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1966年巴菲特致股东的信：我们迎来了第一个十年1966年上半年在1966 年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数从 969.26 下降为870.10。
考虑到获得的 14.70 的红利，总体的道琼斯收益为-8.7%。
上半年我们的收益为8.2%，达到了我的目标（但这并非是我的预测！）。
我们的这种收益情况可以被认为是不正常的。
我们从事的生意的特点是，长期而言我不会让你们任何人失望，但是短期我则有可能让你们忍受负面的结果。
在上半年我们以及两位在企业中拥有10%股份的合伙人联手买下了 Hochschild，Kohn&Co的全部股份。
这是一家巴尔的摩的私人百货公司。
这是我们合伙企业第一次以谈判的方式买下整个生意。
虽然如此，买入的原则并没有任何改变。
对该生意价格的定量和定性的衡量都照常进行，并严格按照与其它投资机会同样的准绳进行了估价。
HK（以后就这样叫它，因为我也是直到交易完成后才知道该公司的确切发音）从各个方面满足了我们的要求。
无论是从生意还是私人交往的角度来说，我们都拥有一流的人才来打理这桩生意。
如果没有优异的管理，即便价格更加便宜，我们也不见得会买下这个生意。
当一个拥有数千名雇员的生意被售出时，想要不吸引一定的公众注意是不可能的。
然而希望你们不要以公众新闻的报道来推断该生意对合伙企业的影响。
我们有超过五千万美元的投资，绝大部分都投资在二级市场上，而HK 的投资只占了我们净投资额的不到 10%。
在对于二级市场的投资部分，我们对于某只证券的投资超过了我们对 HK 投资额度的三倍还多，但是这项投资却不会引起公众的注意。
这并不是说对于 HK 的投资就不重要，它占我们投资额10%比例就说明它对我们而言是一项重要的投资。
但是总体而言它只是我们全部的投资的冰山一角而已。
到年底我准备用购买成本加上自购买后它产生的盈余作为我们对它的估值。
这项评估方法将一直被执行，除非未来发生新的变化。
自然地，如果不是因为一个吸引人的价格，我们是不会买入HK 的。
Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders-1977BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 per share, were moderately better than anticipated a year ago. Of these earnings, $1.43 per share resulted from substantial realizedcapital gains by Blue Chip Stamps which, to the extent of our proportional interest in that company, are included in ouroperating earnings figure. Capital gains or losses realizeddirectly by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries are not included in our calculation of operating earnings.Whiletoo much attention should not be paid to the figure for any single year, over the longer term the record regarding aggregate capital gains or losses obviously is of significance.1977年本公司的营业净利为2,190万美元，每股约当22.54美元，表现较年前的预期稍微好一点，在这些盈余中，每股有1.43美元的盈余，系蓝筹邮票大量实现的资本利得，本公司依照投资比例认列投资收益所贡献，至于伯克希尔本身及其保险子公司已实现的资本利得或损失，则不列入营业利益计算，建议大家不必太在意单一期间的盈余数字，因为长期累积的资本利得或损失才是真正的重点所在。
Buffett’s Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1991巴菲特致股东的信1991年Our gain in net worth during 1991 was $2.1 billion, or 39.6%. Over the last 27 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $6,437, or at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually.1991年本公司的净值成长了21亿美元，较去年增加了39.6%，而总计过去27年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值从19元成长到现在的6,437美元，年复合成长率约为23.7%。
The size of our equity capital -which now totals $7.4 billion - makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate of gain or, for that matter, come close to doing so. As Berkshire grows, the universe of opportunities that can significantly influence the company's performance constantly shrinks. When we were working with capital of $20 million, an idea or business producing $1 million of profit added five percentage points to our return for the year. Now we need a $370 million idea (i.e., one contributing over $550 million of pre-tax profit) to achieve the same result. And there are many more ways to make $1 million than to make $370 million. 现在我们股东权益的资金规模已高达74亿美元，所以可以确定的是，我们可能再也无法像过去那样继续维持高成长，而随着伯克希尔不断地成长，世上所存可以大幅影响本公司表现的机会也就越来越少。
1957年巴菲特致股东信我认为目前市场的价格水平超越了其内在价值，这种情况主要反映在蓝筹股上。
如果这种观点正确，则意味着市场将来会有所下跌——价格水平届时将被低估。
虽然如此，我亦同时认为目前市场的价格水平仍然会低于从现在算起五年之后的水平。
即便一个完整的熊市也不见得会对内在价值造成伤害。
如果市场的价格水平被低估，我们的投资头寸将会增加，甚至不排除使用财务杠杆。
反之我们的头寸将会减少，因为价格的上涨将实现利润，同时增加我们投资组合的绝对量。
所有上述的言论并不意味着对于市场的分析是我的首要工作，我的主要动机是为了让自己能够随时发现那些可能存在的，被低估的股票。
笔记：1.不预测市场未来走势，努力研究企业内在价值2.价格低估时加大买入；价格高估时持有或卖出1958年巴菲特致股东信在去年的信中，我写到“我认为目前市场的价格水平超越了其内在价值，这种情况主要反映在蓝筹股上。
如果这种观点正确，则意味着市场将来会有所下跌——价格水平届时将被低估。
虽然如此，我亦同时认为目前市场的价格水平仍然会低于从现在算起五年之后的水平。
即便一个完整的熊市也不见得会对市场价值的固有水平造成伤害。
”“如果市场的价格水平被低估，我们的投资头寸将会增加，甚至不排除使用财务杠杆。
反之我们的头寸将会减少，因为价格的上涨将实现利润，同时增加我们投资组合的绝对量。
”“所有上述的言论并不意味着对于市场的分析是我的首要工作，我的主要动机是为了让自己能够随时发现那些可能存在的，被低估的股票。
”去年，股票的价格水平稍有下降。
我之所以强调“稍有下降”，是因为那些在近期才对股票有感觉的人会认为股票的价格下降的很厉害。
事实上我认为，相对股票价格的下降，上市公司的盈利水平下降的程度更快一些。
换句话说，目前投资者仍然对于大盘蓝筹股过于乐观。
我并没有想要预测未来市场走势或者是上市公司的盈利水平的意思，只是想要在此说明市场并未出现所谓的大幅下降，同时投资价值也仍然未被低估。
巴菲特给股东的信英文版Dear Shareholders,I wanted to take this opportunity to update you on the current state of Berkshire Hathaway and provide some insights into our recent activities.Firstly, I am pleased to report that 2020 was another successful year for Berkshire Hathaway, despite the challenges brought about by the global pandemic. Our net earnings for the year were $42.5 billion, and our operating earnings were $21.9 billion. This success was largely driven by the outstanding performance of our operating businesses, as well as the improving market conditions.Our insurance subsidiaries, in particular, had an exceptional year. Both GEICO and Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group reported strong results, and we are confident in the long-term prospects of these businesses.In addition to our operating businesses, we also made several significant investments during the year. Some of the notable investments include a substantial purchase of Apple stock, as well as new investments in Verizon Communications and Chevron Corporation. We believe that these investments align with our long-term financial goals and will continue to generate value for our shareholders in the years to come.In terms of capital allocation, we continue to prioritize the repurchase of Berkshire Hathaway shares. In 2020, we repurchased a record $24.7 billion worth of shares, a further indication of ourconfidence in the intrinsic value of our company. We will continue to pursue this strategy in the future, as long as we believe that repurchases represent good value for our shareholders.Looking ahead, we remain optimistic about the future prospects of Berkshire Hathaway. Our strong balance sheet, diversified portfolio, and talented management team position us well to navigate any challenges that may come our way. We will continue to seek out attractive investment opportunities and grow our businesses organically in order to create long-term value for our shareholders.Lastly, I want to express my gratitude to you, our shareholders, for your ongoing support and confidence in Berkshire Hathaway. We are committed to delivering on our promises and working tirelessly to generate superior returns for all of our shareholders.Sincerely,Warren Buffett。
巴菲特致股东的信 1985年各位可能还记得去年年报最后提到的那个爆炸性消息，平时表面上虽然没有什么动作，但我们的经验显示偶尔也会有一些大卡司出现，这种精心设计的企业策略终于在1985年有了结果，在今年报告的后半部将会讨论到(a)我们在资本城/ABC的重大投资部位(b)我们对Scott&Fetzer的购并(c)我们与消防人员保险基金的合约(d)我们卖出在通用食品的部位。
去年波克夏的净值约增加了六亿一千万美金，约相当于增加了48.2%，这比率就好比哈雷慧星造访一般，在我这辈子中再也看不到了，二十一年来我们的净值从19.46增加到1,643.71约为23.2%年复合成长率，这又是一项不可能再重现的比率。
有两个因素让这种比率在未来难以持续，一种因素属于暂时性-即与过去二十年相较，现在股市中缺乏合适的投资机会，如今我们已无法为我们的保险事业投资组合找到价值低估的股票，这种情况与十年前有180度的转变，当时惟一的问题是该挑那一个便宜货。
市场的转变也对我们现有的投资组合产生不利的影响，在1974年的年报中，我可以说我们认为在投资组合中有几支重要个股有大幅成长的潜力，但现在我们说不出口，虽然我们保险公司的主要投资组合中，有许多公司如同过去一样拥有优秀经营团队也极具竞争优势，但目前市场上的股价已充份反应这项特点，这代表今后我们保险公司的投资绩效再也无法像过去那样优异。
第二项负面因素更显而易见的是我们的规模，目前我们在股票投入的资金是十年前的20倍，而市场的铁则是成长终将拖累竞争的优势，看看那些高报酬率的公司，一旦当他们的资本额超过十亿美金，没有一家在往后的十年能够靠再投资维持20%以上的报酬率，而仅能依赖大量配息或买回自家股份来维持，虽然前者能为股东带来更大的利益，但公司就是无法找到理想的投资机会。
而我们的问题就跟他们一样，去年我告诉各位在往后十年我们大约要赚到39亿美金，才能有15%的成长，今年同样的门槛提高到57亿美金(根据统记:扣除石油公司不算，只有15家公司在过去十年能够赚到57亿)我跟Charlie-经营波克夏事业的合伙人，对于波克夏能够保持比一般美国企业更高的获利能力持乐观的态度，而只要获利持续身为股东的你也能保证因此受惠，(1)我们不必去担心每季或每年的帐面获利数字，相反地只要将注意力集中在长远的价值上即可(2)我们可以将事业版图扩大到任何有利可图的产业之上，而完全不受经验、组织或观念所限(3)我们喜爱我们的工作，这些都是关键因素，但即便如此我们仍必须要大赚一笔(比过去达到23.2%还要更多)才有办法使我们的平均报酬率维持15%另外我还必须特别提到一项投资项目，是与最近购买本公司股票的投资人有密切相关的，过去一直以来，波克夏的股票价格约略低于内含价值，维持在这样的水准，投资人可以确定(只要折价的幅度不再继续扩大)其个人的投资经验与该公司本身的表现维持一致，但到了最近，这种折价的状况不再，甚至有时还会发生溢价，折价情况的消失代表着波克夏的市值增加的幅度高于内含价值增长的速度(虽然后者的表现也不错)，当然这对于在此现象发生前便持有股份的人算是好消息，但对于新进者或即将加入者却是不利的，而若想要使后者的投资经验与公司的表现一致，则这种溢价现象便必需一直维持，然而管理当局无法控制股价，当然他可对外公布政策与情况，促使市场参与者的行为理性一点，而我个人偏好(可能你也猜得到)即期望公司股价的表现尽量与其企业本身价值接近，惟有维持这种关系，所有公司的股东在其拥有所有权期间皆能与公司共存共荣，股价剧幅的波动并无法使整体的股东受惠，到头来所有股东的获利总和必定与公司的获利一致，但公司的股价长时间偏离内含价值(不管是高估或低估)都将使得企业的获利不平均的分配到各个股东之间，而其结果好坏完全取决于每个股东本身有多幸运、或是聪明愚笨，长久以来，波克夏本身的市场价值与内含价值一直存在着一种稳定的关系，这是在所有我熟悉的上市公司中少见的，这都要归功于所有波克夏的股东，因为大家都很理性、专注、以投资为导向，所以波克夏的股价一直很合理，这不凡的结果是靠一群不凡的股东来完成，几乎我们所有的股东都是个人而非法人机构，没有一家上市公司能够像我们一样。
在2007年的伯克希尔哈撒韦股东大会上，一位来自旧金山的年轻人问巴菲特，要想成为一个好的投资者，最好的方法是什么？巴菲特说：“我10岁的时候就把奥马哈公立图书馆里能找到的投资方面的书都读完了，很多书我都读了两遍，你要把各种思想装进自己的脑子里，随着时间的推移，当你能分辨出哪些是合理的时候，就该下水了。
”投资不是易懂的学问，对一个投资者来说，读一本好的投资书无论何时都是十分重要的。
可投资的书那么多，究竟读哪一本才算赚到呢？首先这本书必须是有价值的，读一本滥竽充数的投资书无疑是在浪费生命。
其次，这本书要足够有趣，读有价值又有趣的投资书籍，才会有快乐的投资和满意的收益。
最后，它要够通俗。
一个无金融背景的普通投资者去研读一部《投资学》，大概要花费掉你半年内所有的业余时间。
如果把非常复杂的投资哲理用简单易懂的话说出来，它可以节省你很多时间。
根据上面3个指标，我们找出了10本经典的投资书籍，它们的研究对象都是西方市场，或者说就是华尔街，可能有人觉得用书中的内容来理解中国股市是不科学的，但美国股市作为一个成熟市场，有着10倍于中国股市的历史，西方市场所经历过的完全有可能在中国市场上重演。
更重要的是，不论中西方，投资理念一定是共通的。
1 《巴菲特传：一个美国资本家的成长》(Buffett：TheMaking of an American Capitalist)罗杰·洛温斯坦作者罗杰·洛温斯坦曾是《华尔街日报(博客，微博)》的资深财经记者，对巴菲特做过多年的跟踪研究。
这本《一个美国资本家的成长》可以作为一本很好了解价值投资理念的书来读，介绍了巴菲特的投资策略和公司价值分析。
巴菲特是一个善于发现价格洼地的人、一个善于在股市高涨的时候主动离开的人，这在很多方面应该归功于其心理上的优势--能够战胜自己的贪婪和恐惧。
巴菲特的财富有很多来自于周期性行业，因为他能够忍受周期性行业的剧烈波动，又有现金在低位不断的补仓，这才使其有了获得超额收益的可能。
Buffett’s Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1979巴菲特致股东的信 1979年Again, we must lead off with a few words about accounting. Since our last annual report, the accounting profession has decided that equity securities owned by insurance companies must be carried on the balance sheet at market value. We previously have carried such equity securities at the lower of aggregate cost or aggregate market value. Because we have large unrealized gains in our insurance equity holdings, the result of this new policy is to increase substantially both the 1978 and 1979 yearend net worth, even after the appropriate liability is established for taxes on capital gains that would be payable should equities be sold at such market valuations. 首先，还是会计相关的议题，从去年年报开始，会计原则要求保险公司持有的股票投资在资产负债表日的评价方式，从原先的成本与市价孰低法，改按公平市价法列示，由于我们帐上的股票投资拥有大量的未实现利益，因此即便我们已提列了资本利得实现时应该支付的估计所得税负债，我们1978年及1979年的净值依然大幅增加。
巴菲特致合伙人的信1961年（上、下）致我的合伙人：有的合伙人对我说，一年才写一封信，“总要盼很长时间”，能不能半年写一次。
一年写两封信应该也不至于没话说，至少今年是有话说的。
所以，我又写了一封信，以后就每年写两封。
1961 年上半年，包括股息在内，道指的整体收益率是13%。
在这样的行情中，我们应该是最难超过指数的，但在过去六个月里，我管理的所有六个账户的业绩都略高于道指。
1961 年新成立了几个合伙人账户，它们成立的时间有先有后，从成立之初算起，有和指数持平的，也有跑赢的。
这里，我要强调两点。
第一，一年的时间太短，绝对不足以用于评价投资表现，六个月时间更短，更不能用于评价投资表现了。
我之所以不愿意半年写一次信，一个原因就是担心合伙人太看重短期业绩，短期业绩说明不了什么。
我自己更愿意把五年的表现作为评判标准，最好是在五年里经过牛市和熊市相对收益的考验。
第二点，我希望大家都理解，如果股市继续保持1961 年上半年这样的上涨节奏，我怀疑我们不但跑不赢，甚至还会落后指数。
我始终相信，与一般的投资组合相比，我们的持仓更保守，而且大盘越涨，我们越保守。
无论什么时候，我都尽量在投资组合中专门安排一部分资金，投资至少在一定程度上独立于大市的证券。
股市越涨，这部分投资占比越高。
独立于市场有利有弊，市场这口大锅越是热气腾腾，业余的厨子做的饭菜越好吃，这时候业余的厨子尤其厉害，可我们的投资组合呢，更大的仓位都不在锅里。
我们已经开始进行一笔可能规模很大的投资，现在正在公开市场收集筹码，我当然希望这只股票至少在一年里不要上涨。
这样的投资可能拖累短期业绩，但是把时间拉长到几年，不但非常有可能实现超额收益，而且还可以获得极高的防守属性。
我们有望在年底将所有合伙人合并到一个账户。
我已经和新加入的所有合伙人谈过了，也与先前成立的合伙人账户中的代表合伙人讨论了方案。
下面是部分条款：(A) 根据年末市场价值合并所有合伙人账户，明确条款，规定各个合伙人将来如何承担因年底未实现收益需缴纳的税款。
How Inflation Swindles the Equity InvestorThe central problem in the stock market is that the return on capital hasn´t risen with inflation. It seems to be stuck at 12 percent.by Warren E. Buffett, FORTUNE May 1977It is no longer a secret that stocks, like bonds, do poorly in an inflationary environment. We have been in such an environment for most of the past decade, and it has indeed been a time of troubles for stocks. But the reasons for the stock market's problems in this period are still imperfectly understood.There is no mystery at all about the problems of bondholders in an era of inflation. When the value of the dollar deteriorates month after month, a security with income and principal payments denominated in those dollars isn't going to be a big winner. You hardly need a Ph.D. in economics to figure that one out.It was long assumed that stocks were something else. For many years, the conventional wisdom insisted that stocks were a hedge against inflation. The proposition was rooted in the fact that stocks are not claims against dollars, as bonds are, but represent ownership of companies with productive facilities. These, investors believed, would retain their Value in real terms, let the politicians print money as they might.And why didn't it turn but that way? The main reason, I believe, is that stocks, in economic substance, are really very similar to bonds.I know that this belief will seem eccentric to many investors. Thay will immediately observe that the return on a bond (the coupon) is fixed, while the return on an equity investment (the company's earnings) can vary substantially from one year to another. True enough. But anyone who examines the aggregate returns that have been earned by compa-nies during the postwar years will dis-cover something extraordinary: the returns on equity have in fact not varied much at all.The coupon is stickyIn the first ten years after the war - the decade ending in 1955 -the Dow Jones industrials had an average annual return on year-end equity of 12.8 percent. In the second decade, the figure was 10.1 percent. In the third decade it was 10.9 percent. Data for a larger universe, the FORTUNE 500 (whose history goes back only to the mid-1950's), indicate somewhat similar results: 11.2percent in the decade ending in 1965, 11.8 percent in the decade through 1975. The figures for a few exceptional years have been substantially higher (the high for the 500 was 14.1 percent in 1974) or lower (9.5 percent in 1958 and 1970), but over the years, and in the aggregate, the return on book value tends to keep coming back to a level around 12 percent. It shows no signs of exceeding that level significantly in inflationary years (or in years of stable prices, for that matter).For the moment, let's think of those companies, not as listed stocks, but as productive enterprises. Let's also assume that the owners of those enterprises had acquired them at book value. In that case, their own return would have been around 12 percent too. And because the return has been so consistent, it seems reasonable to think of it as an "equity coupon".In the real world, of course, investors in stocks don't just buy and hold. Instead, many try to outwit their fellow investors in order to maximize their own proportions of corporate earnings. This thrashing about, obviously fruitless in aggregate, has no impact on the equity, coupon but reduces the investor's portion of it, because he incurs substantial frictional costs, such as advisory fees and brokerage charges. Throw in an active options market, which adds nothing to, the productivity of American enterprise but requires a cast of thousands to man the casino, and frictional costs rise further.Stocks are perpetualIt is also true that in the real world investors in stocks don't usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, they've had to pay more than book, and when that happens there is further pressure on that 12 percent. I'll talk more about these relationships later. Meanwhile, let's focus on the main point: as inflation has increased, the return on equity capital has not. Essentially, those who buy equities receive securities with an underlying fixed return - just like those who buy bonds.Of course, there are some important differences between the bond and stock forms. For openers, bonds eventually come due. It may require a long wait, but eventually the bond investor gets to renegotiate the terms of his contract. If current and prospective rates of inflation make his old coupon look inadequate, he can refuse to play further unless coupons currently being offered rekindle his interest. Something of this sort has been going on in recent years.Stocks, on the other hand, are perpetual. They have a maturity date of infinity. Investors in stocks are stuck with whatever return corporate America happens to earn. If corporate America is destined to earn 12 percent, then that is the level investors must learn to live with. As a group, stock investors can neither opt out nor renegotiate. In the aggregate, their commitment is actually increasing. Individual companies can be sold or liquidated and corporations can repurchase theirown shares; on balance, however, new equity flotations and retained earnings guarantee that the equity capital locked up in the corporate system will increase.So, score one for the bond form. Bond coupons eventually will be renegotiated; equity "coupons" won't. It is true, of course, that for a long time a 12 percent coupon did not appear in need of a whole lot of correction.The bondholder gets it in cashThere is another major difference between the garden variety of bond and our new exotic 12 percent "equity bond" that comes to the Wall Street costume ball dressed in a stock certificate.In the usual case, a bond investor receives his entire coupon in cash and is left to reinvest it as best he can. Our stock investor's equity coupon, in contrast, is partially retained by the company and is reinvested at whatever rates the company happens to be earning. In other words, going back to our corporate universe, part of the 12 percent earned annually is paid out in dividends and the balance is put right back into the universe to earn 12 percent also.The good old daysThis characteristic of stocks - the reinvestment of part of the coupon - can be good or bad news, depending on the relative attractiveness of that 12 percent. The news was very good indeed in, the 1950's and early 1960's. With bonds yielding only 3 or 4 percent, the right to reinvest automatically a portion of the equity coupon at 12 percent via s of enormous value. Note that investors could not just invest their own money and get that 12 percent return. Stock prices in this period ranged far above book value, and investors were prevented by the premium prices they had to pay from directly extracting out of the underlying corporate universe whatever rate that universe was earning. You can't pay far above par for a 12 percent bond and earn 12 percent for yourself.But on their retained earnings, investors could earn 22 percent. In effert, earnings retention allowed investots to buy at book value part of an enterprise that, :in the economic environment than existing, was worth a great deal more than book value.It was a situation that left very little to be said for cash dividends and a lot to be said for earnings retention. Indeed, the more money that investors thought likely to be reinvested at the 12 percent rate, the more valuable they considered their reinvestment privilege, and the more they were willing to pay for it. In the early 1960's, investors eagerly paid top-scale prices for electric utilities situated in growth areas, knowing that these companies had the ability to reinvest verylarge proportions of their earnings. Utilities whose operating environment dictated a larger cash payout rated lower prices.If, during this period, a high-grade, noncallable, long-term bond with a 12 percent coupon had existed, it would have sold far above par. And if it were a bond with a f urther unusual characteristic - which was that most of the coupon payments could be automatically reinvested at par in similar bonds - the issue would have commanded an even greater premium. In essence, growth stocks retaining most of their earnings represented just such a security. When their reinvestment rate on the added equity capital was 12 percent while interest rates generally were around 4 percent, investors became very happy - and, of course, they paid happy prices.Heading for the exitsLooking back, stock investors can think of themselves in the 1946-56 period as having been ladled a truly bountiful triple dip. First, they were the beneficiaries of an underlying corporate return on equity that was far above prevailing interest rates. Second, a significant portion of that return was reinvested for them at rates that were otherwise unattainable. And third, they were afforded an escalating appraisal of underlying equity capital as the first two benefits became widely recognized. This third dip meant that, on top of the basic 12 percent or so earned by corporations on their equity capital, investors were receiving a bonus as the Dow Jones industrials increased in price from 138 percent book value in 1946 to 220 percent in 1966, Such a marking-up process temporarily allowed investors to achieve a return that exceeded the inherent earning power of the enterprises in which they had invested.This heaven-on-earth situation finally was "discovered" in the mid-1960's by many major investing institutions. But just as these financial elephants began trampling on one another in their rush to equities, we entered an era of accelerating inflation and higher interest rates. Quite logically, the marking-up process began to reverse itself. Rising interest rates ruthlessly reduced the value of all existing fixed-coupon investments. And as long-term corporate bond rates began moving up (eventually reaching the 10 percent area), both the equity return of 12 percept and the reinvestment "privilege" began to look different.Stocks are quite properly thought of as riskier than bonds. While that equity coupon is more or less fixed over periods of time, it does fluctuate somewhat from year to year. Investors' attitudes about the future can be affected substantially, although frequently erroneously, by those yearly changes. Stocks are also riskier because they come equipped with infinite maturities. (Even your friendly broker wouldn't have the nerve to peddle a 100-year bond, if he had any available, as "safe.") Because of the additional risk, the natural reaction of investors is to expectan equity return that is comfortably above the bond return - and 12 percent on equity versus, say, 10 percent on bonds issued py the same corporate universe does not seem to qualify as comfortable. As the spread narrows, equity investors start looking for the exits.But, of course, as a group they can't get out. All they can achieve is a lot of movement, substantial frictional costs, and a new, much lower level of valuation, reflecting the lessened attractiveness of the 12 percent equity coupon under inflationary conditions. Bond investors have had a succession of shocks over the past decade in the course of discovering that there is no magic attached to any given coupon level - at 6 percent, or 8 percept, or 10 percent, bonds can still collapse in price. Stock investors, who are in general not aware that they too have a "coupon", are still receiving their education on this point.Five ways to improve earningsMust we really view that 12 percent equity coupon as immutable? Is there any law that says the corporate return on equity capital cannot adjust itself upward in response to a permanently higher average rate of inflation?There is no such law, of course. On the other hand, corporate America cannot increase earnings by desire or decree. To raise that return on equity, corporations would need at least one of the following: (1) an increase in turnover, i.e., in the ratio between sales and total assets employed in the business; (2) cheaper leverage; (3) more leverage; (4) lower income taxes, (5) wider operating margins on sales.And that's it. There simply are no other ways to increase returns on common equity. Let's see what can be done with these.We'll begin with turnover. The three major categories of assets we have to think about for this exercise are accounts receivable inventories, and fixed assets such as plants and machinery.Accounts receivable go up proportionally as sales go up, whether the increase in dollar sales is produced by more physical volume or by inflation. No room for improvement here.With inventories, the situation is not quite as simple. Over the long term, the trend in unit inventories may be expected to follow the trend in unit sales. Over the short term, however, the physical turnover rate may bob around because of spacial influences - e.g., cost expectations, or bottlenecks.The use of last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory-valuation methods serves to increase the reported turnover rate during inflationary times. When dollar sales are rising because of inflation, inventory valuations of a LIFO company either will remain level, (if unit sales are not rising) orwill trail the rise 1n dollar sales (if unit sales are rising). In either case, dollar turnover will increase.During the early 1970's, there was a pronounced swing by corporations toward LIFO accounting (which has the effect of lowering a company's reported earnings and tax bills). The trend now seems to have slowed. Still, the existence of a lot of LIFO companies, plus the likelihood that some others will join the crowd, ensures some further increase it the reported turnover of inventory.The gains are apt to be modestIn the case of fixed assets, any rise in the inflation rate, assuming it affects all products equally, will initially have the effect of increasing turnover. That is true because sales will immediately reflect the new price level, while the fixed-asset account will reflect the change only gradually, i.e., as existing assets are retired and replaced at the new prices. Obviously, the more slowly a company goes about this replacement process, the more the turnover ratio will rise. The action stops, however, when a replacement cycle is completed. Assuming a constant rate of inflation, sales and fixed assets will then begin to rise in concert at the rate of inflation.To sum up, inflation will produce some gains in turnover ratios. Some improvement would be certain because of LIFO, and some would be possible (if inflation accelerates) because of sales rising more rapidly than fixed assets. But the gains are apt to be modest and not of a magnitude to produce substantial improvement in returns on equity capital. During the decade ending in 1975, despite generally accelerating inflation and the extensive use of LIFO accounting, the turnover ratio of the FORTUNE 500 went only from 1.18/1 to 1.29/1.Cheaper leverage? Not likely. High rates of inflation generally cause borrowing to become dearer, not cheaper. Galloping rates of inflation create galloping capital needs; and lenders, as they become increasingly distrustful of long-term contracts, become more demanding. But even if there is no further rise in interest rates, leverage will be getting more expensive because the average cost of the debt now on corporate books is less than would be the cost of replacing it. And replacement will be required as the existing debt matures. Overall, then, future changes in the cost of leverage seem likely to have a mildly depressing effect on the return on equity.More leverage? American business already has fired many, if not most, of the more-leverage bullets once available to it. Proof of that proposition can be seen in some other FORTUNE 500 statistics - in the twenty years ending in 1975, stockholders' equity as a percentage of total assets declined for the 500 from 63 percent to just under 50 percent. In other words, each dollar of equity capital now is leveraged much more heavily than it used to be.What the lenders learnedAn irony of inflation-induced financial requirements is that the highly profitable companies - generally the best credits - require relatively little debt capital. But the laggards in profitability never can get enough. Lenders understand this problem much better than they did a decade ago - and are correspondingly less willing to let capital-hungry, low-profitability enterprises leverage themselves to the sky.Nevertheless, given inflationary conditions, many corporations seem sure in the future to turn to still more leverage as a means of shoring up equity returns. Their managements will make that move because they will need enormous amounts of capital - often merely to do the same physical volume of business - and will wish to got it without cutting dividends or making equity offerings that, because of inflation, are not apt to shape up as attractive. Their natural response will be to heap on debt, almost regardless of cost. They will tend to behave like those utility companies that argued over an eighth of a point in the 1960's and were grateful to find 12 percent debt financing in 1974.Added debt at present interest rates, however, will do less for equity returns than did added debt at 4 percent rates it the early 1960's. There is also the problem that higher debt ratios cause credit ratings to be lowered, creating a further rise in interest costs.So that is another way, to be added to those already discussed, in which the cost of leverage will be rising. In total, the higher costs of leverage are likely to offset the benefits of greater leverage.Besides, there is already far more debt in corporate America than is conveyed by conventional balance sheets. Many companies have massive pension obligations geared to whatever pay levels will be in effect when present workers retire. At the low inflation rates of 1965-65, the liabilities arising from such plans were reasonably predictable. Today, nobody can really know the company's ultimate obligation, But if the inflation rate averages 7 percent in the future, a twentyfive-year-old employee who is now earning $12,000, and whose raises do no more than match increases in living costs, will be making $180,000 when he retires at sixty-five.Of course, there is a marvelously precise figure in many annual reports each year, purporting to be the unfunded pension liability. If that figure were really believable, a corporation could simply ante up that sum, add to it the existing pension-fund assets, turn the total amount over to an insurance company, and have it assume all the corporation's present pension liabilities. In the real world, alas, it is impossible to find an insurance company willing even to listen to such a deal.Virtually every corporate treasurer in America would recoil at the idea of issuing a "cost-of-living" bond - a noncallable obligation with coupons tied to a price index. But through the privatepension system, corporate America has in fact taken on a fantastic amount of debt that is the equivalent of such a bond.More leverage, whether through conventional debt or unbooked and indexed "pension debt", should be viewed with skepticism by shareholders. A 12 percent return from an enterprise that is debt-free is far superior to the same return achieved by a business hocked to its eyeballs. Which means that today's 12 percent equity returns may well be less valuable than the 12 percent returns of twenty years ago.More fun in New YorkLower corporate income taxes seem unlikely. Investors in American corporations already own what might be thought of as a Class D stock. The class A, B and C stocks are represented by the income-tax claims of the federal, state, and municipal governments. It is true that these "investors" have no claim on the corporation's assets; however, they get a major share of the earnings, including earnings generated by the equity buildup resulting from retention of part of the earnings owned by the Class D sharaholders.A further charming characteristic of these wonderful Class A,B andC stocks is that their share of the corporation's earnings can be increased immedtately, abundantly, and without payment by the unilateral vote of any one of the "stockholder" classes, e.g., by congressional action in the case of the Class A. To add to the fun, one of the classes will sometimes vote to increase its ownership share in the business retroactively - as companies operating in New York discovered to their dismay in 1975. Whenever the Class A, B or C "stockholders" vote themselves a larger share of the business, the portion remaining for ClassD - that's the one held by the ordinary investor - declines.Looking ahead, it seems unwise to assume that those who control the A, B and C shares will vote to reduce their own take over the long run. The class D shares probably will have to struggle to hold their own.Bad news from the FTCThe last of our five possible sources of increased returns on equity is wider operating margins on sales. Here is where some optimists would hope to achieve major gains. There is no proof that they are wrong. Bu there are only 100 cents in the sales dollar and a lot of demands on that dollar before we get down to the residual, pretax profits. The major claimants are labor, raw materials energy, and various non-income taxes. The relative importance of these costs hardly, seems likely to decline during an age of inflation.Recent statistical evidence, furthermore, does not inspire confidence in the proposition that margins will widen in, a period of inflation. In the decade ending in 1965, a period of relatively low inflation, the universe of manufacturing companies reported on quarterly by the Federal Trade Commission had an average annual pretax margin on sales of 8.6 percent. In the decade ending in 1975, the average margin was 8 percent. Margins were down, in other words, despite a very considerable increase in the inflation rate.If business was able to base its prices on replacement costs, margins would widen in inflationary periods. But the simple fact is that most large businesses, despite a widespread belief in their market power, just don't manage to pull it off. Replacement cost accounting almost always shows that corporate earnings have declined significantly in the past decade. If such major industries as oil, steel, and aluminum really have the oligopolistic muscle imputed to them, one can only conclude that their pricing policies have been remarkably restrained.There you have, the complete lineup: five factors that can improve returns on common equity, none of which, by my analysis, are likely to take us very far in that direction in periods of high inflation. You may have emerged from this exercise more optimistic than I am. But remember, returns in the 12 percent area have been with us a long time.The investor's equationEven if you agree that the 12 percent equity coupon is more or less immutable, you still may hope to do well with it in the years ahead. It's conceivable that you will. After all, a lot of investors did well with it for a long time. But your future results will be governed by three variable's: the relationship between book value and market value, the tax rate, and the inflation rate.Let's wade through a little arithmetic about book and market value. When stocks consistently sell at book value, it's all very simple. If a stock has a book value of $100 and also an average market value of $100, 12 percent earnings by business will produce a 12 percent return for the investor (less those frictional costs, which we'll ignore for the moment). If the payout ratio is 50 percent, our investor will get $6 via dividends and a further $6 from the increase in the book value of the business, which will, of course, be reflected in the market value of his holdings.If the stock sold at 150 percent of book value, the picture would change. The investor would receive the same $6 cash dividend, but it would now represent only a 4 percent return on his $150 cost. The book value of the business would still increase by 6 percent (to $106) and the market value of the investor's holdings, valued consistently at 150 percent of book value, would similarlyincrease by 6 percent (to $159). But the investor's total return, i.e., from appreciation plus dividends, would be only 10 percent versus the underlying 12 percent earned by the business.When the investor buys in below book value, the process is reversed. For example, if the stock sells at 80 percent of book value, the same earnings and payout assumptions would yield 7.5 percent from dividends ($6 on an $80 price) and 6 percent from appreciation - a total return of 13.5 percent. In other words, you do better by buying at a discount rather than a premium, just as common sense would suggest.During the postwar years, the market value of the Dow Jones industrials has been as low as 84 percent of book value (in 1974) and as high as 232 percent (in 1965); most of the time the ratio has been well over 100 percent. (Early this spring, it was around 110 percent.) Let's assume that in the future the ratio will be something close to 100 percent - meaning that investors in stocks could earn the full 12 percent. At least, they could earn that figure before taxes and before inflation.7 percent after taxesHow large a bite might taxes take out of the 12 percent? For individual investors, it seems reasonable to assume that federal, state, and local income taxes will average perhaps 50 percent on dividends and 30 percent on capital gains. A majority of investors may have marginal rates somewhat below these, but many with larger holdings will experience substantially higher rates. Under the new tax law, as FORTUNE observed last month, a high-income investor in a heavily taxed city could have a marginal rate on capital gains as high as 56 percent. (See "The Tax Practitioners Act of 1976.")So let's use 50 percent and 30 percent as representative for individual investors. Let's also assume, in line with recent experience, that corporations earning 12 percent on equity pay out 5 percent in cash dividends (2.5 percent after tax) and retain 7 percent, with those retained earnings producing a corresponding market-value growth (4.9 percent after the 30 percent tax). The after-tax return, then, would be 7.4 percent. Probably this should be rounded down to about 7 percent to allow for frictional costs. To push our stocks-asdisguised-bonds thesis one notch further, then, stocks might be regarded as the equivalent, for individuals, of 7 percent tax-exempt perpetual bonds.The number nobody knowsWhich brings us to the crucial question - the inflation rate. No one knows the answer on this one - including the politicians, economists, and Establishment pundits, who felt, a few years back,that with slight nudges here and there unemployment and inflation rates would respond like trained seals.But many signs seem negative for stable prices: the fact that inflation is now worldwide; the propensity of major groups in our society to utilize their electoral muscle to shift, rather than solve, economic problems ; the demonstrated unwillingness to tackle even the most vital problems (e.g., energy and nuclear proliferation) if they can be postponed; and a political system that rewards legislators with reelection if their actions appear to produce short-term benefits even though their ultimate imprint will be to compound long-term pain.Most of those in political office, quite understandably, are firmly against inflation and firmly in favor of policies producing it. (This schizophrenia hasn't caused them to lose touch with reality, however; Congressmen have made sure that their pensions - unlike practically all granted in the private sector - are indexed to cost-of-living changes after retirement.)Discussions regarding future inflation rates usually probe the subtleties of monetary and fiscal policies. These are important variables in determining the outcome of any specific inflationary equation. But, at the source, peacetime inflation is a political problem, not an economic problem. Human behavior, not monetary behavior, is the key. And when very human politicians choose between the next election and the next generation, it's clear what usually happens.Such broad generalizations do not produce precise numbers. However, it seems quite possible to me that inflation rates will average 7 percent in future years. I hope this forecast proves to be wrong. And it may well be. Forecasts usually tell us more of the forecaster than of the future. You are free to factor your own inflation rate into the investor's equation. But if you foresee a rate averaging 2 percent or 3 percent, you are wearing different glasses than I am.So there we are: 12 percent before taxes and inflation; 7 percent after taxes and before inflation; and maybe zero percent after taxes and inflation. It hardly sounds like a formula that will keep all those cattle stampeding on TV.As a common stockholder you will have more dollars, but you may have no more purchasing power. Out with Ben Franklin ("a penny saved is a penny earned") and in with Milton Friedman ("a man might as well consume his capital as invest it").What widows don't noticeThe arithmetic makes it plain that inflation is a far more devastating tax than anything that has been enacted by our legislatures. The inflation tax has a fantastic ability to simply consume capital. It makes no difference to a widow with her savings in a 5 percent passbook account。
1985年巴菲特给股东的信(英文原版) BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:You may remember the wildly upbeat message of last year’s report: nothing much was in the works but our experience had been that something big popped up occasionally. This carefully-crafted corporate strategy paid off in 1985. Later sections of this report discuss (a) our purchase of a major position in Capital Cities/ABC, (b) our acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, (c) our entry into a large, extended term participation in the insurance business of Fireman’s Fund, and (d) our sale of our stock in General Foods.Our gain in net worth during the year was $613.6 million, or 48.2%. It is fitting that the visit of Halley’s Comet coincided with this percentage gain: neither will be seen again in my lifetime. Our gain in per-share book value over the last twenty-one years (that is, since present management took over) has been from $19.46 to $1643.71, or 23.2% compounded annually, another percentage that will not be repeated.Two factors make anything approaching this rate of gain unachievable in the future. One factor probably transitory - is a stock market that offers very little opportunity compared to the markets that prevailed throughout much of the 1964-1984 period. Today we cannot find significantly-undervalued equities to purchase for our insurance company portfolios. The current situation is 180 degrees removed from that existing about a decade ago, when the only question was which bargain to choose.This change in the market also has negative implications for our present portfolio. In our 1974 annual report I could say: “We consider several of our major holdings to have great potential for significantly increased values in future years.” I can’t say that now. It’s true that our insurance companies currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they did in 1974. But current market prices generously appraise these attributes, whereas they were ignored in 1974. Today’s valuations mean that our insurance companies have no chance for future portfolio gains on the scale of those achieved in the past.The second negative factor, far more telling, is our size. Our equity capital is more than twenty times what it was only ten years ago. And an iron law of business is that growth eventually dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead, to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn’t turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible.Their problem is our problem. Last year I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion over the ten years then coming up to earn 15% annually. The comparable figure for the ten years now ahead is $5.7 billion, a 48% increase that corresponds - as it must mathematically - to the growth in our capital base during 1985. (Here’s a little perspective: leaving aside oil companies, only about 15 U.S. businesses have managed to earn over $5.7 billion during the past ten years.)Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, and I are reasonably optimistic about Berkshire’s ability to earn returns superior to those earned by corporate America generally, and you will benefit from the company’s retention of all earnings as long as those returns are forthcoming. We have several things going for us: (1) we don’t have to worry about quarterly or annual figures but, instead, can focus on whatever actions will maximize long-term value; (2) we can expand the business into any areas that make sense - our scope is not circumscribed by history, structure, or concept; and (3) we love our work. All of these help. Even so, we will also need a full measure of good fortune to average our hoped-for 15% - far more good fortune than was required for our past 23.2%.We need to mention one further item in the investment equation that could affect recent purchasers of our stock. Historically, Berkshire shares have sold modestly below intrinsic business value. With the price there, purchasers could be certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this discount) that their personal investment experience would at least equal the financial experience of the business. But recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest premium has prevailed.The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s market value increased even faster than business value (which, itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial experience of the company, any premium of market value over intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.Management cannot determine market prices, although it can, by its disclosures and policies, encourage rational behavior by market participants. My own preference, as perhapsyou’d guess, is for a market price that consistently approximates business value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.Over the long term there has been a more consistent relationship between Berkshire’s market value and business value than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size can claim the same.You might think that institutions, with their large staffs of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by institutions have often been among the most inappropriately valued.Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”Sources of Reported EarningsThe table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. These numbers, along with far more detailed sub-segment numbers, are the ones that Charlie and I focus upon. We do not find consolidated figures an aid in either managing or evaluating Berkshire and, in fact, never prepare them for internal use.Segment information is equally essential for investors wanting to know what is going on in a multi-line business. Corporate managers always have insisted upon such informationbefore making acquisition decisions but, until a few years ago, seldom made it available to investors faced with acquisition and disposition decisions of their own. Instead, when owners wishing to understand the economic realities of their business asked for data, managers usually gave them a we-can’t-tell-you-what-is-going-on-because-it-would-hurt-the-company answer. Ultimately the SEC ordered disclosure of segment data and management began supplying real answers. The change in their behavior recalls an insight of Al Capone: “You can get much further with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.”In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A compendium of the 1977-1984 letters is available upon request.) In the Business Segment Data and Management’s Discussion sections on pages 39-41 and 49-55, much additional information regarding our businesses is provided, including Goodwill and Goodwill Amortization figures for each of the segments. I urge you to read those sections as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, which starts on page 56.(000s omitted) -----------------------------------------Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)------------------- -------------------1985 1984 1985 1984 -------- -------- -------- --------Operating Earnings:Insurance Group:Underwriting ................ $(44,230) $(48,060) $(23,569) $(25,955)Net Investment Income ....... 95,217 68,903 79,716 62,059Associated Retail Stores ...... 270 (1,072) 134 (579)Blue Chip Stamps .............. 5,763 (1,843) 2,813 (899)Buffalo News .................. 29,921 27,328 14,580 13,317Mutual Savings and Loan ....... 2,622 1,456 4,016 3,151Nebraska Furniture Mart ....... 12,686 14,511 5,181 5,917Precision Steel ............... 3,896 4,092 1,477 1,696See’s Candies ................. 28,989 26,644 14,558 13,380Textiles ...................... (2,395) 418 (1,324) 226Wesco Financial ............... 9,500 9,777 4,191 4,828Amortization of Goodwill ...... (1,475) (1,434) (1,475) (1,434)Interest on Debt .............. (14,415) (14,734) (7,288) (7,452)Shareholder-Designated Contributions .............. (4,006) (3,179) (2,164) (1,716) Other ......................... 3,106 4,932 2,102 3,475-------- -------- -------- --------Operating Earnings .............. 125,449 87,739 92,948 70,014Special General Foods Distribution 4,127 8,111 3,779 7,294Special Washington Post Distribution ................. 14,877 --- 13,851 ---Sales of Securities ............. 468,903 104,699 325,237 71,587-------- -------- -------- --------Total Earnings - all entities ... $613,356 $200,549 $435,815 $148,895======== ======== ======== ======== Our 1985 results include unusually large earnings from the sale of securities. This fact, in itself, does not mean that we had a particularly good year (though, of course, we did). Security profits in a given year bear similarities to a college graduation ceremony in which the knowledge gained over four years is recognized on a day when nothing further is learned. We may hold a stock for a decade or more, and during that period it may grow quite consistently in both business and market value. In the year in which we finally sell it there may be no increase in value, or there may even be a decrease. But all growth in value since purchase will be reflected in the accounting earnings of the year of sale. (If the stock owned is in our insurance subsidiaries, however, any gain or loss in market value will be reflected in net worth annually.) Thus, reported capital gains or losses in any given year are meaningless as a measure of how well we have done in the current year.A large portion of the realized gain in 1985 ($338 million pre-tax out of a total of $488 million) came about through the sale of our General Foods shares. We held most of these shares since 1980, when we had purchased them at a price far below what we felt was their per/share business value. Year by year, the managerial efforts of Jim Ferguson and Phil Smith substantially increased General Foods’ business value and, last fall, Philip Morris made an offer for the company that reflected the increase. We thus benefited from four factors: a bargain purchase price, a business with fine underlying economics, an able management concentrating on the interests of shareholders, and a buyer willing to pay full business value. While that last factor is the only one that produces reported earnings, we consider identification of the first three to be the key to building value for Berkshire shareholders. In selecting common stocks, we devote our attention to attractive purchases, not to the possibility of attractive sales.We have again reported substantial income from special distributions, this year from Washington Post and General Foods. (The General Foods transactions obviously took place well before the Philip Morris offer.) Distributions of this kind occur when we sell a portion of our shares in a company back to it simultaneously with its purchase of shares from other shareholders. The number of shares we sell is contractually set so as to leave our percentage ownership in the company precisely the same after the sale as before. Such a transaction is quite properly regarded by the IRS as substantially equivalent to a dividend since we, as a shareholder, receive cash while maintaining an unchanged ownership interest. This tax treatment benefits us because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual taxpayers, incur much lower taxes on dividend income than on income from long-term capital gains. (This difference will be widened further if the House-passed tax bill becomes law: under its provisions, capital gains realized by corporations will be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.) However, accounting rules are unclear as to proper treatment for shareholder reporting. To conform with last year’s treatment, we have shown these transactions as capital gains.Though we have not sought out such transactions, we have agreed to them on several occasions when managements initiated the idea. In each case we have felt that non-selling shareholders (all of whom had an opportunity to sell at the same price we received) benefited because the companies made their repurchases at prices below intrinsic business value. The tax advantages we receive and our wish to cooperate with managements that are increasing values for all shareholders have sometimes led us to sell - but only to the extent that our proportional share of the business was undiminished.At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses. Our Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” You’ll immediately see why we make a good team: Charlie likes to study errors and I have generated ample material for him, particularly in our textile and insurance businesses.Shutdown of Textile BusinessIn July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all devoted to the textile business. The company’s intrinsic business value, however, was considerably less because the textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years (the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom. we immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner.A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what I preferred to believe.The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers.I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital decisions were quite rational.Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 -- on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPIhas more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.* * *There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new for perhaps $30-$50 million.Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to $163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation)When I was 12, I lived with my grandfather for about four months. A grocer by trade, he was also working on a book and each night he dictated a few pages to me. The title - brace yourself - was “How to Run a Grocery Store and a Few Things I Have Learned About Fishing”. My grandfather was sure that interest in these two subjects was universal and that the world awaited his views. You may conclude from this section’s title and contents that I was overexposed to Grandpa’s literary style (and personality).I am merging the discussion of Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s Candy Shops, and Buffalo Evening News here because the economic strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of these businesses have changed little since I reported to you a year ago. The shortness of this discussion, however, is in no way meant to minimize the importance of these businesses to us: in 1985 they earned an aggregate of $72 million pre-tax. Fifteen years ago, before we had acquired any of them, their aggregate earnings were about $8 million pre-tax.While an increase in earnings from $8 million to $72 million sounds terrific - and usually is - you should not automatically assume that to be the case. You must first make sure that earnings were not severely depressed in the base year. If they were instead substantial in relation to capital employed, an even more important point must be examined: how much additional capital was required to produce the additional earnings?In both respects, our group of three scores well. First, earnings 15 years ago were excellent compared to capital then employed in the businesses. Second, although annual earnings are now $64 million greater, the businesses require only about $40 million more in invested capital to operate than was the case then.The dramatic growth in earning power of these three businesses, accompanied by their need for only minor amounts of capital, illustrates very well the power of economic goodwill during an inflationary period (a phenomenon explained in detail in the 1983 annual report). The financial characteristics of these businesses have allowed us to use a very large portion of the earnings they generate elsewhere. Corporate America, however, has had a different experience: in order to increase earnings significantly, most companies have needed to increase capital significantly also. The average American business has required about $5 of additional capital to generate an additional $1 of annual pre-tax earnings. That business, therefore, would have required over $300 million in additional capital from its owners in order to achieve an earnings performance equal to our group of three.。
