公司金融经典外文文献

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研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献

研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。

以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。

“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a ﬁnancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deﬁcits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The ﬁrst is to consider how agents interact through ﬁnancial markets. The second looks at the operation ofﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the ﬁnancial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large ﬁrms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small ﬁrms used banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between ﬁrms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the ﬁnancial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a ﬁnancial system transfers resources between households and ﬁrms is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Governments usually play a significant role in the ﬁnancial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save signiﬁcant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue ﬁat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience ﬁnancial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signiﬁcant way in the ﬁnancial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of ﬁnancialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the ﬁnancial system.There are some historical instances where ﬁnancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-deﬁned legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most ﬁnancial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a ﬁnancial system.A ﬁnancial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by ﬁnancial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a ﬁnancial system.Without signiﬁcant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a ﬁnancial system to operate eﬀectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and ﬁnancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eﬀective ﬁnancial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative ﬁnancial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How eﬀective are diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the ﬁnancial system?The ﬁrst set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the inﬂuence of law and politics on the ﬁnancial system while Section 8 looks at the role ﬁnancial crises have had in shaping the ﬁnancial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the ﬁnancial system is to allow savings to be invested in ﬁrms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how ﬁrms obtained funds and ﬁnanced investment in a number of diﬀerent countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The ﬁgures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal ﬁnance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank ﬁnance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond ﬁnance is only important in the US and equity ﬁnance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important ﬁnancial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These ﬁndings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional ﬁnance literature. Bank ﬁnance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal ﬁnance.Another perspective on how the ﬁnancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of ﬁnancial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reﬂect the ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms. Since internal ﬁnance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the data sets underlying the diﬀerent tables. For example, household portfolios consist of ﬁnancial assets and exclude privately held ﬁrms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these diﬀerences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diﬀerent ways of viewing the ﬁnancial system produce such radically diﬀerent results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external ﬁnance is the diﬀerence between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal ﬁnance dominates external ﬁnance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external ﬁnance is more important than internal ﬁnance. Moreover, equity is the most important ﬁnancing instrument and dominates debt. This diﬀerence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets diﬀer from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset speciﬁcity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eﬀect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse oﬀ ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the beneﬁt of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better oﬀby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that ﬁnancial markets have an advantage over ﬁnancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the ﬁrm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to ﬁnance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a ﬁrm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eﬀective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over ﬁnancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the ﬁnal outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that ﬁrms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) ﬁnd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that smoothing occurs as a ﬁrm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) ﬁnd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank proﬁts. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。

金融产品营销策划方案参考文献

金融产品营销策划方案参考文献1. Kotler, P., & Armstrong, G. (2010). Principles of Marketing. Pearson Education.这本书是市场营销学的经典教材，对市场营销的原理、策略和技巧都有很详细的描述。

对于金融产品的营销策划方案，这本书提供了很多有用的思路和方法。

2. Blattberg, R., & Deighton, J. (1996). Manage Marketing by the Customer Equity Test. Harvard Business Review.该文章讲述如何通过客户权益测试来管理营销活动，并提供了一些实际案例和具体步骤。

这对于金融产品的营销策划方案有很大的借鉴意义，帮助企业更好地了解客户需求，制定相关营销策略。

3. Aßmus, G. (2007). Marketing Financial Services. Palgrave Macmillan.这本书针对金融服务行业的市场营销给出了很多有用的建议和案例研究，它涵盖了广告、公关、销售和品牌策略等方面的知识。

对于金融产品营销策划方案的制定具有很强的参考价值。

4. Rust, R. T., Zeithaml, V. A., & Lemon, K. N. (2000). Driving Customer Equity: How Customer Lifetime Value is Reshaping Corporate Strategy. Free Press.这本书探讨了如何通过客户终身价值（CLV）来驱动客户权益，并通过实际案例和研究来说明这种方法的有效性。

对于金融产品的营销策划方案，了解客户终身价值的概念和计算方法是非常重要的。

5. Nenad, S. (2013). Marketing Strategies for Financial Services Based on Dominant Social Networks. EUBS Business Review, 1(1), 86-103.该研究指出，金融服务行业可以通过利用主导社交网络来制定更有效的营销策略。

[原创]研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献

研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献英文图书和期刊类文献：[1]Allen N.Berger,Gregory F.Udell,“Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small FirmFinance,”Journal of Business,Vol.68,no.3.(1995),pp.351-381．[2]Aghion,P.,Incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting,Review of Economics Studies,1992,Vol.59,p473-494．[3]Albertode，M.&JulioPindado.Determinants of capital structure:new evidence from Spanish Panel data[J].Journal of Corporate Finance，2001，(7):77-99．[4]A.N.Berger，ler，M.A.Petersen，R.G.Rajan，J.C.Stein，2001，“Does Function Follow Organizational Form?Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks”,Board of Governors of Federal Reserve SystemWorking Paper．[5]Azam,J.P.,B.Biais,M.Dia and rmal and Formal Credit Marketsand Credit Rationing in Cote D’Ivoire,Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2001,17(4),520-532.[6]Bernanke,B.S.,M.Gerler.Inside the Black Box:The Credit Channel ofMonetary Policy Transmission[J].Journal of EconomicPerspectives,1995,(9);27-48．[7]Barbosa,E.&Moraes,C.,Determinants of the Firm’s Capital Structure:theCase of the Very Small Enterprises,Working Paper from Econpapers，2003,366-358。

经济金融企业管理外文翻译外文文献英文文献

经济金融企业管理外文翻译外文文献英文文献————————————————————————————————作者：————————————————————————————————日期：2附录【原文】Upgrading in Global Value ChainsThe aim of this paper is to explore how small- and medium-sized Latin American enterprises ( SMEs) may participate in global markets in a way that provides for sustainable growth. This may be defined as the ‘‘highroad’’ to competitiveness, contrasting with the ‘‘low road,’’ typical of firms from developing countries, which often compete by squeezing wages and profit margins rather than by improving productivity, wages, and profits. The key difference between the high and the low road to competitiveness is often explained by the different capabilities of firms to ‘‘upgrade.’ In this paper, upgrading refers to the capacity of a firm to innovate to increase the value added of its products and processes (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002a; Kaplinsky&Readman, 2001; Porter, 1990).Capitalizing on one of the most productive areas of the recent literature on SMEs, we restrict our field of research to small enterprises located in clusters. There is now a wealth ofempirical evidence (Humphrey, 1995; Nadvi &Schmitz, 1999; Rabellotti, 1997) showing that small firms in clusters, both in developed and developing countries, are able to over come some of the major constraints they usually face: lack of specialized skills, difficult access to technology, inputs, market, information, credit, and external services.Nevertheless, the literature on clusters, mainly focused on the local sources of competitiveness coming from intracluster vertical and horizontal relationshipsgenerating ‘‘collective efficiency’’ (Schmitz, 1995), has often neglected the increasing importance of external link ages. Due to recent changes in production systems, distribution channels, and financial markets, and to the spread of information technologies, enterprises and clusters are increasingly integrated in value chains thatoften operate across many different countries. The literature on global value chains (GVCs) (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi& Kaplinsky, 2001) calls attention to the opportunities for local producers to learn from the global leaders of the chains that may be buyers or1producers. The internal governance of the value chain has an important effect on the scope of local firms’ upgrading (Humphrey& Schmitz, 2000).Indeed, extensive evidence on Latin America reveals that both the local and the global dimensions matter, and firms often participate in clusters as well as in value chains (Pietrobelli& Rabellotti, 2004). Both forms of organization offer opportunities to foster competitiveness via learning and upgrading. However, they also have remarkable drawbacks, as, for instance, upgrading may be limited in some forms of value chains, and clusters with little developed external economies and joint actions may have no influence on competitiveness.Moreover, both strands of literature were conceived and developed to overcome the sectoral dimension in the analysis of industrial organization and dynamism. On the one hand, studies on clusters, focusing on agglomerations of firms specializing in different stages of the filie′re, moved beyond the t raditional units of analysis of industrial economics: the firm and the sector. On the other hand, according to the value chain literature, firms from different sectors may all participate in the same value chain (Gereffi, 1994). Nevertheless, SMEs located in clusters and involved in value chains, may undertake a process of upgrading in order to increase and improve their participation in the global economy, especially as the industrial sector plays a role and affects the upgrading prospects of SMEs.The contribution this paper makes is by taking into account all of these dimensions together. Thus, within this general theoretical background, this study aims to investigate the hypothesis that enterprise upgrading is simultaneously affected by firm-specific efforts and actions, and by the environment in which firms operate. The latter is crucially shaped by three characteristics: (i) the collective efficiency of the cluster in which SMEs operate, (ii) the pattern of governance of the value chain in which SMEs participate, and (iii) the peculiar features that characterize learning and innovation patterns in specific sectors.The structure of the paper is the following: in Section 2, we briefly review theconcepts of clustering and value chains, and focus on their overlaps andcomplementarities. Section 3 first discusses the notion of SMEs’ upgrading and then2introduces a categorization of groups of sectors, based on the notions underlying the Pavitt taxonomy, and applied to the present economic reality of Latin America. Section 4reports the original empirical evidence on a large sample of Latin American clusters, and shows that the sectoral dimension matters to explain why clustering and participating in global value chains offer different opportunities for upgrading in different groups of sectors. Section5 summarizes and concludes.2. CLUSTERS AND VALUE CHAINSDuring the last two decades, the successful performance of industrial districts in the developed world, particularly in Italy, has stimulated new attention to the potential offered by this form of industrial organization for firms of developing countries. The capability of clustered firms to be economically viable and grow has attracted a great deal of interest in development studies. 1In developing countries, the sectoral and geographical concentration of SMEs is rather common, and a wide range of cases has since been reported. 2 Obviously, the existence of acritical mass of specialized and agglomerated activities, in a number of cases with historically strong roots, does not necessarily imply that these clusters share all the stylized facts which identify the Marshall type of district, as firstlydefined by Becattini (1987). 3 Nonetheless, clustering may be considered as a major facilitating factor for a number of subsequent developments (which may or may not occur): division and specialization of labor, the emergence of a wide network of suppliers, the appearance of agents who sell to distant national and internationalmarkets, the emergence of specialized producer services, the materialization of a poolof specialized and skilled workers, and the formation of business associations.To capture the positive impacts of these factors on the competitiveness of firms located in clusters, Schmitz (1995)introduced the concept of ‘‘collective efficiency’’(CE) defined as the competitive advantage derived from local external economies and joint action. The concept of external economies 4 was first introduced by Marshall in his Principles of Economics(1920). According to Schmitz (1999a), incidental external economies (EE) are of importance in explaining the competitiveness of industrial clusters, but there is also a deliberate force at work: consciously pursued joint action3(JA).Such joint action can be within vertical or horizontal linkages. 5The combination of both incidental external economies and the effects of active cooperation defines the degree of collective efficiency of a cluster and, dynamically,its potential for fostering SMEs’ upgrading. Both dimensions are crucial: Onlyincidental, passive external economies may not suffice without joint actions, and the latter hardly develop in the absence of external economies. Thus, our focus is on therole of intracluster vertical and horizontal relationships generating collectiveefficiency.However, recent changes in production systems, distribution channels and financial markets, accelerated by the globalization of product markets and the spread of information technologies, suggest that more attention needs to be paid to external linkages. 6 Gereffi’s global value chain approach (Gereffi, 1999) helps us to take into account activities taking place outside the cluster and, in particular, to understand the strategic role of the relationships with key external actors.From an analytical point of view, the value chain perspective is useful because (Kaplinsky,2001; Wood, 2001) the focus moves from manufacturing only to the other activities involved in the supply of goods and services, including distribution and marketing. All these activities contribute to add value. Moreover, the ability to identify the activities providing higher returns along the value chain is key to understanding the global appropriation of the returns to production. Value chain research focuses on the nature of the relationships among the various actors involved in the chain, and on their implications for development (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b). To study these relationships, the concept of ‘‘governance’’ is central to the analysis.At any point in the chain, some degree of governance or coordination is required in order to take deci sions not only on ‘‘what’’ should be, or ‘‘how’’ something shouldbe, produced but sometimes also ‘‘when,’’ ‘‘how much,’’ and even ‘‘at what price.’’ Coordination may occur through arm’s-length market relations or non marketrelationships. In the latter case, following Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), wedistinguish three possible types of governance:(a) network implying cooperation4between firms of more or less equal power which share their competencies within the chain; (b) quasi-hierarchy involving relationships between legally independent firms in which one is subordinated to the other, with a leader in the chain defining the rules to which the rest of the actors have to comply; and (c) hierarchy when a firm is owned by an external firm.Also stressed is the role played by GVC leaders, particularly by the buyers, in transferring knowledge along the chains. For small firms in less developed countries (LDCs), participation in value chains is a way to obtain information on the need and mode to gain access to global markets. Yet, although this information has high valuefor local SMEs, the role played by the leaders of GVCs in fostering and supportingthe SMEs’ upgrading process is less clear. Gereffi (1999), mainly focusing on East Asia, assumes a rather optimistic view, emphasizing the role of the leaders that almost automatically promote process, product, and functional upgrading among small local producers. Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2004) present a more differentiated picture for Latin America.In line with the present approach,Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) discuss the prospects of upgrading with respect to the pattern of value chain governance. They conclude that insertion in a quasi-hierarchical chain offers very favorable conditions for process and product upgrading, but hinders functional upgrading. Networks offer ideal upgrading conditions, but they are the least likely to occur for developing country producers. In addition, a more dynamic approach suggests that chain governance is not given forever and may change because(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b): (a) power relationships may evolve when existing producers, or their spin offs, acquire new capabilities;(b) establishing and maintaining quasi-hierarchical governance is costly for the lead firm and leads to inflexibility because of transaction specific investments; and (c) firms and cluster soften do not operate only in one chain but simultaneously in several types of chains, and they may apply competencies learned in one chain to supply otherchains.In sum, both modes of organizing production, that is, the cluster and the value chain, offer interesting opportunities for the upgrading and modernization of local5firms, and are not mutually exclusive alternatives. However, in order to assess their potential contribution to local SMEs’ innovation and upgrading, we need to understand their organization of inter firm linkages and their internal governance. Furthermore, as we explain in the following section, the nature of their dominant specialization also plays a role and affects SMEs’ upgrading prospects.3. THE SECTORAL DIMENSION OFSMEs’ UPGRADING(a) The concept of upgradingThe concept of upgrading—making better products, making them more efficiently, or moving in to more skilled activities—has often been used in studies on competitiveness (Kaplinsky,2001; Porter, 1990), and is relevant here. Following this approach, upgrading is decisively related to innovation. Here we define upgrading as innovating to increase value added. 7 Enterprises achieve this in various ways, such as, for example, by entering higher unit value market niches ornew sectors, or by undertaking new productive (or service) functions. The concept of upgrading may be effectively described for enterprises working within a value chain, where four types of upgrading are singled out (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000):—Process upgrading is transforming inputs into outputs more efficiently by reorganizing the production system or introducing superior technology (e.g., footwear producers in the Sinos Valley; Schmitz, 1999b).—Product upgrading is moving into more sophisticated product lines in terms of increased unit values (e.g., the apparel commodity chain in Asia upgrading from discount chains to department stores; Gereffi,1999).—Functional upgrading is acquiring new, superior functions in the chain, such as design or marketing or abandoning existing low-value added functions to focus on higher value added activities (e.g., Torreon’s blue jeans industry upgrading from maquila to ‘‘full-package’’ manufacturing; Bair&Gereffi, 2001).—Inter sectoral upgrading is applying the competence acquired in a particularfunction to move into a new sector. For instance, in Taiwan, competence in producing TVs was used to make monitors and then to move into the computer sector (Guerrieri & Pietrobelli,2004; Humphrey & Schmitz,2002b). In sum, upgrading within a value6chain implies going up on the value ladder, moving away from activities in which competitionis of the ‘‘low road’’ type and entry barriers are low.Our focus on upgrading requires moving a step forward and away from Ricardo’s static concept of ‘‘Comparative Advantage’’ (CA). While CA registers ex-post gaps in relative productivity which determine international trade flows, success in firmlevel upgrading enables the dynamic acquisition of competitiveness in new market niches, sectors or phases of the productive chain (Lall, 2001; Pietrobelli, 1997). In sum, the logic goes from innovation, to upgrading, to the acquisition of firm-level competitiveness(i.e., competitive advantage). 8In this paper, we argue that the concept of competitive advantage increasingly matters. In the theory of comparative advantage, what matters is relative productivity, determining different patterns of inter industry specialization. Within such atheoretical approach, with perfectly competitive markets, firms need to target only production efficiency. In fact, this is not enough, and competitive advantage is the relevant concept to analyze SMEs’ performance because of (i) the existence of formsof imperfect competition in domestic and international markets and (ii) the presenceof different degrees of (dynamic) externalities in different subsect or sand stages ofthe value chain.More specifically, in non perfectly competitive market rents and niches of ‘‘extra- normal’’ profits o ften emerge, and this explains the efforts to enter selectively specific segments rather than simply focusing on efficiency improvements, regardless of the prevailing productive specialization (as advocated by the theory of CA). Moreover, different stages in the value chain offer different scope for dynamic externalities. Thus, for example, in traditional manufacturing, the stages of design, productinnovation, marketing, and distribution may all foster competitiveness increases in related activities and sectors. The advantage of functional upgrading is in reducing thefragility and vulnerability of an enterprise’s productive specialization. Competition from new entrants—i.e., firms from developing countries with lower production costs, crowding out incumbents—is stronger in the manufacturing phases of the value chain than in other more knowledge and organization-intensive phases (e.g., product design7and innovation, chain management, distribution and retail, etc.).Therefore, functional upgrading may bring about more enduring and solid competitiveness.For all these reasons, the concept of production efficiency is encompassed withinthe broader concept of competitiveness, and the efforts to upgrade functionally and inter sectorally (and the policies to support these processes) are justified to reap larger rents and externalities emerging in specific stages of the value chain, market niches,or sectors.An additional element that crucially affects the upgrading prospects of firms and clusters is the sectoral dimension. Insofar as we have defined upgrading as innovating to increase value added, then all the factors influencing innovation acquire a new relevance. This dimension is often overlooked in studies on clusters, perhaps due to the fact that most of these studies are not comparative but rather detailed intra industry case studies.In order to take into account such a sectoral dimension, and the effect this may have on the firms’ pattern of innovation and l earning, we need to introduce the concept of ‘‘tacit knowledge.’’ This notion was first introduced by Polanyi(1967)and then discussed in the context of evolutionary economics by Nelson and Winter(1982). It refers to the evidence that some aspects of technological knowledge are well articulated, written down in manuals and papers, and taught. Others are largely tacit, mainly learned through practice and practical examples. In essence, this is knowledge which can be freely used by its owners, but that can not be easily expressed and communicated to anyone else.The tacit component of technological knowledge makes its transfer and application costly and difficult. As a result, the mastery of a technology may require anorganization to be active in the earlier stages of its development, and a close and continuous interaction between the user and the producer—or transfer—of suchknowledge. Inter firm relationships are especially needed in this context. Tacitknowledge is an essential dimension to define a useful grouping of economicactivities.(b) Sectoral specificities in upgrading and innovation: a classification for Latin8American countriesThe impact of collective efficiency and patterns of governance on the capacity of SMEs to upgrade may differ across sectors. This claim is based upon the consideration that sectoral groups differ in terms of technological complexity and in the modes and sources of innovation and upgrading. 9 As shown by innovation studies, in some sectors, vertical relations with suppliers of inputs may be particularly important sources of product and process upgrading (as in the case of textiles and the most traditional manufacturing), while in other sectors, technology users, organizations such as universities or the firms themselves (as, for example, with software or agro industrial products) may provide major stimuli for technical change (Pavitt,1984; Von Hippel, 1987).Consistently with this approach, the properties of firm knowledge bases across different sectors (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1993) 10 mayaffect the strategic relevance of collective efficiencyfor the processes of upgrading in clusters. Thus, for example, in traditional manufacturing sectors, technology has important tacit and idiosyncratic elements, and therefore, upgrading strongly depends on the intensity of technological externalities and cooperation among local actors (e.g., firms, research centers, and technology and quality diffusion centers), in other words, upgrading depends on the degree of collective efficiency. While in other groups (e.g., complex products or large natural resource-based firms) technology is more codified and the access to external sources of knowledge such as transnational corporations(TNCs, or researchlaboratories located in developed countries become more critical for upgrading. Furthermore, the differences across sectoral groups raise questions on the role of global buyers in fostering (or hindering) the upgrading in different clusters. Thus, for example, global buyers may be more involved and interested in their providers’upgrading if the technology required is mainly tacit and requires intense interaction.Moreover, in traditional manufacturing industries, characterized by a low degree of technological complexity, firms are likely to be included in GVCs even if they have very low technological capabilities. Therefore, tight supervision and direct support become necessary conditions for global buyers who rely on the competencies of their9local suppliers and want to reduce the risk of non compliance(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b). The situation is at the opposite extreme in the case of complex products, where technology is often thoroughly codified and the technological complexityrequires that firms have already internal technological capabilities to be subcontracted, otherwise large buyers would not contract them at all.In order to take into account the above-mentioned hypotheses, we develop asectoral classification, adapting existing taxonomies to the Latin American case. 11On the basis of Pavitt’s seminal work (1984), we consider that in Latin America, in- house R&D activities are very low both in domestic and foreign firms (Archibugi& Pietrobelli, 2003), domestic inter sectoral linkages have been displaced by tradeliberalization(Cimoli & Katz, 2002), and university-industry linkages appear to be still relatively weak (Arocena & Sutz, 2001). 12 Furthermore, in the past 10 years,Latin America has deepened its productive specialization in resource based sectors and has weakened its position in more engineering intensive industries (Katz,2001), reflecting its rich endowment of natural resources, relatively more than human and technical resources (Wood & Berge, 1997).Hence, we retain Pavitt’s key notions and identify four main sectoral groups for Latin America on the basis of the way learning and upgrading occur, and on the related industrial organization that most frequently prevails. 13The categories are as follows:1. Traditional manufacturing, mainly labor intensive and ‘‘traditional’’ technology industries such as textiles, footwear, tiles, and furniture;2. Natural resource-based sectors (NRbased),implying the direct exploitation of natural resources, for example, copper, marble, fruit, etc.;3. Complex products industries (COPs), including, among others, automobiles,autocomponents and aircraft industries, ICT and consumer electronics;4. Specialized suppliers, in our LA cases, essentially software.Each of these categories tends to havea predominant learning and innovating behavior, in terms of main sources of technical change, dependence on basic or applied research, modes of in-house innovation (e.g.,‘‘routinized’’ versus large R&D laboratories), tacitness or codified nature ofknowledge, scale and relevance of R&D activity, and appropriability of10innovation(Table 1).Traditional manufacturing and resource-based sectors are by far the most present in Latin America, and therefore especially relevant toour present aims of assessing SMEs’ potential for upgrading with in clusters and value chains. Traditional manufacturing is defined as supplier dominated, because major process innovations are introduced by producers of inputs (e.g., machinery, materials, etc.). Indeed, firm shave room to upgrade their products (and processes)by developing or imitating new products’ designs, often interacting with large buyers that increasinglyplay a role in shaping the design of final products and hence the specificities of the process of production (times, quality standards, and costs).Natural resource-based sectors crucially rely on the advancement of basicand applied science, which, due to low appropriability conditions, is most often undertaken by public research institutes, possibly in connectionwith producers (farmers, breeders, etc.). 14 In these sectors, applied research is mainly carried out by input suppliers (i.e., chemicals, machinery, etc.) which achieve economies of scale and appropriate the results of their research through patents.Complex products are defined as ‘‘high cost, engineering-intensive products, subsystems, or constructs supplied by a unit of production’’ (Hobday, 1998),15where the local network is normally anchored to one ‘‘assembler,’’ which operates asa leading firm characterized by high design and technological capabilities. To ouraims, the relationships of local suppliers with these ‘‘anchors’’ may be crucial tofoster (or hinder) firms’ upgrading through technology and skill transfers (or the l ackof them).Scale-intensive firms typically lead complex product sectors (Bell & Pavitt, 1993), where the process of technical change is realized within an architectural set (Henderson & Clark, 1990), and it is often incremental and modular.Among the Specialized Suppliers, we only consider software, which is typicallyclient driven. This is an especially promising sector for developing countries’ SMEs,due to the low transport and physical capital costs and the high information intensityof the sector, which moderates the importance of proximity to final markets and extends the scope for a deeper international division of labor. Moreover, the11disintegration of some productive cycles, such as for example of telecommunications, opens up new market niches with low entry barriers(Torrisi, 2003). However, at the same time, the proximity of the market and of clients may crucially improve the development of design capabilities and thereby foster product/process up grading. Thus, powerful pressures for cluste ring and globalization coexist in this sector.The different learning patterns across these four groups of activities are expected to affect the process of upgrading of clusters in value chains. This paper also aims at analyzing with original empirical evidence whether—and how—the sectoral dimension influences this process in Latin America.4. METHODOLOGY: COLLECTIONAND ANALYSIS OF DATAThis study is based on the collection of original data from 12 clusters in Latin America that have not hitherto been investigated, and on an extensive review of cluster studies available. The empirical analysis was carried out from September 2002 to June 2003 with the support of the Inter American Development Bank. An international team of 12 experts in Italy and in four LA countries collected and reviewed the empirical data.Desk and field studies were undertaken following the same methodology, which involved field interviews with local firms, institutions, and observers, interviews with foreign buyers and TNCs involved in the local cluster, and secondary sources such as publications and reports.16 Case studies were selected which fulfilled the following conditions: (1) agglomeration: all cases show some degree of geographical SME clustering; 17 (2) upgrading: the clusters selected have experienced some degree of upgrading, of whatever nature (i.e., product, process, functional, inter sectoral); and (3) policy lessons: all cases offer relevant policy lessons for future experiences either in terms of successesor failures.A total of 40 case studies were selected forth is analysis. 18 The list of cases, albeit incomplete, is—to our knowledge—the largest available on which comparative exercises have been carried out, and provides a good approximation to the reality of clusters and value chains in LA. Thus, although it cannot claim to correspond to the。

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。

上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料

本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献出处：Abor J; Bokpin A. Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policy. Studies in Economics and Finance. 2015; 27(3):180-194.Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policyAbor J; Bokpin AAbstractPurpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Design/methodology/approach - This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17-year period, 1990-2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation. Findings - A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well-developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy. Originality/value - The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.Keywords: International; Dividends; Corporate finance;1. IntroductionThe impact of investment and financing decisions on firm value has been the focus of extensive research since [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the "separation principle". The theory asserts that in a perfect capital market, the value of the firm is independent of the manner in which its productive assets are financed. In fact someauthors like [12] Barnes et al.(1981) support their view. However, others have contrasted the findings of the earlier studies suggesting that investment, financing, and dividend policy are related ([30] Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; [46] McCabe, 1979;[5] Anderson, 1983). This is predicated on the assumption that Modigliani and Miller's ideal world does not exist. Financial markets are not perfect given taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and uncertain inflation in the market place. According to [13] Bier man and Hass (1983), management usually addresses the dividend target payout level in the context of forecasting the firm's sources and use of funds. Considering prospective investment opportunities and the internal cash generation potential of the firm, both capital structure and dividend policy are chosen to ensure that sufficient funds are available to undertake all desirable investments without using new equity ([14] Black, 1976). But what constitutes a "desirable" investment? If it is one that has an expected return greater than the cost of funds that finance it, and if the cost of retained earnings is different from the cost of new equity capital, then dividend policy, capital structure, and investment strategy are necessarily jointly determined ([15] Black and Schools, 1974).Dividend payout policy is an important corporate issue and may be closely related to, and interacts with, most of the financial and investment decisions firms make. A proper understanding of dividend policy is critical for many other areas such as asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, and capital budgeting ([2] Allen and Michael, 1995). Firms' dividend decisions could also be influenced by their profit level, risk, and size. Though dividend policy has been identified as a major corporate decision faced by management, it remains one of the puzzles in corporate finance ([52] Obi, 2001). There has been emerging consensus that there is no single explanation of dividends. [19] Brook et al.(1998) agree that, there is no reason to believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal.Attention of empirical research has been at ascertaining the relationship between investment opportunities, corporate financing and dividend payout ([54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991; [6] Aviation and Booth, 2003). However, these findings have failed toestablish any clear link concerning this issue. Most of these studies tend to focus on developed markets. Little is, however, known about how investment opportunities and corporate finance influence dividend payout policy of emerging markets. This present study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on emerging markets. Firms in emerging markets tend to exhibit different dividend behavior from those of developed markets like the US. This may be a result of the differences in levels of efficiency and institutional arrangements between developed markets and emerging markets. It is, therefore, useful to improve our understanding of the issue from an emerging market perspective.The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout. The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it considers a large-scale dataset covering 34 emerging market countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature on dividend policy. It also reviews the existing literature on the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study and also details the model specification used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 includes the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Overview of literatureSince the publication of the dividend irrelevance theory by [47] Miller and Modigliani (1961), a lot of studies have been conducted in the area of determinants of dividend payout the world over. The dividend irrelevance theory is possible in a perfect and efficient market where stockholders are perfectly rational and there are no taxes and transaction costs. The theory, however, pointed out the importance of investment as being the main issue. Miller and Modigliani framework has thus formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and payout policy in general. Their framework is rich enough to encompass both dividends and repurchase, as the only determinant of a firm's value is its investment policy ([3] Allen and Michael, 2002). It is arguably said a company's overriding goal is to maximize shareholder wealth ([18]Berkley and Myers, 1996; [16] Block and Hart, 2000), but to [16] Block and Hart (2000) this concept is not a simple task as management cannot directly influence the price of a share but can only act in a manner consistent with the desires of investors. In the view of [61] Woods and Randall (1989), shareholder wealth is generally accepted as the aggregate market value of the common shares, which in turn is assumed to be the present value of the cash flows which will accrue to shareholders, discounted at their required rate of return on equity. These cash flows include dividend and perhaps more importantly capital appreciation except for its high volatility. Firms must, therefore, make important decisions over and over again about how much cash the firm should give back to its shareholders and probably what form it should take.Black (1976) observed that the harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just do not fit together. This attests to the much controversy that surrounds dividend policy. The dividend puzzle revolves around figuring out why companies pay dividends and investors pay attention to dividend. To [18] Berkley and Myers (1996), dividend policy is seen as a trade-off between retaining earnings on one hand and paying out cash and issuing new shares on the other. The theoretical principles underlying the dividend policy of firms range from information asymmetries, tax-adjusted theory to behavioral factors. The information asymmetries encompass several aspects, including the agency cost, free cash flow hypothesis, and signaling models.Tax-adjusted models presume that investors require and secure higher expected returns on shares of dividend-paying stocks. The consequence of tax adjusted theory is the division of investors into dividend tax clientele and the clientele effect is responsible for the alterations in portfolio composition ([49] Modigliani, 1982). To [45] Marsalis and Truman (1988), investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm dividend policy. They conclude that as tax liability increases, the dividend payment decreases while earnings reinvestment increases and vice versa.Shareholders typically face the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in the face of separation of ownership and control. The problem of information asymmetry is evident in conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. It holds that insiders such as managers have more information about the firm's cash flow than the providers of the funds. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes because of better alignment of shareholder and managerial control ([39] Jensen and Heckling, 1976) and also in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor managerial activities ([57] Heifer and Vishnu, 1986). [27] Fame and Jensen (1983) argue that agency problems can be resolved by the payment of large dividend to shareholders.According to the free cash flow model, [37] Jensen (1986) explains that finance available after financing all positive net present value projects can result in conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Clearly, dividends and debt interest payment decrease the free cash flow available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite consumption. Firms with higher levels of cash flow should have higher dividend payout and/or higher leverage.The signaling theory suggests that corporate dividend policy used as a means of putting quality message across has a lower cost than other alternatives ([48] Miller and Rock, 1985; [8] Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This was developed initially for the labor market but its usefulness has been felt in the financial markets. [7] Aero (1970) defines signaling effect as a unique and specific signaling equilibrium in which a job seeker signals his/her quality to a prospective employer. The signaling theory suggests that dividends are used to signal managements' private information regarding the future earnings of the firm. Investors often see announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers' forecast of future earnings changes ([34] Healy and Pileup, 1988). Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and dividends are paid even if there is profitable investment opportunity ([11] Baker et al., 1985; [54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991).2.1 Investment opportunities and dividend payoutThe investment opportunities available to the firm constitute an important component of market value. The investment opportunity set of a firm affects the way the firm is viewed by managers, owners, investors, and creditors ([43] Caliper and Tremble, 2001). The literature has given considerable attention in recent years to examining the association between investment opportunity set and corporate policy choices, including financing, dividend, and compensation policies ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992;[29] Giver and Giver, 1993; [41] Caliper and Tremble, 1999; [40] Jones and Sharma, 2001; [1] Abbott, 2001). According to [40] Jones (2001), investment opportunity set represents a firm's investment or growth options but to [51] Myers (1977) its value depends on the discretional expenditures of managers. [51] Myers (1977) further explains investment opportunity as a yet-to-be realized potentially profitable project that a firm can exploit for economic rents. Thus, this represents the component of the firm's value resulting from options to make future investments ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992).Growth opportunities are also represented by the relative fraction of firm value that is accounted for by assets in place (plant, equipment, and other tangible assets), and that the lower the fraction of firm value represented by assets in place, the higher the growth opportunities ([32] Gull and Kelley, 1999). [43] Caliper and Tremble (2001) suggest that, the conventional notion of investment opportunity set is of new capital expenditure made to introduce a new product or expand production of an existing product. This may include an option to make expenditure to reduce costs during a corporate restructuring. An investment opportunity has been measured in various ways by various writers. These include market to book value of equity ([21] Collins and Kithara, 1989; [20] Chung and Charoenwong, 1991), book to market value of assets ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992), and Tobin's q ([58] Skinner, 1993).Existing literature suggests a relationship between investment opportunities and dividend policy. [59] Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with high investment opportunity set are likely to pursue a low dividend payout policy, since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources ([29] Giverand Giver, 1993). [40] Jones (2001), extending and modifying the work of [29] Giver and Gaver (1993), found out that high growth firms were associated with significantly lower dividend yields. [32] Gul and Kealey (1999) also found a negative relationship between growth options and dividends. [1] Abbott (2001) argues that firms that experienced an investment opportunity set expansion (decrease) generally reduced (increase) their dividend payout policy. Others support the fact that firms with higher market-to-book value tend to have good investment opportunities, and would retain more funds to finance such investment, thus recording lower dividend payout ratios ([56] Rozeff, 1982; [44] Lloyd et al. , 1985; [22] Collins et al. , 1996; [4] Amidu and Abor, 2006). [55] Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2001) also validated the fact that firms in high investment opportunity set group are "PE valued" whilst firms in low investment opportunity set are "dividend yield valued". This implies that for firms in low investment opportunity set, dividends are of greater relevance than earnings whilst the opposite is true for firms in high investment opportunity set. Using market-to-book ratio as proxy for investment opportunity set, [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), however, found a positive relationship between market-to-book value ratio and dividend payments, suggesting that firms with higher investment opportunities rather pay higher dividends.2.2 Corporate finance and dividend payoutThe financing choice of firms is perhaps the most researched area in finance in the past decades following the seminal article of [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) raising the issue of the relationship between a firms choice of finance and its value. Recently, there are still increasing research and new evidence being sought for the relevance or otherwise of the theory started by Modigliani and Miller. The theorem hinges on the principle of perfect capital markets. This asserts that firm value is completely independent of how its productive assets are financed. Subsequent researches have suggested a relationship between choice of financing and firm value even though some researchers corroborated the findings of Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory ([26] Fama, 1974; [54] Pruitt and Gitman, 1991). However, studiesby [5] Anderson (1983), [53] Peterson and Benesh (1983) have proved that in the "real world" market imperfections effectively prohibit the independence of firm's investment and financing decisions. This market imperfection is primarily coming from the fact that there are taxes, transaction cost, information asymmetry, and bankruptcy cost. This indicates a relationship between the choice of financing and firm value.Financial leverage is said to play an important role in reducing agency costs arising from shareholder-manager conflict and is believed to play a vital role of monitoring managers ([39] Jensen and Meckling, 1976; [37] Jensen, 1986; [60] Stulz, 1988). [28] Farinha (2003) contends that debt is likely to influence dividend decisions because of debt covenants and related restrictions that may be imposed by debtholders. Also, firms with high financial leverage and implied financial risk tend to avoid paying high dividends, so they can accommodate risk associated with the use of debt finance. [56] Rozeff (1982), [25] Easterbrook (1984) and [22] Collins et al. (1996) extending the agency theory observe that firms pay dividend and raise capital simultaneously. In the view of [25] Easterbrook (1984), increasing dividends raises the probability that additional capital will have to be raised externally on a periodic basis. This view is also shared by [31] Green et al. (1993) who argue that dividend payout levels are not totally decided after a firm's financing has been made. [35] Higgins (1972) suggests that firms' dividend payout ratio could be negatively influenced by their need for finance. Thus, dividend decision is taken alongside financing decisions. [36] Higgins (1981) shows a direct link between growth and financing needs, in that rapidly growing firms have external financing need because working capital needs normally exceed the incremental cash flows from new sales. [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003) support the fact that financial constraints can affect dividend decisions, therefore, firms with relatively less debt have greater financial slack and are more likely to pay and maintain their dividends.3. Data and econometric method3.1 Data and variable constructionThis study examines the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on the dividend payout policy of emerging market firms. Our dataset is composed of accounting and market data for a large sample of publicly traded firms in 34 emerging market countries over the period 1990-2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. This information is obtained through the Corporate Vulnerability Utility of the International Monetary Fund. The corporate vulnerability utility provides indicators for surveillance of the corporate sector and it relies on accounting data from Worldscope and market data mainly from Datastream.The dependent variable, dividend payout is defined as the ratio of dividend to capital. Dividend is total cash dividend paid to equity and preferred shareholders. The independent variables include investment opportunity set and corporate finance. We also control for profitability, risk, market capitalization, and two other macroeconomic variables: inflation rate and log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of the country's income level.In terms of the independent variables, Tobin's q is used as a proxy for investment opportunity set. Three measures of corporate finance are used. These are; financial leverage (the ratio of debt to equity), external finance (the ratio of external finance to total finance), and debt maturity (the ratio of short-term debt to total debt).In terms of the control variables, profitability is measured as return on assets. Profitability is considered as the primary indicator of the firm's capacity to declare and pay dividends. [11] Baker et al. (1985) find that a major determinant of dividend payment is the anticipated level of future earnings. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) also report that current and past years' profits are important in influencing dividend payments. Others such as [38] Jensen et al. (1992), [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), and [4] Amidu and Abor (2006) find evidence of a positive association betweenprofitability and dividend payouts. [10] Baker (1989) finds that an important reason cited by firms for not paying dividends is "poor earnings". Similarly, [23] DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that a significant proportion of firms with losses over a five year period, tend to omit their dividends entirely. A positive relationship should exist between profitability and dividend payout.Risk is defined using the O-Score, which is a measure of probability of default. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) find that risk is a major determinant of firms' dividend policy. Firms which have higher risk profiles are more likely to maintain lower dividend payout policy compared with those with lower risk profiles. Using ßvalue of a firm as a measure of its market risk, [56] Rozeff (1982), [44] Lloyd et al. (1985), and [22] Collins et al. (1996) found a significantly negative relationship between ßand dividend payout. Their findings suggest that firms having a higher level of market risk will pursue lower dividend payout policy. [24] D'Souza (1999) also suggests that risk is significantly and negatively related with firms' dividend payout. We expect risk to be negatively related to dividend payout.We control for size of the market. This is defined as ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Size of the market is used as a proxy for capital market access. Firms with better access to the capital market should be able to pay higher dividends ([6] Aivazian and Booth, 2003). It is expected that a positive relationship will exist between market capitalization and dividend payout policy.We also control for two macroeconomic variables: inflation and GDP per capita. Inflation is the inflation rate. GDP per capita is log of GDP per capita and is included as a measure of the country's income level.3.2 Model specificationWe estimate the following panel data regression model: Equation 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where subscript i and t represent the country and time, respectively. Y is a measure of dividend payout. Invt is a measure of investment opportunity set. Fin are measures of corporate finance variables including, financialleverage, external finance, and debt maturity. X are the control variables and include profitability, risk, stock market capitalization, inflation, and GDP per capita. μ is the error term. Using this model, it is possible to investigate the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.3.3 Estimation issuesThis study adopts a panel data method given that it allows for broader set of data points. Therefore, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. Also, panel data can control for individual heterogeneity due to hidden factors, which, if neglected in time-series or cross section estimations leads to biased results ([9] Baltagi, 2005). The panel regression equation differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The general form of the model can be written as: Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where α is a scalar, ßis KX 1 and X it is the it th observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that the μit follow a one-way error component model: Equation 3 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where μi is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The term V it represents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual countries and time. It can be thought of as the usual disturbance in the regression. The choice of the model estimation whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on the underlying assumptions. In a random effect model, μi and V it are random with known disturbances. In the fixed effects model, the μi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with V it independent and identically distributed, i.e. νit∼iid (0,σν2 ). The explanatory variables X it are assumed independent of the V it for all i and t . We use the [62] Hausman (1978) specification test in choosing the appropriate model. We report the results of the Hausman specification test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.].4. Empirical results4.1 Descriptive statisticsTable I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The sample covers 34 emerging countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. It reports the mean and standard deviation of all the variables used in the study as well as the number of observations over the sample period. The mean value for the dependent variable (dividend payout) is 0.32, implying that across the sample countries the average dividend payout is 32 percent. There is, however, a variation in the dependent variable across the countries over the time period as shown by standard deviation of 0.49 with a minimum and maximum dividend payout of 0.00 and 3.93, respectively.The mean investment opportunity set measured by the Tobin's q is 1.05 with a variation of 0.52. All the countries have positive investment opportunities with minimum and maximum values of 0.06 and 5.01, respectively. Financial leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio has a mean value of 1.17 and has a standard deviation of 127.58. External finance registers an average value of -0.01 over the period with a standard deviation of 5.27. Debt maturity has a mean figure of 0.58, indicating that short-term debt accounts for 58 percent of total debt. Profitability defined in terms of return on assets also registers an average value of 6.66 percent. The standard deviation is also shown as 5.37. Risk shows a mean value of -3.37. Stock market capitalization to GDP has a mean value of 49.74 percent. The minimum and maximum values for this variable are 0.00 and 528.49, respectively, with a variation of 66.52. The average inflation rate and GDP per capita are 2.61 and 8.04 percent, respectively (Figure 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).4.2 Correlation analysisWe test for possible degree of multi-collinearity among the regressors by including a correlation matrix of the variables in Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. Dividend payout shows significantly positive correlations with debt maturity, profitability, and GDP per capita. Investment opportunity set exhibits significantly negative correlations with financial leverage, inflation, and GDP per capita, but shows significantly positive correlations with external finance, debt maturity, profitability,and market capitalization. There is a significant but negative correlation between financial leverage and profitability and a positive correlation between financial leverage and risk. External finance shows significant and positive correlations with profitability and inflation but a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Debt maturity is significantly and negatively correlated with GDP per capita. There are significant and negative correlations between profitability and risk, market capitalization, as well as GDP per capita. However, we found positive correlation between profitability and inflation. There are statistically and significant positive correlations between risk and market capitalization, and GDP per capita. Market capitalization is also positively correlated with GDP per capita. Overall, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multi-collinearity is not a potential problem in the regression models.4.3 Panel regression resultsBoth fixed and random effects specifications of the model were estimated. After which the [62] Hausman (1978) test was conducted to determine the appropriate specification. We report the results of the Hausman test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. The test statistics are all significant at 1 percent, implying that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects. The Hausman specification test suggests we reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients are not systematic.The results indicate a statistically significant but negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout ratio. It could be inferred that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to exhibit low dividend payout ratio. In other words, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to pursue a low dividend payout ratio since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources. Paying low dividends means that such firms could retain enough funds to finance their future growth and investments.[29] Gaver and Gaver (1993) note that firms with high growth potential or investment opportunity set are expected to pay low dividends, since investment and dividends are。

金融英语文献选读

金融英语文献选读名词翻译（英汉互译）填空CloseAnswer the question翻译60%英译汉改写句子写信In short,continued reform efforts will result in greater openness of the banking sector,integrated financial markets,increased diversification of banking institutions,strengthened competition,and improved efficiency of resource allocation.(汉译英)P9总之，继续的改革会引起银行业更大程度的开放、金融市场的一体化、增加金融机构的多样化、加强竞争，提高资源的优化配置。

证券业监管的目标是，保护投资者，确保市场的公正性、效率和透明度，降低系统风险regulation goal of the Securities sector is to protect investors,ensure the fairness,efficiency and transparency of the market,reduce the system risk.股票是公司所有权的凭证，债券是债务的书面证明。

Shares are certificates or book entries representing ownership in a corporation or similar entity.Bonds are written evidence of debts.除了传统的存贷业务外，商业银行还提供广泛的中介服务，如国际结算、银行卡、个人金融服务、金融咨询服务等。

Apart from the traditional deposit taking and lending business,commercial banks now offer a broad range of intermediary services such as international settlement,bankcards,personal banking,and financial consulting.Key words:IPO Initial Public Offering首次公开发行OTC Over-the-Counter柜台交易/场外交易GEM Growth Enterprise Market创业板市场SHSE Shanghai Stock Exchange上交所SZSE Shenzhen Stock Exchange深交所CFFEX China Financial Futures Exchange中国金融期货交易所CBRC China Banking Regulatory Commission中国银行业监督管理委员会CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission证监会CIRC China Insurance Regulatory Commission保监会WTO World Trade Organization世界贸易组织IMF International Monetary Fund国际货币基金组织Basel Accord巴塞尔协议PBC People’s Bank of China 中国人民银行ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China中国工商银行ABC Agricultural Bank of China中国农业银行BOC Bank of China中国银行CCB China Construction Bank中国建设银行NPLs Non-performing loans不良贷款CAR capital adequacy ratio资本充足率T-bond国债repo回购ETF Exchange Traded Fund交易所买卖基金LOF Listed Open-ended Fund上市开放式基金•金融机构，金融工具，金融体系，金融中介Financial Institutions,Financial Instruments,Financial System,Financial Intermediation•实体经济，计划经济，改革开放Real Economic,Planned Economic,Reform and Opening up to the outside world•金融资源的有效配置Efficiency allocation of the financial resources•经济的一体化和全球化integration and globalization of the economy•中央银行维持金融稳定的能力The central bank’s capacity for maintaining financial stability•专业银行，国有银行，股份制商业银行，政策性银行，农村信用合作社Specialized banks,State-owned banks,Jointed-equity banks,Policy banks,Rural credit cooperatives•制定和执行货币政策，反洗钱，金融监管Formulate&implement monetary policy,combat money laundering activities,Financial regulation•银行业与证券业、保险业分业（分离）The segregation of banking business from securities and insurance business•1994年汇率并轨，经常项目自由可兑换The unification of the Renminbi(RMB)exchange rates in1994,RMB current account convertibility•房地产和股市的过热Overheating in the real estate sector and the stock market•上市公司，国有企业Listing company,State-owned enterprises•承担、防范、化解、分散风险•Undertake,guard against,dissolve and spread risks•公司治理，所有权结构，董事会，监事会Corporate governance,ownership structure,Board of directors,Board of Supervisors•内控，自律，信息披露,存款保险制度Internal controls,self-discipline,information disclosure,deposit insurance system•不良贷款，资本充足率，全能型银行，个人银行业Non-performing loans(NPLS),Capital adequacy,universal banking,Personal banking business•进一步的利率市场化，汇率弹性加大Further rate liberalization,greater exchange rate flexibility实盘外汇买卖业务Segregation of financial industry存款准备金率reserve requirement ratio(RRR)Paid-in capital,（实收资本）retained earnings（留存利润）,Balance sheet（资产负债表）,profit and loss statement（损益表/利润表）audited financial statement covering the previous3years（经过审计的包含过去3年财务状况的报表）•extend/make/grant....Loan/credit•Take risk（承担风险），spread risk（分散风险）,•Credit worthiness/position/ability/standing（信誉状况）,financial position（财务状况）•Evaluate/evaluation,（评估），assess/assessment（评定）•Promissory note（本票）,banker’s acceptance（银行承兑）,•pay on maturity，Overdraft（透支，透支额）•Terms and conditions,（条款）评估风险Assessment of risk达成协议，成交，达成合约come to an agreement违约风险，Default risk利差interest margin应收账款receivables，应付账款payableModern central banking dates back to the aftermath of great depression of ernments,led by the economic thinking of the great John Maynard Keynes,realized that collapsing money supply and credit availability contributed to the savagery of this depression.This realization that money supply affected economicactivity led to active government attempts to influence money supply through“monetary policy”.At this time, nations created central banks to establish“monetary authority”.This meant that rather than accepting whatever happened to money supply,they would actively try to influence the amount of money available.This would influence credit creation and the overall level of economic activity.P14现代中央银行要追溯到20实际30年代的大萧条余波。

40本顶级经典金融学书籍英文版

40本顶级经典⾦融学书籍英⽂版40本顶级经典⾦融学书籍英⽂版⼀、经典中的经典！1、⾦融学，兹威博迪，罗伯特莫顿（中⽂版）2、Asset Pricing 2005，John H. Cochrane3、Dynamic Asset Pricing ,Duffie4、Continuous-Time Finance Robert C. Merton⼆、固定收益1、Interest Rate- Models Theory and Practice (2nd Edition),Damiano Brigo ·Fabio Mercurio2、The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities 7thE,Frank J. Fabozzi三、投资学Investments--Bodie, Kane, Marcus 5ed四、⾦融⼯程和数量⾦融1、Principle of financial engineering，Salih N. Neftci2、FINANCIAL ENGINEERING AND COMPUTATION,YUH-DAUH LYUU3、Introduction to the Economics and Mathematics of Financial Markets,Jakˇsa Cvitani´c and Fernando Zapatero4、A Benchmark of quantative finace,Eckhard Platen5、Dynamic Structure Modeling,SANJAY K. NAWALKHA6、Numerical Methods for Finance,Jhon A.D.Appleby五、公司财务与兼并收购1、Corporate Fiance 6e,Ross?Westerfield?Jaffe2、Corporate Finance-theory practice，Pascal Quiry Maurizio Dallocchio Yann Le Fur Antonio Salvi3、The Theory of Corporate Finance，Jean Tirole4、Handbook of Corporate Finance1,WILLIAM T. ZIEMBA5、Handbook of Corporate Finance2,WILLIAM T. ZIEMBA6、Principles of Corporate Finance, Seventh Edition,Brealey?Meyers7、Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring,PATRICK A. GAUGHAN8、Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring,Chandrashekar Krishnamurti Vishwanath S.R.六、⾦融市场、机构和货币经济学1、The economics of money,banking and financial markets,Mishkin2、Monetary Economics,Jagdish Handa3、Monetary Theory and Policy，Carl E. Walsh4、Financial Markets and Institutions 5e,Peter Howells and Keith Bain5、Handbook of Finance Financial Markets and Instruments - (2008),Frank J. Fabozzi6、Microeconomics of Banking 2e,Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet七、国际⾦融和汇率1、The Economics of Exchange Rates,Lucio Sarno2、Handbook of International Banking 2003,Andrew W. Mullineux3、International Finance--Putting Theory Into Practice,Piet Sercu⼋、⾏为⾦融Advances in Behavioral Finance,Richard H. Thaler12⽉16⽇更新UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES,FRANKLIN ALLEN Understanding International Bank Risk,Andrew Fight 1Frequently Asked Questions in Quantitative Finance(Wilmott)2Paul Wilmott Introduces Quantitative Finance,Paul Wilmott Fixed Income Analysis 2ndE Frank J. FabozziFixed Income Markets and Their Derivatives,Suresh Sundaresan subprime mortigage credit derivatives Principles of Financial Economics,Stephen F. LeRoyFinancial risk manager handbook,PHILIPPE JORIONMeasuring Market Risk,Kevin Dowd。

金融论文英语参考文献（参考）

金融论文英语参考文献‎金融论文英语参考文‎献‎[1] nelson‎, c. r. &a‎m p; siegel‎, a. f. pa‎r simonious‎modeling ‎o f yield c‎u rves [j],‎journal o‎f business‎1987(4‎): 473489.‎[2] di‎e bold，fran‎c is x and ‎l i, canlin‎..global y‎i eld curve‎dynamics ‎a nd intera‎c tions: ad‎y namic nel‎s on-siegel‎approach[‎j],journal‎of econom‎e trics,XX，‎10:351-363‎[3] bl‎i ss, r. r.‎.testing ‎t erm struc‎t ure estim‎a tion meth‎o ds [j]. a‎d vances in‎futures a‎n d options‎research,‎1997，9:19‎7-231 [‎4] tanner,‎e.，exchan‎g e market ‎p ressures ‎a nd moneta‎r y policy:‎asia and ‎l atin amer‎i ca in the‎1990s [c]‎5working ‎p apers, im‎f,XX.[‎5] so, r. ‎w., price ‎a nd volati‎l ity spill‎o vers betw‎e en intere‎s t rate an‎d exchange‎value of ‎t he us dol‎l ar[j], gl‎o bal finan‎c e journal‎,XX(1)‎:95-107‎ [6] y.sa‎h alia. tes‎t ing conti‎n uous-time‎models of‎the spot ‎i nterest r‎a te [j], r‎e view of f‎i nancial s‎t udies. 19‎96，9:385-4‎26[7] ‎v asicek 0,‎f ong h g t‎e rm struct‎u re modeli‎n g usinge‎x ponential‎splines. ‎j ournal of‎finance[j‎], 1982，37‎:339-348‎ [8] duff‎l e，d. and ‎r. kan. a ‎y ield fact‎o r model o‎f interest‎rates[j]，‎m athematic‎a l finance‎, 1. 1996，‎6: 379-406‎[9] ai‎t sahalia,y‎and r. ki‎m mel. esti‎m ating aff‎i nemultif‎a ctor term‎structure‎models us‎i ng closed‎-form like‎l ihood exp‎a nsions[c]‎? working‎paper,nbe‎r,XX.[‎10] engle，‎r obert e a‎u toregress‎i ve condit‎i onalhete‎r oscedasti‎c ity with ‎e stimates ‎o f the var‎i ance of u‎. k inflat‎i on[j]. ec‎o nomica,19‎82，50:9871‎008[10‎]chen，r.-r‎., and l. ‎s cott maxi‎m um likeli‎h ood estim‎a tionfor ‎a multi-fa‎c tor equil‎i brium mod‎e l of the ‎t erm struc‎t ure of in‎t erest rat‎e s,. journ‎a l of fixe‎d ine, dec‎e mber, 199‎3，12: 14-3‎1 .[11‎]vasicek ‎o. an equi‎l ibrium ch‎a racteriza‎t ion of th‎e term str‎u cture [j]‎? journal‎of financ‎i al econom‎i cs,1977，‎5:177-188.‎[12] j‎.c. cox, ‎j. e. inge‎r soll，s. a‎.ross. a ‎t heory of ‎t he term s‎t ructure o‎f interest‎rates [j]‎.economet‎r ica, 1985‎,53：‎385-407‎[13] edmu‎n d m. a. k‎w aw and ye‎n, resolvi‎n g economi‎c conflict‎between t‎h e united ‎s tates and‎japan[m] ‎. massachu‎s ettsinst‎i tute of t‎e chnolog. ‎1997: 189-‎220.[1‎4] swanson‎，r.，rogoff‎，k.was it ‎r eal the e‎x changera‎t e-interes‎t differen‎t ial relat‎i on over t‎h e modern ‎f loating p‎e riod[j] j‎o urnal of ‎f inance, 1‎988，43: 35‎9-382[‎15] chan, ‎k.，chan, k‎.c.k karol‎y i, a.,int‎r aday vola‎t ility in ‎t he stock ‎i ndex and ‎s tock inde‎x futures ‎m arkets [j‎]review o‎f financia‎l studies ‎1991(4‎) : 657-68‎4.[16]‎kutan, j.‎and s. zh‎o u，\mean r‎e version o‎f interest‎rates in ‎t he eurocu‎r rency mar‎k et[j], ox‎f ord bulle‎t in of eco‎n omics and‎statistic‎s,XX，63: 4‎59-473.‎。

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公司金融经典文献必读目录（契约理论部分）
编者：周业安
中国人民大学经济学院 2005年3月7日
一、基本文献——MM定理：
1、Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller (1958), “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, an of Investment,” American Economic Review 48: 261-297. 中译本参见卢俊（2003）《资本结构理论研究译文三联书店，上海人民出版社，ISBN 7-208-04705-7。

第1－51页。

2、Miller, Merton H. (1977), “Debt and Taxes,” Journal of Finance 32: 261-275.中译本参见卢俊（2－290页。

3、Miller, Merton H. (1988), “The M-M Proposition s After 30 Years,” Journal of Economic Perspective （见电子版）
二、基本文献——代理理论：
1、Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and O Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. 中译本参见卢俊（2003）第184－265页。

2、Jensen, Michael C. (1986), “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” American Econom 323-329. （见电子版）
三、基本文献——信息不对称模型：
1、Ross, Stephen A., 1977, “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling App Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.8(1), pp:23-40.参见电子版。

2、Myers, Stewart C. (1984), “The Capital Structure Puzzle,” Journal of Finance 39: 575-592. 中译本参见卢俊（2003）页。

3、Myers, Stewart C. and N. Majluf (1984), “Co rporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Informa Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-222. 参见Michael J. Brennan, 1996, The Theory Finance, Vol.1，An Elgar Reference Collection. 第207－241页。

四、基本文献——完全合同模型：
1、Townsend, R. M. 1979. “Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification”.Journal of Econo 265-93. 参见电子版。

2、Gale, D. and M. Hellwig 1985. “Incentive compatible debt contracts: the one-period problem”.Review of Economic Studies52:647-63. 参见电子版。

五、经验实证：
1、Fama, E., and K. French 2002. Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and debt, Review of F Studies 15, 1-33. 参见电子版。

2、Graham, J., Harvey, C. 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field. Journal of Finan Economics 60, 187-243. 参见电子版。

3、Murray Z. Frank and Vidhan K. Goyal，2004. Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are Reliably Important? Sa Business, University of British Columbia, Working paper. 参见电子版。

六、基本文献——不完全合同模型：
1、哈特，1998，《企业、合同与财务结构》，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，中译本， ISBN 7-208－02823－
2、Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, 1986, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Journal of Political Economy, 94:691-719. 也可以在Foss编的论文集中找到。

Nicolai J. Foss(ed.), 2000, The Theory Vol. III, London and New York: Routledge.第63－89页。

3、Aghion, P. and P. Bolton. “ An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting”. Revie w of Economic Studies ,1992(59):473-94.。

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