳子”,没有一个全国性的政府. ?联邦制：是联合的国家,好比是一个凉衣服的衣架, “既像小国那样自由和幸福,又像一个大国那样光荣和强大”,联邦实现了自由与力量的统一. （二）分权与制衡 （多媒体课件打出材料） 理论来源 ——欧洲启蒙思想的精华 ?孟德斯鸠是18世纪法国著名的启蒙思想家,著有《论法的精神》,他的立法﹑行政﹑司法三权分立学说,对美国1787年宪法的制定产生了重要影响.用一个形象的比喻就是：照着食谱做菜。 师：分权制衡的精神在于平衡，那么美国联邦政府是如何组成的呢？
美国联邦政府机关事务管理体制基本情况 一、美国联邦总务署概况 美国是一个联邦制国家，实行联邦政府、州政府和地方政府三级行政管理体制，其中地方政府包括县、市、镇、社区、特区等。按照事权划分原则，三级政府分别承担着不同的事务管理和享有相应的管理权力。据了解，目前美国联邦政府除立法、司法机构外，有11个总统办事机构、14个部、57个独立机构。各部和独立机构大多在全国各地设有分支机构，负责管理联邦政府相关事务。驻各地的联邦派出机构，均由在华盛顿的本部管理。联邦政府派往各地的工作人员约占联邦政府总人数的80％。 美国联邦政府机关事务工作由联邦总务署（General Services Administration 简称总务署）统一管理。总务署是联邦政府行政独立机构，署长由总统征求参议院意见并经参议院通过后任命，直接对总统负责。作为联邦政府的集中采购和资产管理机构，总务署与联邦政府行政管理和预算局、人事管理局，被称为联邦政府的三大管理机构。行政管理和预算局主要负责联邦政府各部门组织机构和经费预算管理等项工作，人事管理局是负责联邦政府雇员管理的职能机构。这三大机构是联邦政府正常、高效、有序运转的重要保障，他们的共同特点是为联邦政府各部门、各单位提供相关服务。 1949年7月1日，总务署根据《联邦资产和行政管理服务法》
成立。总务署由联邦工程署、财政部联邦供应局、战争物资管理局和国家档案中心等４个分散的总务机构合并组成，目的是为了避免“职能重复、开支浪费、物资和场地供应上的责权混乱”。同时总务署还接受了一些其他机构的有关职能。随着社会的发展其职能有所调整，20世纪80年代以来，增加了信息技术服务管理等方面的职能。1996年以来，总务署进行了一系列改革，在服务理念、服务领域、服务方式、服务手段等方面都发生了较为深刻的变化。 总务署的主要职责，一是为联邦政府各部门提供办公场所，负责联邦政府机构在全国各地办公楼的修建、维护和经营管理，保证资产的安全运行；二是为联邦政府各部门所需物资设备、公务用车提供优质的集中采购、供应、储存、修理服务和公务旅行、财产处置服务。三是为联邦政府各部门提供电讯、信息处理等方面的技术服务；四是负责研究、制定、评价政府机关事务管理方面的政策法规。此外，还负责前总统及遗孀的服务管理联邦政府的各类用车，指导联邦幼托中心，保护历史建筑，管理优秀艺术项目等。总之，总务署为联邦政府提供的服务是广泛的，哪里有政府的需要，哪里就有总务署提供的优质工作环境，包括办公房、家具、装备、物资、用具、计算机、电话、交通等全方位的服务。 总务署服务机构包括公共建筑服务中心、联邦供应服务中心、联邦技术服务中心和政府政策办公室。职能部门和内部管理机构有11个：财务司，负责总务署的财务管理工作；信息司，负责总
美国联邦政府的建立教学设计 一、三维目标 1、知识与能力 （1）掌握美国1787年宪法的主要内容和权力结构，联邦制产生发展的历史条件。 （2）理解“分权与制衡”原则，培养学生在独立思考的基础从对所学的内容进行较为全面分析、概括和理解的能力。提高阅读和通过多种途径获取历史信息 的能力。 2、过程与方法 （1）结合美国现状讲述美国联邦制发展的历史，通过学习，体会现实、反思历史探究学习，发现问题。 （2）指导学生联系时代背景，从美国联邦制的内容中分析其积极作用与局限性，使学生掌握分步骤、分层次掌握运用唯物史观分析历史现象的方法。 3、情感态度与价值观 使学生认识到政治制度的发展完善是人类历史进步地宝贵遗产，进一步形成开放的世界观。 二、课程标准： 1、说出美国1787年宪法的主要内容和联邦制的权力结构。 2、比较美国总统制和英国君主立宪制的异同。 三、教学对象分析： 教学对象是高一级的学生，学生的基础较好，通过初中三年的历史学习，学生对美国历史已有一定的了解，可以在传授基础知识的同时，适当加入一些探究问题，以扩大学生的知识面。但另一方面，学生的基础不同，知识掌握程度不同，教师应掌握对知识扩展的“度”，注意与学生互动，引导学生对问题的进一步分析与把握，形成正确的价值观、世界观和人生观和分析问题的能力 四、教学重点： 正确评价1787年宪法；“分权与制衡” 教学难点： 理解“分权与制衡” 五、教具： 多媒体课件、图片、实物、表格 六、教学方法： 1、教法指导：问题探究的方法让学生自主学习形成第一印象，再结合图例进行讲授分析；然后用反面论证的方法加深学生的理解；再然后用展示历史资料让学生辨别判断的方法加深学生的理解；最后用列表比较法加深纵向知识联系，加强新旧知识间的结合，深化对所学内容的理解。 2学法指导：运用.辩证法、展示历史资料的方法、归纳法，逐层加深学生的理解。 七、课时安排： 1课时 八、板书设计
一个刚退伍的老兵,一天夜里起床上厕所时,发现老伴没有睡在身边,枕头掉在木头地板上,然后很疑惑的他走进厕所发现了马桶上有一件很小的绿色衣服,当场就被吓死了,请问為什麼? 关键字提示：老兵枕头绿色衣服（不是其他顏色） 2 七点十二分 一名男子很惧怕坐飞机,但是由於工作的关係不得不乘坐飞机在各国间出差往来。他每次都对於时差现象特别不适应，有一次他来到了一个跨洲的国家后，下飞机后看了一下手錶，显示的是早上七点十二分，他随后就哭著自杀了，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：跨洲的国家七点十二分 3 钥匙 一名保险推销员下班后去超市买过耶诞节送给女友的礼品，他最终买的是一个刻有月亮图案的纯银掛件。出超市后，他看见一个小姑娘在路边哭泣，就过去看怎麼回事，突然发现那个小姑娘胸前有一串钥匙。第二天，警方发现小姑娘全身赤裸地死在街边，试分析原因。 关键字提示：保险推销员全身赤裸 4 半张相片 女孩和男孩恋爱很久，当初是男孩先追求的女孩。女孩过生日了，男孩送给她一个音乐盒，虽然是旧的，但女孩十分高兴。不久后有一天，女孩不小心把音乐盒摔坏了，发现里面夹这一张只剩半截的旧相片，上面很模糊地像是一条狗的影像，女孩马上吓死了，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：旧的音乐盒半张相片一条狗的影
有一个孩子，他的父亲是名英国医生，他的母亲是一名日本的英语教师，他从小就因為自己是混血儿而倍感自豪。有一天他翻开母亲上课準备的讲义，发现里面有一张很久前的便条纸，上面画了一面英国国旗，没涂顏色，他立刻回家刺杀了父亲，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：医生英语教师国旗没涂顏色 6 MSN头象 一名有前科的男子刚从警局回家，他由於某件杀人事件而三不五时地被召唤去警局盘问，但由於证据不足被释放了。回家后他和往常一样打开了MSN聊天，忽然发现一名网友的头像是一件骯脏的黑色西装，他马上衝出去，到街上买了一件相同规格，但是顏色為白色的西装。 试分析原因。 关键字提示：骯脏的黑色西装白色的西装 7 可乐的味道 一个在运动中骨折的患者（女性）康復出院了，家里庆祝并大摆宴席。喝饮料的时候，患者的哥哥说今天的可乐怎麼味道有点怪，然后患者的父亲和母亲也喝了纷纷表示可乐味道的确不对。但患者喝后坚称味道正常。患者死於当天晚上洗澡的澡盆里。為什麼？ 关键字提示：女性晚上澡盆 8.牛吃草 有一个年轻的男人，他的房子和邻居夫妇的房子中间隔著一片草坪。有一天深夜，男人被隔壁的吵架声吵醒，之后他又听到了摔东西声、砍刀子声和，过了一会，他又听到了有人撞他家门的声音，但他都没有理会，又睡了过去。第二天，他发现隔壁的男主人惨死在他家门口。推理其过程。 9.云霄飞车
美国的司法体制考察及启示 中国司法改革考察团 原载于《人民司法》2006年第7期93页 为积极稳妥地推进司法体制改革工作，科学借鉴国外和法制度的有益成分，去年10月，中国司法改革考察回对美国司法体制进行了全面考察。 美国司法体制概况 美国是由50个州组成的联邦制固家，实行立法、行政、司法三权分立制度。美国联邦司法体制主要包括法院和司法部两大体系。行使司法权的司法机构仅指法院，检察、警察和国际司法协助等执法部间均由政府所属的司法部管辖。 法院体制。 法院的设置。美国法院分为联邦法院和州法院两大体系。联邦法院根据联邦宪法和法律设立，划分为三级法院，即联邦最高法院、巡回上诉法院、地区法院。联邦最高法院由9名大法官组成，行使联邦最高司法权，有权对宪法进行解释，对行政、立法部门之间的纠纷、州与州之间的重大纠纷等作出最终裁决。联邦巡回上诉法院审理案件实行法律审，一般由3名法官组成会议庭进行。联邦地区法院审理一审普通民刑事案件，美国按照司法区设置94个联邦地区法院，是联邦法院系统中惟一实行陪审制的一级法院。联邦地区法院审理案件除个别案件要由3名法官审理外，一般只由1名法官听审或裁决。 各州法院由各州议会决定设立，在名称和结构上不尽一致，但一般划分为州最高法院、上诉法院、初审法院。与联邦法院审判程序相似，州初审法院是开庭审判的一审法院，州上诉法院和最高法院只进行法律审，对于州上诉法院审判的案件，最高法院也是自由裁量受理。 联邦法院和外联院管辖权的划分。一般而言，发生涉及到联邦法律适用的刑事案件、以联邦为当事人的诉讼、州与州之间的诉讼、州与外国间的诉讼、涉及到联邦法律适用的价值超过1万美元的民商事案件由联邦法院审理，这些案件一般只占到案件总数的5％左右。涉及到州法律适用的案件由州法院审理，数量约为案件总量的95％。联邦法院和州法院系统相互独立，互不隶属，在州法院审理的案件，当事人认为涉及联邦事务的，可以向联邦法院提起诉讼，但是否受理由联邦法院决定。 法院的司法行政事务管理体制。美国联邦法院的司法行政事务由三级法院的首席法官和其他法官代表组成的司法会议负责，具体由司法会议下属的美国法院管理局管理。各州的管理体制不同，此次考察的加利福尼亚州、康涅狄格州法院的司法行政事务由州首席法官负责，下设办公室统一负责州法院系统的司法行政事务。 法官的产生、任用与管理制度。美国联邦法院法官的产生要经历一个严格的进选审查过程。当联邦法院法官空缺或由法律规定增加法官职数时，国会议员、在职法官都可以向总统推荐法盲人选，经司法部、美国律师协会、联邦调查局、参议院司法委员会进行政治背景、个人品行、司法观点和价值取问、司法能力的评估、确认、审查后，总统从审查后的名单中提出拟任法官人选，并经参议院司法委员会举行听证会表决通过，由总统正式任命法官。总统提名法官带有较强的党派政治倾向，一般从长期追随、支持和同情本党的法官中进行提名。卡特、里 根、布什和克林顿四任总统提名的联邦法官，与总统为同一党派的占89．4％。此次考察的康涅狄格州设有专人组成的司法选拔委员会承担法官的选任工作（其中州长提名6人，议会提名6人）。当法官候选人提名后，由司法选拔委员会进行资格审查评估，由州长提名，议
1 Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JOSEPH E. CORCORAN v. MARK LEVENHAGEN, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA STATE PRISON ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 08–10495. Decided October 20, 2009 P ER C URIAM. An Indiana jury convicted Joseph Corcoran of four counts of murder. Corcoran was sentenced to death. After Corcoran’s challenges to his sentence in the Indiana courts failed, he sought federal habeas relief. Corcoran argued in his federal habeas petition that: (1) the Indiana trial court committed various errors at the sentencing phase; (2) his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment; (3) Indiana’s capital sentencing statute was unconstitutional; (4) the prosecution committed misconduct at sentencing; and (5) he should not be executed because he suffers from a men-tal illness. See Corcoran v. Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719, 726 (ND Ind. 2007). The District Court granted habeas relief on Corcoran’s claim of a Sixth Amendment violation, and ordered the state courts to resentence Cor-coran to a penalty other than death. Id., at 725–726. The District Court did not address Corcoran’s other arguments relating to his sentence, noting that they were “rendered moot” by the order that Corcoran be resentenced because of the Sixth Amendment violation. Id., at 734. The Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s Sixth Amendment ruling. Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F. 3d 703, 712, 714 (2008). Then, without mentioning Corcoran’s other sentencing claims, the Seventh Circuit remanded “with instructions to deny the writ,” stating that “Indiana is at liberty to reinstate the death penalty.” Id., at 714. Cor-coran sought rehearing, arguing that the Court of Appeals should have allowed the District Court to consider his
?美国联邦政府公务员知多少? ?11月上旬在共和党总统候选人辩论会上，得克萨斯州州长佩里（Rick Perry）惊人地提出，一旦他上任，将会关闭三个联邦政府部门，虽然他只记得要关闭的是商务部、教育部，第三个部门怎么也想不起来，成为当天辩论会的热门话题，但之后佩里表示，第三个要关闭的是能源部。对于共和党，尤其是茶党来说，联邦政府花费太多纳税人的钱，所以想方设法要削减联邦政府的开销。 据劳工部劳工统计局的统计，2010年联邦政府包括行政、立法以及法院系统雇用的公务员（civilian employee），不包括邮局员工，大约为200万人，使得联邦政府成为美国数一数二的大雇主（沃尔玛号称雇用210万人，为全美最大雇主，但其中有不少季节工）。在一般人的印象中，联邦政府公务员自然大多在首都华盛顿上班，其实不然，约85%的联邦公务员不在大华府地区上班，这些分布在各地上班的人，许多是社安署、国税局、退伍军人事务部、国家公园、海关、边检、法院、国防部等机构的工作人员。 如果按200万联邦政府公务员计算的话，全国现有约3.127亿人，平均每156个人中有一个联邦公务员，联邦公务员占总人口的比率是0.64%。 在所有的联邦机构中，国防部的公务员所占比例最大，据劳工统计局的分类统计，2008年国防部有公务员65.2万人，占当年190万公务员的三分之一，其中在大华府地区上班的约6.8万人，占该部公务员的十分之一强； 其次是退伍军人事务部，公务员28万人，在大华府地区上班的只有8千人，不到该部公务员的三十五分之一；排在第三位的是国土安全部，有公务员17.1万人，其中2.3万人在首都地区上班，不到该部公务员的八分之一。在所有15个部中，除了雇佣公务员最多的上述三个部以外，其他各部雇佣的公务员人数依次为： 司法部：10.8万 财政部：8.8万 农业部：8.2万 国内事务部：6.7万 卫生与公众服务部：6.4万 运输部：5.5万 商务部：3.9万 劳工部：1.6万
《美国联邦地区法院民事诉讼规则》简称《美国联邦民事诉讼规则》 目录美国联邦民事诉讼规则 导论美国联邦民事诉讼规则 第1章本规则的适用范围和一种诉讼形式 第1条本规则的适用范围和目的 第2条一种诉讼形式 第2章诉讼开始；传唤令状、诉答文书、申请书及命令的送达 第3条诉讼开始 第4条传唤状 第4条之1其他令状的送达 第5条诉答文书和其他文件的送达与提交 第6条期间 第3章诉答文书和申请书 第7条允许提出的诉答文书；申请书的格式 第8条诉答文书的一般规则 第9条诉答文书的特别事项 第10条诉答文书的格式 第11条诉答文书、申请书及其他文件的签名；向法院的陈述；制裁 第12条抗辩和异议——提出的期间和方式——通过诉答文书或申请书——基于诉答文书请求判决的申请 第13条反请求和交叉请求 第14条第三当事人诉讼程序 第15条修改和补充诉答文书 第16条审理前会议；日程；管理第4章当事人 第17条原告和被告；当事人能力 第18条请求和救济方法的合并 第19条为公正审判而必要合并的人 第20条当事人的许可合并 第21条当事人的合并错误及不合并 第22条互争权利诉讼 第23条集团诉讼
第23条之1股东的派生诉讼 第23条之2关于非法人团体的诉讼 第24条诉讼参加 第25条替代当事人 第5章庭外证言与发现程序 第26条规范发现程序的一般规定；出示义务 第27条诉讼之前和上诉系属期间的庭外证言 第28条参与作成庭外证言的人员 第29条关于发现程序的约定 第30条口头询问的庭外证言 第31条书面质问的庭外证言 第32条在法院的诉讼程序中庭外证言的使用 第33条对当事人的质问书 第34条提供文件和物件以及为调查或其他目的而进入房地产 第35条身体和精神状态的检查 第36条要求自认 第37条不出示或不协助发现：制裁 第6章开庭审理 第38条要求陪审团审判的权利 第39条陪审团审判或法院审判 第40条为开庭审理而分配案件 第41条撤销诉讼 第42条合并；分开审理 第43条证言的取得 第44条官方记录证明 第44条之1外国法的确定 第45条传票 第46条不需要提出异议 第47条选定陪审团成员 第48条陪审团成员人数——参与裁决 第49条特别裁决和质问书 第50条在陪审团审判的案件中作为法律问题作出的判决；选择重新审理的申请；有条件的裁定