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Journal of Democracy, Volume 25, Number 2, April 2014, pp. 52-66 (Article) 3XEOLVKHG E\ 7KH -RKQV +RSNLQV 8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2014.0035
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A New Twilight in Zimbabwe?
The Perils of Power sharing
Adrienne LeBas
Adrienne LeBas is assistant professor of government at American Uni-versity. She is the author of From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa (2011).
O n 31 July 2013, President Robert Mugabe and his party, the Zim-babwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), claimed victory in concurrent presidential, parliamentary, and local-government elections. The official results gave Mugabe a margin of nearly a mil-lion votes over Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), Mugabe’s longtime rival and also his partner in a power-sharing arrangement since 2009. Parliamentary results were sim-ilarly decisive: The MDC-T lost seats in provinces that it had dominated since 2000, and also lost control of several local-government councils. ZANU-PF increased its share of the 210-member House of Assembly from 45 percent to more than 70 percent of the seats. Most important, the elections terminated a power-sharing arrangement between ZANU-PF and the opposition that had resulted in the rebuilding of Zimbabwe’s economy, the resumption of foreign-aid flows, and the restoration of basic services such as health care and education.
ZANU-PF made electoral gains without recourse to violence or visible intimidation, leading some observer missions, such as that of the African Union (AU), to laud the elections as “free, fair, and credible.” The United States, the United Kingdom, and others, however, rejected the results, cit-ing election irregularities and an uneven electoral playing field. Evidence points to some electoral manipulation, which likely occurred due to a great-ly flawed voter roll. But the easy explanations for the opposition’s stun-ning electoral reversal—repression and manipulation by ZANU-PF—do not seem sufficient. The MDC had faced consistent repression, violence, and electoral manipulation throughout the 2000s, yet previous elections were highly competitive. Until July 2013, there was cause for optimism about an eventual election-led transition in Zimbabwe. What changed?
Journal of Democracy Volume 25, Number 2 April 2014
? 2014 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press
Adrienne LeBas
53 So far, most analyses have focused more on whether the 2013 elec-tion results were rigged than on why four years of power sharing failed to level the electoral playing field. In my view, there are two main rea-sons that power sharing undermined—rather than enhanced—the pros-pects for democratization in Zimbabwe. First, there were significant flaws in the structure and the implementation of the 2008 Global Politi-cal Agreement (GPA), the three-party accord that governed the power-sharing arrangement. The GPA’s lack of strong enforcement mecha-nisms allowed institutional reforms to be only partially implemented or postponed indefinitely. The GPA also failed to address the biggest obstacles to democratization in Zimbabwe: the politicized nature of the military and police and the culture of impunity created by many years of state-sponsored violence. Second,power sharing brought the opposition into government, reducing its ability to run as an outside challenger and making it difficult for the party to claim credit for concrete policy gains. The MDC’s participation in the inclusive government also compromised its organizational strength and mobilizing reach. Key staff were divert-ed to government offices, grassroots structures were neglected, and ties with the party’s civil society allies frayed.
Thus ZANU-PF’s success in the 2013 elections was due partly to rigging and manipulation but also to a genuine erosion of opposition support and organizational strength. Both issues can be traced to the perverse dynamics of power sharing in Zimbabwe. Some deficiencies stem from the design of the agreement and the reluctance of its for-eign backers, notably South Africa, to enforce the GPA’s provisions. But Zimbabwe’s experience suggests a deeper tension in power-sharing agreements: They may be effective in ending immediate crises, but they do not necessarily push countries away from entrenched authoritarian-ism toward democratization.1 Particularly where opposition parties have a shot at winning flawed elections, competition—not negotiation—may be a surer path to democracy in the long run.
Zimbabwe’s most recent period of political crisis began in 2000. Af-ter nearly fifteen years of political dominance by ZANU-PF, a loose co-alition of civil society groups and organized labor succeeded in defeat-ing a proposed constitution in a March referendum. Even in ZANU-PF’s heartland, the three Mashonaland provinces in north-central and north-eastern Zimbabwe, many voted against the government’s proposed con-stitution. Outside these provinces, more than 60 percent of Zimbabwe-ans voted no in the referendum. Even more troubling from ZANU-PF’s perspective, the “no”-vote alliance soon launched an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), that seemed poised to win parliamentary elections in June.
In response to the rising opposition threat, ZANU-PF resorted to vio-lence and repression. ZANU-PF activists and veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation war led large-scale invasions of white-owned commercial
54Journal of Democracy farms. In rural areas, they attacked MDC candidates and activists, as well as those perceived to be MDC supporters. Up to 10,000 MDC sup-porters took refuge in the cities, and as many as 200,000 commercial-farm workers and their families were internally displaced.
Despite the violence, the MDC still won 48 percent of the parliamen-tary seats contested in the June 2000 elections. The MDC largely main-tained this level of support in subsequent contests, even as repression became more systematic and sustained. From 2000 to 2008, violence, intimidation, and increasing social polarization formed the backdrop to what were surprisingly competitive elections. In 2005, the MDC split into two factions. The split did not, however, lead to the broader frag-mentation of the opposition vote that would have strengthened ZANU-PF’s position. Over the next two years, many of those who had defected reaffiliated with the Tsvangirai-led main faction of the MDC (MDC-T), which went on to win the bulk of the opposition vote in the 2008 elec-tions. That year, several incumbents affiliated with the splinter faction, then known as MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M), were defeated by new, rel-atively unknown candidates running on the MDC-T ticket. From 2005 to today, competition between the MDC-T and ZANU-PF has dominated politics in Zimbabwe.
The 2008 elections were Zimbabwe’s most competitive since inde-pendence, and they might have served as the beginning of a true dem-ocratic opening. In the first round, Tsvangirai won 48 percent of the presidential vote to Mugabe’s 43 percent. Independent candidate Simba Makoni took another 8 percent, depriving both frontrunners of a first-round majority win and forcing a runoff. The two MDC factions did exceptionally well in the parliamentary vote: MDC-T won 100of 210 seats in the House of Assembly, and the MDC-M won an additional 10. Together, the two MDC factions commanded a majority in parliament for the first time. As Zimbabwe headed toward the runoff, there was optimism that the MDC-T might win control of both parliament and the presidency.
This potential for greater political opening quickly closed. As the runoff neared, state-security forces unleashed a campaign of violence and intimidation in rural areas that was unprecedented in its scope and intensity.2 In order to ensure Mugabe’s reelection, the military launched an operation, codenamed Makavhotera Papi(Who Did You Vote For?), that resulted in the beatings, torture, and deaths of hundreds of MDC activists and supporters. Tens of thousands of Zimbabweans fled their homes. Citing the violence, Tsvangirai dropped out of the race a few days ahead of the June 27 runoff date, leaving Mugabe to win more than 85percent of the votes cast.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Af-rica, and the AU had previously made only muted objections to vio-lence and repression in Zimbabwe, but the violence preceding the runoff
Adrienne LeBas
55 prompted a reconsideration of the region’s “hands-off” policy. The day before the June balloting, SADC called for a postponement and for in-terparty negotiations to take place. Mugabe refused. After the runoff, SADC declared that the contest “did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe,” and the AU passed a resolution calling for the formation of a government of national unity. SADC recruited South African presi-dent Thabo Mbeki, previously seen as a strong backer of ZANU-PF, to bring ZANU-PF to the table and negotiate a settlement between the parties. On 15 September 2008, ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions signed the Global Political Agreement, which established the framework for a power-sharing government. The GPA was adopted as a constitu-tional amendment in December 2008. On 11 February 2009, Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister, with MDC-M leader Arthur Mutambara as his deputy. Three days later, the multiparty cabinet was sworn in.
The motivations of the parties to the GPA were mixed. For the small-er of the two MDC factions, power sharing was a boon, transforming the MDC-M from a minor party to a shareholder in power and patron-age resources. In addition to the deputy prime minister position, it was awarded three ministerial portfolios. For MDC-T, however, participa-tion in the negotiations and in the inclusive government created internal conflict. Some members of the party’s governing council opposed pow-er sharing, and negotiations with ZANU-PF had always been unpopular with the MDC-T grassroots, which had borne the brunt of state-spon-sored violence in the past. As for ZANU-PF, the party was under intense pressure from its regional allies to negotiate with the MDC. But hard-liners within the party remained hostile to the inclusive government. Zimbabwe’s military chiefs refused to attend Tsvangirai’s swearing-in ceremony, and ZANU-PF’s actions throughout the first six months of inclusive government suggested either an active attempt to sabotage the GPA or a blithe disregard of its terms.
From the beginning, power sharing in Zimbabwe lacked the kind of strong domestic consensus that typically backs governments of national unity. As the inclusive government began to falter, it became appar-ent that SADC would not enforce ZANU-PF compliance with the GPA. Given this and absent a strong internal consensus, the cards were stacked against transformative change under power sharing.
Little Progress on Institutional Reform As Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure detailed in these pages in 2008, the authoritarian cast of Zimbabwe’s party-state presented sig-nificant obstacles to the success of a power-sharing arrangement.3 The inclusive government did little to diminish these tendencies. But the failure of Zimbabwe’s power-sharing experiment was not entirely pre-destined, nor was it the result of ZANU-PF obstructionism alone. Flaws
56Journal of Democracy within the agreement and in the opposition’s strategy contributed to the lack of progress on institutional reform.
First, and perhaps most important, the GPA did not clearly specify the division of executive power, nor did it contain robust dispute-res-
olution procedures. The president,
prime minister, and cabinet were all accorded some degree of executive
authority by the GPA, but the agree-ment was grafted onto a constitu-tion that granted extensive powers to the presidency. The language of the agreement was, throughout, as-pirational rather than precise. The parties were enjoined to “have re-gard to the principles and spirit un-
derlying the Inclusive Government”
and to “take decisions by consensus
and take collective responsibility for all cabinet decisions.”
Collective decision making was never put into practice. Within two weeks of Tsvangirai’s swearing-in, Mugabe unilaterally appointed min-isterial permanent secretaries in violation of the GPA’s requirement to consult with the prime minister. Mugabe subsequently refused to swear in a deputy minister selected by the MDC-T, and he appointed ZANU-PF stalwarts as provincial governors without input from the prime min-ister or the cabinet. The MDC-T challenged these illegal presidential appointments in court, but two years passed before the Supreme Court invalidated the governor appointments. Appeals to SADC and Mbeki also did little to curb ZANU-PF violations of the agreement.
The GPA required reforms in a number of areas, but timelines and implementation details for the bulk of these reforms were left vague. Constitutional reform was an exception to this general rule. SADC viewed the ratification of a new constitution by popular referendum as the primary precondition for holding general elections. Thus the clear-est guidelines in the GPA were those relating to constitutional reform.
A constitutional parliamentary select committee was empowered to con-duct popular-outreach exercises, draft the initial document, and shep-herd this draft through parliament before putting it to a referendum. Ac-cording to the detailed timeline laid out in the GPA, all this was to take place within a year and a half of the installation of the inclusive govern-ment. General elections were therefore expected in 2011 or 2012, well before presidential and parliamentary terms were scheduled to expire. Constitutional reform fell behind schedule almost immediately. The first public hearings began in July 2010, six months after they were scheduled to have been completed. The delays continued as the parties disagreed over how outreach data was to be analyzed. By the GPA’s The primary body tasked with oversight of the GPA , the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), was systematically starved of resources and assistance from state institutions.
Adrienne LeBas
57 timetable, a new constitution should have been adopted by the end of 2010, allowing plenty of time for passing implementation legislation before holding elections. But by the end of 2011, there was still no draft constitution. It was early 2013 before the parties agreed on a final docu-ment, only months before both presidential and parliamentary terms of office were set to end.
Reforms in other areas fared worse. The GPA mandated the creation of an advisory body on economic policy, the National Economic Coun-cil, but it was never convened. Though a new National Security Council (NSC) met sporadically, Mugabe and his security chiefs continued to make military decisions in closed meetings that excluded Tsvangirai. The primary body tasked with oversight of the GPA, the Joint Moni-toring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), was systematically starved of resources and assistance from state institutions. Police regu-larly refused to apprehend those whom JOMIC identified as involved in party violence, and JOMIC had no ability to sanction police officers who applied the law selectively. The weakness of the NSC and JOMIC left the door open for rising violence and intimidation in both rural and urban areas.
From 2000 to 2009, ZANU-PF’s grip on power relied on two factors: 1) the extralegal appropriation and redistribution of resources along partisan lines; and 2) the violent harassment and intimidation of those perceived to be associated with the opposition. The formation of the unity government had no appreciable impact on this kind of ZANU-PF “politics as usual.” Within the first weeks of power sharing, the party embarked on a series of farm invasions, targeting a hundred or so of the country’s remaining four-hundred white-owned commercial farms. Likewise, throughout 2009, state-security forces detained several dozen civil society activists and MDC officials. As in the period preceding power sharing, the whereabouts of those detained were not released, and court orders to produce and charge the accused were ignored.
Violence and intimidation disrupted the constitutional-reform pro-cess. The first All Stakeholders Conference, held in advance of the broader public-outreach meetings, had to close early after ZANU-PF activists stormed the hall, singing revolutionary songs and refusing to disperse. Disruption and violence sponsored by ZANU-PF intensified once the public-outreach meetings commenced. Army personnel, war veterans, and youth activists appeared at these sessions, either to dis-suade participants from speaking freely or to shift the balance of views expressed there. In areas where the MDC-T was dominant, such as Ha-rare, outreach meetings were disrupted by armed ZANU-PF militia and subsequently suspended. When these meetings eventually reconvened, police were present and attendance was low.
The GPA tasked the power-sharing government with rebuilding the rule of law and depoliticizing the security forces, but it provided no
58Journal of Democracy means for the opposition to check ZANU-PF abuses. The prime minis-ter’s integration into military decision making was easily circumvented, and police training remained under the control of ZANU-PF hard-liners. Because the police force remained politicized, JOMIC was unable to pursue those responsible for violence or other violations of the GPA. Unsurprisingly, state-sponsored violence and opposition harassment continued during the inclusive government. Dozens of MDC activists and officeholders, as well as civil society activists and lawyers, were arrested on trumped-up charges.4 War veterans continued to beat up and intimidate perceived opposition supporters in rural areas, and a previ-ously marginal ZANU-PF militia known as Chipangano became increas-ingly active in Harare’s low-income areas. For the first time, Harare’s MDC voters became acquainted with the climate of fear and intimida-tion that had previously characterized only the rural areas.
None of this was surprising. Security issues were a “third rail” dur-ing power-sharing negotiations: ZANU-PF would have likely pulled out of negotiations had the agreement truly threatened its control over the military and police. Consequently, the military chiefs responsible for the 2008 violence retained their positions, as did the head of the police. Impunity was built into the GPA. Legislation passed during the power-sharing period further entrenched ZANU-PF hard-liners’ im-munity from prosecution. In October 2012, legislation creating Zim-babwe’s first Human Rights Commission was signed into law with little strenuous objection from the opposition. The law establishes a transitional-justice mechanism, but it also bars the Commission from investigating any crimes committed before the installation of the in-clusive government in February 2009. As Zimbabwe headed toward new elections, the prosecution of those responsible for past electoral violence was taken off the table.
The June 2013 Elections
As delays in the constitutional-reform process mounted, elections had to be pushed back. Presidential and parliamentary terms of office were set to expire in June 2013, but it was only in January 2013 that the parties approved a constitutional draft. This imposed a very tight timeline for holding the constitutional referendum and, pending its re-sult, writing the new constitution’s provisions into law. The MDC-T appealed to SADC to extend the inclusive government’s tenure, arguing that the necessary reforms and safeguards could not be in place in time for a midyear election. But ZANU-PF succeeded in forcing a July 2013 election date.
The July balloting therefore took place without vital reforms. The repressive 2002 Public Order and Security Act (POSA) remained in force, placing serious constraints on freedoms of expression and assem-
Adrienne LeBas
59 bly. State-controlled media remained largely closed to the opposition throughout the campaign period, and repressive media laws were used to restrict independent broadcasting. These laws were in violation of the rights guaranteed in the newly adopted constitution, but the three months between the March referendum and the July election were insuf-ficient for putting in place implementing legislation.
Political freedoms are important for creating a level playing field, but the lack of electoral reform likely had a greater impact on the polls. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was neither adequately funded nor free of partisan influence. It also lacked full control over the com-piling and review of the voter roll, which remained partly housed with the Register General, a ZANU-PF political appointee. In early July, just weeks before the election, an independent audit of the register found more than 900,000 duplicate registrations, large numbers of deceased voters, and a systematic bias against registration in urban areas.5 These flaws went uncorrected before the election, and the ZEC failed to pro-vide an electronic copy of the final roll to opposition parties. Thus the voter roll was likely a major source of electoral manipulation.
Power sharing did not level the electoral playing field, but there were also significant shifts in public opinion during the inclusive govern-ment. Credible opinion polls showed a decline in expressed support for the MDC from 2008. In 2009, 57 percent of Zimbabweans had voiced their intentions to vote for the MDC, versus only 10 percent for ZANU-PF. Afrobarometer data gathered in June 2012, however, showed ex-pressed voting intentions for ZANU-PF and the MDC-T to be roughly tied, at about 30 percent of respondents for each.6 The Afrobarometer results also illustrate the toll taken on the electorate by ongoing violence and intimidation. In 2012, nearly 90 percent of respondents said that multiparty competitions “always” or “often” lead to violent conflict, and more than 60 percent said that they personally feared becoming a victim of violence or intimidation.7
These polls indicated a shift in the fortunes of the opposition, but the scale of ZANU-PF’s victory still took many by surprise. Mugabe won 61 percent of the presidential vote to Tsvangirai’s 34 percent, though Tsvangirai received roughly the same number of votes as he had in the first round in 2008. Parliamentary results were even more devastating for the opposition. The MDC-T won only 49 seats in the House of As-sembly versus ZANU-PF’s 160, while the other MDC faction lost its entire elected delegation.8ZANU-PF’s margin in the Senate was only slightly less overwhelming. Overall, the MDC-T won only about 30 per-cent of the popular parliamentary vote, though again it won roughly the same number of votes as in 2008.
Suspiciously inflated increases in the number of ZANU-PF votes took many parliamentary seats from the MDC-T, especially in Zimbabwe’s cities. In several Harare and Bulawayo constituencies, the two MDC
60Journal of Democracy factions lost seats that they had held since 2000 and suffered significant declines in the party’s number of votes. In Matabeleland South, previ-ously an MDC stronghold in the far southwest of the country, ZANU-PF won 11 of 12 parliamentary seats. In Manicaland in the east, the MDC-T went from 20 of 26 seats to only 4. There was undoubtedly manipula-tion at play, probably due more to the flawed voter roll than to the vote count itself. Despite likely rigging, however, voting patterns and public-opinion polling point to a real erosion of MDC-T support, as do the shifting organizational fortunes of the two parties, which were apparent throughout the inclusive government. The MDC-T largely abandoned the tactics that had served it well before 2008, while ZANU-PF built upon its successful strategies of polarization and partisan patronage, ex-tending them to new constituencies in urban areas.
MDC-T Weakened
The MDC-T entered the power-sharing government in a weakened position. The party’s grassroots structures had been badly damaged by the violence preceding the 2008 runoff. Many activists refused to re-turn to rural constituencies, and others had been killed or had fled the country. Further, the idea of a negotiated settlement with ZANU-PF was unpopular with the grassroots. Many MDC-T activists, especially within the youth wing, felt that negotiation and power sharing with ZANU-PF had legitimated what they viewed as stolen elections and betrayed those who had been victims of state-sponsored violence. Thus the MDC-T’s organizational reach and activist commitment were already weak when the party entered the inclusive government.
The actions of the MDC-T leadership during power sharing further damaged the party’s internal organization and its relationship with ex-ternal allies in civil society. Some of the party’s problems emerged from a simple diversion of resources and attention. As the MDC-T struggled to staff the prime minister’s office and the seventeen ministries over which it had control, it transferred nearly all its seasoned organizational staff away from the party’s Harvest House headquarters in Harare. Other party decisions raised questions about its priorities and its long-term strategy. It was clear by 2011 that neither SADC nor the domestic courts would adequately enforce the GPA, but the MDC-T never developed a coherent strategy for responding to violations. The party’s periodic threats to withdraw from the government and its lobbying of Mbeki and SADC did not make the MDC-T look like a strong and vibrant opposi-tion force. The party largely abandoned the strategies that had worked for it in the past. It did not organize public meetings or protests, and par-ty leaders abandoned the consciously polarizing prodemocracy rhetoric that had helped the MDC-T to sustain the commitment of its activists during periods of repression and state-sponsored violence. 9
Adrienne LeBas
61 The party’s upper leadership visibly benefited from participation in the inclusive government, creating further tensions at the grassroots level. After initially protesting government-provided Mercedes-Benz automobiles, MDC-T ministers ended up accepting the cars in a move that many Zimbabweans viewed as symbolic of the party’s loss of prin-ciples.10 Elected officials closer to the grassroots reported a crisis of expectations, as party youths and supporters began to demand the mate-rial rewards that they saw accruing to MDC-T officeholders.11 In Harare Province, grassroots structures were battered by violence from ZANU-PF’s Chipangano and by intense intraparty conflict. Yet branch-level organizers reported difficulty reaching party leadership.12 Though the MDC-T leadership announced a massive registration drive in 2011 with a goal of attracting a million new voters, branch officials received little in the way of funds for organizing registration events or T-shirts and party cards to give to young voters.13
MDC-T leadership admitted that grassroots party-building had been neglected during the first years of power sharing, as the movement of party leaders and MPs into government left a “void” at party headquar-ters.14 Yet it was not until mid-2012 that Tsvangirai reinstituted weekly meetings at Harvest House and MDC-T organizing secretary Nelson Chamisa took time away from ministerial duties to spend two days a week on party business.
The MDC-T also faced trouble with its allies in civil society. Through-out the 2000s, civil society organizations had provided vital support to the opposition, which had ranged from direct material and legal assistance to informal help mobilizing voters. By 2012, these important ties were seriously frayed, if not broken. Civil society activists were disappointed that the opposition had not attempted to repeal or revise repressive public-order and civil society laws. Many in civil society viewed as a betrayal the MDC-T’s failure in July 2012 to block the passage of the flawed Human Rights Bill, and still others were outraged that civil society organizations continued to face harassment and threats of closure under the Private Vol-untary Organisations Act, which the MDC never moved to amend.
Civil society activists felt that the MDC factions should have used their parliamentary majority to try to repeal repressive public-order, me-dia, and civil society laws, even if these efforts would have ended with a presidential veto. MDC-T leaders, on the other hand, felt that doing so would likely provoke confrontation with ZANU-PF and would therefore have been inconsistent with their role in the inclusive government. To many in civil society, the MDC-T’s vision of its role in the inclusive government compromised its status as a pro-democracy movement. Nor did the MDC-T seem concerned about the growing distance between the party and civil society. When asked why the party’s former partners had trouble getting meetings with Tsvangirai and other MDC-T leaders, one official explained: “Civil society has to understand that we are in
62Journal of Democracy government now. We can’t meet only with them; we have to think of all Zimbabweans.”15
In contrast to the MDC-T, ZANU-PF emerged from the power-sharing period strengthened. It found new means of deploying patronage, not just to military officials and party loyalists but also to potentially vulner-able MDC-T voters. In the run-up to the elections, ZANU-PF explic-itly targeted urban constituencies where the MDC-T had previously won by substantial margins. A member of ZANU-PF’s elections directorate suggested that this urban strategy was formulated around the time that the inclusive government was established: “We identified a need that we could realistically deliver on, and we ran with it.”16 The Chipangano militia’s attacks on Harare markets and commuter buses allowed ZANU-PF to take control of market stalls and bus stations—important patronage resources—away from the MDC-T’s municipal council.17 ZANU-PF also attempted to extend land-based patronage, its standard strategy in rural areas, to urban voters. In Harare, it established the Harare North Housing Union, which passed out small parcels of land to settlers. The MDC-T–controlled Harare City Council warned that this action directly un-dermined council authority, mentioning that these new settlements were illegal and could be destroyed.18 Yet urban squatters stayed on the new land, the security of which they no doubt credited to ZANU-PF.
ZANU-PF’s attempts to woo urban voters were transparent. A week before the election, ZANU-PF local-government minister Ignatius Chombo ordered local governments and municipalities to write off all outstanding utility bills, a move that would likely throw cash-strapped (and MDC-governed) municipalities into bankruptcy. The canceling of utility bills and encouragement of illegal land-grabbing were consistent with a nationwide program of sustained ZANU-PF interference with MDC-T–controlled local councils during the inclusive government.19 This strategy had paid significant dividends by the time of the 2013 elections: Council performance had declined, allegations of corruption by MDC-T councilors had increased, and popular opinion in urban areas had begun to turn against the MDC-T.
The differences between the two parties were also apparent during the election campaign. The MDC-T chose to run on a policy-based platform, despite limited evidence that this appealed to voters, while ZANU-PF relied on the nationalistic and polarizing rhetoric that had served it well in past elections. Indeed, its 2013 campaign, like ev-ery campaign since 2000, focused on “patriotic history”—the idea that ZANU-PF had a right to rule due to its role in the liberation war. In early July, at the rally that kicked off the party’s campaign, Mugabe spoke of Zimbabwe’s long tradition of armed resistance to colonial rule, and his comments clearly placed Tsvangirai outside that tradi-tion. As in past campaigns, ZANU-PF focused on one simple point: The MDC did not have the right to rule.
Adrienne LeBas
63 The MDC-T’s failure to rebut this claim directly—or to make the case for the opposition as a democratizing force—did little to rally its base or prevent the defection of some urban voters to ZANU-PF. A focus on ser-vice delivery by MDC-T candidates did not help the party, especially when voters were steadily reminded by ZANU-PF of corruption scandals that had plagued MDC-controlled local councils in 2011 and 2012. Yet the MDC-T chose to run on performance rather than a continued commitment to democratization and political reform. Power sharing, however, made it difficult to assess the parties’ relative contributions to policy success. This made a performance-based campaign strategy questionable at best.
As I have argued elsewhere, the political polarization that character-ized the years between 2000 and 2008 reinforced party cohesion and played a role in keeping popular constituencies tied to their respective parties.20 By abandoning the rhetoric and campaign platform that had built the party, the MDC-T contributed to the erosion of its grassroots support and the growing apathy of its core activists. The party’s declin-ing commitment to internal democracy, especially evident in its reluc-tance to commit to open primaries in all constituencies, created tension between party leaders and the grassroots. Whether the MDC-T manages to recover its strength in the coming years will depend on its ability to reestablish its credentials as a pro-democracy movement and to regain the voters and activists whom it lost in 2013. But recent statements do not suggest that the party leadership has learned lessons from power sharing or from its neglect of party organization.
Tsvangirai may or may not retain the party leadership. Certainly, there are many in Zimbabwe who feel that he is a tired candidate who is now also weakened by scandals in his personal life and by the popu-lar perception that he became wealthy after becoming prime minister. Yet there are few viable successors within the MDC-T. The one bright spot is the continued cohesion of the opposition vote in Zimbabwe: The MDC splinter faction lost ground in the 2013 elections, and the MDC-T retained more than 80 percent of the total opposition vote. In the after-math of defeat, it remains to be seen if the MDC-T can rebuild the social coalition that was its base of support in the 2000s.
Looking Ahead
Power sharing in Zimbabwe fell far short of achieving its aims. Of the dozens of tasks laid out in the GPA, a sizeable share were not un-dertaken at all; the majority were only partly implemented; and only a handful were implemented in accordance with the agreement. This fail-ure to reform meant that the July 2013 elections did not occur on a level playing field. Furthermore, the ruling party’s culture of impunity and violence remained unchallenged. Though the 2013 elections were them-selves largely peaceful, the power-sharing period had been violent. Zim-
64Journal of Democracy babwean voters went to the polls knowing that ZANU-PF violence and retribution were a very real possibility in the event of an election loss.
Power sharing did yield some successes alongside these failures. Zimbabwe has a new constitution, one that contains stronger human-rights guarantees and some decentralization of power. The presidency has lost its powers to veto legislation and dismiss parliament; presidents will also be limited to two terms in office, though Mugabe will remain eligible to run again in 2018. Most important, the inclusive government allowed a period of economic recovery. Dollarization ended hyperinfla-tion; the renewal of donor assistance allowed for the restoration of basic services; businesses and local governments were again able to import necessary materials. Can this progress be sustained, given the ruling party’s hostility to foreign direct investment and its frosty relationship with foreign donors?
There are reasons to be skeptical. For the first time since 2000, ZANU-PF is firmly in control of both the presidency and parliament. The party holds a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly, enough to unilater-ally amend the constitution. Repressive public-order and press laws re-main on the books. Yet Zimbabwe has not entered a new period of stable electoral authoritarianism. Mugabe is now ninety years old and may not serve out his full five-year term of office. ZANU-PF is no longer as or-ganizationally solid as it once was. In July 2012, the party dissolved its district coordinating committees, and its increased reliance on the military and on its irregular militia cannot make up for its lack of grassroots orga-nization. Succession also remains a fraught issue within ZANU-PF, which is currently divided between two major factions. Vice-President Joyce Mujuru seems to be on the rise, and she is seen as a moderate who favors economic and political reform. But party hard-liners, notably Emmerson Mnangagwa, retain the backing of many in the military. The upcoming party congress in December 2014 may or may not resolve this division. The potential for a succession crisis to split the party is what enabled the elderly president to refuse to face a challenger for the party leadership in 2009 and to remain ZANU-PF’s presidential candidate in 2013. Absent the unifying threat of a strong MDC-T, these tensions and organizational weaknesses are likely to increase.
Zimbabwe’s experience suggests that competitive elections—not inter-national efforts to encourage institutional reform—may be the best route to democratization. They may create increased conflict and instability in the short run, as rising opposition parties chip away at entrenched pow-erholders. But the historical record suggests that competition and dead-lock are what drive elites toward creating checks on power. International intervention can actually undermine this process, as placing pressure on governments to implement power sharing halts this process of competi-tion and bargaining. In Zimbabwe and elsewhere, it has merely postponed the difficult conflicts that result in genuine institutional reform.
Adrienne LeBas
65 The international community should also be more cautious about sanctions and other means of isolating entrenched authoritarian govern-ments. Where there is not a vibrant opposition, these strategies might limit authoritarian abuses and create some pressure for increased politi-cal opening. But where there is a viable electoral opposition, as there was in Zimbabwe in the 2000s, these strategies are likely to backfire. Many Western governments have implemented targeted sanctions such as travel restrictions against Mugabe’s inner circle. By doing so, they have given ZANU-PF hard-liners a valuable electoral resource and a justification for marginalizing reformist voices within the party. On the stump, Mugabe and other ZANU-PF leaders misrepresented targeted sanctions as general sanctions and they pointed to Western govern-ments’ actions and rhetoric as evidence of the West’s ongoing neocolo-nialist designs on southern Africa. This has been an appeal that garners genuine support in Zimbabwe, and one that has helped to silence tech-nocratic and reformist voices within ZANU-PF.
In the coming years, ZANU-PF may become more conflict-ridden and factionalized, a process that will again open up space for party mod-erates. Normalization of relations between ZANU-PF and the West, as well as continued donor funding for education and health care, may speed this process. The EU’s decision to restore direct support to Zim-babwe’s ministries is probably a step in the right direction. There re-mains competent technocratic staff within the ministries, and Mujuru and other ZANU-PF politicians would rather campaign on government performance than on appeals to Zimbabwe’s liberation-war past.
Latin American transitions to democracy should be our guide in set-tings such as Zimbabwe. In Latin America, reducing the stakes of po-litical loss for entrenched incumbents and their supporters—by offering them “golden parachutes” and assurances that they would not be pros-ecuted—helped to ease them out of power. Removing targeted sanc-tions against the engineers of violence in Zimbabwe may feel wrong, but external pressure has failed to change ZANU-PF’s behavior. At this point, when power within ZANU-PF is uncertain, punitive sanctions and cutting off foreign aid would both do more harm than good. Reengage-ment between a ZANU-PF administration and Western donors could open up space for negotiation between moderates within ZANU-PF and their MDC counterparts. Though the 2013 elections did close some po-litical space in Zimbabwe, particularly from the standpoint of formal opposition parties, there remains the possibility of reopening.
NOTES
1. Scholars have pointed out that power sharing often only postpones conflict and at times may even perpetuate it. Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, “The Hidden Costs of Pow-er Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa,” African Affairs 104 (July 2005):
66Journal of Democracy
375–98; Ian S. Spears, “Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing,” Journal of Democracy 13 (July 2002): 123–36. Even boosters premise their support on power-sharing institutions exercising a real constraint on executive power, which is not always the case. Pippa Nor-ris, Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
2. Human Rights Watch, “Bullets for Each of You”: State-Sponsored Violence Since Zimbabwe’s March 29 Elections (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008).
3. Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony,” Journal of Democracy 19 (October 2008): 41–55.
4. See, for instance, the monthly event audits published by the Zimbabwe Peace Proj-ect, available at https://www.doczj.com/doc/5114807009.html,.
5. Research and Advocacy Unit, “Key Statistics from the June 2013 Voters Roll,” Harare, 5 July 2013.
6. Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “Voting Intentions in Zimbabwe: A Mar-gin of Terror?” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 103, August 2012.
7. Bratton and Masunungure, “Voting Intentions,” 6.
8. The MDC-T was allocated 22 seats in the House of Assembly on a separate women’s roll, and the MDC-N received two seats through the same mechanism.
9. Adrienne LeBas, From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 7.
10. A few months later, controversy again erupted over the purchase of a Mercedes for Harare’s mayor by the MDC-T–controlled city council.
11. JoAnne McGregor, “Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-Sharing, and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39 (Decem-ber 2013): 790.
12. Interviews with Harare branch and provincial MDC-T officials, 10, 11, and 13 July 2012.
13. Ibid.
14. Interviews with Nelson Chamisa, 12 July 2012, and with Lucia Matibenga, 12 July 2012.
15. Interview with MDC-T official in the prime minister’s office, 12 July 2012.
16. Quoted in Jason Moyo, “How Zanu-PF Won Harare from the MDC,” Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 8 August 2013.
17. “Zanu PF in Bid to Recapture Urban Vote,” Zimbabwe Standard (Harare), 24 Sep-tember 2011.
18. This election strategy constituted a strange reversal, as urban squatters had been vi-olently evicted from illegal plots by ZANU-PF in 2005. Operation Murambatsvina (Drive Out the Trash) left 700,000 or more Zimbabweans without homes or other property. Vic-tims were perceived to be MDC supporters.
19. McGregor, “Surveillance and the City.”
20. LeBas, From Protest to Parties.
关于坚持的高中作文 只有坚持奋斗,才能创造奇迹! 身在职场，也只有坚持奋斗,才能创造奇迹! 梅花独自傲雪怒放，是为了创造明媚的春天；风凉凉，雨潇潇， 花草不折，是为了创造明天辉煌的晨光； 孤云飘荡，从不停息，是为了创造雨后天边绚丽的彩虹； 江河奔流，孜孜不倦，是为了汇成宽广的海洋。 人生是一条漫长的岁月之河，而我们就是在努力进取和不懈地奋 斗中渡过。要坚信：有耕耘就一定会有收成。尽管我们所有的付出不会马上获得收成，就似乎我们对着空谷大喊一声，只要坚持下去，就一定会闻声绵长的覆信。 不断努力，坚持奋斗，这样人生才会过得有滋有味。一朵花儿的 开放，也是要花蕾顽强的生长，才慢慢的绽开；一棵树要长成枝叶蕃庑，也要树根坚持扎下土壤，一点一点地吸收营养，一片片翠绿才能满上枝头；糊口的夸姣，也是要坚持一点一滴获取的。所以，如果你是一个急性子，千万不要太急燥，由于所有的锦绣都是在慢条斯里中，在不断地奋斗中为你孕育。人生就是奋斗，是在奋斗中收成着成功，一路上采集着点点滴滴的糊口碎片。谁都想让自己的人生是一帆风顺，但糊口本身就意味着痛苦与快乐并存。失败与困难是我们在奋斗中获取成功的一个必经由程，正所谓是失败是成功之母，困难是人生的动力。
天才作曲家贝多芬２６岁，双耳失聪，作为一个伟大的音乐家，耳聋即是是他的致命伤，“耳朵昼夜作响，内脏同时受到剧痛的折磨，听觉越来越退化”。不仅肉体的伤痛折磨他，失恋的痛苦又摧残着他，使他都到了颠狂的地步。然而，即使在这样的情况下，贝多芬仍是顽强地活了31年。在他耳聋之后，以一种坚强的意志与信念，与命运作斗争。最后创造了他生命的奇迹，“我要扼住命运的咽喉。它决不能使我屈服．．．．．．”。贝多芬就是这样在与命运的搏斗中，才让他在耳聋了之后完成了很多优秀的作品。才让他得到了成功！ 不断求索，顽强奋斗。也可以磨练一个人的品性。诸葛亮未出茅庐之前，就已是万卷经书随意吟，是个满腹经文，旷世之才，虽尚未有成就，但也已名振一方。他始终都保持着充实而自信的糊口立场，以一种乐观向上的心态不断进取。由此，刘备才慕名而来，泛起了“三顾茅庐”的佳话。最后著名于天下。 时机老是留给那些奋斗不息的人的，奋斗才是一种最佳机遇的挑战，奋斗才能激发激情。海燕搏击惊涛骇浪，暴风暴雨，才会轻蔑大海的呼啸。才能独自赏识那汹涌澎湃的美景。人生的道路，只有曲折迂回才能引起人心旷神怡的憧憬；大海的波浪，只有潮起潮落才能涌出惊心动魄的壮美；故事的动人，只有哀婉忧伤中才能让人体会肝肠寸断的悲切；糊口的出色，只有不断地奋斗中成就惊世骇俗的豪迈。 奋斗，给了我们气力的源泉。让我们闯过了寒泠的冬季，迎来了绚烂的春天；奋斗，让我们享受了如诗如画的美景；奋斗，让我们在崎岖的人生岁月中实现了的梦想，成就了生命的绚烂。
⒈屈原(适用范围：价值追求、理想信念、个性品质、责任奉献) 他，长剑佩腰，纵横中原，问天索地，踌躇满志；他，朝搴木兰，夕揽宿莽，奔波效劳，鞠躬尽瘁。然而，子兰谄言，郑袖惑内，艾萧太盛，椒兰甚少，骐骥不跃，美政弗行，举世皆醉，万民同苦。勇气与理想尽灭，悲愤与绝望交加，他掩脸长泣，衣襟浪浪。 落日染红汨罗江，他，一跃冲进万里涛。只把清高的节操留在世上，却让伟大的思想长存历史。 2 贾谊（适用范围：个人和集体、对国家和民族的责任、忠诚） 万籁俱寂，剔亮的露珠顺着野草滴落在洛阳干涸的沙石上。寒雾飘渺，一个凛然的身影随风飘摇，那是赴任的贾生。在他身后，一轮血红的旭日挣出水面，傲立于汉朝昏黄的天宇中。 月光融融，西风萧萧。长沙王府里你正为战祸初平、百废待兴，诸侯割据、危机四伏的现实而愁眉不展。借着这秦时的遗风残月，你满腔热血如江水滔滔，在心中汇聚成那惊世旷古的《过秦论》。 秋波浮动莫名湖畔，业绩初显。你却独倚寒窗，将自己三十四岁的生命浸没于怀王之死的深深自责中，无尽的泪水融入滔滔历史长河，洗净千古多少赤胆忠心 3 司马迁（适用范围：忍辱负重、生命的意义、责任奉献、个人与历史） 就在着手写《史记》之际，“李陵之祸”不期而至。狱中的寒风刺骨，毒卒拷打使他几欲自杀。他仍心存侥幸，期盼着武帝开恩，却等来了“诬上”的罪名。腐刑、亲朋远离、酷吏凌辱让他生理上和心理上都遭到摧残。然而，他从“西伯拘而演《周易》；仲尼厄而作《春秋》；屈原放逐，乃赋《离骚》；左丘失明，厥有《国语》”的遭遇中获得了新的生命动力，隐忍苟活，弃小义，雪大耻，终于完成了“史家之绝唱，无韵之《离骚》”，名垂后世。 4 曹植(适用范围：才华与命运、恃才傲物与人生发展、政治大于亲情、独善其身） 他出口成文，下笔成章，曾博得曹操的欢心，曾充满了“捐躯赴国难，视死忽如归”的豪情；他才高八斗，学富五车，仁人志士无不敬仰。 然而出身权倾一世的曹家，注定他命途多舛。本可成为至高无上的君王，却由于他的不拘小节，不得“曹心”而葬送了他的大好前途。面对手足相残他“七步成诗”，悲叹“本是同根生，相煎何太急”。 怀瑾握瑜，却是英雄无用武之地；壮志难酬，他借酒消愁。想当年“归来宴平乐，美酒斗十千”，到头来只能以豪饮而留名，赢得个“寂寞圣贤”的悲凉美名。
一、阅读理解 1．课外阅读轩。 哑巴渡 离家不远的地方有一个渡口，摆渡的人是一个（）的哑巴老头，乡亲们都管这儿叫哑巴渡。 哑巴老人的船总是干净而清爽，船舷擦得亮亮的，闪着桐油的光泽，一点也不像他（）的脸。哑巴老人的船摆得又快又稳，无论是白天还是黑夜，只要在岸上一吆喝，他就会从船舱里出来，再（）地把过河人送到对岸去，春夏秋冬，从不间断。在这里过河的人，不用担心会耽搁行程。 河水在日复一日，年复一年地流淌着，日子在（）中逝去。哑巴老人在这里默默地把船摆过来，渡过去，人们已经习惯了河水、渡船和哑巴老人的存在，好像这一切都是理所当然的。 直到有一天，哑巴老人生病被送进了医院，大家才怀念起以前只用一双粗大的手说话的哑巴老人。人们想起他摆船的稳当。想起了他一毛钱的渡河钱。想起了他冬天半夜里穿衣解缆就为了送一个行人过河。哑巴不在了，人们觉得船上空落落的。 一天，乡里突然来了个老将军，手里捧着哑巴老人的骨灰盒。哑巴老人得的是肝癌，死在医院里。他把一生摆渡的钱全捐了出来，想在这条河上建一座新桥。 就在新桥建成剪彩的那天，老将军含泪讲述了一件让人震惊的往事：在红军长征的一次战斗中，为了拦截追击的敌人，还是“红小鬼”的老将军奉上级的命令配合班长炸掉石桥。摆渡的哑巴老人就是我的班长！ 阳光下，洁白的桥身闪烁着三个大字：哑巴渡。一位老红军生前在这里炸掉一座桥，摆了一辈子渡，死后又留下了一座桥。 （1）选择合适的词语填在文章中的括号里。 A．干干瘦瘦 B．稳稳当当 C．平平淡淡 D．皱皱巴巴 （2）哑巴老人的船________，他摆得________，从中可以看出哑巴老人________。 （3）“好像这一切都是理所当然的。”句中的“这一切”指的是________。 （4）哑巴老人生病住院，人们怀念他的原因有哪些？ （5）通读全文，哑巴老人一生做了哪几件事？你觉得哑巴老人是个怎样的人？ 【答案】（1）A；D；B；C （2）干净而清爽；又快又稳；他是勤快、摆渡技巧高超、做事利索 （3）年复一年哑巴老人用渡船载人过河。 （4）哑巴老人摆船又快又稳；收费便宜，渡河只收一毛钱；在这里过河，不会耽搁行程。（5）炸桥、摆渡、建桥；哑巴老人识大体、顾大局，一生默默奉献，不求回报。 【解析】【分析】（1）本题考查词语的运用。应在理解词语的基础上，结合具体语境选词填空，使句中表达更准确。 （2）本题主要考查对短文内容的理解记忆能力。解答本题，需要真正阅读短文的内容，然后结合前后句(题目提供的信息)进行补充填空即可。 （3）这是考查指代性词语指代的内容。感知文本内容，从文章中提炼和概括信息，结合
初中成熟作文800字 成熟是件美丽的事情，处于青春期的我们，渴望成熟就像农民渴望丰收，小编收集了初中成熟作文800字，欢迎阅读。 初中成熟作文800字【一】成熟是件美丽的事情，处于青春期的我们，渴望成熟就像农民渴望丰收。但成熟也是残酷的，代表着青春的流逝。对于成熟，我们有多少感悟呢？成熟不仅是生理上的，也是心理上的。随着长大，生理就会逐渐成熟，但是心…… 成熟是件美丽的事情，处于青春期的我们，渴望成熟就像农民渴望丰收。但成熟也是残酷的，代表着青春的流逝。对于成熟，我们有多少感悟呢？ 成熟不仅是生理上的，也是心理上的。随着长大，生理就会逐渐成熟，但是心理成熟，却是困难的。一个心理成熟的人，他的思想会沉稳而又独特、大气。他能清醒的认识自己和别人，拥有内在的、让人折服的气质。所以心理的成熟阶段是一个人的生命中最不平凡的阶段，它会给一个人自信，勇敢和干劲。一个人心理成熟，就像长了一对翅膀，将会带这个人自由翱翔，成就辉煌。 在过去的生命中，我们在逐渐成熟。从不搭理家人，只是享受着家人的爱，到可以主动的为家人做一些事情；从在大庭广众下沉默寡言，到可以在人们面前展示自己；从在公交车上看见老人不搭不理，到可以主动为老人们让座。这些都是我们心里逐渐成熟的标志，是我们走向真正成熟的起点。 ————来源网络搜集整理，仅供个人学习查参考
但是这仍不够，我们需要更加成熟。这就需要从现在启程，从小事做起，在考试失利后不要灰心丧气，努力复习迎接下一次的考试。某件事情做砸了，也不要轻易放弃，应该寻找另一条通道来解决这件事情。以后遇到任何伤心的事情也不能心灰意冷，轻易地掉眼泪，用乐观的心态看待一切。如果我们能做到，心理就能更加成熟。但成熟不是故作深沉，也不是冷漠无情，真正的成熟是自然的。 现在的我仍不成熟，以后应努力地去做看起来完不成的事，使自己更勇敢、更坚强。到那时，成熟就距我不远了。 初中成熟作文【二】谁也无法为另一个人的性格“判刑”，因为谁也无法完全说看懂了别人的心。 ——题记 在阳光明媚的好时光，不正合适于整理曾经的那些往昔吗？我回首寻望一年前无知的自己，想到那次受到的深刻教育，心中是说不出的宁静与舒适。 一年前，在“草长莺飞二月天，拂堤杨柳醉春烟”的好季节中，在“沾衣欲湿杏花雨，吹面不寒杨柳风”的好日子里。活力（2）班中又有了一位新成员，她给人印象不错，又加上她是我新同桌，所以，我也是热情地欢迎。渐渐的，我又发现了，我俩有好多共同点，于是觉得相见恨晚，我们成了密不可分的好朋友。 好朋友，当然是有福同享有难同当。我邀她到我家，她也带我去她家。 去了她家，我才真正享受到自由的快乐。她家的电脑，可以玩游
高中关于坚持的议论文范文【三篇】 【篇一】 坚持往往是成功的代名词，如果想要成功，想要实现自己的梦想，甚至生活中点点滴滴小事 也需要我们的坚持。 坚持的过程是枯燥的，是孤单的，是不被人理解的。当我们全力以赴的去做一件值得做的事 但不被别人所理解时，就会遭到巨大的压力，会使我们在努力的过程中分心，不利于我们完成这 件事，就有很多人因为背负不了这巨大的压力而放弃了。还有的人因为害怕一次次的失败，心理 上承受不了也放弃了。但是被誉为发明大王的爱迪生在寻找适合做灯丝的材料时，经历了一次次 的失败，但他并没有气馁。面对别人的冷嘲热讽，他持着毫不在意外界的看法，依旧认认真真的 实验，最终终于找到了适合做灯丝的材料。在经历过别人的不理解，他依然坚持着自己的信念， 最终获得了成功。所以只要我们坚持，只要我们有恒心，有毅力，正确的看待挫折，我们是一定 能获得成功的。 坚持也是幸福的，因为在短短的人生路上我们有了奋斗的目标，有了前进的方向，人生因为 坚持有了活力，有了生机。坚持会在我们每天的生活中成为一种习惯，这种习惯会让我们不由自 主的坚持，但是习惯的形成会需要一段很长的时间。所以坚持在某种意义上来说也是简单的，我 们在一段时间内有目的的去坚持一件事情，久而久之这件事情就会融入我们的生活，不需要刻意 去提醒自然而然也就会去做。所以，懂得把坚持变为习惯也很重要。 坚持其实也难，但也不难，毕竟事物都有两面性，这也是正常的。所以想要成功，想要实现 自己的理想，要懂得正确的看待坚持中所遇到的困难、挫折。要有一颗平常心，大不了从头再来。但是坚持也要懂得选择正确的事情，不能把时间浪费在无用的事情上。还要懂得享受坚持中的失败，从失败中吸取经验，奠定基础。 做任何事情都要坚持，无论成功与否，重要的是在过程中我们学到了什么，有什么收获，这 比我们是否成功更加重要。 【篇二】 坚持下去便可胜利。只要心还在，梦想还在，我们还可以坚持直至胜利。没有过不去的坎， 只要害怕的心。莫害怕，抓住希望便可突破困境找到方向。 ——题记 人生总是很茫然，时而奔跑时而停留。奔跑时想要休息，休息是渴望更好地冲刺。三分钟热 度用在我身上再合适不过了。谁不想要坚持完成一件事呢，可想的往往比做的容易多了。人生没 有终点只有无数个起跑点，可我站在起跑点上却犹豫了，我太容易动摇了……
高中作文议论文作文素 材精编版 MQS system office room 【MQS16H-TTMS2A-MQSS8Q8-MQSH16898】
高中作文议论文作文素材 最新高中作文素材库44－2爱迪生的灾难1914年12月，爱迪生的实验室在一场大火中化为灰烬，直接经济损失超过200万美金，他多年的科研成果也在大火中付之一炬。大火最凶的当儿，爱迪牛24岁的儿子在浓烟和废墟中发疯似的寻找他的父亲。他最终找到了：爱迪生平静地看着火势，他的脸在火光摇曳中闪亮，他的白发在寒风中飘动。爱迪生在灾难面前，表现出了惊人的冷静。他看着一片废墟说道：“灾难自有它的价值，瞧，这不，我们以前所有的谬误过失都给烧了个一干二净。感谢上帝，这下我们可以从头再来了。”火灾刚过去三个星期，爱迪生就开始着手推出他的第一部留声机。分析：①灾难是不以人的意志为转移的，它能给人带来巨大的痛苦，也能给人带来创新的动力，关键在于你应该怎样对待它。②不幸，是天才的晋升阶梯，信徒的洗礼之水，弱者的无底深渊。③黑夜给了我黑色的眼睛，我却用它寻找光明。——顾城④只有经历地狱般的磨练，才能炼出创造天堂的力量；只有流过血的手指，才能弹出世间的绝唱。——泰戈尔话题：“挫折与成功”“坚守与放弃”游向高原的鱼水从高原由两向东流着，渤海口的一条鱼逆流而行。它的游技很精湛，因而游得很精彩，一会儿冲过浅滩，一会儿划过激流，它穿过了湖泊中的层层鱼网，也躲过了无数水鸟的追逐。它逆行了的壶口瀑布，堪称奇迹；又穿过激水奔流的青铜峡谷，博得鱼们的众声喝彩；它不停的游，最后穿过山涧，挤过礁石，游上了高原。然而它还没来得及发出一声欢呼，瞬间却冻成了冰。若干年后，一群登山者在唐古拉山上的冰块中发现了它，它还保持着游的姿态，有人认出这是渤海口的鱼。分析：一方面只有伟大的精神却没有伟大的方向，最后得到的只有死亡。另一方面，明知山有虎，偏向虎山行，昭显的是一种奋力追求的信念，积极向上的拼搏精神。话题：“成功与方向”“信念”二．个性秉赋弱点第二次世界大战期间，美国陆军反间谍队的高级官员伯尼·费德曼，在一次战地值勤中不幸被德国军虏获，鉴于费德曼的特殊身份为了从他嘴里掏出所需要的情报，德国审讯员施出了种种手段：严刑拷打，心理压力，耍弄诡计，给以厚遇。然均未奏效，以至于德国审讯员无奈地道：费德曼大概愿意我们折腾他，这样给他机会成为英雄。但这位铁打硬汉，最终却被出卖了——出卖他的人不是别人，正是他自己的弱点，原来德国人后来把他送入德国一所培养领导间谍的干部学校去，并让他每人陪同一个教官上课。这位教官不知是有意还是无意，每次讲给学员的东西大都是错误的。起初，费德曼极力忍耐，冷笑置之。有一天他实人忍无可忍，便情不自禁地批驳了德国人一通，并谈了美英机关一些工作的内幕，还向德同人提了一些应该怎样搞清通讯网的建议。自然，这些正是德国人希望知道的。费德曼的悲剧，在于他不容亵渎的职业神圣感和其强烈的敬业精神。德国人正是利用了这一点，将欲取之，乃先诱之，刺激得他“一时技痒”，在维护他的职业尊严中落入对方的圈套。分析：费德曼的职业神圣感和其强烈的敬业精神，本是优点，但优点有时却会成为别人攻击的弱点，德国人正是抓住这一点，达到了自己的目的。话题：“优点与弱点”“的敌人是自己”巴金背书作家巴金十二三岁时，就背会几部书了，其中包括《古文观止》。后来他谈到自己的散文创作时说：“现在有200多篇文章储蓄在我的脑子里面了。虽然我对其中的任何一篇都没有好好地研究过，但是这么具体的东西至少可以使我明白所谓‘文章’究竟是怎么一回事，可以使我明白文章并非神秘不可思议，它也是有条有理、顺着我们思路连上来的。”分析：“熟读唐诗三百首，不会吟诗也会吟。”不要奇怪为什么看书多的人文章就是高人一等，巴金老
五年级阅读理解及答案100篇 【篇一：五年级语文阅读理解100篇】 xt>一、古诗文填空(60分) 1、《清明》的作者是，这首诗的前两句是，。 2、 3、“总把新桃换旧符。”是的诗句。 4、《示儿》的作者是，他是代诗人，诗的后两句是，。 5这样的诗句。 6、。春风又绿江南岸，。 7、。欲把西湖比西子，。 8、，花木成畦手自栽。，。 9、。卷地风来忽吹散，。 10、。二、默写古诗（20分） 1、默写两首描送别朋友的古诗： 《》作者。 。 《》作者。 。 2、默写两首带“银河”字样的古诗： 《》作者
。 。 《》作者 。 。 三、阅读积累（30分） 一、课内：（16分） 1、词，是我国古代的一种，因为句子有长有短，所 以又叫。 2、，，是知也。 3、子不学，。，。 4、“白杨树生根发芽，长出粗壮的枝干。不管遇到还是，不管遇到还是，它总是那么，那么，不，也不。” 二、课外：14分 1、写出“金陵十二钗”中的四个 人：。 2、“病补孔雀裘”的是。“痛吟《葬花词》”的是。 3、《儒林外史》的作者是 4、巴尔扎克是国著名的作家，他的作品有很多，请写 出其中的两部作品名称《》《》 5我班图书角还有他的诗集呢。
6、法国的大仲马著名的作品有《》《 【篇二：沪教版五年级升初中语文阅读理解100篇(第 二部分)】 txt>亵渎可远观而不可亵玩焉 怎样阅读写人的文章● 分析人物的描写方法 姓名班级学号计分 【知识要点】 ● 分析人物的描写方法 写人文章，是以表现人物为重点的，而人物的特点 , 除了通过事情来表现 外，还通过人物描写来展示。人物描写方法，主要有肖像描写、行动描写、语言 描写、心理描写等。只有这样 , 才能把人物写得活灵活现。我们在阅读时，一定 要抓住人物的言行举止，体会人物的个性品质理解作者所要表达的意思。 ●分析写作目的，归纳中心思想 明确了文章写什么，还要弄清作者为什么写这篇文章。对中心思想的总结 概括是加深对课文内容的理解，进一步明确人物形象的有效途径。 一、基本积累：（40分） 1、按要求写四字词语：（18分）
成熟与成长高中作文精选5篇800字 树木经历四季，有硕果挂满枝头的喜悦，也有叶落枝枯的寥落，人的成长经历何尝不是如此呢?树叶间酝酿了香果，也使树日渐成熟，成熟不是衰老，而是懂得该懂得的，担当起该担当的。这里给大家分享一些以成熟为话题的高中作文，希望对大家有所帮助。 以成熟为话题的高中作文篇1 时光轻轻替少年拂拭去轻狂与无知。稚嫩的面孔历经几载春秋演变成坚毅。终于，你迈着沉稳而轻松的脚步在铺满香径的林荫小道上笑魇如花。 呱呱坠地的那一刻，生命是午夜湖中最温柔的那抹日光，姣洁、纯真。我从没料想到岁月如此迅速，推着我们成长的不仅是摇篮还有失败、挫折、悲伤。 成熟并不是光华，它应如秋天之静美，丰收时果实的甘甜。若是世俗中的虚荣和圆滑遮掩了成熟本质的星光，那何必去追寻成年后的责任和感恩。
著名作词家林夕曾说：水是最柔软的，但它亦能坚韧。水的形状依据盛放它的容器所决定变幻莫测，在环境中无论顺、逆都能变换自己的模样却不世故，悠闲随意也是成熟的一种姿态。 成年亦非成熟，前者是时间的标志，后者是心灵的澄清。我们可以看到一棵树的年轮，但无法感受到它的枝繁叶茂中蕴含了多少风雨。 感动中国的人物中，曾有一个女孩用她瘦弱肩承担起一个家，父亲在生命中像梦一般迷茫。母亲瘫痪，整个求学生涯都在学校和家里两头跑，她还小，可她不得不放弃炫丽多彩的年华，我永远不会抛弃母亲。这句话，从她嘴中说出时，成熟懂事是生活给予最好的礼物。 离开了父母的呵护，我们逐渐从简单的心性变得缜密、细心。每个人都有其之不同，可是过程却是相同的。 第一次没有父母陪伴身边的生病，自己拖着疲乏的身体去医院。 没有帮助时，一个人顽强地在困境中努力。 流浪在陌生的城市，一个人在饥寒交迫开始想家。 当我们成熟时，不再怨怼生活的不公。生病了喝着白开水和干面包包熬过。遇到挫折不会轻易放弃。忽有一天我们开始怀念
关于坚持的高中作文 篇一：成功，是坚持开出的花朵 古之成大事者，不惟有超士之才，亦必有坚忍不拔之志。--苏轼 雏鹰为何翱翔于天空，小溪因何汇聚成大海，幼苗又如何能纵横陈一片森林?这一切，因为坚持。是坚持，给了人生绚丽的色彩，是坚持给了成功甘甜的滋味。人生道路，离不开成功，更离不开不懈的坚持。 国父孙中山，生逢乱世，不忍孰视家国受难，为救中华万千民众，毅然投身于革命的洪流之中。此间遍尝挫折，屡遭苦难，在劫难重重，军阀混战中，他没有放弃。在黄花岗起义失败中，他没有放弃。他在等待，他在坚持，为还中国一个郎朗天地而坚持，而努力。终于辛亥革命成功的消息传来，这亦算是对他坚持的肯定和鼓励。 哦，国父的坚持最为坎坷…… 汨罗江畔，江水是否依旧涛涛。江水奔涌间，是否已遮蔽了《楚辞》的歌声。江水依旧在，只是屈夫子已随时间的长河远去。 《离骚》《天问》写出你对民生的关注和对黑暗社会的不满。与渔夫的问答之间，又坚持了自己桀骜的性情。你就是一朵白莲花，纯洁，宁静。风来时，荷花宁折不弯如你之品性。“路漫漫其修远兮，吾将上下而求索”一句诗，仿若你一生的写照。为了心中的净土，为了眼前的百姓，。屈原屈夫子，你选择了一条不归路。 哦，屈夫子的坚持是高尚的…… 就算坐在轮椅上，但他限制不了你的心的自由。就算病入膏肓，但他阻挡不了你思维的扩散。你用人生书写奇迹，你用坚持铸造人生。你-就是霍金。 当你全身几乎不能活动之时，你没有放弃。当你基本丧失语言能力时，你没有放弃。《从大爆炸到黑洞》《时间简史》一部部著作在你的坚持下完成。我知道，你不会放弃，你要坚持到这时光的尽头。 哦，霍金的坚持是辛酸的…… 没有人能随随便便成功! 成功一途，没有坦途。如何能走向成功，唯坚持尔，不畏艰辛，披荆斩棘，用自己心中的坚持化作一把利剑，划破人生的重重枷锁。
高中作文议论文素材三篇 导读：本文高中作文议论文素材三篇，仅供参考，如果觉得很不错，欢迎点评和分享。 智慧(1)引言 古希腊哲学家赫拉克利特说：‘智慧就在于说出真理，按照自然办事，倾听自然的话。“就是说智者应该坚持真理，按照客观规律办事，如范晔所说：”智者顺时而谋。“这就与逆潮而动所施展的诡计狡诈划清了界限。 让智慧充满人间。 (2)事实论据 孙膑智助田忌 齐国大将田忌，多次与齐国的诸公子用金钱作赌注*，但常常赌输。孙膑观察他们的马力都不相上下。只是因为田忌没有按照每匹马的实际情况加以科学匹配使用的结果。于是孙膑告诉田忌：“再赛时，您尽管多下赌注，我保证您取胜。”田忌相信孙膑的智慧，就与齐王、诸公子下千金赌注*。等到将要比赛时，孙膑对田忌说：“今天您用下等马与他们上等马赛，用上等马与他们的中等马赛，用中等马与他们下等马赛。”比赛结果，田忌取得两胜一负的成绩，最后赢得了千金。 陈襄智审窃贼 北宋的陈襄在神宗时任主筐，代理县令。有一次发生一宗盗案，
捕役抓来许多的犯罪嫌疑人。但嫌疑人都拒不承认自己犯盗窃罪，一时无法定案。陈襄胸有成竹地说：“你们不用抵赖，附近有座庙，庙里有座神钟，谁要是偷了东西，只要一摸钟，它就会出声音。”于是陈襄派人押着这些嫌疑犯到庙里摸钟。事先在钟的四周用布幕严严实实围住，不漏一丝光线，再暗中派人在钟上偷偷地涂上了墨。然后让嫌疑犯进去摸钟。过了一会儿，逐个检查手掌。发现唯独一人手上没有墨迹。陈襄立刻命令将此人拿下。这个窃贼只得低头认罪。 叶挺巧投密信 1941年1月6日新四军北移部队九千余人在皖南泾县茂林地区，遭国民党8万军队预伏袭击，经七昼夜的激战，终因寡不敌众，弹尽浪绝，除二千人突围外其余将士或战死或被俘，军长叶挺也被俘。造成震惊中外的“皖南事变”。 叶挺被俘，他苦苦的思索着如何把自己的遭遇告诉党的领导。在从江西上饶押到重庆那天，当他下了囚车，顺着马路走时，看到一个厕所，他灵机一动，要求上厕所。特务只得同意。叶挺在厕所里急忙写了一填充短信，信中说：“我已被押解重庆，任光在我身边阵亡。”落款为“希夷”。并附一张字条和五元钱，一起放在厕所里。字条上写明：请拾信者按信上的地址发出，五元钱作为酬劳。 不久，在重庆的*收到了叶挺的信，迅速展开了营救活动。 *智答记者 在一次记者招待会上，一位西方记者问同恩来：“中国人民银行的资金有多少?”
五年级阅读理解题及答案 (内含45个五年级阅读专练) 深山含笑（五年级阅读训练A） 我以前见过的含笑花都是庭院种植的，叶细花小，象牙色的花蕊吐着幽香，有一种水果般的甜沁。含笑不（以、已）艳丽著称，妙的是一缕沁香。 在井冈山深处，我被另一种含笑花（佩、折）服！几株两三丈高的乔木体如游龙，散发出弥天的清香气息，这就是野生的深山含笑。多么突兀的秀色啊！她简直像一个绝世独立的北方佳人，（竟、竞）然在大山深处隐藏了如此潇洒、如此豪放的春光。和庭院含笑相比，倒（像、向）是临风挺立的 巾帼英雄，笑得那么爽朗、欢畅。那是一种胜利的喜悦，似乎天上的白云都是从她的胸中笑出来的。 从小路那边走过来两个拎着简单行李的年轻人。他们是那个边远的、还没通车的村子里的老师、跟着他们，我们也进了村。目睹孩子们围着老师的亲切嬉闹，我忽然感觉另有一株高大的深山含笑在我心中晃动起来…… 1．把文中括号里有不合适的字划掉。（5分） 2．庭院中的含笑与野生的含笑有什么不同？（3分） ________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ 3．在文中用曲线画出两个比喻句。（2分）
4．注意带点词语，结合题目写出文章最后一句话的意思。（4分） --------------- （五年级阅读训练二） 王若飞同志是一位无产阶级革命家。解放前，他因从事革命工作，被敌人逮捕了。在监狱里，他经常对难友们说：“敌人要摧残我们，我们一定要爱护自己的身体， 我们是革命者，决不能向恶劣的环境屈服，要坚决斗争。” 王若飞同志的身体不好，为了坚持对敌斗争，他想方设法，利用各种条件锻炼身体。 王若飞同志在狱中的锻炼方法之一是日光浴。他利用每天短暂的放风时间到院子里晒太阳。后来，他得了严重的风湿性关节炎，敌人被迫允许他每天晒一两小时太阳。他就利用这个机会，躺在院子里让太阳晒全身，把皮肤晒得紫红紫红的。 冷水擦身，是王若飞锻炼身体的另一种方法。那时，反动派百般折磨政治犯，别说洗澡，就连喝的水也不供给。但王若飞的言行感动了出身贫苦的老看守员，他偷偷地给王若飞买了几只大碗，王若飞同志每天用它盛冷水，用毛巾蘸着擦身，擦到全身发红为止。 王若飞同志在狱中还有一种锻炼方法，叫做“室内体操”。体操包括伸腿、弯腰、曲臂等动作。不管三九天，还是三伏天，他都坚持锻炼。 一次，一个难友问王若飞：“我有一事不明白，你骂**，骂蒋介石，天不怕，地不怕，真是好汉。可是，你坐在牢房里，还天天做操，
关于坚持的作文_我依然坚持5篇 我不愿与人相比，但却也不甘落后，面对这些失败，我手足无措。我不知是什么原因，尽管我自认为努力了，只能掩盖。现在小编为大家收集整理优秀的作文，如果喜欢这篇文章可以参考学习。欢迎持续关注我们的后续更新。 关于坚持的作文1 每当我看到有人因坚持做某一件事而成功时，便由衷地佩服，默默地点赞，但我却没有认真地向他们学习。 文化课，在我永是小菜一碟，好成绩更如探囊取物，教室自然是专属我的职场。可在我的课程表中，“体育”永远是一个大大的红叉，是我内心深处最大的痛。那绿茵 操场，就是我眼中的“刑场”，各种“酷刑”应有尽有，短短的四十分钟，却成了我冰冷的漫长冬夜。 体育老师那冷酷的表情使我彻底陷入了绝望。偌大的操场，十圈的“见面礼”，让 我的双腿接近“死机”，上气不接下气，只想瘫倒在草地上。“每人二十个俯卧撑!”八个 字如晴天霹雳，整个人被石化了，接着碎了一地。卖萌、求饶等招都不管用了。 趴在地上，瞬间来了个“五体投地”，软如面条。老师凌厉的目光把我吓得赶紧爬 了起来。本想蒙混过关，但又一想，这岂不让天下人耻笑?不管怎样，咬着牙我也得做完。虽这样想，可刚做了几个，就汗流如雨，四肢软绵绵的。还是算了，大不了以抄作业堵住他们的嘴，何必苦了自己呢? 快放弃之时，脑中顿时闪过他们的身影——那些为了自己心中的理想和信念而坚持不懈的人，那些即使遇到再大的荆棘也从未想过放弃、停下脚步的人，我并不比他们差!一股力量涌上心头，脑袋中只有一个念头，我要坚持，坚持，再坚持!我一定能行! 还有五个、四个、三个、二个、一个，我成功了! 虽然累得趴在地上，虽然衬衫全湿，贴在身上，但涨红的脸上却展露着笑容。因为坚持，我战胜了自己! 人生路上的拦路虎并非只有体育课，“路漫漫其修远兮”，谁都无法预知前路会发 生什么。在上下求索中，我必将永远坚持下去! 关于坚持的作文2
高中语文议论文作文素材汇总 一经营人心 清代乾隆年间，南昌城有一点心店主李沙庚，以货真价实赢得顾客满门。但其赚钱后 便掺杂使假，对顾客也怠慢起来，生意日渐冷落。一日，书画名家郑板桥来店进餐，李沙 庚惊喜万分，恭请题写店名。郑板桥挥毫题定“李沙庚点心店”六字，墨宝苍劲有力，引 来众人观看，但还是无人进餐。原来“心”字少写了一点，李沙庚请求补写一点。但郑板 桥却说：“没有错啊，你以前生意兴隆，是因为‘心’有了这一点，而今生意清淡，正因 为‘心’少了这一点。”李沙庚感悟，才知道经营人生的重要。从此以后，痛改前非，又 一次赢得了人心，赢得了市场。 人心是一笔无形资产，是一笔不可忽视的巨大财富。对于企业、商家而言，经营人心 是事业健康、持续发展的关键。 二平凡与不平凡 海尔总裁张瑞敏先生在比较中日两个民族的认真精神时曾说：如果让一个日本人每天 擦桌子六次，日本人会不折不扣地执行，每天都会坚持擦六次;可是如果让一个中国人去做，那么他第一天可能擦六次，第二天可能擦六遍，但到了第三天，可能就会擦五次、四次、三次。到后来，就不了了之。有鉴于此，他表示，把每一件平凡的事做好就是不平凡。 三成功之道 一个青年向一个富翁请教成功之道，富翁却拿了三块大小不一的西瓜放在青年面前，“如果每块西瓜代表一定程度的利益，你选那块?” “当然是最大的那块!”青年毫不犹豫地回答。 富翁一笑：“那好，请吧!”富翁把那块最大的西瓜递给青年，而自己却吃起了最小 的那块。 很快，富翁就吃完了，随后拿起桌上的最后一块西瓜得意地在青年面前晃了晃，大口 吃起来。 青年马上明白了富翁的意思：富翁吃的瓜虽无青年的瓜大，却比青年吃得多。 如果每块西瓜代表一定程度的利益，那么富翁占有的利益自然比青年多。 吃完西瓜，富翁对青年说：“要想成功，就要学会放弃，只有放弃眼前利益，才能获 取长远大利，这就是我的成功之道。” 四和为贵思想协调人类发展
【阅读理解】五年级语文阅读理解精选及答案 我喜欢露珠，我赞美它。 夏日的清晨，我来到野外散步。在万道霞光中，一个美妙的，崭新的世界便（显现呈现出现）在我的眼前。看！那无边的绿叶上，闪动着无数颗晶莹的露珠，一颗、两颗、十颗、百颗……啊！像夜空中璀璨的繁星，像碧波上撒满了宝石，又像千百万闪光的眼睛。啊！露珠！这就是极普通又为人们所喜爱的露珠。 露珠的身体很小，生命也很短暂，但它却是不平凡的。当夜幕笼罩的时候它像慈母用乳汁（教育哺育培育）儿女一样地滋润着禾苗每当黎明到来的时候它又最早睁开那不知疲倦的眼睛它白天隐身于空气中，夜晚无声地辛勤工作。它不像暴雨那样挟带风雷闪电以（夸耀显耀炫耀）它的威力，更不像冰雹那样对一切（残酷残忍残暴）无情。它把短暂的一生，献给树木、庄稼……而对它们却无所苛求。它多么像辛勤的园丁，培育着祖国的花朵，多么像我们敬爱的老师，伏在桌边灯下夜以继日地工作，把全部心血洒在我们的心田…… 我爱露珠，它比珍珠更珍贵，比宝石更晶莹，比群星更璀璨。我赞美它。露珠精神将永远在我心头闪动。 １、联系上下文，在文中括号处选择恰当的词语，依次写在横线上。 ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ ＿＿＿＿＿ ２、把文章第三自然段中没有标点的地方加上标点。 ３、联系上下文理解字义。 ⑴它白天隐身于空气中。于：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ ⑵又为人们所喜爱。为：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ ４、“露珠精神将永远在我心头闪动”中“露珠精神”是指＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 2 这是一个迷人的海滨的夏夜。 夕阳西下，天空燃烧着一片橘红色的晚霞。大海也被霞光染成了红色，它比天空的景色更壮观。当一排排波浪涌起的时候，那映照在浪峰上的霞光，又红又亮，闪烁着，滚动着，使人赞叹。 夜幕降临，天空的霞光渐渐淡下去了，深红的颜色变成了浅红，当一切光都消失了的时候，那高而远的天空中便出现了夜明星。它是那么大，那么亮，放射着令人注目的光辉，活像一盏挂在高空的明灯． 夜色加浓，各处的灯火，也陆续亮了起来，尤其是山坡上那一片片灯光，它们从半空中倒映在乌蓝的海面上，像一串流动的珍珠． 我踏着软绵绵的沙滩，望着这夏夜的景色，心里有说不出的愉快和兴奋。
关于成熟的高中作文800字 1 体味成熟总感觉成熟一词离我很遥远，提到成熟只会想到被硕果累累压弯了的枝头，从生活中寻找却无从下手。只感觉我们生活中洋溢着的应是青春的色彩与朝气，成熟又从何说起呢？ 每当上作文课时我只有僵直，面无表情的坐在那里。老师念着作文写得好的同学的名字，反复仔细的过滤却只能给自己沉痛的一击——没有我的名字。顾不得老师讲什么，只有心中涌出的苦涩。老师发下了报纸把那些“才子”“才女”们都叫了出去商量投稿的事情。我翻弄 着手中的报纸，眼却不住的向门外瞟去，心中很不是滋味儿。这期间老是要我们品读报纸上的文章，我知道自己看不到心里去，只是漫不经心的寻找着什么——是形容此时心情的词句，还是能开导我的话语？“门是为开而设计的，而墙则坚硬无比，有些门很像墙。”随意翻找 中的一句话，是作者漫步校园的随想却深入当我的心中。我好似得到了启发，一下课顾不得吃饭就想感受一下校园。 当走出教学楼冷风吹来的那一刻，积压在我心底的一切痛苦好似减掉了一半，不知因为心的冰冷让这一切都麻木，还是这凛冽的风向让我更清醒。只听着风刮的声音，虽然是冷风，但依然显示着它的热情。走到操场，希望它的空旷冲淡心中的一切，让那颗乐观的心再次有活力的跳动，我不顾一切的在操场上奔跑，风刺疼了我的脸。我顾不上这疼，只希望迎面吹来的风冲刷我心中的忧愁，让我在忙碌压抑的初
三生活还保持着青春应有的笑容和色彩，我喜欢两拳紧握一心一意向前跑的感觉，可以那么用心，那么简单，因为那时心中只有一个信念向前-向前-向前。 我发现自己原来很要强，总拿自己和别人比，总感觉自己比别人差——我没有自信。今天所发生的一切不断告诉我，我不需要和别人比我要和昨天的自己比，重要的是有努力用心的去做，坚定自己的信念。寒风中静静的体味这一切不正是成熟吗？-成长中的不断的体会领悟，不断的进龋 坐在操场上，晒着太阳，想着这一切的一切，心中只剩下快乐的感悟，希望时间永远定格在体味成熟的这一刻。2 话成熟从有这个词开始到现在，已不能用词典上那么一句生硬的解释来阐释这个词的内涵了。人类社会已经把这个词的意思扩充了许多，从本意到引申义，更到一些只能意会而不可言传的喻意。用一个全面的定义去框住它，好难。 有人说成熟是一种明亮而不刺眼的光辉，一种不再需要对被人察言观色的从容，一种洗刷了偏激的淡漠。 也有人说成熟是激情不再的青春，是斗志不再的稳妥，是安于现状的唯诺，是否定自我的无主。 成熟，究竟是褒是贬。怎样的成熟才算是真正意义上的成熟？ 突然有一天，感觉到肩上的担子重了，所负担的压力多了，对于社会上的一些现象有感慨了，开始重视一些现实，不再经常幻想自己功成名就了，更多地想要对自己负责人，也许从这时起，我们就可以说我
以坚持为话题的作文：坚持让平凡变伟大 人生便如一块香料，只有在坚持的信念为柴，坚守的行动为火炙烤中才能散发出最浓郁的芬芳。 一个人做好一天的事很容易，但要用一辈子去做好一件事却是不容易的。记得几年前那个曾经感动了神州大地的王顺友。马班邮路上一个人一匹马，用一生的脚步踏出一条架在山区里的绿色通道。无可否认，他很平凡。但我们更应肯定，他确实伟大。在这个平凡的岗位上，他一走就是几十年。就算是一捧粗沙，也早就被磨成润珠了。倘若少了这份坚持，我们又去哪里寻找这份感动，寻觅这种精神？ 坚持让平凡变成伟大。但是浅尝辄止也同样让一位天才黯然神伤。他是一个神话，一个物理世界的传奇人物爱因斯坦；他提出了狭义相对论，广义相对论；他开启了科学历程的新纪元。但有一次他失败了。在想黑洞研究的过程中，他中途放弃了。因为这个问题的结论与他预想的相反。可是就在几年之后，他的这一结论却成为另一位物理学家获得成功的一个重要依据。他懊悔地说：“我本来是可其成功的，但是我放弃了！”上帝是公平的，他给了每个人一把打开成功大门的钥匙。无论你是谁，只要你抓住了坚持这把钥匙，成功的曙光就会毫不吝啬的照向你。但一旦放弃了他，就算是近在咫尺的胜利女神也会悄然离开。 《浮士德》一部几十年血汗著成的巨著，包含了一位作家歌德一生的努力。相比于今天的快餐文化，那里面写满了坚持。在这个物欲横流纸醉金迷的社会里，人们往往只注意眼前的利益却忽视了通往成功最重要的因素——坚持。为什么古今中外无可计数的作品随时间的流逝而烟消云散？为什么几十年著述而成的《本草纲目》流传至今？又为什么天才的爱因斯坦会懊悔不已？又为什么一个平凡的邮差永驻人们心间？是坚持！坚持着以理念已被封为创业者的必备素质之一。有了坚持，才能劈荆斩棘，才能一千次的跌倒有一千零一次的站起。好多人抱怨，自己坚持了，自己努力了，为什么还不成功？那是因为坚持还没有累积到足以成功的高度。有了坚持不一定成功；但没有坚持，就注定失败。对于成功，坚持的塑造必不可少！ 以坚持为话题的作文：坚持就是胜利 人们都想在事业或学业上有所成就，但是，只有一部分人取得了胜利，而相当一部分人却陷入失败的若痛之中。这是为什么呢? 俗语说“功到自然成”。按理说那些失败者完全可以尝到胜利的喜悦，但他们往往缺少一种胜利的必要条件，那就是坚持。这就是他们失败的原因。上边的俗语中所提到的“功到”其中已经隐含了“坚持”的意思。可见，一个人要想取得学业上或事业上的成功，除了个人的努力之外，坚持也是实现这一目标的重要条件。 英国著名作家狄更斯平时很注意观察生活、体验生活，不管刮风下雨，每天都坚持到街头去观察、谛听，记下行人的零言碎语，积累了丰富的生活资料。这样，他才在《大卫?科波菲尔》中写下精彩的人物对话描写，在《双城记》中留下逼真的社会背景描写，从而成为英国一代文豪，取得了他文学事业上的巨大成功。爱迪生曾花了整整十年去研制蓄电池，其间不断遭受失败的他一直咬牙坚持，经过了五万次左右的试验，终于取得成功，发明了蓄电池，被人们授与“发明大王”的美称。 狄更斯和爱迪生就是靠坚持而取得最后的胜利的。坚持，使狄更斯为人们留下许多优秀著作，也为世界文学宝库增添了许多精品；坚持，使爱迪生攻克了许许多多的难关，为人类的进步作出不可磨灭的贡献。可见，坚持能够使人取得事业和学业上的成功。 那些失败者往往是在最后时刻未能坚持住而放弃努力，与成功失之交臂。曾记得瑞典一位化学家在海水中提取碘时，似乎发现一种新元素，但是面对这繁琐的提炼与实验，他退却了。当另一化学家用了一年时间，经过无数次实验，终于为元素家族再添新成员——溴而名垂千古时，那位瑞典化学家只能默默地看着对方沉浸在胜利的喜悦之中。这两位化学家，一
高中作文素材：精选议论文素材 一位自以为有才华的青年因得不到重用，非常苦恼，他质问上帝，命运为什么对他如此不公，高考作文素材：精选议论文素材(1)(2)。 上帝从路边随便捡起一块小石子，又随便扔了出去，问青年：你能找到我刚才扔出去的那块石子吗? 不能。青年摇了摇头。 上帝把手指上的金戒指取下来，扔到石子堆中去，又问青年：你能找到我刚才扔出去的金戒指吗? 能。果然，青年没多久就找到了金戒指。 你现在明白了吗尿青年犹豫了一阵，兴奋地回答：明白了。 其实，当一个人抱怨自己怀才不遇时，许多的情况恰恰是：他还不过是一块小石子，而远远不是一块金子。 (13)外衣 某菜市场里最近出了一件让商贩们很郁闷的事。每天大清早，就会有一个穿着财神袍子、戴着官帽的人来要钱。此人每到一家商铺门口，就会举着一张小黄纸片朗声吼：财神到！商贩们如果不拿钱出来接财神，他就不走。市场里二三百家商铺，每一家要一到两元，大一些铺面的要五元，一天下来收入可观。 做生意的人就图个每天早晨吉利，明知这个乞丐与其他乞丐一样都是以乞讨为生，但就因为他把自己打扮成财神爷的样子，谁也不愿得罪他---哪个愿意把财神往外轰啊！ 一件外衣的作用竟有如此之大，难怪有些人总喜欢找各式各样的外衣披在身上。 (14)一个没有小偷的城市 济州，是韩国西南海上的岛屿，1955年建市，是一座有30万人口的港口城市。人称济州无乞丐、无小偷、无大门。 一天晚上，我们来到了济州闹市，在一个拐弯的路边角上，发现了一个水果摊。我本想买点水果带回宾馆，可是，售货主人却怎么也找不着。问了韩国朋友，他告诉我们，这里每个水果都标了价，如果售货摊主人不在，你拿多少就把钱算好，放在一个固定的铁桶里。我问，拿了水果不付钱的有没有?他摇摇头。这个水果摊我们先后转了两遍，的确，没有发现水果被人偷的现象。 联想起白天，我们在公路边看到树上垂下的许多鲜红的桔子，举手可摘，济州的桔子味道极其鲜美，却没有发现有人去动它。 在济州民俗村，我发现此地的农户院有门框，而无大门，门框内有三根活动的横木栏杆。据介绍，三个栏杆都横置放着，表示主人已出远门，暂时不会回来，来客就不必等了；如果两根栏杆横着，放下 一根木棍，说明主人出去办事，稍晚才能回来；如果横着一根栏杆，放下了两根，说明主人就在附近串门，一刻就会回来；如果三根栏杆都斜着放下，说明主人在家，来客可以进去了。这种习俗延续至今。 济州人虽有贫富差异，但却以盗用为耻，以劳动守法为荣。这可能就是无小偷文化的历史渊源。 (15)50元的杀伤力是多大 一名老人中暑晕倒，三名大学生急忙拨打120。但急救中心的人员赶到后，清醒过来的老人执意不肯去医院，径自离去，急救中心的工作人员抓住这3名学生不放，硬向他们收了50元的出车费和出诊费。发生在上海的这件事让许多人疑惑：凭什么让善良学子掏这50元钱? 这50元很可能就扼杀了三名学子的善性。50元钱对三学子来说不是小数目，付出了代价，他们学到什么?三人很可能后悔不迭，为自己不谙世情后悔，为自己多管闲事后悔等。后悔之后是反思，50元钱让他们重新认识社会，重新为自己的行为定位。助人为乐的美好品德，也许会因为这区区50元钱被抑制或扼杀，这实在是一种悲哀。 更可怕的是，50元钱事件通过媒体传播后，一些人同样会产生共鸣，一些家长也许会以此教育子女：看看吧，多管闲事有啥用?许许多多的传统美德教育，不及这50元现象来得实在和深刻。这家医院毫发无损地得到了50元，却让很多人失去了珍贵的美德，这是不是道德教育的悲剧?