Introduction Religious Offences and Liberal Politics From the Religious Settlements to Mult
- 格式:pdf
- 大小:94.12 KB
- 文档页数:20
法律谚语英文版法律以规定当事人权利和义务为内容的,对全体社会成员具有普遍约束力的一种特殊行为规范(社会规范)。
以下是店铺为你整理的关于法律谚语英文版,欢迎大家阅读。
法律谚语英文版一1. Consent makes law.合意产生法律.2. Custom has the force of law.民俗具有法律效力.3. Except as otherwise provided by law.法律另有规定的除外.4. Every law has a loop hole.凡是法律皆有漏洞.5. Law governs man , reason the law.法律管制人,理性管法律。
6. Law is law, just or not.无论正义与否,法律就是法律.7. Law is mind without reason.法律是无由的理念.8. No one is above the law.任何人不能凌驾于法律之上.9. One with the law is a majority.谁拥有法律,谁就是大多数.10. The law wil catch up with him in the end.最终法律饶不了他.法律谚语英文版二1. The more laws, the more offences.法律越多,违法者越多.2. This document is legally binding.该法律文件具有法律约束力.3. The law is in abeyance.此法暂缓执行.4. This law has become a dead letter.此法已成为一纸空文.5. Where law ends, tyranny begins.法律的终点便是暴政的起点.6. A later statute takes away the effect of a prior one.后法优于前法.7. Arms and laws do not flourish together.武力与法律不能同时兴盛.8. Customs,religious and philosophies tend to form the basis for a nation's laws. 风俗宗教和哲学常是一个国家法律构成之基础.9. Equity is a correction of common legal rules in theirdefective parts. 衡平法是对普通法律规则中瑕疵部分的矫正.10. Every law has no atom of strength, as far as no public opinion supports it. 若无公众舆论支持,法律是没有丝毫力量的.法律谚语英文版三1. n civilized life, law floats in a sea of ethics在文明社会,法律依靠道德所支撑2. It can hardly be taken to be a guarantee that every law shall treat every person the same不能保证每一部法律都能平等地对待每一个人。
New York UniversitySchool of LawCLASSICAL LIBERALISMHistory, Theory and Contemporary JurisprudenceMario J. Rizzo Fall, 2010 Department of Economics L06.3014.001 mario.rizzo@Description: Classical liberalism is the political philosophy that holds that society, within a legal framework of private property and liberty of contract, largely runs itself. This course is an interdisciplinary exploration of the fundamental principles of liberalism and its application to issues of broad relevance to the law. These principles are developed through classical and contemporary sources from Marcus Tullius Cicero to Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett. The applications include religious toleration, the legal status of homosexuality, the moral and economic status of profiting from the ignorance of others, paternalistic legislation, and slippery slopes.Two books have been ordered and are available at the NYU bookstore:David D. Boaz (ed.), The Libertarian Reader: Classic and Contemporary Writings from Lao Tzu to Milton Friedman (Free Press, 1998). When a reading is followed by a (B) it will be found in this collection.Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford, 2000).I. IntroductionDavid Boaz, “The Roots of Libertarianism,” From: Libertarianism: A Primer, Chapter 2. (Blackboard)F.A. Hayek, “Why I am Not a Conservative”. From: The Constitution of Liberty.II. The General Principle of Spontaneous OrderRonald Hamowy, “The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order,” pp. 39-58. From: The Political Sociology of Freedom.(Blackboard)Todd J. Zywicki, “Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex Systems, and Decentralization.” From: Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 9, 143-150 (1998). Available at JSTOR (through Bobst Library).Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization.” From: Essays on Individuality, ed. Felix Morley. (Blackboard)III.Fundamental Principles: “Classical” Views• Utilitarianism(a) Narrowly ConceivedJeremy Bentham, Selections from An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, The Constitutional Code, and Deontology in Kelly Rogers(ed.), Self-Interest: An Anthology of Philosophical Perspectives.(Blackboard)David Lieberman, “The Critique of the Common Law,” From: Bentham: Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, vol. II, ed. by Gerald Postema.(Blackboard)Jeremy Bentham, “Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How to be Measured,”From: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chap.IV. (Optiona l)______________,“Pleasures and Pains, Their Kinds.” From: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chap, V.Skim to see the wide variety of pleasures and pains recognized.(Optional)Immanuel Kant, “Happiness…an Indefinite Concept,” “Reason Ill-Equipped to Secure Happiness,” Excerpts from Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals in Kelly Rogers (ed.), Self-Interest: An Anthology of PhilosophicalPerspectives.(Blackboard)(b) Broadly ConceivedLudwig von Mises, “Ownership,” Chapter 1, Socialism: An Economic andSociological Analysis (Orig. 1922), pp. 27-36.• Indirect UtilitarianismHenry Hazlitt, “Need for General Rules.” From: The Foundations of Morality, Chap. 8.David Hume, “Justice and Property.” From: Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3.(B)Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part II, Sec. II, Chap. III,Paragraphs II.II.15-II.II.18; II.II.20. Begins “It is thus that man…”• Natural LawMarcus Tullius Cicero, “True Law.” From: The Commonwealth (p. 270) (De Re Publica) (54BC).Samuel Pufendorf, “On Natural Law.” From: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1682), Book 1, Chap. III.Wilhelm von Humboldt, “The Purpose of Man” and “The Purpose of the State.”From: The Sphere of Duties of Government (1792) [also known as TheLimits of State Action]. (Blackboard)IV.Fundamental Principles: Division of Knowledge in SocietyF. A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” From: American EconomicReview, Sept. 1945, pp. 519-30. (B, abridged) / Unabridged: “The Use ofKnowledge in Society.”Russell Hardin, “Liberalism.” From: How Do You Know? The EconomicsOf Ordinary Knowledge, Chap. 4. (Blackboard)V.Fundamental Principles: Contemporary Views Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, Part 1: “The Problems of Knowledge,” Chap. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights and the Rule of Law: Classical Liberalism Confronts the Modern Administrative State (forthcoming). (Handout) Chap. 1, “Where Natural Law and Utilitarianism Converge”Chap. 2, “Where Natural Law and Utilitarianism Diverge”Chap. 3, “The Traditional Conception of the Rule of Law”Chap. 4, “Property Rights in the Grand Scheme”Chap. 10, “The Rule of Law Diminished”VI.Social CooperationHenry Hazlitt, “Social Cooperation.” The Foundations of Morality, Chap. 6.Specific Issue: Should People Be Able to Profit from the Ignorance of Others?Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, (De Officiis) Book 3, sec. 12-13 (44B.C.)Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia (1270), “Of Fraudulent Dealing inBuying and Selling,” From: Aquinas Ethicus: or, the MoralTeaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions ofthe Second part of the Summa Theologica, ed. Joseph Rickaby, S.J.U.S. Supreme Court, Laidlaw v .Organ (1819) Summarized and discussedin David Friedman, Law’s Order, Chap. 12, pp. 168-70.Israel Kirzner, “Entrepreneurship, Entitlement and Economic Justice.”From: Perception, Opportunity and Profit (1979). (Blackboard).VII.Social and Religious TolerationGeorge Smith, “Philosophies of Toleration.” From: Atheism, Ayn Rand and Other Heresies (1991). (Blackboard)John Stuart Mill, “On Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being.”From: On Liberty (1859). (B)Specific Issue: Homosexuality, Same-Sex Marriage and the LawLea Campos Boralevi, “Sexual Non-Conformists,” From: Bentham andthe Oppressed, Chap. 3 (1984) (Blackboard)Jeremy Bentham, “Offences Against One’s Self: Pederasty, Part I”From: Journal of Homosexuality (1972 – originally written c.1785). (Optional)Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010) , pp. 1-24; 109-136. (Also please skimthe “Findings of Fact” section [pp. 54-108] and compare withBentham’s empirical analysis of sexual non-conformity above.) Specific Issue: Knowledge Problems in Morals LegislationMario J. Rizzo, “The Problem of Moral Dirigisme: A New ArgumentAgainst Moralistic Legislation.” From: 1 NYU Journal of Law andLiberty 798-813 (up to not incl. Kantianism); 816-818 (up to notincl. IX); 820-826. (2005)VIII.Liberty and DemocracyBenjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of theModerns.” (1819). From: Political Writings. (B,abridged).Herbert Spencer, “Right to Ignore the State,” From Social Statics (1851). (B)Herbert Spencer, "Political Rights - So-Called." From: Principles of Ethics (1887), vol. 2, ch. 22.Ilya Somin, “When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss: How Political Ignorance Threatens Democracy,”Cato Policy Analysis no. 525 (2004), pp. 1-5; 9-21.Emphasis on Parts IV and V.R.H. Coase, “The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas,” AmericanEconomic Association, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1974, pp.384-391.Available at: JSTOR (through Bobst Library).IX.General Slippery Slope AnalysisA. V. Dicey, “The Debt of Collectivism to Benthamism.” From: Lectures on theRelation between Law and Public Opinion in England during theNineteenth Century, Lecture IX.Eugene Volokh and David Newman, “In Defense of the Slippery Slope,” From: Legal Affairs, March-April, 2003. (The full story is in Volokh, “TheMechanisms of the Slippery Slope,” From: 116 Harvard Law Review 1026(2003).)Mario J. Rizzo and D. Glen Whitman, “The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories and Slippery Slopes.” From: 51 UCLA Law Review 539 (2003),pp. 540-46; 570-73. (Optional)Available at: HeinOnline (through Julius Law Library)X.PaternalismJohn Stuart Mill, “Objections to Government Interference.” From: On Liberty. (B) Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein,” Libertarian Paternalism.” From: AEA Papers and Proceedings (May 2003), pp. 175-179.Available at: JSTOR (through Bobst Library).Mario J. Rizzo and D. Glen Whitman, “The Knowledge Problem in the New Paternalism,”Brigham Young University Law Review 905 (2009), pp.905-940.D. Glen Whitman, “Against the New Paternalism: Internalities and the Economicsof Self-Control,” Cato Policy Analysis, no. 563 (2006). (Optiona l)D. Glen Whitman and Mario J. Rizzo, “Paternalist Slopes.” From: 2 NYU Journalof Law and Liberty, 411-443 (2007). (Optional)Mario J. Rizzo and D. Glen Whitman, “Little Brother is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes," 51 Arizona Law Review 685-736 (2009). (Optional)。
六级英语作文范文初中语文Chapter 1: IntroductionAs we delve into the realm of Chinese language education in middle school, it is crucial to acknowledge the importance of language skills in fostering effective communication. The proficiency of students in English reflects not only their ability to comprehend and utilize a foreign language, but also their overall cognitive development. Hence, this paper will explore the significance of teaching English as a second language in middle schools and suggest effective strategies for enhancing language proficiency among students.Chapter 2: BackgroundIn recent years, English has gained prominence as a global language, becoming a vital tool for intercultural communication and international cooperation. Middle school is the ideal time to commence language education, as it provides students with ample opportunities to develop their language skills before advancing to higher education. However, the current English curriculum in Chinese middle schools often falls short in helping students acquire fundamental language skills, such as listening, speaking, reading, and writing. Consequently, it is essential to evaluate the existing teaching methods and propose innovative approaches that encourage active engagement.Chapter 3: Methods for Enhancing English Language Proficiency 3.1 Creating an immersive English learning environmentTo foster fluency in English, it is imperative to establish an immersive learning environment. This can be achieved by incorporating activities that encourage students to communicate in English both inside and outside the classroom. For instance, organizing English clubs, hosting debate competitions, and arranging field trips to English-speaking countries can provide students with real-life opportunities to practice their language skills. Moreover, utilizing multimedia resources, such as movies, TV shows, and online platforms, can expose students to authentic English language usage.3.2 Integrating technology into English language teachingIn today's digital era, technology plays a pivotal role in language education. Utilizing interactive language learning applications, websites, and software can offer students personalized learning experiences and instant feedback. Virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies can be utilized to simulate real-life scenarios, enabling students to practice their language skills in a safe and controlled environment.Chapter 4: ConclusionTo enhance English language proficiency among middle school students, a comprehensive approach is required. By creating an immersive English learning environment, incorporating technology into teaching practices, and adopting innovative approaches, educators can help students develop their language skills effectively. It is imperative for educational institutions to embracethese strategies to equip students with the necessary language skills they need to thrive in an increasingly globalized world.在现代社会中,信息技术的迅速发展和普及使得人们对于信息的获取和传播变得更加方便和快捷。
1. The National People’s Congress is the highest organ of state power. 全国人民代表大会是最高国家权力机关。
2. The judicial organs of China consist of people’s courts,people’s procurator and the public security departments. 我国的司法机关由人民法院人民检查院和公安部门组成。
3. In the application of the law all citizens are deemed as equals. 一切公民在适用法律上一律平等。
4. The criminal law is one of the basic laws of our country. 刑法是我国基本法之一。
5. Criminal responsibility shall be borne for intentional crimes. 故意犯罪应当负刑事责任6. In China,the principal penalties are public surveillance,detention,fixed-time imprisonment,life imprisonment and death. 我国的主要刑罚是管制,拘役,有期徒刑,无期徒刑和死刑7. The court’s job is administering justice and upholding the law. 法院的任务是执行法律和维护法律。
8. The accused was declared innocent. 被告人被宣布为无罪。
9. The court acquitted him of a crime. 法院宣判他无罪。
10. The court pronounced the accused not guilty. 法院宣判被告无罪。
斯坦福大学英文演讲:别在不断优秀中沦落平庸〔下〕再说一遍,认为得了优秀是因为自己聪明的想法并没有任何错,不过,哈佛学生没有认识到的是他们没有第三种选择。
当我指出这一点时,她十分震惊。
我指出,真正的自尊意味着最初根本就不在乎成绩是否优秀。
真正的自尊意味着对此问题的足够认识:尽管你在成长过程中的一切都在教导你要相信自己,但你所等获得的成绩,还有那些奖励、成绩、奖品、录取通知书等所有这一切,都不能来定义你是谁。
她还说,这个年轻的女孩子说哈佛学生把他们的自我效能带到了世界上,如她所说的“创新〞。
但当我问她“创新〞意味着什么时,她能够想到的唯一例子不过是“世界大公司五百强的首席执行官〞。
我告诉她这不是创新,这只是成功,而且是狭义的成功而已。
真正的创新意味着运用你的想象力,发挥你的潜力,创造新的可能性。
但这里我并不是在谈论技术创新,不是创造新机器或者制造一种新药,我谈论的是另外一种创新,是创造你自己的生活。
不是走现成的道路,而是创造一条属于自己的道路。
我谈论的想象力是道德想象力(moral imagination:心理学专业名词)。
“道德〞在这里无关对错,而是与选择有关。
道德想象力意味着创造自己新生的能力。
它意味着不随波逐流,不是下一步要“进入〞什么名牌大学或研究生院。
而是要弄清楚自己到底想要什么,而不是父母、同伴、学校、或社会想要什么。
即确认你自己的价值观,思考迈向自己所定义的成功的道路,而不仅仅是接受别人给你的生活,不仅仅是接受别人给你的选择。
当今走进星巴克咖啡馆,效劳员可能让你在牛奶咖啡、加糖咖啡、特制咖啡等几样东西之间做出选择。
但你可以做出另外的选择,你可以转身走出去。
当你进入大学,人家给你众多项选择择,或法律或医学或投资银行和咨询以及其他,但你同样也可以做其他事,做从前根本没有人想过的事。
让我再举一个反面的例子。
几年前我写过一篇涉及同类问题的文章。
我说,那些在耶鲁和斯坦福这类名校的孩子往往比拟谨慎,去追求一些稳妥的奖励。
Understanding the true essence of the world is a profound journey that often begins with introspection and extends to the exploration of the universes mysteries.Heres an essay that delves into the concept:The Quest for the True Essence of LifeIn the vast expanse of existence,the human quest for meaning has been an enduring pursuit.It is a journey that transcends time,culture,and language,seeking to uncover the profound truths that underpin our reality.This essay aims to explore the concept of the true essence of the world from various perspectives,including philosophical,scientific, and spiritual.Philosophical PerspectivesPhilosophy has long been the realm where the most profound questions about life are pondered.Ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates,Plato,and Aristotle sought to understand the nature of existence,truth,and the good life.They believed that the essence of the world could be understood through reason and logic.In the modern era, existentialists like JeanPaul Sartre and Albert Camus explored the concept of personal freedom and the inherent absurdity of life without inherent meaning.Scientific DiscoveriesScience has provided us with a different lens through which to view the world.Through the laws of physics,chemistry,and biology,we have come to understand the mechanisms that govern our universe.The theory of evolution,for instance,offers a naturalistic explanation for the diversity of life on Earth.Quantum mechanics,with its strange and counterintuitive principles,challenges our classical understanding of reality,suggesting that the essence of the world may be far more complex and interconnected than we initially thought.Spiritual and Religious InsightsReligion and spirituality offer another avenue for comprehending the worlds essence. Many religious traditions propose that the true nature of existence is divine or transcendent.For example,in Hinduism,the concept of Brahman represents the ultimate reality that is the source of all existence.Buddhism teaches that the essence of life is characterized by impermanence,suffering,and the possibility of enlightenment.The Role of Personal ExperienceUltimately,the understanding of the worlds true essence is deeply personal.Each individuals experiences,beliefs,and values contribute to a unique perspective on life. Some may find meaning through relationships and community,while others may seek it through solitude and introspection.The essence of the world,in this sense,is not a fixed concept but a dynamic and evolving understanding that is shaped by our individual journeys.ConclusionThe quest to understand the true essence of the world is a multifaceted endeavor that involves delving into the depths of human thought,scientific discovery,and spiritual insight.It is a journey that is as old as humanity itself and continues to inspire us to seek deeper understanding and connection with the universe.While there may not be a single answer to what the true essence of the world is,the pursuit itself is a testament to our innate desire for meaning and our relentless quest for knowledge.This essay provides a broad overview of how different fields contribute to our understanding of the worlds essence,emphasizing the importance of personal experience in shaping our individual perspectives.。
Disciplinary Sanction Provisions for Foreign Students of Jiuzhou College ofVocation and TechnologyTo strengthen the ethos discipline construction, maintain normal school teaching order and life order, and create a good learning and living environment, according to the Ministry of Education promulgated Regular Institutions of Higher Education Student Management Provisions, Institution of Higher Education Accept Foreign Students Provisions and other laws and provisions, combined with our school’s actual situation, this provisions are developed. Article 1 The provisions are applicable to all students at all levels and all grades registered in the school.Article 2 Student disciplinary sanction should be done with proper procedures, clear and sufficient evidence, accurate determination and appropriate sanctions.Article 3 Types of disciplinary sanction are divided into:(A) Warning;(B) Serious warning;(C) Demerits;(D) Academic probation;(E) School expulsion.Article 4 For foreign students with one of the following circumstances, a lighter or mitigated punishment may be given:(A) Actively admit misconduct after disciplinary, with profound understanding and outstanding repentance performance;(B) Take the initiative to expose misconduct of others, which is verified.Article 5For students be subject to disciplinary sanction with one of the following circumstances, increase a level of punishment:(A) After discipline, refuse to admit fault; or provide perjury, obstruct the investigation and handling; or take excuse representations and unreasonable entanglement after the punishment, with bad attitude;(B) Take threat or retaliation actions against the prosecutors, witnesses or management personnel;(C) Those who have received disposition at the school.Article 6 For those who are in violation of Chinese laws, constitute a criminal offense, school expulsion punishment will be given. In violation of security provisions, of harsh nature, school expulsion punishment will be given; other violations of security provisions, depending on the seriousness, demerits or academic probation punishment will be given.Article 7 For those who organize and incite riots, sabotage stability and unity, disturb social order, school expulsion will be given; organize and establish illegal organizations or plan, organize large rallies, marches, demonstrations and other activities without approval from relevant organizations, school expulsion will be given; participate in illegal organizations, rallies, marches, demonstrations and other activities, depending on the seriousness, criticize education or warning will be given.Article 8 For those who are in violation of the school management provisions, affecting school teaching order, life order and public spaces management order, infringe legitimate rights and interests of other individuals and organizations, does not constitute a crime, depending on the circumstances and consequences, he following sanctions will be given: (A) For those who are in violation of the school management provisions, affecting school teaching order, life order and public spaces management order, infringe legitimate rights and interests of other individuals and organizations, warning, serious warning or demerit will be given. If the circumstances and consequences are serious, probation or expulsion will be given;(B) For those who obstruct national staff, school administrators to perform perform official business in accordance with laws or school discipline rules and provisions, depending on the circumstances and consequences of the severity, warning until probation punishment will be given;(C) For those who deliberately destruct public facilities, damage schools or others’ property, make illegal use of electricity, fire and other dangerous items, and cause consequences, in addition to compensation for economic losses, a serious warning or demerit will be given; (D) For those who take sexual harassment and other acts of hooliganism, causes trouble for excessive drinking, gambling or provide gambling conditions, a serious warning or demerit will be given;(E) Disseminate, copy illegal books or audio-visual products, engage in illegal pyramid schemes or conduct religious activities in school, a serious warning or demerit will be given;(F) Insult, slander, lodge false accusation, frame-up or threaten others, infringe others’ communication freedom, a warning, serious warning or demerit will be given.Article 9In violation of the "Jiuzhou College of Vocation and Technology foreign students dormitory provisions," the following sanctions will be given:(A) Night out without the approval of the college, who has accumulated two times per semester, a warning will be given; up to 3 times, a serious warning will be given; up to 5 times, a demerit will be given; up to 7 times and above, an academic probation punishment will be given;(B) Accommodate others in foreign student apartment without permission, a warning and a serious warning will be given. For unauthorized off-campus renters, a serious warning will be given. Foreign students apply to off-campus housing for special reasons and get the approval from the college, in violation of relevant provisions, and cause adverse impacts to the school, demerits or probation sanction will be given;(C) Foreign students are not allowed to use open flame or burn debris in the apartment, may not cook food in the room. In case fire caused by negligence, depending on the seriousness, a serious warning or more serious sanction will be given.(D) Breach of electricity provisions, make private use of illegal electrical appliances, depending on the specific circumstances, warning or more serious sanction will be given. (E) During classes and lunch time, 23:00 in the night, make loud noise, play musical instruments, play music, organize gatherings and other actions in the foreign students apartment to affect others to learn, live, rest, criticism and education will be given, for those who do not listen to discourage, depending on the circumstances of severity, a warning or more serious sanction will be given.(F) Other violations of the provisions of the apartment management, depending on the seriousness, a warning or more serious sanction will be given.Article 10 For misconduct in interpersonal, serious violation of public morality, depending on the seriousness, demerits or probation sanction will be given.Article 11 For theft, fraud of state, collective and private properties, does not constitute a crime, depending on the seriousness, the following sanctions will be given:(A) The value is less than 500 yuan, a warning or serious warning will be given;(B) The value is exceeding 500 yuan but less than 1000 yuan, a serious warning or demerit will be given;(C) The value is more than 1000 yuan, demerits or probation sanction will be given;(D) The value is less than 1000 yuan, but the one refuses to mend errors after repeated education, demerit or probation sanction will be given.Article 12 For in violation of the relevant provisions of China on computer networks use, does not constitute a crime, depending on the circumstances and the degree of harm, the following sanctions will be given:(A) write or transmit harmful information which has distorted facts or insult, slander others personality, obscenity, violence and others on the network, causing adverse effects, demerit or probation sanction will be given;(B) Intentionally produce and disseminate computer viruses and other destructive programs, undermine the normal operation of computer system, a serious warning or demerit will be given;(C) Misappropriate others’ IP address, user accounts through network, causing network security hazard, a warning or serious warning will be given.Article 13Organize, plan or participate in fight, scuffle, does not constitute a crime, in addition to undertaking appropriate economic compensation (including the victim's medical expenses, nursing fee, and other expenses necessary) responsibilities, the following sanctions will be given:(A) For fight, scuffle planner, perpetrator, a demerit will be given; where the circumstances are serious, probation sanction will be given;(B) Participate in a fight, scuffle, depending on the seriousness, a warning or serious warning will be given;(C) Willfully provide tools and instruments for others to fight, a demerit will be given. Article 14 For those who take unlawful possession, carrying the Chinese public security authorities controlled tools, a serious warning will be given; causing the consequences, a demerit sanction will be given depending on the seriousness.Article 15 For those who take addictive drugs, depending on the seriousness, a demerit or probation sanction will be given.Article 16 For those who secretly swim in rivers, a warning or serious warning will be given. Article 17 When the accumulated absenteeism time reaches certain credit hours, the appropriate sanction will be given:(A) 16 credit hours, a warning will be given;(B) 24 credit hours, a serious warning will be given;(C) 32 credit hours, a demerit will be given;(D) 40 credit hours, a probation sanction will be given;(E) When the accumulated absenteeism time reaches 50 credit hours or leave school without asking for leave for consecutive weeks and fail to participate in the required teaching activities, the student will be ordered to drop out of school.Article 18 For those who are in violation of the exam provisions, the following sanctions will be given:(A) The candidate does not comply with the examination disciplines, abide by work assignments and requirements of the examination staff, with one of the following examination disciplinary offences, a warning or serious warning will be given;1. Carry items other than those specified into the examination room or fail to place in the specified location;2. Fail to participate in the examination on the specified seat;3. Answer examination paper before the exam start signal is sent or keep to answer examination paper after the exam end signal is sent;4. Peep, whisper to each other, make secret signal or gesture during exam;5. Within the examination room or educational testing institutions prohibited scope, make noise, smoke or conduct other actions affecting order of examination room;6. Leave the examination room in the examination process without approval from the examination staff;7. Take examination papers and answer sheets (including answer sheet, answer paper, the same below), scratch paper and other exam papers out of the examination room;8. Write name, candidate number with pen or paper other than specified or write on place other than the examination paper specified scope or otherwise mark message on the answer sheet;9. Other behaviors in violation of examination room rules but not yet constitute cheating.(B) For those with the following cheating behaviors, a demerit will be given; if the circumstances are serious, a probation sanction will be given:1. Take exam content related text material or electronic equipment containing exam content related information into the examination room;2. Plagiarism or assist others to copy exam answers or information related to the exam content;3. Rob, steal others’ exam papers, answer or force others to provide convenience for their own plagiarism;4. Intentionally destroy papers, answer sheet or exam material;5. Transmit, receive goods or exchange papers and answer sheets, scratch paper;6. Other cheating behaviors.(C) For those with the following cheating behaviors, depending on the circumstances, probation or expulsion sanction will be given:1. Take exam replaced by others or replace others to enter examination;2. Organize cheating;3. Use communications equipment for cheating;4. Other serious cheating behaviors.Article 19For those who plagiarize, copy others’ research results, a demerit or probation sanction will be given, if the circumstances are serious, a expulsion will be given.Article 20 Practice fraud, forge documents, deceive organizations, deceive others, does not constitute a crime, depending on the seriousness, a serious warning or demerit will be given. Article 21 For foreign students have been disciplined, cancel one year scholarship from the university and assessing qualifications of various honorary titles.Article 22Foreign students’ probation period is generally one year. For foreign students punished by probation, colleges should regularly assess them, and offer timely assistance and education. Within one month after probation expires, the students themselves file application, and the college makes decision based on their performance, submit to college competent leadership for approval, then the probation can be lifted. Probation sanction lasts for six months but less than one year, if significant repentance performance during the period, according to the above procedures, the early termination of probation may be done. For those who inviolate the disciplines again during the probation period, an expulsion will be given.Article 23 For foreign students punished by probation and failed to lift the probation before graduation, the school take course completion treatment for them. After the probation is expired, upon application, the working unit belonging to prove their good performance, the school audit eligible for graduation, the school may exchange graduation certificate.Article 24 For foreign students being expulsed from academic status, the school grants learning proof. Foreign students should go through leaving school formalities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the school, and leave school within 10 days after receiving the notice.Article 25For misconducts not listed in the provisions, but sanction shall be given, give sanction with reference to the most similar terms.Article 26 For sanctions materials of foreign students, the college shall truly and completely keep into archives.Article 27 The provisions are interpreted by Jiuzhou College of Vocation and Technology.。
关于法律的英语谚语【篇一:关于法律的英语谚语】法律谚语格言名言英文版精选 consent makes law.合意产生法律. custom has the force of law.民俗具有法律效力. except as otherwise provided by law.法律另有规定的除外. every law has a loop hole.凡是法律皆有漏洞. law governs man , reason the law.法律管制人,理性管法律。
law is law, just or not.无论正义与否,法律就是法律. law is mind without reason.法律是无由的理念. no one is above the law.任何人不能凌驾于法律之上. one with the law is a majority.谁拥有法律,谁就是大多数.10. the law wil catch up with him in the end.最终法律饶不了他.法律谚语格言名言英文版 the more laws, the more offences.法律越多,违法者越多. this document is legally binding.该法律文件具有法律约束力. the law is in abeyance.此法暂缓执行. this law has become a dead letter.此法已成为一纸空文. where law ends, tyranny begins.法律的终点便是暴政的起点. a later statute takes away the effect of a prior one.后法优于前法. arms and laws do not flourish together.武力与法律不能同时兴盛.customs,religious and philosophies tend to form the basis for a nation s laws. 风俗宗教和哲学常是一个国家法律构成之基础. equity is a correction of common legal rules in their defective parts. 衡平法是对普通法律规则中瑕疵部分的矫正.10. every law has no atom of strength, as far as no public opinion supports it. 若无公众舆论支持,法律是没有丝毫力量的. 11. in civilized life, law floats in a sea of ethics.在文明社会,法律依靠道德所支撑.12. it can hardly be taken to be a guarantee that every law shall treat every person the same.不能保证每一部法律都能平等地对待每一个人。
【英文演讲】经典演讲- Religious Belief and Public MoralityMario Matthew Cuomo"Religious Belief and Public Morality"Thank you very much, Father Hesburgh, Father McBrien, all the distinguished clergy who are present, ladies and gentlemen:I am very pleased to be at Notre Dame and I feel very much at home, frankly --not just because you have seven or eight hundred students from New York state, not just because --not just because Father McBrien's mother's name is Catherine Botticelli -- a beautiful name -- not just because Father Hesburgh is a Syracuse native, but also because of your magnificent history of great football teams. Oh, the subway -- They mean a lot to us, the...great Fighting Irish. The subway alumni of New York City have always been enthralled. And for years and years all over the state, Syracuse north and south, out on Long Island, people on Saturday's would listen to their radio and now watch their television to watch the great Fighting Irish wearing the Gallic Green. It's marvelous. The names of your great players reverberate back from the years: Nick Buoniconti, Nick Pietrosante, Angelo Bertelli. How about Ralph Guglielmi? What a great player he is.I want to begin this talk by drawing your attention to the title of the lecture: "Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor'sPerspective." I was not invited to speak on "church and state" generally, and certainly not to speak on "Mondale against Reagan." The subject assigned to me is difficult enough. I'll not try to do more than I've been asked.I'm honored by the invitation, but the record shows that I'm not the first governor of New York State to appear at an event involving Notre Dame. One of my great predecessors, Al Smith, went to the Army-Notre Dame football game each time it was played in New York. His fellow Catholics expected Smith to sit with Notre Dame; protocol required him to sit with Army because it was the home team. Protocol prevailed. But not without Smith noting the dual demands on his affections: "I’ll take my seat with Army," he said, "but I commend my soul to Notre Dame!"Today, frankly, I'm happy I have no such problem: Both my seat and my soul are with Notre Dame. And as long as Father McBrien or Father Hesburgh doesn't invite me back to sit with him at the Notre Dame-St. John’s basketball game, I'm confident my loyalties will remain undivided. And in a sense, it’s a question of loyalty that Father McBrien has asked me here today to discuss. Specifically, must politics and religion in America divide our loyalties? Does the "separation between church and state" imply separation between religion and politics? Between morality and government? And are these different propositions? Even more specifically, what is the relationship of my Catholicism to mypolitics? Where does the one end and the other begin? Or are they divided at all? And if they're not, should they be?These are hard questions. No wonder most of us in pubic life -- at least until recently -- preferred to stay away from them, heeding the biblical advice that if "hounded and pursued in one city," we should flee to another. Now, however, I think that it's too late to flee. The questions are all around us; the answers are coming from every quarter. Some of them have been simplistic; most of them fragmentary; and a few, spoken with a purely political intent, demagogic. There's been confusion and compounding of confusion, a blurring of the issue, entangling it in personalities and election strategies, instead of clarifying it for Catholics, as well as for others.Today, I'd like to try -- just try -- to help correct that. And of course I can offer you no final truths, complete and unchallengeable. But it's possible that this one effort will provoke other efforts --both in support and contradiction of my position -- that will help all of us to understand our differences and perhaps even discover some basic agreement. In the end, I am absolutely convinced that we will all benefit if suspicion is replaced by discussion, innuendo by dialogue, if the emphasis in our debate turns from a search for talismanic criteria and neat but simplistic answers to an honest, more intelligent attempt at describing the role that religion has in our public affairs, and the limits placed on that role. And if we do itright -- if we're not afraid of the truth even when the truth is complex --this debate, by clarification, can bring relief to untold numbers of confused, even anguished Catholics, as well as to many others who want only to make our already great democracy even stronger than it is.I believe the recent discussion in my own state has already produced some clearer definition. As you may know, in early summer an impression was created in some quarters that official Church spokespeople would ask Catholics to vote for or against specific candidates on the basis of their political position on the abortion issue alone. I was one of those that was given that impression. Thanks to the dialogue that ensued over the summer -- only partially reported by the media -- we learned that the impression was not accurate.Confusion had presented an opportunity for clarification, and we seized it. Now all of us -- all of us are saying one thing, in chorus, reiterating the statement of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops that they will not take positions for or against specific political candidates, and that their stand --the stand of the bishops and the cardinals --on specific issues should not be perceived as an expression of political partisanship. Now, of course the bishops will teach --they must teach --more and more vigorously, and more and more extensively. But they have said they will not use the power of their position, and the great respect it receives from all Catholics, to give an imprimatur to individual politicians orparties. Not that they couldn't do it if they wished to -- some religious leaders, as you know, do it. Some are doing it at this very moment. And not that it would be a sin if they did. God does not insist on political neutrality. But because it is the judgment of the bishops, and most of us Catholic laypeople, that it is not wise for prelates and politicians to be too closely tied together.Now, I think that getting this consensus in New York was an extraordinarily useful achievement. And now, with some trepidation, I take up your gracious invitation to continue the dialogue in the hope that it will lead to still further clarification.Let me begin this part of the effort by underscoring the obvious. I do not speak as a theologian; I don't have that competence. I do not speak as a philosopher; to suggest that I could, would be to set a new record for false pride. I don’t presume to speak as a "good" person, except in the ontological sense of that word. My principal credential is that I serve in a position that forces me to wrestle with the problems that you've come here to study and to debate.I am by training a lawyer and by practice a politician. Now, both those professions make me suspect in many quarters, including --including some of my own coreligionists. Maybe there's no better illustration of the public perception of how politicians unite their faith and their profession than the story they tell in New York about "Fishhooks"McCarthy, a famous Democratic leader. (He actually lived.) "Fish Hooks" McCarthy lived on the Lower East Side. He was right-hand man to Al Smith, the prototypical political person of his time. "Fishhooks," the story goes, was devout. So devout that every morning on his way to Tammany Hall to do his political work, he stopped into St. James Church on Oliver Street in downtown Manhattan, fell on his knees, and whispered every morning the same simple prayer: "O, Lord, give me health and strength. We'll steal the rest.""Fishhooks" notwithstanding, I speak here as a politician; and also as a Catholic, a layperson baptized and raised in the pre-Vatican II Church, educated in Catholic schools, attached to the Church first by birth, then by choice, now by love; an old-fashioned Catholic who sins, regrets, struggles, worries, gets confused, and most of the time feels better after confession. The Catholic Church is my spiritual home. My heart is there, and my hope.But there is, of course, more to being a Catholic than a sense of spiritual and emotional resonance. Catholicism is a religion of the head as well as the heart, and to be a Catholic is to say, "I believe," to the essential core of dogmas that distinguishes our faith. The acceptance of this faith requires a lifelong struggle to understand it more fully and to live it more truly, to translate truth into experience, to practice as well as to believe. That's not easy: applying religious belief to everyday life often presentsdifficult challenges. And it's always been that way. It certainly is today. The America of the late twentieth century is a consumer society, filled with endless distractions, where faith is more often dismissed than challenged, where the ethnic and other loyalties that once fastened us to our religion seem to be weakening.In addition to all the weaknesses, all the dilemmas, all the temptations that impede every pilgrim's progress, the Catholic who holds political office in a pluralistic democracy, a Catholic who is elected to serve Jews and Muslims and atheists and Protestants, as well as Catholics, bears special responsibility. He or she undertakes to help create conditions under which all can live with a maximum of dignity and with a reasonable degree of freedom; where everyone who chooses may hold beliefs different from specifically Catholic ones, sometimes even contradictory to them; where the laws protect people's right to divorce, their right to use birth control devices, and even to choose abortion.In fact, Catholic public officials take an oath to preserve the Constitution that guarantees this freedom. And they do so gladly, not because they love what others do with their freedom, but because they realize that in guaranteeing freedom for all, they guarantee our right to be Catholics: our right to pray, our right to use the sacraments, to refuse birth control devices, to reject abortion, not to divorce and remarry if we believe it to be wrong.The Catholic public official lives the political truth that most Catholics through most of American history have accepted and insisted on: the truth that to assure our freedom we must allow others the same freedom, even if occasionally it produces conduct by them which we would hold to be sinful. I protect my right to be a Catholic by preserving your right to be a Jew, or a Protestant, or a nonbeliever, or anything else you choose. We know that the price of seeking to force our belief on others is that they might someday force their belief on us.Now, this freedom is the fundamental strength of our unique experiment in government. In the complex interplay of forces and considerations that go into the making of our law and policies, its preservation, the preservation of freedom, must be a pervasive and dominant concern. But insistence on freedom is easier to accept as a general proposition than in its applications to specific situations because there are other valid general principles firmly embedded in our Constitution, which, operating at the same time, create interesting and occasionally troubling problems. Thus, the same amendment of the Constitution that forbids the establishment of a state church affirms my legal right to argue that my religious belief would serve well as an article of our universal public morality.I may use the prescribed processes of government -- the legislative and executive and judicial processes --to convince my fellow citizens, Jewsand Protestants and Buddhists and nonbelievers, that what I propose is as beneficial for them as I believe it is for me. But it's not just parochial or narrowly sectarian but fulfills a human desire for order, for peace, for justice, for kindness, for love, for any of the values that most of us agree are desirable even apart from their specific religious base or context.I'm free to argue for a governmental policy for a nuclear freeze not just to avoid sin, but because I think my democracy should regard it as a desirable goal. I can, if I wish, argue that the state should not fund the use of contraceptive devices not because the Pope demands it, but because I think that the whole community -- for the good of the whole community -- should not sever sex from an openness to the creation of life. And surely I can, if I am so inclined, demand some kind of law against abortion, not because my bishops say it is wrong, but because I think that the whole community, regardless of its religious beliefs, should agree on the importance of protecting life -- including life in the womb, which is at the very least potentially human and should not be extinguished casually.Now, no law prevents us from advocating any of these things. I am free to do so. So are the bishops. So is Reverend Falwell. In fact, the Constitution guarantees my right to try. And theirs. And his.But should I? Is it helpful? Is it essential to human dignity? Would it promote harmony and understanding? Or does it divide us sofundamentally that it threatens our ability to function as a pluralistic community? When should I argue to make my religious value your morality? My rule of conduct your limitation? What are the rules and policies that should influence the exercise of this right to argue and to promote?Now, I believe I have a salvific mission as a Catholic. Does that mean I am in conscience required to do everything I can as governor to translate all of my religious values into the laws and regulations of the State of New York or of the United States? Or be branded a hypocrite if I don’t? As a Catholic, I respect the teaching authority of my bishops. But must I agree with everything in the bishops' pastoral letter on peace and fight to include it in party platforms? And will I have to do the same for the forthcoming pastoral on economics even if I am an unrepentant supply-sider? Must I, having heard the pope once again renew the Church's ban on birth control devices as clearly as it's been done in modern times --must I as governor veto the funding of contraceptive programs for non-Catholics or dissenting Catholics in my state? I accept the Church's teaching on abortion. Must I insist that you do by denying you Medicaid funding? By a constitutional amendment? And if by a constitutional amendment, which one? Would that be the best way to avoid abortions or to prevent them?Now, these are only some of the questions for Catholics. People withother religious beliefs face similar problems. Let me try some answers. Almost all Americans accept the religious values as a part of our public life. We are a religious people, many of us descended from ancestors who came here expressly to live their religious faith free from coercion or repression. But we are also a people of many religions, with no established church, who hold different beliefs on many matters. Our public morality, then -- the moral standards we maintain for everyone, not just the ones we insist on in our private lives --depends on a consensus view of right and wrong. The values derived from religious belief will not --and should not --be accepted as part of the public morality unless they are shared by the pluralistic community at large, by consensus. So that the fact that values happen to be religious values does not deny them acceptability as part of this consensus. But it does not require their acceptability, either.Think about it: The agnostics who joined the civil rights struggle were not deterred because that crusade's values had been nurtured and sustained in black Christian churches. And those on the political left are not perturbed today by the religious basis of the clergy and laypeople who join them in the protest against the arms race and hunger and exploitation.The arguments start when religious values are used to support positions which would impose on other people restrictions that they findunacceptable. Some people do object to Catholic demands for an end to abortion, seeing it as a violation of the separation of church and state. And some others, while they have no compunction about invoking the authority of Catholic bishops in regard to birth control and abortion, might reject out of hand their teaching on war and peace and social policy.Ultimately, therefore, what this means is that the question whether or not we admit religious values into our public affairs is too broad to yield to a single answer. Yes, we create our public morality through consensus and in this country that consensus reflects to some extent the religious values of a great majority of Americans. But no, all religiously based values don't have an a priori place in our public morality. The community must decide if what is being proposed would be better left to private discretion than public policy, whether it restricts freedoms, and if so to what end, to whose benefit, whether it will produce a good or bad result, whether overall it will help the community or merely divide it.Now, the right answers to these terribly subtle and complex questions can be elusive. Some of the wrong answers, however, are quite clear. For example, there are those who say there is a simple answer to all these questions; they say that by history and by the practice of our people we were intended from the beginning to be --and should be today --a Christian country in law. But where would that leave the nonbelievers?And whose Christianity would be law, yours or mine? This "Christian nation" argument should concern -- even frighten -- two groups in this society: non-Christians and thinking Christians. And I believe it does.I think it's already apparent that a good part of this nation understands --if only instinctively --that anything which seems to suggest that God favors a political party or the establishment of a state church is wrong and dangerous. Way down deep the American people are afraid of an entangling relationship between formal religions --or whole bodies of religious belief -- and government. Apart from the constitutional law and apart from religious doctrine, there's a sense that tells us it's wrong to presume to speak for God or to claim God's sanction of our particular legislation and his rejection of all other positions. Most of us are offended when we see religion being trivialized by its appearance in political throwaway pamphlets. The American people need no course in philosophy or political science or Church history to know that God should not be made into a celestial party chairman.To most of us, the manipulative invoking of religion to advance a politician or a party is frightening and divisive. The American public will tolerate religious leaders taking positions for or against candidates, although I think the Catholic bishops are right in avoiding that position. But the American people are leery about large religious organizations, powerful churches, or synagogue groups engaging in such activities --again, not as a matter of law or doctrine, but because our innate wisdom and our democratic instinct teaches us these things are dangerous for both sides --dangerous for the religious institution, dangerous for the rest of our society.Now, today there are a number of issues involving life and death that raise questions of public morality. And they are also questions of concern to most religions. Pick up a newspaper -- almost any newspaper -- and you're almost certain to find a bitter controversy over any one of these questions: Baby Jane Doe, the right to die, artificial insemination, embryos in vitro, abortion, birth control -- not to mention nuclear war and the shadow that it throws across all of existence.Now, some of these issues touch the most intimate recesses of our lives, our roles as someone's mother or child or husband; some affect women in a unique way. But they are also public questions, for all of us -- public questions, not just religious one[s]. Put aside what God expects. Assume, if you like, that there is no God. Say that the Supreme Court has taken God entirely out of our civics. Then the greatest thing still left to us, the greatest value available to us, would be life -- life itself. Even a radically secular world must struggle with the questions of when life begins, under what circumstances it can be ended, when it must be protected, by what authority; it, too, must decide what protection to extend to the helpless and the dying, to the aged and the unborn, to life in all of itsphases.Now, as a Catholic, I have accepted certain answers as the right ones for myself and for my family, and because I have, they have influenced me in special ways, as Matilda’s husband, as a father of five children, as a son who stood next to his own father's deathbed trying to decide if the tubes and the needles no longer served a purpose. As a governor, however, I am involved in defining policies that determine other people's rights in these same areas of life and death. Abortion is one of these issues, and while it is only one issue among many, it is one of the most controversial and affects me in a special way as a Catholic public official. So let me spend a little time considering it.I should start, I believe, by noting that the Catholic Church's actions with respect to the interplay of religious values and public policy make clear that there is no inflexible moral principle which determines what our political conduct should be. Think about it. On divorce and birth control, without changing its moral teaching, the Church abides the civil law as it now stands, thereby accepting -- without making much of a point of it --that in our pluralistic society we are not required to insist that all our religious values be the law of the land. The bishops are not demanding a constitutional amendment for birth control or on adultery.Abortion is treated differently.Of course there are differences both in degree and quality betweenabortion and some of the other religious positions that the Church takes: Abortion is a matter of life and death and degree counts. But the differences in approach reveal a truth, I think, that is not well enough perceived by Catholics and therefore still further complicates the process for us. That is, while we always owe our bishops' words respectful attention and careful consideration, the question whether to engage the political system in a struggle to have it adopt certain articles of our belief as part of the public morality is not a matter of doctrine. It is a matter of prudential political judgment. Recently, Michael Novak put it succinctly. "Religious judgment and political judgment are both needed," he wrote, "but they are not identical."Now, my Church and my conscience require me to believe certain things about divorce, about birth control, about abortion. My Church does not order me -- under pain of sin or expulsion -- to pursue my salvific mission according to a precisely defined political plan. As a Catholic I accept the Church's teaching authority. And while in the past some Catholic theologians may appear to have disagreed on the morality of some abortions --It wasn’t, I think, until 1869 that excommunication was attached to all abortions without distinction --and while some theologians may still disagree, I accept the bishops' position that abortion is to be avoided.As Catholics, my wife and I were enjoined never to use abortion todestroy the life we created, and we never have. We thought Church doctrine was clear on this. And more than that, both of us felt it in full agreement with what our own hearts and our own consciences told us. For me, for Matilda, life or fetal life in the womb should be protected, even if five of nine justices of the Supreme Court and my neighbor disagree with me. A fetus is different from an appendix or a set of tonsils. At the very least, even if the argument is made by some scientists or theologians that in the early stages of fetal development we can't discern human life, the full potential of human life is indisputably there. That, to my less subtle mind, by itself is enough to demand respect, and caution, indeed reverence.But not everyone in our society agrees with me and Matilda. And those who don’t -- those who endorse legalized abortions -- aren’t a ruthless, callous alliance of anti-Christians determined to overthrow our moral standards. In many cases, the proponents of legal abortion are the very people who have worked with Catholics to realize the goals of social justice set out by popes in encyclicals: the American Lutheran Church, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the Presbyterian Church in the United States, B'nai B'rith Women, the Women of the Episcopal Church. And these are just a few of the religious organizations that don't share the Catholic Church's position on abortion.Now, certainly, we should not be forced to mold Catholic morality toconform to disagreement by non-Catholics, however sincere they are, however severe their disagreement. Our bishops should be teachers, not pollsters. They should not change what we Catholics believe in order to ease our consciences or please our friends or protect the Church from criticism. But if the breadth and intensity and sincerity of opposition to Church teaching shouldn't be allowed to shape our Catholic morality, it can't help but determine our ability -- our realistic, political ability -- to translate our Catholic morality into civil law, a law not for the believers who don't need it but for the disbelievers who reject it.And it's here, in our attempt to find a political answer to abortion -- an answer beyond our private observance of Catholic morality --that we encounter controversy within and without the Church over how and in what degree to press the case that our morality should be everybody else's morality. I repeat, there is no Church teaching that mandates the best political course for making our belief everyone's rule, for spreading this part of our Catholicism. There is neither an encyclical nor a catechism that spells out a political strategy for achieving legislative goals. And so the Catholic trying to make moral and prudent judgments in the political realm must discern which, if any, of the actions one could take would be best.This latitude of judgment is not something new in our Catholic Church. It's not a development that has arisen only with the abortion issue. Take,for example, a very popular illustration -- and I heard about again tonight two or three times, and I'm told about often: the question of slavery. It has been argued that the failure to endorse a legal ban on abortions is equivalent to refusing to support the cause of abolition before the Civil War. This analogy has been advanced by bishops of my own state.But the truth of the matter is, as I'm sure you know, few, if any, Catholic bishops spoke for abolition in the years before the Civil War. And it wasn’t, I believe, that the bishops endorsed the idea of some humans owning and exploiting other humans. Not at all. Pope Gregory XVI, in 1840, had condemned the slave trade. Instead it was a practical political judgment that the bishops made. And they weren’t hypocrites; they were realists. Remember, at the time, the Catholics were a small minority, mostly immigrants, despised by much of the population, often vilified and the object even of sporadic violence. In the face of a public controversy that aroused tremendous passions and threatened to break the country apart, the bishops made a pragmatic decision. They believed their opinion would not change people's minds. Moreover, they knew that there were Southern Catholics, even some priests, who owned slaves. They concluded that under the circumstances arguing for a constitutional amendment against slavery would do more harm than good, so they were silent -- as they have been, generally, in recent years, on the question of birth control, and as the Church has been on even。
T he E ngl ish r efor ma tion: religious reform in England in 16 century .as a result, the church of English was established as a state church.T he gl ori ou s r ev ol utio n:William landed at Torbay on NOV 15, 1688 marched upon London. In England this takeover was relatively smooth with no bloodshed nor any execution of the king.T he b i ll o f rig h ts: is the term used to for the first ten amendments to the US constitution. It guarantees freedom of religious, freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and petition, freedom from unreasonable searches and legal rights.U tili tar ia ni sm: was the ideal of Jeremy Bentham suggested the government's function should be to achieve “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”should be done in two ways: government should be efficient; should interfere as little as possible.Blac k D ea th:modern name given to the deadly bubonic plague. Spread though Europe in the 14 century 1347``1650 killed one half and one third the population in England.Con sti tu ti on al M onarc hy: is a system, under this system the King or Queen is head of the state, but their power is limited by Parliament or the law.Bosto n T ea Par ty: in 1773, British ships of tea reached Boston; several dozen residents dressed as Indians boarded the ships at night threw the tea into the harbor.Red Sc ar e: took place in America in 1919`1920.during it many Communists and Progressive people were arrested in America.T he Bri ti sh Co mmo nw ea lth: a voluntary association of some 40 countries that were once British colonies.Whi g s (i n Br itai n): originated with the Glorious Revolution .known by the nickname, derogatory name for cattle drives. Loosely speaking, the Whigs were those who opposed absolutely monarchy and supported the right to religious freedom for Nonconformists.N ew D eal: a program put forward by President Roosevelt to overcome the Great Depression.Cou ntercu ltur e: was a movement of revolt against the values, the aesthetic standards, the personal behavior and the social relations of conventional society.Blood y M ary: during Queen Mary's reign, at least 300 Protestants were burnt as heretics.Ch ec ks a nd b a lan c es: it is a system by the US constitution. According to it powers are divided among government branches and those branches check each other.T he thr ee w av es o f i mmigra tion to A mer ica n:1) 1810``1854:2)1860``1890 :3)1890```1914Blac k T hur sd ay o f 1929: referred to Oct 24, 1929, the day when the stock market in the United States collapsed. Tens of millions of shares were dumped on the Market and millions of dollars of paper profit were wiped out within a few hours.T he Ch urc h o f E ng la nd: a state church supported by the British government .the king is head of the Church of England.T erti ary c oll eg es: offer a range of full-time and part-time vocational cause for student over 16, as well as academic courses.T he U S fed era l sy stem: the US Constitution sets up a federal system of government which has two layers of rule .there is a central or federal government for the nation which alone has the power to answer question that affect the nation as a whole .there are also state and local governments .Each layer of government has separate and distinct powers laid down in the Constitution.Buil t envir on ment: refers to those features of the environment built by people or changed by people.Ben efi t o f cl ergy: referred to the privilege given to clerks in English history. At that time, clerks charged with criminals offences were tried in the Bishop's courts instead of in the king's court, and the Bishop's court did not inflict corporal punishment.T he ar ticl es of Co nfed er atio n: It was the first constitution of the US of America adopted at the Second Continental Congress and used during the war of Independence against Britain.Ban k h ol id ay s: are also called official public holidays. The term goes back to the Bank holidays Act of 1871.owes its name to the fact that banks are closed on the days specified.Rou nd h ead s: supporters of parliament in the English Civil Wars called Roundheads because of their short haircutsT he gr ea t C har ter: also know as Magna Carta which the English barons limited the King's powers. Regarded as the foundation of English liberties.T he Ind u str ia l R evo lu ti on: refers to the mechanization of industry and Consequent changes in social and economic organization in Britain in the 18 and 19 centuries. Britain was the first country to industrialize in Europe.T he Ca nad ia n S hi eld: covers almost half of Canada and it is a semicircular band of rocky highlands and plateaus around Houdon Bay from the northern shores of Quebec to the Arctic shores of the northeastterritories.Comp r eh en siv e sc ho ol s take pupils without references to ability or aptitude and provide a wide a wide-ranging secondary education for all or most of the children in a district.T he Pur i tan s were wealthy, well-educated gentlemen .They wanted to purify the Church of England .Dissatisfied with the political corruption in England and threatened with religious persecution, the Puritan leaders saw the New World as the refuge provide by God for those he meant to save.War Pow er A ct: it was an act that limited the president's power in sending troops aboard and required the President to consult Congress before any such decision.T he C ommo nw eal th: it is a free association of independent countries that were once colonies of Britain. Nations are joined together economically and have certain trading arrangements. The decision to become to become a member of the Commonwealth is left to each nation.E lectora l Col l eg e: the electors of all 50 states and the District of Columbia –a total of 538 persons—persons –comprise what is known as the Electoral College .To be successful, a candidate for the Presidency must receive 270 votes.N o ta xa tio n w ith ou t r ep r esen ta ti on: the people in the British colonies opposed the unfair treatment by the British government. They declared,”No taxation without representation”, that is, without their representatives taking part in decision making, they had no obligation to pay taxes to Britain. Britai n's tw o-p ar ty sy stem: the Conservation party and the Labor Party since 1945 either of the two parties has held power.Rena i ssanc e: was the traditional period between the Middle Ages and modern in Europe ,covering the years C1350-1650.The Renaissance was a period of significant achievement and change.M ultic ul tural i sm: means to recognize that Australians are from different backgrounds and social cohesion is attained by tolerating differences within an agreed legal and constitutional framework. M anifest D estin y: refers to the theory that said it was right for the US to expand territory.T he h und r ed y ear s' w ar: refers to the intermittent war between France and England that lasted from 1337to 1453.E stab li sh ed ch urc h es: two established churches in Britain, that is, churches legally recognized as official churches of state; in England the churches of England and in Scotland the Church of Scotland.Ab oli tio ni sts: were those Americans who demanded immediate abolition of slavery before the Civil War.T op ograp hical r egi on s refer to the regions that divide according to the shape of the surface land.Free churches are some of the Protestant Churches in Britain which are free from government.T he gr ea t d ep r essi on: refers to the great economic crisis that hit the whole capitalist world in the 1930sBlac k p ow er a mov emen t of th e b la c k Muslims led by Malcolm during the civil Rights Movement Contrary to Martian Luther King's idea, Black Power movement advocated violence and attempted to separate themselves from white society.Shad ow cab i n et: the party which wins the second largest number of seats in Parliament becomes the official Opposition and it forms its own “”cabinet” known as Shadow cabinetWha t w as th e si gn ifica nc e o f th e E ngl i sh C ivi l War?Not only overthrew feudal system in England but also shook the foundation of the feudal rule in Europe .It is generally regarded as the beginning of modern world history.Wha t w as th e op en fi eld sy stem l i ke in E ngl and i n hi stor y?Under the system, villages were surrounded by 3gteat hedge less fields .These fields were divided into strips and shared out among the villagers, one great field was left “fallow” each years so that its soil recovered richness.。
Religious Offences and Liberal Politics:From the Religious Settlements to Multi-Cultural SocietyIan HunterDraft paper, not for citing.IntroductionIn this paper I will argue that some of the key features associated with modern liberal political orders — particularly in the areas of religious toleration and cultural pluralism — are the result of specific political and legal arrangements arrived at by European states in order to contain religious civil war at the end of the seventeenth century. As such, liberal political and legal regimes contain features which are irreducible to their main modern forms of philosophical justification, some indeed which conflict with such justifications. One can of course respond to this state of affairs by declaring the actual historical arrangements to be merely factual or “non-ideal” in relation to the normative or ideal domain of political or moral philosophy. To do this, however, is to risk overlooking the normative dimensions of the historical arrangements themselves — in this case the early modern religious settlements. But it is also to risk a kind of philosopher’s self-delusion, in which it is imagined that political norms arrived at through rational introspection have an intrinsic moral force, regardless of their capacity to engage the historical political-legal order and the personae engaged in its day-to-day operations. This paper explores the contrary course. It offers a sketch of the political and legal order established by some of the early modern religious settlements, and then argues its salience for understanding the character of multi-religious and multi-cultural governance in certain modern liberal states, with particular reference to such religious offences as sacrilege and blasphemy.The post-Kantian political philosophies developed by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas can be cited in passing as prime examples of modern philosophies that fail to engage the political and legal orders arising from the early modern settlements, except to declare them in need of philosophical reconstruction or historical supersession. Rawls and Habermas are not topics of discussion in the present paper, and they are mentioned here only to illustrate the gap between modern justifications for liberal-democratic politics and the forms in which liberal political orders first emerged from the settlements that brought an end to religious civil war at the end of the seventeenth century. Despite important differences in method, Rawls and Habermas both assume that the heart of liberalism lies in justice, understood in terms of principles of political and social rights grounded in the rational consent of democratic citizens. On this view, the political and legal arrangements imposed by early liberal orders — toleration measures, church-state separation — will not be properly legitimate until they have been freely chosen by rational individuals who will see them as necessary for their own exercise of reason (Forst 2003). Yet, as Raymond Geuss has pointed out, the central norm of much early modern political thought was not justice but security or social peace (Geuss 2002). Further, many early architects of religious toleration regarded the notion of a single universal reason not as the foundation but as a threat to the cultural pluralism required for toleration, which they sought to ground in a suitably de-confessionalised political and legal regime, regardless of whether this was democratic (Hunter 2004; Thomasius 2004).If modern philosophical liberalism is significantly disengaged from the historical architecture of toleration and pluralism, however, then its communitarian critics are even more so. This is because they take Rawls at his word and assume that he is indeed the philosophical architect of the liberal political order, so that in attacking his philosophical discourse they are attacking something called liberalism. Catholic and Communitarian philosophers have thus taken it on themselves to attack something called liberal individualism, by treating this the unfortunate product of the fracturing of communal moral identity during the Reformation (MacIntyre 1981). They have also criticised the supposed rational neutrality of the liberal conception of justice, in particular its attempt to ground religious freedom in the exercise of free rational choice, rather than in the right to pursue a substantive good characteristic of a group moral identity (Sandel 1998; Galeotti1999). And finally they have attacked the presumed neutrality of key aspects of the liberal order itself, specifically the separation of church and state, arguing that this is simply a disguised moral commitment similar to the commitment to theocracy, and that only full democracy can resolve the question of which commitment should determine the political order (Bader 1999). If, however, the emergent liberal order was not grounded in a conception of justice — Kantian or Aristotelian — then much of the communitarian critique of liberalism is beside the point, regardless of its standing as a critique of Rawls. Further, if security and social peace did indeed play a key role in motivating and justifying liberal arrangements for toleration and the separation of church and state, then it is idle to attack early liberalism for lacking substantive norms, even if these norms are not those of a moral community, are quite unlike Aristotelian conceptions of an inherent moral telos, and could not possibly have been arrived at through democratic deliberation.The reason that early liberalism looks so unlike that which Rawls defends and the communitarians attack is that it was not based in a set of arguments about the nature of human reason and morality. Rather, it was based in a set of political and legal measures designed to address a particular historical situation characteristic of central and western European states during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. This situation was that of religious civil war in France and England, and, in the German Empire, a mix of two kinds of religious war, civil and inter-state. In what follows, it is argued that the key elements of early liberalism — varying degrees of toleration and church-state separation — formed part of the religious settlements that brought these wars to an end, a symptom of which was the increasing redundancy of such religious crimes as heresy, witchcraft and blasphemy. These settlements, it is argued, laid down the central cultural, political and legal protocols for the liberal governance of multi-religious societies. And if we are to understand the role of these protocols in the governance of emerging multi-cultural societies, then we must attend to their historical gravity and force, rather than to their philosophical defence or critique. To do this, I will begin by briefly looking at the context in which religious offences operated in pre-liberal confessional states, then sketch the manner in which such offences were displaced by the terms of the religious settlements, before concluding by looking at recent discussion of the crime of blasphemy in the context of multi-cultural societies.Religious Offences and the Sacral StateThroughout the medieval and early modern period, European Christianity was more than just a spiritual locus. It was a formidable earthly force. It exercised direct political and juridical power through an archipelago of armed prince-bishops, the diocesan structure being in fact the footprints left by Christian warriors as the made their way across Europe, stamping out ‘paganism’ in the early middle ages (Bartlett 1993: 5-23). And it exercised indirect power through secular princes, who enforced the law of the most powerful prince-bishop — the bishop of Rome — as part of their exercise of lordship (Padoa-Schioppa 1997). Under these circumstances, where there was no clear distinction between the religious and political community or between the Christian and the citizen, religious offences were at once spiritual transgressions and a judicial felonies, attracting severe criminal punishment.We can suggest, then, that such sacrilegious offences as heresy, witchcraft and blasphemy emerged as sins and crimes in Western Europe as the result of a particular set of cultural and political circumstances: broadly, those of a transcendent sacralising religion exercising overwhelming political and juridical powers, both through its own authority and that of the secular prince or emperor. There are two broad factors to take into account. In the first place, as the obverse of the sacred, sacrilege was a powerful and authentic expression of core Christian sacramental practices, finding expression in both popular devotion and elite theological speculation. A common focus was provided by those earthly things held to be bearers of the transcendent divinity — the church and within the church the Eucharistic host — which, as the most sacred and beneficial of things, were also the most vulnerable to profanation and degradation. Thus, in many parts of late-medieval Europe, as the magical source of God’s blessing on the community, the host was paraded through the village and fields in early spring to ensure a good harvest (Baur 1992). Concomitantly, the allegation of sacrilegious profanation of the host was the routine way of triggering murderous Christian pogroms against local Jewish communities, non-believers whose polluting proximity to the circle of communicants threatened communication with God (Nirenberg 1996).Second, if sacrilege was deeply rooted in sacramental religious practice, then during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it underwent a major elaboration andcodification in canon law, where it was linked to heresy, blasphemy and witchcraft. This was the time at which the university canonists of Northern Italy developed a common legal process for dealing with this array of crimes; a process that could be initiated by denunciation, deployed oaths of veridiction, permitted the regulated use of torture to obtain evidence, denied appeal, and could result in the death sentence (Trusen 1992). The extension of canon and Roman law across Western Europe during this period resulted in a centralised system of legal authority, permitting the papacy to exert religious and civil jurisdiction via local clerical and secular authorities (Padoa-Schioppa 1997). Sacrilege thus came to be prosecuted in a much more systematic manner and, because of its linkage to heresy, blasphemy and witchcraft, participated in a cross-referring nexus of religious criminality. Heretics were thus routinely denounced as sacrilegious, their guilt being proved by the fact that they performed mock masses, feasted on Eucharistic wafers, broke crucifixes, declared Jesus to be a fraud, and so on. And those on trial for sacrilege were routinely denounced as heretics, their profane acts being indicative of their secret adherence to erroneous and ungodly beliefs.The presence of sacrilegious religious offences in early modern Europe was thus symptomatic of a tightly woven and far-flung matrix of sacramental practices, juridical procedures, and authority structures, anchored ecclesiastically in the papacy and politically in the Holy Roman Empire. Despite the relative civil autonomy of the Northern Italian city states, elsewhere in Europe this matrix resulted in a virtual super-imposition of the sacramental community on the civil community. Threats to the sacramental community resulting from sacrilege, heresy and blasphemy, once proved by the ecclesiastical courts, were subject to the harshest of punishments by the civil authorities. Conversely, threats to civil authority were themselves treated as analogous to sacrilege against the sacred person of the prince, who was God’s viceroy on earth (Kantorowicz 1957). It is this very superimposition of the sacramental and civil communities, however, that explains the intensity and uncontrollability of the religious-political conflicts that followed from the splitting of the church at the beginning of the 16th century. For once the heresy that would become the Protestant church had escaped the juridical and political machinery designed to contain such outbreaks, Protestantprinces immediately used this machinery to defend their religion against the Roman church and against rival Protestant churches and sects.Given that faith communities were demarcated by the border between the sacred and the profane — between true believers and the heretical monsters — the civil conflicts that erupted across Europe assumed a specifically religious intensity, as those one sought to exterminate were not just political enemies but polluting threats to the sacramental community and its capacity to communicate with God (Crouzet 1990). Further, this sacramental violence was made all the more difficult to control by the fact that the new religion differed from the old both in its construction of the sacred and therefore in its sense of sacrilege. The Calvinists in particular stressed the transcendence and inscrutability of God, rejecting the notion of real presence in the Eucharist, and regarding other forms of Catholic immanentism — rituals, processions, pilgrimages, relics — as sacrilegious idolatry, making sacrilege itself into a flashpoint for sacramental violence. In June 1528, for example, the first act of Calvinist iconoclasm in Paris — the vandalising of an image of the Virgin — was answered by an act of Catholic ritual cleansing, as all parishes and the university organised processions to atone for this sacrilege (Ramsey 1999: 8). Ritual burnings, disembowelments, and massacres were soon to follow, as France descended in a series of religious civil wars in which both sides viewed the extermination of the other as necessary for cleansing a spiritual pollution and restoring the purity of the sacramental community.At the same time, however, the very ferocity of this violence, which threatened the survival of the state itself, led Bodin and the politiques to make the first attempts to separate religious and political community, by developing a secular conception of sovereignty. We can see this in terms with which the Chancellor Michel de L’Hôpital addressed a peace colloquium during the first war of religion in 1562:It is not a question of establishing the faith, but of regulating the state. It ispossible to be a citizen without being a Christian. You do not cease to be asubject of the King when you separate from the Church. We can live inpeace with those who do not observe the same ceremonies. (L'Hôpital1824-5: I, 425)In fact Chancellor L’Hôpital’s words proved to be in vain in the French context, as France would eventually solve the problem of religious conflict by suppressing then eliminating the French Calvinists or Huguenots. Nonetheless, they pointed forward to a profound change — the uncoupling of political governance from Christianity spirituality — which would radically transform the character of the sacred and of sacrilege.The Spiritualising of Religion and the Desacralising of Law and PoliticsDuring the 17th century France, England, and the German Empire were all faced with the same set of problems: how to achieve religious peace and how to establish stable rule in territories containing bitterly divided religious communities. The measures that evolved to meet these problems — religious toleration being just the tip of the iceberg — would alter the disposition of the sacred and lead to the sidelining of sacrilege (together with heresy and, eventually, blasphemy) within an increasingly autonomous civil domain. Unfortunately for the historian, these developments differed significantly both within the German Empire and between England and France, so that there is no typical case. In order to keep my exposition manageable, I will thus focus on developments in the German states — Brandenburg-Prussia in particular — making do with just a few comparative remarks on England and France, acknowledging upfront the element of historical bias thus introduced.The developments that saw the institution of religious peace within the German Empire were piecemeal, protracted, and never fully successful. Nonetheless, we can detect a pattern of development in the century that separated the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and the more permanent Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In bringing an end to the Thirty Years War, Westphalia declared that henceforth all three main confessions — Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism — would be recognised and tolerated under imperial law, albeit within the limits of a complex set of arrangements intended to stabilise a particular distribution of religious communities both within and between states. In his account of this multiplex process, the German historian of church law, Martin Heckel, points to a number of key elements: the relegation of theology in favour of European public law as the key discourse in the peace negotiations; the gradual acceptance of the permanence of heresy by leading negotiators, even if the churcheswould have none of this; and, most important of all, the dropping of religious truth as a criterion for peace in the great treaties, and its replacement by a quite different kind of norm for legitimacy: namely, the attainment of social peace (Heckel 1989; Heckel 1992). In making social peace the prime duty of the sovereign — as opposed to defending the faith or enforcing religious law as God’s earthly viceroy — these developments led to a profound secularisation of the political domain. Yet, as Heckel has argued, this was not a secularisation driven by some all-embracing secularist philosophy (in the manner of the French philosophes), but one carried forward by many anonymous jurists and statesmen who remained devoted Christians (Heckel 1984). Far from attempting to expunge Christianity, their prime objective was to secure the survival of their own confessions in the face of wholesale religious slaughter. Yet they gradually accepted that for this to happen it would be necessary to separate the church’s pursuit of salvation from the state’s aim of worldly security.In the case of post-Westphalian Brandenburg-Prussia, this led to a profound dual transformation of the religious and political landscape. On the one hand, there was remarkable desacralisation of politics, as jurisconsults and political philosophers attached to the court began to reconstruct the objectives of the state in quasi-Hobbesian terms; that is, in terms of maintaining external and internal security while eschewing all higher-level religious and moral aims. On the other hand, there was a no less remarkable spiritualisation of religion, as the Pietists aided by important lay theologians attempted to undermine the whole idea of religious orthodoxy — that is, the idea that salvation was tied to a particular set of theological doctrines and sacramental practices — arguing instead that salvation came instead from a purely personal inner relation to God.The manner in which this dual desacralisation of politics and spiritualisation of religion transformed the prior construction of sacrilege, heresy, and witchcraft can be seen in the writings of Christian Thomasius, professor of law at the University of Halle in the late 17th century, lay theologian, and jurisconsult to the Brandenburg-Prussian court. In his works attacking the legal prosecution of heresy, witchcraft and sacrilege, Thomasius argued along two convergent paths. First, in keeping with his Epicurean form of Protestantism, Thomasius attacked what he called the visible church, understood as a public institution whose doctrines and rituals are necessary for salvation, arguing insteadthat the true church is invisible, known by no outward doctrinal or liturgical signs, with its members permanently scattered across the globe. This was in effect an attempt to detach salvation from the church, and it removed the theological grounds of heresy and sacrilege by (in effect) denying that God was mediated by specific sacred doctrines or by sacred rituals in holy places (Thomasius 1705). Second, in keeping with the quasi-Hobbesian conception of politics which he had learned from his mentor Samuel Pufendorf, Thomasius argued that the state had no religious objectives and must be restricted to the ends of maintaining domestic peace and external security (Thomasius 1701; Thomasius 1705). For this reason, there should be no laws against sacrilege, heresy and witchcraft as such, unless the actions associated with them gave rise to violence or civil disorder, in which case they would be punished for that reason, and not because they profaned the community of the faithful (Thomasius 1701).Unlike his more famous contemporary John Locke, Thomasius did not base his arguments for toleration on the philosophical notion of natural rights, but on the dual imperatives to spiritualise religion and desacralise the state, whose overarching goal was not personal liberty but the stable governance of multi-confessional societies (Dreitzel 1997). More generally, we can say that Thomasius’s Epicurean Christianity and Hobbesian politics were held together not by a philosophical doctrine grounded in human reason, but by a cultural-political strategy designed to address a particular set of circumstances. We gain a good insight into the character of this strategy via the key use Thomasius makes of the category of adiaphora (Thomasius 1705). Adiaphora refers to things neither commanded nor forbidden by God, hence morally indifferent in the sense of being irrelevant to salvation. As the result of his highly personalist Epicurean style of Christianity, Thomasius declared virtually the entirety of the visible church — all of its liturgies, sacraments and theological doctrines — to be morally indifferent with regards to salvation. On the one hand, this meant that forms of worship were a matter of “Christian freedom”, to be left to the disposition of individuals or groups to the extent that they posed no threat to social peace. On the other hand, it also meant that should any form of worship pose a threat to public peace then, as something morally indifferent, it was legitimately subject to the civil sovereign, who had absolute authority over all matters capable of threatening public order. The object of this dual strategy was not todefend individual freedom of conscience as such; rather, it was to deprive the churches of all civil and political authority, thereby removing the instruments of their mutual religious persecution, and establishing a de-confessionalised state as the means of maintaining a legally enforced toleration between the rival religious communities. In Brandenburg-Prussia, it was this dual strategy that led to the disappearance of such religious offences as heresy and witchcraft and the transformation of others, such as blasphemy, into public order offences no longer grounded in sacrilege.Thomasius thus marks the moment at which, after a century-and-a-half of religious war, the web of canon laws which had tied the political to the religious community began to be unpicked, allowing the persona of the citizen to be differentiated from that of the Christian; although even in Western Europe this moment was neither epochal nor universal. In late seventeenth-century England, religious peace was achieved in a quite different way: not by dismantling the confessional state, but by rebuilding it in a more stable, less persecutory form. This was achieved in accordance with two broad strategies. First, the Anglican church that was to be established as the state religion was purged of enough Anglo-Catholic theology to bring back on board moderate Calvinists, providing a stable religious middle-ground. Second, using a combination of test acts and toleration acts, non-conforming Protestants and Catholics were excluded from office-holding in the Anglican state, while permitted freedom of private worship. While this set of strategies proved no less successful in securing religious peace than those used in Brandenburg-Prussia, its effect on the laws pertaining to heresy, witchcraft, sacrilege and blasphemy was far less dramatic and uniform. While heresy and witchcraft laws were repealed during the 18th century, blasphemy remained a common law crime as a means of protecting the state religion, leading it to form a new juridical series with sedition and obscenity. Nonetheless, here too blasphemy progressively lost its basis in sacrilege, gradually assuming the form of a public order offence, with the result that blasphemy prosecutions became increasingly rare.Blasphemy and Multi-Cultural SocietiesAs a result of the broad developments just discussed, in those Western European-based jurisdictions where sacrilege and blasphemy laws remained on the books, they lost theirreligious character. As these laws evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth century, it was no longer the violation of persons, things and places inhabited by a transcendent divinity that defined the crime, but something else altogether: the giving of offence in a manner that might lead to civil disorder or violence. This sea change allows what were formerly religious offences to be either abolished or, if harmful conduct remains, to be sanctioned by non-religious public order and anti-discrimination laws. This is the tendency that informs the 1985 report of the United Kingdom’s Law Commission, which recommends abolition of the common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel on the grounds that they are archaic offences presenting unjustified infringements of the right to freedom of speech (Commission 1985). The same sense of historical development informs work of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, in its Blasphemy Report of 1994. The Commissioners thus argue that the key element of the law — that of offensiveness likely to cause civil disturbance — obviates the need for a special law on blasphemy, as this element is well covered by other public-order and anti-discrimination laws (Commission 1994). I would suggest that this kind of recommendation is indicative not of a state of affairs in which society has lost touch with the sacred; rather, it is indicative of one in which the sacred exists only at the level of society — that is, at the level of voluntary religious associations — having been purged from the coercive apparatus of the state as a result of the early modern religious settlements. This would be in keeping with the fact that the last blasphemy prosecution launched in an Australian jurisdiction — namely the action initiated by George Pell, then Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, against a painting called Piss Christ — failed. This was in part because the Victorian Supreme Court was unsure whether there was a law against blasphemy in Victoria, and in part because even if there were, the painting was unlikely to cause pubic unrest (1998).It would be a mistake, though, to think that the story ends here, or to assume that this line of development is irresistible and destined to be universal. That kind of assumption is suited to the view of a universal process of modernisation driven by the progressive realisation of humanity’s common capacity for rational self-governance. It is not suited to the account we have given, in which toleration and the separation of church and state represent a strategic response to a particular historical state of affairs, and whichdepend upon something as fallible as the institutions of a deconfessionalised liberal state. We should not be surprised, then, or take it as sign of anachronism or irrationalism, if blasphemy has returned to the political agenda of a liberal state like the United Kingdom. One of the pointers to what is at stake in this return is provided by the last blasphemy prosecution launched in the United Kingdom. One of only a handful in the twentieth century, the case against Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses arose from the complaint of a Muslim man and took place in 1991, at a time when Rushdie was under threat of religious murder from the Islamic theocracy of Iran. If the circumstances of the prosecution point to a novel form of the problem of religious friction — that arising from the presence of non-Christian religious communities in Christian or post-Christian societies — then the resolution of the case points backwards, towards the specific character of the English religious settlement. The charge against Rushdie failed because, according to the common law of England, blasphemy may only be committed against the Church of England, whose political establishment reflects the character of the Anglican Settlement (1991).If the Rushdie case was a pointer to the emergence of problems associated with the liberal government of a multi-religious and multi-cultural society, then the catastrophe of 11 September 2001 catapaulted these problems to the forefront of political and legal discussion in a way that could scarcely have been imagined at the end of the twentieth century. Before that year was out, the British government had introduced the Anti-terrorism Crime Security Act which, in addition to new police and judicial powers to deal with the planning and execution of terrorist acts, had also proposed introducing a crime of incitement to religious hatred. This would have been an extension of the existing incitement to racial hatred statutes of the Public Order Act 1986 and was aimed at increasing the legal protection available to Britain’s Islamic community. Despite concerns about the extension of state power, this combination of increasing the state’s capacity to deal with external security, while protecting religious freedom as a means of forestalling domestic religious conflict, looks very much like the actions of a deconfessionalised liberal state. In the event, the incitement to religious hatred provisions of the anti-terrorism bill failed to pass through the House of Lords, apparently due to worries about freedom of speech. It was this that led Lord Avebury to table a Private。