Urban Political Economics*
Robert W. Helsley
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
August 2003
Contents
1.Introduction
2.Objectives and local policy formation
2.1.Politics
2.2.Property values
2.3.Profits
https://www.doczj.com/doc/421962961.html,plex politics
3.Local political institutions
3.1.The institutions and their consequences
3.2.The common pool problem in city councils
3.3.Equilibrium models of distributive politics
4.Private government
4.1.Supplementary provision and the strategic response
4.2.Supplementary regulation
4.3.Potential competition
4.4.Gated communities
5.Conclusion
References
*I thank Richard Arnott, Keith Head, Vernon Henderson, Will Strange, Ralph Winter, and especially Jacques Thisse for helpful comments. Ron Cheung provided outstanding research assistance. The financial support of the UBC Center for Urban Economics and Real Estate is gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract
This chapter considers the role of economic and political institutions in the formation of local public policies. The chapter has three objectives. First, to synthesize the dominant models of local policy formation with mobile households, with particular emphasis on the objectives that are attributed to the institutions that provide collective goods. Second, to describe and model local political institutions, and consider their implications for taxes, expenditures and voting behavior. Third, to examine how institutional change, specifically the entry of new institutions in the form of private government, influences policy outcomes and the welfare of residents.
Keywords: multi-community democracy, stratification, property value maximization, developers, local political institutions, legislative decision making, the common pool problem, citizen candidates, private government, supplementary provision, supplementary regulation, potential competition, gated communities.
1.Introduction
The "new" political economics uses the tools of modern economic analysis and game theory to study how economics and politics interact to determine public policies.
In contrast to public economics, with its emphasis on the positive and normative effects of tax and spending policies, and public choice, with its emphasis on collective choice rules, political economy emphasizes the process of policy formation. Political economics is fundamentally concerned with how optimal policies are modified by political and institutional constraints. Much of modern political economics has been developed in macroeconomics, where, for example, questions about differences in public sector performance across countries are a natural concern. In this context, the political economics approach is to ask whether there are institutional differences between governments that lead to systematic variations in spending, or whether there are systematic failures in legislative decision making processes that lead to excessive levels of spending or public debt. In political economics, the emphasis is on how government policies are determined.
For better or worse, urban political economics does not exist as a well defined field of study. This is not to say that economics and politics do not combine to determine local public policies. Surely they do. However, political economics is a very new field, and the perspectives and models of political economics have not been widely applied to urban policy issues. What follows is a selective review of a particular set of topics where local politics and urban economics intersect. Specifically, this chapter considers the role of economic and political institutions in the formation of local public policies. The
chapter has three objectives. First, to synthesize the dominant models of local policy formation with mobile households, with particular emphasis on the objectives that are attributed to the institutions that provide collective goods. Second, to describe and model local political institutions, and consider their implications for taxes, expenditures and voting behavior. Third, to examine how institutional change, specifically the entry of new institutions in the form of private government, influences policy outcomes and the welfare of residents. If this chapter has a unifying theme, it is that local economic and political institutions are interesting and important.
Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) argue that institutions should be integrated more fully into economic theory. They classify economic models of institutions into three groups: (1) models that focus on how the economic environment influences institutions, (2) models that focus on the implications of a given institutional structure for economic outcomes, and (3) integrated models that allow for "the influence of institutions on economic outcomes and for the influence of the environment of the institutions." (p. 307) The models that are considered in this review fit this classification quite naturally. The models of local policy formation reviewed in Section 2 focus on how the economic environment influences the formation of communities. The models of local political institutions in Section 3 take membership as fixed, and examine the consequences of different institutions for outcomes. The models of private government in Section 4 are integrative. They consider how the institutional environment influences policy outcomes, and how the economic environment influences the formation or entry of new institutions.
2.Objectives and local policy formation
There are three basic approaches to modeling the formation of public policy at the local level. Each approach considers a system of local governments providing collective goods to mobile residents who choose between jurisdictions to maximize utility. The approaches differ fundamentally in their treatment of the problem of collective choice and in the objectives that are attributed to the institutions that provide collective goods. The first approach, pioneered by Westhoff (1977,1979) and Rose-Ackerman (1979), assumes that community tax and spending policies are made through open agenda majority voting. The second approach, initiated by Wildasin (1979) and Brueckner (1979), supposes that local policies are chosen to maximize aggregate property values in a community. The third approach, initiated by Henderson (1974) and Stiglitz (1977), assumes that local policy is formed by profit maximizing entrepreneurial governments or developers.
2.1.Politics
One of the interesting consequences of the dominance of the Tiebout (1956) tradition in local public finance is that models of local government have historically paid little attention to politics or political institutions. As noted by Rose-Ackerman (1983ab) and others, Tiebout’s original model can be seen as an explicit attempt to eliminate the need for politics at the local level. A metropolitan area in Tiebout's world is composed of an arbitrarily large number of competitive local governments, each offering a different
bundle of taxes and public expenditures. Since each voter’s ideal policy is offered by one of these local governments, an individual can always secure her most preferred policy outcome by moving. Mobility is thus a substitute for politics in the informal Tiebout tradition.
However, attempts to formalize Tiebout's insights inevitably forced authors to confront the collective choice problem, and led to the development of equilibrium models of local government in which politics play an important role. Here we briefly review the key elements of such a model, focusing on the characteristics of the political equilibrium within a community. 1
Following Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984), consider a metropolitan area composed of a fixed number of communities with fixed geographic boundaries. Each community provides a congestible local public good to its residents. There are no spillovers between communities. Public good provision in each community is financed by a local tax on housing services that balances the community government's budget. The public good and tax package, or policy vector, in each community is chosen by majority rule.
Preferences are represented by the increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility function U(g,h,x), where g is the level of the local public good in the consumer's community, h is housing services, and x is a composite numeraire commodity. Residents
1 See Ross and Yinger (1999) for an extensive review of the literature on models of "sorting and voting," with particular emphasis on the determinants and consequences of the capitalization of fiscal variables into housing prices.
differ in income y, which is continuously distributed on a closed support.2 Letting p h represent the before-tax price of housing and t represent the local property tax rate, the budget constraint of a resident with income y is x + ph ￡ y, where p = (1 + t)p h is the after-tax price. Residents are perfectly mobile, and move between communities in response to perceived differences in utility levels, which in turn reflect differences public goods, taxes, and housing prices.
The indirect utility function of a consumer with income y is
V(p,y,g) ≡ Max
U(g,h,y - ph) = U(g,h(p,y,g),y – ph(p,y,g)), (2.1)
h
where h(p,y,g) is the Marshallian demand function for housing. The assumptions made about the form of the direct utility function imply that the level sets of V(p,y,g) in (g,p) space slope upward and are strictly concave. Further, the slope of such an indifference curve, dp/dg = -(?V/?g)/(?V/?p), is assumed to be strictly increasing in income. This is an instance of the Spence-Mirrlees "single-crossing property" (Gans and Smart (1996), Edlin and Shannon (1998)). The single-crossing property serves two important functions in this setting. First, it ensures that consumers are sorted by income in equilibrium. In particular, it ensures that each community is occupied by consumers with incomes in a connected interval, and that higher income consumers reside in communities that provide higher levels of the public good. Second, as discussed below, it ensures that there is a policy vector for each community that a majority of community residents prefers to any other.
2 More recent work in this literature assumes that individuals are differentiated by income and a taste parameter. See, for example, Epple and Platt (1998), Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001).
The budget constraint of a community government is tp h H - c(g,N) = 0, where H is aggregate housing consumption in the community, N is community population, and c(g,N) is the increasing and convex cost of public good provision.3 Solving the
government budget for p = p h + c(g,N)/H (thus eliminating the tax rate), and substituting this into the indirect utility function yields a consumer's "policy preference" function W(g,y) ≡ V(p h + c(g,N)/H,y,g). As noted by Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 20), the salient assumption about individual behavior in political economics is that the consumer,as a political agent, engages in "voting, lobbying or some other form of political activity"to maximize her policy preferences. The most preferred policy or "bliss point" of a resident with income y is
g(y) = Argmax g W(g,y) = Argmax g V(p h + c(g,N)/H,y,g),(2.2)where g ￠(y) > 0 by the single-crossing condition.
The characteristics of a consumer's most preferred policy, and the political actions that follow from the pursuit of that outcome, depend in part on how the consumer expects the endogenous variables N, H and p h to respond to changes in the community's tax and expenditure policy. Two different assumptions about voter expectations have been made in this literature. Prior to Epple and Romer (1991), most authors assumed voter myopia.Myopic voters treat N, H and p h as fixed. In this case, the locus that describes the set of feasible (g,p) pairs from the voter's perspective (the "government services frontier," p =p h + c(g,N)/H) is increasing and convex, and the consumer's most preferred policy lies at the tangency of this locus and the highest indifference curve that the voter can reach, as 3 If the distribution of income is F(y), and this community contains all consumers with incomes in the interval [y -,y +], then N = F(y +) – F(y -), and, in equilibrium, housing consumption is
H =h(p,y,g)dF(y)y -y +
ú.
shown in Figure 2.1. Further, the policy preferences of each consumer are "single-peaked" (Black (1948)) under these conditions: a consumer's ordering of policy alternatives is determined by their relative distances from her bliss point g(y). More formally, if policy preferences are single-peaked, then for any alternative policies g'' and g', g'' ≥ g' ≥ g(y) or g'' ￡ g' ￡ g(y) implies W(g'',y) ￡ W(g',y).
In subsequent work, some authors have endowed voters with a limited amount of foresight regarding the impacts of policy choices on community populations and housing market outcomes. More specifically, Epple and Romer (1991) and Epple and Platt (1998) assume that voters take only the policy vectors of other communities as fixed when making political choices. This implies that each voter takes the level of utility available in other communities as fixed, but is cognizant of how policy changes in their home community will influence population and housing market outcomes through intra-metropolitan migration. Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) find that local policy choices in a sample of Boston communities are more consistent with this utility taking assumption than the with simpler assumption of voter myopia.
An equilibrium in this model requires that every consumer maximize utility, over goods and communities, that community budgets balance, and that community housing markets clear.45 In addition, and most important for our purposes, the policy vector in each community must be a political equilibrium. In this literature, the political process is
4 The tradition is to close the model by assuming an exogenous housing supply function for each community. See Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984) for this convention, and Henderson (1985) for an alternative.
5 The existence of an equilibrium in the model outlined in this section has been demonstrated by Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993). However, the existence of equilibria in models of multicommunity democracy is, in general, problematic. See Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) for a general discussion. Hansen and Kessler (2001) present conditions under which an equilibrium fails to exist the original Westhoff (1977, 1979) model. The Westhoff model differs from the model described above in two ways: housing is not considered, and local public goods are financed through a proportional income tax. Nechyba (1997) provides an existence proof for a related model in which housing consumption is exogenous.
an idealized form of majority voting, sometimes called open agenda or institutionless majority rule, in which each element of the government services frontier is put against every other element in a sequence of pairwise elections until a Condorcet winner emerges. The essence of the celebrated median voter theorem (Black (1948)) is that with single-peaked policy preferences, such an equilibrium policy exists and corresponds to the median of the most preferred policies of the voters in a community. 6 Since the most preferred policy function g(y) is monotonic, the median of the most preferred policies in turn corresponds to the most preferred policy of the consumer with the median income, that is, to the bliss point of the median voter.7
The resulting equilibrium has three properties. The first is "stratification": each community is composed of individuals with incomes in a single, connected interval.8 The second property is "boundary indifference": the border consumer between two adjacent communities must be indifferent between them. The final property is "ascending bundles": public good levels (and housing prices) increase with the highest income in a community.
Stratification, or the sorting of consumers into imperfectly homogeneous communities, plays a role in many important policy issues. Epple and Romer (1991) show, in contrast to the traditional view, that local redistribution may occur in equilibrium in a system of stratified communities.9 In the case of education, stratification
6 See Gans and Smart (1996) for a general examination of the implications of single-crossing conditions for the existence and stability of majority voting equilibria.
7 If the distribution of income is F(y), and this particular community contains all consumers with incomes in the interval [y-,y+], then the equilibrium policy of the community is g(y M), where the median income y M satisfies F(y+) – F(y M) = N/2. Median voter models of local politics have a very long history. See, for example, Bowen (1943) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).
8 In models with two-dimensional heterogeneity (e.g., Epple and Platt (1998)), stratification is imperfect in the sense that two residents with identical incomes (but different taste parameters) may reside in different communities in equilibrium.
9 The traditional view is that local redistribution with mobile households is infeasible since generous redistributive policies will repel high-income households, and thus
and local property tax finance lead to differences in educational spending and presumably outcomes across communities. Fernandez and Rogerson (1996,1997,1998,1999) examine the implications of stratification for local spending on education and education finance reform, while de Bartolome (1990) considers the implications of stratification for the production of educational peer group effects. Epple and Romano (1998) use a multicommunity model to study the implications of stratification for competition between public and private schools. The broader implications of stratification for knowledge spillovers, economic growth and the distribution of income are considered by Benabou (1993, 1996), Durlauf (1994,1996ab) and Fernandez and Rogerson (2001).
There are at least three potential sources of inefficiency in this context. First, there is in general no reason to expect the preferred policy of the median voter to coincide with the policy that maximizes welfare in the community. For example, if we take utilitarianism as our normative benchmark, the optimal policy will maximize the policy preferences of the resident with the mean rather than the median income (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000), Section 3.1). Second, the method of finance may distort consumption and production decisions. This is certainly the case with property tax finance and housing, as discussed in this context by Yinger (1982) and others. Finally, the location choices of consumers may be inefficient due to externalities associated with migration, as in de Bartolome (1990). This issue arises, in general, whenever consumers choose between a finite number of jurisdictions, and changes in the population of one community cause changes in the utility levels in others (Scotchmer (1986)).
2.2.Property values
undermine the tax base. See Wildasin (1991) for a review of the literature on local redistribution, and an analysis of equilibrium and optimum redistribution policies in a federal system.
Models of multicommunity democracy assume that collective choices are made through direct majority voting. Of course, there are many other political institutions that might aggregate the policy preferences of individuals in a city, including a representative institution like a city council. We will consider the role of representative local political institutions in the next section. This subsection considers another popular, if somewhat ad hoc, rule for aggregating preferences. This is the assumption that policies are chosen to maximize property values in a community.
Following Edelson (1976), Wildasin (1979), and especially Brueckner (1979,
1982, 1983), consider a large system of small communities in which each community has an exogenous stock of houses.10 Index the houses in a particular community by i =1,2,…,N. Residents derive utility from a public good g, housing h i and a composite numeraire commodity x according to the utility function U(g,h i ,x). Public good provision is financed by a uniform tax on house value that balances the community's budget.Although residents have identical preferences, they may differ in income y. Each
community is "open" in the sense that the utility level that it must offer an individual with a particular income is exogenously determined. Heuristically, this can be justified by assuming that the number of communities is arbitrarily large, and that moving between communities is costless. Denote the equilibrium utility level that a community must offer a resident with income y by U*(y).
The maximum amount that a resident with income y is willing to pay for the
services offered by house i, the bid rent for house i, denoted R i (g,h i ,y), is implicitly defined by
U(g,h i ,y – R i ) = U*(y).(2.3) 10 Brueckner (1983) introduces housing production into the framework outlined here and shows that the welfare implications of property value maximization then depend on the method of finance. In particular, a head tax per house is required in order for property value maximization to lead to a first-best allocation.
Then the implicit function theorem implies
?R i /?g = (?U i /?g)/(?U i /?x).(2.4)In this open community model, the slope of the bid rent function with respect to the level of the public good is equal to the consumer's marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the numeraire. This means that the benefits of public spending are
perfectly capitalized into house rents. This result plays an important role in the analysis.
The value of house i is defined as the present value of the stream of net rents that the house provides. Assuming that the house earns rent R i in perpetuity, house value V i is given by the asset equilibrium condition
V i = (R i (g,h i ,y) - t V i )/q ,(2.5)where t is the property tax rate, t V i is the property tax liability per period, and q is the constant discount rate. Community budget balance requires tS i V i = C(g,N), where
C(g,N) is the provision cost function. Then (2.5) implies that aggregate property value in the community is
S i V i = (S i R i (g,h i ,y) – C(g,N))/q .(2.6)
The critical assumption in this branch of the literature is that the community
chooses the level of the public good to maximize (2.6). Of course, since resident utilities are fixed by assumption, there is nothing else to maximize in this setting. Interestingly,since all houses are owned by absentee landlords, at least in this basic version of the model, this objective implies that local policies are chosen to maximize the wealth of a
group of non-residents. Using (2.4), the first-order condition for a maximum of S i V i with respect to g implies
S i (?U i /?g)/(?U i /?x) - ?C/?g = 0. (2.7)Thus, the level of the public good that maximizes aggregate property value satisfies the Samuelson condition for efficient provision. In this system of open communities,aggregate property value maximization and welfare maximization are synonymous.11This result has been the basis of a number of tests for allocative efficiency in the local public sector.12
Several authors have argued that property value maximization may be the reduced form outcome of some unspecified political process. Wildasin and Wilson (1996) note that
"in communities where significant numbers of households are owners of their own property, voting behavior may be motivated by land-value maximization considerations; to the extent that this is so, there is no real difference between a voting model and a model based on land value maximization. Even if voters are not landowners, it is not implausible to assume that the interest of landowners is reflected in the local political process, if that process can respond to pressures brought to bear by mechanisms other than voting." (p. 179)
11 Welfare maximization can serve as an institutional objective in its own right. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that exclusive institutions like private governments (Helsley and Strange (1998)) or political parties (Caplin and Nalebuff (1997)) choose policies to maximize the welfare of their members.12 See Brueckner (1979, 1982) and, more recently, Deller (1990), Taylor (1995), and Hughes and Edwards (2000).
Many local policies seem at least consistent with the objective of property value maximization. For example, local growth controls seem to be popular with voters in part because they increase the property values of current residents.13
Others have tried to articulate the individual incentives and political institutions that might support property value maximization as political equilibrium, or to provide what Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1998) call "micro-political" foundations for this objective. Sonstelie and Portney (1980) argue that with perfect mobility and no limit on the number of communities, it is optimal for a resident property owner to separate consumption and investment decisions by voting for the policy vector that maximizes property value and then moving (if necessary) to the community that offers the highest level of utility.
Brueckner and Joo (1991) develop a dynamic model with imperfect mobility that examines how capitalization influences the policy preferences of current residents in a community. In particular, they show that expectations about future housing prices cause voters to consider the preferences of future residents when choosing the level of a durable public good. The key result is that the level of public spending that maximizes the utility of a current resident is determined by a weighted average of the net marginal benefit to the resident and the net marginal benefit to a prospective buyer of the resident’s house. This implies that "the preferences of an individual who does not yet reside in the community are reflected in the voter's ideal g and thus in the choice he makes in the voting booth." (p. 457) This also implies that property value maximization only leads to the first-best outcome if the marginal valuation of the owner and the prospective buyer are equal. If current owners and future owners have difference preferences, then utility maximization and property value maximization are not equivalent. In related work,
13 See Brueckner (1995) and Helsley and Strange (1995) for complementary models of the impacts of growth controls on housing prices, and Katz and Rosen (1987) for evidence.
Wildasin and Wilson (1996) show that imperfect mobility can severe the tie between property value maximization and welfare maximization by giving communities an incentive to overtax less mobile workers. Sprunger and Wilson (1998) present a model with resident property owners in which imperfect mobility and uncertainty about the productivity and objectives of local governments cause the benefits of durable local public goods to be imperfectly capitalized into property values. They show that this can lead to either over- or under-provision.14
2.3.Profits
Entrepreneurial incentives play several interesting roles in the process of local policy formation. First, at a normative level, Stiglitz (1977) and Bewley (1981) argue that efficiency in a system of local governments may require the active participation of "entrepreneurial" governments or land developers. Bewley (1981) shows, through a series of examples, that mobile but myopic voters, who by assumption do not consider how their migration choices impact economic conditions elsewhere in the economy, may have no incentive to leave inefficient communities. Under these conditions, efficiency may require that governments take actions to attract or repel residents. Bewley considers several objectives that such entrepreneurial governments might pursue, including maximizing population, maximizing land values, and maximizing the government budget surplus. Following Henderson (1974), Stiglitz (1977, p. 295) notes that land developers
14 Epple and Romer (1991) also consider the implications of capitalization for voting behavior in their model of multicommunity democracy and redistribution. In particular, they show that if non-myopic voters are homeowners rather than renters, then housing demand will depend on the possibility of capital gains associated with changes in local policy. This will change the slope of a voter's indifference curves in (g,p) space (generally causing them to become flatter), which implies that "an owner with a given endowed income will prefer a lower level of redistributive taxation than a renter with the same income." (p. 844)
are natural candidates to perform this active role: "The 'developer' plays a central role in this formulation [achieving efficient equilibria]. Essentially, the private developer can do anything that a centralized government can do, and, hence, if there are 'inefficiencies' he can eliminate them."
Second, at a positive level, the provision of infrastructure, public services and amenities by land or housing developers is an important part of the process of community formation. This is especially true in the case of so-called "private governments," as discussed in Section 4. Consequently, and following Henderson (1980), many models of community formation are based on the private provision and finance of a public good by a profit maximizing developer.15 In these models, the policy preferences of residents are expressed through the land market, and the developer translates these expressions into a collective choice via profit maximization. As discussed below, the analysis tends to focus on how competition between developers, or more generally market structure, impacts the efficiency of the resulting equilibrium.16 Third, and closely related, models of "profit maximizing government" (Sonstelie and Portney (1978), Epple and Zelenitz (1981)) assume that local policies are chosen by a city manager or bureaucrat to maximize the excess of tax revenue over the costs of public good provision.
To develop the basic ideas, following Helsley and Strange (1994), consider a system of monocentric community sites, where each site is owned by separate developer.
15 There are a number of formal similarities between models of local policy formation based on profit maximization and models based on property value maximization. For example, if one interprets the absentee landowners in the basic Brueckner (1979) model of property value maximization as a single land developer, then the developer's profit is proportional to aggregate land value in (2.6).
16 Many of the results in this literature originated in the literature on profit maximizing clubs (Scotchmer (1985ab)). Club models typically admit more general pricing policies. For example, a club might charge both a membership fee and a per use price for the
club's common facilities. Henderson and Thisse (1999, 2001), in a series of papers on the nature of small numbers competition in multi-community models, bridge the gap between developer and club models by considering optimal non-linear pricing strategies for a land developer.
The number of active developers, or the number of occupied sites, is denoted by M. For simplicity, suppose that each site is a long, narrow strip of land of width j, and that land in each community is differentiated only by its distance from employment, concentrated at the eastern edge of the strip. 17 Assume that the opportunity cost of urban land is zero.
There are N residents in the region, and the population of a community is denoted by N. Residents are identical and perfectly mobile, and move between communities to maximize utility. There are three goods in the model: a local public good g, land consumption l, and a numeraire x. Assuming that land consumption is exogenously fixed at one unit, and that the utility function is quasi-linear, the utility of a resident may be written as U(g) + x, where U(?) is increasing and strictly concave, and land consumption has been suppressed. The budget constraint of a resident living at distance z from the employment center is x + r(z) + tz ￡ y, where r(z) is land rent, t is commuting cost, and y is income, which consists of exogenous labor income w and an equal share of the profits of all developers.
If U* is the equilibrium utility level in the system, then the bid rent function for land in the community is r(z) = y + U(g) – tz – U*. The market clearing condition for land implies that the boundary of a community z* satisfies z* = N/j. Then the boundary rent condition r(z*) = 0 implies r(z) = t(z* - z) = t((N/j) – z). Using the budget to substitute for x in the utility function and in turn substituting for r(z) implies that the utility of a resident can be written as
V(g,N) = y + U(g) – tN/j.(2.8)
The profit of a developer equals aggregate differential land rent less the costs of 17 This specification of the geography is not essential, but does simplify the strategic interactions in the model. Somewhat surprisingly, the "shape" of a community matters in this context because it influences the curvature of a developer's best response function. See Helsley and Strange (1994) for details.
public good provision,
p (g,N) = (t/2)(N 2/j ) – C(g),(2.9)where the cost function C(g) is increasing and convex. Incorporating the income from land development into (2.8) yields
V(g,N) = w + U(g) – C(g)/N – (tN)/(2j ),(2.10)where each resident is assumed to receive an equal share of the profits of all developers.
The efficient allocation maximizes (2.10) with respect to g and N. The first-order conditions for this problem imply NU'(g) = C'(g), the Samuelson condition for efficient provision of the public good, and p (g,N) = 0. The latter condition, which implies that aggregate land rent equals the cost of public good provision, is an instance of the Henry George theorem (Stiglitz (1977), Arnott (1979)). Whether such an efficient allocation exists depends in part on whether the aggregate population is an integer multiple of the efficient city size. If it is not, then there is a remainder of consumers who cannot be
accommodated in a community of efficient size, and a first-best allocation does not exist.
The equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in public good levels, where each
developer chooses g to maximize his profit, subject to the equilibrium location decisions of residents, and taking the choices of other developers as fixed. In what follows, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium. Letting g i represent the public good level chosen by developer i, and g 0 represent the conjectured public good level chosen by the other (M –
1) developers, the migration or equal utility condition is V(g i ,N i ) = V(g 0,(N - N i )/(M –
1)). This implicitly defines the population of community i as a function of g i and g 0:
N i (g i ,g 0)=N M +j t M -1M (U(g i )-U(g 0)).(2.11)Thus, the population of community i is increasing in g i , and decreasing in the level of the public good provided by developer i's rivals.
Developer i's problem is to choose g i to maximize p (g i ,N i (g i ,g 0)). The first-order condition for this problem implies
M -1M N i ￠ U (g i )-￠ C (g i )=0.(2.12)Thus, with a finite number of active developers, each provides too little of the local
public good, relative to the first-best allocation. Underprovision arises from the strategic interactions between the communities, and in particular, from the pecuniary externality identified by Scotchmer (1985a, 1986). An increase in g i attracts residents from other communities, increasing utility there. However, this contribution to welfare is ignored by an individual developer. The symmetric equilibrium population of each community equals N /M from (2.11).
As the population of the region and the number of active developers increases,maintaining the symmetric equilibrium size of each community at N /M, (2.12) implies that the level of public good provision in each community rises. In the limit, where the population and the number of active developers are arbitrarily large, equilibrium public good provision satisfies the Samuelson rule, and is therefore efficient. Intuitively, in a
课题：第一章导论第二章供求理论 教学目的：让学员了解西方经济学的研究对象及供求理论的基本内容 重点：需求机制供给机制弹性理论 难点：市场均衡 教学过程： 第一章导论 第一节西方经济学的研究对象 一、西方经济学的产生 西方经济学家把满足人类欲望的物品分为“自由取用物品”与“经济物品”。前者是无限的，后者是有限的，而且在人类生活中后者占有十分重要地位。人类的欲望是无限的，但用来满足人类欲望的“经济物品”是有限的。 相对于人类的无穷欲望而言，“经济物品”或者说生产这些物品所需要的资源总是不足的，这就是稀缺性。 二、西方经济学的定义 英国经济学家L.罗宾斯：经济学是一门科学，它把人类行为作为目的与可以有其他用途的稀缺资源之间的关系来研究。 美国出版的《国际社会科学百科全书》：按广泛接受的定义，经济学是研究稀缺资源在无限而又有竞争性的用途中间配置的问题。它是一门研究人与社会寻求满足他们的物质需求与欲望的方法的社会科学，这是因为他们所支配的东西不允许他们去满足一切愿望。 美国经济学家萨缪尔森：经济学研究人和社会如何做出最终抉择，在使用或不使用货币的情况下，来使用可以有其他用途的稀缺的生产性资源在现在或将来生产各种商品，并把商
品分配给社会的各个成员或集团以供消费之用。 第二节西方经济学的几种基本概念和分析方法 一、西方经济学的几种基本概念 （一）微观经济学与宏观经济学 1.微观经济学： 微观经济学以单个经济单位作为研究对象，通过研究单个经济单位的经济行为和相应的经济变量单项数值的决定来说明在市场经济条件下价格机制如何解决社会的资源配置问题。 核心问题：价格机制如何解决资源配置问题？ （1）研究的对象是单个经济单位（居民与厂商）的经济行为。 （2）解决的问题是资源配置。 （3）中心理论是价格理论。价格是一只“看不见的手”。 （4）研究方法是个量分析。 2.宏观经济学： 宏观经济学是以整个国民经济为研究对象，通过研究经济中各有关总量的决定及其变化，来说明社会资源如何才能够得到充分利用。 （1）研究的对象是整个经济； （2）解决的问题是资源利用； （3）中心理论是国民收入理论； （4）研究方法是总量分析。 （二）实证经济学与规范经济学 实证经济学是指那些企图超脱或排斥一切价值判断，只研究经济本身的内在规律，并根据这些规律来分析和预测人们经济行为效果的经济学。
[美]西格德·F.奥尔森独木舟之道阅读 答案 独木舟之道 [美]西格德—F.奥尔森 ①移动的独木舟颇像一叶风中摇曳的芦苇。宁静是它的一部分,还有拍打的水声,树中的鸟语和风声。荡舟之人是独木舟的一部分,从而也与它所熟悉的山水融为一体。从他将船桨浸入水中的那一刻起,他便与它一起漂流,独木舟在他的手下服服帖帖,完全依照他的意愿而行。船桨是他延长的手臂,一如手臂是他身体的器官。划独木舟的感觉与在一片绝好的雪坡上滑雪几近相同,带着那种轻快如飞的惬意,小舟灵活敏捷,任你摆布;划独木舟还有一种与大地和睦相处,融为一体的感觉。然而,对于一个划独木舟的人而言,最重要的莫过于当他荡起船桨时所体验的那种欢乐。 ②掌控独木舟需要平衡,要使小舟与灵活摇摆的身体成为一体。当每次划桨的节律与独木舟本身前进的节律相吻合时,疲劳便被忘却,还有时间来观望天空和岸上的风景,不必费力,也不必去考虑行驶的距离。此时,独木舟随意滑行,划桨就如同呼吸那样毫无意识,悠然自得。倘若你幸而划过一片映照着云影的平静水面,或许还会有悬在天地之间的感觉,仿佛不是在水中而是在天上荡舟。 ③如果风起浪涌,你必须破浪前进,则另有一番奋战的乐趣。每一道席卷而来的浪头都成为要被挫败的敌手。顶风破浪的一天――巧妙
地躲过一个又一个小岛,沿着狂风肆虐的水域下风处的岸边艰难行进,猛然再冲进激荡的水流和狂风之中,如此这般,周而复始――可以确保你晚上睡得香,做个好梦。在独木舟上,你是独自一人在自己的体魄、机智和勇气来与狂风暴雨抗争。这就是为什么当经过一天的搏斗之后,终于在能挡风避雨的悬崖的背风处支起帐篷,竖起独木舟晾干,烧着晚饭时,心中会油然升起那种只有划独木舟的人才会有的得意之情。乘风破浪需要的不只是划桨的技巧,而且要凭直觉判断出浪的规模势头,要知道它们在身后如何破碎。荡舟之人不仅要熟悉他的独木舟及其路数,还要懂得身后涌起的波涛意味着什么。在狂野的水路上,乘着万马奔腾般的风浪冲向蓝色的地平线是何等欢快! ④急流也是一种挑战。尽管它们充满险情,变化多端,无法预测,但凡是熟悉独木舟水路的人都喜爱它们的怒吼和激流。人们可以在大船、驳船、橡皮船及木筏上冲过急流,然而,只有在独木舟上,你才能真正感受到河流及其力量。当独木舟冲向一泻千里、奔腾咆哮的急流边缘,继而被它那看不见的力量所掌控时,在全神贯注之中是否也会有隐隐的不安?起初,并无速度的感觉,但是,陡然间你便成为急流的一部分,被卷入吐着白沫、水花四溅的岩石之中。当你明白已经无法掌控命运,没有任何选择时,便如同以往所有那些荡舟人一样高喊着冲入激流,将自己的生死置之度外。当小舟完全处于河流的掌控之中时,荡舟人便知道了超然的含义。当他凭借着技巧或运气穿过河中的沉树、突出的岩石和掀起的巨浪时,他没必要得到别的奖赏,只要他体验到那种欢乐就足矣。
电大《西方经济学》作业 （第一章至第五章） 一、填空题 1．“生产什么”、“如何生产”和“为谁生产”是人类社会所必须解决的基本问题，这三个问题被称为_资源配置___ 问题。 2.市场经济与计划经济的差别主要表现在三个基本问题上，一是决策机制不同，二是协调机制不同，三是激励机制不同。 3.微观经济学解决的问题是资源配置，宏观经济学解决的问题是资源利用。 4.是否以一定的价值判断为依据，是实证方法与规范方法的重要区别之一。 5.两种互补商品之间价格与需求成反方向变动，两种替代商品之间价格与需求成同方向变动。 6.需求定理表明的商品价格与需求量反方向变动的关系是替代_ 效应和收入效应共同作用的结果。 7.在供给与供给量的变动中，价格变动引起供给量变动，而生产技术的变动引起供给的变动。 8.需求的变动引起均衡价格与均衡数量同方向变动。 9.市场经济就是一种用价格机制来决定资源配置的经济体制。 10.当某商品的价格上升5％，而需求量减少8％时，该商品属于需求 富有弹性。当某商品的价格下降5％而需求量增加2％时，该商品属于需求缺乏弹性。
11.如果交叉弹性为负值，则两种商品为互补关系。 12.能够做到薄利多销的商品是需求富有弹性的商品。 13.如果某种商品需求缺乏弹性而供给富有弹性，则税收就主要落在消费者身上。 14.基数效用论采用的是边际效用分析法，序数效用论采用的是无差异曲线分析法。 15如果把无差异曲线与消费可能线合在一个图上，那么消费可能线必定与无数条无差异曲线中的一条相切于一点，在这个切点上就实现了消费者均衡。 16.消费者愿意对某种物品所支付的价格与他实际支付的价格的差额称为消费者剩余。 17.技术效率是投入的生产要素与产量的关系，经济效率是成本与收益的关系。 18.代理人在不违背合约的情况下，以违背委托人的利益为代价来实现 自己的利益，代理人的这种行为被称为机会主义行为。 19.总产量曲线、平均产量曲线、边际产量曲线都是先上升而后下降，这反映了边际产量递减规律。 20. 边际产量曲线与平均产量曲线相交于平均产量的曲线的最高点。 21.适度规模就是指生产规模的扩大正好使收益递增达到最大。 22.不同的等成本线与不同的等产量线相切，形成不同的生产要素最适 组合点，将这些点连接在一起就可得出生产扩张线。 二、选择题： 1．稀缺性的存在意味着：（ D ） A.竞争是不好的，必须消灭它 B.政府必须干预经济
《宏观经济学》 教案 课程名称：宏观经济学适用专业：经济与管理类规定学时：54学时3学分开课学期：二年级上学期任课教师：曾福生 湖南农业大学经济学院
宏观经济学教案 一、课程说明 宏观经济学是从总体、总量出发，以整个国民经济作为考察对象，研究社会总体的经济行为及其后果，以及相应的经济变量如何决定。宏观经济学主要内容包括：国民收入核算理论、国民收入决定理论（支出－收入模型、IS－LM模型、AD－AS模型）、失业与通货膨胀理论、经济增长与经济周期理论、以及宏观经济政策与实践等。该课程主要介绍西方的基本经济理论，由于我们现在在经济领域中更多的是运用西方的理论，因而该课程是其他专业课的基础。但是宏观经济理论以一些假设为前提，与实际差距较大，比较抽象，有时要运用数学进行推导，因此为了更好地学习这门课程，首先挑选了难度适宜的教材，并主要按教材内容来讲授，适当补充一些内容。其次，还需要用一些难度适宜的习题，来使学生更好地掌握理论，提高分析能力。另外，由于经济理论比较抽象和枯燥，在课堂上可以举一些实例帮助学生理解，也可以培养学生用经济理论分析和解决实际问题的能力。 二、教学内容 宏观经济学是西方经济学的重要组成部分，主要介绍宏观经济学的基本知识、基本理论和基本政策。课程主要讲授国民收入核算理论、简单国民收入决定理论、产品市场和货币市场的一般均衡、宏观经济政策与实践、总需求－总供给模型、失业与通货膨胀理论、经济增长和经济周期理论、宏观经济学在目前的争论等内容。 三、本课程的教案主要包括下列教学活动形式 1、本章的教学目标及基本要求 2、本章各节教学内容及学时分配 3、教学重点与难点 4、本章教学内容的深化和拓宽 5、本章教学方式（手段）及教学过程中应注意的问题 6、本章的主要参考书目 7、本章的思考题和习题 8、教学进程 四、课程教学的基本要求 本课程的教学环节包括：课堂讲授、习题课、课外作业。通过本课程各个教学环节的教学，重点培养学生的学习能力、分析问题解决问题的能力。
绝密★启用前 高等学校招生全国统一考试 语文 本试卷分为第I卷（阅读题）和第II卷（表达题）两部分，第I卷第1页至6页，第II卷第7页至8页.全卷满分150分，考试时间150分钟。 考生注意事项： 1．答题前，务必在试题卷、答题卡规定的地方填写自己的姓名、座位号，并认真核对答题卡上所粘贴的条形码中的姓名、座位号与本人姓名、座位号是否一致。务必在答题卡背面规定的地方填写姓名和座位号后两位。 2．答选择题（第I卷1 ~ 6题，第II卷15 ~ 17题）时，每小题选出答案后，用2B铅笔把答题卡上 ．．．．所对应题目的答案标号涂黑。如需改动，用橡皮擦干净后，再选涂其他答案标号。 3．答非选择题（第I卷7 ~ 14题，第II卷18 ~ 21题）必须使用0.5毫米的黑色墨水签字笔在答题卡上书写，要求字体工整、笔迹清晰。作图题可先用铅笔 在答题卡 ．．．的规定的位置绘出，确认后再用0.5毫米的黑色墨水签字笔描清楚。必 须在题号所指示的答题区域作答，超出答题区域书写的答案无效，在试题卷、草 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 稿纸上答题无效 ．．．．．．．。 4．考试结束后，务必将试题卷和答题卡一并上交。 第I卷（阅读题，共66分） 一、（9分） 阅读下面的文字，完成1 ~ 3题。 ①当今的艺术仿佛在兴致勃勃地享受一场技术的盛宴。戏曲舞台上眼花缭乱的灯光照射，3D电影院里上下左右晃动的座椅，魔术师利用各种光学仪器制造观众的视觉误差，摄影师借助计算机将一张平庸的面容修饰得貌若天仙……总之，从声光电的全面介入到各种闻所未闻的机械设备，技术的发展速度令人吃惊。然而，有多少人思考过这个问题：技术到底赋予了艺术什么？关于世界，关于历史，关于神秘莫测的人心——技术增添了哪些发现？在许多贪大求奢的文化工程、文艺演出中，我们不难看到技术崇拜正在形成。
2019年电大西方经济学考试计算题汇总附 答案 电大西方经济学试卷小抄计算题汇总 1．假定某厂商只有一种可变要素劳动L ，产出一种产品Q ，固定成本为既定，短期生产函数Q= -0．1L 3+6L 2+12L ，求： （1） 劳动的平均产量AP 为最大值时的劳动人数 （2） 劳动的边际产量MP 为最大值时的劳动人数 （3） 平均可变成本极小值时的产量 解：（1）因为：生产函数Q= -0．1L 3+6L 2+12L 所以：平均产量AP=Q/L= - 0．1L 2+6L+12 对平均产量求导，得：- 0．2L+6 令平均产量为零，此时劳动人数为平均产量为最大。 L=30 （2）因为：生产函数Q= -0．1L 3+6L 2+12L 所以：边际产量MP= - 0．3L 2+12L+12 对边际产量求导，得：- 0．6L+12 令边际产量为零，此时劳动人数为边际产量为最大。 L=20 （3）因为： 平均产量最大时，也就是平均可变成本最小，而平均产量最大时L=30，所以把L=30 代 入Q= -0．1L 3+6L 2 +12L ，平均成本极小值时的产量应为：Q=3060，即平均可变成本最小时的产量为3060. 1．已知：某国流通中的现金为5000亿美元，货币乘数为6，银行的存款准备金为700亿美元，试求： 基础货币和货币供应量（M1） 解： 34200 570065700700500010=?=?==+=+=h m h M K M RE M M 2．Q=6750 – 50P ，总成本函数为TC=12000+0．025Q 2。 求（1）利润最大的产量和价格？ （2）最大利润是多少？ 解：（1）因为：TC=12000+0．025Q 2 ，所以MC = 0.05 Q 又因为：Q=6750 – 50P ，所以TR=P ·Q=135Q - (1/50)Q 2 MR=135- (1/25)Q 因为利润最大化原则是MR=MC 所以0.05 Q=135- (1/25)Q Q=1500 P=105 （2）最大利润=TR-TC=89250 3．已知生产函数Q=LK ，当Q=10时，P L = 4，P K = 1 求：（1）厂商最佳生产要素组合时资本和劳动的数量是多少？ （2）最小成本是多少？ 解：（1）因为Q=LK, 所以MP K = L MP L =K 又因为；生产者均衡的条件是MP K / MP L =P K /P L 将Q=10 ，P L = 4，P K = 1 代入MP K / MP L =P K /P L 可得：K=4L 和10=KL 所以：L = 1.6，K=6.4 （2）最小成本=4·1.6+1·6.4=12.8。 4．已知：中行规定法定存款准备率为8%，原始存款为5000亿美元，假定银行没有超额准备金，求： 解： （1）存款乘数和派生存款。 625005.125000,5.1208 .01=?=?===e R e K M D K （2）如中行把法定存款准备率提高为12%，假定专业银行的存款总量不变，计算存款乘数和派生存款 43000 6.85000,6.812 .01=?=?===e R e K M D K （3）假定存款准备金仍为8%，原始存款减少4000亿美元，求存款乘数和派生存款
西方经济学教案
西方经济学教案 课程名称：西方经济学（宏微观）适用专业：经济管理系各专业 规定学时：60学时
沙市大学经济管理系 宏观经济学教案 一、课程说明 宏观经济学以政府干预为核心，研究GDP核算、简单国民收入决定、IS－LM模型、IS－LM－BP模型以及宏观经济政策。宏观经济学研究中心是国民收入如何决定，因此宏观经济学又被称为收入决定理论。宏观经济学是以研究整个国民经济为对象，通过研究和分析总量的决定及其变化，来考察国民经济整体的运行功能，近而说明
资源如何才能在全社会范围内得以充分利用这一问题的。其中心理论是国民收入决定理论，以及分析和研究在现有既定的资源未能得以充分利用的原因，以及如何充分利用的途径和实现经济稳定增长等问题，以弥补市场机制的不足，寻求政府干预经济的理论依据和干预手段，并且为政府宏观经济政策的灵活运作用，提供一套的理论规范和行为规范。本部分的教学内容主要由国民收入核算理论、决定理论、波动理论和增长理论，以及宏观经济政策等构成。 二、教学内容 宏观经济学是西方经济学的重要组成部分，主要介绍宏观经济学的基本知识、基本理论和基本政策。课程主要讲授国民生产总值的核算及决定、总供给和总需求理论、凯恩斯的国民收入决定理论、失业和通货膨胀理论、经济周期与经济增长以及宏观经济政策、和国际贸易和国际收支等内容。 三、本课程的教案主要包括下列教学活动形式 1、教学目标及基本要求 2、学时分配 3、教学重点与难点
4、教学大纲 5、教学方式 6、教学进程 7、思考题和习题 8、参考资料 四、课程教学的基本要求 本课程的教学环节包括：课堂讲授、习题课、课外作业。通过本课程各个教学环节的教学，重点培养学生的学习能力、分析问题解决问题的能力。 （一）课堂讲授 主要教学方法：主要采用教师课堂讲授为主，增加讨论课和习题课，调动学生学习的主观能动性。 （二）习题 习题是本课程的重要教学环节，通过习题巩固讲授过的基本理论知识，培养学生自学能力和分析问题解决问题的能力。 习题课：安排每章后。 （三）考试环节 学生成绩评定：平时成绩40%，期末考试60% 平时成绩包括：学习态度、小测验、作业等。
新课标中考语文名著阅读及答案 1、安徽芜湖 ?小人鱼向上帝的太阳举起了她光亮的手臂，她第一次感到要流出眼泪。在那条船上，人声和活动又开始了。她看到王子和他美丽的新娘在寻找她。他们悲悼地望着那翻腾的泡沫，好像他们知道她已经跳到浪涛里去了似的。在冥冥中她吻着这位新嫁娘的前额，她对王子微笑。于是她就跟其他的空气中的孩子们一道，骑上玫瑰色的云块，升入天空里去了。?上面语段出自（国家）作家安徒生的童话名篇《》。其中的主人公小人鱼，为了能和王子在一起，她用自己的交换巫婆的药物，让巫婆帮她变成了，但最终她还是没能得到王子的爱情，只能变成了。 答案：丹麦《海的女儿》声音（舌头）人泡沫 2、北京 鲁迅先生回忆自己青少年时期生活经历的一部散文集是《①》《藤野先生》是其中的一篇。这篇散文记叙了作者在日本②（地名）学医的生活，其中的匿名信事件和看电影（幻灯片）事件令他感受到身为弱国国民遭受的屈辱，同时也看到国人的麻木，这使他产生了③的想法。 答案：①朝花夕拾②仙台③弃医从文 3、福建福州 下列句中的“甲、乙、丙、丁”是名著中的四个人物，依次对应正确 ．．的一项是（） ①在乱石山碧波潭底，孙悟空变作一只螃蟹，偷走了【甲】的辟水金睛兽，随即到芭蕉洞 哄骗罗刹女。 ②夜里家中失火了，【乙】头顶麻袋，裹着给马披的被子，冲进大火中抢救出硫酸盐罐， 拦住受惊吓的枣红马，央求邻居一起抢救仓库。 ③【丙】粗犷的脸又长又笨重，短发覆在前额，小小的眼睛深藏在阴沉的眼眶里。他曾说： ?我哭泣，我痛苦，我只是欲求真理。? ④快到收割的时候了，麦子长得至少有十多米高。【丁】走了一个小时才走到这一片田的 尽头。 A.甲：红孩儿乙：外祖母丙：列夫·托尔斯泰丁：尼摩船长 B.甲：牛魔王乙：外祖母丙：列夫·托尔斯泰丁：格列佛 C.甲：牛魔王乙：格里戈里丙：贝多芬丁：尼摩船长 D.甲：红孩儿乙：格里戈里丙：贝多芬丁：格列佛 答案：B 4、福建莆田 A、请判断下列说法的正误，对的打“√”，错的打“×”。 （1）?他的腿长步大，腰里非常的稳，跑起来没有多少响声，步步都有些伸缩，车把不动，使座儿觉到安全、舒服。?这句话写的是祥子拉车的情景。（） （2）米开朗琪罗面对的是怀着敌意的城市维也纳，他的音乐受到欢呼，他的困难却无人问津。（） （3）?那时正是快要收割的时候，麦子长得至少有四十英尺高。我走了一个钟头才走到田地
部编人教版四年级语文上册课外阅读专项同步练习（含答案）1. 阅读下文，回答问题 那条白线很快地向我们移来，逐渐拉长，变粗，横贯江面。再近些，只见白浪翻滚，形成一道六七米高的________。浪潮越来越近，犹如________，________飞奔而来；那声音如同________，好像大地都被震得颤动起来。（1）把语段补充完整。 再近些，只见白浪翻滚，形成一道六七米高的______。浪潮越来越近，犹如______，______飞奔而来；那声音如同______，好像大地都被震得颤动起来。（2）本段按照______的顺序，描写了______的景象。 （3）找出具体描写大潮发出巨响和浩大声势的句子。 2. 阅读下文，回答问题 青头又跳到牛身上，隔着肚皮和红头说话：“红头！不要怕，你会出来的。我听说牛肚子里一共有四个胃（wèi），前三个胃是贮（zhù）藏食物的，只有第四个胃才是管消化的！” “可是你说这些对我有什么用呢？”红头悲（bēi）哀地说。 “当然有用。等一会儿牛休息的时候，它要把刚才吞进去的草重新送回嘴里，然后细嚼慢咽（yàn）……你是勇敢的蟋蟀，你一定能出来的。”“谢谢你！”红头的声音小得几（jī）乎听不见了。它咬着牙不让自己失去知觉。（1）“我听说牛肚子里一共有四个胃，前三个是贮藏食物，只有第四个胃才是管消化的。”这是______告诉______：只要不进入______，就______。 （2）“可是你说这些对我有什么用呢？”这句话的意思中的“你”指______，“我”指______，这句话的意思是______。 （3）“当然有用。等一会儿牛休息的时候，它要把刚才吞下去的草重新送回嘴里，然后细嚼慢咽……你是勇敢的蟋蟀，你一定能出来！”句中的省略号表示（） 3. 阅读短文，回答问题（一） 看不见的爱<节选> 那孩子很认真，屏住呼吸，瞄得很久，才打出去。我站在旁边，可以看出他这一弹一定打不中，可是他还在不停地打。 我走上前去，对那位母亲说：“让我教他怎样打好吗？” 男孩停住了，但还是看着瓶子的方向。
四、计算题 1．当人们的平均收入增加20％时，某种商品的需求量增加了30％，计算需求收入弹性，并说明这种商品是正常物品还是低档物品，是奢侈品还是生活必需品。1．（1）根据计算收入弹性系数的公式：（2）从其收入弹性为正值来看，该商品是正常商品；由于其收入弹性大于一，故该商品为奢侈品。 2．社会原收入水平为1000亿元，消费为800亿元，当收入增加到1200亿元时，消费增加至900亿元，请计算边际消费倾向和边际储蓄倾向。（1）边际消费倾向MPC＝△C／△Y＝(900－800)／(1200－1000)＝0.5；（2）边际储蓄倾向MPS＝△S／△Y＝(1200－900)－(1000－800)／(1200－1000)＝0.5。（也可以用1－MPC得出）1．已知M＝120，P X＝20元，P Y＝10元，消费者在购买X与Y商品时的组合方式，以及从X、Y中所得到的总效用如下： 组合方式MU X／P X与MU Y／P Y总效用 Q X＝6 Q Y＝0 1／20≠0／10 1 Q X＝5 Q Y＝2 2／20≠8／10 67 Q X＝4 Q Y＝4 5／20≠7／10 69.5 Q X＝3 Q Y＝6 12／20＝6／10 87 Q X＝2 Q Y＝8 14／20≠5／10 85.5 Q X＝1 Q Y＝10 16／20≠4／10 80 Q X＝0 Q Y＝12 0／20≠3／10 70.5 从上表可看出，购买3单位X商品与6单位Y商品可以实现效用最大化 2．某国的边际消费倾向为0.6，边际进口倾向为0.2，请计算该国的对外贸易乘数。2．对外贸易乘数＝1／(1－边际消费倾向＋边际进口倾向)＝1／(1－0.6＋0.2)＝1.67 1.下面是某企业的产量、边际成本、边际收益情况： 边际成本（元） 产 量 边际收益（元） 2 2 10 4 4 8 6 6 6 8 8 4 1 10 2 这个企业利润最大化的产量是多少？为什么？2.中央银行想使流 通中的货币量增加1200万元，如果现金一存款率是0.2，法定准备率是0.1，中央银行需要在金融市场上购买多少政府债券？（1）利润最大化的原则是边际收益与边际成本相等，根据题意，当产量为6单位时，实现了利润最大化。（2）在产量小于6时，边际收益大于边际成本，这表明还有潜在的利润没有得到，企业增加生产是有利的；在产量大于6时，边际收益小于边际成本，这对该企业来说就会造成亏损，因此企业必然要减少产量；只有生产6单位产量时，边际收益与边际成本相等，企业就不再调整产量，表明已把该赚的利润都赚到了，即实现了利润最大化。2.根据货币乘数的计算公式：，已知cu＝0.2，r＝0.1，则。已知M＝1200，mm＝4，根据公式，H＝300万，即中央银行需要在金融市场上购买300 万元的政府债券 1.某商品的需求价格弹性系数为0.15，现价格为1.2元，试问该商品的价格上涨多少元才能使其消费量减少10％？1.已知E d=0.15，P＝1.2，，根据计算弹性系数的一般公式：将已知数据代入上式：。(元)，该商品的价格上涨0.8元才能使其消费量减少10％。 2.如果要使一国的经济增长率从6％提高到8％，在资本－产量比率为3 的前提下，根据哈罗德经济增长模型，储蓄率应有何变化？2.根据哈罗德经济增长模型的公式：。已知C＝3，G1＝6％，G2＝8％，将已知数据代入，则有： S1＝3×6％＝18％S2＝3×8％＝24％因此，储蓄率应从18％提高到24％。 1.某种商品在价格由10元下降为6元时，需求量由20单位增加为40单位，用中点法计算这种商品的需求弹性。 １. 。 34 .1 5.0 67 .0 8 4 30 20 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 1 2 1- = - = - = + ? + ? = P P P Q Q Q E d 1.某企业产品价格弹性系数在0.5- 2.0之间，如果明年把价格降低10%，销售量预期会增加多少？ 解：根据公式： P P Q Q E d? ? = P P E Q Q d ? ? = ? 当 d E=-0.5时，% 5 % 10 5.0= - ? - = ? Q Q 当 d E=-2.0时，% 20 % 10 0.2= - ? - = ? Q Q 因此，销售量预期会增加5%-20%之间。 2．某个国家共有1亿人，16岁以下儿童2000万人，65岁以上老年人1000万人。在全日制学校学生1400万人，家庭妇女500万人，残疾人和其他没有劳动能力者100万人，失业者500万人，其余为就业者。这个经济中劳动力参工率与失业率分别是多少？2．（1）该国的劳动力人数为：7000－2000＝5000万人，劳动力参工率为：5000/7000＝0。714。（2）该国的失业率为：500/5000＝0。1，即该国的失业率为10％ 2.根据如下资料，按支出法计算国内生产总值。 项目金额 （亿 元） 项目项目金额 （亿元） 耐用品 支出 318.4 劳务1165.7 厂房与 设备支 出 426 进口429.9 政府购 买支出 748 公司利 润 284.5 工资和 其它补 助 2172.7 出口363.7 所得税435.1 居民住 房支出 154.4 非耐用 品支出 858.3 企业存 货净变 动额 56.8 解：GDP=C+I+G+（X-M）=（318.4+858.3+1165.7）+（426+154.4+56.8）+748+（363.7-429.9）=3661.4 1．20世纪70年代汽油价格上升了200％，豪华汽车（耗油大）的需求量减少了50％，这两者之间的需求交叉弹性是多少？它们之间是什么关系？1．（1）根据交叉弹性的弹性系数计算公式，将已知数据代入：（2）由于交叉弹性为负值，故这两种商品为互补关系。2．一个经济中的消费需求为8000亿元，投资需求为1800亿元，出口为1000亿元，进口为800亿元，计算该经济的总需求，并计算各部分在总需求中所占的比例。2．（1）根据题意，C＝8000亿元，I＝1800亿元，NX＝1000－800＝200亿元，因此：YD＝C＋I ＋NX＝8000＋1800＋200＝10000亿元。（2）消费需求在总需求中所占的比例为：8000/10000＝0。8，即80％。（3）投资需求在总需求中所占的比例为：1800/10000＝0。18，即18％。（4）国外需求在总需求中所占的比例为：200/10000＝0。02，即2％1．某种商品的需求弹性系数为1。5，当它降价10％时，需求量会增加多少？1．已知Ed=1。5，，根据计算弹性系数的一般公式：需求量会增加： 2．1950年，教授的平均工资为300元，2000年，教授的平均工资为4000元。以1950年的物价指数为100，2000年的物价指数为2100，教授的实际平均工资增加了，还是减少了？2．2000年教授的实际平均工资＝1950年的名义工资× 从计算结果来看，教授的实际平均工资减少了。 五、问答题（每小题 15 分，共 30 分） 1．如何理解边际产量递减规律？（1）边际产量递减规律的基本内容是：在技术水平不变的情况下，当把一种可变的生产要素投入到一种或几种不变的生产要素中时，最初这种生产要素的增加会使产量增加，但当它的增加超过一定限度时，增加的产量将要递减，最终还会使产量绝对减少。2）这一规律发生作用的前提是技术水平不变。技术水平不变是指生产中所使用的技术没有发生重大变革。 1
《西方经济学》教案 教学目的和要求： 通过本课程的学习，使学生全面系统地掌握《西方经济学》的基本概念和基本理论；了解市场经济运行的一般原理和政府对国民经济进行宏观调控的依据与方法、手段；帮助学生利用所学到的经济学知识解决真实世界中所遇到的各种复杂问题，并作出正确选择；同时也为进一步学习其它专业知识打下一个坚实的基础。教学重点和难点： 微观部分： 经济学的定义，经济学中若干基本假定；市场均衡，供求理论与政府政策；弹性，*蛛网理论；基数效用论，序数效用论，消费者选择；长期生产函数，最优投入组合，规模经济；完全竞争市场的需求曲线，完全竞争市场的短期均衡；完全垄断市场，垄断竞争市场；完全信息博弈；分配理论；公共产品，公共选择；*福利经济理论。 宏观部分： 国民经济循环体系与循环流量图；国内生产总值的核算方法；两部门模型；均衡国民收入的决定；乘数原理；两部门的IS曲线；LM曲线的定义及其推导；财政政策；货币政策；通货膨胀；失业的经济学解释；经济周期的含义与类型。
教学方法、教学手段、考核方法及实践： 密切关注经济学前沿及最新发展动态并引入到教学过程之中。教学方法上通过制作课件、运用多媒体等现代化教学平台拓展教学内容，提高教学效果。主要是课堂教授，启发式教学；安排二次社会实践活动；二次总结、复习课采用多媒体教学。考核方法一般以闭卷考试方式进行。 微观部分 第一章导论 学习目标：通过讲授要求学生了解经济学的含义研究对象和研究方法，掌握西方经济学的基本概念；了解西方经济学的形成和发展及对西方经济学的总体认识。 讲授难点：机会成本和生产的可能性边界 讲授重点：资源的稀缺性和人类欲望的无限性 §1、西方经济学的研究对象 一、什么是西方经济学 Economy------“经济”一词，起源于古希腊的家政管理（亚里士多德（Aristotes，前384—前322年），古希腊著名哲学家和科学家，他的经济思想主要见之于《政治学》和《伦理学》。他认为，经济一词应包括两个内容：一是研究家庭关系，除夫妻关系外，主要是研究奴隶主与奴隶的关系；二是研究致富技术。 经济：1、产出/投入的最优化，致富之路；2、经帮济世； 、生产关系3．
独木舟之道[美] 西格德 F. 奥尔森①移动的独木舟颇像一叶风中摇曳的芦苇。宁静是它的一部分，还有拍打的水声，树中的鸟语和风声。荡舟之人是独木舟的一部分，从而也与它所熟悉的山水融为一体。从他将船桨侵入水中的那一刻起，他便与它一起漂流，独木舟在他的手下服服帖帖，完全依照他的意愿而行。船桨是他延长的手臂，一如手臂是他身体的器官。划独木舟的感觉与在一片绝好的雪坡上滑雪几近相同，带着那种轻快如飞的惬意，小舟灵活敏捷，任你摆布;划独木舟还有一种与大地和睦相处，融为一体的感觉。然而，对于一个划独木舟的人而言，最重要的莫过于当他荡起船桨时所体验的那种欢乐。②掌控独木舟需要平衡，要使小舟与灵活摇摆的身体成为一体。当每次划桨的节律与独木舟本身前进的节律相吻合时，疲劳便被忘却，还有时间来观望天空和岸上的风景，不必费力，也不必去考虑行驶的距离。此时，独木舟随意滑行，划桨就如同呼吸那样毫无意识，悠然自然。倘若你幸而划过一片映照着云影的平静水面，或许还会有悬在天地之间的感觉，仿佛不是在水中而是在天上荡舟。 ③如果风起浪涌，你必须破浪前进，则另有一番奋战的乐趣。每一道席卷而来的浪头都成为要被挫败的敌手。顶风破浪的一天巧妙地躲过一个又一个的小岛，沿着狂风肆虐的水域下风处的岸边艰难行进，猛然再冲进激荡的水流和狂风之中，如此这般，周而复始可以确保你晚上睡得香，做个好梦。在独木舟上，你是独自一人在用自己的体魄、机智和勇气来与风暴雨抗争。这就是为什么当经过一天的搏斗之后，终于在能挡风避雨的悬崖的背风处支起帐篷，竖起独木舟晾干，烧着晚饭时，心中会油然升起那种只有划独木舟的人才会有的得意之情。乘风破浪需要的不只是划桨的技巧，而且要凭直觉判断出浪的规模势头，要知道它们在身后如何破碎。荡舟之人不仅要熟悉他的独木舟及其路数，还要懂得身后涌起的波涛意味着什么。在狂野的水路上，乘着万马奔腾般的风浪冲向蓝色的地平线是何等欢快!④急流也是一种挑战。尽管它们充满险情，变化多端，无法预测，但凡事熟悉独木舟水路的人都喜爱他们的怒吼和激流。人们可以在大船、驳船、橡皮船及木筏上冲过激流，然而，只有在独木舟上，你才能真正感受到河流及其力量。当独木舟冲向一泻千里、奔腾咆哮的急流边缘，继而被它那看不见的力量所掌控时，在全神贯注之中是否也会有隐隐的不安?起初，并无速度的感觉，但是，徒然间你便成为急流的一部分，被卷入吐着白沫、水花四溅的岩石之中。当你明白已经无法掌控命运，没有任何选择时，便如同以往所有那些荡舟人一样高喊着冲入激流，将自己的生死置之度外。当小舟完全处于河流的掌控之中时，荡舟人便知道了超然的含义。当他凭借着技巧或运气穿过河中的沉树、突出的岩石和掀起的巨浪时，他没必要得到别的奖赏，只要他体验到那种欢乐就足矣。⑤印第安人说，只有傻子才会在急流中荡舟。然而，我却知道只要有眼里闪烁着探险的目光，心中怀有触摸荒野之愿望的年轻人，就会有人在急流中荡舟。体验大自然的风雨及风险是可怕而又奇妙的，尽管我也悲叹年轻人的鲁莽，可是也疑惑倘若没有它，世界会是个什么样子。我知道这种鲁莽不对，是我赞成年轻人感想敢做的精神。我赞许他们所知道的那种荣耀。⑥然而，比冲过白浪、迎战飓风或躲过它们更重要的是那种感性认识，即只要水路之间有可以连接的陆路，就没有你去不了的地方。独木舟所给予的是无边无际的水域和自由，是毫无约束的朴鲁和探索，那种感觉是大船永远无法体验的。帆船、划艇、汽艇和游艇无不因其重量和规模而受制于所航行的水域。但独木舟全无这种限制。它如同风一般自由，可以随心所欲地到达任何心驰神往的地方。⑦只要有水路的地方，就有连接水路之间的水路。尽管路上长满了荒草，有时难以被发现，但它们总是在那里。当你背着行囊穿过这些小路时，你与历史上曾走过这里的无数旅者结伴而行。荡舟人喜欢划桨的声音及它在水中移动的感觉，其原因之一便是这使他与传统联系在一起。在人类实施机械化运输和学会使用舵轮之前很多年，古人便划着小木舟、兽皮制作的打猎小舟和独木舟在大地的水路上运行。荡舟人随着桨的划动和小舟的前行而摇荡时，便沉浸于忘却已久的回忆之中，并在潜意识中激起了深深的沧桑感。⑧当他荡舟漂流多日，远离自己的家园时;当他查看外出的行
《西方经济学》讲义完整版 第一章导言 教学目的与要求： 重点掌握：稀缺性的含义；选择的含义；机会成本的含义；微观经济学的含义；宏观经济学的含义；实证方法与规范方法的区别 一般掌握：生产可能性曲线的含义；微观经济学与宏观经济学的关系；实证分析方法 一般了解：计划经济与市场经济的特征；经济理论与经济政策的关系 教学内容： 第一节经济学的研究对象 一、稀缺性 （一）定义：相对于人类社会的无穷欲望而言，经济物品，或者说生产这些物品所需要的资源总是不足的。这种资源的相对有限性就是稀缺性。 （二）注意问题： 1、稀缺性是相对的：相对于人类社会的无穷欲望。 2、稀缺性的存在是绝对的：各个时期：原始社会…当今社会 一切社会：贫穷或富裕 二、生产可能性曲线、机会成本和选择 （一）选择：有限的资源满足什么欲望
（二）机会成本：为了得到某种东西而放弃的另一种东西。 注意：机会成本是一种观念上的损失，并不是实际的支出。 （三）生产可能性曲线 1、定义：资源既定条件下两种物品最大产量的组合。也称生产转换线。 2、假设。 （1）、固定的资源：在一定时间上，可供使用的各种生产要素的数量是固定不变的。（2）、充分就业：在现有生产过程中，所有的生产要素均得到了充分使用，不存在着资源闲置。 （3）、生产技术：在考虑问题的时间范围之内，生产技术，即由投入转化为产出的能力，是固定不变的。 （4）、两种产品：为了简化问题起见，通常假定某一经济仅生产两种产品。 3、图形分析： 从图象上看出，生产力可能性曲线是一条斜率为负且凹向原点的曲线，其经济含义是什么？ 第一，生产可能性曲线揭示了稀缺法则。任何经济不可能无限量地生产。 第二，任何一个经济必须做出选择。但不可能有同时选择二个不同的点。同时，决定了在生产可能性曲线上的某一点进行生产就意味着决定了资源的配置。 它是在给定的假设条件下，最大可能的产量组合的轨迹，它一般凹向原点，隐含着成本递增法则成立。该曲线上的任意一点均代表着有产率的产量组合，曲线之外的任意一点表明在
课内阅读专项练习 一、阅读课内片段，回答问题。 景阳冈(节选) 原来那大虫拿人，只是一扑，一掀，一剪，三般．提不着时，气性先自没了一半。那大虫又剪不着，再吼了一声，一兜兜将回来。武松见那大虫复翻身回来，双手（）起梢棒尽平生气力，只一棒，从半空（）将下来。只听得一声响，簌簌地将那树连枝带叶劈脸打将下来。定睛看时，一棒劈不着大虫。原来慌了，正打在枯树上，把那条梢棒折做两截，只拿得一半在手里。那大虫咆哮，性发起来，翻身又只一扑，扑将来。武松又只一跳，却退了十步远。那大虫却好把两只前爪搭在武松面前。武松将半截棒丢在一边，两只手就势把大虫顶花皮（）住，一按按将下来。那只大虫急要挣扎，早没了气力。被武松尽气力纳定，那里肯放半点儿松宽。武松把只脚望大虫面门上、眼睛里只顾乱（）。那大虫咆哮起来，把身底下扒起两堆黄泥，做了一个土坑。武松把那大虫嘴直按下黄泥坑里去。那大虫吃武松奈何得没了些气力。武松把左手紧紧地揪住顶花皮，偷出右手来，（）起铁锤般大小拳头，尽平生之力，只顾（）。打得五七十拳，那大虫眼里、口里、鼻子里、耳朵里都迸出鲜血来。那武松尽平昔神威，仗胸中武艺，半歇儿把大虫打做堆，却似躺着一个锦布袋。 1.本文选自我国四大名著之一，另外三大名著是《》《》《》 2.根据课文将下列动词填在文中的括号里。 踢轮揪提打劈 3.画“”的句子中加点字“般”的意思是。这“三般”写出了大虫的。 4.选文把老虎“拿人”的本领写得十分生动，为什么要这样写? 二、阅读课内片段，回答问题。 青山处处埋忠骨(节选)
毛主席不由自主地站了起来，仰起头，望着天花板，强忍着心中的悲痛，目光中流露出无限的春恋。岸英奔赴朝鲜时，他因为工作繁忙，未能见上一面，谁知竟成了永别！“儿子活着不能相见，就让我见见遗骨吧！”毛主席想，然而他很快打消了这种念头。他若有所思地说道：“哪个战士的血肉之躯不是父母所生?不能因为我是主席，就要搞特殊。不是有千千万万志愿军烈士安葬在朝鲜吗?岸英是我的儿子，也是朝鲜人民的儿子，就尊重朝鲜人民的意愿吧。” 秘书将电报记录稿交毛主席签字的一瞬间，毛主席下意识地踌躇了一会儿，那神情分明在说，难道岸英真的回不来了?父子真的不能相见了?毛主席黯然的目光转向窗外，右手指指写字台，示意秘书将电报记录稿放在上面。 第二天早上，秘书来到毛主席的卧室。毛主席已经出去了，签过字的电报记录稿被放在了枕头上，下面是被泪水打湿的枕巾。 青山处处埋忠骨，何须马革襄尸还 1.判断下列句子所运用的描写手法。(可多选)(3分) A.心理描写 B.语言描写 C.动作描写 D.神态描写 （1）“儿子活着不能相见，就让我见见遗骨吧！”毛主席想。（）（2）毛主席黯然的目光转向窗外，右手指指写字台，示意秘书将电报记录稿放在上面。（）2.“签过字的电报记录稿被放在了枕头上，下面是被泪水打湿的枕巾”让我产生了这样的联想：夜深人静时，我们仿佛看到 ，仿佛听到。 3.下列对选文最后一个自然段理解最准确的是（） A.烈土的精神与青山同在，不在乎是否将遗骨运回家乡 B.人都牺牲了，遗骨运回家乡又有什么用 C.把遗骨运回家乡既麻烦又浪费财物，不如找个好地方埋葬了 D.既然朝鲜人民要求把遗骨埋在那儿，我们就不必把遗骨运回国了 三、阅读课内片段，回答问题。 人物措写一组(节选)
解：按支出法计算： GDP=个人消费支出+私人国内总投资+政府购买支出+净出口 =（318.4+858.3+1165.7）+(426.0+154.4+56.8)+(748.0)+(363.7-429.9) =2342.4+637.2+748.0-66.2=3661.4(亿元) ◆19．已知：折旧380亿元、个人所得税580亿元、公司未分配利润80亿元、间接税490亿元、国内生产总值5400亿元、企业所得税640亿元、转移支付430亿元、政府给居民户支付的利息190亿元。根据以上资料计算国内生产净值、国民收入、个人收入和个人可支配收入。 解：（1）国内生产净值NDP＝国内生产总值－折旧＝5400－380＝5020(亿元)。 （2）国民收入NI＝NDP－间接税＝5020－490＝4530(亿元) 。 （3）个人收入PI＝NI－公司未分配利润－企业所得税＋政府给居民户的转移支付＋政府向居民支付的利息＝4530－80－640＋430＋190＝4430(亿元) 。 （4）个人可支配收入PDI＝PI－个人所得税＝4430－580＝3850(亿元)。 ◆20．下面是一个经济中的有关资料，根据这些资料用支出法计算该国的GDP： （1）购买汽车、彩电等耐用消费品支出1000亿元； （2）购买食品、服装等非耐用消费品支出2000亿元； （3）雇用保姆和家庭教师支出200亿元； （4）企业投资支出（包括厂房和设备）2000亿元； （5）企业支付给工人的工资3000亿元； （6）企业支付的银行利息和向政府交纳的税收共500亿元； （7）今年初存货为1500亿元，年底存货为1000亿元； （8）各级政府为教育和社会保障支出2000亿元； （9）中央政府国防与外交支出500亿元； （10）中央与地方政府税收收入2500亿元； （11）出口产品收入1500亿元； （12）进口产品支出1000亿元。 解：个人消费支出耐用品＝1000亿 非耐用品＝2000亿 其他劳务＝200亿 私人国内总投资厂房设备＝2000亿 存货净变动＝1000－1500＝－500亿 政府购买转支教育社保＝2000亿 国防外交＝500亿 净出口＝1500－1000＝500亿
北京市2016-2019年中考语文试卷【名著阅读题及答案解析】汇集 2019年中考题 名著阅读(5分) 15.阅读一部名著时，个性鲜明的人物、曲折起伏的情节、纷繁多样的人情世态……都可能引发你的阅读兴趣。请结合一部名著的内容，说出是什么引发了你的阅读兴趣，并简要说明这一兴趣是如何促使你阅读这部名著的。(100字左右) 答案： 15 【答案示例】《三国演义》情节曲折紧凑，引人入胜。我在阅读赤壁之战时，便被诸葛亮为完成联吴抗曹大业，奉命使吴，舌战张昭等东吴诸谋士的精彩表现和犀利辞锋深深吸引。这个情节满足了我的求知欲和好奇心，让我对赤壁之战的后续发展产生浓厚兴趣。 【解析】本题考查名著阅读知识点，相比往年名著阅读题，今年中考题口变化不大，学作答范围依然十上分广泛。学生只需在九部名著中选定一部名著，细致陈述该名著中的主要人物与主要情节，说出引发自己阅读兴趣的原因（好奇心、求知欲、成长、写作、培养品质）即可。总之，今年名著阅读题中规中矩，难度不大。 2018年中考题 名著阅读（5分） 14．俄国著名作家列夫?托尔斯泰说：“理想的书籍，是智慧的钥匙。”请结合你阅读过的一部长篇小说，简要谈谈你对这句话的理解。（100字左右） 答： 答案示例：一本好书能够给我们带来无限收获，开启智慧的大门。《三国演义》中，诸葛亮草船借箭的故事，让我学会了面对看似无法完成的任务时，只要善于转换思路，借助他人力量就可以帮助自己获得成功。关羽单刀赴会，运用勇气和计谋成功脱险，让我明白处变不惊也是一种智慧。 2017年中考题 名著阅读（10分） 8.下面是一副曾悬挂在山东曲阜孔府内的对联。这副对联可以让我们从多方面了解到孔子的思想。请你从上、下联中各选择一个方面，并分别以【链接材料】一则语录中的相关内容为例，简要说出你的认识。（4分） 上联：居家当思清内外别尊卑重勤俭择朋友有益于已 下联：处世尤宜慎言语守礼法远小人亲君子无愧于心