外文翻译
原文
The Capital Structure Puzzle
Material Source: Paper Resources Author:Stewart C. Myers THISPAPER'S TITLE IS INTENDED to remind you of Fischer Black's well-known note on "The Dividend Puzzle," which he closed by saying, "What should the corporation do about dividend policy? We don't know." I will start by asking, "How do firms choose their capital structures?" Again, the answer is, "We don't know."
The capital structure puzzle is tougher than the dividend one. We know quite a bit about dividend policy. John Lintner's model of how firms set dividends 1201 dates back to 1956, and it still seems to work. We know stock prices respond to unanticipated dividend changes, so it is clear that dividends have information content-this observation dates back at least to Miller and Modigliani (MM) in 1961. We do not know whether high dividend yield increases the expected rate of return demanded by investors, as adding taxes to the MM proof of dividend irrelevance suggests, but financial economists are at least hammering away at this issue.
By contrast, we know very little about capital structure. We do not know how firms choose the debt, equity or hybrid securities they issue. We have only recently discovered that capital structure changes convey information to investors. There has been little if any research testing whether the relationship between financial leverage and investors' required return is as the pure MM theory predicts. In general, we have inadequate understanding of corporate financing behavior, and of how that behavior affects security returns.
I do not want to sound too pessimistic or discouraged. We have accumulated many helpful insights into capital structure choice, starting with the most important one, MM's No Magic in Leverage Theorem (Proposition 1) 1311. We have thought long and hard about what these insights imply for optimal capital structure. Many of us have translated these theories, or stories, of optimal capital structure into more or less definite advice to managers. But our theories don't seem to explain actual financing behavior, and it seems presumptuous to advise firms on optimal capital
structure when we are so far from explaining actual decisions. I have done more than my share of writing on optimal capital structure, so I take this opportunity to make amends, and to try to push research in some new directions.
I will contrast two ways of thinking about capital structure:
1. A static tradeoff framework, in which the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-value ratio and gradually moving towards it, in much the same way that a firm adjusts dividends to move towards a target payout ratio.
2. An old-fashioned pecking order framework, in which the firm prefers internal to external financing, and debt to equity if it issues securities. In the pure pecking order theory, the firm has no well-defined target debt-to-value ratio. Recent theoretical work has breathed new life into the pecking order frame- work. I will argue that this theory performs at least as well as the static tradeoff theory in explaining what we know about actual financing choices and their average impacts on stock prices.
Managerial and Neutral Mutation Hypotheses
I have arbitrarily, and probably unfairly, excluded "managerial" theories which might explain firms' capital structure choices.' I have chosen not to consider models which cut the umbilical cord that ties managers' acts to stockholders' interests.
I am also sidestepping Miller's idea of "neutral mutation." He suggests that firms fall into some financing patterns or habits which have no material effect on firm value. The habits may make managers feel better, and since they do no harm, no one cares to stop or change them. Thus someone who identifies these habits and uses them to predict financing behavior would not be explaining anything important.
The neutral mutations idea is important as a warning. Given time and imagination, economists can usually invent some model that assigns apparent economic rationality to any random event. But taking neutral mutation as a strict null hypothesis makes the game of research too tough to play. If an economist identifies costs of various financing strategies, obtains independent evidence that he costs are really there, and then builds a model based on these costs which explains firms' financing behavior, then some progress has been made, even if it proves difficult to demonstrate that, say, a type A financing strategy gives higher firm value than a type B. (In fact, we would never see type B if all firms follow value-maximizing strategies).
There is another reason for not immediately embracing neutral mutations: we know investors are interested in the firm's financing choices, because stock prices
change when the choices are announced. The change might be explained as an information effect" having nothing to do with financing per se-but again, it is bit too easy to wait until the results of an event study are in, and then to think of an information story to explain them. On the other hand, if one starts by assuming that managers have special information, builds a model of how that information changes financing choices, and predicts which choices will be interpreted by investors as good or bad news, then some progress has been made.
So this paper is designed as a one-on-one competition of the static tradeoff and pecking-order stories. If neither story explains actual behavior, the neutral mutations story will be there faithfully waiting.
The Static Tradeoff Hypothesis
A firm's optimal debt ratio is usually viewed as determined by a tradeoff of the costs and benefits of borrowing, holding the firm's assets and investment plans constant. The firm is portrayed as balancing the value of interest tax shields against various costs of bankruptcy or financial embarassment. Of course, there is controversy about how valuable the tax shields are, and which, if any, of the costs of financial embarassment are material, but these disagreements give only variations on a theme. The firm is supposed to substitute debt for equity, or equity for debt, until the value of the firm is maximized. Thus the debt-equity tradeoff is as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Costs of adjustment. If there were no costs of adjustment, and the static tradeoff theory is correct, then each firm's observed debt-to-value ratio should be its optimal ratio. However, there must be costs, and therefore lags, in adjusting to the optimum. Firms can not immediately offset the random events that bump them away from the optimum, so there should be some cross-sectional dispersion of actual debt ratios across a sample of firms having the same target ratio.
Large adjustment costs could possibly explain the observed wide variation in actual debt ratios, since firms would be forced into long excursions away from their optimal ratios. But there is nothing in the usual static tradeoff stories suggesting that adjustment costs are a first-order concern-in fact, they are rarely mentioned. Invoking them without modelling them is a cop-out.
Any cross-sectional test of financing behavior should specify whether firms' debt ratios differ because they have different optimal ratios or because their actual ratios diverge from optimal ones. It is easy to get the two cases mixed up. For example, think of the early cross-sectional studies which attempted to test MM's
Proposition I. These studies tried to find out whether differences in leverage affected the market value of the firm (or the market capitalization rate for its operating income). With hindsight, we can quickly see the problem: if adjustment costs are small, and each firm in the sample is at, or close to its optimum, then the in-sample dispersion of debt ratios must reflect differences in risk or in other variables affecting optimal capital structure. But then MM's Proposition I cannot be tested unless the effects of risk and other variables on firm value can be adjusted for. By now we have learned from experience how hard it is to hold "other things constant" in cross-sectional regressions.
Of course, one way to make sense of these tests is to assume that adjustment costs are small, but managers don't know, or don't care, what the optimal debt ratio is, and thus do not stay close to it. The researcher then assumes some (usually unspecified) "managerial" theory of capital structure choice. This may be a convenient assumption for a cross-sectional test of MM's Proposition I, but not very helpful if the object is to understand financing behavior.
But suppose we don't take this "managerial" fork. Then if adjustment costs are small, and firms stay near their target debt ratios, I find it hard to understand the observed diversity of capital structures across firms that seem similar in a static tradeoff framework. If adjustment costs are large, so that some firms take extended excursions away from their targets, then we ought to give less attention to refining our static tradeoff stories and relatively more to understanding what the adjustment costs are, why they are so important, and how rational managers would respond to them.
But I am getting ahead of my story. On to debt and taxes.
Debt and taxes. Miller's famous "Debt and Taxes" paper cut us loose from the extreme implications of the original MM theory, which made interest tax shields so valuable that we could not explain why all firms were not awash in debt. Miller described an equilibrium of aggregate supply and demand for corporate debt, in which personal income taxes paid by the marginal investor in corporate debt just offset the corporate tax saving. However, since the equilibrium only determines aggregates, debt policy should not matter for any single tax- paying firm. Thus Miller's model allows us to explain the dispersion of actual debt policies without having to introduce non-value-maximizing manager.
Trouble is, this explanation works only if we assume that all firms face approximately the same marginal tax rate, and that is an assumption we can
immediately reject. The extensive trading of depreciation tax shields and investment tax credits, through financial leases and other devices, proves that plenty of firms face low marginal rates.
Given significant differences in effective marginal tax rates, and given that the static tradeoff theory works, we would expect to find a strong tax effect in any cross-sectional test, regardless of whose theory of debt and taxes you believe.
Figure 2 plots the net tax gain from corporate borrowing against the expected realizable tax shield from a future deduction of one dollar of interest paid. For some firms this number is 46 cents, or close to it. At the other extreme, there are firms with large unused loss carry forwards which pay no immediate taxes. An extra dollar of interest paid by these firms would create only a potential future deduction, usable when and if the firm earns enough to work off prior carry for- wards. The expected realizable tax shield is positive but small. Also, there are firms paying taxes today which cannot be sure they will do so in the future. Such a firm values expected future interest tax shields at somewhere between zero and the full statutory rate.
译文
资本结构之谜
资料来源:论文资源库作者：斯图尔特?C?迈尔斯本文的标题是意在提醒费希尔布莱克的著名理论“股利之谜”本文的标题是意在提醒大家费希尔布莱克的著名理论“股利之谜”，他最后说，“公司应该做些什么与股息政策相关的内容？我们不知道。”首先我会要求，“公司如何选择自己的资本结构？”同样，答案是，“我们不知道。”
让人不解的是资本结构比股息更强硬。我们知道不少有关股利政策的内容，约翰林特纳的模式如何设置分红公司的历史可以追溯到1201至1956年，似乎仍在使用。我们知道，股票价格应对意外的股利变动，所以很明显，股息有资料内容这个观察至少可以追溯到1961年米勒和莫迪利亚尼。我们不知道是否会增加要求高股息收益率的预期回报率的投资者，作为增加税收的建议的MM股利无关的证明，但至少金融经济学家在这个问题上骂个不停。
相比之下，我们对资本结构了解很少。我们不知道公司如何选择债券，股票或混合型证券的问题。我们最近才发现，资本结构的变化信息是传递给投资者的。目前几乎已经没有财务杠杆之间是否和投资者的要求回报率的关系研究的纯MM理论预测了。在一般情况下，我们的企业对融资行为认识不足，以及
A Clear Look at Internal Controls: Theory and Concepts Hammed Arad (Philae) Department of accounting, Islamic Azad University, Hamadan, Iran Barak Jamshedy-Navid Faculty Member of Islamic Azad University, Kerman-shah, Iran Abstract: internal control is an accounting procedure or system designed to promote efficiency or assure the implementation of a policy or safeguard assets or avoid fraud and error. Internal Control is a major part of managing an organization. It comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives and, in doing so, support performance-based management. Internal Control which is equal with management control helps managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of resources. Internal controls should reduce the risks associated with undetected errors or irregularities, but designing and establishing effective internal controls is not a simple task and cannot be accomplished through a short set of quick fixes. In this paper the concepts of internal controls and different aspects of internal controls are discussed. Keywords: Internal Control, management controls, Control Environment, Control Activities, Monitoring 1. Introduction The necessity of control in new variable business environment is not latent for any person and management as a response factor for stockholders and another should implement a great control over his/her organization. Control is the activity of managing or exerting control over something. he emergence and development of systematic thoughts in recent decade required a new attention to business resource and control over this wealth. One of the hot topic a bout controls over business resource is analyzing the cost-benefit of each control. Internal Controls serve as the first line of defense in safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud. We can say Internal control is a whole system of controls financial and otherwise, established by the management for the smooth running of business; it includes internal cheek, internal audit and other forms of controls. COSO describe Internal Control as follow. Internal controls are the methods employed to help ensure the achievement of an objective. In accounting and organizational theory, Internal control is defined as a process effected by an organization's structure, work and authority flows, people and management information systems, designed to help the organization accomplish specific goals or objectives. It is a means by which an organization's resources are directed, monitored, and measured. It plays an important role in preventing and detecting fraud and protecting the organization's resources, both physical (e.g., machinery and property) and intangible (e.g., reputation or intellectual property such as trademarks). At the organizational level, internal control objectives relate to the reliability of financial reporting, timely feedback on the achievement of operational or strategic goals, and compliance with laws and regulations. At the specific transaction level, internal control refers to the actions taken to achieve a specific objective (e.g., how to ensure the organization's payments to third parties are for valid services rendered.) Internal control
企业财务风险及应对探讨文献综述 重庆工商大学会计专业200X级X班XX 指导老师XXX 目录 摘要 ............................................................................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 一、财务风险基础理论研究在理论界，财务风险已经成为现在财务理论的核心内容，得到了学者的广泛关注和重视。财务风险与企业资金的筹措、运用、管理以及安全密切相关，它是从价值方面反映企业在理财活动里边以及处理财务关系中所遇到的风险。.......................... 错误!未定义书签。 1、财务风险的概念研究........................................................................................ 错误!未定义书签。James C. Van Horn, John M. Wachowicz Jr(2001)在《Fundamental of Financial Management》里面更宽泛地说明了财务风险包括可能丧失偿债能力的风险，以及由于使用财务杠杆而导致的每股收益变动。 ......................................................................................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 2、财务风险的类型研究........................................................................................ 错误!未定义书签。 二、财务风险产生因素研究.......................................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。 三、财务风险管理策略研究.......................................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。参考文献 ......................................................................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。
外文翻译 原文 Firms in International Trade Material Source: https://www.doczj.com/doc/4715020571.html, Author: Andrew B. Bernard For most of its lengthy history the field of international trade largely ignored the role of the firm in mediating the flow of goods and services. Traditional trade theory explained the flow of goods between countries in terms of comparative advantage, that is, variation in the opportunity costs of production across countries and industries. Even the research focusing on differentiated varieties and increasing returns to scale that followed Helpman and Krugman continued to retain the characterization of the representative firm.?However, the assumption of a representative firm, while greatly enhancing the tractability of general equilibrium analysis, is emphatically rejected in the data. My research over the past decade has been an attempt to explore international trade from below: to understand the decisions of heterogeneous firms in shaping international trade and their effects on productivity growth and welfare. Firm Heterogeneity and Trade My early work with J. Bradford Jensen was motivated by a simple question: what do we know about firms that trade? The answer at the time was "very little" and our initial efforts focused on locating firm-level data and describing the world of exporting firms. Our first study compared exporters and non-exporters for the entire U.S. manufacturing sector and established a set of facts about exporting plants and firms.?Two major results stand out. First, only a small fraction of firms are exporters at any given time. Even in sectors where the United States is thought to have comparative advantage, such as Instruments, a majority of firms produce only for the domestic market. Similarly, some firms are exporting even in net import sectors such as Textiles and Apparel. Second, exporters are substantially and significantly different than non-exporters, even in the same industry and region. Exporters are dramatically larger, more productive, pay higher wages, use more skilled workers, and are more technology- and capital-intensive than their non-exporting counterparts. In related
旅游服务贸易外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
旅游服务贸易的国际竞争力：罗马尼亚的案例 引言 旅游业是唯一的可以为任何发展水平的国家提供贸易机会的服务活动。然而，它也是一个很大程度因为国家的能力和在全球经济中的表现而又有明确的利益分配不均行业，而这又需要提高自己的竞争力。 自20世纪90年代初，罗马尼亚旅游业经历了出口量，生长速率和结构的重大变化。这些不同的波动都影响了罗马尼亚在国际旅游市场上相对的竞争地位并引起了其旅游贸易平衡的变化。同时，新的和更多的错杂的欧式建筑，引起了罗马尼亚的区域旅游竞争力的显著变化。 在此背景下，本文试图提出一个框架，以竞争力和旅游贸易表现之间的关系为重点，来评估罗马尼亚的旅游服务贸易的国际竞争力。 一、国际竞争力视角：国际竞争力之与国际旅游业的相关性 国际竞争力的概念，尽管有争议，难以捉摸，但现在已经得到认可，并继续吸引世界各地的学者和决策者的关注。 到目前为止，为提高国际竞争力已采取措施，都被认为是在经济层面进行的(加瑞利，2003)通常是指一个国家生产的商品和服务，以满足国际市场的考验，并同时保持和增加公民的收入的能力(欧洲委员会，2007)。 由于竞争力最终取决于一国企业在国内和国际的市场成功，所以对竞争力的注意力都集中在企业层面的竞争力上(波特，1990)，对于此的普遍理解是指“……该公司保持，并更好的是，扩大其全球市场份额，增加和扩大利润的能力” (克拉克和盖，1998, 经济合作与发展组织，1993)。 因此，虽然广泛流传但是国际竞争力作为与国家经济和其国际贸易相关
的理论基础已经不太在学术文献进行分析。因此，一个国家国际竞争力的性质，效益和局限性仍然含糊不清(科尔德威尔，2000,克鲁格曼，1994, 1996)。 国际竞争力，是指一个国家在货物和服务贸易方面巩固和保持贸易优势相对于世界其他地区的贸易优势。 每当一个国家的经济福利通过贸易流量的增加，或通过从初始平衡状态的贸易条件的改变而增加，他的国际竞争力都会得到提高(科尔德威尔，2000)。 贸易理论表示，经济福利依赖于一个国家有比较优势的货物和服务的生产。这实际上意味着当生产符合一国的比较优势的情况时国际竞争力能得到保障。如果一国能在国际上表现良好并在出口市场竞争成功，这可能就是他们健全的国际竞争力的标志。 因此，在国际上，竞争力定义为一个经济体能够吸引其出口需求和投资供给需求的能力和在所有社会规范内提升公民生活水平的能力。这反过来又取决于宏观和微观经济政策，影响生产的经济生产率要素和经营成本的法规和制度。 一个可用的文献回顾和实证证据支持国际竞争力可以解释为在一定程度上，一个国家的出口能力这一观点(道乐和沃尔夫，1993, 格博格等. 2004)。还有就是，事实上，是出口表现和国际竞争力之间的循环关系。出口是国际竞争力的第一衡量指标。出口情况的改善会导致了一个国家的竞争力提升。这种效果是一个企业的技能，知识，创新和运用新技术并能够在一个成功的商业方式中利用技术机会等的结果。 另一方面，为了在竞争激烈的全球市场努力成功实现出口，一个国家被迫提高竞争力。更具竞争力的国家，它的经济更强大。因此，它更有能力在全球市场竞争，以吸引具有较高的知识，技能，水平人们去购买新技术等，
会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
内部控制透视：理论与概念 摘要：内部控制是会计程序或控制系统，旨在促进效率或保证一个执行政策或保护资产或避免欺诈和错误。内部是一个组织管理的重要组成部分。它包括计划、方法和程序使用，以满足任务，目标和目的，并在这样做，支持基于业绩的管理。内部控制是管理阶层的平等与控制可以帮助管理者实现资源的预期的有效管理的结果通过。内部控制应减少或违规错误的风险关联未被发现的，但设计和建立有效的内部控制不是一个简单的任务，不可能是一个实现通过快速修复短套。在此讨论了内部文件的概念的不同方面的内部控制和管制。 关键词：内部控制，管理控制，控制环境，控制活动，监督 1、介绍 环境需要新的业务控制变量不为任何潜在的股东和管理人士的响应因子为1，另外应执行/她组织了一个很大的控制权。控制是管理活动的东西或以上施加控制。思想的产生和近十年的发展需要有系统的商业资源和控制这种财富一个新的关注。主题之一热一回合管制的商业资源是分析每个控制成本效益。 作为内部控制和欺诈的第一道防线，维护资产以及预防和侦查错误。内部控制，我们可以说是一种控制整个系统的财务和其他方面的管理制定了为企业的顺利运行;它包括内部的脸颊，内部审计和其他形式的控制。 COSO的内部控制描述如下。内部控制是一个客观的方法用来帮助确保实现。在会计和组织理论，内部控制是指或目标目标的过程实施由组织的结构，工作和权力流动，人员和具体的管理信息系统，旨在帮助组织实现。这是一种手段，其中一个组织的资源被定向，监控和测量。它发挥着无形的（重要的作用，预防和侦查欺诈和保护组织的资源，包括生理（如，机械和财产）和乙二醇，声誉或知识产权，如商标）。在组织水平，内部控制目标与可靠性的目标或战略的财务报告，及时反馈业务上的成就，并遵守法律，法规。在具体的交易水平，内部控制是指第三方采取行动以实现一个具体目标（例如，如何确保本组织的款项，在申请服务提供有效的。）内部控制程序reduce程变异，导
中英文资料外文翻译 财务风险重要性分析 译文： 摘要：本文探讨了美国大型非金融企业从1964年至2008年股票价格风险的决定小性因素。我们通过相关结构以及简化模型，研究诸如债务总额，债务期限，现金持有量，及股利政策等公司财务特征，我们发现，股票价格风险主要通过经营和资产特点，如企业年龄，规模，有形资产，经营性现金流及其波动的水平来体现。与此相反，隐含的财务风险普遍偏低，且比产权比率稳定。在过去30年，我们对财务风险采取的措施有所减少，反而对股票波动（如独特性风险）采取的措施逐渐增加。因此，股票价格风险的记载趋势比公司的资产风险趋势更具代表性。综合二者，结果表明，典型的美国公司谨慎管理的财政政策大大降低了财务风险。因此，现在看来微不足道的剩余财务风险相对底层的非金融公司为一典型的经济风险。 关键词：资本结构；财务风险；风险管理；企业融资 1 绪论 2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。毫无疑问，向金融机构的巨额举债和内部融资均有风险。事实上，有证据表明，全球主要银行精心策划的杠杆（如通过抵押贷款和担保债务）和所谓的“影子银行系统”可能是最近的经济和金融混乱的根本原因。财务杠杆在非金融企业的作用不太明显。迄今为止，尽管资本市场已困在危机中，美国非金融部门的问题相比金融业的困境来说显得微不足道。例如，非金融企业破产机遇仅限于自20世纪30年代大萧条以来的最大经济衰退。事实上，非金融公司申请破产的事件大都发生在美国各行业（如汽车制造业，报纸，房地产）所面临的基本经济压力即金融危机之前。这令人惊讶的事实引出了一个问题“非金融公司的财务风险是如何重要？”。这个问题的核心是关于公司的总风险以及公司风险组成部分的各决定因素的不确定性。 最近在资产定价和企业融资再度引发的两个学术研究中分析了股票价格风险利
附录 F.1英文参考资料及中文翻译 F. 1 .1international trade documents role General international trade documents (international trade documents) is the international trade of use all the documents, documents and certificates collectively. Usually with international trade documents to deal with in and out of delivery of the goods El, transportation, insurance, inspection and quarantine, customs declaration, the settlement of exchange, etc. Special international trade documents usually refers to the settlement documents, especially the l/c under the way of settlement of documents. International trade documents and the use of import and export trade program closely related, the documents in the import and export enterprise work throughout the export, purchase, transportation, the whole process of the proceeds, the effort is big, timeliness strong, is broad, in addition to import and export enterprise internal between various departments the cooperation with the outside, still must and bank, customs, transportation department, insurance companies, the inspection and quarantine agencies and the relevant administrative authorities happen various contact, linked together, mutual influence, also are conditions. International trade documents for the performance of a contract is necessary means International trade is the transnational goods business, due to the particularity of the multinational business, which is the purchase and sale of the different departments are located in different countries, are remote, in most cases, the goods and payment can't perform simple direct exchange, but only as the medium of exchange with documents means. The international trade of the documents that sales of goods through the documents realization sale, the seller should not only will the actual delivery of goods export shipment, and should submit to the buyer include the title to the goods vouchers, complete documents to show real assignment. The seller/p means that the delivery of the goods, and the buyer payment is get to buy goods on behalf of property rights certificate, the deal is no longer with the goods as the core, but with documents as the core. Documents and payment of the convection principle has become the international trade of general principles of the commodity business. As international trade experts "; m Cardiff in the export trade in his book mentioned: "from a business perspective, can say CIF the purpose of the contract is not the buying and selling of goods itself, but the documents relating to the goods business." What say here "documents" is the international trade of documents. International trade documents many kinds, every kind of documents has its
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附录B 如何监测内部控制 内部控制是任何组织有效运行的关键,董事会、执行长和内部审计人员都为实现这个企业的目标而工作;该内部控制系统是使这些团体确保那些目标的达成的一种手段。控制帮助一个企业有效率地运转。此外,运用一种有效的风险系统,风险可被降低到最小。同时,控制促进经营和与经营有关的信息的可靠性。全美反舞弊性财务报告委员会发起组织(COSO；1992) 在它发布的具有开创性的文件《内部控制整合框架》中,将内部控制定义为：企业风险管理是一个过程，受企业董事会、管理层和其他员工的影响，包括内部控制及其在战略和整个公司的应用，旨在为实现经营的效率和效果、财务报告的可靠性以及法规的遵循提供合理保证。该委员会还指出,一个的内部控制的系统包括五个要素。它们是：控制环境、风险评估、信息和沟通、控制活动、监控。 COSO的定义及五个要素已被证明确实对不同的团体,如董事会和首席执行官起到作用。这些群体对内部控制系统的监管以及系统设计与运行有责任。而且,内部审计人员已经发现COSO的指导是有用的。这群人员可能会被董事会或管理层要求去测试控制。COSO最近发布的一份讨论文件，指出五个要素监控,其中的五个要素的确定在1992 frame work COSO原本。中国发展简报的题为《内部控制-整合框架：内部控制体系监督指南》(COSO，2007)。在文件中,COSO 强调监控的重要性，以及这些信息常常被没有充分利用。 因为董事会、执行长,和内部审计人员都在一个公司的内部控制中扮演着重要角色，内部控制的各要素,包括监测,都对所有的团体有着非常重要的意义。同时,外审计人员对监测有兴趣。《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（2002）为外部审计师创建了一个新的监督体制。所有的五个要素,包括监测,必须加以考虑。另外,内部控制审计必须结合对财务报告的检查。在一体化审计之前，在首席执行官的领导下，也许也在内部审计活动的支持下的管理，评估了内控制体系的有效性。随后外部审计人员对控制出具意见。起监督角色的董事会，将阅读内部审计、管理层和首席执行官出具的报告。文件关于监测对每一个团体的指导起了帮助,因为他们分别为各自的角色而劳动。 第一，什么是监测。监测的组成可评估内部控制系统在过去一段时间发挥效用的质量。其对控制功能的评估有助于企业确定其控制在有效地运作中。在执行监测活动时，相关人员参与审查系统的设计及其运行效果。这种检查必须进行及时,目的是为了提供给企业最大的利益。管理层负责做出适当的行动以回应这些结果。当事人对内部控制有兴趣,可以充分依赖这个内部控制系统,如果合适的监
外文出处：Maijoor S. The Internal Control Explosion[J]. International Journal of Auditing, 2000, 4(1):101–109. 内部控制爆炸① 摘要：Power的1997版书以审计社会为主题的探讨使得审计活动在联合王国（英国）和北美得到扩散。由审计爆炸一同带动的是内部控制制度的兴起。审计已经从审计结果转向审计制度和内部控制，它已内部控制爆炸然成为公众对公司治理和审计监管政策的辩论主题。Power表示对什么是有效的内部控制各方说法不一。本人对内部控制研究方面有一个合理的解释。内部控制对非常不同概念的各个领域的会计进行探究，并研究如何控制不同水平的组织。因此，内部控制研究的各类之间的交叉影响是有限的，而且，许多内部会计控制是研究是再更宽广的公司治理问题的背景下进行的。所以，许多有关内部控制制度对公司治理的价值观点扔需要进行研究。 关键词：机构理论；公司治理；外部审计；内部审计；内部控制制度；管理控制 1 概述 Power的1997版书以审计社会为主题的探讨使得审计活动在联合王国（英国）和北美得到扩散。由审计爆炸一同带动的是内部控制制度的兴起。审计已经从审计结果转向审计制度和内部控制，它已然成为公众对公司治理和审计监管政策的辩论主题。例如，在最近的对于欧洲联盟内外部审计服务的内部市场形成的辩论中，监管建议建立关于内部控制和内部审计制度。虽然对有关内部控制的价值期望高，但Power表示对什么是有效的内部控制各方说法不一。本人对内部控制研究方面有一个合理的解释。内部控制是对非常不同概念的各个领域的会计进行探究，并研究如何控制不同水平的组织。因此，内部控制研究的各类之间的交叉影响是有限的，而且，许多内部会计控制是研究是再更宽广的公司治理问题的背景下进行的。所以，许多有关内部控制制度对公司治理的价值观点扔需要进行研究。 在审计和公司治理的公共政策辩论中，内部控制的概念越来越得到重视。公共越来①Maastricht Accounting and Auditing Research and Education Center (MARC), Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands s.maijoor@marc.unimaas.nl Fax: 31-43-3884876 Tel: 31-43-3883783
本科毕业论文（设计） 外文翻译 Financial Risk Management Although financial risk has increased significantly in recent years, risk and risk management are not contemporary issues. The result of increasingly global markets is that risk may originate with events thousands of miles away that have nothing to do with the domestic market. Information is available instantaneously, which means that change, and subsequent market reactions, occur very quickly. The economic climate and markets can be affected very quickly by changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices. Counterparties can rapidly become problematic. As a result, it is important to ensure financial risks are identified and managed appropriately. Preparation is a key component of risk management. What Is Risk? Risk provides the basis for opportunity. The terms risk and exposure have subtle differences in their meaning. Risk refers to the probability of loss, while exposure is the possibility of loss, although they are often used interchangeably. Risk arises as a result of exposure. Exposure to financial markets affects most organizations, either directly or indirectly. When an organization has financial market exposure, there is a possibility of loss but also an opportunity for gain or profit. Financial market exposure may provide strategic or competitive benefits. Risk is the likelihood of losses resulting from events such as changes in market prices. Events with a low probability of occurring, but that may result in a high loss, are particularly troublesome because they are often not anticipated. Put another way, risk is the probable variability of returns. Since it is not always possible or desirable to eliminate risk, understanding it is an important step in determining how to manage it.
外文翻译 原文 World Trade and International Trade Material Source:https://www.doczj.com/doc/4715020571.html, Author: Ted Alax In today’s complex economic world, neither individuals nor nations are self-sufficient. Nations have utilized different economic resources; people have developed different skills. This is the foundation of world trade and economic activity. As a result of this trade and activity, international finance and banking have evolved. For example, the United States is a major consumer of coffee, yet it does not have the climate to grow any or its own. Consequently, the United States must import coffee from countries (such as Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala) that grow coffee efficiently. On the other hand, the United States has large industrial plants capable of producing a variety of goods, such as chemicals and airplanes, which can be sold to nations that need them. If nations traded item for item, such as one automobile for 10,000 bags of coffee, foreign trade would be extremely cumbersome and restrictive. So instead of batter, which is trade of goods without an exchange of money, the United State receives money in payment for what it sells. It pays for Brazilian coffee with dollars, which Brazil can then use to buy wool from Australia, which in turn can buy textiles Great Britain, which can then buy tobacco from the United State. Foreign trade, the exchange of goods between nations, takes place for many reasons. The first, as mentioned above is that no nation has all of the commodities that it needs. Raw materials are scattered around the world. Large deposits of copper are mined in Peru and Zaire, diamonds are mined in South Africa and petroleum is recovered in the Middle East. Countries that do not have these resources within their own boundaries must buy from countries that export them. Foreign trade also occurs because a country often does not have enough of a particular item to meet its needs. Although the United States is a major producer of sugar, it consumes more than it can produce internally and thus must import sugar.