1985年巴菲特给股东的信(英文原版) BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
You may remember the wildly upbeat message of last year’s report: nothing much was in the works but our experience had been that something big popped up occasionally. This carefully-
crafted corporate strategy paid off in 1985. Later sections of this report discuss (a) our purchase of a major position in Capital Cities/ABC, (b) our acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, (c) our entry into a large, extended term participation in the insurance business of Fireman’s Fund, and (d) our sale of our stock in General Foods.
Our gain in net worth during the year was $613.6 million, or 48.2%. It is fitting that the visit of Halley’s Comet coincided with this percentage gain: neither will be seen again in my lifetime. Our gain in per-share book value over the last twenty-one years (that is, since present management took over) has been from $19.46 to $1643.71, or 23.2% compounded annually, another percentage that will not be repeated.
Two factors make anything approaching this rate of gain unachievable in the future. One factor probably transitory - is a stock market that offers very little opportunity compared to the markets that prevailed throughout much of the 1964-1984 period. Today we cannot find significantly-undervalued equities to purchase for our insurance company portfolios. The current situation is 180 degrees removed from that existing about a decade ago, when the only question was which bargain to choose.
This change in the market also has negative implications for our present portfolio. In our 1974 annual report I could say: “We consider several of our major holdings to have great potential for significantly increased values in future years.” I can’t say that now. It’s true that our insurance companies currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they did in 1974. But current market prices generously appraise these attributes, whereas they were ignored in 1974. Today’s valuations mean that our insurance companies have no chance for future portfolio gains on the scale of those achieved in the past.
The second negative factor, far more telling, is our size. Our equity capital is more than twenty times what it was only ten years ago. And an iron law of business is that growth eventually dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-
return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead, to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn’t turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible.
Their problem is our problem. Last year I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion over the ten years then coming up to earn 15% annually. The comparable figure for the ten years now ahead is $5.7 billion, a 48% increase that corresponds - as it must mathematically - to the growth in our capital base during 1985. (Here’s a little perspective: leaving aside oil companies, only about 15 U.S. businesses have managed to earn over $5.7 billion during the past ten years.)
Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, and I are reasonably optimistic about Berkshire’s ability to earn returns superior to those earned by corporate America generally, and you will benefit from the company’s retention of all earnings as long as those returns are forthcoming. We have several things going for us: (1) we don’t have to worry about quarterly or annual figures but, instead, can focus on whatever actions will maximize long-term value; (2) we can expand the business into any areas that make sense - our scope is not circumscribed by history, structure, or concept; and (3) we love our work. All of these help. Even so, we will also need a full measure of good fortune to average our hoped-for 15% - far more good fortune than was required for our past 23.2%.
We need to mention one further item in the investment equation that could affect recent purchasers of our stock. Historically, Berkshire shares have sold modestly below intrinsic business value. With the price there, purchasers could be certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this discount) that their personal investment experience would at least equal the financial experience of the business. But recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest premium has prevailed.
The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s market value increased even faster than business value (which, itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial experience of the company, any premium of market value over intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.
Management cannot determine market prices, although it can, by its disclosures and policies, encourage rational behavior by market participants. My own preference, as perhaps
you’d guess, is for a market price that consistently approximates business value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.
Over the long term there has been a more consistent relationship between Berkshire’s market value and business value than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size can claim the same.
You might think that institutions, with their large staffs of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by institutions have often been among the most inappropriately valued.
Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”
Sources of Reported Earnings
The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. These numbers, along with far more detailed sub-segment numbers, are the ones that Charlie and I focus upon. We do not find consolidated figures an aid in either managing or evaluating Berkshire and, in fact, never prepare them for internal use.
Segment information is equally essential for investors wanting to know what is going on in a multi-line business. Corporate managers always have insisted upon such information
before making acquisition decisions but, until a few years ago, seldom made it available to investors faced with acquisition and disposition decisions of their own. Instead, when owners wishing to understand the economic realities of their business asked for data, managers usually gave them a we-can’t-tell-you-what-is-
going-on-because-it-would-hurt-the-company answer. Ultimately the SEC ordered disclosure of segment data and management began supplying real answers. The change in their behavior recalls an insight of Al Capone: “You can get much further with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.”
In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A compendium of the 1977-1984 letters is available upon request.) In the Business Segment Data and Management’s Discussion sections on pages 39-41 and 49-55, much additional information regarding our businesses is provided, including Goodwill and Goodwill Amortization figures for each of the segments. I urge you to read those sections as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, which starts on page 56.
(000s omitted) -----------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
------------------- -------------------
1985 1984 1985 1984 -------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ................ $(44,230) $(48,060) $(23,569) $(25,955)
Net Investment Income ....... 95,217 68,903 79,716 62,059
Associated Retail Stores ...... 270 (1,072) 134 (579)
Blue Chip Stamps .............. 5,763 (1,843) 2,813 (899)
Buffalo News .................. 29,921 27,328 14,580 13,317
Mutual Savings and Loan ....... 2,622 1,456 4,016 3,151
Nebraska Furniture Mart ....... 12,686 14,511 5,181 5,917
Precision Steel ............... 3,896 4,092 1,477 1,696
See’s Candies ................. 28,989 26,644 14,558 13,380
Textiles ...................... (2,395) 418 (1,324) 226
Wesco Financial ............... 9,500 9,777 4,191 4,828
Amortization of Goodwill ...... (1,475) (1,434) (1,475) (1,434)
Interest on Debt .............. (14,415) (14,734) (7,288) (7,452)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions .............. (4,006) (3,179) (2,164) (1,716) Other ......................... 3,106 4,932 2,102 3,475
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings .............. 125,449 87,739 92,948 70,014
Special General Foods Distribution 4,127 8,111 3,779 7,294
Special Washington Post Distribution ................. 14,877 --- 13,851 ---
Sales of Securities ............. 468,903 104,699 325,237 71,587
-------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities ... $613,356 $200,549 $435,815 $148,895
======== ======== ======== ======== Our 1985 results include unusually large earnings from the sale of securities. This fact, in itself, does not mean that we had a particularly good year (though, of course, we did). Security profits in a given year bear similarities to a college graduation ceremony in which the knowledge gained over four years is recognized on a day when nothing further is learned. We may hold a stock for a decade or more, and during that period it may grow quite consistently in both business and market value. In the year in which we finally sell it there may be no increase in value, or there may even be a decrease. But all growth in value since purchase will be reflected in the accounting earnings of the year of sale. (If the stock owned is in our insurance subsidiaries, however, any gain or loss in market value will be reflected in net worth annually.) Thus, reported capital gains or losses in any given year are meaningless as a measure of how well we have done in the current year.
A large portion of the realized gain in 1985 ($338 million pre-tax out of a total of $488 million) came about through the sale of our General Foods shares. We held most of these shares since 1980, when we had purchased them at a price far below what we felt was their per/share business value. Year by year, the managerial efforts of Jim Ferguson and Phil Smith substantially increased General Foods’ business value and, last fall, Philip Morris made an offer for the company that reflected the increase. We thus benefited from four factors: a bargain purchase price, a business with fine underlying economics, an able management concentrating on the interests of shareholders, and a buyer willing to pay full business value. While that last factor is the only one that produces reported earnings, we consider identification of the first three to be the key to building value for Berkshire shareholders. In selecting common stocks, we devote our attention to attractive purchases, not to the possibility of attractive sales.
We have again reported substantial income from special distributions, this year from Washington Post and General Foods. (The General Foods transactions obviously took place well before the Philip Morris offer.) Distributions of this kind occur when we sell a portion of our shares in a company back to it simultaneously with its purchase of shares from other shareholders. The number of shares we sell is contractually set so as to leave our percentage ownership in the company precisely the same after the sale as before. Such a transaction is quite properly regarded by the IRS as substantially equivalent to a dividend since we, as a shareholder, receive cash while maintaining an unchanged ownership interest. This tax treatment benefits us because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual taxpayers, incur much lower taxes on dividend income than on income from long-term capital gains. (This difference will be widened further if the House-passed tax bill becomes law: under its provisions, capital gains realized by corporations will be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.) However, accounting rules are unclear as to proper treatment for shareholder reporting. To conform with last year’s treatment, we have shown these transactions as capital gains.
Though we have not sought out such transactions, we have agreed to them on several occasions when managements initiated the idea. In each case we have felt that non-selling shareholders (all of whom had an opportunity to sell at the same price we received) benefited because the companies made their repurchases at prices below intrinsic business value. The tax advantages we receive and our wish to cooperate with managements that are increasing values for all shareholders have sometimes led us to sell - but only to the extent that our proportional share of the business was undiminished.
At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses. Our Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” You’
ll immediately see why we make a good team: Charlie likes to study errors and I have generated ample material for him, particularly in our textile and insurance businesses.
Shutdown of Textile Business
In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.
When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all devoted to the textile business. The company’s intrinsic business value, however, was considerably less because the textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years (the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.
At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.
We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom. we immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.
In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.
Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”
It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.
I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.
I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner.
A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what I preferred to believe.
The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)
Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-
investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-
effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.
Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers.
I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”
For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.
Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital decisions were quite rational.
Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 -- on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI
has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.
This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.
My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
* * *
There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.
The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new for perhaps $30-$50 million.
Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to $163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.
Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.
Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation)
When I was 12, I lived with my grandfather for about four months. A grocer by trade, he was also working on a book and each night he dictated a few pages to me. The title - brace yourself - was “How to Run a Grocery Store and a Few Things I Have Learned About Fishing”. My grandfather was sure that interest in these two subjects was universal and that the world awaited his views. You may conclude from this section’s title and contents that I was overexposed to Grandpa’s literary style (and personality).
I am merging the discussion of Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s Candy Shops, and Buffalo Evening News here because the economic strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of these businesses have changed little since I reported to you a year ago. The shortness of this discussion, however, is in no way meant to minimize the importance of these businesses to us: in 1985 they earned an aggregate of $72 million pre-tax. Fifteen years ago, before we had acquired any of them, their aggregate earnings were about $8 million pre-tax.
While an increase in earnings from $8 million to $72 million sounds terrific - and usually is - you should not automatically assume that to be the case. You must first make sure that earnings were not severely depressed in the base year. If they were instead substantial in relation to capital employed, an even more important point must be examined: how much additional capital was required to produce the additional earnings?
In both respects, our group of three scores well. First, earnings 15 years ago were excellent compared to capital then employed in the businesses. Second, although annual earnings are now $64 million greater, the businesses require only about $40 million more in invested capital to operate than was the case then.
The dramatic growth in earning power of these three businesses, accompanied by their need for only minor amounts of capital, illustrates very well the power of economic goodwill during an inflationary period (a phenomenon explained in detail in the 1983 annual report). The financial characteristics of these businesses have allowed us to use a very large portion of the earnings they generate elsewhere. Corporate America, however, has had a different experience: in order to increase earnings significantly, most companies have needed to increase capital significantly also. The average American business has required about $5 of additional capital to generate an additional $1 of annual pre-tax earnings. That business, therefore, would have required over $300 million in additional capital from its owners in order to achieve an earnings performance equal to our group of three.
When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-
putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign - with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest.
If the widget company consistently earned a superior return on capital throughout the period, or if capital employed only doubled during the CEO’s reign, the praise for him may be well deserved. But if return on capital was lackluster and capital employed increased in pace with earnings, applause should be withheld. A savings account in which interest was reinvested would achieve the same year-by-year increase in earnings - and, at only 8% interest, would quadruple its annual earnings in 18 years.
The power of this simple math is often ignored by companies to the detriment of their shareholders. Many corporate compensation plans reward managers handsomely for earnings increases produced solely, or in large part, by retained earnings - i.e., earnings withheld from owners. For example, ten-year, fixed-price stock options are granted routinely, often by companies whose dividends are only a small percentage of earnings.
An example will illustrate the inequities possible under such circumstances. Let’s suppose that you had a $100,000 savings account earning 8% interest and “managed” by a trustee who could decide each year what portion of the interest you were to be paid in cash. Interest not paid out would be “retained earnings” added to the savings account to compound. And let’s suppose that your trustee, in his superior wisdom, set the “pay-
out ratio” at one-quarter of the annual earnings.
Under these assumptions, your account would be worth $179,084 at the end of ten years. Additionally, your annual earnings would have increased about 70% from $8,000 to $13,515 under this inspired management. And, finally, your “dividends” would have increased commensurately, rising regularly from $2,000 in the first year to $3,378 in the tenth year. Each year, when your manager’s public relations firm prepared his annual report to you, all of the charts would have had lines marching skyward.
Now, just for fun, let’s push our scenario one notch further and give your
trustee-manager a ten-year fixed-price option on part of your “business” (i.e., your savings account) based on its fair value in the first year. With such an option, your manager would reap a substantial profit at your expense - just from having held on to most of your earnings.
If he were both Machiavellian and a bit of a mathematician, your manager might also have cut the pay-out ratio once he was firmly entrenched.
This scenario is not as farfetched as you might think. Many stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that fashion: they have gained in value simply because management retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in its hands.
Managers actually apply a double standard to options. Leaving aside warrants (which deliver the issuing corporation immediate and substantial compensation), I believe it is fair to say that nowhere in the business world are ten-year fixed-price options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders. Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme. It would be particularly unthinkable for managers to grant a long-term option on a business that was regularly adding to its capital. Any outsider wanting to secure such an option would be required to pay fully for capital added during the option period.
The unwillingness of managers to do-unto-outsiders, however, is not matched by an unwillingness to do-unto-themselves. (Negotiating with one’s self seldom produces a barroom brawl.) Managers regularly engineer ten-year, fixed-price options for themselves and associates that, first, totally ignore the fact that retained earnings automatically build value and, second, ignore the carrying cost of capital. As a result, these managers end up profiting much as they would have had they had an option on that savings account that was automatically building up in value.
Of course, stock options often go to talented, value-adding managers and sometimes deliver them rewards that are perfectly appropriate. (Indeed, managers who are really exceptional almost always get far less than they should.) But when the result is equitable, it is accidental. Once granted, the option is blind to individual performance. Because it is irrevocable and unconditional (so long as a manager stays in the company), the sluggard receives rewards from his options precisely as does the star. A managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years, could not wish for a better “incentive” system.
(I can’t resist commenting on one long-term option given an “outsider”: that granted the U.S. Government on Chrysler shares as partial consideration for the government’s guarantee of some lifesaving loans. When these options worked out well for the government, Chrysler sought to modify the payoff, arguing that the rewards to the government were both far greater than intended and outsize in relation to its contribution to Chrysler’s recovery. The company’s anguish over what it saw as an imbalance between payoff and performance made national news. That anguish may well be unique: to my knowledge, no managers - anywhere - have been similarly offended by unwarranted payoffs arising from options granted to themselves or their colleagues.)
Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently describes them as desirable because they put managers and owners in the same financial boat. In reality, the boats are far different. No owner has ever escaped the burden of capital costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option bears no capital costs at all. An owner must weigh upside potential against downside risk; an option holder has no downside. In fact, the business project in which you would wish to have an option frequently is a project in which you would reject ownership. (I’ll be happy to accept a lottery ticket as a gift - but I’ll never buy one.)
In dividend policy also, the option holders’ interests are best served by a policy that may ill serve the owner. Think back to the savings account example. The trustee, holding his option, would benefit from a no-dividend policy. Conversely, the owner of the account should lean to a total payout so that he can prevent the option-holding manager from sharing in the account’s retained earnings.
Despite their shortcomings, options can be appropriate under some circumstances. My criticism relates to their indiscriminate use and, in that connection, I would like to emphasize three points:
First, stock options are inevitably tied to the overall performance of a corporation. Logically, therefore, they should be awarded only to those managers with overall responsibility. Managers with limited areas of responsibility should have incentives that pay off in relation to results under their control. The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big payoff for his performance - even if he plays for a cellar-
dwelling team. And the .150 hitter should get no reward - even if he plays for a pennant winner. Only those with overall responsibility for the team should have their rewards tied to its results.
Second, options should be structured carefully. Absent special factors, they should have built into them a retained-
earnings or carrying-cost factor. Equally important, they should be priced realistically. When managers are faced with offers for their companies, they unfailingly point out how unrealistic market prices can be as an index of real value. But why, then, should these same depressed prices be the valuations at which managers sell portions of their businesses to themselves? (They may go further: officers and directors sometimes consult the Tax Code to determine the lowest prices at which they can, in effect, sell part of the business to insiders. While they’re at it, they often elect plans that produce the worst tax result for the company.) Except in highly unusual cases, owners are not well served by the sale of part of their business at a bargain price - whether the sale is to outsiders or to insiders. The obvious conclusion: options should be priced at true business value.
Third, I want to emphasize that some managers whom I admire enormously - and whose operating records are far better than mine - disagree with me regarding fixed-price options. They have built corporate cultures that work, and fixed-price options have been a tool that helped them. By their leadership and example, and by the use of options as incentives, these managers have taught their colleagues to think like owners. Such a Culture is rare and when it exists should perhaps be left intact - despite inefficiencies and inequities that may infest the option program. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is preferable to “purity at any price”.
At Berkshire, however, we use an incentive@compensation system that rewards key managers for meeting targets in their own bailiwicks. If See’s does well, that does not produce incentive compensation at the News - nor vice versa. Neither do we look at the price of Berkshire stock when we write bonus checks. We believe good unit performance should be rewarded whether Berkshire stock rises, falls, or stays even. Similarly, we think average performance should earn no special rewards even if our stock should soar. “Performance”, furthermore, is defined in different ways depending upon the underlying economics of the business: in some our managers enjoy tailwinds not of their own making, in others they fight unavoidable headwinds.
The rewards that go with this system can be large. At our various business units, top managers sometimes receive incentive bonuses of five times their base salary, or more, and it would appear possible that one manager’s bonus could top $2 million in 1986. (I hope so.) We do not put a cap on bonuses, and the potential for rewards is not hierarchical. The manager of a relatively small unit can earn far more than the manager of a larger unit if results indicate he should. We believe, further, that such factors as seniority and age should not affect incentive compensation (though they sometimes influence basic compensation). A 20-year-old who can hit .300 is as valuable to us as a 40-year-old performing as well.
Obviously, all Berkshire managers can use their bonus money (or other funds, including borrowed money) to buy our stock in the market. Many have done just that - and some now have large holdings. By accepting both the risks and the carrying costs that go with outright purchases, these managers truly walk in the shoes of owners.
Now let’s get back - at long last - to our three businesses:
At Nebraska Furniture Mart our basic strength is an exceptionally low-cost operation that allows the business to regularly offer customers the best values available in home furnishings. NFM is the largest store of its kind in the country. Although the
already-depressed farm economy worsened considerably in 1985, the store easily set a new sales record. I also am happy to report that NFM’s Chairman, Rose Blumkin (the legendary “Mrs. B”), continues at age 92 to set a pace at the store that none of us can keep up with.
She’s there wheeling and dealing seven days a week, and I hope that any of you who visit Omaha will go out to the Mart and see her in action. It will inspire you, as it does me.
At See’s we continue to get store volumes that are far beyond those achieved by any competitor we know of. Despite the unmatched consumer acceptance we enjoy, industry trends are not good, and we continue to experience slippage in poundage sales on a same-store basis. This puts pressure on per-pound costs. We now are willing to increase prices only modestly and, unless we can stabilize per-shop poundage, profit margins will narrow.
At the News volume gains are also difficult to achieve. Though linage increased during 1985, the gain was more than accounted for by preprints. ROP linage (advertising printed on our own pages) declined. Preprints are far less profitable than ROP ads, and also more vulnerable to competition. In 1985, the News again controlled costs well and our household penetration continues to be exceptional.
One problem these three operations do not have is management. At See’s we have Chuck Huggins, the man we put in charge the day we bought the business. Selecting him remains one of our best business decisions. At the News we have Stan Lipsey, a manager of equal caliber. Stan has been with us 17 years, and his unusual business talents have become more evident with every additional level of responsibility he has tackled. And, at the Mart, we have the amazing Blumkins - Mrs. B, Louie, Ron, Irv, and Steve - a three-generation miracle of management.
I consider myself extraordinarily lucky to be able to work with managers such as these.
I like them personally as much as I admire them professionally.
Insurance Operations
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table, listing two key figures for the insurance industry:
Yearly Change Combined Ratio
in Premiums after Policyholder
Written (%) Dividends
------------- ------------------
1972 ............... 10.2 96.2
1973 ............... 8.0 99.2
1974 ............... 6.2 105.4
1975 ............... 11.0 107.9
1976 ............... 21.9 102.4
1977 ............... 19.8 97.2
1978 ............... 12.8 97.5
1979 ............... 10.3 100.6
1980 ............... 6.0 103.1
1981 ............... 3.9 106.0
1982 ............... 4.4 109.7
1983 ............... 4.5 111.9
1984 (Revised) ..... 9.2 117.9
1985 (Estimated) ... 20.9 118.0
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
The industry’s 1985 results were highly unusual. The revenue gain was exceptional, and had insured losses grown at their normal rate of most recent years - that is, a few points above the inflation rate - a significant drop in the combined ratio would have occurred. But losses in 1985 didn’t cooperate, as they did not in 1984. Though inflation slowed considerably in these years, insured losses perversely accelerated, growing by 16% in 1984 and by an even more startling 17% in 1985. The year’s growth in losses therefore exceeds the inflation rate by over 13 percentage points, a modern record.
Catastrophes were not the culprit in this explosion of loss cost. True, there were an unusual number of hurricanes in 1985, but the aggregate damage caused by all catastrophes in 1984 and 1985 was about 2% of premium volume, a not unusual proportion. Nor was there any burst in the number of insured autos, houses, employers, or other kinds of “exposure units”.
A partial explanation for the surge in the loss figures is all the additions to reserves that the industry made in 1985. As results for the year were reported, the scene resembled a revival meeting: shouting “I’ve sinned, I’ve sinned”, insurance managers rushed forward to confess they had under reserved in earlier years. Their corrections significantly affected 1985 loss numbers.
A more disturbing ingredient in the loss surge is the acceleration in “social” or “judicial” inflation. The insurer’s ability to pay has assumed overwhelming importance with juries and judges in the assessment of both liability and damages. More and more, “the deep pocket” is being sought and found, no matter what the policy wording, the facts, or the precedents.
This judicial inflation represents a wild card in the industry’s future, and makes forecasting difficult. Nevertheless, the short-term outlook is good. Premium growth improved as 1985 went along (quarterly gains were an estimated 15%, 19%, 24%, and 22%) and, barring a supercatastrophe, the industry’s combined ratio should fall sharply in 1986.
The profit improvement, however, is likely to be of short duration. Two economic principles will see to that. First, commodity businesses achieve good levels of profitability only when prices are fixed in some manner or when capacity is short. Second, managers quickly add to capacity when prospects start to improve and capital is available.
In my 1982 report to you, I discussed the commodity nature of the insurance industry extensively. The typical policyholder does not differentiate between products but concentrates instead on price. For many decades a cartel-like procedure kept prices up, but this arrangement has disappeared for good. The insurance product now is priced as any other commodity for which a free market exists: when capacity is tight, prices will be set remuneratively; otherwise, they will not be.
Capacity currently is tight in many lines of insurance - though in this industry, unlike most, capacity is an attitudinal concept, not a physical fact. Insurance managers can write whatever amount of business they feel comfortable writing, subject only to pressures applied by regulators and Best’s, the industry’s authoritative rating service. The comfort level of both managers and regulators is tied to capital. More capital means more comfort, which in turn means more capacity. In the typical commodity business, furthermore, such as aluminum or steel, a long gestation precedes the birth of additional capacity. In the insurance industry, capital can be secured instantly. Thus, any capacity shortage can be eliminated in short order.
That’s exactly what’s going on right now. In 1985, about 15 insurers raised well over $3 billion, piling up capital so that they can write all the business possible at the better prices now available. The capital-raising trend has accelerated dramatically so far in 1986.
If capacity additions continue at this rate, it won’t be long before serious
price-cutting appears and next a fall in profitability. When the fall comes, it will be the fault of the capital-raisers of 1985 and 1986, not the price-cutters of 198X. (Critics should be understanding, however: as was the case in our textile example, the dynamics of capitalism cause each insurer to make decisions that for itself appear sensible, but that collectively slash profitability.)
In past reports, I have told you that Berkshire’s strong capital position - the best in the industry - should one day allow us to claim a distinct competitive advantage in the insurance market. With the tightening of the market, that day arrived. Our premium volume more than tripled last year, following a long period of stagnation. Berkshire’s financial strength (and our record of maintaining unusual strength through thick and thin) is now a major asset for us in securing good business.
We correctly foresaw a flight to quality by many large buyers of insurance and reinsurance who belatedly recognized that a policy is only an IOU - and who, in 1985, could not collect on many of their IOUs. These buyers today are attracted to Berkshire because of its strong capital position. But, in a development we did not foresee, we also are finding buyers drawn to us because our ability to insure substantial risks sets us apart from the crowd.
To understand this point, you need a few background facts about large risks. Traditionally, many insurers have wanted to write this kind of business. However, their willingness to do so has been almost always based upon reinsurance arrangements that allow the insurer to keep just a small portion of the risk itself while passing on (“laying off”) most of the risk to its reinsurers. Imagine, for example, a directors and officers (“D & O”) liability policy providing $25 million of coverage. By various “excess-of-loss”reinsurance contracts, the company issuing that policy might keep the liability for only the first $1 million of any loss that occurs. The liability for any loss above that amount up to $24 million would be borne by the reinsurers of the issuing insurer. In trade parlance, a company that issues large policies but retains relatively little of the risk for its own account writes a large gross line but a small net line.
In any reinsurance arrangement, a key question is how the premiums paid for the policy should be divided among the various “layers” of risk. In our D & O policy, for example. what part of the premium received should be kept by the issuing company to compensate it fairly for taking the first $1 million of risk and how much should be passed on to the reinsurers to compensate them fairly for taking the risk between $1 million and $25 million?
One way to solve this problem might be deemed the Patrick Henry approach: “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience.” In other words,
how much of the total premium would reinsurers have needed in the past to compensate them fairly for the losses they actually had to bear?
Unfortunately, the lamp of experience has always provided imperfect illumination for reinsurers because so much of their business is “long-tail”, meaning it takes many years before they know what their losses are. Lately, however, the light has not only been dim but also grossly misleading in the images it has revealed. That is, the courts’ tendency to grant awards that are both huge and lacking in precedent makes reinsurers’ usual extrapolations or inferences from past data a formula for disaster. Out with Patrick Henry and in with Pogo: “The future ain’t what it used to be.”
The burgeoning uncertainties of the business, coupled with the entry into reinsurance of many unsophisticated participants, worked in recent years in favor of issuing companies writing a small net line: they were able to keep a far greater percentage of the premiums than the risk. By doing so, the issuing companies sometimes made money on business that was distinctly unprofitable for the issuing and reinsuring companies combined. (This result was not necessarily by intent: issuing companies generally knew no more than reinsurers did about the ultimate costs that would be experienced at higher layers of risk.) Inequities of this sort have been particularly pronounced in lines of insurance in which much change was occurring and losses were soaring; e.g., professional malpractice, D & 0, products liability, etc. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that issuing companies remained enthusiastic about writing business long after premiums became woefully inadequate on a gross basis.
An example of just how disparate results have been for issuing companies versus their reinsurers is provided by the 1984 financials of one of the leaders in large and unusual risks. In that year the company wrote about $6 billion of business and kept around $2 1/2 billion of the premiums, or about 40%. It gave the remaining $3 1/2 billion to reinsurers. On the part of the business kept, the company’s underwriting loss was less than $200 million - an excellent result in that year. Meanwhile, the part laid off produced a loss of over $1.5 billion for the reinsurers. Thus, the issuing company wrote at a combined ratio of well under 110 while its reinsurers, participating in precisely the same policies, came in considerably over 140. This result was not attributable to natural catastrophes; it came from run-of-the-
mill insurance losses (occurring, however, in surprising frequency and size). The issuing company’s 1985 report is not yet available, but I would predict it will show that dramatically unbalanced results continued.
A few years such as this, and even slow-witted reinsurers can lose interest, particularly in explosive lines where the proper split in premium between issuer and reinsurer remains impossible to even roughly estimate. The behavior of reinsurers finally
Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders-1977 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 per share, were moderately better than anticipated a year ago. Of these earnings, $1.43 per share resulted from substantial realized capital gains by Blue Chip Stamps which, to the extent of our proportional interest in that company, are included in our operating earnings figure. Capital gains or losses realized directly by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries are not included in our calculation of operating earnings.While too much attention should not be paid to the figure for any single year, over the longer term the record regarding aggregate capital gains or losses obviously is of significance. 1977年本公司的营业净利为2,190万美元，每股约当22.54美元，表现较年前的预期稍微好一点，在这些盈余中，每股有1.43美元的盈余，系蓝筹邮票 大量实现的资本利得，本公司依照投资比例认列投资收益所贡献，至于伯克希尔本身及其保险子公司已实现的资本利得或损失，则不列入营业利益计算，建议大家不必太在意单一期间的盈余数字，因为长期累积的资本利得或损失才是真正的重点所在。 Textile operations came in well below forecast, while the results of the Illinois National Bank as well as the operating earnings attributable to our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps were about as anticipated. However, insurance operations, led again by the truly outstanding results of Phil Liesche's managerial group at National Indemnity Company, were even better than our optimistic expectations. 纺织事业的表现远低于预估，至于伊利诺国家银行的成绩以及蓝筹邮票贡献给我们的投资利益则大致如预期，另外，由Phil Liesche领导的国家产险保险业务的表现甚至比我们当初最乐观的期望还要好。 Most companies define record's earnings as a new high in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding. 通常公司会宣称每股盈余又创下历史新高，然而由于公司的资本会随着盈余的累积扩增，所以我们并不认为这样的经营表现有什么大不了的，比如说每年股本扩充10%或是每股盈余成长5%等等，毕竟就算是静止不动的定存帐户， 由于复利的关系每年都可稳定地产生同样的效果。 Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate
巴菲特致股东的信的读后感1500字沃伦·巴菲特，全球知名的投资大师，伯克希尔——哈撒韦公司总裁，全美排名第二富豪。巴菲特是第一位靠证券投资成为拥有几百亿美元资产的世界富豪。在过去的35年中，他执掌的伯克希尔公司每股账面价值从19美元上升至37.987美元，年复合增长率高达24.00%。尤为难能可贵的是，伯克希尔已经是一家资产总额高达1300多亿美元的巨型企业。 巴菲特虽然没有写过什么书，但他每年都要在伯克希尔?哈撒韦的公司年报中给股东写一封信，总结在过去一年中的成败得失。从挑选经理、选择投资目标、评估公司，到有效地使用金融信息，这些信涵盖面甚广。 应该投资具有高内在价值的看得懂的公司 巴特在本书中对价值投资的定义是在一家好公司高内在价值公司)的价格波市场低估的时候买入该公司的股票并长明持有。 巴菲特特相信一家好公司的股票可以给持有者带来持续高额回报，但它的市场价格却不是总是和其内在价值相匹配，因为市场价格是波动的，反应的是当下市场的偏好，而价值和价格只有在长期才会
逐渐趋同。因此，当我们进行投资时，应该同时考虑两点，既这家公司是不是高价值公司，当前买入时的价格是不是低于它的内在价值。 换言之，即使这家公司是好公司，但它的当前价格过高，我们也不应该买入，而是应该观望，等待合适的时机；如果这不是家高价值的公司，无论它当前的价格是高还是低，我们都不应该考虑买入。当一家公司的杠杆率高的时候，对它管理层的容错率就越低，这时候一家还不错的公司也可能被放大弱点和不足，进而变得平庸。 那么更具体点，究意什么样的公司才是一个高价值的公司呢？巴非特认为这既取决于客观条件，也取決于投资者本身。一方面，一家公司应该具备长期的竞争力，竞争力包括可以带来一定程度垄断效应的诸如品牌效应、规模经济、科技创新等的商业壁垒。这样子的商业壁垒可以保证一家公司在可预见的未来能保持定价或者成本上的优势，使竟争对手很难轻易进入市场并与其抗衡。 另一方面，好公司也是相对于投资者本身的，只有该投资者自身看得懂的公司才可能是对于他自身而言的好公司，投资者应该充分利用自已的认知能力、学习能力，进行广泛的阅读和与业内精英人士的请教，提高自己对市场的判断，任何高于自己理解的行业和公司应该避免投资，只在自己看得懂的范围内挑选合适的公司进行投资。
1973年巴菲特致股东的信 翻译：Rick https://www.doczj.com/doc/801869358.html,/s/blog_a3453d2201015q5j.html 巴菲特购买蓝带印花公司的时候，该公司的主业已经开始出现大幅下滑。但是巴菲特看重的是其两个子公司：喜诗糖果和Wesco金融公司。 巴菲特收购多元零售公司，并不是看重其主业：女装连锁零售店。而是看重其持有蓝带印花公司16%的股权。 ------------------------------------------------------------ To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our financial results for 1973 were satisfactory, with operating earnings of $11,930,592, producing a return of 17.4% on beginning stockholders' equity. Although operating earnings improved from $11.43 to $12.18 per share, earnings on equity decreased from the 19.8% of 1972. This decline occurred because the gain in earnings was not commensurate with the increase in shareholders' investment. We had forecast in last year's report that such a decline was likely. Unfortunately, our forecast proved to be correct. 致伯克希尔股东： 1973年的财务结果令人满意，我们的营业利润为1193万元，相对于年初的股东权益产生了17.4%的回报。虽然每股的营业利润从11.43美元提高到了每股12.18美元，ROE却从1972年的19.8%下降到了1973年的17.4%。 下降的原因是盈利的增长未跟上股东权益的增长。在去年的年报里，我们曾预测ROE可能会出现下降，如今不幸言中。 Our textile, banking, and most insurance operations had good years, but certain segments of the insurance business turned in poor results. Overall, our insurance business continues to be a most attractive area in which to employ capital. Management's objective is to achieve a return on capital over the long term which averages somewhat higher than that of American industry generally—while utilizing sound accounting and debt policies. We have achieved this goal in the last few years, and are trying to take those steps which will enable us to maintain this performance in the future. Prospects for 1974 indicate some further decline in rate of return on our enlarged capital base.
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东： 根据公认会计原则(通常被称为「GAAP」)，伯克希尔在2019年赚了814亿美元。这个数字的组成部分是240亿美元的营业利润，37亿美元的已实现资本利得，以及537亿美元的未实现资本利得净额的增加。这些收入的每一项都是在税后基础上提出的。 这537亿美元的增长需要评论。这源于2018年实施的一项新的公认会计准则(GAAP)规定，要求持有股票证券的公司在收益中计入这些证券未实现收益和亏损的净变化。正如我们在去年的信中所说，无论是我的伯克希尔合伙人查理?芒格(Charlie Munger)还是我都不同意这一规则。 会计行业采用这一规则，实际上是其自身思维的一个巨大转变。在2018年之前，公认会计准则坚持认为(证券交易公司除外)，投资组合中未实现的收益永远不会计入收益，未实现的亏损只有在被视为「非暂时性」的情况下才会计入收益。现在，伯克希尔公司必须在每个季度的财务报表中记录公司股票的每一次涨跌，不管这些涨跌可能有多么反复无常。对于许多投资者、分析师和评论员来说，财务报表是一条重要的新闻。 伯克希尔公司2018年和2019年的表现明证了我们对新规定的看法。2018年是股市下跌的一年，我们的净未实现收益减少了206亿美元，因此我们报告的GAAP收益只有40亿美元。2019年，不断上涨的股价使上述537亿美元的净未实现收益增加了537亿美元，使按公认会计准则计算的收益增至本信开头所述的814亿美元。这些市场波动导致GAAP收益疯狂增长了1,900% ! 与此同时，在我们可以称之为真实世界的地方，而不是会计领域，伯克希尔在这两年中所持股票的平均价值约为2000亿美元，我们所持股票的内在价值在这段时间内稳步大幅增长。 查理和我希望你把注意力放在营业利润上——2019年营业利润几乎没有变化——而忽略投资的季度和年度收益或亏损，无论这些收益或亏损是实现的还是未实现的。 我们的建议是，无论如何都不能削弱这些投资对伯克希尔的重要性。随着时间的推移，我和查理预计，我们所持的股票——作为一个整体——将带来巨大的收益，尽管是以一种不可预测和极不规律的方式。要想知道为什么我们会乐观，请继续下一个讨论。 复利的力量
Buffett’s Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1992 巴菲特致股东的信1992年 Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually. 1992年本公司的净值成长了20.3%，总计过去28年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的7,745美元，年复合成长率约为23.6%。 During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.52 billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative. Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The conversions were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we issued 6,106 shares. 回顾过去一年，伯克希尔的净值增加了15.2亿美元，其中98%系来自于盈余与投资组合的增值，剩下的2%则是因为发行新股的缘故，这些股份是因为我们赎回在1993年1月4日所发行的可转换特别股，其中有部份持有人不要现金而选择领取本公司的普通股，大部分的持有人选择在1月进行转换，另外有一小部份则在去年12月就径行转换，总计当初我们发行总值4.76亿美元的债券中，4,600万在一月转换，另外4.05亿美元则以现金赎回，转换价订为11,719美元一股，换算下来一共发行了6,106股。 Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the company.伯克希尔目前流通在外股数为1,152,547股，相较于1964年10月1日当初，巴菲特合伙取得伯克希尔控制权时的1,137,778股来说，增加的股数实属有限。 We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire, doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth of its owners. 对于发行新股我们有相当严格的规定，那就是除非我们确信所收到的价值与我们付出的一致时，我们才会考虑这样做，当然同等的价值不是那么容易达到，因为我们一向自视甚高，不过那又如何，除非确定公司股东的财富也会增加，否则我们不会随便扩大规模。 Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates. On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Aren't they 大家要知道这两个目的不一定就会自然吻合，事实上在我们过去所举过的例子中，有些就是看起来有趣但却是让价值受到减损的经验，在那次经验
1957年巴菲特致股东信 我认为目前市场的价格水平超越了其内在价值，这种情况主要反映在蓝筹股上。 如果这种观点正确，则意味着市场将来会有所下跌——价格水平届时将被低估。虽然如此，我亦同时认为目前市场的价格水平仍然会低于从现在算起五年之后的水平。即便一个完整的熊市也不见得会对内在价值造成伤害。如果市场的价格水平被低估，我们的投资头寸将会增加，甚至不排除使用财务杠杆。反之我们的头寸将会减少，因为价格的上涨将实现利润，同时增加我们投资组合的绝对量。 所有上述的言论并不意味着对于市场的分析是我的首要工作，我的主要动机是为了让自己能够随时发现那些可能存在的，被低估的股票。 笔记： 1.不预测市场未来走势，努力研究企业内在价值 2.价格低估时加大买入；价格高估时持有或卖出 1958年巴菲特致股东信 在去年的信中，我写到“我认为目前市场的价格水平超越了其内在价值，这种情况主要反映在蓝筹股上。如果这种观点正确，则意味着市场将来会有所下跌——价格水平届时将被低估。虽然如此，我亦同时认为目前市场的价格水平仍然会低于从现在算起五年之后的水平。即便一个完整的熊市也不见得会对市场价值的固有水平造成伤害。” “如果市场的价格水平被低估，我们的投资头寸将会增加，甚至不排除使用财务杠杆。反之我们的头寸将会减少，因为价格的上涨将实现利润，同时增加我们投资组合的绝对量。” “所有上述的言论并不意味着对于市场的分析是我的首要工作，我的主要动机是为了让自己能够随时发现那些可能存在的，被低估的股票。” 去年，股票的价格水平稍有下降。我之所以强调“稍有下降”，是因为那些在近期才对股票有感觉的人会认为股票的价格下降的很厉害。事实上我认为，相对股票价格的下降，上市公司的盈利水平下降的程度更快一些。换句话说，目前投资者仍然对于大盘蓝筹股过于乐观。我并没有想要预测未来市场走势或者是上市公司的盈利水平的意思，只是想要在此说明市场并未出现所谓的大幅下降，同时投资价值也仍然未被低估。我仍然坚持认为，从长期的投资眼光来看，目前的市场仍显昂贵。 我们在 1957 的主要活动 市场的下跌带来了更大的投资机会，因此我们的头寸（包括 WORK-OUT 的部分）也相应有所增加。所谓 WORK-OUT 的部分，是指我们对于公司出售、合并、清算等活动所进行的投资。这种投资的风险在于预期的上述活动可能最终没有完成。在 1956 年年末，我们的一半
2011年巴菲特致股东公开信 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们： 2010年，我们A股和B股的账面价值增长了13%。在过去46年间，账面价值从19美元增长到95453美元，相当于平均每年增长22%。 2010年的亮点，是公司收购了伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路运输公司。交易的运转情况比我预想得更好。目前来看，这条铁路可令伯克希尔的税前盈利能力增长近40%。 无论是我的搭档查理·芒格，还是我本人，都难以精确预测到所谓的“寻常年份”，充分估计到我们的盈利能力，只是大体预见2011年是一个没有大灾引发保险赔付、商业环境正常的年份，某种程度上优于2010年，但不及2005、2006年的好光景。我和查理每一天都在思考如何能更好地使用这笔庞大的资产。 过去一年，整个经济环境弥漫着悲观情绪，我们通过向固定资产和设备投资60亿美金来彰显对市场的信心，其中的九成都用在了美国本土。未来公司业务会不断对外拓展，但多数投资会在境内。2011年，我们会创下股权投资80亿美金的新纪录，增长的20亿将全部用于美国市场。 金钱永远在追逐机会，而在美国始终有大量的机会。评论者习惯讲“巨大的不确定性”，但无论现在看上去多么风平浪静，未来总归是不确定的。 别被这些现实状况吓到了。在我的一生中，政治家和所谓的专家们一直喋喋不休地抱怨着美国所面临的种种难题，尽管国民目前的生活已经6倍优越于我出生时。预言家们忽略了一个最重要的“确定因素”：人的潜力无限，而美国的制度则善于发挥这种潜力。在过去两个世纪中，经济危机频仍，甚至出现内战，但这一体系依然照常运转，并且生机勃勃，富有效率。 我们并不比国家建立之初时的祖先们更聪明或勤奋。但环顾四周，会发现我们正处于一个远胜于任何殖民时期国民梦想的世界。正如1776年、1861年、1932年和1941年一样，美国更令人期待的未来总在前面。 内在价值——今日与明日 我和查理都相信，那些受托管理他人资金的人，应当在投资伊始确立业绩目标。如果缺失标准，他们就会随便把这支业绩之箭射出，然后无论在哪儿落地，都把它画成靶心。 我们在很早以前就声明，伯克希尔的职责是提升每股的内在价值，并使其高于同期标普500的增速。有些年份我们做到了，有些则没有。如果长期而言我们无法做到，对投资者便毫无价值。他们会觉得持有一支指数基金会得到相同甚至更好的收益。 需要注意的是，每年的这些数字，既不可轻易忽略，也不要过分看重。地球绕太阳运行的速度与投资理念及决策得到回报的时间并不同步。比方说，在GEICO，我们在上一年度花费了9亿美金向投保人积极投放广告，但无法取得立竿见影的效果。而许多在铁路和公共事业方面的巨额投资，也要着眼于长远回报。 未来，我们希望一些平均指标能够比标普表现更好，尽管这难以确定。如果达到这一目标，就能在股票市场的坏年份中取得较好业绩，而在牛市中则要忍受相对较差的业绩。 对任何人而言，“如何使用资金”必须和“我们现在拥有什么”结合考虑，以期合理估计公司的内在价值。如果CEO善于把握这个关系，未来投资会提升公司现有价值；如果CEO的才能和动机令人生疑，目前的价值必然会缩水，结局迥异。在上世纪60年代末，如果把1美元交给SearsRoe-buck或MontgomeryWard的CEO，相比交给SamWalton，命运会截然不同。 我和查理都希望非保险业务的每股收益能以令人满意的速度持续增长。但数字越大，工作就越有挑战。我们需要打理好目前的生意，完成更多大型并购。我们已经准备好了，用来打“大象”的枪支已然上膛，而用来扣动扳机的手指则蠢蠢欲动。 伯克希尔拥有很多优势。首先，我们拥有一批才能出众的主管，他们对于自身业务和伯克希尔都超乎
2012年度巴菲特致股东的信
致伯克希尔哈萨维的股东： 2011年我们的A股和B股每股账面价值增长了4.6%。在过去47年，即现任管理层就职以来，账面价值从每股19美元增长到99860美元，年复合增长19.8%。 伯克希尔副董事长，我的合伙人查理-芒格对2011年公司取得的进展感到满意，以下是要点： 董事会的主要工作是确保让合适的人选来运营我们的业务，确认下一代领导人并让他们做好准备明天就可以接管公司。我在19个公司董事会任职，伯克希尔董事们在继承方案上投入的时间和努力是最多的。更重要的是，他们的努力得到了回报。 2011年开始的时候，Todd Combs作为一名投资经理加入了我们，在年末结束不久，Ted Weschler也加入了我们。他们两个人都拥有杰出的投资技能，以及对伯克希尔的承诺。在2012年他们两人只掌管数十亿美元资金，但他们拥有的大脑、判断力和魅力，可以在我和查理不再运营伯克希尔时掌管整个投资组合。 你们的董事会对于谁会成为CEO的继任人也同样热情。同样我们也有两个非常好的超级替补。我们到时候可以做到无缝交接，而伯克希尔的前途将保持光明。我的98%以上净财富都是伯克希尔股票，他们将进入各种慈善基金。将如此多资金投入到一只股票中并不符合传统智慧。但我对这一安排感到满意，我知道我们的业务质量好并且多元化，而管理他们的人又如此能干。有了这些资产，我的继任者就有了良好的开端。不要把这段话解读为我和查理会去哪里。我们仍非常健康，并且喜欢我们做的事情。 在9月16日，我们收购了路博润，一家生产添加剂和其他特殊化学制品的全球性公司。自James Hambrick在2004年成为CEO以来取得了杰出的成绩。税前利润从1.47亿美元增长到10.85亿美元。路博润在特殊化学领域将会有很多附加的收购机会。其实，我们已经同意了三起收购，成本为4.93亿美元。Jame James s 是一个有原则的买家，一个超级的公司运营者。查理和我都迫切希望扩张他的
致伯克夏·哈撒韦公司股东： 2005年伯克夏公司的净利润为56亿美元，每股A种股票和B种股票账面价值增长了6.4%。在过去的41年间，也就是说从目前的管理层接手以来，每股账面价值从19美元增长到59,377美元，年复合增长率为21.5%（这份报告中使用的所有数据适用于伯克夏A种股票，这是本公司在1996年以前发行在外的唯一一种股份，B种股票拥有A股股票三十分之一的经济利益）。 2005年伯克夏的表现相当不错。我们进行了5起并购，其中2起并购已经完成，而且我们下属的大多数业务经营良好。尽管卡特里娜飓风(Hurricane Katrina)让伯克夏公司和整个保险行业遭受到了创纪录的巨大损失。估计卡特里娜飓风给我们造成的损失高达25亿美元，她那两个同样可恶的妹妹丽塔（Rita）和威尔玛（Wilma）飓风，又让我们进一步损失了9亿美元。 在2005年这个巨灾之年我们的保险业务能够取得如此辉煌的业绩，应该归功于GEICO及其杰出的首席执行官Tony Nicely。统计数据清楚地表明，在过去仅仅两年时间里，GEICO经营效率提高了32%。尤为引人注目的是，保单数量增长了26%，收益大幅增长，与此同时，公司员工数量却减少了4%。由于我们能够如此显著地降低单位成本，所以能为客户创造更多的价值。这样的结果如何呢？GEICO去年赢得了更多的市场份额，获得了令人羡慕的盈利，并进一步提高了品牌的影响力。如果你2006年喜得龙子龙孙的话，给他起名叫Tony。 我写这份报告的目的是为股东们估计伯克夏的内在价值并提供相应的信息，之所以说是估计，是因为尽管计算内在价值在投资中为重中之重，但往往并不精确，且错误常常非常严重。公司业务的前景越是不确定，内在价值的计算就越是有可能谬之千里（关于内在价值的有关解释，请参见公司年报的第77-78页）。不过伯克夏公司具有以下有利因素: 种类众多的相对稳定的收入流，同时拥有巨大的流动性和很少的债务。这些因素使伯克夏公司能够比其他绝大多数公司更为准确地估计内在价值。 尽管伯克夏的财务特征有助于提高估值的准确度，但计算内在价值的工作由
巴菲特2011年致股东的一封信（全文） 11-03-02 18:13:06 作者：巴菲特来源: ［免责条款：本站发展的宗旨是成为价值投资者共同交流、共同学习、共同研究的专业价值投资平台，凡依据这些文章资料和数据进行操作所造成的一切后果请投资者自行承担，均与本站无关。投资者应负责独立核实数据的准确性、时效性和完整性。］ 伯克希尔公司董事长巴菲特（Warren Buffett）2月26日发布了长达27页的致股东的信，他在信中谈到关于伯克希尔的业务模式与方向，以及自己的接班人问题，同时透露包括高盛与通用电气今年将回购伯克希尔持有的优先股，以下为巴菲特致股东信的全文。 关于保险业务部分和GEICO公司 现在让我告诉你一个真实的故事，这将有助于你了解一个企业的内在价值远远超过其帐面价值，而这个故事也可以顺便让我重温一下那些美好的回忆。 60年前的最后一个月，GEICO走进我的生命之中，而这也彻底改变了我的一生。当时我还是哥伦比亚大学的一名研究生，是被我的恩师本-格雷厄姆推荐过去的。 有一天，我在图书馆里翻阅《美国名人录》时发现本（Ben）是政府雇员保险公司（现在的GEICO）的董事长。当时我对保险业一无所知，同时也没有听说过这家公司。后来图书管理员给我看了一些关于保险公司的汇编材料，才让我对GEICO有了初步的了解，之后我决定拜访下这家位于华盛顿的公司。 但是当我到达公司总部的时候，门却是紧闭着的。之后我开始不厌其烦地敲门，一个看门人把我带到了当时公司里唯一的一个人面前——洛里默?戴维森（Lorimer Davidson）。接下来的4个小时是我的幸运时刻，戴维森十分详细地把保险业和GEICO给我讲解了一遍，这是我们美好友谊的一个开始。此后不久，我从哥伦比亚大学顺利毕业，并成为在奥马哈市（Omaha）的一名股票推销员。当然，我从 GEICO那里获得了不少建议，使我在一开始就拥有了数十家客户。而在和戴维森会面之后，我所投资的9800美元也实现了75%的盈利率。 后来，戴维森成为GEICO公司的CEO，但是他做梦也没有想到公司会在上世纪70年代中期（当时他已退休了）遇到了巨大麻烦——股票跌幅超过95%！伯克希尔（Berkshire）
本公司2002年的净值增加了61亿美元，每股A股或B股的帐面净值增加了10.0%，累计过去38年以来，也确实是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的41,727美元，年复合成长率约为22.2%*。 *1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级一般股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年往常流通在外唯一的一种股份，B级一般股则拥有A级一般股三十分之一的权利。 从任何角度来看，2002年无异是丰收的一年，后面我会再详加讲明，以下是几点总结： ?尽管外界景气低迷，但伯克希尔旗下所有非保险事业的表现都异常优异，十年前，我们非保险事业的税前盈余为2.72亿美元，但时至今日，在持续大举扩张零售、制造、服务以及金融事业版图之后，这数字约当我们一个月的获利。
?2002年我们旗下保险事业的浮存金大幅增加了57亿美元，累积达到412亿美元，更棒的是，运用这些资金的成本仅为1%，能够回到以往低成本浮存金的感受真好，特不是经历过惨淡的前三年，伯克希尔的再保险部门以及GEICO车险在2002年都大放异彩，而General RE的承保纪律也已恢复。 ?伯克希尔购并了几项重要的新事业，其产业竞争力在各自的业界均堪称数一数二，并由优秀的经理人所治理，这些特点是我们"进入"策略决定关键的两只脚，至于合理的价格则是第三只脚，只是不同于一般融资购并者LBO及私人投资银行，我们并没有所谓的"退出"策略，在买进以后，我们就把它们好好地放着，这也是为何伯克希尔往往成为许多卖方以及其经理人，心目中的首选，有时甚至是唯一的选择。 这两位新成员分不是
?我们的股票投资组合表现超越市场上大多数的指数，关于负责治理GEICO保险资金的Lou Simpson来讲，这是司空见惯的 事，但就我个人而言，却是在经历过好几个悲惨的年头后，终于 获得翻身。 综合以上这些有利的因素，造就我们的帐面净值大幅超越S&P 500指数达到32.1个百分点，如此的成绩有点反常，伯克希尔的副董事长兼要紧合伙人-查理曼格跟我本人最希望的是伯克希尔每年都能稳定的超越指数几个百分点就好，我想在以后的某些年 度，极有可能会看到S&P指数大幅超越我们的表现，尤其是当股 市大幅上涨的年头，要紧的缘故在于目前我们在股市投资占总资 产的比例已大幅下降，因此也由因此如此的转变，让我们在2002年股市大幅回档之际，仍能维持不错的绩效。 关于去年的结果，我还有一点要补充，假如你经常阅读最近 几年上市公司的财务报表，你会发觉满是所谓"拟制性盈余"这类
全文翻译巴菲特2012年致股东的信，使你清晰知道巴菲特的投资方向，学习其精湛的投资技巧。站在巨人的肩膀上，让你看得更远。 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们： 2011年，我们公司的A股和B股（相当于B股的1500分之1）的每股账面净值都增长了4.6%。过去47年期间（也就是说从现在的管理层接管公司开始至今），每股账面净值从19美元增长到了99,860美元，每年复合增长率为19.8%。 我和我的合作伙伴伯克希尔公司的副董事长查理·芒格，对公司2011年的业务发展感到相当满意。其中作为突出亮点的好消息包括： 第一个好消息：董事会成员最主要的工作，一是现在由正确的领导人在经营管理企业业务，二是确保已经选定下一代接班的领导人而且已经准备好明天就能接任。我本人曾经加入过19家公司的董事会，我认为，在接班人选计划上付出的时间和精力上，伯克希尔公司的董事会肯定排名前列。更可喜的是，他们的努力已经得到了回报。 2011年初，托德·康布斯（Todd Combs）作为投资经理人加入我们公司，2012年初泰德随时韦斯切勒（Ted Weschler）也加入公司。他们两位都具有杰出的投资技巧，而且愿意全心全意为伯克希尔公司服
务。2012年他们俩人将会管理几十亿美元的投资，但是，当我和芒格不同管理伯克希尔公司的时候，他们俩人具备的头脑、判断和性格完全能够管理伯克希尔公司的整个投资组合。 公司董事会对作为我的接班人担任公司未来CEO职位的经理人也同样充满信心，他们对他已经非常了解，对于此人的管理能力和个人品德也非常敬仰。（我们同时还有两位超一流的后备人选）。未来需要移交管理职责的时候，一切将会是平滑过渡无缝连接，伯克希尔公司的发展前景仍将是一片光明。我的个人财富98%以上都在伯克希尔公司的股票上，所有这些持股将会捐赠给几家不同的慈善组织。如此高度集中投资于一只股票完全违背传统的投资智慧。但是，由于我本人非常了解伯克希尔公司拥有的各家企业的品质有多么优秀，多元化程度有多么分散，以及管理这些企业的经理人的才干有多么出色，所以我对这种安排非常满意。能够拥有如此优质的资产，我的接班人将会拥有一个很好的起点。可是，千万不要根据我的这些说法，就推断我和芒格很快将会离开公司管理岗位，我们仍然非常健康，而且我们非常热爱我们的工作。 第二个好消息：2011年9月16日，我们收购了Lubrizol公司，这是一家全球性的添加剂及其它特殊化学品生产企业。从2004年James Hambrick担任CEO以来，这家公司创出了杰出的业绩记录，税前利润从1.47亿增长到10.85亿美元。Lubrizol公司在特殊化学品领域将
《2019年巴菲特致股东的信》阅读心得 1. 运营成果 根据美国通用会计准则(GAAP)，伯克希尔2018年盈利40亿美元，其中包括：2018年公司运营利润为248亿美元，30亿美元的非现金亏损(无形资产减值)几乎都来源自我们对卡夫亨氏的持股，28亿美元的实际资本收益来自卖出所投资证券，206亿美元的亏损来自我们投资组合中未实现资本利得的减值。 美国通用会计准则的新规定要求我们在收益中包括最后一项。正如我在2017年年报中所强调的，无论是伯克希尔副董事长查理-芒格，还是我都不认为这条规则是明智的。相反，我们两人一直认为，在伯克希尔，这种按市值计价的变化将导致我们的净利润出现剧烈而无常的波动。 股价短期出现随机剧烈波动。 这一预言的准确性可以从我们2018年的季度财报中看出。在第一和第四季度，我们分别了11亿美元和254亿美元的GAAP亏损。在第二和第三季度，我们分别报告了120亿美元和185亿美元的利润。与这些剧烈波动形成鲜明对比的是，伯克希尔旗下的许多业务在各个季度都实现了持续且令人满意的运营利润。全年来说，这些业务的利润比2016年176亿美元的高点还要高出41%。 我们每季度的GAAP收益的大幅波动将不可避免地继续下去。这是因为我们庞大的股票投资组合截至2018年底价值接近1730亿美元经常会经历单日20亿美元或更多的价值波动，而新规则都要求我们必须立即将这些波动计入我们的净利润。事实上，在股价高度波动的第四季度，我们有好几天都经历了单日盈利或亏损超过40亿美元。 我们对此的建议?请关注运营收益，少关注其它任何形式的暂时收益或损失。我的这番话丝毫不削弱我们的投资对伯克希尔的重要性。随着时间推移，我和查理
2012年巴菲特致股东的信（重点节选） 投资往往为被描述为这样一个过程，现在投入一些钱，希望未来能收回更多的钱。在伯克希尔哈撒韦，我们采用更高的标准，将投资定义为“现在将购买力让渡给他人，合理期待未来支付名义收益税率后，仍能获得更高的购买力”。简言之，投资就是放弃现在的消费，以便将来有能力消费更多。 从我们的定义可以得出一个重要结论：衡量投资风险高低的指标不应是贝塔值一个基于波动率的华尔街术语，常用于衡量风险，而是持有期满后投资人出现购买力损失的合理概率。资产价格可能大幅波动，但只要有理由肯定投资期满后它们带来的购买力能得到提升，这项投资就没有风险。稍后我们还会看到，价格没有波动的资产也可能充满风险。 投资选择林林总总，但大体可分为三类，理解每一类的特点很重要。下面，我们将展开详细的分析。 市场上以特定货币结算的投资包括货币市场基金、债券、按揭、银行存款和其他工具。大多数此类投资都被视为“安全”，但事实上却是可能属于最危险的资产。它们的贝塔值可能是零，但风险巨大。 上个世纪，这类投资工具摧毁了很多国家投资者的购买力，尽管投资者一直能够按时收到支付的本息。而且，这样的糟糕结果将来还会不断重现。政府决定货币的最终价值，而系统性力量有时会推动它们制定导致通胀的政策。这些政策一不留神就会失控。 即使是在美国，政府强烈希望维持本币稳定，但是，我1965年接管伯克希尔哈撒韦以来，美元也已贬值高达86%。当年花1美元能买到的东西，今天至少要花7美元。因此，这些年来，一个免税机构须取得4.3%的债券投资年收益，才能保持购买力不变。假如管理层还将一切利息收入视为“收益”，他们一定是在开玩笑。 对于像你我这样的应税投资者，情况就更糟了。过去的47年里，美国国债不断地滚动，年回报率5.7%。听起来好像还不错。但对于个人所得税率平均为25%的的个人投资者而言，这5.7%的回报率所能带来的实际收益是零。投资者缴纳的、可见的所得税将拿走上述回报率中的1.4个百分点，通胀因素这个隐形的“税种”将吞噬其余4.3个百分点。值得指出的是，
2013巴菲特致股东的信 沃伦·巴菲特 致伯克希尔哈撒韦有限公司的股东： 2012年，伯克希尔的总收益为241亿美元。我们用13亿美元回购公司股票，这使得我们的资产净值增加了228亿美元。A、B类股票每股账面价值增长了14.4%。在过去的48年，我们的账面价值从19美元增长到114214美元，年均复合增长为19.7%。 2012年“少收了三五斗” 过去的一年伯克希尔有很多的好事情，但似乎应该先说说不太好的。自1965年我掌管伯克希尔开始，我从未想过能够一年获得241亿美元的收益，但这个表现并不尽如人意，在过去48年中，这是我们的账面价值上升幅度第九次跑输标普指数。 值得一提的是，在这9年的八个年头里，标普指数上涨幅度超过了15%，我们通常在逆势中干得更好。 如果以5年为周期，过去的48年里有43个这样的周期，到目前为止，43个5年周期，我们还没有一次被标普打败过，然而，这次可能有点不一样，如果2013年标普继续高歌猛进，我们这个记录将可能被打破。 不管伯克希尔表现如何，有一件事情你无论如何都要坚信，那就是查理和我都不会改变我们的绩效衡量标准。我们的工作就是要跑赢标普指数来提升伯克希尔的内在价值，如果我们做到了这一点，虽然不可预知，但随着时间的推移，最终伯克希尔的股价上涨也将超越标普的上涨幅度。 而如果不幸，我们没有做到这一点，我们的管理对于我们的持有者而言是毫无价值的，因为他们完全可以直接买入成本更低的以标准普尔为标的的指数型基金。 查理和我都始终坚信，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的内在价值增长速度能够小幅度跑赢标普指数。 我们的自信是因为我们有着一些伟大的企业，一个卓越的管理团队以及以投资者利益为导向的企业文化。当市场处于下跌或者小幅上涨的年份，我们一定是更棒的，但是在过去几年的这种高歌猛进的市场里，我们很难打败市场。 收购亨氏只是猎象游戏的开始 2012年第二件让人失望的事情是我没能进行一笔重大并购，我瞄准了几只大象，但最终空手而归。 不过，今年我们的运气似乎有所好转，2月份，我们联手3G资本收购了亨氏食品，我们占50%的股权，另外50%的股权由巴西著名的商人和慈善家豪尔赫·保罗·雷曼领导的3G 资本持有。 我们买不到比这更好的公司了。保罗和我是老朋友了，他也是一个杰出的管理人士，他的3G资本和伯克希尔各出资40亿美元购买普通股，而伯克希尔还将另外出资80亿美元购买每年分红率达9%的优先股。