中小企业资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)An Analysis of Working Capital Management Results Across IndustriesAbstractFirms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the fund s available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied upin current assets. We provide insights into the performance of surv eyed firms across key components of working capital management by usi ng the CFO magazine’s annual Working CapitalManagement Survey. We discover that significant differences exist b etween industries in working capital measures across time.In addition.w e discover that these measures for working capital change significantl y within industries across time.IntroductionThe importance of efficient working capital management is indisputa ble. Working capital is the difference between resources in cash or readily convertible into cash (Current Assets) and organizational commi tments for which cash will soon be required (Current Liabilities). Th e objective of working capital management is to maintain the optimum balance of each of the working capital components. Business viabilit y relies on the ability to effectively manage receivables. inventory.a nd payables. Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. Much managerial effort is expended in b ringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back towa rd optimal levels. An optimal level would be one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency.A recent example of business attempting to maximize working capita l management is the recurrent attention being given to the applicatio n of Six Sigma®methodology. Six S igma®methodologies help companies measure and ensure quality in all areas of the enterprise. When used to identify and rectify discrepancies.inefficiencies and erroneous tra nsactions in the financial supply chain. Six Sigma®reduces Days Sale s Outstanding (DSO).accelerates the payment cycle.improves customer sati sfaction and reduces the necessary amount and cost of working capital needs. There appear to be many success stories including Jennifertwon’s(2002) report of a 15percent decrease in days that sales are outstanding.resulting in an increased cash flow of approximately $2 million at Thibodaux Regional Medical Cenrer.Furthermore bad debts declined from 3.4millin to $6000000.However.Waxer’s(2003)study of multiple firms employing Six Sig ma®finds that it is really a “get rich slow”technique with a r ate of return hovering in the 1.2 – 4.5 percent range.Even in a business using Six Sigma®methodology. an “optimal”level of working capital management needs to be identified. Industry factors may impa ct firm credit policy.inventory management.and bill-paying activities. S ome firms may be better suited to minimize receivables and inventory. while others maximize payables. Another aspect of “optimal”is the extent to which poor financial results can be tied to sub-optimal pe rformance.Fortunately.these issues are testable with data published by CFO magazine. which claims to be the source of “tools and informati on for the financial executive.”and are the subject of this resear ch.In addition to providing mean and variance values for the working capital measures and the overall metric.two issues will be addressed in this research. One research question is. “are firms within a p articular industry clustered together at consistent levels of working capital measures?For instance.are firms in one industry able to quickl y transfer sales into cash.while firms from another industry tend to have high sales levels for the particular level of inventory . The other research question is. “does working capital management perform ance for firms within a given industry change from year-to-year?”The following section presents a brief literature review.Next.the r esearch method is described.including some information about the annual Working Capital Management Survey published by CFO magazine. Findings are then presented and conclusions are drawn.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the f inance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores.should have been anticipated because the co rporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for e ight of the last ten years of its corporate life.As part of a stud y of the Fortune 500s financial management practices. Gilbert and Rei chert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects.wh ile inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the compa nies.More recently. Farragher. Kleiman and Sahu (1999) find that 55 p ercent of firms in the S&P Industrial index complete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding account s receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any curre nt asset accounts or liability accounts across industries.Thus.mixed ev idence exists concerning the use of working capital management techniq ues.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the s ubject of many articles over the years (e.g. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1 996).with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management.Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tend ency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low l evels of current liabilities. Simultaneously investigating accounts rece ivable and payable issues.Hill. Sartoris.and Ferguson (1984) find diffe rences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received.while payors view paymen t as the postmark date.Additional WCM insight across firms.industries.a nd time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of value creation that incorporate effective short-term financial management acti vities.However.these models are generic models and do not consider uni que firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located in may have more influence on th at company’s fortunes than overall GNP”(2002. 507).In fact. a car eful review of this 627-page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industr y factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In-House Credit Card”(128) and nothing on WC M stability over time. This research will attempt to fill this void by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided ver y few recent reports about working capital management. The most relev ant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) article on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effect ive supply chain management by Hadley (2004).Research Method The CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group.was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management co nsulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global l ist of clients. The original survey reports several working capital b enchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an a nnual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations”value located on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). T his value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “days of working capital”(DWC) value is based on the d ollar amount in each of the aggregate.equally-weighted receivables.inven tory.and payables accounts. The “days of working capital”(DNC) repr esents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount fromvendor until the sale to the customer.the collection of the receiva bles. and payment receipt.Thus.it reflects the companys ability to fin ance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firm and industry val ues for days sales outstanding (A/R).inventory turnover.and days payabl es outstanding (A/P).Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –2000 period .Across the nearly 1.000 firms in the survey.cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion ef ficiency”(CCE).averages 9.0 percent.Incorporating a 95 percent confide nce interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and invent ories less payables divided by daily sales.averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6).because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days).In all ins tances.the standard deviation is relatively small.suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO report s.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management Perfo rmanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its ing the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-s ix industries that had at least eight companies included in the rank ings each year.In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean ove rall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best avera ge ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assume s that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the ent ire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleum in dustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital man agement rankings.In fact.the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later i n this paper).Furthermore.the petroleum industry had the lowest standar d deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry.which ranked secon d in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst work ing capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-s econd in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures ConclusionsThe research presented here is based on the annual ratings of wo rking capital management published in CFO magazine. Our findings indic ate a consistency in how industries “stack up”against each other over time with respect to the working capital measures.However.the wor king capital measures themselves are not static (i.e.. averages of wo rking capital measures across all firms change annually); our results indicate significant movements across our entire sample over time. O ur findings are important because they provide insight to working cap ital performance across time. and on working capital management across industries. These changes may be in explained in part by macroecono mic factors Changes in interest rates.rate of innovation.and competitio n are likely to impact working capital management. As interest rates rise.there would be less desire to make payments early.which would stretch accounts payable.accounts receivable.and cash accounts. The ra mifications of this study include the finding of distinct levels of WCM measures for different industries.which tend to be stable over ti me. Many factors help to explain this discovery. The improving econom y during the period of the study may have resulted in improved turn over in some industries.while slowing turnover may have been a signal of troubles ahead. Our results should be interpreted cautiously. Our study takes places over a short time frame during a generally impr oving market. In addition. the survey suffers from survivorship bias –only the top firms within each industry are ranked each year and the composition of those firms within the industry can change annua lly.Further research may take one of two lines.First.there could bea study of whether stock prices respond to CFO magazine’s publication of working capital management rating.Second,there could be a study of which if any of the working capital management components relate to share price performance.Given our results,there studies need to take industry membership into consideration when estimating stock price reaction to working capital management performance.对整个行业中营运资金管理的研究格雷格Filbeck.Schweser学习计划托马斯M克鲁格.威斯康星大学拉克罗斯摘要:企业能够降低融资成本或者尽量减少绑定在流动资产上的成立基金数额来用于扩大现有的资金。

研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。

以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。

“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。

题目：家族式中小企业融资存在的问题及对策第一部分外文翻译原文Family SME financing problems and countermeasures1、The status of family SMEsFamily-owned SMEs in the development of our country experienced a small to large, from weak to strong in the process, along with the family business in China today the deepening of economic reform and development and growth, has gone through four stages: the first stage, From 1978 to 1987, after the December 1978 Third Plenary Session of the Party, the private sector began to sprout exploration; the second stage, from 1988 to 1991, in 1988 the state promulgated the "Provisional Regulations on private Enterprises", the private sector has been Legislative protection; the third stage, from 1992 to 1996, the spring of 1992, Comrade Deng Xiaoping's southern tour speech, encourage private sector development; the fourth stage, the 15th Party Congress in 1997 affirmed the non-public economy is an important component of the socialist market economy private enterprises to enter the stage of stable development.At present, China's family-owned SMEs in general to take the family system management mode, although this management model, although in favor of corporate governance, reducing the commission Enterprises - the agency costs, but this also increases the external transactions arising from the establishment of corporate identity costs. On the one hand our economy is in a transition period, various policies and regulations are not perfect, the community has not formed a unified identity for the family of SMEs, which makes family-owned SMEs in the market development, customer acquisition financing and other aspects in particular more difficult. On the other hand due to the absolute control of the family by the family-owned small and medium enterprises, the decision arbitrary and authoritarian strong, the error rate is large, resulting in enterprise development to a certain stage on the lack of power, it is difficult to continue to develop.2、The main problem of family exist in the process of SME financing2.1 Family ownership structure and governance structure of SMEs unreasonableOur family ownership structure of SMEs in general showing unity, closed characteristics. According to statistics, the founder of the family business enterprise investment accounted for 75% of total share capital, its holding ratio as high as 70%, while the proportion of shares held by the founder's family also accounted for 10% ofthe company's total share capital, both in the family business of Holdings the proportion of 80%, the enterprise has absolute control. This single ownership structure and the closure of many family-owned SMEs generally do not pay attention to external financing, business development and capital accumulation is still relying on its own within the family obtain financing, which limits the expansion of enterprises.2.2 The family behind SME management modeCurrently, many executives are from family-owned small and medium enterprises within the family, but also because of the family's absolute control of the enterprise, many business owners arbitrariness in decision-making, so that companies will bring tremendous business risk to the enterprise zone to instability, which will undoubtedly increase the risk of funding provided. Meanwhile, in the internal distribution ofprofits, there is no established concept of sustainable development can play, often only taking into account the short-term interests, net of corporate profits spectroscopic eat, rarely from the perspective of enterprise development, consider using retained funds to supplement operating funds, and their accumulation of weak sense.2.3 The family-owned SME financial system is not perfectAs noted in the survey, more than 50 percent of family-owned SMEs in the financial system is not perfect, and many family-owned small and medium business managers lack professional financial management knowledge, lack of major financial decision analysis to develop a reasonable and legitimate, and even prepare several sets of accounts to check payable regulatory authorities. Because most investors to corporate lending main consideration is return on investment, and ROI analysis depends mainly on the view the company's financial statements, due to the corporate financial system defects, it is difficult to provide accurate accounting information, investors are unable to find out the enterprise the true face, nature does not give business loans.3、The Solution of family financing of SMEs3.1 Family fade colors, introducing diversification of investorsFirst of all to clarify property rights, according to the contribution principle, the principle of efficiency, fairness rationalize the relationship between members of the family property, clear the nature of the enterprise, the definition of enterprise property rights, reform of property rights. Forward to the public on the basis of clear property rights on the inside, diversify their ownership by absorbing social capital, the equity isfully owned by the family into a controlling stake, the investor capital, human capital and social capital is allocated in equal shares, to increase transparency and social trust.3.2 Change management model to promote institutional innovationMany of our family-owned small and medium enterprises in the employment context nepotism, meritocratic closer. This management model is not conducive to family-owned small and medium enterprises to introduce outstanding management personnel, resulting in a lack of family-owned small and medium business decision rationality, increasing the risk offamily-owned small and medium business, reducing the level of family credit for SMEs, resulting in banks and investors unwilling to its loans and investments. In view of this, family-owned SMEs should abandon the family management, the introduction of professional managerial system, the implementation of corporate restructuring in accordance with the requirements of modern enterprise system, the introduction of outstanding management talent, improve operational efficiency and reduce operational risks. So as to raise the level of credit to enhance financing capacity. At present, the rapid development of China's many family businesses employ people outside the family as a decision-making executives, such as the United States and other countries.3.3 Cegulate corporate financial system, improve financial managementAccording to the relevant regulations of the state, the establishment of financial and accounting system sound enterprises, not cooking the books, establish and improve financial reporting system to improve the credibility and transparency of the financial situation of the financial statements. These include: 1, raise funds, and the effectiveuse of funds, supervision and funding normal operation, maintenance, financial security, boost profits. 2, establish a sound financial management system, financial revenues and expenditures do a good job planning, control, accounting, analysis and assessment work. 3, to strengthen the management of financial accounting, in order to improve the timeliness and accuracy of accounting information.In short, to be truly effective in solving the difficult problem of family SME financing, companies need to go through joint efforts of financial institutions, to create a family-owned diversified financing channels for SMEs, social credit sound socio-economic environment for the family-owned SMEs the development provides a relaxed environment for raising capital.第二部位论文译文题目：家族式中小企业融资存在的问题及对策一、家族式中小企业的现状家族式中小企业在我国的发展经历了一个由小到大、由弱变强的过程，当今中国的家族企业随着经济体制改革的不断深化而发展壮大，经历了四个阶段:第一阶段，1978～1987年，1978年12月党的十一届三中全会以后，私营企业开始萌芽探索;第二阶段，1988～1991年，1988年国家颁布了《私营企业暂行条例》，私营企业得到了立法保护;第三阶段，1992～1996年，1992年春邓小平同志南巡讲话，鼓励私营企业发展;第四阶段，1997年党的十五大肯定了非公经济是社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分，私营企业进入稳步发展阶段。

资本结构外文文献翻译外文资料翻译—英文原文How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention tothe effects of financial leverage. There is no doubt that the highlevels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed, evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks (e.g., through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations) and the so-called “shadowbanking system” may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financialdislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms. To date, problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example, non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact, bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries (e.g., automotive manufacturing, newspapers, and real estate) that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question, “How important is financialrisk for non-financial firms?” At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. (2001) that firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor (see Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003, among others). Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi (2003) showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g., Dichev, 1998, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008).However, much of the empirical work examining equity price risktakes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, this外文资料翻译—英文原文paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First, we seek to understand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations (i.e., economic or business risks) andrisks associated with financing the firms operations (i.e., financial risks). Second, we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggests thatfinancial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost (i.e., via homemade leverage) and well-functioningcapital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless, financial policies, such as adding debt to the capital structure, can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast, recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms mayalso be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However, this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated withfinancial distress or other market imperfections associated withfinancial leverage. Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financialrisk by examining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States. Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk (volatility) relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thus, throughout the paper, we consider financial leverage as the wedgebetween asset volatility and equity volatility. For example, in a static setting, debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy is determined by owners (and managers), we are careful to examine the effects of firms? asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically, we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and, as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company (i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm (i.e. factors determining financial risk). We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft (1996), or alternatively,外文资料翻译—英文原文in a reduced form model of financial leverage. An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors (e.g., dividends), as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns. Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms? operations andassets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm. For example, firm size and age provide measures of line of- businessmaturity; tangible assets (plant, property, and equipment) serve as ap roxy for the …hardness? of a firm?s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential. Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk, we examine total debt, debt maturity, dividend payouts, and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising: factorsdetermining economic risk for a typical company explain the vastmajority of the variation in equity volatility.Correspondingly, measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is about 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique). This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels. These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels, debt maturity, or cash holdings (see, for example, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007). In addition, many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit, call provisions in debt contracts, or contingencies insupplier contracts), special purpose vehicles (SPVs), or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant, with predicted signs. In addition, the magnitudes of the effects are substantial. We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm. Thisis intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of英文原文外文资料翻译—business, which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns. Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak. Consistent with the predictions of Pástor and Veronesi (2003), we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility. This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky. Among economic risk variables, the effects of firm size, profit volatility, and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies, our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk. Otherwise, financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy, it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part, determined by the economic risks firms take. However, some of the specific findings areunexpected. For example, in a simple model of capital structure, dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm (i.e., increase net debt). We find that dividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm?s operations (e.g., a maturecompany with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time. Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk. This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last 30 years at the same time that measures of equity price risk (such as idiosyncratic risk) appear to have been increasing. In fact, measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near 1.0 (i.e., no leverage) by the end of our sample. There are several possible reasons for this. First, total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last 30 years, so our measure of implied leverage should also decline. Second, firms have significantly increased cash holdings, so measures of net debt (debtminus cash and short-term investments) have also declined. Third, the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky (especially technology-oriented)英文原文外文资料翻译—firms becoming publicly listed. These firms tend to have less debtin their capital structure. Fourth, as mentioned above, firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities. To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades, firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results. First, we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results. This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification. We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S. non-financial firms andfind evidence consistent with our conclusions. Finally, we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short, our results suggest that, as a practical matter, residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S. firm. This raises questions about the level of expected financial distresscosts since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies. For example, our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage (e.g., Dichev, 1998). Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimatedefault probabilities, since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce risk. Lastly, our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter. This is not the proper interpretation. Instead, our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks. Of course, financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management. In contrast, our study suggeststhat the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks. In short, gross financial risk may be important, but firms can manage it. This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that 外文资料翻译—英文原文are more difficult (or undesirable) to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A. Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3] Borowski, D.M., and P.J. Elmer. An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis: the Case of S&L Bankruptcy [J].Financial Management, Autumn.2004;[4] Casey, C.and N. Bartczak. Using Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress: Some Extensions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5] John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6] Altman. Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and DefaultRisk[M](RiskBooks,London.译文:财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献Title: Financing Channels for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and English LiteratureIntroduction:Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in driving economic growth, job creation, and innovation. However, they often face challenges in accessing finance due to limited assets, credit history, and information transparency. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing existing literature in both Chinese and English.1. Overview of SME Financing Channels:1.1 Bank Loans:Traditional bank loans are a common financing option for SMEs. They offer advantages such as long-term repayment periods, lower interest rates, and established banking relationships. However, obtaining bank loans may be challenging for SMEs with insufficient collateral or creditworthiness.1.2 Venture Capital and Private Equity:Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) attract external investments in exchange for equity stakes. These financing channels are particularly suitable for high-growth potential SMEs. VC/PE investors often provide not only financial resources but also expertise and networks to support SMEs' growth. However, SMEs may face challenges in meeting the stringent criteria required by VC/PE firms, limiting accessibility.1.3 Angel Investment:Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide early-stage funding to SMEs. They are often interested in innovative and high-potential ventures. Angel investments can bridge the funding gap during a company's initial stages, but SMEs need to actively seek out and convince potential angel investors to secure funding.1.4 Government Grants and Subsidies:Governments offer grants and subsidies to support SMEs' business development and innovation. These resources play a pivotal role in ensuring SMEs' survival and growth. However, the application process can be cumbersome, and the competition for these funds is usually high.1.5 Crowdfunding:Crowdfunding platforms allow SMEs to raise capital from a large poolof individual investors. This channel provides opportunities for SMEs to showcase their products or services and engage directly with potential customers. However, the success of crowdfunding campaigns depends on effective marketing strategies and compelling narratives.2. Comparative Analysis:2.1 Chinese Literature on SME Financing Channels:In Chinese literature, research on SME financing channels focuses on the unique challenges faced by Chinese SMEs, such as information asymmetry, high collateral requirements, and insufficient financial transparency. Studiesemphasize the importance of government policies, bank loans, and alternative financing channels like venture capital and private equity.2.2 English Literature on SME Financing Channels:English literature encompasses a broader range of financing channels and their implications for SMEs worldwide. It highlights the significance of business angel investment, crowdfunding, trade credit, factoring, and peer-to-peer lending. The literature also emphasizes the role of financial technology (fintech) in expanding SMEs' access to finance.3. Recommendations for SMEs:3.1 Enhancing Financial Literacy:SMEs should invest in improving their financial literacy to understand different financing options and strategies. This knowledge will help them position themselves more effectively when seeking external funding.3.2 Diversifying Funding Sources:To mitigate financing risks, SMEs should explore multiple channels simultaneously. A diversified funding portfolio can help SMEs access different sources of capital while reducing dependence on a single channel.3.3 Building Relationships:Developing relationships with banks, investors, and relevant stakeholders is crucial for SMEs seeking financing. Strong networks and connections can provide valuable support and increase the likelihood of securing funding.Conclusion:Access to appropriate financing channels is crucial for the growth and development of SMEs. This analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing Chinese and English literature, highlights the diverse options available. By understanding the strengths and limitations of each channel, SMEs can make informed decisions and adopt strategies that align with their unique business requirements. Governments, financial institutions, and other stakeholders should continue to collaborate in creating an enabling environment that facilitates SMEs' access to finance.。

Evaluating A Company's Capital StructureFor stock investors that favor companies with good fundamentals, a "strong" balance sheet is an important consideration for investing in a company's stock. The strength of a company' balance sheet can be evaluated by three broad categories of investment-quality measurements: working capital adequacy, asset performance and capital structure. In this article, we'll look at evaluating balance sheet strength based on the composition of a company's capital structure..A company's capitalization (not to be confused with market capitalization) describes the composition of a company's permanent or long-term capital, which consists of a combination of debt and equity. A healthy proportion of equity capital, as opposed to debt capital, in a company's capital structure is an indication of financial fitness.Clarifying Capital Structure Related TerminologyThe equity part of the debt-equity relationship is the easiest to define. In a company's capital structure, equity consists of a company's common and preferred stock plus retained earnings, which are summed up in the shareholders' equity account on a balance sheet. This invested capital and debt, generally of the long-term variety, comprises a company's capitalization, i.e. a permanent type of funding to support a company's growth and related assets.A discussion of debt is less straightforward. Investment literature often equates a company's debt with its liabilities. Investors should understand that there is a difference between operational and debt liabilities - it is the latter that forms the debt component of a company's capitalization - but that's not the end of the debt story.Among financial analysts and investment research services, there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes a debt liability. For many analysts, the debt component in a company's capitalization is simply a balance sheet's long-term debt. This definition is too simplistic. Investors should stick to a stricter interpretation of debt where the debt component of a company's capitalization should consist of the following: short-term borrowings (notes payable), the current portion of long-termdebt, long-term debt, two-thirds (rule of thumb) of the principal amount of operating leases and redeemable preferred stock. Using a comprehensive total debt figure is a prudent analytical tool for stock investors.It's worth noting here that both international and U.S. financial accounting standards boards are proposing rule changes that would treat operating leases and pension "projected-benefits" as balance sheet liabilities. The new proposed rules certainly alert investors to the true nature of these off-balance sheet obligations that have all the earmarks of debt. (To read more on liabilities, see Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly and Uncovering Hidden Debt.) Is there an optimal debt-equity relationship?In financial terms, debt is a good example of the proverbial two-edged sword. Astute use of leverage (debt) increases the amount of financial resources available to a company for growth and expansion. The assumption is that management can earn more on borrowed funds than it pays in interest expense and fees on these funds. However, as successful as this formula may seem, it does require that a company maintain a solid record of complying with its various borrowing commitments. (For more stories on company debt loads, see When Companies Borrow Money, Spotting Disaster and Don't Get Burned by the Burn Rate.)A company considered too highly leveraged (too much debt versus equity) may find its freedom of action restricted by its creditors and/or may have its profitability hurt as a result of paying high interest costs. Of course, the worst-case scenario would be having trouble meeting operating and debt liabilities during periods of adverse economic conditions. Lastly, a company in a highly competitive business, if hobbled by high debt, may find its competitors taking advantage of its problems to grab more market share.Unfortunately, there is no magic proportion of debt that a company can take on. The debt-equity relationship varies according to industries involved, a company's line of business and its stage of development. However, because investors are better off putting their money into companies with strong balance sheets, common sense tells us that these companies should have, generally speaking, lower debt and higher equitylevels.Capital Ratios and IndicatorsIn general, analysts use three different ratios to assess the financial strength of a company's capitalization structure. The first two, the so-called debt and debt/equity ratios, are popular measurements; however, it's the capitalization ratio that delivers the key insights to evaluating a company's capital position.The debt ratio compares total liabilities to total assets. Obviously, more of the former means less equity and, therefore, indicates a more leveraged position. The problem with this measurement is that it is too broad in scope, which, as a consequence, gives equal weight to operational and debt liabilities. The same criticism can be applied to the debt/equity ratio, which compares total liabilities to total shareholders' equity. Current and non-current operational liabilities, particularly the latter, represent obligations that will be with the company forever. Also, unlike debt, there are no fixed payments of principal or interest attached to operational liabilities.The capitalization ratio (total debt/total capitalization) compares the debt component of a company's capital structure (the sum of obligations categorized as debt + total shareholders' equity) to the equity component. Expressed as a percentage, a low number is indicative of a healthy equity cushion, which is always more desirable than a high percentage of debt. (To continue reading about ratios, see Debt Reckoning.)Additional Evaluative Debt-Equity ConsiderationsCompanies in an aggressive acquisition mode can rack up a large amount of purchased goodwill in their balance sheets. Investors need to be alert to the impact of intangibles on the equity component of a company's capitalization. A material amount of intangible assets need to be considered carefully for its potential negative effect as a deduction (or impairment) of equity, which, as a consequence, will adversely affect the capitalization ratio. (For more insight, read Can You Count On Goodwill? and The Hidden Value Of Intangibles.)Funded debt is the technical term applied to the portion of a company's long-termdebt that is made up of bonds and other similar long-term, fixed-maturity types of borrowings. No matter how problematic a company's financial condition may be, the holders of these obligations cannot demand payment as long the company pays the interest on its funded debt. In contrast, bank debt is usually subject to acceleration clauses and/or covenants that allow the lender to call its loan. From the investor's perspective, the greater the percentage of funded debt to total debt disclosed in the debt note in the notes to financial statements, the better. Funded debt gives a company more wiggle room. (To read more on financial statement footnotes, see Footnotes: Start Reading The Fine Print.)Lastly, credit ratings are formal risk evaluations by credit-rating agencies - Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps and Fitch –of a company's ability to repay principal and interest on debt obligations, principally bonds and commercial paper. Here again, this information should appear in the footnotes. Obviously, investors should be glad to see high-quality rankings on the debt of companies they are considering as investment opportunities and be wary of the reverse.ConclusionA company's reasonable, proportional use of debt and equity to support its assets is a key indicator of balance sheet strength. A healthy capital structure that reflects a low level of debt and a corresponding high level of equity is a very positive sign of investment quality.To continue learning about financial statements, read What You Need To Know About Financial Statements and Advanced Financial Statement Analysis.。

中小企业成本管理研究外文翻译中文文献Cost Management in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Research on Foreign LiteratureAbstractAs the backbone of the economy, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in creating jobs, stimulating innovation, and driving economic growth. However, they often face challenges in managing costs effectively. This article examines and analyzes foreign literature on cost management in SMEs. It explores various cost management techniques, such as activity-based costing, budgeting, and cost control, and highlights the importance of cost management in enhancing the competitiveness and sustainability of SMEs. The findings provide valuable insights for SMEs to optimize their cost management practices and achieve long-term success in the competitive business environment.1. Introduction1.1 BackgroundCost management is an essential aspect of business operations, as it directly impacts the profitability and financial stability of a company. In SMEs, which typically have limited resources and face intense competition, effective cost management is even more crucial.1.2 ObjectivesThe primary objective of this research is to examine the foreign literature on cost management in SMEs and identify best practices and techniques thatcan be applied in the Chinese context. By understanding the experiences and strategies of SMEs in other countries, Chinese SMEs can learn from their successes and avoid potential pitfalls in cost management.2. Cost Management Techniques2.1 Activity-Based Costing (ABC)Activity-Based Costing is a cost allocation method that assigns costs to specific activities or cost objects based on their utilization of resources. This technique provides a more accurate understanding of the cost drivers in a company, enabling SMEs to allocate resources more effectively and identify areas for cost reduction.2.2 BudgetingBudgeting is a fundamental cost management tool that allows SMEs to plan and control their financial resources. By setting realistic and achievable budgets, SMEs can monitor their expenses, forecast future costs, and make informed decisions regarding resource allocation.2.3 Cost ControlCost control involves monitoring and regulating expenses to ensure that they remain within planned limits. SMEs can employ various cost control techniques, such as implementing cost-saving measures, negotiating favorable contracts with suppliers, and leveraging technology to streamline operations and reduce overhead costs.3. Importance of Cost Management in SMEs3.1 Enhanced CompetitivenessCost management enables SMEs to offer competitive prices without compromising on quality. By optimizing their cost structure, SMEs can improve their profit margins and gain a competitive edge in the market.3.2 Resource OptimizationEffective cost management allows SMEs to allocate their limited resources strategically. By identifying unnecessary costs and reallocating funds to key areas, SMEs can optimize their production processes and invest in critical areas such as research and development.3.3 Financial StabilityCost management helps SMEs maintain a stable financial position by minimizing the risk of running into cash flow problems or accumulating excessive debt. By controlling costs and ensuring efficient resource allocation, SMEs can safeguard their financial health and sustain long-term growth.4. ConclusionThis research on foreign literature emphasizes the significance of cost management in SMEs and provides valuable insights into proven techniques and strategies. By implementing effective cost management practices, SMEs can optimize their operational efficiency, enhance competitiveness, and achieve long-term success in an increasingly competitive business environment. This research serves as a guide for Chinese SMEs to improve their cost management practices and overcome challenges effectively. By integrating foreign experiences with localized strategies, SMEs can navigatethe complexities of cost management and position themselves for sustainable growth.。

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。

中⼩企业资本结构论⽂中英⽂对照资料外⽂翻译⽂献中英⽂对照资料外⽂翻译⽂献表1报告的是解释变量的描述性统计。

在本报告所述期间，在越南中⼩型企业的平均资产负债率约为43.91％。

然⽽，在样品的资产负债率变化很⼤，从最⼤负债⽐率为97.25％，最低4.95％。

随着债务到期，我们发现，⼤部分的中⼩型企业相⽐长期债务雇⽤更多的短期负债，以资助其运作。

平均短期负债⽐率约为41.98％，⽽长期债务⽐率仅为1.93％。

短期负债的中⼩企业多种多样，如商业银⾏贷款，贸易信贷从供应商，客户的预付款，借款的朋友或亲戚，以及⼀些其他来源的。

其他短期负债⽐率，代表⼤多来⾃⽹络，账户融资的总资产的⽐例相对较⾼（24.62％）。

显然，对中⼩型企业的资本结构，资⾦来源从原⽂：Capital Structure in Small andMedium-sized EnterprisesThe Case of VietnamTran Dinh Khoi Nguyen and Neelakantan RamachandranAbstract:The objective of this article is to identify the determinants influencing the capital structure of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam. Empirical results show that SMEs employ mostly short-term liabilities to finance their operations. A firm’s ownership also affects the way a SME finances its operations. The capital structure of SMEs in Vietnamis positively related to growth, business risk, firm size, networking, and relationships with banks; but negatively related to tangibility. Profitability seems to have no significant impact ton the capital structure of Vietnamese SMEs. The strong impact of such determinants as firm ownership, firm size, relationships with banks, and networking reflects the asymmetric features of the fund mobilization process in a transitional economy like that of Vietnam.Key words: SMEs, capital structure, leverage, banking relationships1 IntroductionVietnam has been changing to a market-oriented economy over the past eighteen years, and there is growing recognition of SMEs’ importance in the transitional economy. Consequently, the Government has introduced numerous policies in order to support this important business sector. According to recent statistics, 96 per cent of registered firms are classified as small and medium-sized firms, of which private SMEs account for nearly 82 per cent. The small business sector in Vietnam also generates 25 per cent of annual GDP. However, SMEs still face the difficult issue of access to capital for future development (Doanh and Pentley 1999). This raises a question as to what factors influence the capital structure of Vietnamese SMEs —an important concern in improving financial policies to support the small business sector. There are only a limited number of studies on factors influencing capital structure among Vietnamese firms.As for similar studies in other countries, most empirical evidence on capital structure tends to focus on large firms in developed countries Only in recent years have a few studies examinedthese issues either in developing countries or among small firms A review of empirical studies on the capital structure of SMEs helped us to identify some key issues. Not all determinants are consistent with those predictions advanced by theories of finance. Indeed, there are some contrary results on the relationship between some determinants and capital structure among firms in some countries In addition, the firm characteristics are often at the centre in most empirical studies, while the effects of managers’ behaviour have seldom been examined. In a qualitative piece of research, Michaelas, Chittenden, and Pitziouris (1998) argued that owners’ behaviour, in conjunction with internal and external factors, will determine capital structure decisions. This requires further quantitative studies to examine what factors influence capital structure in the small business sector in developing countries. Based on such gaps in the existing literature, this paper attempts to study features of the capital structure of Vietnamese SMEs, over the period 1998–2001, and examine the influence of specific determinants on SMEs’ capital structure. This study has combined data from financial statements and questionnaires given to SMEs’ financial managers to explore how Vietnamese SMEs finance their operations. The study examines such determinants as growth, tangibility, business risk, profitability, size, ownership, relationship with banks, and networking on three measures of capital structure.2 Literature Review and HypothesesCapital structure is defined as the relative amount of debt and equity used to finance a firm. Theories explaining capital structure and the variation of debt ratios across firms range from the irrelevance of capital structure, proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), to a host of relevance theories. If leverage can increase a firm’s value in the MM tax model (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Miller 1977), firms have to trade off between the costs of financial distress, agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and tax benefits, so as to have an optimal capital structure. However, asymmetric information and the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf 1984; Myers 1984) state that there is no well defined target debt ratio. The latter model suggests that there tends to be a hierarchy in firms’preferences for financing: first using internally available funds, followed by debt, and finally external equity. These theories identify a large number of attributes influencing a firm’s capital structure.Although the theories have not considered firm size, this section will attempt to apply the theories of capital structure in the small business sector, anddevelop testable hypotheses that examine the determinants of capital structure in Vietnamese SMEs.2.1 Firm GrowthWe think that this proposition is more relevant in the context of the small business sector in Vietnam, where there was a scarcity of long-term credits in the period 1998–2001 (ADB 2002). In addition, as most SMEs in Vietnam operate in the trading and service sectors, demand for new investment in fixed assets are relatively low. Doanh and Pentley (1999) also argued that Vietnamese SMEs often look for short-term bank loans or other resources from relatives, friends or suppliers to finance their operations. Taking percentage change in total assets as a measure of firm’s growth, we hypothesize that:A firm’s growth will be positively related to debt ratios.2.2 Business RiskAccording to the theory of financial distress, higher business risk increases the probability of financial distress, so firms have to trade off between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs. Thus, it predicts a negative relationship between business risk and leverage. In the context of the small business sector, Queen and Roll (1987) argue that SMEs are likely to have a higher level of business risk, relative to large firms. Therefore, we propose the hypothesis:Business risk will be negatively related to debtratios.2. 3 Firm OwnershipThe role of state ownership is still a controversial topic in Vietnam’s reform process. As noted above, the Vietnamese financial system is characterized by a bank-based system where SOCBs1 dominate and provide the bulk of loans in the economy (ADB 2002). Soo (1999) also pointed out that most SOCB credits are channeled to SOEs. It can be validly argued that state-owned SMEs have their own advantages over private SMEs in accessing credit from SOCBs. The plausible explanation for this argument is that state-owned SMEs have long-lasting ties with commercial banks from the pre-reform era. Because they are state-owned, SOCBs’ policies favour the state business sector, as compared to the private business sector, notably in terms of interest rates, banking procedures, and collateral requirements. Therefore, it could be expected that state-owned SMEs have more opportunities to access bank loans. Based on this argument, we hypothesize that: State-owned SMEs will employ more debt than private SMEs.。

文献出处：Kadri Cemil Akyüz, İlker Akyüz, Hasan Serіn, et al. The financing preferences and capital structure of micro, small and medium sized firm owners in forest products industry in Turkey[J]. Forest Policy & Economics, 2016, 8(3):301-311.第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。

默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。

土耳其林业行业微型以及中小企业的融资偏好和资本结构Kadri Cemil Akyqz, I˙lker Akyqz, Hasan SerJn, Hicabi Cindik卡德里杰米尔，拉克·阿基茨，哈桑·塞尔文，黑卡比克里迪克摘要：资本结构的大多数理论和实证研究都集中于大型企业。

对微型，中小型企业进行了数量有限的资本结构研究，在对影响家族企业主的资金决策的因素的调查是非常少的。

本研究探索MSMS公司所有者的资本结构和融资偏好，并更加侧重于林业产品行业中MSMS 公司的初始和持续融资中披露的债务与股本偏好。

在本研究中，土耳其黑海地区18个城市对林业产品行业的MSMS企业所有者的财务偏好进行了调查。

根据对851家企业的抽样调查，确定了这些部门的一些财务特征和资本结构。

从研究中得出的初步结果表明，MSMS 公司的所有者倾向于内部财务来源，反映在初始和持续的企业设施中，外部市场的成本资本过高。

关键词：土耳其小公司林业产品行业金融偏好财务结构小企业的一般特点五十年代和六十年代，垂直整合的大型企业集团框架内组建的大型生产单位几乎被普遍认为是经济社会发展总体模式中最重要的要素之一。

然而，随着1973年石油和能源价格冲击之后出现的动荡，出现了一些惨烈的案例，大型企业遇到经济困难，为了生存而被迫脱离劳动力（Henrekson和Johanson，1999 ）。

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。

中小企业营运资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Effects of working capital management on SME profitability AbstractThe objective of the research presented here is to provide empirical evidence about the effects of working capital management on the profitability of a sample of small and medium-sized Spanish firms. With this in mind, we collected a panel of 8,872 SMEs covering the period 1996-2002. The results, which are robust to the presence of endogeneity, demonstrate that managers can create value by reducing their firm’s number of days accounts receivable and inventories. Equally, shortening the cash conversion cycle also improves the firm’s profitability.IntroductionThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions. Researchers have particularly offered studies analyzing investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation, among other topics. But the investment that firms make in short-term assets, and the resources used with matu rities of under one year, represent the main share of items on a firm’s balance sheet.In fact, in our sample the current assets of small and medium-sized Spanish firms represent 69.48 percent of their assets, and at the same time their current liabilities represent more than 52.82 percent of their liabilities.Working capital management is important because of its effects on the firm’s profitability and risk, and consequently its value (Smith, 1980). On the one hand, maintaining high inventory levels reduces the cost of possible interruptions in the production process, or of loss of business due to the scarcity of products, reduces supply costs, and protects against price fluctuations, among other advantages (Blinder and Manccini, 1991). On the other, grant ing trade credit favors the firm’s sales in various ways. Trade credit can act as an effective price cut (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner, 1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), incentivizes customers to acquire merchandise at times of low demand (Emery, 1987), allows customers to check that the merchandise they receive is as agreed (quantity and quality) and to ensure that theservices contracted are carried out (Smith, 1987), and helps firms to strengthen long-term relationships with their customers (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). However, firms that invest heavily in inventory and trade credit can suffer reduced profitability. Thus, the greater the investment in current assets, the lower the risk, but also the lower the profitability obtained.On the other hand, trade credit is a spontaneous source of financing that reduces the amount required to finance the sums tied up in the inventory and customer accounts. But we should bear in mind that financing from suppliers can have a very high implicit cost if early payment discounts are available. In fact the opportunity cost may exceed 20 percent, depending on the discount percentage and the discount period granted (Wilner,2000; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). In this respect, previous studies have analyzed the high cost of trade credit, and find that firms finance themselves with seller credit when they do not have other more economic sources of financing available (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1997).Decisions about how much to invest in the customer and inventory accounts, and how much credit to accept from suppliers, are reflected in the firm’s cash conversion cycle, which represents the average number of days between the date when the firm must start paying its suppliers and the date when it begins to collect payments from its customers. Some previous studies have used this measure to analyze whether shortening the cash conversion cycle has positive or negative effects on the firm’s profitability. Specifically, Shin and Soenen (1998) analyze the relation between the cash conversion cycle and profitability for a sample of firms listed on the US stock exchange during the period 1974-1994. Their results show that reducing the cash conversion cycle to a reasonable extent increases firms’ profitability. More recently, Deloof (2003) analyzes a sample of large Belgian firms during the period 1992-1996. His results confirm that Belgian firms can improve their profitability by reducing the number of days accounts receivable are outstanding and reducing inventories. Moreover, he finds that less profitable firms wait longer to pay their bills.These previous studies have focused their analysis on larger firms. However, the management of current assets and liabilities is particularly important in the case ofsmall and medium-sized compan ies. Most of these companies’ assets are in the form of current assets. Also, current liabilities are one of their main sources of external finance in view of their difficulties in obtaining funding in the long-term capital markets (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and the financing constraints that they face (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). In this respect, Elliehausen and Woken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Danielson and Scott (2000) show that small and medium-sized US firms use vendor financing when they have run out of debt. Thus, efficient working capital management is particularly important for smaller companies (Peel and Wilson, 1996).In this context, the objective of the current work is to provide empirical evidence about the effects of working capital management on profitability for a panel made up of 8,872 SMEs during the period 1996-2002.This work contributes to the literature in two ways. First, no previous such evidence exists for the case of SMEs.We use a sample of Spanish SMEs that operate within the so-called continental model, which is characterized by its less developed capital markets (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), and by the fact that most resources are channeled through financial intermediaries (Pampillón, 2000). All this suggests that Spanish SMEs have fewer alternative sources of external finance available, which makes them more dependent on short-term finance in general, and on trade credit in particular. As Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) suggest, firms operating in countries with more developed banking systems grant more trade credit to their customers, and at the same time they receive more finance from their own suppliers. The second contribution is that, unlike the previous studies by Shin and Soenen (1998) and Deloof (2003), in the current work we have conducted tests robust to the possible presence of endogeneity problems. The aim is to ensure that the relationships found in the analysis carried out are due to the effects of the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability and not vice versa.Our findings suggest that managers can create value by reducing their firm’s number of days accounts receivable and inventories. Similarly, shortening the cash conversion cycle also improves the firm’s profitability.From this point, the work is structured as follows: in Section 2, we describe the sample and variables used; in the third section, we present the analyses carried out and our findings; finally, we end by discussing our main conclusions.Data and Variablesi. DataWe obtained the data used in this study from the AMADEUS database. This database was developed by Bureau van Dijk, and contains financial and economic data on European companies.The sample comprises small and medium-sized firms from Spain. The selection of SMEs was carried out according to the requirements established by the European Commission’s recommendation 96/280/CE of 3rd April, 1996, on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. Specifically, we selected those firms meeting the following criteria for at least three years: a) have fewer than 250 employees; b) turn over less than €40 million; and c) possess less than €27 million of total assets.In addition to the application of those selection criteria, we applied a series of filters. Thus, we eliminated the observations of firms with anomalies in their accounts, such as negative values in their assets, current assets, fixed assets, liabilities, current liabilities, capital, depreciation, or interest paid. We removed observations of entry items from the balance sheet and profit and loss account exhibiting signs that were contrary to reasonable expectations. Finally, we eliminated 1 percent of the extreme values presented by several variables. As a result of applying these filters, we ended up with a sample of 38,464 observations.In order to introduce the effect of the economic cycle on the levels invested in working capital, we obtained information about the annual GDP growth in Spain from Eurostat.ii. VariablesIn or der to analyze the effects of working capital management on the firm’s profitability, we used the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. We defined this variable as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets.With regards to the independent variables, we measured working capitalmanagement by using the number of days accounts receivable, number of days of inventory and number of days accounts payable. In this respect, number of days accounts receivable (AR) is calculated as 365 ×[accounts receivable/sales]. This variable represents the average number of days that the firm takes to collect payments from its customers.The higher the value, the higher its investment in accounts receivable.We calculated the number of days of inventory (INV) as 365 ×[inventories/purchases]. This variable reflects the average number of days of stock held by the firm. Longer storage times represent a greater investment in inventory for a particular level of operations.The number of days accounts payable (AP) reflects the average time it takes firms to pay their suppliers. We calculated this as 365 ×[accounts payable/purchases]. The higher the value, the longer firms take to settle their payment commitments to their suppliers.Considering these three periods jointly, we estimated the cash conversion cycle (CCC). This variable is calculated as the number of days accounts receivable plus thenumber of days of inventory minus the number of days accounts payable. The longer the cash conversion cycle, the greater the net investment in current assets, and hence the greater the need for financing of current assets.Together with these variables, we introduced as control variables the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its leverage. We measured the size (SIZE) as the logarithm of assets, the sales growth (SGROW) as (Sales1 –Sales0)/Sales0, the leverage (DEBT) as the ratio of debt to liabilities. Dellof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable. For some firms in his study such assets are a significant part of total assets. However our study focuses on SMEs whose fixed financial assets are less important. In fact, companies in our sample invest little in fixed financial assets (a mean of 3.92 percent, but a median of 0.05 percent). Nevertheless, the results remain unaltered when we include this variable.Furthermore, and since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’sprofitability, we controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the variable GDPGR, which measures the annual GDP growth.iii. Description of sampleTable II offers descriptive statistics about the variables used for the sample as a whole. These are generally small firms, with me an assets of more than €6 million; their return on assets is around 8 percent; their number of days accounts receivable is around 96 days; and their number of days accounts payable is very similar: around 97 days. Together with this, the sample firms have seen their sales grow by almost 13 percent annually on average, and 24.74 percent of their liabilities is taken up by debt. In the period analyzed (1996-2002) the GDP has grown at an average rate of 3.66 percent in Spain.Table IIDescriptive StatisticsROA measure return on assets, AR number of days accounts receivable, INV number of days of inventory, AP number of days accounts payable, CCC cash conversion cycle, ASSETS value of assets in thousand euros, SGROW sales growth, DEBT financial debt level, and GDPGR annual GDP growth. Variable Obs. Mean SD Median 10th Perc. 90th Perc.ROA 38464 0.0792 0.0834 0.0678 0.0041 0.1768 AR 38464 96.8299 55.7682 96.2962 22.0945 165.2533 INV 38452 77.2140 70.0499 59.3042 6.8692 166.6171 AP 38371 97.8090 57.3568 93.8075 24.5344 174.9668 CCC 38371 76.3117 90.6413 64.7704 -19.6907 190.2017 ASSETS 38464 6955.1090 4461.3940 13308 2718.5 5541 SGROW 32674 0.1299 0.3105 0.0862 -0.0928 0.3492 DEBT 35237 0.2474 0.1839 0.2306 0.0098 0.5021 GDPGR 38464 0.0366 0.0075 0.0420 0.0240 0.0430ConclusionsWorking capital management is particularly important in the case of small and medium-sized companies. Most of these companies’ asset s are in the form of current assets. Also, current liabilities are one of their main sources of external finance. In this context, the objective of the current research has been to provide empirical evidence about the effects of working capital management on the profitability of a sample of small and medium-sized Spanish firms. For this purpose, we collected apanel consisting of 8,872 SMEs covering the period 1996-2002.According to previous studies focus on large firms (Shin and Soenen, 1998; Deloof, 2003), the analyses carried out confirm the important role of working capital management in value generation in small and medium-sized firms. We find a significant negative relation between an SME’s profitability and the number of days accounts receivable and days of inventory. We cannot, however, confirm that the number of days accounts payable affects an SME’s return on assets, as this relation loses significance when we control for possible endogeneity problems.Finally, SMEs have to be concerned with working capital management because they can also create value by reducing their cash conversion cycle to a minimum, as far as that is reasonable.So urce: Pedro J. García, Pedro Martínez,2007. “Effects of Working Capital Management on SME Profitability ” . Inter national Journal of Managerial Finance. Vol. 3, No. 2.pp. 164-177.译文：营运资金管理对中小企业盈利能力的影响摘要这里提供的研究的目的是提供有关营运资金管理对示例的中小型西班牙公司盈利能力的影响的实证证据。

资本结构代理成本外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The Impact of Capital Structure on Agency Costs[Abstract] This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the agency costs hypothesis which suggests that increase of leverage may reduce agency costs. Both multivariate tests and univariate tests are employed in this study. The multivariate tests reveal that general relationship between leverage and agency costs is significantly negative. Univariate tests are further used to assess whether agency costs are significantly different when a firm has a relatively higher debt to asset ratio from when it is less leveraged. Similar supporting evidence is found for the agency costs hypothesis. Moreover, results from the univariate tests also indicate that this general negativerelationship no longer holds when an extremely high level of leverage is present.[Keywords] Agency costs, Leverage, Agency costs hypothesis, and Opposite effect1. IntroductionIn their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs occur due to incomplete alignment of the agent’s and the owner’s interests. The separation of ownership and control may generate agency costs. Two types of agency costs are identified in the paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976): agency costs derived from conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-managers, and conflicts between equity holders and debt holders. From then on, a great amount of research has been devoted to demonstrate the interaction between agency costs and financial decisions, governance decisions, dividend policy, and capital structure decisions.Much empirical evidence collected by researchers, for example, Ang et al. (2000), and Fleming et al. (2005), shows that agency costs generated from the conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-manager could be reduced by increasing the owner-managers’ proportion in equity, i.e., agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s ownership. However, the conflicts between equity holders and debt holders would be more complicated. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there should be an optimal capital structure, under which the lowest agency costs of a firm can be deduced from an independent variable --- “the ratio of outside equity to the whole outside financing”. The locus of agency costs, which is equal to agency costs of outside equity and the ones of debt, would be a convex curve. This implies that agency costs should not be monotonic any more.Some researchers such as Grossman and Hart (1982); Williams (1987), argue that high leverage reduces agency costs and increases firm value byencouraging managers to act more in the interests of equity holders. This argument is known as the agency costs hypothesis. Higher leverage may reduce agency costs through the monitoring activities by debt holders (Ang et al., 2000), the threat of liquidation which may cause managers to lose reputation, salaries, etc. (William, 1987), pressure to generate cash flow for the payment of interest expenses (Jensen 1986), and curtailment of overinvestment (Harvey et al., 2004).However, as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases beyond a certain point, the opposite effect of leverage on agency costs may occur (Altman, 1984 and Titman, 1984). When leverage becomes relatively high, further increases may generate significant agency costs. Three reasons are identified in the literature which can cause this opposite effect: first reason is the increase of bankruptcy costs (Titman 1984). Second reason is that managers may reduce their effort to control risk which result in higher expected costs of financial distress, bankruptcy, or liquidation (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2005). Finally, inefficient use of excessive cash used by managers for empire building would also increase agency costs (Jensen, 1986).2. Literature ReviewJensen and Meckling (1976) identify agency costs derived from conflicts between equity holders and owner-managers as “residual loss” which means agent consumes various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the firm to maximize his own utility. Related to this issue, Harris & Raviv (1990), Childs et al. (2005) and Lee et al. (2004) argue that managers always want to continue firm’s current operations even if liquidation of the firm is preferred by investors. Also, Stulz (1990), Alvarez et al. (2006) and Kent et al. (2004) suggest the manager always want to invest all available funds even if paying out cash is better for outside shareholders, and conflictbetween the manager and equity holders cannot be resolved through contracts based on cash flows and investment expenditures.Agency theory becomes more complicated when debt holders’ interest is considered. As a financing strategy, debt is widely discussed in capital structure literatures. Modigliani and Miller (1963) demonstrate that in order to raise the value of a firm, the amount of debt financing should be as big as possible for tax subsidyii. However, their theory ignores the agency costs of debt. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the optimal utilization of debt is when the debt is utilized to the point where marginal wealth benefits of the tax subsidy are just equal to the marginal wealth effects of agency costs.A number of researchers focus on the issue of improvement of firm efficiency by reducing agency costs. Some of them focus on the methods to control managers’ behaviors. For instance, Fama (1980) conducts a discussion of how the pressure from managerial labor markets helps to discipline managers. He points out that the key condition to acquire absolute control of managerial behavior through wage adjustments is that the weight of the wage revision process is sufficient enough to resolve any potential managerial incentives problems. Another example is Chance’s (1997) argument on a derivate substitution of executive compensation. He suggests giving the manager stocks without right to vote, which could be beneficial in preventing an executive from wielding too much control. Other researchers are interested in the optimal capital structure under which value of firms could be maximized while agency costs could be minimized. Based on these observations, the agency costs hypothesis stating that the leverage affects agency costs is put forward.Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that monitoring activities by debt holders will tend to increase the optimal level of monitoring and thereforewill increase the marginal benefits. What’s more, banks which are one of the major sources of external funds especially for small firms also play a crucial role in monitoring the activities of managers.However, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the effect of leverage on total agency costs could not be monotoniciii. When the proportion of debt in total capital increases beyond a certain point, the loss would increase due to negative net present value projects, and the firm will not be able to meet current payments on a debt obligation, thus bankruptcy will occur (Terje et al. 2006). Although Haugen and Senbet (1978) argue that bankruptcy cos ts are an insignificant determinant of a firm’s capital structure, Altman (1984) finds that indirect costs associated with bankruptcy are not insignificant when these costs are accounted for the first time. Titman (1984) gives a possible theoretical link between liquidation and capital structure. It links the potentially substantial costs associated with liquidation with the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2005) suggest that in highly leveraged firms, managers may shift risk or reduce effort to control risk which would also result in expected costs of financial stress, bankruptcy, or liquidation. Additionally, inefficient use of excessive cash which is derived from higher than normal leverage level for empire building would also increase agency costs (Jensen, 1986).Therefore, at low level of leverage, increases of leverage will produce positive incentives for managers and reduce total agency costs by reducing the counterpart of external equity. However, after reaching a certain point, where bankruptcy and distress become more likely and the agency costs of outside debt overwhelm the agency costs of outside equity, any further increases in leverage will then result in higher total agency costs.The subject of the measurements of the agency costs magnitude and firm performance has been widely discussed in the literature. Thesemeasurements are usually taken by using ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market data. Ang et al. (2000) made one of the first attempts to measure the magnitude of agency costs by two ratios from financial statements. First ratio is a proxy for the so-called direct agency costs. In order to facilitate comparisons, it is standardized as operating expenses to sales ratio. Second ratio is a proxy for the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization. This type of agency costs is derived from management’s shirking or from poor investment decisions. This ratio is calculated by annual sales to total assets. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) take a different approach and employ profit efficiency as the performance measure. They use profit efficiency, rather than cost efficiency to evaluate the performance of managers, since profit efficiency explains how well managers raise revenues while reduce costs and it processes tighter relationship with the concept of value maximization. Additionally, Saunders et al. (1990); Cole and Mehran (1998) use stock market returns and their volatility to measure agency costs and firm performance.3. Data and MethodologyData used in this study are drawn from Datastream. 323 UK companies are selected from FTSE ALL SHARE index. We choose UK public companies in this study because of three reasons: First, The UK is a country with mature money and capital markets where debt financing is relatively easy to conduct by companies. Second, maximization of shareholders’ wealth is the dominant goal of management in the Anglo-American world which is consistent with the theory this study is based on. Third, data of public companies could reflect the effect of leverage on agency costs more accurately and sensitively especially in the efficient markets like the UK.There are five variables used in this study. Table 1 provides a summary of these variables along with definitions. Following Ang et al. (2000)’s study,we focus on measuring the direct agency costs which is the ratio of operating expenses to sales. This ratio indicates how effectively the firm’s management controls operating expenses and it tends to capture the impact of agency costs such as excessive perquisite consumption. Operating expenses variable here excludes corporate wages, salaries and other labor-related items, interest expense, rent, leasing and hiring expenses, purchases, depreciation and bad assets written off. A series of checks and filters on the data have been conducted to reduce the sample from a maximum of approximately 400iv firms to a final sample of 323 firms for Year 2004 to Year 2005. The top and bottom 5%v are also removed to avoid the possible outlier effect.The measurements of leverage and agency costs are critical. Debt to asset ratio is employed which is total debts divided by total assets. However, we do not differentiate between long-term or short-term debt. Three other variables are considered to control other confounding effects: performance (proxied by return on asset), firm size (proxied by log of sales), and industry classification (13 industry dummies). Note that we include 13 industry dummy variables in this study because the ratio of operating expenses to sales varies across industries due to the varying importance of inventory and fixed assets.译文：关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响[导言] 本文旨在提供经验证据对代理成本假说这表明增加的杠杆可以减少代理成本。

企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)An Analysis of Working Capital Management Results Across IndustriesAbstractFirms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the fund s available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied upin current assets. We provide insights into the performance of surv eyed firms across key components of working capital management by usi ng the CFO magazine’s annual Working CapitalManagement Survey. We discover that significant differences exist b etween industries in working capital measures across time.In addition.w e discover that these measures for working capital change significantl y within industries across time.IntroductionThe importance of efficient working capital management is indisputa ble. Working capital is the difference between resources in cash or readily convertible into cash (Current Assets) and organizational commi tments for which cash will soon be required (Current Liabilities). Th e objective of working capital management is to maintain the optimum balance of each of the working capital components. Business viabilit y relies on the ability to effectively manage receivables. inventory.a nd payables. Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. Much managerial effort is expended in b ringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back towa rd optimal levels. An optimal level would be one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency.A recent example of business attempting to maximize working capita l management is the recurrent attention being given to the applicatio n of Six Sigma®methodology. Six S igma®methodologies help companies measure and ensure quality in all areas of the enterprise. When used to identify and rectify discrepancies.inefficiencies and erroneous tra nsactions in the financial supply chain. Six Sigma®reduces Days Sale s Outstanding (DSO).accelerates the payment cycle.improves customer sati sfaction and reduces the necessary amount and cost of working capital needs. There appear to be many success stories including Jennifertwon’s(2002) report of a 15percent decrease in days that sales are outstanding.resulting in an increased cash flow of approximately $2 million at Thibodaux Regional Medical Cenrer.Furthermore bad debts declined from 3.4millin to $6000000.However.Waxer’s(2003)study of multiple firms employing Six Sig ma®finds that it is really a “get rich slow”technique with a r ate of return hovering in the 1.2 – 4.5 percent range.Even in a business using Six Sigma®methodology. an “optimal”level of working capital management needs to be identified. Industry factors may impa ct firm credit policy.inventory management.and bill-paying activities. S ome firms may be better suited to minimize receivables and inventory. while others maximize payables. Another aspect of “optimal”is the extent to which poor financial results can be tied to sub-optimal pe rformance.Fortunately.these issues are testable with data published by CFO magazine. which claims to be the source of “tools and informati on for the financial executive.”and are the subject of this resear ch.In addition to providing mean and variance values for the working capital measures and the overall metric.two issues will be addressed in this research. One research question is. “are firms within a p articular industry clustered together at consistent levels of working capital measures?For instance.are firms in one industry able to quickl y transfer sales into cash.while firms from another industry tend to have high sales levels for the particular level of inventory . The other research question is. “does working capital management perform ance for firms within a given industry change from year-to-year?”The following section presents a brief literature review.Next.the r esearch method is described.including some information about the annual Working Capital Management Survey published by CFO magazine. Findings are then presented and conclusions are drawn.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the f inance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores.should have been anticipated because the co rporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for e ight of the last ten years of its corporate life.As part of a stud y of the Fortune 500s financial management practices. Gilbert and Rei chert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects.wh ile inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the compa nies.More recently. Farragher. Kleiman and Sahu (1999) find that 55 p ercent of firms in the S&P Industrial index complete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding account s receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any curre nt asset accounts or liability accounts across industries.Thus.mixed ev idence exists concerning the use of working capital management techniq ues.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the s ubject of many articles over the years (e.g. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1 996).with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management.Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tend ency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low l evels of current liabilities. Simultaneously investigating accounts rece ivable and payable issues.Hill. Sartoris.and Ferguson (1984) find diffe rences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received.while payors view paymen t as the postmark date.Additional WCM insight across firms.industries.a nd time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of value creation that incorporate effective short-term financial management acti vities.However.these models are generic models and do not consider uni que firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located in may have more influence on th at company’s fortunes than overall GNP”(2002. 507).In fact. a car eful review of this 627-page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industr y factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In-House Credit Card”(128) and nothing on WC M stability over time. This research will attempt to fill this void by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided ver y few recent reports about working capital management. The most relev ant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) article on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effect ive supply chain management by Hadley (2004).Research Method The CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group.was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management co nsulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global l ist of clients. The original survey reports several working capital b enchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an a nnual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations”value located on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). T his value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “days of working capital”(DWC) value is based on the d ollar amount in each of the aggregate.equally-weighted receivables.inven tory.and payables accounts. The “days of working capital”(DNC) repr esents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount fromvendor until the sale to the customer.the collection of the receiva bles. and payment receipt.Thus.it reflects the companys ability to fin ance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firm and industry val ues for days sales outstanding (A/R).inventory turnover.and days payabl es outstanding (A/P).Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –2000 period .Across the nearly 1.000 firms in the survey.cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion ef ficiency”(CCE).averages 9.0 percent.Incorporating a 95 percent confide nce interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and invent ories less payables divided by daily sales.averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6).because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days).In all ins tances.the standard deviation is relatively small.suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO report s.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management Perfo rmanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its ing the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-s ix industries that had at least eight companies included in the rank ings each year.In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean ove rall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best avera ge ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assume s that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the ent ire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleum in dustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital man agement rankings.In fact.the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later i n this paper).Furthermore.the petroleum industry had the lowest standar d deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry.which ranked secon d in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst work ing capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-s econd in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures ConclusionsThe research presented here is based on the annual ratings of wo rking capital management published in CFO magazine. Our findings indic ate a consistency in how industries “stack up”against each other over time with respect to the working capital measures.However.the wor king capital measures themselves are not static (i.e.. averages of wo rking capital measures across all firms change annually); our results indicate significant movements across our entire sample over time. O ur findings are important because they provide insight to working cap ital performance across time. and on working capital management across industries. These changes may be in explained in part by macroecono mic factors Changes in interest rates.rate of innovation.and competitio n are likely to impact working capital management. As interest rates rise.there would be less desire to make payments early.which would stretch accounts payable.accounts receivable.and cash accounts. The ra mifications of this study include the finding of distinct levels of WCM measures for different industries.which tend to be stable over ti me. Many factors help to explain this discovery. The improving econom y during the period of the study may have resulted in improved turn over in some industries.while slowing turnover may have been a signal of troubles ahead. Our results should be interpreted cautiously. Our study takes places over a short time frame during a generally impr oving market. In addition. the survey suffers from survivorship bias –only the top firms within each industry are ranked each year and the composition of those firms within the industry can change annua lly.Further research may take one of two lines.First.there could bea study of whether stock prices respond to CFO magazine’s publication of working capital management rating.Second,there could be a study of which if any of the working capital management components relate to share price performance.Given our results,there studies need to take industry membership into consideration when estimating stock price reaction to working capital management performance.对整个行业中营运资金管理的研究格雷格Filbeck.Schweser学习计划托马斯M克鲁格.威斯康星大学拉克罗斯摘要:企业能够降低融资成本或者尽量减少绑定在流动资产上的成立基金数额来用于扩大现有的资金。

How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of2008has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage.There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis.Indeed,evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks(e.g.,through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations)and the so-called“shadow banking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financial dislocation.Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date,problems in the U.S.non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example,non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the1930s.In fact,bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S.industries(e.g.,automotive manufacturing,newspapers,and real estate)that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question,“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms?”At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk.A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al.(2001)that firm-specific(idiosyncratic)risk has tended to increase over the last40years.Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor(see Goyal and Santa-Clara,2003,among others).Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi(2003)showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value.Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g.,Dichev,1998,Campbell,Hilscher,and Szilagyi,2008).However,much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk.In contrast,this paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk.First,we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations(i.e.,economic or business risks)and risks associated with financing the firms operations(i.e.,financial risks). Second,we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller(1958)suggests that financial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost(i.e.,via homemade leverage)and well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless,financial policies,such as adding debt to the capital structure,can magnify the risk of equity.In contrast,recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives.However,this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financial distress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage.Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk by examining determinants of total firm risk.In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk(volatility)relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage.Thus, throughout the paper,we consider financial leverage as the wedge between asset volatility and equity volatility.For example,in a static setting,debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility.Because financial policy is determined by owners(and managers),we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy.Specifically,we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and,as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company(i.e.factors determining economic risk)and those associated with financing the firm(i.e.factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural modelapproach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors(e.g.,dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns.Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms’operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of-business maturity;tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising:factors determining economic risk for a typical company explain the vast majority of the variation in equity volatility. Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios.Specifically,in our sample covering1964-2008average actual net financial (market)leverage is about1.50compared to our estimates of between1.03and1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings(see,for example, Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors(e.g.lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts,or contingencies in supplier contracts),special purpose vehicles(SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant,with predicted signs.In addition,the magnitudes of the effects are substantial.We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns.Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak.Consistent withthe predictions of Pástor and Veronesi(2003),we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility.This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt,and therefore are potentially less risky.Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size,profit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk.Otherwise,financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy,it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part,determined by the economic risks firms take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected.For example,in a simple model of capital structure,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk.This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities).We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to1983tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia(2007)that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last30years at the same time that measures of equity price risk(such as idiosyncratic risk)appear to have been increasing. In fact,measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near1.0 (i.e.,no leverage)by the end of our sample.There are several possible reasons for this. First,total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last30 years,so our measure of implied leverage should also decline.Second,firms have significantly increased cash holdings,so measures of net debt(debt minus cash and short-term investments)have also declined.Third,the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky(especially technology-oriented)firms becoming publicly listed.These firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure.Fourth,as mentioned above,firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities.To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades,firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results.First,we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results.This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification.We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S.non-financial firms and find evidence consistent with our conclusions.Finally,we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short,our results suggest that,as a practical matter,residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S.firm.This raises questions about the level of expected financial distress costs since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies.For example,our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage(e.g.,Dichev,1998).Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimate default probabilities,since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce stly,our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter.This is not the proper interpretation.Instead,our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks.Of course,financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management.In contrast,our study suggests that the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks.In short,gross financial risk may be important,but firms can manage it.This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that are more difficult(or undesirable)to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A.Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3]Borowski,D.M.,and P.J.Elmer.An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis:the Case of S&L Bankruptcy[J].Financial Management,Autumn.2004;[4]Casey, C.and ing Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress:Some Extensions[J].Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5]John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6]Altman.Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default Risk[M]．Risk Books,London.译文：财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。