Religious Offences and Liberal Politics:
From the Religious Settlements to Multi-Cultural Society
Ian Hunter
Draft paper, not for citing.
Introduction
In this paper I will argue that some of the key features associated with modern liberal political orders — particularly in the areas of religious toleration and cultural pluralism — are the result of specific political and legal arrangements arrived at by European states in order to contain religious civil war at the end of the seventeenth century. As such, liberal political and legal regimes contain features which are irreducible to their main modern forms of philosophical justification, some indeed which conflict with such justifications. One can of course respond to this state of affairs by declaring the actual historical arrangements to be merely factual or “non-ideal” in relation to the normative or ideal domain of political or moral philosophy. To do this, however, is to risk overlooking the normative dimensions of the historical arrangements themselves — in this case the early modern religious settlements. But it is also to risk a kind of philosopher’s self-delusion, in which it is imagined that political norms arrived at through rational introspection have an intrinsic moral force, regardless of their capacity to engage the historical political-legal order and the personae engaged in its day-to-day operations. This paper explores the contrary course. It offers a sketch of the political and legal order established by some of the early modern religious settlements, and then argues its salience for understanding the character of multi-religious and multi-cultural governance in certain modern liberal states, with particular reference to such religious offences as sacrilege and blasphemy.
The post-Kantian political philosophies developed by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas can be cited in passing as prime examples of modern philosophies that fail to engage the political and legal orders arising from the early modern settlements, except to declare them in need of philosophical reconstruction or historical supersession. Rawls and Habermas are not topics of discussion in the present paper, and they are mentioned here only to illustrate the gap between modern justifications for liberal-democratic politics and the forms in which liberal political orders first emerged from the settlements that brought an end to religious civil war at the end of the seventeenth century. Despite important differences in method, Rawls and Habermas both assume that the heart of liberalism lies in justice, understood in terms of principles of political and social rights grounded in the rational consent of democratic citizens. On this view, the political and legal arrangements imposed by early liberal orders — toleration measures, church-state separation — will not be properly legitimate until they have been freely chosen by rational individuals who will see them as necessary for their own exercise of reason (Forst 2003). Yet, as Raymond Geuss has pointed out, the central norm of much early modern political thought was not justice but security or social peace (Geuss 2002). Further, many early architects of religious toleration regarded the notion of a single universal reason not as the foundation but as a threat to the cultural pluralism required for toleration, which they sought to ground in a suitably de-confessionalised political and legal regime, regardless of whether this was democratic (Hunter 2004; Thomasius 2004).
If modern philosophical liberalism is significantly disengaged from the historical architecture of toleration and pluralism, however, then its communitarian critics are even more so. This is because they take Rawls at his word and assume that he is indeed the philosophical architect of the liberal political order, so that in attacking his philosophical discourse they are attacking something called liberalism. Catholic and Communitarian philosophers have thus taken it on themselves to attack something called liberal individualism, by treating this the unfortunate product of the fracturing of communal moral identity during the Reformation (MacIntyre 1981). They have also criticised the supposed rational neutrality of the liberal conception of justice, in particular its attempt to ground religious freedom in the exercise of free rational choice, rather than in the right to pursue a substantive good characteristic of a group moral identity (Sandel 1998; Galeotti
1999). And finally they have attacked the presumed neutrality of key aspects of the liberal order itself, specifically the separation of church and state, arguing that this is simply a disguised moral commitment similar to the commitment to theocracy, and that only full democracy can resolve the question of which commitment should determine the political order (Bader 1999). If, however, the emergent liberal order was not grounded in a conception of justice — Kantian or Aristotelian — then much of the communitarian critique of liberalism is beside the point, regardless of its standing as a critique of Rawls. Further, if security and social peace did indeed play a key role in motivating and justifying liberal arrangements for toleration and the separation of church and state, then it is idle to attack early liberalism for lacking substantive norms, even if these norms are not those of a moral community, are quite unlike Aristotelian conceptions of an inherent moral telos, and could not possibly have been arrived at through democratic deliberation.
The reason that early liberalism looks so unlike that which Rawls defends and the communitarians attack is that it was not based in a set of arguments about the nature of human reason and morality. Rather, it was based in a set of political and legal measures designed to address a particular historical situation characteristic of central and western European states during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. This situation was that of religious civil war in France and England, and, in the German Empire, a mix of two kinds of religious war, civil and inter-state. In what follows, it is argued that the key elements of early liberalism — varying degrees of toleration and church-state separation — formed part of the religious settlements that brought these wars to an end, a symptom of which was the increasing redundancy of such religious crimes as heresy, witchcraft and blasphemy. These settlements, it is argued, laid down the central cultural, political and legal protocols for the liberal governance of multi-religious societies. And if we are to understand the role of these protocols in the governance of emerging multi-cultural societies, then we must attend to their historical gravity and force, rather than to their philosophical defence or critique. To do this, I will begin by briefly looking at the context in which religious offences operated in pre-liberal confessional states, then sketch the manner in which such offences were displaced by the terms of the religious settlements, before concluding by looking at recent discussion of the crime of blasphemy in the context of multi-cultural societies.
Religious Offences and the Sacral State
Throughout the medieval and early modern period, European Christianity was more than just a spiritual locus. It was a formidable earthly force. It exercised direct political and juridical power through an archipelago of armed prince-bishops, the diocesan structure being in fact the footprints left by Christian warriors as the made their way across Europe, stamping out ‘paganism’ in the early middle ages (Bartlett 1993: 5-23). And it exercised indirect power through secular princes, who enforced the law of the most powerful prince-bishop — the bishop of Rome — as part of their exercise of lordship (Padoa-Schioppa 1997). Under these circumstances, where there was no clear distinction between the religious and political community or between the Christian and the citizen, religious offences were at once spiritual transgressions and a judicial felonies, attracting severe criminal punishment.
We can suggest, then, that such sacrilegious offences as heresy, witchcraft and blasphemy emerged as sins and crimes in Western Europe as the result of a particular set of cultural and political circumstances: broadly, those of a transcendent sacralising religion exercising overwhelming political and juridical powers, both through its own authority and that of the secular prince or emperor. There are two broad factors to take into account. In the first place, as the obverse of the sacred, sacrilege was a powerful and authentic expression of core Christian sacramental practices, finding expression in both popular devotion and elite theological speculation. A common focus was provided by those earthly things held to be bearers of the transcendent divinity — the church and within the church the Eucharistic host — which, as the most sacred and beneficial of things, were also the most vulnerable to profanation and degradation. Thus, in many parts of late-medieval Europe, as the magical source of God’s blessing on the community, the host was paraded through the village and fields in early spring to ensure a good harvest (Baur 1992). Concomitantly, the allegation of sacrilegious profanation of the host was the routine way of triggering murderous Christian pogroms against local Jewish communities, non-believers whose polluting proximity to the circle of communicants threatened communication with God (Nirenberg 1996).
Second, if sacrilege was deeply rooted in sacramental religious practice, then during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it underwent a major elaboration and
codification in canon law, where it was linked to heresy, blasphemy and witchcraft. This was the time at which the university canonists of Northern Italy developed a common legal process for dealing with this array of crimes; a process that could be initiated by denunciation, deployed oaths of veridiction, permitted the regulated use of torture to obtain evidence, denied appeal, and could result in the death sentence (Trusen 1992). The extension of canon and Roman law across Western Europe during this period resulted in a centralised system of legal authority, permitting the papacy to exert religious and civil jurisdiction via local clerical and secular authorities (Padoa-Schioppa 1997). Sacrilege thus came to be prosecuted in a much more systematic manner and, because of its linkage to heresy, blasphemy and witchcraft, participated in a cross-referring nexus of religious criminality. Heretics were thus routinely denounced as sacrilegious, their guilt being proved by the fact that they performed mock masses, feasted on Eucharistic wafers, broke crucifixes, declared Jesus to be a fraud, and so on. And those on trial for sacrilege were routinely denounced as heretics, their profane acts being indicative of their secret adherence to erroneous and ungodly beliefs.
The presence of sacrilegious religious offences in early modern Europe was thus symptomatic of a tightly woven and far-flung matrix of sacramental practices, juridical procedures, and authority structures, anchored ecclesiastically in the papacy and politically in the Holy Roman Empire. Despite the relative civil autonomy of the Northern Italian city states, elsewhere in Europe this matrix resulted in a virtual super-imposition of the sacramental community on the civil community. Threats to the sacramental community resulting from sacrilege, heresy and blasphemy, once proved by the ecclesiastical courts, were subject to the harshest of punishments by the civil authorities. Conversely, threats to civil authority were themselves treated as analogous to sacrilege against the sacred person of the prince, who was God’s viceroy on earth (Kantorowicz 1957). It is this very superimposition of the sacramental and civil communities, however, that explains the intensity and uncontrollability of the religious-political conflicts that followed from the splitting of the church at the beginning of the 16th century. For once the heresy that would become the Protestant church had escaped the juridical and political machinery designed to contain such outbreaks, Protestant
princes immediately used this machinery to defend their religion against the Roman church and against rival Protestant churches and sects.
Given that faith communities were demarcated by the border between the sacred and the profane — between true believers and the heretical monsters — the civil conflicts that erupted across Europe assumed a specifically religious intensity, as those one sought to exterminate were not just political enemies but polluting threats to the sacramental community and its capacity to communicate with God (Crouzet 1990). Further, this sacramental violence was made all the more difficult to control by the fact that the new religion differed from the old both in its construction of the sacred and therefore in its sense of sacrilege. The Calvinists in particular stressed the transcendence and inscrutability of God, rejecting the notion of real presence in the Eucharist, and regarding other forms of Catholic immanentism — rituals, processions, pilgrimages, relics — as sacrilegious idolatry, making sacrilege itself into a flashpoint for sacramental violence. In June 1528, for example, the first act of Calvinist iconoclasm in Paris — the vandalising of an image of the Virgin — was answered by an act of Catholic ritual cleansing, as all parishes and the university organised processions to atone for this sacrilege (Ramsey 1999: 8). Ritual burnings, disembowelments, and massacres were soon to follow, as France descended in a series of religious civil wars in which both sides viewed the extermination of the other as necessary for cleansing a spiritual pollution and restoring the purity of the sacramental community.
At the same time, however, the very ferocity of this violence, which threatened the survival of the state itself, led Bodin and the politiques to make the first attempts to separate religious and political community, by developing a secular conception of sovereignty. We can see this in terms with which the Chancellor Michel de L’H?pital addressed a peace colloquium during the first war of religion in 1562:
It is not a question of establishing the faith, but of regulating the state. It is
possible to be a citizen without being a Christian. You do not cease to be a
subject of the King when you separate from the Church. We can live in
peace with those who do not observe the same ceremonies. (L'H?pital
1824-5: I, 425)
In fact Chancellor L’H?pital’s words proved to be in vain in the French context, as France would eventually solve the problem of religious conflict by suppressing then eliminating the French Calvinists or Huguenots. Nonetheless, they pointed forward to a profound change — the uncoupling of political governance from Christianity spirituality — which would radically transform the character of the sacred and of sacrilege.
The Spiritualising of Religion and the Desacralising of Law and Politics
During the 17th century France, England, and the German Empire were all faced with the same set of problems: how to achieve religious peace and how to establish stable rule in territories containing bitterly divided religious communities. The measures that evolved to meet these problems — religious toleration being just the tip of the iceberg — would alter the disposition of the sacred and lead to the sidelining of sacrilege (together with heresy and, eventually, blasphemy) within an increasingly autonomous civil domain. Unfortunately for the historian, these developments differed significantly both within the German Empire and between England and France, so that there is no typical case. In order to keep my exposition manageable, I will thus focus on developments in the German states — Brandenburg-Prussia in particular — making do with just a few comparative remarks on England and France, acknowledging upfront the element of historical bias thus introduced.
The developments that saw the institution of religious peace within the German Empire were piecemeal, protracted, and never fully successful. Nonetheless, we can detect a pattern of development in the century that separated the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and the more permanent Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In bringing an end to the Thirty Years War, Westphalia declared that henceforth all three main confessions — Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism — would be recognised and tolerated under imperial law, albeit within the limits of a complex set of arrangements intended to stabilise a particular distribution of religious communities both within and between states. In his account of this multiplex process, the German historian of church law, Martin Heckel, points to a number of key elements: the relegation of theology in favour of European public law as the key discourse in the peace negotiations; the gradual acceptance of the permanence of heresy by leading negotiators, even if the churches
would have none of this; and, most important of all, the dropping of religious truth as a criterion for peace in the great treaties, and its replacement by a quite different kind of norm for legitimacy: namely, the attainment of social peace (Heckel 1989; Heckel 1992). In making social peace the prime duty of the sovereign — as opposed to defending the faith or enforcing religious law as God’s earthly viceroy — these developments led to a profound secularisation of the political domain. Yet, as Heckel has argued, this was not a secularisation driven by some all-embracing secularist philosophy (in the manner of the French philosophes), but one carried forward by many anonymous jurists and statesmen who remained devoted Christians (Heckel 1984). Far from attempting to expunge Christianity, their prime objective was to secure the survival of their own confessions in the face of wholesale religious slaughter. Yet they gradually accepted that for this to happen it would be necessary to separate the church’s pursuit of salvation from the state’s aim of worldly security.
In the case of post-Westphalian Brandenburg-Prussia, this led to a profound dual transformation of the religious and political landscape. On the one hand, there was remarkable desacralisation of politics, as jurisconsults and political philosophers attached to the court began to reconstruct the objectives of the state in quasi-Hobbesian terms; that is, in terms of maintaining external and internal security while eschewing all higher-level religious and moral aims. On the other hand, there was a no less remarkable spiritualisation of religion, as the Pietists aided by important lay theologians attempted to undermine the whole idea of religious orthodoxy — that is, the idea that salvation was tied to a particular set of theological doctrines and sacramental practices — arguing instead that salvation came instead from a purely personal inner relation to God.
The manner in which this dual desacralisation of politics and spiritualisation of religion transformed the prior construction of sacrilege, heresy, and witchcraft can be seen in the writings of Christian Thomasius, professor of law at the University of Halle in the late 17th century, lay theologian, and jurisconsult to the Brandenburg-Prussian court. In his works attacking the legal prosecution of heresy, witchcraft and sacrilege, Thomasius argued along two convergent paths. First, in keeping with his Epicurean form of Protestantism, Thomasius attacked what he called the visible church, understood as a public institution whose doctrines and rituals are necessary for salvation, arguing instead
that the true church is invisible, known by no outward doctrinal or liturgical signs, with its members permanently scattered across the globe. This was in effect an attempt to detach salvation from the church, and it removed the theological grounds of heresy and sacrilege by (in effect) denying that God was mediated by specific sacred doctrines or by sacred rituals in holy places (Thomasius 1705). Second, in keeping with the quasi-Hobbesian conception of politics which he had learned from his mentor Samuel Pufendorf, Thomasius argued that the state had no religious objectives and must be restricted to the ends of maintaining domestic peace and external security (Thomasius 1701; Thomasius 1705). For this reason, there should be no laws against sacrilege, heresy and witchcraft as such, unless the actions associated with them gave rise to violence or civil disorder, in which case they would be punished for that reason, and not because they profaned the community of the faithful (Thomasius 1701).
Unlike his more famous contemporary John Locke, Thomasius did not base his arguments for toleration on the philosophical notion of natural rights, but on the dual imperatives to spiritualise religion and desacralise the state, whose overarching goal was not personal liberty but the stable governance of multi-confessional societies (Dreitzel 1997). More generally, we can say that Thomasius’s Epicurean Christianity and Hobbesian politics were held together not by a philosophical doctrine grounded in human reason, but by a cultural-political strategy designed to address a particular set of circumstances. We gain a good insight into the character of this strategy via the key use Thomasius makes of the category of adiaphora (Thomasius 1705). Adiaphora refers to things neither commanded nor forbidden by God, hence morally indifferent in the sense of being irrelevant to salvation. As the result of his highly personalist Epicurean style of Christianity, Thomasius declared virtually the entirety of the visible church — all of its liturgies, sacraments and theological doctrines — to be morally indifferent with regards to salvation. On the one hand, this meant that forms of worship were a matter of “Christian freedom”, to be left to the disposition of individuals or groups to the extent that they posed no threat to social peace. On the other hand, it also meant that should any form of worship pose a threat to public peace then, as something morally indifferent, it was legitimately subject to the civil sovereign, who had absolute authority over all matters capable of threatening public order. The object of this dual strategy was not to
defend individual freedom of conscience as such; rather, it was to deprive the churches of all civil and political authority, thereby removing the instruments of their mutual religious persecution, and establishing a de-confessionalised state as the means of maintaining a legally enforced toleration between the rival religious communities. In Brandenburg-Prussia, it was this dual strategy that led to the disappearance of such religious offences as heresy and witchcraft and the transformation of others, such as blasphemy, into public order offences no longer grounded in sacrilege.
Thomasius thus marks the moment at which, after a century-and-a-half of religious war, the web of canon laws which had tied the political to the religious community began to be unpicked, allowing the persona of the citizen to be differentiated from that of the Christian; although even in Western Europe this moment was neither epochal nor universal. In late seventeenth-century England, religious peace was achieved in a quite different way: not by dismantling the confessional state, but by rebuilding it in a more stable, less persecutory form. This was achieved in accordance with two broad strategies. First, the Anglican church that was to be established as the state religion was purged of enough Anglo-Catholic theology to bring back on board moderate Calvinists, providing a stable religious middle-ground. Second, using a combination of test acts and toleration acts, non-conforming Protestants and Catholics were excluded from office-holding in the Anglican state, while permitted freedom of private worship. While this set of strategies proved no less successful in securing religious peace than those used in Brandenburg-Prussia, its effect on the laws pertaining to heresy, witchcraft, sacrilege and blasphemy was far less dramatic and uniform. While heresy and witchcraft laws were repealed during the 18th century, blasphemy remained a common law crime as a means of protecting the state religion, leading it to form a new juridical series with sedition and obscenity. Nonetheless, here too blasphemy progressively lost its basis in sacrilege, gradually assuming the form of a public order offence, with the result that blasphemy prosecutions became increasingly rare.
Blasphemy and Multi-Cultural Societies
As a result of the broad developments just discussed, in those Western European-based jurisdictions where sacrilege and blasphemy laws remained on the books, they lost their
religious character. As these laws evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth century, it was no longer the violation of persons, things and places inhabited by a transcendent divinity that defined the crime, but something else altogether: the giving of offence in a manner that might lead to civil disorder or violence. This sea change allows what were formerly religious offences to be either abolished or, if harmful conduct remains, to be sanctioned by non-religious public order and anti-discrimination laws. This is the tendency that informs the 1985 report of the United Kingdom’s Law Commission, which recommends abolition of the common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel on the grounds that they are archaic offences presenting unjustified infringements of the right to freedom of speech (Commission 1985). The same sense of historical development informs work of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, in its Blasphemy Report of 1994. The Commissioners thus argue that the key element of the law — that of offensiveness likely to cause civil disturbance — obviates the need for a special law on blasphemy, as this element is well covered by other public-order and anti-discrimination laws (Commission 1994). I would suggest that this kind of recommendation is indicative not of a state of affairs in which society has lost touch with the sacred; rather, it is indicative of one in which the sacred exists only at the level of society — that is, at the level of voluntary religious associations — having been purged from the coercive apparatus of the state as a result of the early modern religious settlements. This would be in keeping with the fact that the last blasphemy prosecution launched in an Australian jurisdiction — namely the action initiated by George Pell, then Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, against a painting called Piss Christ — failed. This was in part because the Victorian Supreme Court was unsure whether there was a law against blasphemy in Victoria, and in part because even if there were, the painting was unlikely to cause pubic unrest (1998).
It would be a mistake, though, to think that the story ends here, or to assume that this line of development is irresistible and destined to be universal. That kind of assumption is suited to the view of a universal process of modernisation driven by the progressive realisation of humanity’s common capacity for rational self-governance. It is not suited to the account we have given, in which toleration and the separation of church and state represent a strategic response to a particular historical state of affairs, and which
depend upon something as fallible as the institutions of a deconfessionalised liberal state. We should not be surprised, then, or take it as sign of anachronism or irrationalism, if blasphemy has returned to the political agenda of a liberal state like the United Kingdom. One of the pointers to what is at stake in this return is provided by the last blasphemy prosecution launched in the United Kingdom. One of only a handful in the twentieth century, the case against Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses arose from the complaint of a Muslim man and took place in 1991, at a time when Rushdie was under threat of religious murder from the Islamic theocracy of Iran. If the circumstances of the prosecution point to a novel form of the problem of religious friction — that arising from the presence of non-Christian religious communities in Christian or post-Christian societies — then the resolution of the case points backwards, towards the specific character of the English religious settlement. The charge against Rushdie failed because, according to the common law of England, blasphemy may only be committed against the Church of England, whose political establishment reflects the character of the Anglican Settlement (1991).
If the Rushdie case was a pointer to the emergence of problems associated with the liberal government of a multi-religious and multi-cultural society, then the catastrophe of 11 September 2001 catapaulted these problems to the forefront of political and legal discussion in a way that could scarcely have been imagined at the end of the twentieth century. Before that year was out, the British government had introduced the Anti-terrorism Crime Security Act which, in addition to new police and judicial powers to deal with the planning and execution of terrorist acts, had also proposed introducing a crime of incitement to religious hatred. This would have been an extension of the existing incitement to racial hatred statutes of the Public Order Act 1986 and was aimed at increasing the legal protection available to Britain’s Islamic community. Despite concerns about the extension of state power, this combination of increasing the state’s capacity to deal with external security, while protecting religious freedom as a means of forestalling domestic religious conflict, looks very much like the actions of a deconfessionalised liberal state. In the event, the incitement to religious hatred provisions of the anti-terrorism bill failed to pass through the House of Lords, apparently due to worries about freedom of speech. It was this that led Lord Avebury to table a Private
Member’s Bill proposing repeal of the existing common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel, and the introduction of a new offence of incitement to religious hatred. And it was this bill that led to the appointment of a House of Lord’s Select Committee to inquire into these issues and, more broadly, into the utility of existing religious offences in England and Wales.
In briefly discussing the Committee’s report, which was published in April 2003, I will not attempt to do justice to its often fascinating detail, only to draw out what is significant in relation to our historical sketch of the early modern religious settlements. The first thing to note is that the Committee was unable to arrive at any positive recommendations. While recognising the need to offer increased protection to religious communities against vilification, abuse and violence, it was unable to agree on the means of doing so, failing to recommend either the abolition of the existing blasphemy laws, or the creation of a new offence of incitement to religious hatred (Committee 2003a: 38-9). There appear to be several reasons for the Committee’s inability to act, related both to the diversity of the submissions it received and, more significantly, to a lack of assurance or agreement with regards to the appropriate intellectual framework for arriving at judgments on the key issues.
First, with regards to the diversity of the submissions, it is noteworthy that the Islamic Society of Britain recommends retention of the blasphemy law and its extension to all religious communities, arguing primarily from the need to protect the Islamic community from “Islamophobia”, particularly that instigated by the British National Party (Committee 2003b). For its part, the Muslim Council for Religious and Racial Harmony argues the need to strengthen laws against incitement to religious hatred, but also against “sacrilege and abuse of religious sanctities”, citing as a prime example of “filth against Muslims” Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, however, is not unhappy with the existing law covering incitement to racial hatred — from which Judaism benefits as an ethnically based religion — and is more worried by the apparent failure of the Crown Prosecution Service to use the law, particularly against anti-Jewish attacks by Muslims. The Board is happy for the blasphemy law to remain in its current form, as protection of the Church of England, but would support an incitement to religious hatred statute in order to extend protection to the Islamic community. For
their part, the Anglican and Catholic churches agree that a law against incitement to religious hatred should be introduced and, were this to prove successful in protecting religious communities, then the blasphemy laws could be repealed. Given this diversity of advice, some of arising from religious communities in relations of actual or potential conflict, it is not surprising that the Committee could see no clear direction arising from the submissions it received.
Second, the Committee’s uncertainty is compounded by one of the central legal-intellectual frameworks that it feels compelled to use in its deliberations: namely, that provided by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention has not been directly accepted into English law but, since the Human Rights Act 1998, it is required that judicial bodies must interpret English law in a manner rendering it consistent with the Convention. The problem is that it is not readily apparent how England’s religious offences laws might be rendered consistent with the Convention. Article 9 of the Convention states in part that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”; while Article 10 stipulates that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”; and Article 14 declares that “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status” (Council 1950). The Committee is well aware that were an appeal on a blasphemy case to find its way to Strasbourg then the existing common law, with its restriction of protection to the Church of England, would be radically incompatible with Article 14. Yet it can see no clear way to change the law, because of what it regards as an impossible balancing act imposed by the right to have one’s religion protected and the right to freedom of speech. Treating this as a quasi-philosophical problem, the Committee finds that it would be very difficult to draft laws against incitement to religious hatred that could discriminate between illegitimate incitement and the legitimate expression of hostility towards a religion (Committee 2003a: 26-7).
But this difficulty is surely a pointer to a more profound underlying problem, namely, the apparent incompatibility between the language of the Convention on Human Rights and the terms in which European political and legal orders have dealt with the
problems of religious conflict and religious freedom. The Convention uses the language of natural right — one might say the language of Locke and Rawls — in order to formulate fundamental rights to such things as freedom of religion and freedom of speech. And it leaves open the question of how these different rights are to be reconciled, and the extent to which they might be limited by security and public order provisos. If the history we have sketched is tenable, however, then freedom of religion arose not from natural rights but from the measures employed by liberal orders to deal with the problem of religious conflict. Toleration measures, for example, emerged as a means of escaping the conflict arising from state-sanctioned religious persecution, and involved either detaching churches from the institutions of judicial and political authority, or else restricting their capacity to use these in a persecutory manner. This was typically achieved by offering varying degrees of freedom of worship, not as an unfettered natural right, but to the degree required to preserve social peace. As the inheritors of these settlements, liberal political and legal orders are not involved in the game of balancing potentially conflicting fundamental rights, but in the quite different task of adjusting degrees of freedom (whether of speech or religion) in light of an assessment of the likely threats to personal and state security arising. The Committee is still in touch with this way of thinking, as we can see from the following comment, in which it acknowledges that its judgments must be informed by an assessment of the fluctuating level of religious tranquility:
We are a society in which no major religious group, including atheists,
objects to the presence of others, and there is little friction between the
leaders of various faiths. It is, however, important to recognise that
continued tranquility depends not only upon continued mutual tolerance
but, equally, on equality of protection from intolerance on the basis of
religion or belief or no belief. So long as the major religious communities
can pursue their ideas, their beliefs and their practices, and so long as none
of these cause any undue impact upon the secular segment of society, or
on each other, a form of stability can be achieved. But this cannot be taken
for granted. (Committee 2003a: 7)
The difficulty is that there is no apparent way of reconciling this way of approaching the problem with the language of universal human rights. This gives rise to a remarkable state of affairs, in which the actual organisation of the liberal political and juridical order remains out of reach of a central mode of modern moral reflection.
Thirdly, and finally, this is a pointer to the fact that the Committee’s failure to arrive at any recommendations appears to reflect a fundamental ambivalence in its own thinking about the character of English religious offences. On the one hand, the Committee insists that religious offences date from a time in which it was held that religious belief was part an parcel of the social and political order, which could not survive if people were permitted to express contempt for religion or to violate its laws. Since those days are long passed, it is not at all clear that we need religious offences of any kind: “Some might regret that, but it does not alter the fact that the law is now concerned with the preservation of the peace of the realm, and the concern is not so much with views of the deity as with the satisfactory state of society” (Committee 2003a: 46). The Committee thus appears sympathetic to those submissions which argue that existing public-order offences, covering things like incitement to commit a crime, intimidation, assault, and damage to property, should be able to offer all of the protection that members of religious communities need, without having to make religious faith part of the definition of the crime. This, broadly, is the path taken by the UK Law Commission in 1985 and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in 1997, when they recommended that the crime of blasphemy be abolished. Finally in this regard, the Committee comments that: “It must be appreciated that the definition [of blasphemy] has developed historically to meet various, primarily political rather than religious, perceptions of a need for the law to protect institutions, originally the State itself”; even if this fact is regretted by the Church of England and completely rejected by several Evangelical witnesses (Committee 2003a: 47).
On the other hand, however, elsewhere, the Committee seems far less sure that the day of religious offences has passed. In discussing India’s laws against religious vilification, for example, the Committee comments that, “The rationale underlying the Indian laws was neither antipathy to freedom of speech as such nor the protection of public freedom, but the maintenance of public peace and tranquility in a country where
religious passions were considered to be easily aroused and inflamed” . Yet, despite its own acknowledgement of the contingent character of English religious tranquility, the Committee makes no move to draw on the Indian laws. It would appear the reason for this reticence lies in an underlying view that “the United Kingdom is not a secular state”, and that “religious belief continues to be a significant component, or even determinant, of social values, and plays a major role in the lives of a large number of the population” (Committee 2003a: 38). For this reason, it is proper to entertain laws that protect not just the persons of members of religious communities, but also their faiths as such. This view would seem to be in part informed by the traditional conception of England as a state whose church is part of its constitution; but also in part by a kind of mult-culturalist ideology in which the state should have the role of embodying the religious identities of its constituent communities. Oscillating between a view of the laws as fundamentally directed towards maintaining the religious peace, and a view in which their role is to protect the religious freedom and (multi-)cultural identity of the nation, the Committee is in no position to use the former view as a means of grasping the character and limits of the latter.
****
What is singularly missing from this spread of views is a sense of the way in which a deconfessionalised liberal state uses the criterion of public order as the base-line from which to make the necessary discriminations. This is a state whose forms of toleration are grounded neither in inalienable individual rights and freedoms, nor in the communal identities of its constituent religious communities. Rather, it is one which is defined by its task of governing of these communities in a way that pre-empts their mutual persecution. This is also the perspective missing from the arguments of both philosophical liberals and multicultual communitarians.
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二、科学成就 钱学森长期担任中国火箭和航天计划的技术领导人，对航天技术、系统科学和系统工程做出了巨大的和开拓性的贡献。钱学森共发表专著7部，论文300余篇。主要贡献表现在以下几方面： ①应用力学 钱学森在应用力学的空气动力学方面和固体力学方面都做过开拓性的工作。与冯·卡门合作进行的可压缩边界层的研究，揭示了这一领域的一些温度变化情况，创立了卡门——钱学森方法。与郭永怀合作最早在跨声速流动问题中引入上下临界马赫数的概念。 ②喷气推进与航天技术 从40年代到60年代初期，钱学森在火箭与航天领域提出了若干重要的概念：在40年代提出并实现了火箭助推起飞装置(JATO)，使飞机跑道距离缩短；在1949年提出了火箭旅客飞机概念和关于核火箭的设想；在1953年研究了行星际飞行理论的可能性；在1962年出版的《星际航行概论》中，提出了用一架装有喷气发动机的大飞机作为第一级运载工具，用一架装有火箭发动机的飞机作为第二级运载工具的天地往返运输系统概念。 ③工程控制论 工程控制论在其形成过程中，把设计稳定与制导系统这类工程技术实践作为主要研究对象。钱学森本人就是这类研究工作的先驱者。 ④物理力学 钱学森在1946年将稀薄气体的物理、化学和力学特性结合起来的研究，是先驱性的工作。1953年，他正式提出物理力学概念，主张从物质的微观规律确定其宏观力学特性，改变过去只靠实验测定力学性质的方法，大大节约了人力物力，并开拓了高温高压的新领域。1961年他编著的《物理力学讲义》正式出版。现在这门科学的带头人是苟清泉教授，1984年钱学森向苟清泉建议，把物理力学扩展到原子分子设计的工程技术上。 ⑤系统工程 钱学森不仅将我国航天系统工程的实践提炼成航天系统工程理论，并且在80年代初期提出国民经济建设总体设计部的概念，还坚持致力于将航天系统工程概念推广应用到整个国家和国民经济建设，并从社会形态和开放复杂巨系统的高度，论述了社会系统。任何一个社会的社会形态都有三个侧面：经济的社会形态，政治的社会形态和意识的社会形态。钱学森从而提出把社会系统划分为社会经济系统、社会政治系统和社会意识系统三个组成部分。相应于三种社会形态应有三种文明建设，即物质文明建设(经济形态)、政治文明建设(政治形态)和精神文明建设(意识形态)。社会主义文明建设应是这三种文明建设的协调发展。从实践角度来看，保证这三种文明建设协调发展的就是社会系统工程。从改革和开放的现实来看，不仅需要经济系统工程，更需要社会系统工程。 ⑥系统科学 钱学森对系统科学最重要的贡献，是他发展了系统学和开放的复杂巨系统的方法论。 ⑦思维科学
A NSWER KEY Part One: Essay Writing 1 An Introduction to Writing Activity (Point and Support in a Paragraph), pages 5–6 Point:There are drawbacks to moviegoing. Support: 1. Inconvenience b. Long time to find parking spot and long walk to theater d. Sticky floor 3. Other moviegoers a. Running kids b. Laughing, shouting teenagers Activity (Introductory Paragraph), 8 1. c 2. b 3. a 4. a. Inconvenience of going out b. Temptations of the theater c. Behavior of some patrons Activity (Body: Supporting Paragraphs), 9–10 1. To begin with, I just don’t enjoy the general hassle of the evening. 2. b. Parking lot is always jammed d. Tickets may sell out, and theater is crowded e. Tickets cost up to $8 each 3. Second, the theater offers tempting snacks that I really don’t need. 4. b. 2) chocolate bars 3) Milk Duds 5. Many of the other patrons are even more of a problem than the concession stand. 6. a. Little kids race up and down the aisles b. Teenagers talk back to the screen, whistle, make funny noises Activity (Concluding Paragraph), 10 1. a 2. c Review Activities, 18–20 Answers will vary. 2 The Writing Process Activities (Freewriting, Questioning, Making a List, Clustering, Scratch Outline), 25–31 Answers will vary.
浅论钱学森的马克思主义哲学观 ——以钱学森的现代科学技术体系思想为例 内容摘要：钱学森以马克思主义哲学为指导，以系统思想为方法论基础，提出了现代科学技术体系的伟大构想，这个体系包括“三层次一核心十一个桥梁十一大部门”，体现了其对马克思主义哲学的精神实质、研究对象、体系及基本方法等方面的独到见解。本文拟就现代科学技术体系中体现的钱学森的马克思主义哲学观予以分析阐述。 关键词：钱学森；现代科学技术体系；马克思主义哲学 随着近代科学从宗教神学的束缚中走向独立，各门自然科学在长期的演变过程中从最初的分化状态逐渐趋向于整体化和结构化，科学与技术逐渐走向联姻，科学的部门结构和层次结构日益分化，其的整体化特征也日益明显。至现代，科学和技术发展一体化，形成了自身的体系，即现代科学技术体系。20世纪70年代末以来，钱学森以马克思主义哲学为指导，运用系统论观点对现代科学和技术进行了新的分类，提出了现代科学技术体系的伟大构想。这个体系体现了钱学森关于马克思主义哲学的观点。 一、钱学森现代科学技术体系思想的形成 （一）理论基础 钱学森提出现代科学技术体系的构想，有其深厚的理论基础。主要表现在两方面，一是钱学森研究过程中始终坚持的系统思想，二是其较深厚的马克思主义哲学功底。 第一，钱学森深刻的系统思想始终贯穿于现代科学技术体系中。其系统思想源于1950年对工程控制论的研究。受美国数学科学家维纳控制论思想的启发，钱学森结合其赴美留学期间对火箭、导弹的研究，运用控制论的原理解决了远程火箭的自动导航、火箭发动机燃烧的伺服稳定等问题。后来他意识到，不只在火箭技术领域，整个工程技术范围内几乎处处存在着被控制的系统。于是，他用更系统的方法将当时工程技术领域的实践经验概括成一般理论，并于1954年出版了《工程控制论》。该书首次提出了关于受控工程系统的理论和方法，这些理论和方法可直接应用于工程设计的实践中。其实，《工程控制论》一书已经触及到了系统思想。“《工程控制论》第十八章中，钱学森同志就讲到用重复不那么可靠
钱学森主要学术贡献 钱学森长期担任中国火箭和航天计划的技术领导人，对航天技术、系统科学和系统工程做出了巨大的和开拓性的贡献。钱学森共发表专著7部，论文300余篇。 主要贡献表现在以下几方面： ①应用力学 钱学森在应用力学的空气动力学方面和固体力学方面都做过开拓性的工作。与冯·卡门合作进行的可压缩边界层的研究，揭示了这一领域的一些温度变化情况，创立了卡门——钱学森方法。与郭永怀合作最早在跨声速流动问题中引入上下临界马赫数的概念。 ②喷气推进与航天技术 从40年代到60年代初期，钱学森在火箭与航天领域提出了若干重要的概念：在40年代提出并实现了火箭助推起飞装置(JATO)，使飞机跑道距离缩短；在1949年提出了火箭旅客飞机概念和关于核火箭的设想；在1953年研究了行星际飞行理论的可能性；在1962年出版的《星际航行概论》中，提出了用一架装有喷气发动机的大飞机作为第一级运载工具，用一架装有火箭发动机的飞机作为第二级运载工具的天地往返运输系统概念。 ③工程控制论 工程控制论在其形成过程中，把设计稳定与制导系统这类工程技术实践作为主要研究对象。钱学森本人就是这类研究工作的先驱者。 ④物理力学 钱学森在1946年将稀薄气体的物理、化学和力学特性结合起来的研究，是先驱性的工作。 1953年，他正式提出物理力学概念，主张从物质的微观规律确定其宏观力学特性，改变过去只靠实验测定力学性质的方法，大大节约了人力物力，并开拓了高温高压的新领域。1961年他编著的《物理力学讲义》正式出版。现在这门科学的带头人是苟清泉教授，1984年钱学森向苟清泉建议，把物理力学扩展到原子分子设计的工程技术上。 ⑤系统工程 钱学森不仅将中国航天系统工程的实践提炼成航天系统工程理论，并且在80年代初期提出国民经济建设总体设计部的概念，还坚持致力于将航天系统工程概念推广应用到整个国家和国民经济建设，并从社会形态和开放复杂巨系统的高度，论述了社会系统。任何一个社会的社会形态都有三个侧面：经济的社会形态，政治的社会形态和意识的社会形态。钱学森从而提出把社会系统划分为社会经济系统、社会政治系统和社会意识系统三个组成部分。相应于三种社会形态应有三种文明建设，即物质文明建设(经济形态)、政治文明建设(政治形态)和精神
英文论文Introduction的写作技巧 —as a "hook" to attract the readers 学术论文中的引言(Introduction)是对全文内容和结构的总体勾画（The purpose of the Introduction is to stimulate the reader’s interest and to provide pertinent background information necessary to understand the rest of the paper.Without an introduction it is sometimes very difficult for your audience to figure out what you are trying to say. There needs to be a thread of an idea that they will follow through your paper）。The introduction section shows the questions that shoul d be answered for the readers once they finish reading the “Introduction”. 1 引言的内容与结构布局 引言的主要任务是向读者勾勒出全文的基本内容和轮廓。它可以包括以下五项内容中的全部或其中几项： 1）介绍某研究领域的背景、意义、发展状况、目前的水平等； 2）对相关领域的文献进行回顾和综述，包括前人的研究成果，已经解决的问题，并适当加以评价或比较； 3）指出前人尚未解决的问题，留下的技术空白，也可以提出新问题、解决这些新问题的新方法、新思路，从而引出自己研究课题的动机与意义； 4）说明自己研究课题的目的； 5）概括论文的主要内容，或勾勒其大体轮廓。 如何合理安排以上这些内容，将它们有条有理地给读者描绘清楚，并非容易之事。经验告诉我们，引言其实是全文最难写的—部分。这是因为作者对有关学科领域的熟悉程度，作者的知识是渊博、还是贫乏，研究的意义何在、价值如何等问题，都在引言的字里行间得以充分体现。 我们可以将引言的内容分为三到四个层次来安排。第一层由研究背景、意义、发展状况等内容组成，其中还包括某一研究领域的文献综述；第二层提出目前尚未解决的问题或急需解决的问题，从而引出自己的研究动机与意义；第三层说明自己研究的具体目的与内容；最后是引言的结尾，可以介绍一下论文的组成部分。 第一层：1) Introducing the general research area including its background, importance, and p resent level of development……2) Reviewing previous researc h in this area……… 第二层：Indicating the problem that has not been solved by previous research, raising a relevant
《大学英语预备级1》课程开篇导学 Introduction of College English (Foundation) 一. 课程简介：General Introduction of this Course 1课程名称：大学英语精读课 Intensive Reading 2授课教材：《大学英语》（综合教程预备级）(上海外语教育出版社, 2003) College English -Integrated Course (foundation) 二. 课程任务：Content of Class 2.1 阅读：Reading Unit 1, Reading: A School with No Rules This unit discusses different ideas about discipline in schools by looking at the context of the “free” school of Summerhill where the students make the rules. This unit relates discipline to learning and motivation Unit 2, Reading: Fear of the Unknown, Not the known This unit has a mystery poem and a mystery story.
Unit 3, Reading: Reporting the News This unit looks at the job of newspaper reporting and the role of the international news agencies. Unit 4, Reading: Living in Virtual Reality This unit looks at the world of virtual reality: special helmets and clothing and computers. Unit 5, Reading: The Richest Man in the World This unit looks at the stories of how some of the richest people became rich. Unit 6, Reading: Practical Jokes This unit takes up the topic of practical jokes and reports on some tricks which have been played by the media. Unit 7, Reading: Life is Just a Dream In this unit there is an interview with a doctor who explains why we dream and what
中国航天报/2011年/12月/8日/第003版 航天论坛 钱学森系统科学思想和系统科学成就 中国航天科技集团公司原710所副所长科技委主任于景元 钱学森在开创我国航天事业过程中，同时也开创了一套既有普遍科学意义、又有中国特色的系统工程管理方法与技术。实践已证明了这套组织管理方法的科学性和有效性。从今天来看，就是在当时条件下，把科学技术创新、组织管理创新与体制机制创新有机结合起来，实现了综合集成创新，从而走出了一条发展我国航天事业的自主创新和协同创新道路。我国航天事业一直在持续发展，其根本原因就在于自主创新和协同创新。 系统科学思想的形成与发展 航天系统工程的成功实践，不仅是钱老对管理科学与工程的重大贡献，同时也为建立系统科学体系奠定了实践基础。 系统科学是有三个层次结构的学科体系。在钱老建立的系统科学体系中，处在工程技术或应用技术层次上的是系统工程；处在技术科学层次上直接为系统工程提供理论方法的有运筹学、控制论、信息论等；而处在基础科学层次上属于系统理论的便是系统学。这样三个层次结构的系统科学经过系统论通向辩证唯物主义。 在系统科学体系中，系统学是需要建立的新兴学科。20世纪80年代中期，钱老以系统学讨论班的方式开始了创建系统学的工作。在讨论班上，钱老首先提出了系统新的分类，将系统分为简单系统、简单巨系统、复杂巨系统和特殊复杂巨系统。生物体系统、人体系统、人脑系统、地理系统、社会系统、星系系统等都是复杂巨系统。其中社会系统是最复杂的系统了，又称作特殊复杂巨系统。这些系统又都是开放的，与外部环境有物质、能量和信息的交换，所以又称作开放的复杂巨系统。 20世纪90年代中期，钱老提出开创复杂巨系统的科学与技术，实际上就是由综合集成方法、综合集成理论、综合集成技术和综合集成工程所构成的复杂巨系统科学技术体系，这就把复杂科学体系大大向前发展了，发展到了复杂巨系统科学体系。 系统科学、复杂巨系统科学对现代科学技术发展，特别对现代科学技术向综合性整体化方向发展必将产生重大影响。这是钱学森对现代科学技术发展的巨大贡献，也是中华民族乃至全人类的宝贵知识财富和思想财富。 认识和改造世界的知识体系 钱老从系统科学思想出发，从整体上去认识和把握人类认识世界和改造世界的知识结构，提出了现代科学技术体系和人类知识体系，这是钱老对现代科学技术发展的系统性和整体性贡献。 钱学森提出的现代科学技术体系结构，从纵向上看有11个科学技术部门。这11个科学技术部门是自然科学、社会科学、数学科学、系统科学、思维科学、人体科学、地理科学、军事科学、行为科学、建筑科学、文艺理论。这是根据现代科学技术发展到目前水平所做的划分。随着科学技术发展，今后还会产生新的科学技术部门，所以这个体系是动态发展系统。 我国正在实施科技兴国战略，我们不仅要充分发挥自然科学技术的重要作用，更要发挥现代科学技术体系的综合优势和整体力量。 从钱老建立现代科学技术体系和人类知识体系可以看出，钱老作为一位伟大的科学家，他不仅有学科和领域的深度，又有跨学科、跨领域的广度，还有跨层次的高度。如果把深度、广度和高度看做三维结构的话，那么钱学森就是一位三维科学家。 系统科学的实践意义
大多数英文科技学术论文都可以使用一种所谓Introduction-Methods-Results and Discussion (IMRAD) 的形式，如下图的沙漏所示，先由普遍到具体问题，再由具体到普遍结论。 这里先总结Introduction的写法和注意事项。 与中文论文“简短”的“概述”(或“前言”)不一样，英文的Introduction内容通常较长。好的论文在Introduction部分很见功底，文献的阅读量、信息综合能力，可以给读者很多的信息量，因此写好它容不得半点马虎。 Introduction(说明综述)部分的内容通常用来为作者创造一个研究空间。先介绍目前的研究现状，然后指出存在的不足或尚没有解决的问题，最后再介绍“存在的问题”是“如何”被作者的研究所解决。因此，Introduction可以由这“三波”或者说“三部分”来组成。 具体而言，这“三波”如此展开： 第一波：提出研究现状和此研究的重要性 先通过陈述表明所要研究问题的重要性——当然这部分内容不是必须，并介绍此领域的研究现状，具体可参考文献综述引用。 研究问题要与自己的研究内容高度相关，时态一般可用一般现在时，并通过很确定的语气和具体的形容词来强调研究的重要生。
The flow of foams is seen in many process, and its use in major industries means that an understanding of foam rheology is of paramount importance. 第二波：强调有必要解决存在的问题 指出该研究目前存在的问题，可以通过提问的方式或者通过某种方式扩展此领域已有知识和结论。 这一波非常重要，只有指出存在的问题或尚待解决的问题，才能突显出自己的研究价值。在这一部分的写作时，一般通过转折词来表示过渡，并在指出问题时使用负面的词汇。 … ; however, the relationship between emergence and soil temperature has not been investigated previously… In contrast to the extensive literature describing ….., little attention has been paid to…第三波：介绍作者自己的研究内容 介绍作者的研究目的和大致的研究内容。也可以在此部分表明自己的研究假设前提，宣布自己的主要研究发现、它们的价值，如有需要，也可以介绍论文的框架结构——方便读者了解复杂的文章结构。 这部分的内容主要用来介绍作者如何“填补”提出的“问题”或“不足”。 This paper presents the results of an extensive experimental program… 关于此处的时态，比如是presents还是presented? 即是一般过去时还是一般现在时？一般而言： ?如果主语是paper, article, thesis, report等指代文章本身的抽象词汇，使用一般现在时； ?如果主语是实验调查本身，比如study, experiment, investigation等具体词汇，使用一般过去时或一般现在时都可以。 万能法则：此处的时态如果拿不准，一直使用一般现在时。
钱学森，中国现代物理学家、世界著名火箭专家。浙江杭州市人，1911年12 月11日生于上海。1934年在美国麻省理工学院和加利福尼亚理工学院学习。1938年获博士学位后留校任教并从事火箭研究。1947－1955年间任麻省理工学院和加利福尼亚理工学院教授。1955年10月冲破种种阻力回国后，曾任中国科学院力学研究所所长，第七机械工业部副部长，国防科工委副主任等职。 钱学森为中国火箭和导弹技术的发展提出了极为重要的实施方案。1956年4月起，他长期担任火箭导弹和航天器研制的技术领导职务，对中国火箭导弹和航天事业和发展作出了重大贡献。 钱学森生前是全国政协副主席、中国科学院数理化学部委员、中国宇航学会名誉理事长、中国科技协会主席。 一、生平简介 钱学森(1911～X)中国科学家，火箭专家，1911年12月1日生于上海，3岁时随父来到北京，1934年毕业于上海交通大学机械工程系，1935年赴美国研究航空工程和空气动力学，1938年获加利福尼亚理工学院博士学位。后留在美国任讲师、副教授、教授以及超音速实验室主任和古根罕喷气推进研究中心主任。1950年开始争取回归祖国，受到美国政府迫害，失去自由，历经5年于1955年才回到祖国，1958年起长期担任火箭导弹和航天器研制的技术领导职务。1959年，加入中国共产党。现任中国科技协会名誉主席等职。 二、科学成就 钱学森长期担任中国火箭和航天计划的技术领导人，对航天技术、系统科学和系统工程做出了巨大的和开拓性的贡献。钱学森共发表专著7部，论文300余篇。主要贡献表现在以下几方面： ①应用力学 钱学森在应用力学的空气动力学方面和固体力学方面都做过开拓性的工作。与冯·卡门合作进行的可压缩边界层的研究，揭示了这一领域的一些温度变化情况，创立了卡门——钱学森方法。与郭永怀合作最早在跨声速流动问题中引入上下临界马赫数的概念。 ②喷气推进与航天技术 从40年代到60年代初期，钱学森在火箭与航天领域提出了若干重要的概念：在40年代提出并实现了火箭助推起飞装置(JATO)，使飞机跑道距离缩短；在1949年提出了火箭旅客飞机概念和关于核火箭的设想；在1953年研究了行星际飞行理论的可能性；在1962年出版的《星际航行概论》中，提出了用一架装有喷气发动机的大飞机作为第一级运载工具，用一架装有火箭发动机的飞机作为第二级运载工具的天地往返运输系统概念。 ③工程控制论 工程控制论在其形成过程中，把设计稳定与制导系统这类工程技术实践作为主要研究对象。钱学森本人就是这类研究工作的先驱者。 ④物理力学 钱学森在1946年将稀薄气体的物理、化学和力学特性结合起来的研究，是先驱性的工作。1953年，他正式提出物理力学概念，主张从物质的微观规律确定其宏观力学特性，改变过去只靠实验测定力学性质的方法，大大节约了人力物力，并开拓了高温高压的新领域。1961年他编著的《物理力学讲义》正式出版。现
英文论文引言的写作技巧Introduction 学术论文中的引言(Introduction)是对全文内容和结构的总体勾画。引言尽管不像摘要那样有一定的篇幅限制和相对固定的格式，但在内容和结构模式上也有需要遵循的规律。本章首先介绍这些规律，然后探讨需要掌握的语言技巧。 引言的内容与结构布局 引言的主要任务是向读者勾勒出全文的基本内容和轮廓。它可以包括以下五项内容中的全部或其中几项： 介绍某研究领域的背景、意义、发展状况、目前的水平等; 对相关领域的文献进行回顾和综述，包括前人的研究成果，已经解决的问题，并适当加以评价或比较； 指出前人尚未解决的问题，留下的技术空白，也可以提出新问题、解决这些新问题的新方法、新思路，从而引出自己研究课题的动机与意义； 说明自己研究课题的目的； 概括论文的主要内容，或勾勒其大体轮廓。 如何合理安排以上这些内容，将它们有条有理地给读者描绘清楚，并非容易之事。经验告诉我们，引言其实是全文最难写的—部分。这是因为作者对有关学科领域的熟悉程度，作者的知识是渊博、还是贫乏，研究的意义何在、价值如何等问题，都在引言的字里行间得以充分体现。 我们可以将引言的内容分为三到四个层次来安排(如图8.1所示)。第一层由研究背景、意义、发展状况等内容组成，其中还包括某一研究领域的文献综述；第二层提出目前尚未解决的问题或急需解决的问题，从而引出自己的研究动机与意义；第三层说明自己研究的具体目的与内容；最后是引言的结尾，可以介绍一下论文的组成部分。 第一层： 1) Introducing the general research area including its background, importance, and present level of development…………………………………………………………… 2) Reviewing previous research in this area…………………………………………………… 第二层：Indicating the problem that has not been solved by previous research, raising a relevant question …………………………………………………………………………………第三层：Specifying the purpose of your research………………………………… 第四层： 1) Announcing your major findings ……………………………………… 2) Outlining the contents of your paper ……………………………………
系统科学、思维科学与人体科学---钱学森 研究现代科学技术的发展，也自然会提出科学技术体系的结构问题[1]。在自然科学、数学科学和社会科学这三大部门之外，现在似乎应该考虑三个新的、正在形成的大部门：系统科学、思维科学和人体科学[2]。关于这三个部门，我在以前的几篇文章[2，3，4]中曾讲了一些初步看法，也得到了同专们对这些看法的意见。这些意见促使我进一步考虑这三大部门科学的发展和结构问题，在这里我将谈谈一些想法，请大家讨论，批评指正。 一先说系统科学这个大部门。 以前我看到大力发展一类新的工程技术——系统工程的必要性，因而提议进一步发展和深入研究这类工程技术的理论基础。目前系统工程，除了与各门系统工程专业有关的专门学问，如工程系统工程的应用力学、机械设计、电力工程等之外，各专业系统工程的共同理论基础是运筹学；而今后进一步发展也要用到与运筹学相关的控制论。但是运筹学在现代科学技术体系中是紧靠工程技术实践的一般理论，属于我们称为技术科学的那类科学，技术科学是趋势为工程技术服务的；也可以说实践经验的理论总结，首先达到的台阶是技术科学。控制论这一门 20世纪前半叶从自动控制技术成长起来的新科学也是技术科学。但在技术科学这个台阶之上，应该还有一个台阶，即基础科学。在自然科学这个大部门中，例如物理学是基础科学，化学是基础科学，系统工程这类工程技术迈到运筹学以及控制论这一级台阶不会就停止不动，上面还有它们的基础科学。但什么是它们的基础科学呢?这是从观代科学技术体系这一观点或科学学[1]的观点不能不提出的课题。换句话说，也就是要建立系统科学的结构体系[3]。 关于系统科学的基础科学这一问题，我以前没有答案，而只是模糊地提问道[3]：运筹学的进一步精炼会不会出一门理论事理学?控制论(包括工程控制论、生物控制论、经济控制论和社会控制论)的进一步精炼会不会出一门理论控制论?这种提法，只引起我们思索，而没有指明途径，不解决问题。 要有进展，我们必须从系统工程的范围中走出来，在更大的视野中去考察。 我们看到生物学界的发展，正如罗申( R．Rosen)在不久前的一篇论文中[5]所讲的，18世纪以来的近代科学发展，在自然科学的研究中占主导地位的是还原论和经验论的方法，或形而上学的方法，这在当时是一个伟大的进步，是对古人的反击和革命；古代人们直观地以有机物或神灵主宰一切。然而，罗中似乎忘记了从神灵到拉普拉斯的机械论之间也曾有过古代的唯物主义和辩证法；近代科学方法是从古代唯物主义发展而来的。罗中指出，近代科学的这种只重分析与实验的方法，在生物学的研究中把生物解剖得越来越纲，近四五十年更是攻打到了分子的层次。我们可以说把生命现象分解为分子与分子的相互作用，现在已取得了伟大的、惊人的成就，建立了分子生物学这门有非常充实内容的科学。但在这一发展面前，也有许多生物学家感到失望，我们知道得越细、越多，反而失去全貌，感到对生命的理解仍然很渺茫好象知道得越少了。 50年前冯·贝塔朗费比较明确地认识到这一点，他开始所谓理论生物学( Theorethche
钱学森的系统思维的显著特征包括辩证性、整体性、开放性、综合性、超前性等内容提要以马克思主义哲学为指导，探讨了钱学森的系统思维的产生条件、形成标志和显著特征（辩证性、整体性、开放性、综合性、超前性等）阐明其系统思维对辩证思维的丰富、发展和对改革开幕放、领导决策的指导意义。 素有“科学巨子”之称的钱学森同志，是我国当代最杰出的科学家之一。他为我国的火箭导弹技术、航空航天技术和系统工程理论方面作出了开拓性贡献。 钱学森同志之所以取得如此巨大的科学成就，得益于他的系统辩证观——系统思维。可以说，没有其科学的系统思维，就没有共科学上的巨大成就。钱学森同志主持的“总体设计部”，就是其系统思维的成功应用。他在系统工程理论方面的成果，则是其系统思维的结晶。 系统思维指的是，人们必须把研究和处理的对象看作是一个完整的系统，并辩证地对待它的整体与部分、部分与部分、系统与环境等的相互作用和相互联系，以求达到对问题作出的最佳处理的一种思维方式。 研究和推广钱学森的系统思维，对于实现人的思维科学化、现代化，对于培养创造型人才，加速四个现代化建设的进程，具有重要的意义。 一、钱学森系统思维产生的条件和形成标志 恩格斯指出：“每一时代的理论思维，从而我们时代的理论思维，都是一种历史的产物，在不同的时代具有非常不同的形式，并因而具有非常不同的内容。”钱学林系统思维是适应于现时代所需要的科学思维方式，是人类辩证思维发展的现代形态，同时又与他本人优良的德、识、才、学的素质紧密相联。其系统思维产生的条件有四个方面。 （一）高度的爱国主义和集体主义精神是钱学森系统思维产生的思想前提，也是其系统思维得到应用、拓展的动力和源泉。 钱学森同志具有高度的爱国主义精神，时刻为报效祖国创造着条件。他说：我“在美国呆了二十年，二十年中，前三四年是学习，后十几年是工作，所有这一切都是在做准备，为了回到祖国后能为人民做点事。我在美国那么长时间，从来没有想过这辈子要在那里呆下去。”新中国的诞生，促成了他毅然放弃国外优越的生活和工作条件，冲破了重重阻力，于1955年回到了他亲爱的祖国。 钱学森的爱国之举，得到了党和国家领导人毛泽东、周恩来、聂荣臻等同志的高度赞扬，并委以重任。他耳闻目睹新中国的光辉成就，坚信社会主义能够救中国，坚信中国共产党人一定有智慧、有力量打一场科学技术的翻身仗。于是，他凭着强烈的爱国主义的责任感到地共产党人的集体智慧和力量的信赖，满怀信心地主动承担了我国国防尖端技术——火箭导弹技术、航空航天技术的组织、管理、研制工作。他在科学实践活动中，亲身感受到社会主义制度比资本主义制度提供了更好的发展科学技术的环境。他认为，在社会主义制度下，我们不仅能在更广泛
A Brief Introduction to the University Distinguished guests, Welcome to our university. Before you start to look around, allow me to give you a brief account of the school. Founded in 1927, our university is one of this city’s earliest un iversities of liberal arts. It is staffed with an excellent faculty, and has a total enrollment of over 10,000 students. In the past years, it has turned out numerous well-qualified students and found its graduates active in professions of all walks of life. Since its establishment, the university has always steered itself toward the objective that its students have an overall healthy development. Not only does it provide the students with basic academic courses, but it manages to expose them to the up-to-date knowledge. Besides, students are free to participate in colorful campus activities and social practice, which are intended for broadening their mind and developing their potential talent(https://www.doczj.com/doc/7614388201.html,). Currently, both our faculty and students are making every effort to improve the quality of our education in the direction of a first-rate university. Thank you. 点评：近几年，随着我国顺利加入世贸组织以及经济全球化步伐的加快，许多国内高校纷纷与国外大学合作办学，教育走向国际化成为人们关注的热点，也是大学生门比较关心的热点问题。本预测题为热议校园生活话题，与2004年旅游景点介绍2006年考查的名校校园开放如出一辙。 尊敬的各位嘉宾： 欢迎来到我们这所大学，在你开始游览这所大学之前，请允许我简单介绍一下这所学校。 我所在的这所大学成立于1927年，它是本市最早成立的文科大学之一，配备了优秀的师资队伍，招生总人数达10000余人。在过去的数年间，这所大学培养了大批优秀学子，其毕业生活跃于各个专业领域(四级作文)。 自本校成立以来，我们一直以全面发展学生的身心健康为目标，我们不但为学生提供基础的学习课程，而且还教授学生最新的知识。此外，学生们还可以自由地参加各种各样的校园活动和社会实践，这有助于他们开拓思维、开发他们的潜在能力。 目前，我们学校的师生正在为提高我校的教学质量、为把我校打造成为一流大学而奋斗。谢谢大家。
钱学森的系统思想 2014年05月13日14:46 来源：学习时报作者：于景元字号 打印纠错分享推荐浏览量 223 关于系统科学，钱学森曾明确指出，系统科学是从事物的整体与部分、局部与全局以及层次关系的角度来研究客观世界的。客观世界包括自然、社会和人自身。能反映事物这个特征最基本和最重要的概念就是系统。所谓系统是指由一些相互关联、相互作用、相互影响的组织部分构成并具有某些功能的整体。系统在客观世界中是普遍存在的。 系统是系统科学研究和应用的基本对象。这和自然科学、社会科学等不同，但有深刻的内在联系。系统科学能把自然科学、社会科学等领域研究的问题联系起来作为系统进行综合性和整体性研究，这就是为什么系统科学具有交叉性、综合性、整体性与横断性的原因，也是系统科学区别于其他科学技术领域的一个根本特点，使系统科学处在现代科学技术发展的综合性整体化的方向上。 系统科学也有三个层次的知识结构。在钱学森建立的系统科学体系中，处在工程技术或应用技术层次上的是系统工程，这是直接用来改造客观世界的工程技术，但和其他工程技术不同，它是组织管理技术；处在技术科学层次上直接为系统工程提供理论方法的有运筹学、控制论、信息论等；处在基础科学层次上属于基础理论的便是系统学。 系统学是揭示客观世界中系统普遍规律的基础科学。这样三个层次结构的系统科学体系经过系统论通向辩证唯物主义。系统论属于哲学层次，是连接系统科学与辩证唯物主义哲学的桥梁。 关于系统论，钱学森曾明确指出，我们所提倡的系统论，既不是整体论，也非还原论，而是整体论与还原论的辩证统一。钱学森关于系统论的这个思想后来发展成为他的综合集成思想。根据这个思想，钱学森又提出了将还原论方法与整体论方法辩证统一起来的系统论方法。 客观事物普遍联系及其整体性思想就是系统思想，系统科学体系的建立就使系统思想从一种哲学思维发展成为系统的科学体系，使系统思想发展到了系统科学思想。系统科学体系是系统科学思想在工程、技术、科学直到哲学不同层次上的体现。这就使哲学思想有了科学基础，把哲学和科学统一起来了，系统科学思想是钱学森对辩证唯物主义系统思想的重要发展和丰富。 在系统科学体系中，系统工程已应用到实践中并取得显著成就；运筹学、控制论、信息论等也有了各自的理论方法并处在发展之中。但系统学却是需要建立的新兴学科，这也是钱学森最早提出来的。20世纪80年代中，钱学森以“系统学讨论班”的方式开始了创建系统学的工作。从1986年到1992年的7年时间里，钱学森参加了讨论班的全部学术活动。在讨论班上，钱学森首先提出了系统新的分类，将系统分为简单系统、简单巨系统、复杂巨系统和特殊复杂巨系统。如生物体系统、人体系统、人脑系统、地理系统、社会系统、星系系统等都是复杂巨系统。其中社会系统是最复杂的系统了，又称作特殊复杂巨系统。这些系统又都是开放的，与外部环境有物质、能量和信息的交换，所以又称作开放的复杂巨系统。 对于简单系统和简单巨系统已有了相应的方法论和方法，但对复杂巨系统和社会系统却不是已有方法论和方法所能处理的，需要有新的方法论和方法。所以，关于复杂巨系统的理论研究，钱学森又称作复杂巨系统学。
Introduction I. Teaching Objectives 1.To understand the definition of globalization and its origin, modern concept as well as contributing elements. 2.To understand the trend of culture merge and the reality of culture diversity. 3.To understand the disadvantages of culture diversity and strategies for overcoming them. II. Leading in III. Teaching Procedures Step 1 Have the students listen to the lead-in case The Word Car. Ask the students warming-up questions: ●What is Mondeo? (A brand of Ford car company.) ●Why does Ford source globally? (To reduce the costs by means of specialization so as to be more competitive an intense international competition.) ●Can you describe the phenomenon by one word? (Globalization) ●What competence is needed in successfully doing business internationally? (Effective intercultural communication competence)