Globalization essay

Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?

ROBERT HUNTER WADE*

London School of Economics and Political Science,UK Summary.—Over the past20years or so India,China,and the rest of East Asia,experienced fast

economic growth and falls in the poverty rate,Latin America stagnated,the former Soviet Union,

Central and Eastern Europe,and sub-Saharan Africa regressed.But what are the net trends?The

neoliberal argument says that world poverty and income inequality fell over the past two decades

for the?rst time in more than a century and a half,thanks to the rising density of economic

integration across national borders.The evidence therefore con?rms that globalization in the

context of the world economic regime in place since the end of Bretton Woods generates more

‘‘mutual bene?t’’than‘‘con?icting interests.’’This paper questions the empirical basis of the

neoliberal argument.

ó2004Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.

Key words—globalization,poverty,inequality,neoliberalism,political economy of statistics,

World bank

?Over the past20years the number of people living on less than$1a day has fallen by200million,after rising steadily for200years’(James Wolfensohn,president of the World Bank,World Bank,2002b).

?The best evidence available shows...the current wave of globalization,which started around1980,has actu-ally promoted economic equality and reduced pov-erty’(Dollar&Kraay,2002;emphasis added).

?Evidence suggests the1980s and1990s were decades of declining global inequality and reductions in the proportion of the world’s population in extreme pov-erty’(Martin Wolf,The Financial Times,2002).

?[G]lobalization has dramatically increased inequality between and within nations’(Jay Mazur,US union leader,2000).

1.INTRODUCTION

The neoliberal argument says that the dis-tribution of income between all the world’s people has become more equal over the past two decades and the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen,for the?rst time in more than a century and a half.It says that these progressive trends are due in large part to the rising density of economic integration between countries,which has made for rising e?ciency of resource use worldwide as coun-tries and regions specialize in line with their comparative advantage.Hence the combina-tion of the‘‘dollar-Wall Street’’economic regime1in place since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime in the early1970s,and the globalizing direction of change in the world economy since then,serves the great majority of the world’s people well.The core solution for lagging regions,Africa above all,is freer domestic and international trade and more open?nancial markets,leading to deeper inte-gration into the world economy.

Evidence from the current long wave of globalization thus con?rms neoliberal eco-nomic theory––more open economies are more prosperous,economies that liberalize more experience a faster rate of progress,and people who resist further economic liberalization must be acting out of vested or‘‘rent-seeking’’interests.The world economy is an open system in the sense that country mobility up the income/wealth hierarchy is unconstrained by the structure.The hierarchy is in the process of being?attened,the North–South,core-periph-ery,rich country-poor country divide is being eroded away as globalization proceeds.The same evidence also validates the rationale of the World Trade Organization(WTO),the World

World Development Vol.32,No.4,pp.567–589,2004

ó2004Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain

0305-750X/$-see front matter doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.10.007

*I thank without implicating Sanjay Reddy,Michael

Ward,Branko Milanovic,Ron Dore,David Ellerman,

Martin Wolf,Timothy Besley,and James Galbraith;and

the Institute for Advanced Study,Berlin,and the Crisis

States Program,DESTIN,LSE,for?nancial support.

Final revision accepted:30October2003.

567

Bank,the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and other multilateral economic organizations as agents for creating a global‘‘level playing’’?eld undistorted by state-imposed restrictions on markets.This line of argument is champi-oned by the more powerful of the centers of ‘‘thinking for the world’’that in?uence inter-national policy making,including the inter-governmental organizations such as the World Bank,the IMF and the WTO,also the US and UK Treasuries,and opinion-shaping media such as The Financial Times and The Econo-mist.

The standard Left assumption,in contrast,is that the rich and powerful countries and classes have little interest in greater equity.Consistent with this view,the‘‘anti-globalization’’(more accurately,‘‘anti-neoliberal’’)argument asserts that world poverty and inequality have been rising,not falling,due to forces unleashed by the same globalization(for example,union leader Jay Mazur’s quote above).2The line of solution is some degree of tightening of public policy limits on the operation of market forces; though the‘‘anti-neoliberal’’camp embraces a

much wider range of solutions than the liberal camp.

The debate tends to be conducted by each side as if its case was overwhelming,and only an intellectually de?cient or dishonest person could see merit in other’s case.For example,Martin Wolf of The Financial Times claims that the‘‘anti-globalization’’argument is‘‘the big lie.’’3If translated into public policy it would cause more poverty and inequality while pretending to do the oppo-site.

This paper questions the empirical basis of the neoliberal argument.In addition,it goes beyond the questions to suggest di?erent con-clusions about levels and trends,stated in terms not of certainties but stronger or weaker probabilities.Finally it explains why we should be concerned about probably-rising world inequality,and how we might think about the neglected subject of the political economy of statistics.

2.THE REGIONAL COLLAGE

The growth rate of world GDP,measured in US dollars and at current exchange rates,fell sharply from around5.5%in1970–80to2.3% in1980–90to1.1%in1990–2000.4This is bad news,environmental considerations aside.But it still grew a little faster than world population over the past two decades;and the(population-weighted)GDP of developing countries as a group grew a little faster than that of the high-income countries.On the other hand,regional variation within the global South is large.Table 1shows the trends of regional per capita GNP to the per capita GNP of the‘‘core’’regions (with incomes converted to US$at current exchange rates as a measure of international purchasing power).During1960–99the per capita incomes of sub-Saharan Africa,Latin America,and West Asia and North Africa fell as a fraction of the core’s;South Asia’s remained more or less constant;East Asia’s (minus China)rose sharply;China’s also rose sharply but from a very low base.The most striking feature is not the trends but the size of the gaps,testimony to the failure of‘‘catch-up.’’Even success-story East Asia has an average income only about13%of the core’s.5 It is a safe bet that most development experts in 1960would have predicted much higher per-centages by2000.

The variation can also be shown in terms of the distribution of world income by regions and income percentiles.Figure1shows the regional distribution of people at each income percentile for two years,1990and1999.Here incomes are expressed in‘‘purchasing power parity’’dollars(PPP$),6in order to measure, Table1.GNP per capita for region as%of core’s GNP

per capita a

Region196019801999 Sub-Saharan

Africa

542 Latin America201812 West Asia and

North Africa

997 South Asia212 East Asia(w/o

China and Japan)

6813 China113 South545 North America124100101 Western Europe11110498 Southern Europe526060 Australia and NZ957573 Japan79134145 North(=core)100100100 Source:Arrighi,Silver,and Brewer(2003).

a Based on World Bank data.GNP at current exchange rates.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 568

notionally at least,domestic purchasing power.One sees the African collapse in the increased share of the African population in the bottom quintile;also the falling back of the Eastern and Central European populations from the second to the third quintile;and the rising share of the East Asian population in the second quintile.

Figure 2shows,in the top half,the world’s population plotted against the log of PPP$income,taking account of both between-coun-try and within-country income

distribution;

Figure 1.World income distribution,by region,at each percentile of global income distribution:(A)1990and (B)1999

(population at any particular income ?100)(Source:Dikhanov &Ward,2003).

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?569

and the breakdown by region.The bottom half shows the world’s income plotted against income level,hence the share of income accru-ing to people at di?erent income levels and in di?erent regions.Residents of South Asia and East Asia predominate at income levels below the median,and residents of the OECD coun-tries predominate at the top.

Finally,Figure 3shows the movement in the bimodal shape of the overall PPP$income-to-population distribution during 1970–99.The 1999distribution has shifted forward

compared

Figure 2.World income distribution,by region:top half,distribution of world population against income;bottom half,

distribution of world income against income,1999(Source:Dikhanov &Ward,2003).

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

570

to the 1970one,especially the lower of the two income humps,re?ecting the arrival of large numbers of South and East Asians into the middle deciles of the world income distribution.How does the collage––positive world per capita growth and wide divergence of economic performance between developing regions––net out in terms of global trends in poverty and inequality?

3.POVERTY

Figure 2shows the two standard interna-tional poverty lines,$1per day and $2per day;and also the line corresponding to an income of 50%of the world’s median income.Notice that even the higher $2per day absolute poverty line is below the conventional ‘‘minimum’’relative poverty line of half of the median.Notice too how small a share of world income goes to those on less than $1per day,and how small a share of the income of the richest earners would be needed to double the income of the poorest.Figures 1–3are based on a data set on income inequality compiled by the United Nation’s World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER).7But the standard poverty numbers––the ones normally used in discussions about the state of the world––come from the World Bank’s data set.This is the source of the claims that,in the words of President James Wolfensohn,‘‘Over the past 20years the number of people living on less than $1a day has fallen by 200million,after rising steadily for 200years’’8and ‘‘the proportion of people worldwide living in absolute poverty has dropped steadily in recent decades,from 29%in 1990to a record low of 23%in 1998.’’9The opening sentence of the Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001says,‘‘Of the world’s 6billion people 1.2billion live on less than $1a day,’’the same number in 1987and 1998.10

No ifs or buts.I now show that the Bank’s ?gures contain a large margin of error,and the errors probably ?atter the result in one direc-tion.11

To get the world extreme poverty headcount the Bank ?rst de?nes an international poverty line for a given base year by using purchasing power parity conversion factors (PPPs)to convert the purchasing power of an average of the o?cial national poverty lines of a set of low-income countries into the US dollar amount needed to have the same notional purchasing power in the United States in the same year.In its ?rst global poverty estimation this procedure yielded a conveniently under-standable US$1per day for the base year of 1985.12Then the Bank uses PPP conversion factors to estimate the amount of local cur-rency,country by country,needed to have the same purchasing power in the same year as in the US base case.This gives an international extreme poverty line equivalent to US$1

per

Figure 3.World income distribution,1970,1980,1990,1999(Source:Dikhanov &Ward,2003).

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?571

day,expressed in domestic currency.By way of illustration,Rs.10may have the same pur-chasing power in India in1985as US$1in the United States in the same year,in which case India’s international extreme poverty line is Rs. 10per day.From household surveys the Bank then estimates the number of people in the country living on less than this?gure.It sums the country totals to get the world total.It uses national consumer price indices to keep real purchasing power constant across time,and adjusts the international poverty line for each country upwards with in?ation.

(a)Large margin of error

There are several reasons to expect a large margin of error,regardless of direction.First, the poverty headcount is very sensitive to the precise level of the international poverty lines. This is because the shape of income distribution near the poverty line is such that,in most developing countries,a given percentage change in the line brings a similar or larger percentage change in the number of people below it.Recent research on China suggests that a10%increase in the line brings a roughly 20%increase in the poverty headcount. Second,the poverty headcount is very sensi-tive to the reliability of household surveys of income and expenditure.The available surveys are of widely varying quality,and many do not follow a standard template.Some sources of error are well known,such as the exclusion of most of the bene?ts that people receive from publicly provided goods and services.Others are less well known,such as the sensitivity of the poverty headcount to the survey design.For example,the length of the recall period makes a big di?erence to the rate of reported expendi-ture––the shorter the recall period the higher the expenditure.Arecent study in India suggests that a switch from the standard30-day report-ing period to a seven-day reporting period lifts 175million people from poverty,a nearly50% drop.This is using the Indian o?cial poverty https://www.doczj.com/doc/5e17489430.html,ing the higher$1/day international line the drop would be even greater.13The point here is not that household surveys are less reli-able than other possible sources(for example, national income accounts);simply that they do contain large amounts of error.

Third,China and India,the two most important countries for the overall trend,have PPP-adjusted income?gures that contain an even bigger component of guess work than for most other signi?cant countries.The main sources of PPP income?gures(the Penn World Tables and the International Comparison Pro-ject)are based on two large-scale international price benchmarking exercises for calculating purchasing power parity exchange rates,one in 1985in60countries,the other in1993in110 countries.The government of China declined to participate in both.The purchasing power parity exchange rate for China is based on gu-estimates from small,ad hoc price surveys in a few cities,adjusted by rules of thumb to take account of the huge price di?erences between urban and rural areas and between eastern and western regions.The government of India declined to participate in the1993exercise.The price comparisons for India are extrapolations from1985quali?ed by later ad hoc price sur-veys.The lack of reliable price comparisons for China and India––hence the lack of reliable evidence on the purchasing power of incomes across their distributions––compromises any statement about levels and trends in world poverty.14

Fourth,the often-cited comparison between 1980and1998––1.4billion in extreme poverty in1980,1.2billion in1998––is not valid.The Bank introduced a new methodology in the late1990s which makes the?gures noncom-parable.The Bank has recalculated the poverty numbers with the new method only back to 1987.15

The change of method amounts to:(i)a change in the way the international poverty line was calculated from the o?cial poverty lines of a sample of low-and middle-income countries (and a change in the sample countries),which resulted in,(ii)a change in the international poverty line from$PPP1per day to$PPP1.08 per day,and(iii)a change in the procedure for aggregating,country by country,the relative price changes over1985–93for a standard bundle of goods and services.

We do not know what the1980?gure would be with the new method.We do know however that the new method caused a huge change in the poverty count even for the same country in the same year using the same survey data.16 Table2shows the method-induced changes by regions for1993.Angus Deaton,an expert on these statistics,comments that‘‘Changes of this size risk swamping real changes...it seems impossible to make statements about changes in world poverty when the ground underneath one’s feet is changing in this way.’’17

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 572

(b)Downward bias

Further sources of error bias the results downward,making the number of people in poverty seem lower than it really is;and the bias probably increases over time,making the trend look rosier than it is.There are at least three reasons.

First,the Bank’s international poverty line underestimates the income or expenditure needed for an individual(or household)to avoid periods of food-clothing-shelter con-sumption too low to maintain health and well-being.(Moreover,it avoids altogether the problem that basic needs include unpriced public goods such as clean water and access to basic healthcare.)The Bank’s line refers to an ‘‘average consumption’’bundle,not to a basket of goods and services that makes sense for measuring poverty(though‘‘$1per day’’does have intuitive appeal to a Western audience being asked to support aid).Suppose it costs Rs.30to buy an equivalent bundle of food in India(de?ned in terms of calories and micro-nutrients)as can be bought in the United States with$1;and that it costs Rs.3to buy an equivalent bundle of services(haircuts,mas-sages)as$1in the United States,such services being relatively very cheap in developing countries.18Current methods of calculating purchasing power parity,based on an average consumption bundle of food,services and other things,may yield a PPP exchange rate of$PPP 1?Rs.10,meaning that Rs.10in India buys the equivalent average consumption bundle as $1in the United States.But this is misleading because the poor person,spending most income on food,can buy with Rs.10only one-third of the food purchasable with$1in the United States.To take the international poverty line for India as Rs.10therefore biases the number of poor downward.

We have no way of knowing what proportion of food-clothing-shelter needs the Bank’s international poverty line captures.But we can be fairly sure that if the Bank used a basic needs poverty line rather than its present arti?cial one the number of absolute poor would rise, because the national poverty lines equivalent to a global basic needs poverty line would prob-ably rise(perhaps by30–40%).19A30–40% increase in a basic-needs-based international poverty line would increase the world total of people in extreme poverty by at least30–40%. Indeed a recent study for Latin America shows that national extreme poverty rates,using poverty lines based on calori?c and demo-graphic characteristics,may be more than twice as high as those based on the World Bank’s$1/ day line.For example,the World Bank esti-mates Brazil’s extreme poverty rate(using its international poverty line)at5%,while the Economic Commission for Latin America, using a calories-and-demography poverty line, estimates the rate at14%.20

In short,we can be reasonably con?dent that switching from the Bank’s rather arbitrarily derived international extreme poverty line to one re?ecting the purchasing power necessary to achieve elementary human capabilities would substantially raise the number of people in extreme poverty.

The second reason is that the Bank’s new international poverty line of$1.08/day probably increases the downward bias,leading the Bank to exaggerate the decline in the poverty head-count between the years covered by the old methodology and those covered by the new one. The new international poverty line of$PPP1.08 lowers the equivalent national poverty lines in most countries compared to the earlier$PPP1 line.It lowers them in77%of the94countries for which data are available,containing82%of their population.It lowers the old international poverty line for China by14%,for India,by 9%,for the whole sample by an average of 13%.21As noted,even a small downward shift in the poverty line removes a large number of people out of poverty.

Third,future‘‘updating’’of the international poverty line will continue arti?cially to lower the true numbers,because average consump-tion patterns(on which the international pov-erty line is based)are shifting toward services whose prices relative to food and shelter are lower in poor than in rich countries,giving the false impression that the cost of the basic

Table2.1993poverty rate,using old and new World

Bank methodology a

Old poverty rate(%)New poverty rate(%)

Subsaharan Africa39.149.7

Latin America23.515.3

Middle East/N Africa 4.1 1.9

Source:Deaton(2001).

a The poverty rate is the proportion of the population

living on less than$1a day.

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?573

consumption goods required by the poor is falling.22

All these problems have to be resolved in one way or another in any estimate of world pov-erty,whoever makes it.But the fact that the World Bank is the near-monopoly provider introduces a further complication.The number of poor people is politically sensitive.The Bank’s many critics like to use the poverty numbers as one of many pointers to the con-clusion that it has accomplished‘‘precious little,’’in the words of US Treasury Secretary O’Neill;which then provides a rationale for tighter US control of the Bank,as in the state-ment by the head of the US Agency for Inter-national Development,‘‘Whether the US way of doing things drives some multilateral insti-tutions,I think it should,because,frankly,a lot of the multilateral institutions don’t have a good track record.’’23

Acomparison of two recent Bank publica-tions suggests how the Bank’s statements about poverty are a?ected by its tactics and the ideological predispositions of those in the ideas-controlling positions.The World Devel-opment Report2000/2001:Attacking Poverty says that the number of people living on less than$1a day increased by20million from1.18 billion in1987to1.20billion in1998.When it was being written in the late1990s the key ideas-controlling positions in the Bank were held by Joe Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur(respec-tively,chief economist and director of the World Development Report2000/2001),not noted champions of neoliberal economics.24 At that time the Bank was trying to mobilize support for making the Comprehensive Devel-opment Framework the new template for all its work,for which purpose lack of progress in development helped.Then came the majority report of the Meltzer Commission,for the US Congress,which said the Bank was failing at its central task of poverty reduction and therefore should be sharply cut back––as shown by the fact that the number of people in absolute poverty remained constant at1.2billion during 1987–98.25Now the Bank needed to emphasize progress.The next major Bank publication, Globalization,Growth,and Poverty:Building an Inclusive World Economy,claimed that the number of people living in poverty decreased by 200million in the18years over1980–98.26By this time Stiglitz and Kanbur were gone and David Dollar,a prominent Bank economist, was ascendant.He was chief author of Global-ization,Growth and Poverty.27

(c)Conclusions about poverty

We can be fairly sure that the Bank’s poverty headcount has a large margin of error in all years,in the sense that it may be signi?cantly di?erent from the headcount that would result from the use of PPP conversion factors based more closely on the real costs of living of the poor(de?ned in terms of income needed to buy enough calories,micronutrients and other necessities in order not to be poor).By the same token we should question the Bank’s con?-dence that the trend is downward.

We do not know for sure how the late1990s revision of the method and the PPP numbers alters the poverty headcount in any one year and the trend.But it is likely that the Bank’s numbers substantially underestimate the true numbers of the world’s population living in extreme poverty,and make the trend look brighter.

On the other hand,it is quite plausible that the proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty has fallen over the past20 years or so.For all the problems with Chinese and Indian income?gures we know enough about trends in other variables––including life expectancy,heights,and other nonincome measures––to be con?dent that their poverty headcounts have indeed dropped dramatically over the past20years.If it is the case(as some experts claim)that household surveys are more likely to miss the rich than the poor,their results may overstate the proportion of the population in poverty.The magnitude of world population increase over the past20years is so large that the Bank’s poverty numbers would have to be huge underestimates for the world poverty rate not to have fallen.Any more precise statement about the absolute number of the world’s people living in extreme poverty and the change over time currently rests on quicksand.

4.INEQUALITY

The world poverty headcount could move in one direction while world in equality moved in the other.The neoliberal argument says that they have both dropped.28But in the past several years world income distribution has become a hot topic of debate in international economics and in sociology(much hotter than trends in world poverty).Disagreements about the overall inequality trend should not be sur-

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 574

prising given the variation in regional economic performance––di?erent ways of measuring emphasize di?erent parts of the collage.

The only valid short answer to the question,‘‘What is the trend of world income distribu-tion?’’is,‘‘It depends on which combination out of many plausible combinations of mea-sures and countries we choose.’’29Whereas we could get better data on the poor to the extent that the poverty headcount would command general agreement,there is no single best mea-sure of world income inequality.

The choices include:alternative measures of income(GDP per capita converted to US dol-lars using market exchange rates or GDP per capita adjusted for di?erences in purchasing power across countries);alternative weightings of countries(each country weighted as one unit or by population);alternative measures of dis-tribution(including the Gini or some other average coe?cient,or ratios of the income of the richer deciles of world population to that of poorer deciles,or average income of a set of developing countries to that of a set of devel-oped countries);alternatives sources of data on incomes(national income accounts or house-hold surveys);alternative samples of countries and time periods.

We can be reasonably con?dent of the fol-lowing six propositions.

Proposition1.World income distribution has become rapidly more unequal,when incomes are measured at market exchange rates and expres-sed in US dollars.

No one disputes this.The dispute is about what the?gures mean.Most economists say that exchange-rate-based income measures are irrel-evant,and hence would dismiss the data in Table 1.GDP incomes should always be adjusted by PPP exchange rates to take account of di?er-ences in purchasing power,they say.30This makes a big di?erence to the size of the gap between rich and poor.As noted,the PPP adjustment is made by computing the relative prices for an average bundle of goods and ser-vices in di?erent countries.The PPP adjust-ment substantially raises the relative income of poor countries.India’s PPP GDP,for exam-ple,is about four times its market exchange rate GDP.The PPP adjustment thus makes world income distribution look much more equal than the distribution of market-exchange-rate incomes.

Market-exchange-rate-based income com-parisons do su?er from all the ways in which o?cial exchange rates do not re?ect the‘‘real’’economy:from distortions in the o?cial rates, exclusion of goods and services that are not traded,and sudden changes in the o?cial exchange rate driven more by capital than by trade movements.Nevertheless,we should reject the argument that incomes converted via PPP exchange rates should always be used in preference to incomes converted at market exchange rates.

The practical reasons concern the weak-nesses of the PPP numbers.Plausibly con-structed PPP numbers for China di?er by a factor of two.Estimates for countries of the former Soviet Union before the1990s also di?er by a wide margin;and India’s di?er too. So if incomes converted via market exchange rates do not give an accurate measure of rel-ative purchasing power,neither do the PPP numbers for countries that carry heavy weight in world trends.Con?dence in world PPP income distribution should be correspondingly limited.

Practical problems aside,PPP-adjustment is in principle preferable when one is interested in domestic purchasing power or,more gen-erally,material well-being.We may however, be interested in income not only as a measure of material well-being.We may also be inter-ested in income as a proxy for the purchasing power of residents of di?erent countries over goods and services produced in other coun-tries––for example,the purchasing power of residents of developing countries over advanced country products,compared to the purchasing power of residents of advanced countries over developing country products.If we are interested in any of the questions about the economic and geopolitical impact of one country(or region)on the rest of the world––including the cost to developing countries of repaying their debts,importing capital goods,and participating in interna-tional organizations––we should use market exchange rates.

The reason why many poor small countries are hardly represented in negotiations that concern them directly is that they cannot a?ord the cost of hotels,o?ces,and salaries in places like Washington DC and Geneva,which must be paid not in PPP dollars but in hard currency bought with their own currency at market exchange rates.In addition,the reason they cannot a?ord to pay the foreign exchange

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?575

costs of living up to many of their interna-tional commitments––hiring foreign experts to help them exercise control over their banking sectors so that they can implement their part of the anti-money-laundering regime,for example––likewise re?ects their low market-exchange-rate incomes.On the other hand, international lenders have not been lining up to accept repayment of developing country debts in PPP dollars,which would reduce their debt repayments by75%or more in many cases.

These same‘‘foreign’’impacts feed back to domestic state capacity.For example,we should use market exchange rates to pick up the key point that the long-run deterioration in the exchange rates of most developing countries is putting those countries under increasing internal stress.When a rising amount of real domestic resources has to go into acquiring a given quantity of imports––say,of capital goods––other domestic uses of those resources are squeezed,including measures to reduce poverty,to?nance civil services and schools and the like.This backwash e?ect is occluded in PPP calculations.

Hence we do need to pay attention to what is happening to market-exchange-rate world income distribution.It is widening fast.

The next four propositions refer to inequality of PPP-adjusted incomes,as an approximation to domestic purchasing power.

Proposition2.World PPP-income polarization has increased,with polarization measured as richest to poorest decile.

The broad result is hardly surprising:the top 10%is comprised almost entirely of people living in the core countries of North America, western Europe,and Japan,where incomes have grown over the past20–30years,while a large chunk of the bottom10%is comprised of African countries where incomes have stag-nated or fallen.According to one study,the trend of richest to poorest decile goes like this: 1970––92,1980––109,1990––104,1999––104.31Another study?nds a jump in the ratio of25%over1988––93.32The change is made up of the top decile pulling sharply up from the median and the bottom decile falling away from the median.The polarizing trend would be much sharper with the top1%rather than the top decile.Proposition3.Between-country world PPP-income inequality has increased since at least 1980,using per capita GDPs,equal country weights(China?Uganda),and a coefficient like the Gini for the whole distribution.

Of course,we would not weight countries equally if we were interested simply in relative well-being.But we would weight them equally––treat each country as a unit of observation,analogous to a laboratory test observation––if we were interested in growth theory and the growth impacts of public poli-cies,resource endowments,and the like.We might,for example,arrange(unweighted) countries by the openness of their trade regime and see whether more open countries have better economic performance.

The same inequality-widening trend is obtained using a somewhat di?erent measure of inequality––the dispersion of per capita GDPs across the world’s(equally weighted)countries. Dispersion increased over the long period, 1950––98,and especially fast over the1990s. Moreover,the dispersion of per capita GDP growth rates has also risen over time,suggest-ing wider variation in performance among countries at each income level.Astudy by the Economic Commission for Latin America using these dispersion measures concludes that there is‘‘no doubt as to the existence of a de?nite trend toward distributive inequality worldwide,both across and within coun-tries.’’33

Proposition4.Between-country world PPP-income inequality has been constant or falling since around1980,with countries weighted by population.

This is the result that the neoliberal argument celebrates.There are just two problems.First, exclude China and even this measure shows a widening since1980;also exclude India and the widening is pronounced.Therefore,falling income inequality is not a general feature of the world economy,even using the most favor-able combination of measures.34

Second,this measure––the average income of each country weighted by population––is interesting only as an approximation to what we are really interested in,which is income distribution among all the world’s people or households regardless of which country they reside in.We would not be interested in mea-suring income inequality within the United

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 576

States by calculating the average income for each state weighted by population if we had data for all US households.

Proposition5.Several serious studies find that world PPP-income inequality has increased over a period within the past two to three decades, taking account of both between-and within-country distributions.

Studies which attempt to measure income distribution among all the world’s people show widely varying results,depending on things like the precise measure of inequality,the sample of countries,the time period,and the sources of income data.But several studies,which use a variety of data sources and methods,point to widening inequality.

Steve Dowrick and Muhammad Akmal make an approximation to the distribution of income among all the world’s people by com-bining(population-weighted)between-country inequality in PPP-adjusted average incomes with within-country inequality.They?nd that world inequality widened over1980–93using all of four common measures of inequality over the whole distribution.35

Branko Milanovic uses the most compre-hensive set of data drawn only from household income and expenditure surveys(it does not mix data from these surveys with data from national income accounts).He?nds a sharp rise in world inequality over as short a time as 1988–93,using both the Gini coe?cient and ratio(or polarization)measures.36Some of his ?ndings are shown in Table 3.Preliminary analysis of1998data suggests a slight drop in inequality in1993–98,leaving a large rise over 1988–98.

We have to be cautious about Milanovic’s results partly because household surveys have the kind of weaknesses described above (though these weaknesses do not make them worse than the alternative,national income accounts,which have their own problems),and partly because even a10-year interval,let alone a?ve-year interval,is very short,suggesting that some of the increase may be noise.

Yuri Dikhanov and Michael Ward combine micro-level household survey data with national income accounts,using the WIDER data set,a di?erent statistical technique to the earlier authors,and a longer time period,1970–99.They?nd that the Gini coe?cient increased over this period from0.668to0.683.37 Proposition6.Pay inequality within countries was stable or declining from the early1960s to 1980–1982,then sharply and continuously increased to the present.1980–82is a turning point toward greater inequality in manufacturing pay worldwide.38

Pay data have the great advantage over income data that pay data are a much less ambiguous variable,have been collected sys-tematically by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization(UNIDO)since the early1960s,and give many more observation points for each country than any data set on incomes.(The standard data set for world poverty and inequality,the World Bank’s Deininger-Squire set,has few observation points for most of Africa,West Asia and Latin America during the1980s and1990s,requiring the analyst to guess the intervening years.)The disadvantage of pay data,of course,is that they treat only a small part of the economy of many developing countries,and provide only a proxy for incomes and expenditure.They are of lim-ited use if our interest is only in relative well-being(though of more use if our interest is in the e?ects of trade,manufacturing innovation, etc.).But not as limited as may seem at?rst sight,because what is happening to pay rates in formal-sector manufacturing re?ects larger trends,including income di?erences between countries and income di?erences within coun-tries(since the pay of unskilled,entry-port jobs in manufacturing is closely related to the opportunity cost of time in the‘‘informal’’or agricultural sectors).39

(a)China and India

With38%of the world’s population,China and India shape world trends in poverty and inequality.They have grown very fast over the past decade(India)or two(China),if the?g-ures are taken at face value.China’s average purchasing power parity income rose from0.3

Table3.World income distribution by households

(1988and1993)

19881993%Change

Gini0.630.67+6

Richest decile/median7.288.98+23

Poorest decile/median0.310.28)10

Source:Milanovic(2002a).

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?577

of the world average in 1990to 0.45in 1998,or 15percentage points in only eight years.

We can be sure that world poverty and inequality are less than they would be had China and India grown more slowly.About any stronger conclusion we have to be cautious.First,recall that China’s and India’s purchasing power parity numbers are even more ques-tionable than those for the average developing country,because of their nonparticipation in the international price comparisons on which the PPP calculations rest.Second,China’s growth in the 1990s is probably overstated.Many analysts have recently been revising China’s growth statistics downward.Whereas government ?gures show annual real GDP growth of 7–8%in 1998and 1999one authority on Chinese statistics estimates that the econ-omy may not have grown at all.40

Even the Chinese government says that the World Bank has been overstating China’s average income,and the Bank has recently revised its numbers down.Table 4shows the Bank’s estimates for China’s average GNP in US$for 1997–99and the corresponding growth rates.The level of average (exchange rate-con-verted)income fell sharply during 1997–98,while the corresponding growth rate over 1997–98was +6.4%.The Bank reduced China’s per capita income partly because it believed that China’s fast growth campaign begun in 1998had unleashed a torrent of statistical falsi?ca-tion.In addition,the Chinese government arm-twisted the World Bank (especially after the allegedly accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999)to lower average income below the threshold of eligi-bility for concessional IDAlending from the Bank––not for cheap IDAloans but for the privilege extended to companies of IDA-eligible countries to add a 7.5%uplift on bids for World Bank projects.41

Over the 1990s China’s annual growth rate is more likely to have been around 6–8%than the 8–10%of the o?cial statistics.This one change lowers the probability that world interper-sonal distribution has become more equal.42We have to be cautious about going from China’s fast growth to falls in world income inequality not only because China’s growth rates and income level may be overstated but also because the rise in inequality within both China and India partly o?sets the reduction in world income inequality that comes from their relatively fast growth of average income––though careful calculations of the relative strength of the two contrary e?ects have yet to be made.43China’s surging inequality is now greater than before the Communists won the civil war in 1949,and inequality between regions is probably higher than in any other sizable country.The ratio of the average income of the richest to poorest province (Guangdong to Guizhou)rose from around 3.2in 1991(current yuan)to 4.8in 1993,and remained at 4.8in 1998–2001.44The corre-sponding ?gure for India in the late 1990s was 4.2,the United States,1.9.

(b)The United States and other Anglo political

economies Canada excepted,all the countries of English settlement,led by the United States,have experienced big increases in income inequality over the past 20–30years.In the United States,the top 1%of families enjoyed a growth of after-tax income of almost 160%over 1979–97,while families in the middle of the distribution had a 10%increase.45Within the top 1%most of the gains have been concentrated in the top 0.1%.This is not a matter of reward to educa-tion.Inequality has expanded hugely among the college-educated.Whatever the causes,the fact is that the United States is now back to the same level of inequality of income as in the decades before 1929,the era of the ‘‘robber barons’’and the Great Gatsby.Income distri-bution in the United Kingdom grew more unequal more quickly than even in the United States during the 1980s,and is now the most unequal of the big European countries.

(c)Country mobility

How much do countries move in the income hierarchy?One study uses real GNP per capita data (GNP de?ated in local currency to a

Table 4.China’s GNPPC and growth rate (1997–99)a

1997

19981999GNPPC/PPP (US$)3,0703,0503,550GNPPC (US$)

860750780Annual growth rate of GNPPC (%)

7.4

6.4

6.1

Source :World Bank,World Development Indicators (1999–2001).a

Note that each volume gives ?gures for only one year,so that the discrepancy can be seen only by compiling one’s own table.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

578

common base year,then converted to dollars at the exchange rate for that base year),and?nds a robustly trimodal distribution of world pop-ulation against the log of GNP per capita during1960–99.46The three income zones might be taken as empirical correlates of the conceptual zones of core,semi-periphery,and periphery.For the100countries in the sample, 72remained in the same income zone over the whole period sampled at?ve yearly intervals (e.g.,Australia remained in zone1,Brazil in zone2,Bolivia in zone3).The remaining28 countries moved at least once from one zone to another(e.g.,Argentina from1to2).No country moved more than one zone.(South Korea,Hong Kong and Singapore in1960were already in the middle,not low zone.)There are about as many cases of upward movement as https://www.doczj.com/doc/5e17489430.html,pared to the rate of potential mobility(each country moving one zone at each measurement date)the rate of actual mobility was3%.

Of the28out of100countries that moved at least once between zones,about half had‘‘sta-ble’’moves in the sense that their position in 1990and1999was one zone above or below their position in1960and1965.Greece moved stably up from2to1,Argentina moved stably down from1to2,El Salvador moved stably down from2to3.As many countries moved stably up as down.

(d)The absolute income gap

Our measures of inequality refer to relative incomes,not absolute incomes.Inequality between developing countries as a group and developed countries as a group remains con-stant if the ratio of developing country income to developed country income remains at5%. But this,of course,implies a big rise in the absolute size of the gap.The absolute gap between a country with average income of $1,000growing at6%and a country with average income$30,000growing at1%con-tinues to widen until after the40th year! China and India are reducing the absolute gap with the faltering middle-income states such as Mexico,Brazil,Russia and Argentina, but not with the countries of North America, Western Europe and Japan.Dikhanov and Ward’s?gures show that,overall,the absolute gap between the average income of the top decile of world population and the bottom decile increased from$PPP18,690in1970to $PPP28,902in1999.47We can be sure that––a seventh proposition––absolute gaps between people and countries are widening fast and will continue to widen for at least two genera-tions.

(e)Conclusions about inequality

The evidence does support the liberal argument when inequality is measured with population-weighted countries’per capita PPP-adjusted incomes,plus a measure of average inequality,taking China’s income statistics at face value.On the other hand,polarization has clearly increased.Moreover,several studies that measure inequality over the whole distribution and use either cross-sectional household sur-vey data or measures of combined inequality between countries and within countries show widening inequality since around1980.The conclusion is that world inequality measured in plausible ways is probably rising,despite China’s and India’s fast growth.The conclusion is reinforced by evidence of a quite di?erent kind.Dispersion in pay rates within manufac-turing has become steadily wider since the early 1980s,having remained roughly constant from 1960to the early1980s.Meanwhile,absolute income gaps are widening fast.

5.GLOBALIZATION

I have raised doubts about the liberal argu-ment’s claim that(a)the number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide is currently about1.2billion,(b)it has fallen substantially since1980,by about200million,and(c)that world income inequality has fallen over the same period,having risen for many decades before then.Let us consider the other end of the argument––that the allegedly positive trends in poverty and inequality have been driven by rising integration of poorer countries into the world economy,as seen in rising trade/ GDP,foreign direct investment/GDP,and the like.

Clearly the proposition is not well supported at the world level if we agree that globalization has been rising while poverty and income inequality have not been falling.Indeed,it is striking that the pronounced convergence of economic policy toward‘‘openness’’worldwide over the past20years has gone with divergence of economic performance.But it might still be possible to argue that globalization explains di?erences between countries:that more open

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?579

economies or ones that open faster have a better record than less open ones or ones than open more slowly.

This is what World Bank studies claim.The best known,Globalization ,Growth and Pov-erty ,48distinguishes ‘‘newly globalizing’’countries,also called ‘‘more globalized’’coun-tries,from ‘‘nonglobalizing’’countries or ‘‘less globalized’’countries.It measures globalizing by changes in the ratio of trade to GDP over 1977–97.Ranking developing countries by the amount of change,it calls the top third the more globalized countries,the bottom two-thirds,the less globalized countries.It ?nds that the former have had faster economic growth,no increase in inequality,and faster reduction of poverty than the latter.‘‘Thus globalization clearly can be a force for poverty reduction,’’it concludes.

The conclusion does not follow.First,using ‘‘change in the trade/GDP ratio’’as the mea-sure of globalization skews the results.49The globalizers then include China and India,as

well as countries such as Nepal,C ^o

te d’Ivoire,Rwanda,Haiti,and Argentina.It is quite pos-sible that ‘‘more globalized’’countries are less open than many ‘‘less globalized’’countries,both in terms of trade/GDP and in terms of the magnitude of tari?s and nontari?barriers.A country with high trade/GDP and very free trade policy would still be categorized as ‘‘less globalized’’if its increase in trade/GDP over 1977–97put it in the bottom two-thirds of the sample.Many of the globalizing countries ini-tially had very low trade/GDP in 1977and still had relatively low trade/GDP at the end of the period in 1997(re?ecting more than just the fact that larger economies tend to have lower ratios of trade/GDP).To call relatively closed economies ‘‘more globalized’’or ‘‘globalizers’’and to call countries with much higher ratios of trade/GDP and much freer trade regimes ‘‘less globalized’’or even ‘‘nonglobalizers’’is an audacious use of language.

Excluding countries with high but not rising levels of trade to GDP from the category of more globalized eliminates many poor coun-tries dependent on a few natural resource commodity exports,which have had poor eco-nomic performance.The structure of their economy and the low skill endowment of the population make them dependent on trade.If they were included as globalized their poor economic performance would question the proposition that the more globalized countries do better.On the other hand,including China and India as globalizers––despite relatively low trade/GDP and relatively protective trade regimes––guarantees that the globalizers,weighted by population,show better perfor-mance than the nonglobalizers.Table 5pro-vides an illustration.

The second problem is that the argument fudges almost to vanishing point the distinction between trade quantities and trade policy,and implies,wrongly,that rising trade quantities––and the developmental bene?ts thereof––are the consequence of trade liberalization.

Third,the argument assumes that fast trade growth is the major cause of good economic performance.It does not examine the reverse causation,from fast economic growth to fast trade growth.Nor does it consider that other variables correlated with trade growth may be important causes of economic performance:quality of government,for example.One reex-amination of the Bank’s study ?nds that the globalizer countries do indeed have higher quality of government indicators than the nonglobalizer countries,on average.50Finally,trade does not capture important kinds of ‘‘openness,’’including people ?ows and ideas

Table 5.Trade-dependent nonglobalizers and less-trade-dependent globalizers

Exports/GDP

GNPRG 1988–99(%)

1990

1999%Change Nonglobalizers Honduras 364217)1.2Kenya 2625)0.040.5Globalizers India 71157 6.9B’desh

6

14

133

3.3

Source :World Bank,World Development Report 2000/01,Tables 1and 13.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

580

?ows.Imagine an economy with no foreign trade but high levels of inward and outward migration and a well-developed diaspora net-work.In a real sense this would be an open or globalized economy,though not classi?ed as such.

Certainly many countries––including China and India––have bene?ted from their more intensive engagement in international trade and investment over the past one or two decades. But this is not to say that their improved per-formance is largely due to their more intensive external integration.They began to open their own markets after building up industrial capacity and fast growth behind high barri-ers.51In addition,throughout their period of so-called openness they have maintained pro-tection and other market restrictions that would earn them a bad report card from the World Bank and IMF were they not growing fast.China began its fast growth with a high degree of equality of assets and income, brought about in distinctly nonglobalized con-ditions and unlikely to have been achieved in an open economy and democratic polity.52 Their experience––and that of Japan,South Korea and Taiwan earlier––shows that coun-tries do not have to adopt liberal trade policies in order to reap large bene?ts from trade.53 They all experienced relatively fast growth behind protective barriers;a signi?cant part of their growth came from replacing imports of consumption goods with domestic production; and more and more of their rapidly growing imports consisted of capital goods and inter-mediate goods.As they became richer they tended to liberalize their trade––providing the basis for the misunderstanding that trade lib-eralization drove their growth.For all the Bank study’s quali?cations(such as‘‘We label the top third?more globalized’without in any sense implying that they adopted pro-trade policies. The rise in trade may have been due to other policies or even to pure chance’’),it concludes that trade liberalization has been the driving force of the increase in developing countries’trade.‘‘The result of this trade liberalization in the developing world has been a large increase in both imports and exports,’’it says.On this shaky basis the Bank rests its case that developing countries must push hard toward near-free trade as a core ingredient of their development strategy,the better to enhance competition in e?cient,rent-free markets.Even when the Bank or other development agencies articulate the softer principle––trade liberal-ization is the necessary direction of change but countries may do it at di?erent speeds––all the attention remains focused on the liberalization part,none on how to make protective regimes more e?ective.

In short,the Bank’s argument about the benign e?ects of globalization on growth, poverty and income distribution does not sur-vive scrutiny at either end.And a recent cross-country study of the relationship between openness and income distribution strikes another blow.It?nds that among the subset of countries with low and middle levels of average income(below$5,000per capita in PPP terms, that of Chile and the Czech Republic),higher levels of trade openness are associated with more inequality,while among higher-income countries more openness goes with less inequality.54

6.CONCLUSION

It is plausible,and important,that the pro-portion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty has probably fallen over the past two decades or so,having been rising for decades before then.Beyond this we cannot be con?dent,because the World Bank’s poverty numbers are subject to a large margin of error, are probably biased downward,and probably make the trend look rosier than it really is.On income distribution,several studies suggest that world income inequality has been rising during the past two to three decades,and a study of manufacturing pay dispersions buttresses the same conclusion from another angle.The trend is sharpest when incomes are measured at market-exchange-rate incomes.This is less rel-evant to relative well-being than PPP-adjusted incomes,in principle;but it is highly relevant to state capacity,interstate power,and the dynamics of capitalism.One combination of inequality measures does yield the conclusion that income inequality has been falling––PPP-income per capita weighted by population, measured by an averaging coe?cient such as the Gini.But take out China and even this measure shows widening inequality.Falling inequality is thus not a generalized feature of the world economy even by the most favorable measure.Finally,whatever we conclude about income inequality,absolute income gaps are widening and will continue to do so for decades.

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?581

If the number of people in extreme poverty is not falling and if global inequality is widening, we cannot conclude that globalization in the context of the dollar-Wall Street regime is moving the world in the right direction,with Africa’s poverty as a special case in need of international attention.The balance of proba-bility is that––like global warming––the world is moving in the wrong direction.

The failure of the predicted e?ects aside,the studies that claim globalization as the driver are weakened by(a)the use of changes in the trade/ GDP ratio or FDI/GDP ratio as the index of globalization or openness,irrespective of level (though using the level on its own is also problematic,the level of trade/GDP being determined mainly by country size);(b)the assumption that trade liberalization drives increases in trade/GDP;and(c)the assumption that increases in trade/GDP drive improved economic performance.The problems come together in the case of China and India,whose treatment dominates the overall results.They are classed as‘‘globalizers,’’their relatively good economic performance is attributed mainly to their‘‘openness,’’and the deviation between their economic policies––substantial trade protection and capital controls,for example––and the core economic policy pack-age of the World Bank and the other multilat-eral economic organizations is glossed.

At the least,analysts have to separate out the e?ect of country size on trade/GDP levels from other factors determining trade/GDP,including trade policies,because the single best predictor of trade/GDP is country size(population and area).They must make a clear distinction between statements about(i)levels of trade,(ii) changes in levels,(iii)restrictiveness or openness of trade policy,(iv)changes in restrictiveness of policy,and(v)the content of trade––whether a narrow range of commodity exports in return for a broad range of consumption imports,or a diverse range of exports(some of them replaced imports)in return for a diverse range of imports (some of them producer goods to assist further import replacement).

(a)Should we worry about rising inequality? The neoliberal argument says that inequality provides incentives for e?ort and risk-taking, and thereby raises e?ciency.As Margaret Thatcher put it,‘‘It is our job to glory in inequality and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the bene?t of us all.’’55We should worry about rising inequal-ity only if it somehow makes the poor worse o?than otherwise.

The counterargument is that this productive incentive e?ect applies only at moderate, Scandinavian,levels of inequality.At higher levels,such as in the United States over the past 20years,it is likely to be swamped by social costs.Aside from the moral case against it, inequality above a moderate level creates a kind of society that even crusty conservatives hate to live in,unsafe and unpleasant.

Higher income inequality within countries goes with:(i)higher poverty(using World Bank data and the number of people below the Bank’s international poverty line);56(ii)slower economic growth,especially in large countries such as China,because it constrains the growth of mass demand;(iii)higher unemployment; and(iv)higher crime.57The link to higher crime comes through the inability of unskilled men in high inequality societies to play tradi-tional male economic and social roles,includ-ing a plausible contribution to family income. But higher crime and violence is only the tip of a distribution of social relationships skewed toward the aggressive end of the spectrum,with low average levels of trust and social capital.In short,inequality at the national level should certainly be a target of public policy,even if just for the sake of the prosperous.

The liberal argument is even less concerned about widening inequality between countries than it is about inequality within countries, because we cannot do much to lessen interna-tional inequality directly.But on the face of it, the more globalized the world becomes,the more that the reasons why we should be con-cerned about within-country inequalities also apply between countries.If globalization within the current framework actually increases inequality within and between countries,as some evidence suggests,increases in world inequality above moderate levels may cut world aggregate demand and thereby world economic growth,making a vicious circle of rising world inequality and slower world growth.

Rising inequality between countries impacts directly the national political economy in the poorer states,as rich people who earlier com-pared themselves to others in their neighbor-hood now compare themselves to others in the United States or Western Europe,and feel deprived and perhaps angry.Inequality above moderate levels may,for example,predispose

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 582

the elites to become more corrupt as they com-pare themselves to elites in rich countries.They may squeeze their own populations in order to sustain a comparable living standard,enfeebling whatever norms of citizenship have emerged and preventing the transition from an‘‘oligar-chic’’elite,concerned to maximize redistribu-tion upward and contain protests by repression, to an‘‘establishment’’elite,concerned to pro-tect its position by being seen to operate fairly. Likewise,rapidly widening between-country inequality in current exchange rate terms feeds back into stress in public services,as the increasing foreign exchange cost of imports, debt repayment and the like has to be o?set by cuts in budgets for health,education,and industrial policy.

Migration is a function of inequality,since the fastest way for a poor person to get richer is to move from a poor country to a rich country. Widening inequality may raise the incentive on the educated people of poor countries to migrate to the rich countries,and raise the incentive of unskilled people to seek illegal entry.Yet migration/refugees/asylum is the single most emotional,most atavistic issue in Western pol-itics.Polls show that more than two-thirds of respondents agree that there should be fewer ‘‘foreigners’’living in their countries.58 Rising inequality may generate con?ict between states,and––because the market-exchange-rate income gap is so big––make it cheap for rich states to intervene to support one side or the other in civil strife.Rising inequality in market-exchange-rate terms––helped by a high US dollar,a low(long-run)oil price,and the WTO agreements on intellectual property rights,investment,and trade in services––allows the United States to?nance the military sinews of its postimperial empire more cheaply.59

The e?ects of inequality within and between countries depend on prevailing norms.Where power hierarchy and income inequality are thought to be the natural condition of man the negative e?ects can be expected to be lighter than where prevailing norms a?rm equality.Norms of equality and democracy are being energeti-cally internationalized by the Atlantic states,at the same time as the lived experience in much of the rest of the world is from another planet.

In the end,the interests of the rich and pow-erful should,objectively,line up in favor of greater equity in the world at large,because some of the e?ects of widening inequality may contaminate their lives and those of their chil-dren.This?ts the neoliberal argument.But the route to greater equity goes not only through the dismantling of market rules rigged in favor of the rich––also consistent with the neoliberal argument––but through more political(non-market)in?uence on resource allocation in order to counter the tendency of free markets to concentrate incomes and power.This requires international public policy well beyond the boundaries of neoliberalism.

The need for deliberate international redis-tribution is underlined by the evidence that world poverty may be higher in absolute numbers than is generally thought,and quite possibly rising rather than falling;and that world income inequality is probably rising too. This evidence suggests that the income and prosperity gap between a small proportion of the world’s population living mainly in the North and a large proportion living entirely in the South is a structural divide,not just a matter of a lag in the South’s catch-up.Sus-tained preferences for the South may be necessary if the world is to move to a single-humped and more narrowly dispersed distri-bution over the next century.

(b)The political economy of statistics Concerns about global warming gave rise to a coordinated worldwide project to get better climatological data;the same is needed to get better data on poverty and inequality.The World Bank is one of the key actors.It has moved from major to minor source of foreign ?nance for most developing countries outside of Africa.But it remains an important global organization because it wields a dispropor-tionate in?uence in setting the development agenda,in o?ering an imprimatur of‘‘sound ?nance’’that crowds in other resources,and in providing?nance at times when other?nance is not available.Its statistics and development research are crucial to its legitimacy.60Other regional development banks and aid agencies have largely given up on statistics and research, ceding the ground to the World Bank.Alter-native views come only from a few‘‘urban guerrillas’’in pockets of academia and the UN system.61Keynes’dictum on practical men and long-dead economists suggests that such intel-lectual monopolization can have a hugely neg-ative impact.

Think of two models of a statistical organi-zation that is part of a larger organization working on politically sensitive themes.The

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?583

‘‘exogenous’’model says that the statistics are produced by professionals exercising their best judgment in the face of di?culties that have no optimal solutions,who are managerially insu-lated from the overall tactical goals of the organization.The‘‘endogenous’’model says that the statistics are produced by sta?who act as agents of the senior managers(the princi-pals),the senior managers expect them to help advance the tactical goals of the organization just like other sta?,and the statistics sta?therefore have to massage the data beyond the limits of professional integrity,or quit. Certainly the simple endogenous model does not?t the Bank;but nor does the other.The Bank is committed to an O?cial View of how countries should seek poverty reduction,rooted in the neoliberal agenda of trade opening,?nancial opening,privatization,deregulation, with some good governance,civil society and environmental protection thrown in;it is exposed to arm-twisting by the G7member states and international nongovernmental organizations(NGOs);it must secure their support and defend itself against criticism.62It seeks to advance its broad market opening agenda not through coercion but mainly by establishing a sense that the agenda is right and ?tting.Without this it would lose the support of the G7states,Wall Street,and fractions of developing country elites.The units of the Bank that produce the statistics are partly insulated from the resulting pressures,especially by their membership in‘‘epistemic communities’’of professionals inside and outside the Bank;but not wholly insulated.To say otherwise is to deny that the Bank is subject to the Chinese proverb,‘‘O?cials make the?gures,and the ?gures make the o?cials;’’or to Goodhart’s law,which states that an indicator’s measure-ment will be distorted if it is used as a target. (Charles Goodhart was thinking of monetary policy,but the point also applies to variables used to make overall evaluations of the per-formance of multilateral economic organiza-tions.)To say otherwise is equally to deny that the Bank is a?ected by the same pressures as the Fund,about which a former Fund o?cial said,‘‘The managing director makes the big decisions,and the sta?then puts together the numbers to justify them.’’63But little is known about the balance between autonomy and compliance in the two organizations,or the latitude of their statisticians to adjust the country numbers provided by colleagues else-where in the organization which they believe to be?ddled(as in the China case,above).64 Some of the Bank’s statistics are also pro-vided by independent sources,which provide a check.Others,including the poverty numbers, are produced only by the Bank,and these are more subject to Goodhart’s law.The Bank should appoint an independent auditor to ver-ify its main development statistics or cede the work to an independent agency,perhaps under UN auspices(but if done by,say,UNCTAD, the opposite bias might be introduced).And it would help if the Bank’s?gures on poverty and inequality made clearer than they do the pos-sible biases and the likely margins of error.

All this,of course,only takes us to the starting point of an enquiry into the causes of the probable poverty and inequality trends,65 their likely consequences,and public policy responses;but at least we are now ready to ask the right questions.Above all,we have to go back to a distinction that has all but dropped out of development studies,between increasing returns and decreasing returns or,more gener-ally,between positive and negative feedback mechanisms.The central question is why,at the level of the whole,the increasing returns of the Matthew e?ect––‘‘To him who hath shall be given’’––continues to dominate decreasing returns in the third wave of globalization.

NOTES

1.Gowan(1999).

2.Mazur(2000).

3.Wolf(2000).

4.International Monetary Fund(2003).The trend is, however,highly sensitive to the dollar’s strong depreci-ation in the1970s and appreciation in the1990s.When this is allowed for,the world growth rate may be closer to trendless.

5.In more concrete terms the number of hours of work it took for an entry-level adult male employee of McDonalds to earn the equivalent of one BigMac aro-und2000ranged from:Holland/Australia/NZ/UK/US,

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 584

0.26–0.53h;Hong Kong,0.68h;Malaysia/South Korea,

1.43–1.46h;Philippines/Thailand,

2.32–2.2.66h;China,

3.96h;India,8h.

6.Purchasing power parity is a method of adjusting relative incomes in di?erent countries to take account of the fact that market exchange rates do not accurately re?ect purchasing power––as in the common observa-tion that poor Americans feel rich in India and rich Indians feel poor in the United States.

7.The WIDER data set marries consumption from household surveys with consumption from national income accounts,and makes an allowance for(nonpub-lic sector)nonpriced goods and services.

8.World Bank(2002a)and World Bank(2002b,p.30).

9.Wolfensohn(2001).

10.World Bank(2001b,p.3).The$1a day is measured in purchasing power parity.See also World Bank(2002c).

11.I am indebted to Sanjay Reddy for discussions about the Bank’s poverty numbers(Reddy&Pogge, 2003a).See also Ravallion(2003),and Reddy and Pogge (2003b).In this paper I do not consider the additional problems that arise when estimating the impact of economic growth on poverty.See Deaton(2003).

12.The Bank also calculates a poverty headcount with $2/day,which su?ers from the same limitations as the$1/ day line.

13.Reported in Deaton(2001).

14.See Reddy and Pogge(2003a).

15.Also‘‘[Since1980]the most rapid growth has occurred in poor locations.Consequently the number of poor has declined by200million since1980’’(Dollar& Kraay,2002,p.125).

16.The new results were published in World Devel-opment Report2000/2001(World Bank,2001a).

17.Deaton(2001,p.128).

18.I take this example from Pogge and Reddy(2003).

19.The25–40%?gure is Reddy and Pogge’s estimate, the range re?ecting calculations based on PPP conver-sion factors for1985and1993,and for‘‘all-food’’and ‘‘bread-and-cereals’’indices.

20.Also,Bolivia’s extreme poverty rate according to the World Bank line was11%,according to the ECLA line,23%;Chile,4%,8%;Colombia,11%,24%;Mexico, 18%,21%(ECLA,2001,p.51).

21.Reddy and Pogge(2003a).

22.This e?ect is ampli?ed by the widespread removal of price controls on‘‘necessities’’and the lowering of tari?s on luxuries.

23.Gopinath(2002).

24.See Wade(2002a).It uses Stiglitz’s?ring and Kanbur’s resignation to illuminate the US role in the Bank’s generation of knowledge.

25.Meltzer Commission(2000).Meltzer later described the drop in the proportion of the world’s population in poverty from28%in1987to24%in1998 as a‘‘modest’’decline,the better to hammer the Bank (Meltzer,2001).

26.World Bank(2002c).See Deaton(2002).

27.Dollar was ascendant not in terms of bureaucratic position but in terms of epistemic in?uence,as seen in the Human Resource department’s use of him as a ‘‘metric’’for judging the stature of other economists. When reporters started contacting the Bank to ask why it was saying di?erent things about the poverty num-bers––speci?cally why two papers on the Development Research Complex’s web site gave di?erent pictures of the trends––the response was not,‘‘We are a research complex,we let100?owers bloom,’’but rather an assertion of central control.Chief economist Nick Stern gave one manager‘‘special responsibility’’for making sure the Bank’s poverty numbers were all‘‘coherent’’(Stern to research managers,email,April4,2002). 28.Non-World Bank champions of the idea that globalization improves global income distribution include Martin Wolf of The Financial Times(Wolf, 2002b;source of the epigraph;Wolf,2000,2001a, 2001b);also Giddens,described by some as a leading social theorist of his generation(2002,p.72),and Ian Castles,former Australian Statistician,who claims that ‘‘most studies suggest that the past25years have seen a reversal in the trend towards widening global inequal-ities which had been proceeding for two centuries’’(Castles,2001).

IS GLOBALIZATION REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY?585

29.In addition to the studies referenced elsewhere I draw on:Firebaugh(1999),Jones(1997),Pritchett (1997),Quah(1997),UNDP(1999),Kanbur(2002), Korzeniewicz and Moran(1997,2000).

30.Areviewer comments,‘‘The idea of using market exchange rates to calculate international inequality is unbelievably stupid,and it is amazing that it still makes an appearance here.The UN had a commission of enquiry on this,which concluded unambiguously that using market exchange rates was wrong.’’But the World Bank continues to use market exchange rates,adjusted by the‘‘Atlas’’methodology,to calculate the per capita incomes that it then uses to rank countries by their degree of development;and hence as a criterion for its lending decisions.Member countries’voting shares in the Bank are based largely on their Fund quotas,which in turn are based largely on relative GDP at market exchange rates.So the Bank’s practice does imply that it thinks that relative per capita incomes calculated through market exchange rates are meaningful proxies for well-being(and the practice has the bene?t of holding down the voting share of developing countries). Moreover,as the text explains,incomes converted at market exchange rates do give meaningful measures of international purchasing power.Businesses making exporting and FDI decisions(auto makers,for example) pay more attention to relative incomes at market exchange rates than to PPP incomes.

31.Dikhanov and Ward(2003).

https://www.doczj.com/doc/5e17489430.html,anovic(2002b).

33.ECLA(2002,p.85).The dispersion of per capita GDP/PPP is measured as the average logarithmic deviation,the dispersion of growth rates as the standard deviation.

34.In an earlier debate with Martin Wolf I wrongly said that the result depends on both China and India. Wolf commented,‘‘Here you argue that if we exclude China and India,there is no obvious trend in inequality. But why would one want to exclude two countries that contained about60%of the world’s poorest people two decades ago and still contain almost40%of the world’s population today?To fail to give these giants their due weight in a discussion of global poverty alleviation or income distribution would be Hamlet without the princ.’’(Wolf,2002a).This misconstrues my argument.

35.Dowrick and Akmal(2001).They?nd that world inequality increased over1980–93using Gini,Theil, coe?cient of variation,and the variance of log https://www.doczj.com/doc/5e17489430.html,anovic’s(2002a)preliminary analysis of1998 data and an associated reworking of1988and1993data has produced the following Gini coe?cients(and stan-dard deviations):1988:61.9(1.8),1993:65.2(1.8),1998: 64.2(1.9).The trend for the Theil coe?cient is similar (personal communication,June9,2003).Sala-i-Martin (2002)?nds a drop in both extreme poverty and inequality.His?ndings have been rejected in Milanovic (2002c)and Nye and Reddy(2003).

37.Dikhanov and Ward(2003).

38.See the work of James Galbraith and collaborators in the University of Texas Inequality Project,http:// https://www.doczj.com/doc/5e17489430.html,.Also,Galbraith(2002).

39.This is the answer to a reviewer’s remark,‘‘The work of Galbraith and his collaborators at Texas is essentially worthless for the purposes currently being discussed.We are interested in people’s command over resources,not the earnings of people in work in the formal sector.The latter is transparently irrelevant in most of the poor countries of the world,including India and China.’’

40.See Kynge(2002)and Rawski(2002).As another example from Rawski’s analysis,Chinese government ?gures show total real GDP growth of25%during1997–2000,whereas energy consumption?gures show a drop of13%(not all of which is likely to be due to replacement of ine?cient coal-?red furnaces.)Rawski estimates the growth rate since2000has been about half the o?cial rate.See further Waldron(2002).

41.World Bank sources who request anonymity. During negotiations for China’s joining the WTO Chinese economists argued against the insistence of the United States and other rich countries that its average income be expressed in terms of purchasing power party––and hence that China should be under the same obligations as‘‘middle-income’’countries,tougher than those on‘‘low-income’’countries.This is another example of the politics of statistics.

42.In addition,taking account of even just the obviously big and roughly measurable environmental costs lowers China’s o?cial GDP by roughly8%, India’s,by5%.See Hommann and Brandon(1995). 43.Evidence for rising inequality in India over the past two decades is set out in Jha(2000).Deaton agrees that inequality in India has been increasing‘‘in recent years,’’and that consumption by the poor did not rise as fast as average consumption(Deaton,2002).

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 586

峄山碑及译文

《峄山碑》全文及译文 《峄山碑》是秦始皇二十八年（公元前219年）东巡时所刻，下面是小编为大家带来的峄山碑全文及译文，欢迎阅读。 碑文 皇帝立国，维初在昔，嗣世称王 讨伐乱逆，威动四极，武义直方 戎臣奉诏，经时不久，灭六暴强 廿有六年，上荐高号，孝道显明 既献泰成，乃降专惠，亲巡远方 登于绎山①，群臣从者，咸思攸长 追念乱世，分土建邦，以开争理 功战日作，流血于野，自泰古始 世无万数，陀及五帝，莫能禁止 廼今皇帝，壹家天下，兵不复起 灾害灭除，黔首康定，利泽长久 群臣诵略，刻此乐石，以箸经纪 注：①绎山：指峄山。 皇帝日：“金石刻尽，始皇帝所为也。今袭号而金石刻辞不称，始皇帝其于久远也。如后嗣为之者，不称成功盛德。”丞相臣斯、臣去疾，御史大夫臣德。昧死言，臣请具刻诏书，金石刻因明白矣。臣昧死请，制日可。 注释： 皇帝立国，维初在昔，嗣世称王 （维是发语词，不翻。嗣世，一代代，继承。这三句，是一句话。） 讨伐乱逆，威动四极，武义直方 （武义直方，就相当于说正义战争。） 戎臣奉诏，经时不久，灭六暴强 （戎臣，就是带兵的将领。灭六暴强即诛灭六国。） 廿有六年，上荐高号，孝道显明

（皇帝二十六年，公元前221年。群臣上表，请求秦王称皇帝号。就叫上荐高号。这个孝道，是说秦国各代国君，均有统一之志，始皇帝的统一，乃是完成祖先之道。）既献泰成，乃降专惠，亲巡远方 （溥惠，尃惠。溥就是普。我用的书里面，百度百科里面，都错成了专字。既献泰成，乃降尃惠，亲巡远方。应该是这样子才对。既，就是完成了的意思。泰成，就是大成。完成了统一大业。普惠，把恩泽给了所有的人。寴车巛，就是亲巡。从车和从辵，都是表示动作的形符。坐车出巡，就是车巛。） 登于绎山①，群臣从者，咸思攸长 （登上峄山，大家都发起了怀古之悠情。） 追念乱世，分土建邦，以开争理 （过去是乱世，起因于分土建国，就是封建制。所以，大家才会去争斗。） 功战日作，流血于野，自泰古始 （功战就是攻战。自太古以来就是如此。） 世无万数，，阤yi3及五帝，莫能禁止 （无数代以来，到五帝时代，都不能禁止。阤，延续。） 廼今皇帝，壹家天下，兵不复起 （如今统一了，不再打仗了。） 灾害灭除，黔首康定，利泽长久 （黔首，就是百姓。） 群臣诵略，刻此乐石，以箸经纪 （诵略，因为皇帝的功德是说不完的，所以，大臣说的，只是大略。是为诵略。经纪，就是法度，秩序。） 以上内容，是始皇帝的刻辞。下面，是秦二世的内容。上面的是四言诗。下面的，是散文了。 皇帝曰：‘金石刻尽始皇帝所为也，令袭号而金石刻辞不称始皇帝。其于久远也，如后嗣为之者，不称成功盛德。丞相臣斯、臣去疾、御史大夫臣德昧死言：‘请具刻诏书，金石刻因明白矣。’臣昧死请。制曰：“可’。” 译文 皇帝立国，维初在昔，嗣世称王 讨伐乱逆，威动四极，武义直方戍臣奉诏，经时不久，灭六暴强

峄山碑 释文

峄山碑释文 皇帝立国，维初在昔， 维是发语词，不翻。 嗣世称王，一代代，继承。 这三句，是一句话。 讨伐乱逆，威动四极，武义直方。 武义直方，就相当于说正义战争。 我们的战争是正义的。 我们作战的对象，是乱逆 戎臣奉诏，经时不久，灭六暴强。 戎臣，就是带兵的将领。诛灭六国。 廿有六年，上荐高号，孝道显明。 皇帝二十六年，公元前221年。 群臣上表，请求秦王称皇帝号。就叫上荐高号。 这个孝道，是说秦国各代国君，均有统一之志， 始皇帝的统一，乃是完成祖先之道。 既献泰成，乃降专惠，亲巡远方。 溥惠， 尃惠。 溥就是普。 我用的书里面，百度百科里面，都错成了专字。 既献泰成，乃降尃惠，亲巡远方。 应该是这样子才对。 既，就是完成了的意思。泰成，就是大成。 完成了统一大业。 普惠，把恩泽给了所有的人。 寴车巛，就是亲巡。 从车和从辵，都是表示动作的形符。 坐车出巡，就是车巛。 登于峄山，群臣从者，咸思攸长。 登上峄山，大家都发起了怀古之悠情。 追念乱世，分土建邦，以开争理。 过去是乱世，起因于分土建国，就是封建制。所以，大家才会去争斗。功战日作，流血于野，自泰古始。 功战就是攻战。自太古以来就是如此。 世无万数，陀及五帝，莫能禁止 无数代以来，到五帝时代，都不能禁止。 阤，延续。 乃今皇帝，壹家天下，兵不复起 如今统壹了，不再打仗了。 灾害灭除，黔首康定，利泽长久 黔首，就是百姓。 群臣诵略，刻此乐石，以著经纪 经纪，就是法度，秩序。

诵略，因为皇帝的功德是说不完的，所以，大臣说的，只是大略。是为诵略。以上内容，是始皇帝的刻辞。 下面，是秦二世的内容。 上面的是四言诗。 下面的，是散文了。 皇帝曰，金石刻尽始皇帝所为也， 今袭号，而金石刻辞不称始皇帝，其于久远也。如后嗣为之者，不称成功盛德。丞相臣斯，这是李斯。 臣去疾，此人据说是姓杜。 御史大夫臣德，此人史传无载。 左丞相，右丞相，御史大夫， 是政府首脑。 当时的官制，这三位均是宰相。 当时的制度，是宰相负责制。 可以开府。 就是可以自己组成一个行政班子。 人员由宰相任命。不通过皇帝。 当时的宰相，权利是很大的。 皇帝基本就是个国家象征。 秦始皇很厉害，所以他能管事儿。 到了二世，就不管事了。事全交给宰相处理。 汉朝的皇帝，其实也是不太过问事情的。 政务交给宰相处理。 皇权，相权，在中国历史上， 是皇权越来越大， 相权越来越小。 昧死言，臣请具刻诏书金石刻，因明白矣。臣昧死请。 制曰，可。这是皇帝说的。 皇帝说，可以。 昧死言，就是冒着因冒犯皇帝而可能被处死的危险，来进言。 这是一种大臣上书的格式。 因为皇帝总是对的，皇帝即是圣人。 你对他说话，可能就是错的。 这个峄山刻石就讲完了。 简单的，跟现代汉语没什么区别的词就不用讲了。 其实在战国后期，所有的人， 不论是哪国的百姓， 都是希望统一的。 春秋战国之际的所有思想家，其思想都是要求统一的。 无论是儒，墨，老庄，都要求统一。 社会整体的愿望就是统一，结束战争。 所以，如果不是秦国政治比较急功近利， 他完全可以是一个好的帝国。

峄山碑全文及译文

峄山碑全文及译文文件排版存档编号：[UYTR-OUPT28-KBNTL98-UYNN208]

《峄山碑》全文及译文《峄山碑》是秦始皇二十八年（公元前219年）东巡时所刻，下面是小编为大家带来的峄山碑全文及译文，欢迎阅读。 碑文 皇帝立国，维初在昔，嗣世称王 讨伐乱逆，威动四极，武义直方 戎臣奉诏，经时不久，灭六暴强 廿有六年，上荐高号，孝道显明 既献泰成，乃降专惠，亲巡远方 登于绎山①，群臣从者，咸思攸长 追念乱世，分土建邦，以开争理 功战日作，流血于野，自泰古始 世无万数，陀及五帝，莫能禁止 廼今皇帝，壹家天下，兵不复起 灾害灭除，黔首康定，利泽长久 群臣诵略，刻此乐石，以箸经纪 注：①绎山：指峄山。 皇帝日：“金石刻尽，始皇帝所为也。今袭号而金石刻辞不称，始皇帝其于久远也。如后嗣为之者，不称成功盛德。”丞相臣斯、臣去疾，御史大夫臣德。昧死言，臣请具刻诏书，金石刻因明白矣。臣昧死请，制日可。 注释： 皇帝立国，维初在昔，嗣世称王

（维是发语词，不翻。嗣世，一代代，继承。这三句，是一句话。） 讨伐乱逆，威动四极，武义直方 （武义直方，就相当于说正义战争。） 戎臣奉诏，经时不久，灭六暴强 （戎臣，就是带兵的将领。灭六暴强即诛灭六国。） 廿有六年，上荐高号，孝道显明 （皇帝二十六年，公元前221年。群臣上表，请求秦王称皇帝号。就叫上荐高号。这个孝道，是说秦国各代国君，均有统一之志，始皇帝的统一，乃是完成祖先之道。） 既献泰成，乃降专惠，亲巡远方 （溥惠，尃惠。溥就是普。我用的书里面，百度百科里面，都错成了专字。既献泰成，乃降尃惠，亲巡远方。应该是这样子才对。既，就是完成了的意思。泰成，就是大成。完成了统一大业。普惠，把恩泽给了所有的人。寴车巛，就是亲巡。从车和从辵，都是表示动作的形符。坐车出巡，就是车巛。） 登于绎山①，群臣从者，咸思攸长 （登上峄山，大家都发起了怀古之悠情。） 追念乱世，分土建邦，以开争理 （过去是乱世，起因于分土建国，就是封建制。所以，大家才会去争斗。）功战日作，流血于野，自泰古始 （功战就是攻战。自太古以来就是如此。） 世无万数，，阤yi3及五帝，莫能禁止 （无数代以来，到五帝时代，都不能禁止。阤，延续。） 廼今皇帝，壹家天下，兵不复起

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Globalization 译文

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全球化的利与弊Economic globalization 全世界都在谈论全球化，有的人认为它是本世纪的发明，有的人看到它的负面影响。 经济上的利与弊： 随着电子货币的到来，投资变得很方便，只要点击一下，大量货币就会从一个国家流通到另一个国家。这就开辟了个人投资的新渠道。 提高了劳工的流动性，因此开辟了前所未有的就业和培训前景。 激烈的竞争促使价格下降和服务的改进，例如送货上门和售后服务。 全球化导致产生统一市场，从而使那些不在这个市场中的国家受到更多的剥削。 仅仅３００家公司就占全球产值的三分之一，占国际贸易的一半。而食品生产则由１２家公司控制。 贫困的劳工群体越来越被排斥在外。不稳定性在增加，１９９７年在欧洲抛售黄金储备的传闻就使南非５万矿工失业。这就是多米诺骨牌效应。 All over the world about globalization, some people think that it is the invention, some people see its negative effects. Economic advantages and disadvantages: With the arrival of electronic money, it's very convenient for investment, click, a lot of money from one country to flow into another country. It opened up new avenues of personal investment. To improve the labor mobility, and thus opened an employment and training. Competitive price and service to the improvement, such as door-to-door and after-sales service. Globalization leads to a single market, so that the market in the country is more exploitation. Only 300 companies is one-third of global output, accounting for half of the international trade. While food production is controlled by 12 companies. Poverty and labor group is excluded. Instability in 1997 in Europe, selling gold reserves rumours that South Africa is 5 million miners unemployment. This is the domino effect. 统一供应的危险性在增长，忽视了市场上产品的多样性。 Supply risk in growth, has neglected the diversity of products on the market. 社会上的利与弊： 在政治上，欧盟和联合国等组织的权力在扩大，这可以在全球决策的舞台上抵消多国公司的作用。媒体的跨国力量有助于控制不公正现象，有助于各国的言论自由。 南北差距在扩大。贫困世界在全球收入中只占１·４％，１０年前占２·３％。 最严重的社会后果是犯罪全球化，对贫困国家劳动力的剥削有增无减。非法移民在增加。 文化上的利与弊： 文化的传播更快了，政治和知识产权的障碍减少了，谁也不能阻止一种文化产品在其国内的传播。“逆殖民化”在加强：例如美国迈阿密和洛杉矶的拉丁化。 亚洲和非洲繁荣城市人口的增长成为文化传播的新的推动力。 最近一份联合国人文发展报告显示，全球文化只朝着一个方向传播：从富国向穷国，而不是从穷国向富国。 在文化生产上，商业利润至上，质量和多样性被忽视。 Politically, the European Union and the United Nations organization such as power in the world, which can be expanded in the decision on the stage of the multinational corporation offset. Multinational force helps to control the media injustices, helps countries freedom of speech.

《提的写法》教学设计

《提的写法》教学设计 一、教学目标 1、知识目标：学习提画的写法以及斜提与竖提的关系；理解用笔轻重和笔画粗细的关系。 2、德育目标：学习书法艺术，感知优秀传统；养细心认真的良好习惯。 3、能力目标：明确汉字的笔画均有起笔、行笔、收笔三个部分组成；掌握斜提与竖提的写法。 二、重点难点 1、重点分析： （1）书写每一笔画，都分为起、行、收三个部分。 （2）提的形态及写法。 （3）笔顺规则：从左到右、从上到下 2、难点分析： 写生开始写字，握笔过死，过于用力，用笔的提按变化是难点。 三、教法与学法 1、学生的理解能力较差，在教学中，少讲或者不讲抽象的理论，多讲怎样写，在什么地方写。使学生通过记忆、模仿，逐步形成定型动作（即习惯动作）。 2、教学中把知识分散，边讲边练，各个突破。 3、通过“功、食”教学，解决提的写法 四、教具准备： 多媒体课件 五、教学过程 (一) 直接导入

同学们好，今天的写字课我们来学习提的写法。 （二）出示斜提范字，说明斜提的写法。 1、起笔——逆时针方向，向右下重按。 2、行笔——转向右，向右上中锋行笔，边行边提，笔画由粗变细。 3、收笔——紧接行笔，顺势出锋，宜尖。 学生练习： 教师指导：运指和运腕的幅度，指和腕的运动是互相配合、互相联系的。运指中含着运腕，运腕含着运指，不能截然分开。然后教师纠正发现的问题。 （三）出示竖提范字，说明斜提的写法。 1、竖的末端连挑。 2、竖画正直，由粗渐细。 3、挑画出头，可另起笔，行笔斜向右上，劲直。 学生练习： 教师指导：检查学生作业，发现问题，找出原因，及时纠正。 （四）作品欣赏：扇面、、条幅、中堂、斗方、横幅。 （五）临创作前准备： 1、书写的主要内容。（可以是文章诗词，格言警句等等健康向上，吉利祥和的文字等，都可作为书法作品的内容。） 2、颜体楷书集字、拼字练习 3、生宣纸。结合书写内容设计书写形式 4、印章和印泥。 （六）出示范作： （七）要求: 实践创作：（在一下的两题中任选一题完成。） 1、临摹上边的一幅作品，也可改变布局。（只能选择中堂、条幅、斗方） 2、创作一幅书法作品，题目自定。

Globalization definitions

表1：全球化的定義 項 次 人名或機構定義 1 David Held et al.當代社會生活的所有層面（包括文化、犯罪、金融、宗教精神等），在整個世界的相互聯繫上，已經日益擴張、深入和加速。 2 Ulrich Beck 跨國行動者從權力、取向、認同和網絡等各種面向穿透 和侵蝕主權國家的過程。 3 R. Cohen and P. Kennedy 時空概念的變化、文化互動的增長、世界所有居民都面臨共同問題的增加、相互聯繫和相互依存的增強、跨國行為體的發展和跨國組織網絡的擴展，以及全方位的一體化。 4 A. G. McGrew 組成當代世界體系的國家與社會之間的聯繫和相互溝通 的多樣化，是世界某個部份發生的事情、決定和活動能 夠對全球遙遠地方的個人和團體產生重要影響。 5 Barbara Parker (2005: 49) 對傳統界限，例如國家、時間、空間等等日漸增加的穿透性。 6 喬治?索羅斯 (2002: i) 全球化等於資金的自由流動，而國家也愈來愈受到全球金融市場及跨國企業的主導。 7 Kenich Ohame 國與國間貿易界限或障礙的消弭。 8 Peter Dicken 為傳統國際生產、投資及貿易形式上的轉變。 9 Douglas Kellner (2002) 高度複雜、矛盾和模糊的制度與社會關係，以及牽涉商 品、勞務、想法、科技、文化形式和人的流動。 10 卡爾?海因 茲?巴奎 全球化係以貿易聯繫的密切程度為基準，國際貿易額佔 全球生產的比例越高，世界經濟全球化的程度就越高。 11 Richard C. Longworth 全球化可視為全球經濟體系的形成，使企業家能夠在世 界任何地方籌募資金，藉著這些資金，利用世界任何地 方之科技、通訊、管理和人才，在世界任何地方製造商 品，賣給世界任何地方的顧客。 12 Richard G. Harris (1993) 經濟學者通常將全球化視為生產、分配和商品行銷的國 際化。 13 Christopher Chase-Dunn et al. (2000) 全球化通常意指通訊和運輸科技的改變，資本流動和商 品貿易日增的國際化，以及經濟競爭的主戰場從國內市 場轉移到世界市場。

3竖提的写法教学设计下

<竖提的写法>教学设计 执教：王继新2014、3、14 第2）周课时1课时授课时间3．10---3、14 课题：竖提的写法 教学目标1、使学生学会竖提的写法，做到用笔正确。 2、学习书写含有笔画竖提的字。培养学生养成良好的书写习惯。 3、教育学生做人谦虚礼让，宽容待人，团结合作。继续培养学生正确的写字姿势和正确的执笔方法。培养学生初步的书写审美能力。 教学重点：竖提的书写方法。 教学难点：写法技巧、运笔方法。理解竖钩和竖提的区别和联系，如何记住书写要领。 教学方法：自学、讲解、练写法 教学准备：范字卡、田子格纸。 教学过程： 一、导入新课： 导入过渡：汉字是由笔画组成的，笔画是构成汉字的最小结构单位，就好比房屋是由建筑材料建成，要建成房屋就离不开建筑材料。要想写好汉字，首先要写好基本的笔画。欣赏名家名作，陶冶情操，激发学生爱写字的兴趣。 1.复习卧钩的写法。 2.由复习引入新课。下面我们就来学习和研究笔画“竖提”的写法。揭示课题。 二、探究写法： （一）、观察比较、分析探究、尝试练写。

学习写“竖提”笔画 1. 形象比喻，初识笔画“竖提”的形态。 提问：竖提像什么？引导，点拨难点，突出重点。 2、竖提的形状特征的描绘。学生说。 3、小组合作交流说说“竖提”的形态。 4、让学生尝试练写“竖提”,在练写中体会笔画的特点及写法。 （二）、师讲解示范： 1、笔画竖提的写法 1）、让学生范写，说说自己看到的“竖提”有什么特点。 2）、老师示范书写，指名说笔画名称及其书写要点。 3）、教师分析讲解：书写每一个笔画都要有起笔、行笔、收笔。 书写要领：起笔重——行笔写竖——收笔前稍顿笔后出钩。 4）、分小组讨论交流写法： 5）、学生练写，教师巡视指导。 6）、小结：师生共同研究小结： 竖提是竖与提连写的复合笔画，起笔方式同竖。行笔至提处稍驻，提笔稍向左，旋即折向下蹲锋，行势后向右上挑出，收笔同提。 2、学写例字： 1）、说说哪些字有竖提笔画呢？ 2）、运用多媒体讲解并示范“长、” 3）、师在投影仪前示范，让学生观察体会。 4）、生仿写，师巡视指导。 5）、引导学生研究例字“长”，让学生观察“长”在米字格中的位置。（竖提挺直撇收、捺展）。 6）、练写例字“长”，师再次巡视指导。

书法的故事｜秦始皇用他的字统一了中国文字!

书法的故事｜秦始皇用他的字统一了中国文字！ 书法的故事秦代刻石统一规范的小篆书法小篆的形成 及其特点李斯小篆是秦代产生的规范篆书，与大篆（古文、籀文等）相对而言，也叫秦篆。在小篆这种新型字体形成的过程中，值得重视的历史人物是李斯。李斯（？—前208），楚上蔡（今属河南）人，秦朝丞相，书法家。据《太平广记》引《蒙恬笔经》载，公元前221年秦王政（秦始皇）统一中国后，丞相李斯上奏章说：“上古时所创制的大篆，在社会上还很通行，但这些大篆字体毕竟是远古时期的产物，很多人不认识。现在删略大篆中繁琐的笔画，选取复合字体中的一部分，加工改造，变成小篆。”他的建议得到秦始皇的恩准。于是，李斯等人以西周以来秦系文字为基础统一全国文字，并以新造的小篆作为学童启蒙的识字课本和推广应用的楷模，从此与先秦大篆相对而言的小篆就成了秦代的通行书体。李斯擅长书法，宦官赵高以下的官员，都佩服李斯创造小篆的才华。当时刻在名山、碑碣、印玺、铜人上的文字，都出自李斯的手笔。他在书秦望山记功石时，竟然说：“我死后五百三十年，当会有一个人接替我的书迹。”可见他在书法艺术上的自信心和自豪感。小篆有什么特点呢？与大篆相比，小篆的特点表现为：线条圆匀，结构统一定型，字形呈纵势长方。秦始皇留下的六处七篇刻石秦峄山刻石（五

代徐铉摹刻本）从书法发展上看，秦代以小篆光耀史册。而小篆又以秦始皇在位十二年间留下的六处七篇记功刻石文 字最值得称道。这六处七篇刻石是：峄山刻石、泰山刻石、琅琊台刻石、之罘刻石、东观刻石（刻于之罘）、碣石刻石、会稽刻石。《史记·秦始皇本纪》载，秦始皇统一中国后，第三年（前219）即率大臣，浩浩荡荡东巡，宣扬其威德盛治，到峄山、泰山、琅琊山等处刻石，以歌颂其功业。第四年再东巡，在之罘山留下之罘刻石、东观刻石。过了三年再东巡至碣石，面对苍茫大海，他喜气洋洋不可一世，又立石颂德。第十年（前210），始皇南巡，至会稽，再刻石彪炳其伟业，愿江山千秋永固。这四次巡游，刻石六处，文章七篇。二世皇帝即位后下了一道诏书，命令在始皇帝所刻石上加刻一段文字，说明这是始皇帝所刻，使后世不疑。六处七篇刻石，据说都出自李斯手笔。其中东观刻石、碣石刻石，历代都无著录。之罘一刻，原石也早已散佚，欧阳修所得拓本，是二世皇帝加刻的诏书21字，原文付阙（见欧阳修《集古录跋尾》卷一）。传世仅见久已失真的宋代《汝帖》本13字，风格与其他刻本差别很大。因此宋代流传的秦始皇刻石拓本仅峄山、泰山、琅琊、会稽四种，称为“秦四山刻石”。秦峄山刻石拓本局部放大《峄山刻石》，又名《峄山碑》，为始皇东巡第一刻。其前段是秦始皇颂赞文，刻于秦始皇二十八年（前219）；后段是秦二世诏书，刻于秦二世元年（前209）。

globalizationinmyeyes我眼中的全球化

Globalization in my eyes Globalization has penetrated into all aspects of our life around the world. We can see it everywhere and anytime. It benefits our life a lot. In view of going out to play, globalization in economy makes it convenient for people to travel all over the world and enjoy wonderful scenes in different places. Besides, globalization in food gives eating lovers chances to taste different foods easily. And globalization in industry creates more wisdom and has deep influence on the development of industry, etc. However, there are also disadvantages during the process of globalization. On the one hand, more and more Chinese people are used to the foreign lifestyle, and they usually celebrate foreign holidays instead of our traditional ones. On the other hand, globalization has a great impact on our national products. There is a sense among people that foreign goods are better than goods made in China. Last but not least, it enlarge the distance between the developing countries and the developed countries, which is bad for the global harmony. In my eyes, globalization is a two-edged sword. If we master it validly, we can create a new world, or what wait us is destroy.