文献出处：Acharya V V, Myers S C, Rajan R G. The internal governance of firms [J]. The Journal of Finance, 2011, 66(3): 689-720.
原文
The Internal Governance of Firms
VIRAL V. ACHARYA, STEWART C. MYERS, and RAGHURAM G. RAJAN
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, in which dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.
The people you pay are more important over time than the people who pay you.
A PUBLIC CORPORATION is commonly viewed as an organization run by CEOs and monitored by a board of directors on behalf of shareholders. This governance structure separates decision management (by the CEO and other managers) from decision control (by the board) and from investment and risk-bearing (by public shareholders), and is viewed as reasonable and efficient (Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) and Jensen (2000)) provided that decisions are made to maximize the value of shareholders’ residual claim. Many public corporations thrive under this governance structure.
Yet the clear evidence that public corporations “work” has to be set against the equally clear evidence that most shareholders have little control over boards (Monks (2008)) and that many boards treat CEOs generously (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). CEOs are self interested, and hence not automatically faithful servants of the shareholders (Jensen (1986, 1993), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny(1990), and Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 1997)). The market for corporate control can provide some
discipline, but it is hard to see it as effective in controlling operational decisions. How, then, can one reconcile the survival and apparent efficiency of the public corporation with the weak channels through which it is supposedly governed?
In this paper, we argue that there are important stakeholders in the firm, particularly subordinate managers, who care about its future. Because of their power to withdraw their contributions to the firm, these stakeholders can force the CEO to act in a more public-spirited and far-sighted way, even if the CEO acts in his own short-term self interest and shareholders are dispersed and powerless. We call this process internal governance.
The main departure of this paper from most of the existing literature is our treatment of the firm as a composition of diverse agents with different horizons, interests, and opportunities for misappropriation and growth. To understand how the differences among diverse agents lead to internal governance, we first consider a partnership run by an old CEO who is about to retire. The CEO has a young manager working under him who will be the future CEO. Three ingredients go into producing the firm’s cash flow: the firm’s capital stock; the CEO’s ability to manage the firm, which depends on his skill and firm-specific knowledge; and the young manager’s effort, which allows her to learn and prepare for promotion.
We assume that the CEO can commit to an investment plan, which means the CEO will leave behind a predetermined amount of capital stock. The CEO can appropriate everything else: he can divert cash out of the firm, consume perks, or convert cash to leisure by shirking. The CEO cannot directly commit future CEOs to any course of action in this period or in the future.
Because the CEO has a short horizon, he could simply decide to take all of the cash flow, investing nothing for the future. However, he nee ds the young manager’s effort in order to generate the cash flow. If the manager sees that the CEO will leave nothing behind, she has scant incentive to exert effort, and cash flow will fall significantly. To forestall such an outcome, the CEO commits to investing some fraction of current cash flow, building or enhancing the firm’s capital stock in order to create a future for his young employee, thereby motivating her. This allows the firm to
build substantial value despite being led by a sequence of myopic and rapacious CEOs.
We show that internal governance is most effective when both the CEO and the manager contribute to the firm’s cash flows. If the CEO’s contributions dominate, he has no desire to limit his capture of cash flow in order to provide incentives for the manager. If, on the other hand, the manager’s contributions dominate, she has little incentive to learn because she cannot capture value today, and learning will be of little use when she does become the CEO.
We extend the basic model by allowing the CEO to commit to sell the firm to the manager when he retires. We show that if the manager has the necessary cash to buy the firm from the CEO at the end of the latter’s tenure, then the CEO’s horizon can effectively be lengthened to coincide with that of the firm. This rolling partnership, therefore, increases investment to a constrained efficient level—it essentially reduces the firm’s agency problem down to the problem of incentivizing managerial effort. Of course, many junior managers will lack the wealth or borrowing capacity to buy the firm from the CEO, and thus the rolling partnership will often not be feasible. Outside equity can help recover some of the effects of the rolling partnership, however. We show that a combination of internal governance and a rudimentary form of outside governance by shareholders can improve the efficiency of the firm dramatically.
To see the intuition, suppose the firm is a public corporation. Following Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000), we assume that shareholders have only the crude but basic property right to take over the firm and its capital stock, firing the CEO if necessary. In equilibrium, shareholders do not intervene because the CEO delivers just enough value to the shareholders to keep them at bay. Value is delivered by paying out cash dividends or by investing cash to increase the capital stock—a larger capital stock increases the future value of shareholders’ claim.
Outside equity thus has no direct control over investment or effort decisions; it has no operational influence. Even so, it can greatly enhance investment by the CEO and the value of the firm. The CEO can sell a portion of the cash flow generated by future generations of CEOs to outside shareholders today; future CEOs, in turn, will
pay outside shareholders the required return on financing raised. Thus, the CEO can indirectly replicate the sale to the manager in a rolling partnership by using shareholders as the intermediary. This gives the current CEO the incentive to invest more, as he forces future generations of CEOs to pay for the investment he makes. The resulting steady-state capital stock can deviate from the constrained efficient level, but it always is greater than its level in our base case where the CEO cannot sell the firm to his manager.
We also obtain a theory of dividend policy. Shareholders do not care whether they are paid in cash or by increases in the firm’s capital stock. Although a dollar paid out as dividends and a dollar left behind as investment costs the same to the CEO, initially he prefers to compensate shareholders by investing, because investment motivates greater managerial effort. With decreasing he acts as if he cares about his subordinates and the survival of the firm. This reduced form appears to well capture the observed behavior of CEOs. Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) conclude from interviews that continuity of the firm is CEOs’ primary objective. Donaldson (1984) describes top management’s objective as maximizing corporate wealth, not shareholder value. returns to investment, however, the rate of return on investment falls and eventually the CEO makes the manager worse off by investing more—the additional investment increases cash flows in the next period when the manager will be CEO, but it also increases sharehol ders’ claim.Thus, when the return on investment diminishes beyond a point, the current CEO will switch to paying dividends, not because shareholders prefer dividends to capital gains per se, but because additional investment would reduce the manager’s ren ts to below her participation constraint. This gives us a dividend policy that follows the life cycle of a firm. No dividends are paid when the firm is young and investment is profitable, but dividends commence when the firm is mature. The firm starts paying out when additional investment would impose too heavy a future burden on junior managers, who will have to meet the expectations of outside shareholders.
We offer these models to make a general point: the traditional description of the f irm falls short on three counts. First, control need not be exerted just top-down, or fro
m outside; it can also be asserted bottom-up. The CEO has to give his subordinates a r eason to follow, as otherwise they can withdraw their contributions to the firm. This is how subordinates exert control over the CEO. Second, the view that there is one resid ual claimant in the firm, the shareholder, is too narrow. Anyone who shares in the rent s or quasi-rents generated by the firm has some residual claim, and thus there is no eas y equivalence between maximizing shareholder value and maximizing efficiency. Thi rd, the fact that CEOs and managers collect rents at different horizons means that each has to pay attention to the others’ residual claims in order to elicit cooperation. The n eed for the CEO to take actions that limit the agency problem associated with his subo rdinates’ effort limits his incentive to misappropriate. Thus, one agency problem chec ks another: the constraints that parties inside the firm impose on each other ensure that the firm can function and survive, even if outside governance is weak.
We find that this combination of internal and external governance can encourage greater investment and longer effective CEO horizons than with external governance alone. The combination also eliminates rents that would be extracted by future top management if there were only internal governance.
译文
企业内部治理
阿查里雅, 斯图尔特, 拉贾恩
我们开发了一个内部治理的模型，在这个模型中，高级管理层的自私行为会受到下属的潜在的监视，管理层的行为是受到一定的限制的。即使在很少或没有投资者外部治理的情况下，内部治理也能缓解代理问题，并确保企业盈利的真实性和有效性。外部治理，即使被认为是一种外在的和不被知情的方法，却是完善
内部治理和提高效率的一个补充方法。它能促进投资和股利政策理论的发展，这样说来，首席执行官的自私行为，也受到一定的控制，股利分配的目的在于维持内部和外部控制的平衡。
随着时间的推移，对一个企业来说，你能按约定支付股息给股东，比股东不断投资钱支付给你好，这对企业来说更重要，即企业要获得持续的盈利，并兑现对股东的股息分配承诺。
公开募股的公司（即我们所说的上市公司），其组织架构，通常被看作是一个由首席执行官负责经营，董事会代表股东进行监控的组织高层管理结构。这种治理结构将决策管理层 (由首席执行官和其他管理人员组成)，与决策控制层(董事会)，投资和风险承者(流通股股东)分离开来，总经理负责企业的日常运营管理，股东决定企业的未来战略方向，这种方式被视为是合理和高效的(法玛和詹森(1983 a,1983 b)和詹森(2000))，一个企业的股东，其股息分配的价值如果能够稳定的增长，代表企业发展状况一般很好。在这种治理结构下，许多公司都能繁荣和发展起来。
然而，有一个明确的证据表明，企业中，董事会与履行经营权的总经理经常形成对抗，并且，大多数的股东也难以控制董事会(蒙克斯(2008))，不过，很多董事会对首席执行官非常慷慨(贝伯夏克和弗里德(2004))。首席执行官们大多都是自私自利的，他们只是企业高薪雇佣来的高级打工人员，自然也不会包容忠实的股东，他们会帮助大董事掩盖企业真实的经营状况(詹森(1986、1993)，莫克、施莱费尔和维什尼)(1990), 施莱费尔和维什尼(1989、1997))，使得其他股东和外界对企业的真实情况很难有个真正的了解。公司控制金融市场应当拥有自己的原则和纪律,但是很难被认为是控制运营决策的有效方法。因此，如何协调公营公司的生存和效率呢，所谓的管理真的是一种无力的渠道吗?
在本文中,我们认为公司有重要的利益相关者,特别是副经理,他们关心自己的未来。因为他们有权力控制对公司的贡献，这些利益相关者可以迫使首席执行官在公益活动中表现的更热心和有远见，即使首席执行官的短期行为是以自我利益为中心，股东分散又无能为力。我们称之为内部治理过程。
本文的主要观点来自大部分现有文献，我们将公司视为具有不同层位,利益,滥用和发展机会的多种多样的代理组合。（完整译文请到百度文库）为了理解不
英文文献及翻译 文献题目An Overview of Servlet and JSP Technology 文献作者Nagle ,Wiegley 题目翻译Servlet和JSP技术简述 参考人 院 (系) 专业班级 学号
1 A Servlet's Job Servlets are Java programs that run on Web or application servers, acting as a middle layer between requests coming from Web browsers or other HTTP clients and databases or applications on the HTTP server. Their job is to perform the following tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. Figure 1-1Web middleware role 1.1 Read the explicit data sent by the client. The end user normally enters this data in an HTML form on a Web page. However, the data could also come from an applet or a custom HTTP client program. 1.2 Read the implicit HTTP request data sent by the browser. Figure 1-1 shows a single arrow going from the client to the Web server (the layer where servlets and JSP execute), but there are really two varieties of data: the explicit data that the end user enters in a form and the behind-the-scenes HTTP information. Both varieties are critical. The HTTP information includes cookies, information about media types and compression schemes the browser understands, and so on. 1.3 Generate the results. This process may require talking to a database, executing an RMI or EJB call, invoking a Web service, or computing the response directly. Your real data may be in a relational database. Fine. But your database probably doesn't speak HTTP or return results in HTML, so the Web browser can't talk directly to the database. Even if it could, for security reasons, you probably would not want it to. The same argument applies to most other applications.You need the Web middle layer to extract the results inside a document.
零售企业营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
译文： 零售企业的营销策略 Philip Kotlor 今天的零售商为了招徕和挽留顾客，急欲寻找新的营销策略。过去，他们挽留顾客的方法是销售特别的或独特的花色品种，提供比竞争对手更多更好的服务提供商店信用卡是顾客能赊购商品。可是，现在这一切都已变得面目全非了。现在，诸如卡尔文·克连，依佐和李维等全国性品牌，不仅在大多数百货公司及其专营店可以看到，并且也可以在大型综合商场和折扣商店可以买到。全国性品牌的生产商为全力扩大销售量，它们将贴有品牌的商品到处销售。结果是零售商店的面貌越来越相似。 在服务项目上的分工差异在逐渐缩小。许多百货公司削减了服务项目，而许多折扣商店却增加了服务项目。顾客变成了精明的采购员，对价格更加敏感。他们看不出有什么道理要为相同的品牌付出更多的钱，特别是当服务的差别不大或微不足道时。由于银行信用卡越来越被所有的商家接受，他们觉得不必从每个商店赊购商品。 百货商店面对着日益增加的价格的折扣店和专业商店的竞争，准备东山再起。历史上居于市中心的许多商店在郊区购物中心开设分店，那里有宽敞的停车场，购买者来自人口增长较快并且有较高收入的地区。其他一些则对其商店形式进行改变，有些则试用邮购盒电话订货的方法。超级市场面对的是超级商店的竞争，它们开始扩大店面，经营大量的品种繁多的商品和提高设备等级，超级市场还增加了它们的促销预算，大量转向私人品牌，从而增加盈利。 现在，我们讨论零售商在目标市场、产品品种和采办、服务以及商店气氛、定价、促销和销售地点等方面的营销策略。 一、目标市场 零售商最重要的决策时确定目标市场。当确定目标市场并且勾勒出轮廓时，零售商才能对产品分配、商店装饰、广告词和广告媒体、价格水平等作出一致的决定。如沃尔玛的目标市场相当明确：
中英文翻译 内部控制爆炸① 摘要：Power的1997版书以审计社会为主题的探讨使得审计活动在联合王国（英国）和北美得到扩散。由审计爆炸一同带动的是内部控制制度的兴起。审计已经从审计结果转向审计制度和内部控制，它已然成为公众对公司治理和审计监管政策的辩论主题。Power表示对什么是有效的内部控制各方说法不一。本人对内部控制研究方面有一个合理的解释。内部控制对非常不同概念的各个领域的会计进行探究，并研究如何控制不同水平的组织。因此，内部控制研究的各类之间的交叉影响是有限的，而且，许多内部会计控制是研究是再更宽广的公司治理问题的背景下进行的。所以，许多有关内部控制制度对公司治理的价值观点扔需要进行研究。 关键词：机构理论；公司治理；外部审计；内部审计；内部控制制度；管理控制 1 概述 Power的1997版书以审计社会为主题的探讨使得审计活动在联合王国（英国）和北美得到扩散。由审计爆炸一同带动的是内部控制制度的兴起。审计已经从审计结果转向审 ①Maastricht Accounting and Auditing Research and Education Center (MARC), Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands s.maijoor@marc.unimaas.nl Fax: 31-43-3884876 Tel: 31-43-3883783
计制度和内部控制，它已然成为公众对公司治理和审计监管政策的辩论主题。例如，在最近的对于欧洲联盟内外部审计服务的内部市场形成的辩论中，监管建议建立关于内部控制和内部审计制度。虽然对有关内部控制的价值期望高，但Power表示对什么是有效的内部控制各方说法不一。本人对内部控制研究方面有一个合理的解释。内部控制是对非常不同概念的各个领域的会计进行探究，并研究如何控制不同水平的组织。因此，内部控制研究的各类之间的交叉影响是有限的，而且，许多内部会计控制是研究是再更宽广的公司治理问题的背景下进行的。所以，许多有关内部控制制度对公司治理的价值观点扔需要进行研究。 在审计和公司治理的公共政策辩论中，内部控制的概念越来越得到重视。公共越来越关注内部控制，令人对power在1997年英国和北美的书中的审计社会的现状有所信服。此书的主题是在Anglo-Saxon经济体的审计活动：审计爆炸的扩散。Power表示，联合开发与审计爆炸带动了内部控制制度兴起。增加监管问责制是公众对审计和公司治理政策辩论机构内部控制系统的一部分。然而Power注意到，尽管公众对内部控制的关注度迅速增加，内部控制的概念还是很模糊。他支出，内部控制是什么，内部控制的有效性的界定是内部控制的最基本问题。 本文讨论研究内部控制的兴起，认为内部控制的研究也有一些潜在的问题。首先，在以往的研究中，长期的内部控制涵盖完全不同的概念。其次，有关的内部控制研究机构的规模是有限的，要从孤立的学科进行交叉使用得到结果很难。因此，内部控制是尚未独立的研究范畴。最后，以往的对内部控制的研究没有彻底解决在审计和公司治理的公共政策辩论中谈到的内部控制有关问题。假设的内部控制、财务报告和公司治理的基本关系也没有被证实。 本文解构如下：在开始对内部控制进行研究和讨论之前，先介绍了两个主要的，在Power1997的书中所提出的发展：第一部分讨论了审计爆炸，第二部分讨论了内部控制的崛起。两者也讲被从欧盟的角度评论。第三部分讨论了什么是内部控制，并从会计研究的三个主要观点出发，研究内部控制制度。第四部分确定了内部控制和公司治理的公共政策辩论所承担的四个基本关系，并讨论之前的相关研究。最后一节提供了一个总结和结论。 2 内部控制的崛起 不论是否存在审计爆炸，Power1997和1998在审计中变得越来越重要。根据Power （1997年83爷），因为内部控制系统的可审计假设使得审计爆炸成为可能。根据更具体
绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译____________________________________________________________________ ________________________ Performance management-how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means,
市场营销策略 1 市场细分和目标市场策略 具有需求，具有购买能力并愿意花销的个体或组织构成了市场。然而，在大多数市场中，购买者的需求不一致。因此，对整个市场采用单一的营销计划可能不会成功。一个合理的营销计划应以区分市场中存在的差异为起点，这一过程被称为市场细分，它还包括将何种细分市场作为目标市场。 市场细分使公司能更加有效地利用其营销资源。而且，也使得小公司可以通过集中在一两个细分上场上有效地参与竞争。市场细分的明显缺点是，其导致了比单一产品、单一大市场策略更高的生产和营销成本。但是，如果市场细分得当的话，更加符合消费者的需求，实际上将生产更高的效率。 确定目标市场有三种可供选择的策略，它们是统一市场、单一细分市场和多重细分市场。统一市场策略即采取一种营销组合用到一个整体的、无差异的市场中去。采取单一细分市场策略，公司仍然仅有一种营销组合，但它只用在整个市场的一个细分市场中。多重细分市场策略需要选择两个或更多的细分市场，并且每个细分市场分别采用一种单独的营销组合。 2 产品定位 管理者将注意力集中于一种品牌，并以恰当的方式将其与类似的品牌相区分，但这并不意味着该品牌就一定能够最后赢利。因此，管理者需要进行定位，即塑造与竞争品牌和竞争对手的其他品牌相关的自我品牌形象。 市场营销人员可以从各种定位策略中加以选择。有时，他们决定对某一特定产品采用一种以上的策略。以下是几种主要的定位策略： 2.1与竞争者相关的定位 对一些产品来说，最佳的定位是直接针对竞争对手。该策略特别适用于已经具有固定的差别优势或试图强化这种优势的厂商。为排挤微处理器的竞争对手，Intel公司开展了一项活动使用户确信它的产品优于竞争对手的产品。公司甚至为电脑制造商出钱，让它们在自己的广告中带上“Intel Inside”标志。作为市场领导者，可口可乐公司推出新产品并实施其市场营销策略。同时，它密切注视百事可乐公司，以确保对主要竞争对手的任何一次巧妙、有效的营销举措采取相应的对策。 2.2 与产品类别和属性相关的定位 有时候，公司的定位策略有必要将自己的产品与其类别和属性相联系（或相区别）。一些公司尽力将其产品定位在期望的类别中，如“美国制造”。用一句某顾问的话来说，“当你说‘美国制造’的时候，有一种强烈的感情因素在吸引着你”。因此，一家名为Boston Preparatory的规模不大的运动服制造商正在运用这种定位策略，以期胜过那些并非所有产品都在美国制造的势力强大的竞争对手如Calvin Kiein和Tommy Hilfiger。 2.3 通过价格和质量定位 某些生产者和零售商因其高质量和高价格而闻名。在零售行业，Saks Fifth Avenue和Neiman Marcus公司正是定位于该价格—质量策略的。折扣店Target Kmart则是定位于该策略的反面。我们不是说折扣商店忽视质量，而是说它们更加强调低廉的价格。Penny's公司努力—并且大多获得了成功—通过升级高级服装线和强调设计者的名字将其商店定位于价格—质量策略上。 “品牌”一词是个综合性的概念，它包含其他更狭义的理解。品牌即一个名称和（或）标志，用以识别一个销售者或销售集团的产品，并将之与竞争产品相区别。 品牌名称由能够发音的单词、字母和(或)数字组成。品牌标志是品牌的一部分，它以符号、图案或醒目的颜色、字体的形式出现。品牌标志通过视觉识别，但当人们仅仅读出品牌名称的时候，品牌标志并不能够被表达出来。Crest、Coors、Gillette都是品牌名称。AT&T由醒目的线条构成的地球以及Ralph Lauren's Polo的马和骑手是品牌标志，而Green Giant（罐装冷冻菜蔬产品）和Arm&Hammer（面包苏打）既是品牌名称又是品牌标志。 商标是销售者已经采用并且受到法律保护的品牌。商标不仅包括品牌标志，如许多人所认为的那样，也包括品牌名称。1946年的The Lanham Art法案允许厂商向联邦政府注册商标，以保护它们免受其他厂商的使用或误
会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响 安妮比蒂，美国俄亥俄州立大学 瓦特史考特廖，多伦多大学 约瑟夫韦伯，美国麻省理工学院 1简介 管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本 的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。 当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在日本。他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。 我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金 流量的不同影响。直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性可能较低获得债务融资的可能性。然而，这种可能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。 具体来说，我们确定的数据样本证券公司有1163个采样公司（议会），通过发行资本公共债务或银团债务。我们限制我们的样本公司最近获得的债务融资持有该公司不断融资与借款。然而，在样本最近获得的债务融资的公司，也有可能是信号，在资本提供进入私人信息差异和约束他们放在管理中的行为。相关理论意味着减少公共债务持有人获取私人信息，因而减少借款有效的监测。在这些参数的基础上，我们预测，会计质量应该有一
顾客满意策略与顾客满意营销 原文来源：《Marketing Customer Satisfaction 》自20世纪八十年代末以来, 顾客满意战略已日益成为各国企业占有更多的顾客份额, 获得竞争优势的整体经营手段。 一、顾客满意策略是现代企业获得顾客“货币选票”的法宝随着时代的变迁, 社会物质财富的极大充裕, 顾客中的主体———消费者的需求也先后跨越了物质缺乏的时代、追求数量的时代、追求品质的时代, 到了20世纪八十年代末进入了情感消费时代。在我国, 随着经济的高速发展,我们也已迅速跨越了物质缺乏时代、追求数量的时代乃至追求品质的时代, 到今天也逐步迈进情感消费时代。在情感消费时代, 各企业的同类产品早已达到同时、同质、同能、同价, 消费者追求的已不再是质量、功能和价格, 而是舒适、便利、安全、安心、速度、跃动、环保、清洁、愉快、有趣等,消费者日益关注的是产品能否为自己的生活带来活力、充实、舒适、美感和精神文化品位, 以及超越消费者期望值的售前、售中、售后服务和咨询。也就是说, 今天人们所追求的是具有“心的满足感和充实感”的商品, 是高附加值的商品和服务,追求价值观和意识多元化、个性化和无形的满足感的时代已经来临。 与消费者价值追求变化相适应的企业间的竞争, 也由产品竞争、价格竞争、技术竞争、广告竞争、品牌竞争发展到现今的形象竞争、信誉竞争、文化竞争和服务竞争, 即顾客满意竞争。这种竞争是企业在广角度、宽领域的时空范围内展开的高层次、体现综合实力的竞争。它包括组织创新力、技术创新力、管理创新力、产业预见力、产品研发力、员工向心力、服务顾客力、顾客亲和力、同行认同力、社会贡献力、公关传播沟通力、企业文化推动力、环境适应力等等。这些综合形象力和如何合成综合持久的竞争力, 这就是CSft略所要解决的问题。CS寸代,企业不再以“自己为中心”,而是以“顾客为中心”；“顾客为尊”、“顾客满意”不再是流于形式的口号, 而是以实实在在的行动为基础的企业经营的一门新哲学。企业不再以质量达标, 自己满意为经营理念, 而是以顾客满意, 赢得顾客高忠诚度为经营理念。企业经营策略的焦点不再以争取或保持市场占有率为主, 而是以争取顾客满意为经营理念。因此, 营销策略的重心不再放在竞争对手身上而是放在顾客身上, 放在顾客现实的、潜在的需求上。当企业提供的产品和服务达到了顾客事先的期望值, 顾客就基本满意；如果远远超越顾客的期望值, 且远远高于其他同行, 顾客才真正满意；如果企业能不断地或长久地令顾客满意, 顾客就会忠诚。忠诚的顾客不仅会经常性地重复购买, 还会购买企业其它相关的产品或服务；忠诚的顾客不仅会积极向别人推荐他所买的产品, 而且对企业竞争者的促销活动具有免疫能力一个不满意的顾客会将不满意告诉16-20个人, 而每一个被告知者会再传播给12-15个人。这样, 一个不满意者会影响到二、三百人。在互联网普及的今天, 其影响则更大。据美国汽车业的调查, 一个满意者会引发8笔潜在的生意, 其中至少有一笔会成交。而另一项调查表明, 企业每增加5%的忠诚顾客, 利润就会增长25%-95%。一个企业的80%的利润来自20%的忠诚顾客；而获取一个新顾客的成本是维持一个老顾客成本的6倍。所以,美国著名学者唐?佩 珀斯指出: 决定一个企业成功与否的关键不是市场份额, 而是在于顾客份额。 于是, 企业纷纷通过广泛细致的市场调研、与消费者直接接触、顾客信息反馈等方式来了解顾客在各方面的现实需求和潜在需求。依靠对企业满意忠诚的销售、服务人员, 定期、定量地对顾客满意度进行综合测定, 以便准确地把握企业经营中与“顾客满意” 目标的差距及其重点领域, 从而进一步改善企业的经营活动。依靠高亲和力的企业文化、高效率的人文管理和全员共同努力, 不断地向顾客提供高附加值的产品, 高水准的亲情般的服
外文文献原稿和译文 原稿 Performance management - how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected
New Public Management : Contemporary Western trend of the new public administration From the start of the 1970s, the West has dominated the field of public administration nearly a century. and was regarded to be effective, even the best traditional or mainstream public administration, subjected to a new external environment increasingly tough challenges, and the almost routine, rigid-tier system can not meet the increasingly rapid changes in information and knowledge-intensive society and economic life, build on its two major theoretical basis -- Goodnow Wilson and the political-administrative theory and the two-layer management Huibaike no theory Law answered and solved the government faces an increasingly serious problems and difficulties : the financial crisis, the social welfare policy unsustainable, government agencies increasingly bloated, inefficient, the public lost confidence in the government's ability, "government failure" theory has begun to dominate. It is in this historical backdrop, a new public administration theory, Management -- New Public Management (NewPublic Management) in the 1980s, the Anglo-American two crops, and the rapid expansion of the Western countries. And the number of traditional public administration within the framework of the changes, Public management is not new to the existing administrative structure and ways of some degree of partial adjustment or simply to lower administrative costs and reduce administrative expenses, but more importantly, it is the traditional model of public administration of a comprehensive settlement and denied. 1.The new public management theory
绩效考核外文文献及翻译 外文文献 1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His or her line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. If you are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits down and talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often as you can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole process to be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; c orporate social responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would then
Marketing Strategy Market Segmentation and Target Strategy A market consists of people or organizations with wants,money to spend,and the willingness to spend it.However,within most markets the buyer' needs are not identical.Therefore,a single marketing program starts with identifying the differences that exist within a market,a process called market segmentation, and deciding which segments will be pursued ads target markets. Marketing segmentation enables a company to make more efficient use of its marketing resources.Also,it allows a small company to compete effectively by concentrating on one or two segments.The apparent drawback of market segmentation is that it will result in higher production and marketing costs than a one-product,mass-market strategy.However, if the market is correctly segmented,the better fit with customers' needs will actually result in greater efficiency. The three alternative strategies for selecting a target market are market aggregation,single segment,and multiple segment.Market-aggregation strategy involves using one marketing mix to reach a mass,undifferentiated market.With a single-segment strategy, a company still uses only one marketing mix,but it is directed at only one segment of the total market.A multiple-segment strategy entails selecting two or more segments and developing a separate marketing mix to reach segment. Positioning the Product Management's ability to bring attention to a product and to differentiate it in a favorable way from similar products goes a long way toward determining that product's revenues.Thus management needs to engage in positioning,which means developing the image that a product projects in relation to competitive products and to the firm's other products. Marketing executives can choose from a variety of positioning strategies.Sometimes they decide to use more than one for a particular product.Here are several major positioning strategies: