Network Effects, Homogeneous Goods and International Currency Choice:
New Evidence on Oil Markets from an Older Era
Barry Eichengreen#, Livia Chi?u*? and Arnaud Mehl*
This version: July 2014
Abstract
Conventional wisdom has it that network effects are strong in markets for homogenous goods, leading to the dominance of one settlement currency in such markets. The alleged dominance of the dollar in global oil markets is said to epitomize this phenomenon. We question this presumption with evidence for earlier periods showing that several national currencies have simultaneously played substantial roles in global oil markets. European oil import payments before and after World War II were split between the dollar and non-dollar currencies, mainly sterling.
Differences in use of the dollar across countries were associated with trade linkages with the United States and the size of the importing country. That several national currencies could simultaneously play a role in international oil settlements suggests that a shift from the current dollar-based system toward a multipolar system in the period ahead is not impossible.
Key words:network effects, homogeneous goods, international invoicing currency, oil markets, US dollar role
JEL classification: F30, N20
#
University of California, Berkeley; *
European Central Bank;
?
Paris School of Economics. E-mails:
eichengr@https://www.doczj.com/doc/3413262505.html,; livia.chitu@ecb.europa.eu; arnaud.mehl@ecb.europa.eu. The authors are grateful to Linda Goldberg, Richard Friberg, David Painter, Catherine Schenk and participants to the Bank of Canada-ECB workshop on “Exchange Rates: A Global Perspective”, Frankfurt am Main, 27-28 June 2013, for comments as well as to Oliver Gloede, Galo Nuno, Elitza Mileva and Cédric Tille for helpful discussions. The authors are also grateful to Carmen-Angelika Motes for help in accessing the electronic archives of the library of the Deutsche Bundesbank and to Peter Housego for help in accessing the BP archive. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem.
1. Introduction
Notwithstanding a near meltdown of the US financial system, the downgrade of US sovereign debt by one rating agency and the emergence of the renminbi as a potential rival, the global financial crisis underscored – in the view of many – how dominant the dollar remains in the global monetary system (see e.g. Frankel 2013, Prasad 2014) One of the clearest signs of the US dollar’s dominant international role is its status as the all but exclusive currency used for pricing and settling transactions in global oil markets. The prices of West Texas Intermediate, Brent and Dubai crude are all expressed in dollars.1The dollar is used as the unit of account for virtually all benchmark prices.2 NYMEX, the world’s largest oil futures market, provides quotes exclusively in dollars. In the global oil market, whether for spot, term or future contracts and irrespective of country, the dollar reigns supreme.
The dominance of the dollar in global oil markets is relevant for several key international economic issues. It is essential to the understanding of the dollar’s international status and international currency choice. It reduces exchange rate risk borne by US firms and brings potential gains to US consumers.3It has major implications for the degree of exchange rate pass-through of oil and commodity price shocks and for forecasting of domestic inflation for all economies.4Many models used for policy simulations –including by the IMF or the Federal Reserve Board– assume that oil prices are set in dollars (see e.g. Backus and Crucini, 2000; Kumhof et al., 2010; Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri, 2011).
There have been periodic attempts to change this state of affairs, from OPEC’s “Geneva I and II” conventions in 1972-73, whose participants vowed to quote oil prices in a basket of currencies, to Iraq’s attempt to settle its oil exports in euros in the early 2000s using a European bank as conduit. In each case these efforts failed immediately or were short-lived (see e.g. Al-Chalabi, 1980; Mileva and Siegfried, 2012). Recent efforts by the Chinese authorities to strengthen the role of the renminbi in China’s external trade, particularly for oil and other commodity imports from e.g. African countries, have similarly had little impact (Eichengreen, 2013).
1 West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil is also known as “Texas light sweet” crude; Brent is a heavier source of crude from the North Sea; and Dubai a variety used to benchmark Persian Gulf exports to Asia.
2There are a few exceptions, however. For instance, some Canadian grades are quoted in Canadian dollars; Chinese oil companies price domestically produced oil in dollars but settle domestic contracts in renminbi; the Tokyo Commodity Exchange lists an array of oil future contracts based on Asian grades of petroleum, all quoted in yen (see ECB, 2005).
3 Devereux, Shi and Xu (2010) provide an in-depth analysis of the issue in a simple analytical model.
4 For recent contributions on the implications for the degree of exchange rate pass-through for prices and quantities of international invoicing currency choice, see e.g. Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010), who find large differences in the extent of exchange rate pass-through to US import prices between dollar-priced goods (25%) and non-dollar-priced goods (95%) or Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012), who point to the key role played by differences in productivity across exporting firms in their ability to absorb exchange rate movements in their mark-ups.
The dollar’s dominance as unit of account and means of payment in global oil markets is said to rest on two pillars. One, as with all facets of international currency status, are network effects (Krugman, 1980). Oil prices tend to be expressed and transactions to be settled in dollars because, as it is argued, the US was the first oil producer and remained the largest global oil producer for fully a century, until it was overtaken by the Middle East in the 1950s. Once the practice of expressing oil prices in dollars and settling transactions in that unit became so widespread, and a critical mass of transactions was reached, it was costly for individual buyers and sellers to do otherwise.
The first oil well successfully drilled was in Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859 (Yergin, 2008). The US is still home to five of the “Seven Sisters,” the oil multinationals that have dominated global oil markets since the early 20th century.5 Yergin reports that, as early as 1928, the “traditional formula” to calculate the price of crude oil for sale in international markets (“traditional” implying that it was most likely used even earlier) was the US Gulf Coast price plus the going freight rate from that coast to market, even if the oil was supplied by a non-US source (Yergin, 2008, p. 247). It is this reference price that the “Seven Sisters” used in 1928 to divide global oil markets among themselves under the so-called “As-Is” agreement. The US Gulf Coast price of earlier periods bears more than passing resemblance to today’s West Texas Intermediate (WTI) benchmark. All this would appear to testify to the importance of first-mover advantage, incumbency and network increasing returns.
The second pillar is homogeneity of the product.6Oil is neither firm- nor country-specific. Producers are price takers. Their identity is unimportant. Oil prices fluctuate according to global supply and demand, with deviations from world prices disappearing quickly through arbitrage.7 This has two implications for the choice of invoicing and settlement currency according to McKinnon (1979, pp. 72-77). Producers, as price takers, have no market power to set prices in their own currency. And because oil is relatively homogenous, there is substantial convenience in quoting 5The five US “Sisters” include the four Aramco partners (i.e. which joined forces to produce oil in Saudi Arabia), namely: Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon); Standard Oil of New York/ “Socony-Vacuum” (Mobil); Standard Oil of California/“SoCal” (Chevron); Texaco; the fifth US “Sister” is Gulf.
6 This is not to deny the existence of variations in the quality of crude oil (sweet, sour, mazut), which in turn depend on an array of factors (such as geographical origin and sulphur content). Virtually all crude needs to be refined (heated) in order to be converted into gasoline, jet fuel, home heating oil, industrial oil, etc. Those products differ in terms of value added. That oil is traded in three contracts, namely term (often used by Gulf countries), spot (often confidential, and without central clearing) and futures (which account for the majority of global oil trading today) further adds to observed price variations. Still, oil is relatively homogeneous compared to many other goods – relative to most manufactured goods, for example. It is sufficiently homogeneous to be traded on organized exchanges. If every barrel differed significantly in quality and characteristics, the standard contracts that exchanges require would not be feasible, and oil would have to be traded “over the counter.” Oil is not branded; that is to say, prices can be quoted without mentioning the name of the producer (see Rauch, 1999). Again, this is in contrast to goods which have a reference price but are not traded on organized exchanges (such as highly specialised chemical products like polymerization and copolymerization substances), and goods where the name of the producer is an important guide to quality and other characteristics.
7 As McKinnon puts it, oil is what Hicks (1974) would call a “flexprice” good.
prices in just one currency to facilitate comparisons.8 In practice, McKinnon further observes, the currency of choice will be sterling or the dollar insofar as it is in London, New York and Chicago that centralised commodity exchanges emerged as clearinghouses for supply and demand.9
Hartmann (1998) and Friberg and Wilander (2008) conclude that one of the main stylised facts emerging from the literature on currency choice in international trade is that commodities are generally invoiced in one currency, typically the dollar. The literature on the use of the dollar as the currency of denomination, invoicing and settlement in oil-market transactions is pitched at a high level of generality, however. It tends to be based on stylized rather than closely-observed facts.
A major constraint facing empirical work on currency choice in international trade in oil, as in other commodities, goods and services, has been lack of detailed data. Friberg and Wilander (2008) note that investigators have mainly relied on snippets of aggregate data, surveys of selected firms, and casual empiricism (e.g. “for instance noting that oil is traded in US dollars,” as they put it).10Another way of putting the point is that there is no meaningful empirical work on choice of currency in the oil market because it is presumed that there is no variation in currency usage in the recent data, given that virtually all recent transactions are widely believed to be denominated, invoiced and settled in dollars.11
In this paper we present evidence showing that the effects of network increasing returns and product homogeneity on the currency used as means of payment in the global oil market are not as strong as conventionally supposed. In 8 Goldberg and Tille (2008) provide evidence of a “coalescing” effect, according to which exporters use the same invoicing currency as their competitors in order to limit movements in their relative price. They find that this tendency is especially strong for homogenous goods like oil.
9 At the same time, he notes that petroleum and gasoline products have long been traded throughout the world at fairly uniform prices without such geographically centralised exchanges. He also notes that before 1974, in “a rather charming anachronism”, several oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf demanded payment in sterling because they had been previously part of the sterling area (although they quoted prices and paid taxes in US dollars).
10They point to an array of “stylized facts”, including that primary products are generally priced in dollars; that manufactured goods traded between advanced economies are invoiced in the exporter’s currency (a finding from Grassman’s seminal 1973 study), although Asian economies and the US use dollars for both imports and exports; and that emerging market currencies are typically not used in North-South trade.
11Recently investigators have looked more closely at trade invoicing and settlement decisions by currency. In analysing export invoicing data for 24 advanced and emerging economies over 1997-2004, Goldberg and Tille (2008) find empirical support of their “coalescing effect” favouring the dollar. Kamps (2006) considers similar data and highlights the growing role of the euro in the trade of regions neighbouring the euro area. Other studies have used firm-level data for individual countries (see e.g. Donnenfeld and Haug, 2003; Oi et al., 2004; Wilander, 2006; Ligthart and da Silva, 2007). Friberg and Wilander (2008) report on the results of a survey conducted in 2006 on the currency choice of Swedish exporters, finding inter alia that price, invoicing and settlement currencies tend to be one and the same (i.e. 85% of the exporters surveyed used the same currency for 90% or more of their export revenues); they also report that currency choice is occasionally set through bargaining between exporters and importers. Goldberg and Tille (2011) test for such bargaining and strategic interactions in Canadian import data in the period 2002-2009, while Goldberg and Tille (2013) provide a bargaining theory for international trade invoicing and pricing.
earlier periods, oil transactions were in fact undertaken in a number of different currencies. This suggests that there is room for more than one national currency as means of payment even for a good as homogenous as oil. This conclusion is consistent with what we have called elsewhere the “new view” of international currency markets (Chi?u, Eichengreen and Mehl, forthcoming), according to which network increasing returns are not as strong as commonly supposed, first-mover advantage is not everything, incumbency is no guarantee of success, and several national currencies can play consequential roles in international transactions.
Specifically, we show here that European oil import payments both before and after World War II were split almost evenly between the dollar and non-dollar currencies, mainly sterling. Limited data suggest that what was true of European oil markets was also true of the global oil market, consistently with the fact that Europe accounted for a substantial share of global oil imports then.12
Use of the dollar and other currencies in international petroleum transactions varied across countries, however. These differences in dollar usage are associated with the extent of trade linkages with the US and the size of the importing country. There is also evidence that countries with more stable currencies used the dollar less; that strategic motives (i.e. government influence in the oil sector) made countries less inclined to use the dollar; and that countries that were constrained by capital controls in their ability to pay freely with sterling used the dollar more. In contrast, we find little evidence in favour of liquidity effects or international political considerations in explaining currency choice.
Our data on the use of the dollar and other currencies for oil import payments are for the period from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, i.e. the period when the dollar was dethroning sterling as the main international currency. They are, to the best of our knowledge, unique. That they focus on oil is one of their strengths, given the allegedly dominant role of the dollar in global oil markets today. A case study of this well-defined, relatively homogenous commodity allows us to approach the problem of international currency use at a more granular level than previous studies.
Section 2 presents the data used in our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the key stylised facts, while Sections 4 sets out the methodology. Section 5 and Section 6 present baseline estimates and robustness check results, after which Section 7 concludes.
2. Data
Our data on the currency composition of oil import payments are from Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA, 1949). They were gathered by statisticians employed by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, the predecessor of today’s OECD) based on submissions by 16 European countries 12 We estimate that the share of the dollar in global oil import payments reached at least 31% and that of non-dollar currencies at least 23% (these are lower bounds insofar as there is no information on currency denomination for the remainder of global oil imports).
eligible to the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan): Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.13
The ECA volume was meant to inform decisions taken by US authorities on how to finance European oil imports. This was no small matter. In all, more than 10% of total aid under the Marshall Plan was spent on oil. Plan administrators sought to estimate how many dollars the recipients would require to meet their oil import needs. Ensuring that the provision of dollars through the Marshall Plan would suffice for this purpose would help Western Europe to secure the energy it needed for recovery. Providing adequate dollars for European petroleum imports would also help to maintain markets for US oil companies when their potential customers would otherwise have been unable to obtain dollars (Painter, 1984). This was no small consideration for a US-dominated Marshall Plan administration.
The ECA volume contains detailed data on the currency composition of oil imports by the 16 participating countries. Data are broken down not just by country and currency (dollar vs. non-dollar) but also by product (crude, refined products, petroleum equipment). They are available for different fiscal years (pre-war, 1947, 1949, 1950 along with projections for 1953).14Both quantities (i.e. in thousands of metric tonnes) and values (i.e. in thousands of dollars) are reported.
The authors use the term “dollar oil” for oil that “the importing country must pay [for in] dollars” (ECA, 1949, p. 1 footnote 3). “Dollar oil is in general – but not always – sourced in the “continental United States or by American-owned companies from offshore sources” (ibid.). “All other oil,” they continue, “is, in general, classified as non-dollar oil.” Thus, these data provide information on the use of the dollar and other units as settlement currencies for oil imports (i.e. not as the currency of denomination of prices or of invoicing).
“Non-dollar oil” was mostly sterling oil insofar as two of the Seven Sisters (Royal Dutch-Shell and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now known as British Petroleum) were of British origin. While only sterling is explicitly mentioned in the volume, other currencies might have played a role; as noted by the authors: “there is likely to be continued pressure to replace some additional dollar oil with oil from sterling or other non-dollar sources” (ECA, 1949, p. 11).
Attention was paid to this question because oil was the largest single item in the dollar budget of most Marshall Plan countries. Oil purchased from US companies required dollar reserves, since US companies preferred payment in that form. US companies demanded dollars to pay salaries and purchase supplies that were themselves dollar-denominated. They were not interested in accumulating inconvertible blocked currencies that could be used to pay salaries and purchase supplies only in the oil-importing country itself. UK companies, in contrast, may have
13 Germany is the sum of the Bizone and the French Zone; Italy includes Trieste.
14 The data for our independent variables were available for calendar years, by contrast.
been willing to take sterling and dollars insofar as they had sterling-denominated costs but also sought to purchase US oil equipment, technology and tankers, again typically using dollars (Painter, 1984).
Sceptical readers may object that the same factors responsible for the existence of the data make them less than representative. Given the dollar shortage following World War II, countries might have used other currencies in extremis only in this period. Oil companies thus may have accepted payment in sterling where, under other circumstances, they would have demanded dollars. The pattern in these years was idiosyncratic, such sceptics would insist. And once the dollar shortage ended, so did the use of other currencies for payments, they would suggest.
Reassuringly, the ECA volume also provides estimates of oil imports in quantity terms for the pre-war period when there was no comparable dollar shortage.15 In that earlier period, some 41% of the oil imports of European countries were paid in dollars, while fully 59% were paid for using other currencies. This is similar to the post-World War II pattern.16 Moreover, complementary evidence for the modern era (which we provide in Section 3 below) suggests that oil companies still used sterling in oil payments to a considerable extent in the 1970s. Even today, they still use other units than the dollar to invoice international transactions in the European oil market. Again, this suggests that the pattern before and after World War II was not an anomaly.17 It suggests further that the assertion that the dollar has always dominated payments in the market for global oil transactions is overdrawn.
Sceptics may further contend that use of the dollar in oil settlements was heavily a function of how many dollars were made available to European countries by the United States through the Marshall Plan, rather than the result of any economic calculus on the part of the recipients. But the provision by the US of dollars to European countries, through its foreign aid program to finance their oil imports, would have worked against our finding that sterling and other currencies also played a consequential role in oil payments in this period. Moreover, as we will show below, when we control for Marshall aid received each year by the countries in our sample, we find that it had no significant bearing on the heterogeneity over time and countries in dollar usage.
Still others will question whether the data are accurate. Reporting biases there may be, but European countries had every incentive to overestimate – not underestimate – the share of dollar settlements in order to maximise their Marshall aid. The ECA was aware of these incentives and insisted on checking data provided by participating countries against its own estimates. Where it detected discrepancies, it generally found that dollar oil needs had been too “ambitiously estimated” (ECA, 15 There were various restraints on long-term foreign lending, but this is a different matter (see Capie, 2002 for details).
16 See Section 3 for details. A caveat is that the classification between dollar and non-dollar sources was not necessarily made on “exactly the same bases” for the pre-war period as it had been for the post-war period (ECA, 1949, p. footnote 6). But the overall picture is broadly the same.
17 We provide additional evidence for periods before and after the years 1938-53 on which our formal analysis focuses in Section 3 below.
1949, p. 4) and reduced them by some 15% in value terms. This suggests that our data are not biased towards underestimating the role played by the dollar in the international oil markets.
Finally one could also argue that because a large share of oil trade was intra-firm, due to the fact that the Seven Sisters were vertically integrated, there might have been a close correspondence between nationality of companies and nationality of the currency used for invoicing in international oil transactions. European countries would pay their oil imports in dollar or sterling, depending on whether they would purchase oil from US or British companies. It is not clear theoretically that intra-firm trade necessarily implies that the exporter’s currency is used for invoicing, however. Currency choice in intra-firm trade depends also on the degree of homogeneity of the product traded.18 For the contemporaneous period, Ito et al. (2010 and 2013) find a tendency for the importer’s (not the exporter’s) currency to be used for invoicing in a sample of intra-Japanese firm transactions, especially for non-differentiated products. Thus, Japanese firms invoice in dollars – not in yen – when they export to their US subsidiaries. Hence there is here no correspondence between nationality of companies and nationality of the currency used. The reason is that exports are destined for local subsidiaries that face competition in local markets. In this case, Japanese parent firms tend to price-to-market and to take exchange rate risk by invoicing in the importing country’s currency. Similar patterns might have well characterised the period before and after World War II insofar as oil is a non-differentiated product.
3. Overview
A first observation is that, even for a good as homogenous as oil there is room for more than one currency of payment in the global market, contrary to the presumption in recent theoretical models and related empirical studies. Figure 1 shows the breakdown by currency of denomination of oil imports (crude and refined products) in thousands of metric tonnes for the 16 countries participating in the European Recovery Program. Each bar splits the quantity of oil imports into the share of dollar and non-dollar payments in each of the fiscal year for which data is available: pre-war (usually 1938), 1947, 1949, 1950 and 1953.19 While the dollar is clearly an important currency for payments, with an average share of 43% of total oil imports, it is by no means the only one or, for that matter, overwhelmingly dominant. The majority (57%) of European oil imports were paid in non-dollar currencies, presumably mainly sterling.
Importantly (as noted before), the picture was essentially the same before World War II, when patterns cannot be ascribed to the postwar dollar shortage. The share of the dollar in Europe’s oil imports was 41%, while that of non-dollar 18 In addition, in the absence of detailed data, it is difficult to assess how important this phenomenon really was (see FTC (1952, chapter 2, fn 22): “only limited data on marketing operations of the major oil companies in the post-World War period are available”.
19 Where, repeating what we said above, the data for 1953 are projections. As for the prewar year, the ECA volume notes that country officials provided data for “1938 or another representative prewar year” (see footnote 2 to Tables 3 and 4, pp. 33-34, ECA, 1949).
currencies was 59%.20Both before and after World War II world oil markets were multi-polar in the sense that international transactions were settled using several currencies.
Similar breakdowns in value terms (i.e. in thousands of dollars; available for 1949 and 1950 only) tell a similar story.21The share of the dollar here is a few percentage points higher, at about 50%. This reflects the fact that a larger proportion of high-value added products, including practically all lubricating oils, were purchased from the US (ECA, 1949, p. 14). Still, the fairly equal split between dollar and non-dollar currencies again points to the use of multiple international currencies.
To what extent do these findings for European markets extend to global markets? Europe accounted for a substantial share of global oil imports (about 40% in 1948). As a matter of definition, then, what was true for European oil markets was to some extent also true for global oil markets.
Figure 2 provides one estimate of the currency breakdown of global oil imports in 1948-49. In constructing this estimate we augmented the information available from ECA (1949) with that from US Federal Trade Commission (1952). FTC provides data on oil imports by source and destination country in North America, South America, Europe, Asia and Africa in 1948 in thousands of barrels.22The estimated share of the dollar in global oil imports is the sum of oil imports paid in dollars by European countries (from ECA, 1949), oil imports by the US (from Federal Trade Commission, 1952), which were assumed to be all paid in dollars, and 30% of sterling area imports (30% being the estimate of the dollar content of oil sales to the sterling area from Schenk, 1996, p. 29). The estimated share of non-dollar currencies in global oil imports is then the sum of two components: oil imports paid in non-dollar currencies by European countries and 70% of the sterling area’s imports. The remainder are oil imports from other countries for which information on currency denomination is not available.
Figure 2 again suggests that there was room for more than one national currency in global oil market settlements. The dollar was the main currency of payment of global oil imports in 1948/9, with an estimated share of 31%. But the share of non-dollar currencies was also large, at 23%. Although there is no information on currency denomination for the residual (46%), it is likely that at least some of these imports were paid in currencies other than the dollar. For instance, 20The share of the dollar actually declined between 1947 and 1953, from 48% to 38%. This likely reflects efforts by US oil companies to “sterlingize” their oil exports to Europe to address the dollar shortage in the run-up to the so-called “New Look” agreements of 1953 (see Painter, 1984; Schenk, 1996; Galpern, 2009). In addition, European countries might have tried to shift their imports away from the US members of the Seven Sisters and toward the British members in response to the postwar dollar shortage.
21 These breakdowns are not shown here to save space but are available from the authors upon request.
22 We converted barrels to metric tonnes in order to compare these data with those of the ECA, using a conversion factor of 0.1364 for crude oil and 0.1228 for refined products (for more details see https://www.doczj.com/doc/3413262505.html,/conversionfactors.jsp).
Royal Dutch Shell had been active in Asian markets since its creation in the late 19th century.
There is also variation across countries in the intensity of use of the dollar and other currencies as means of payment for oil imports. This is apparent in Figure 3, which breaks down by currency of denomination the oil imports of the 16 European countries (here we again consider imports by volume). The data are averages over the 1938-50 period (we excluded projections for fiscal year 1953).23Use of the dollar varied greatly. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and the UK, did not use the dollar much; there the average share was barely a third of oil import payments. In the case of the Netherlands and the UK, this might reflect the fact they were home to two of the Seven Sisters, i.e. Royal Dutch-Shell and AIOC (now known as BP). For the other countries we will have to look for another explanation. The dollar was the dominant currency of payment of oil imports for Portugal, Germany, Turkey and Sweden, in each of which its share was close or in excess of 60%. Similar patterns hold when considering currency shares for oil imports in value terms, albeit with small differences that mirror price differences in the basket of oil products imported, in turn.
Figure 4 – which reports the evolution of the share of the dollar in the oil import payments of selected countries of our sample between 1938 and 1953 – further shows that not only was there heterogeneity in payment patterns across countries, but also within countries over time.
The state of affairs is further illustrated in Figure 5, which plots the share of dollar payments in oil imports in quantity terms of each country (on the horizontal axis) against the share of the United States as a source of the country’s oil imports (on the vertical axis) in 1948-49. Under the extreme assumption of full dollar payment of oil purchases from the US and no vehicle role for the dollar, all points would lie along the 45-degree line. In practice, the use of the dollar in oil import payment is greater than what would be expected on the basis of oil trade with the US. This is especially true for France, Belgium-Luxembourg, Portugal, Turkey and Italy. Similar patterns emerge as regards oil imports in value terms.24Admittedly, that the share of dollar payments exceeds the share of the US as an oil supplier to Europe in part reflects the role of US multinationals which sold to the continent oil sourced from offshore (i.e. from sources such as Saudi Arabia or Venezuela) and not just from the United States (an aspect which we will need to take into account in the empirical estimates below).
The importance of the dollar also varies across products. Table A1 of the appendix provides a currency breakdown of European countries’ oil imports by product category in 1949. As noted above, the share of the dollar is slightly higher for higher-valued products.25 However, it is lower, at about one-third, for oil equipment,
23 Although including them would change little in terms of the results.
24 These patterns are not shown here to save space but are available from the authors upon request.
25 Also consistently with this, the implied dollar price of a dollar oil barrel relative to that of a non-dollar oil barrel (both obtained by dividing prices by quantities for 1949 and 1950, i.e. the two years for which such data are available) was higher for some country-year observations (see Figure A1 in the
e.g. refining equipment, storage equipment, casing or pipelines. This reflects the fact that a large portion of imports thereof were produced by European countries themselves and consequently settled in their own currencies.
Against the objection that the period surrounding World War II was exceptional and unrepresentative, we can provide additional evidence, albeit of a more fragmentary nature, for both earlier and later years. As noted previously, Yergin (2008, p. 247) emphasises that the “traditional formula” to calculate the price of crude oil for sale in international markets in the 1920s was based on the dollar, reflecting the position of the United States as the leading global petroleum producer. At the same time, firm-level evidence suggests that sterling was also widely used for international oil payments in this period. The general sales ledgers of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC, now known as BP) in the BP archives contain detailed information on each transaction between 1926 and 1930.26 They show that sterling was used when APOC was selling oil in this period. No other currency is mentioned. Some of these ledgers breakdown various charges (e.g. insurance costs) and proceeds (e.g. including or excluding custom duties), all in sterling.
Schenk (2010) provides some complementary evidence for the 1970s. As she notes (p. 360), oil-producing States in this period received royalty payments both in sterling and dollars. Circa 1974, 19 per cent of royalty payments were denominated in sterling, 81 per cent in dollars. Over time, contracts expired and tended to be replaced by new ones in which royalty payments denominated in sterling were replaced by royalty payments denominated in dollars, giving rise to the situation in the final quarter of the 20th century where the dollar was dominant to an unusual degree.
Another complementary perspective is for the current period, as provided by recent Eurostat data. This also suggests that there is room for more than one currency in international oil transactions.27 While the dollar accounts for over three-quarters of import invoicing in a majority of countries, some countries use other currencies to a non-negligible extent, including Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg and Austria, which all use the euro – and, in the case of Sweden, the kronor – as invoicing unit for over half of their imports. The use of multiple international currencies is still more evident on the export side. No fewer than 12 countries use the euro and other currencies as invoicing units for the majority (i.e. over half) of their exports.28 However, insofar as Europe accounted for about 20% of global oil imports in 2010 (against 40% after World War II), it is unclear that what is true for Europe is true for global oil markets now, unlike then.
appendix). This again reflects the fact that a large proportion of high-value added products, including practically all lubricating oils, were purchased from US companies.
26See BP Archive, ARC 93666, 93704, 93690, 93686 and 93689.
27 The data pertain to extra-EU imports and exports in value terms.
28 On average, 65% of UK extra-EU oil exports were invoiced in domestic currency, against 35% for Sweden. A caveat is that the value of EU oil exports is markedly lower than that of their imports (i.e. the former accounts for about one-third of the latter).
4. Empirical framework
What explains the heterogeneity across countries and time in the use of dollar and non-dollar currencies as units of payment for oil imports before and after World War II? To get at this question, we use an empirical framework based on Goldberg and Tille (2008). Our general specification is of the form:
t
i t US t i t US t i m t i US m t i US i m t i fxvol Y Y Y Y X X ,4,,3,,,,2,,1,$, μ?αααααβ+′+′+′+++++=t t i,ΘZ γfxcontrols α
(1)
where the dependent variable is the share of a country’s imports of crude and refined oil that was paid for in dollars, βm $ in country i (with i = 1, … 16) and fiscal year t (with t = 1938, 1947, 1949, 1950, 1953). In the baseline specification we express imports in quantity terms.29 We also consider imports of crude and refined oil separately in robustness checks, along with imports of petroleum equipment. In estimating Eq. (1) we control for unobserved country effects, denoted αi , and for time effects Θ.
A first potential determinant is import penetration of US firms, denoted X m US . To measure this, we include the share of the US in country i ’s total imports, using data from Mitchell (1998) for 1938 and 1947 and the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics for 1949, 1950 and 1953. Denomination tends to be tilted towards the currency of the country that accounts for the largest share of the market, since exporting firms prefer being paid in their own currency to minimise exchange rate exposure (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005). Higher US import penetration should thus be associated with high producer currency pricing (PCP; i.e. dollar payments) and lower local currency pricing (LCP; i.e. payment in European currencies). Theory is quieter when the choice is between local currency, producer currency and a vehicle (i.e. third) currency, like sterling, although intuition suggests that the expected impact of higher US import penetration on the share of dollar payments is here likely to be the same.
We consider in robustness checks two alternative measures. First, the share of the US in country i ’s oil imports in 1948 (using data from FTD, 1952; data for other years were not readily available). Second, time-varying guesstimates of the share of the US as an oil supplier, which we obtain by supplementing the latter (time-invariant) observations with US production of oil relative to total world production.30
A limitation of these alternative metrics (as previously mentioned) is that they capture only direct European purchases from the US and not those from US companies
29
We leave imports in value terms for the robustness checks (as values are available for 1949 and 1950 only).
30 We could produce such guesstimates for 1949, 1950 and 1953 (the years for which data on US production of oil relative to total world production could be gathered from American Petroleum Institute, 1959).
offshore, for which no data appear to be readily available. This means that these measures underestimate the size of the US relative to its competitors.
A second potential determinant is relative market size, which we measure as the ratio of country i’s GDP relative to that of the US, denoted Y i/Y US in Eq. (1) (data from Maddison, 2010). Relative market size matters insofar as exporters in small countries are less likely to play a significant role in destination markets and to be able to use their own currency as a means of payment (Goldberg and Tille, 2008). They are also more likely to use imported inputs and less likely to use their own currency in international transactions (Campa and Goldberg, 2007).31 When choice is restricted to only two currencies (i.e. producer vs. local currency pricing), Goldberg and Tille (2013) show that the bargaining weight of importers decreases when they are fragmented relative to exporters and that, as a result, they are charged relatively high prices. They are then also less willing to be exposed to exchange rate risk, which increases the extent of local currency pricing (i.e. non-dollar payments).32 Conversely, Goldberg and Tille’s model suggests that importers are ready to take on more exchange rate risk exposure when they are less fragmented – and hence more powerful – because they can also benefit from low prices and receive more of the joint surplus from trade contract negotiations. This increases the extent of producer currency pricing (i.e. dollar payments).33
We also include in the baseline specification the interaction between X m US and Y i/Y US.This is designed to account for the possibility that the impact on currency choice of import penetration from US firms depends on relative market size, and vice-versa.34
In addition, we consider a proxy for currency stability, following Goldberg and Tille (2011). This is the coefficient of variation of country’s i exchange rate relative to the dollar (calculated as annual averages from monthly data taken from Global Financial Data), denoted fxvol. Theory suggests that firms prefer to invoice trade in a stable currency so as to minimize disturbances to demand and profits (see e.g. Baron, 1976; Giovannini, 1988; Devereux et al., 2004; Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005; Wilander, 2006).35 The role of exchange rate volatility is likely more limited for differentiated products for which demand is relatively insensitive to prices (Goldberg and Tille, 2008). Hence, stable currencies are likely to be preferred as units 31 The dollar, in contrast, benefits from the fact that exporters selling to the US may strive to stabilise their prices relative to those of US producers of comparable goods. Theory is less explicit when it comes to the size of importers relative to one large exporter (i.e. our sample of small European economies relative to the US).
32 Goldberg and Tille define fragmentation as the absolute number of importers (or exporters).
33 There is no theory when currency choice is between three or more units, i.e. dollar, sterling, local or still other currencies. The impact of relative market size on currency denomination of oil import payments is here an empirical question, in other words.
34This continuous interaction is calculated with centred variables to ensure that estimates remain economically interpretable and efficient, should the constant term fall outside the range of observable data (see Simpson and Lewis, 2001, for further details).
35In addition, exporters may also choose to invoice in a currency that help them hedge against volatility in input costs (Novy, 2006).
of payments for relatively homogeneous good, such as oil, for which demand is price elastic. In robustness checks, we use as alternative metrics of currency stability the relative volatility of exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar, compared to volatility vis-à-vis sterling, as well as the volatility of exchange rates vis-à-vis sterling.
An important feature of international financial markets in the 1940s is their segmentation by exchange restrictions. One segment consisted of the US and other countries with trade surpluses and “hard” currencies fully convertible into dollars. The other segment was composed of countries with “soft” currencies and short of dollars, namely a large part of Western Europe, South America and the sterling area (i.e. either British colonies and protectorates or members of the Commonwealth). This pattern was not without implications for the currency denomination of oil imports (see Menderhausen, 1950; Painter, 1984; Schenk, 1996; and Galpern, 2009).
Up to 1953, British treasury regulations prohibited US companies from selling oil for sterling outside the sterling area since Britain would have been obliged to convert sterling acquired in this way into dollars on demand (as per the Anglo-US Financial agreement of 1945). They were allowed to sell oil for sterling or dollars to the sterling area, in contrast.36 And they could sell oil for dollars outside the sterling area. British companies, on the other hand, could sell oil for sterling wherever the latter was accepted as a means of international payment, i.e. both inside and outside the sterling area. They could also sell for dollars and, under certain conditions, for other European currencies, such as the Dutch gulden or the French Franc (Shannon, 1949). All this put US multinationals at a competitive disadvantage, particularly in continental Europe.37
Sceptical readers could argue that sterling played a prominent role in international oil markets at this time only because of such capital controls. However, that US oil companies wishing to sell oil outside the sterling area (i.e. mainly to continental European countries, which account for 13 out of the 16 countries we consider in this paper) were largely limited to doing so for dollars works against our main conclusion. This would have heightened the importance of the dollar in global 36Shannon notes that “all business [under the Anglo-American Loan Agreement with the US and Western Hemisphere countries of 1945] must be conducted on a dollar or near dollar basis… the main imports involved are … oil from Mexico and Venezuela”, which – needless to say – largely came from US multinationals (Shannon, 1949, p. 226). This said, US oil companies committed in the early 1950s to gradually reduce the dollar content of their oil exports to a level matching that of British companies, which was estimated at 30% at that time (see Schenk, 1996). The Economic Cooperation Administration, the body administering Marshall aid, sought to actively fight against such “currency discrimination or other undesirable trade practices” by refusing to finance with dollar aid purchases by British-controlled companies of oil facilities whose operations depended on such practices (Painter, 1984; Schenk, 1996). The need to save dollars as rationale for capital controls became less pressing in the second part of the 1950s as the dollar shortage ended and UK current account convertibility was re-established in 1955.
37 Concerns from US companies about what they considered to be discriminatory exchange controls led to intense negotiations to put an end to the so-called “sterling-dollar oil controversy” in 1950-3. These negotiations culminated with the so-called “New Look” agreements, the essence of which was to encourage the US Sisters to “sterlingize” (i.e. increase the sterling content) of their oil sales while allowing them to sell oil for sterling outside the sterling area (i.e. mainly Western Europe) as a quid pro quo.
oil settlements, other things equal. In other words, it works against the presumption that the role of sterling and other currencies was artificially inflated by UK capital controls. This suggests that our conclusion is not simply a figment of postwar capital controls. Finally, it is worth emphasising that Ireland and the UK itself are the only sterling area countries in the sample. This makes it hard to argue that what we are picking up is entirely a sterling-area story.
All this notwithstanding, we control explicitly for the potential effects of this segmentation in the estimates by introducing three time-varying dummy variables designed to capture the main institutional features of UK exchange control regulations post-World War II, denoted fxcontrols. These dummy variables equal one when a country is in a given year, respectively: a member of the sterling area (and zero otherwise); a so-called “bilateral account” country (and zero otherwise); and a so-called “transferrable account” country (and zero otherwise).38 Values are taken from BIS (various issues).
We will show that British exchange controls are not the entire story. Other economic and structural characteristics of economies explain a significant portion of the variation across countries and time in dollar and sterling usage, even after “controlling for controls.” The economic importance of these factors is in fact even greater than that of exchange controls, again suggesting that observed patterns were not only due to the latter.
5. Baseline results
We estimate Eq. (1) using a linear country-effect estimator with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered heterogeneity to control for residual correlation between country observations in each year. The share of payments in dollars is the dependent variable.39
Table 1 reports baseline estimates of Eq. (1) for the share of dollar payments in oil imports in quantity terms for our sample of 15 European countries in 1938, 1947, 1949, 1950 and 1953. Columns 1-2 and 3-4 report those obtained with a 38 Sterling of “bilateral account” countries could be automatically transferred to accounts in the sterling area, while those held in “transferrable account” countries could be automatically transferred to accounts in both the sterling area and in other “transferrable account countries” (see BIS, various issues). Goldberg and Tille (2008) similarly test for whether the fact that a country is in a de jure or de facto euro or dollar bloc matters for currency invoicing.
39We consider the share of oil import payments in non-dollar currencies in robustness checks only, owing to the absence of a currency breakdown of the data on non-dollar oil import payments (assuming in the former case that the only unit used is sterling). We also experiment with a variety of other estimation techniques than linear fixed or random effect estimators, including panel tobit, difference GMM and system GMM. For the estimates using crude oil as dependent variable, we explicitly control for the fact that some countries imported no crude at all (i.e. neither from dollar nor from non-dollar sources) due to lack of refining facilities.
random effect and a fixed effect estimator, respectively. We control for time effects in columns 2 and 4.40
A first finding is that differences in dollar usage are affected by trade linkages with the United States. The coefficient on US import penetration is positive, large, and statistically significant in columns 2 and 4.41 This suggests that producer currency pricing (i.e. dollar payments) increases with penetration of US firms, in other words that denomination tends to be tilted towards the currency of US exporters where they account for the largest share of the market, insofar as they prefer being paid in their own currency to minimise exchange rate exposure (as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005). According to our estimates, a 1% increase in the share of the US in European imports is associated with a ?% increase in the share of dollar oil payments.
In addition, the impact of US import penetration is greater in larger countries, as suggested by its significant interaction coefficient with size. For a given level of import penetration from US firms, larger European oil importers (especially e.g. Germany, France, Italy and Belgium-Luxembourg) tend to use the dollar disproportionately more for import payments.42 This finding might be interpreted as reflecting the fact that larger and more powerful European importers are ready to take on more exchange rate risk exposure because they can also negotiate lower prices, as suggested in Goldberg and Tille (2013).43
Figure 6 provides an intuitive sense of this effect by plotting the estimated share of the US dollar in oil import payments (on the y-axis) against the share of US imports in total imports (on the x-axis) using the baseline model estimates in column (2) of Table 1. The effect is large. Assuming that the US is the source of 16% of total imports, the sample average, and that the economy is the size of Austria or Denmark (e.g. 2% of US GDP), the dollar would be used for 43% of oil import payments. Assuming that import penetration remains unchanged but that the economy is larger (e.g. about 20% of US GDP, a size roughly equivalent to that of France or Germany), our estimates indicate that the dollar would be used for 63% of oil import payments, a 20 percentage points increase.
We find no evidence that currency stability mattered for currency choice of oil import payments over the full estimation period. The estimated parameter for the coefficient of variation of the local currency’s exchange rate relative to the dollar is insignificant. The dummies for foreign exchange controls are mostly insignificant (we 40 Iceland drops out from the sample because the size variable was not available. We also dummy out Austria in 1947, where the share of the dollar in its oil import payments reached 100% (i.e. four times the average in other years).
41 But not when we do not control for time effects, as in columns 1 and 3.
42 In contrast, size alone is insignificant, except in column 2 (at the 10% level of confidence).
43 This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that when we use implied oil prices (which we can derive for 1949 and 1950 observations) as the dependant variable, the interaction coefficient between size and US import penetration is negative indeed, albeit insignificant, which is possibly due to the small number of observations available then for estimation.
return to this finding below).44 If we exclude the foreign exchange controls from the specification (as in columns 5 and 6), we find again strong evidence that import penetration and its interaction with size both affect the dollar share. The two coefficients are positive, significant and of a similar economic magnitude as before.
Table 2 reports similar estimates with the share of dollar payments in oil imports in value terms as the dependent variable (note that the results are based here on less than half of our original sample, due to limited availability of the dependent variable). The coefficient on US import penetration is again positive. It is significant in the estimations of columns 4, 5 and 6. When it is significant, the magnitude of the effect is also somewhat smaller. The estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the share of the US in European imports is associated with a roughly 0.3-0.4% increase in the dollar share of oil import payments. The interaction of import penetration and size is positive, mostly significant and somewhat smaller in size than the estimates in Table 1.
One noteworthy difference is that the coefficient on the variability of the local currency against the dollar is positive and significant. A possible explanation for why exchange rate volatility against the dollar shows up with the expected sign in the estimates for oil imports in value, but not quantity terms, is the difference in samples. Recall that we have data for only 1949 and 1950 for oil in value terms but data for 1938, 1947, 1949, 1950 and 1953 for oil in quantity terms. When we restrict the sample for the quantity equations to 1949 and 1950, volatility against the dollar sometimes shows up significantly as well.45 One interpretation of this result could be that currency instability mattered for the choice of a currency of oil import payments especially in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but not much before or thereafter.
Another difference is the impact of UK foreign exchange controls, which is significant in the random effect estimates of columns 1 and 2. The share of the dollar in the oil import payments of sterling area members (the UK, Ireland and Iceland) is estimated to be about 17 percentage points lower than that of the remaining countries, other things equal. This may reflect, as noted, the fact that US oil companies were pressured to sell an ever increasing share of their exports for sterling to the sterling area, particularly during the “dollar-sterling oil controversy” of the early 1950s.
In contrast, the share of the dollar in the oil import payments of bilateral account countries (mainly European continental countries) is estimated to be 9 percentage points higher than that of other countries, ceteris paribus. UK regulations made cross-border payments in sterling especially difficult for bilateral account countries (compared to sterling area and transferrable account countries). These countries were those whose international payment positions were so imbalanced among themselves, and with the UK, that unrestricted transferability of sterling could 44 Except the sterling area member dummy in the specification of column 3 (which is found to have a counterintuitive positive sign and to be statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence; more on this below).
45 Although only if one does not include the foreign exchange control dummies in the regression. If one keeps the foreign exchange control dummies, the effect then becomes insignificant.
not “be allowed without too great danger of a one-sided development” (BIS, 1948, p. 151).46Sterling from bilateral account countries could be transferred freely only to and from the sterling area; sterling transfers were not allowed among bilateral countries themselves, and they were not allowed with third countries outside the sterling area (such as the United States) without the authorisation of UK Control. That the use of sterling was costly and inconvenient for the bilateral account countries helps to explain why they were keen to use the dollar instead to pay for oil imports.
Overall, capital controls undoubtedly played a role in shaping currency use in this period. But other variables, like country size and trade linkages, had an even greater economic impact on the share of the dollar in oil import payments.47
6. Robustness
In robustness checks, we explore the importance of other variables considered in the literature on international currency invoicing but for which data are more limited, along with a range of institutional and political factors and alternative variable definitions.48
As an alternative measure of currency stability, we consider the premium between the free market rate in Basle for foreign banknotes and the official exchange rate.49 This can be thought of as the black market rate and as a measure of expected devaluation of the currency in question. An alternative interpretation is that the black market rate measures distortions and frictions in local currency markets relative to the dollar. Data are available for 11 of our 16 countries from BIS (various issues).
The literature suggests that a currency is more likely to be used for invoicing and settlement purposes if it is liquid and benefits from low transaction costs (Swoboda, 1968 and 1969; Portes and Rey, 1998; Devereux and Shi, 2013). Rey (2001) points to “thick market externalities” when a unit has a large presence in global international trade and low transaction costs of exchange. We proxy liquidity with the bid-ask spread of country i’s currency vis-à-vis the US dollar, following Goldberg and Tille (2008). We use London quotations in December of year t to that 46 Several of these countries were located in continental Europe, including Austria, Belgium, France or Italy.
47 Assuming again that import penetration from US firms is 16% of total imports and that the economy is the size of Austria or Denmark (e.g. 2% of US GDP), the estimates of column 2 of Table 2 suggest that the dollar would be used for 42% of oil import payments. Assuming again that import penetration remains unchanged but that the economy is larger (e.g. about 20% of US GDP, a size roughly equivalent to that of France or Germany), our estimates indicate that the dollar would be used for 68% of oil import payments, a 26 percentage points increase, one which is well above the estimated impact of foreign exchange controls in absolute value.
48 Unless stated otherwise, in all robustness checks we use a linear random-effects estimator, given that the Hausman test did not reject the null that the parameters estimated with an (efficient) random-effects estimator were the same as those using a (consistent but less efficient) fixed-effects estimator.
49 There was an active and legal market for such banknotes in Switzerland in the immediate aftermath of World War II.
end, taken from archived issues of the Financial Times (data were available for the entire period for nine of the countries of our sample).
We also control for the fact that some countries were oil producers. We add a dummy variable which equals one for the three countries which were home to one of the European “Sisters”, i.e. the UK (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now BP, and Royal Dutch-Shell); France (Compagnie Fran?aise des Pétroles, CFP, which was sometimes considered as the “Eighth Sister”; see Yergin, 2008); and the Netherlands (Royal Dutch-Shell).
Friberg and Wilander (2008), Goldberg and Tille (2011) and (2013) highlight the role of strategic interactions – of bargaining between exporters and importers – as a potential determinant of currency choice. In Goldberg and Tille (2013)’s two-currency model, the impact of bargaining power on invoicing currency choice crucially depends on whether exporters and importers bargain over both the price of a transaction and currency of invoicing or only over the latter.50 In addition, Goldberg and Tille (2011) consider the share of foreign or government ownership in an industry as a measure of related-party effects and constraints on pricing behaviour that might be associated with government influence. To capture potential government influence, we include in Eq. (1) a dummy variable that equals one for the two countries in our sample which have a multinational oil company partly (or wholly) owned by government, namely: the UK (AIOC); and France (Compagnie Fran?aise des Pétroles, CFP).
To capture other potential political motives (for instance, that US allies might have had a stronger preference for the US dollar) we include a dummy variable that equals one for countries that were part of the Axis during World War II (Austria, Germany and Italy) and a dummy that equals one for the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1949 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the UK).
Finally, we control for Marshall aid received each year by each country, since it could be argued that use of the dollar in oil settlements was heavily a function of how many dollars were made available to European countries by the United States through the European Recovery Program.
As Table 3 shows, the coefficients on import penetration and its interaction with size for the most part remain significantly positive.51 Size alone has a significant effect in only two specifications, exchange rate volatility in just one. The dummies for UK foreign exchange controls are insignificant. Neither our measure of local currency market frictions or distortions (the premium between the free market rate in Basle for 50 For instance, if bargaining concerns both aspects, importers with higher bargaining power negotiate lower prices but are also readier to accept higher exchange rate exposure, which leads to lower local currency pricing. In contrast, if bargaining takes place only over invoicing currency choice, higher bargaining power on the part of importers – expectedly – leads to higher local currency pricing.
51 With the exception of the specification using the black market rate reported in column 1 and that of liquidity reported in column 2; readers should note the smaller number of observations left for these two specifications, however, due to limited data availability.
foreign banknotes and the official exchange rate) nor our measure of foreign exchange market liquidity (the bid-ask spread of the local currency vis-à-vis the US dollar quoted in London) has a statistically significant effect. This may reflect the limited availability of data for both variables (note that the results for liquidity are in line with those of Goldberg and Tille (2008) for the modern period, however). Moreover, if we substitute exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis sterling for exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the dollar, this alternative measure of volatility is also found to have an insignificant effect. We obtain similar results if we use as yet another alternative measure exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the dollar, compared to exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis sterling.52 If currency instability mattered, it is evidently currency instability against the dollar.
Oil producers (i.e. the UK, the Netherlands and France) are found to use the dollar significantly less. By our estimates, the share of dollar payments in these countries was about 13 percentage points lower, ceteris paribus.53
The coefficient on government influence is also statistically significant. The two countries with a multinational oil company partly (or wholly) owned by government (the UK and France) have dollar shares 8 percentage points lower than other countries, ceteris paribus. This might reflect the role of related party-effects and constraints on pricing behaviour associated with government influence, consistently with Goldberg and Tille (2011). The Axis power and NATO founding member dummies are insignificant, in contrast. This suggests that economic – more than political – factors drove currency choice in oil markets before and after World War II.
Table 4 reports estimates based on our baseline sample using the share of dollar payments in oil imports in quantity terms as dependent variable, obtained using panel tobit, difference GMM and system GMM estimation techniques (also controlling for instrument proliferation bias as regards the latter two techniques, as suggested by Roodman, 2009). The main results remain unaltered to a large extent. The coefficient on import penetration is significantly positive (with a similar economic magnitude) in three specifications, while the coefficient of its interaction with size is positive and significant (and somewhat higher than in the baseline estimates, in some instances).54 Size alone, along with exchange rate volatility, again have little effect. Among UK foreign exchange controls, only the transferable account dummy is significant in one specification.
The inertia variable included in columns 3 to 5 is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable estimated using difference GMM and system GMM methods. Inertia, as opposed to “coalescing effects” (see Goldberg and Tille, 2008, 2011) does not appear to have been systematically considered in previous work on currency 52 Both sets of estimates are not reported here for the sake of brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
53They likely used their own currency as a unit of international settlement (i.e. sterling, the Dutch Guilder and the French franc, respectively) or sterling (for the Netherlands and France), albeit in proportions that are difficult to ascertain given the absence of a currency breakdown of the data on the share of non-dollar oil import payments.
54 Except in column 4.
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校园博客系统需求分析 评审日期：2010 年04 月01 日 目录 1导言 (1)
1.2范围 (1) 1.3缩写说明 (1) 1.4术语定义 (1) 1.5引用标准 (1) 1.6参考资料 (2) 2系统定义 (2) 2.1项目来源及背景 (2) 2.2系统整体结构 (2) 3应用环境 (3) 3.1系统运行网络环境 (3) 3.2系统运行硬件环境 (4) 3.3系统运行软件环境 (4) 4功能规格 (4) 4.1角色（ A CTOR ）定义 (5) 4.1.1博客访问者 (5) 4.1.2管理用户 (5) 4.1.3 数据库 (6) 4.2系统主U SE C ASE图. (6) 4.3客户端子系统 (6) 4.4管理端子系统 (8) 4.4.1 登录管理 ....................................................... 10 4.4.2 类型管理 ......................................................... 11 4.4.3 评论管理 ....................................................... 12 4.4.4 留言管理 ....................................................... 12 4.4.5 图片管理 ....................................................... 12 4.4.6 用户管理 ....................................................... 13 5性能需求 (13) 5.1 界面需求 (13) 5.2响应时间需求 (13) 5.3可靠性需求 (13) 5.4开放性需求 (14) 5.5可扩展性需求 (14) 5.6系统安全性需求 (14) 6产品提交 (14)
1.1 博客信息系统概述 “博客”（Blog或Weblog）一词源于“Web Log（网络日志）”的缩写，是一种十分简易的傻瓜化个人信息发布方式。任何人都可以像使用免费电子邮件一样，完成个人网页的创建、发布和更新。博客就是开放的私人空间，可以充分利用超文本链接、网络互动、动态更新等特点，在网络中，精选并链接全球互联网中最有价值的信息、知识与资源；也可以将个人工作过程、生活故事、思想历程、闪现的灵感等及时记录和发布，发挥个人无限的表达力；更可以以文会友，结识和汇聚朋友，进行深度交流沟通[1]。 “博客”当然是个大家都陌生的名词，博客的英文名词就是“Blog或Weblog”（指人时对应于Blogger），是一个典型的网络新事物，查阅最新的英文词典也不可能查到。该词来源于“Web Log（网络日志）”的缩写，特指一种特别的网络个人出版形式，内容按照时间顺序排列，并且不断更新。 博客是一种零编辑、零技术、零成本、零形式的网上个人出版方式。 博客概念一般包含了三个要素（当然，也不需要局限这些定义）： （1）网页主体内容由不断更新的、个性化的众多日志组成。 （2）按时间顺序排列，而且是倒序方式，也就是最新的放在最上面，最旧的放在最下面。 （3）内容可以是各种主题、各种外观布局和各种写作风格，但是文章内容以“超链接”作为重要的表达方式。 因此，博客是个人性和公共性的结合体，其精髓不是主要表达个人思想，不是主要记录个人日常经历；而是以个人的视角，以整个互联网为视野，精选和记录自己在互联网上看到的精彩内容，为他人提供帮助，使其具有更高的共享价值。 博客精神的核心并不是自娱自乐，甚至不是个人表达自由，相反，是体现一种利他的共享精神，为他人提供帮助。个人日记和个人网站主要表现的还是“小我”，而博客表现的是“大我”。也许形式上很接近，但内在有着本质的差异。所有优秀博客网站中，真正表达作者个人的内容非常有限，最多只是点缀，而不像个人网站那样是核心。 1.2 博客发展趋势 趋势一：博客现在正在形成个人的信誉机制，有了博客之后就确立了一个个人虚拟身份，简单的来讲就是个人在互联网上是有名有姓的，而不再是一种匿名的行为，网民从流浪汉变成了一个定居者。以前在互联网上的各种行为都是在匿名状态中，相互之间是不认识的，但有了博客之后可以天天关注，而别的人也可
汇博通文档借阅管理系统使用说明书 汇博通知识管理系统的属性管理，实际上已提供了借阅与归还功能，但那是针对每一份文件 或档案而言的。 这里，为客户提供一款专门用于文档的借阅与归还的软件，不但可办理一份文件的借阅或归 还手续，只要有需要，也可批量办理借阅与归还，另外，还提供了与借阅有关的一系列统计 报表。 发放功能与借阅类似，所不同的只是发放不必归还，如将购买的资料、图书发放给职员学习 等。 注：借阅与归还模块的操作，需要获得以下三种权限中的一种： 系统管理员 归档授权（档案管理员） 编号授权（文件管理员） 与借阅与归还模块相关的系统参数的设置说明如下：
首页 汇博通主页的模块工具条上，有一个借阅与归还的按钮，单击它即进入借阅与归还首页。 借阅（发放） 前面已经介绍过，借阅与发放的区别在于，借阅需要归还，发放则不必归还，从某种意义上 来说，发放实际上已将所有权（或有条件的所有权）转移给接收者。 借阅界面包括左右两个子窗体，左侧子窗体用于显示可供借阅（发放）的文档，其上部有搜 索关键词输入框，输入相应关键词即可查找出可供借阅的相应文档，如果要借阅的文档已经 在操作者手上，并且，标注有条形码或电子标签，操作者可直接通过条码阅读器或电子标签
阅读器读取相应编码直接获取到该文档。 根据实际需要，通过点选左侧的复选框，选择具体文档，然后，通过点击两个子窗体中间的箭头，即可将选中的文档添加到右侧子窗体的列表中，即可直接办理借阅或发放手续。 可供借阅（发放）检索列表待选区。借阅（发放）选择勾选列表区。 可供借阅（发放） 输入文件名称、编号、责任者或主题词等属性，点击【检索】按钮进行查找，如下图： 勾选确定后点击该按钮，即可添加到已 选择列表区中。
如何使用群晖备份、同步文件？通过群晖管家安装好NAS之后，想要实现备份、同步还要随时随地查看所有的文件？只需要一个Drive，就能把你的需求统统搞定。让你轻松的掌握文件同步和备份。 Drive既是备份盘、同步盘、网盘，还可以是协作盘。集中管理所有文件，还能够同步不同电脑上的数据。团队脑风暴时，可以多人在同一个文档上实时协同编辑，还能够备份电脑上的文件并且提供多版本保护。 安装及设置drive套件 1、打开群晖DSM界面，在套件中心安装Drive套件。 2、安装Drive套件会一并安装Drive管理控制台——顾名思义，就是可以设置Drive 相关功能、管理所有备份和同步的设备、查看历史版本等。 3、建议你在Drive管理控制台启用深度搜索，就可以在Drive里面查找内文关键字还有照片各种原始信息，步骤如图。
设置备份盘 1、首先进入群晖官网的下载中心，根据NAS机型，选择下载“Drive Client”PC客户端，Windows、Mac、Ubuntu一应俱全，系统兼容妥妥的。 2、PC客户端安装完成后，根据需求修改Drive服务器（NAS端）和电脑（本地端）的不同文件夹。 3、设置完成后，进入Drive PC客户端的控制面板，将同步模式改成“单向上传”，点击应用，然后就开始备份啦。 同步盘如何实现 1、同步盘很简单，设置步骤跟上面的备份盘一样，在需要同步的电脑上安装Drive PC客户端，并且选择双向同步。 2、如果在办公场景，希望把他人分享给你的共享文件夹同步到电脑本地，在PC客户 端控制面板点击“创建>启用同步与我共享”，这么一来，别人与你分享的文件也会同步到本地。
Web日志集中管理系统的研究与实现 吴海燕朱靖君程志锐戚丽 （清华大学计算机与信息管理中心，北京100084） E-mail：wuhy@https://www.doczj.com/doc/3413262505.html, 摘要： Web服务是目前互联网的第一大网络服务，Web日志的分析对站点的安全管理与运行维护非常重要。在实际运行中，由于应用部署的分散性和负载均衡策略的使用，使得Web日志被分散在多台服务器上，给日志的管理和分析带来不便。本文设计并实现了一个Web日志集中管理系统（命名为ThuLog），系统包括日志集中、日志存储和日志分析三个模块。目前，该系统已经在清华大学的多个关键Web应用系统上进行了应用，能够帮助系统管理员清晰地了解系统运行情况，取得了较好的运行效果。 关键词：Web日志日志分析日志集中管理系统 The Research and Implementation of a Centralized Web Log Management System Wu Haiyan Zhu Jingjun Cheng Zhirui Qi Li (Computer&Information Center,Tsinghua University,Beijing100084) Abstract：Web is now the biggest network service on the Internet.The analysis of Web logs plays an important role in the security management and the maintenance of a website.But because of the decentralization of deployment and the use of load balancing,Web logs are often seperated on each Web server,which makes the management and analysis of them not so convenient.This paper designs and implements a Web Log Centralized Management System(named ThuLog),which includes3modules:the centralization of logs,the storage of logs and the analysis of logs.Through log analysis of several critical Web systems in Tsinghua University,it could help system administrators learn clearly what happens in information systems and achieves good operating results. Key words：Web Logs Log Analysis Web Log Centralized Management System 1.引言 近年来，随着计算机网络技术的迅速发展，Web正以其广泛性、交互性、快
博 客 系 统 需 求 分 析 报 告 院系：信息电子工程学院 班级：软件08-1 设计小组人员：29号 日期：2010年5月24日
一、系统概述 “博客”一词是从英文单词Blog音译（不是翻译）而来。Blog是Weblog 的简称，而Weblog则是由Web和Log两个英文单词组合而成。 Weblog就是在网络上发布和阅读的流水记录，通常称为“网络日志”，简称为“网志”。博客（BLOGGER）概念解释为网络出版（Web Publishing）、发表和张贴（Post-这个字当名词用时就是指张贴的文章）文章，是个急速成长的网络活动，现在甚至出现了一个用来指称这种网络出版和发表文章的专有名词——Weblog，或Blog。 在网络上发表Blog的构想始于1998年，但到了2000年才开始真正流行。而2000年博客开始进入中国，并迅速发展，但都业绩平平。直到2004年木子美事件，才让中国民众了解到了博客，并运用博客。2005年，国内各门户网站，如新浪、搜狐，原不看好博客业务，也加入博客阵营，开始进入博客春秋战国时代。起初，Bloggers将其每天浏览网站的心得和意见记录下来，并予以公开，来给其他人参考和遵循。但随着Blogging快速扩张，它的目的与最初已相去甚远。目前网络上数以千计的Bloggers发表和张贴Blog的目的有很大的差异。不过，由于沟通方式比电子邮件、讨论群组更简单和容易，Blog已成为家庭、公司、部门和团队之间越来越盛行的沟通工具，因为它也逐渐被应用在企业内部网络（Intranet）。目前，国内优秀的中文博客网有：新浪博客，搜狐博客，中国博客网，腾讯博客，博客中国等。 二、需求分析 博客系统是一个多用户、多界面的系统，主要包括以下几个模块组成。 1.匿名用户模块 本模块主要由注册、登录、浏览博客、评论4个部分组成。匿名用户可以对其他用户的博客内容时行浏览、评论。也可以通过注册后登录博客系统，申请一个属于自己的博客。 2.注册用户模块 本模块主要由个人信息管理、评论管理、好友管理、相册管理、文章管理5
XX集团—人力资源管理系统操作手册 目录 常用操作（新人必读） (2) 1.基础数据管理 ................................................................................................................... - 5 - 1.1组织架构 (5) 1.2职位体系 (8) 1.3职员维护 (11) 1.4结束初始化.................................................................................. 错误！未定义书签。 2.组织管理业务 ................................................................................................................. - 27 - 2.1组织规划 (27) 2.2人力规划 (33) 2.3组织报表 (38) 3.员工管理业务 ................................................................................................................. - 41 - 3.1员工状态管理 (41) 3.2合同管理 (41) 3.3后备人才管理 .............................................................................. 错误！未定义书签。 3.4人事事务 (52) 3.5人事报表 (59) 4.薪酬管理 ......................................................................................................................... - 69 - 4.1基础数据准备 (69) 4.2薪酬管理日常业务 (92) 4.3薪酬管理期末业务 (107) 4.4薪酬报表 (108)
前言 本《操作手册》内容是按该软件主界面上第一横排从左至右的顺序对各个功能加以介绍的，建议初学者先对第一章系统设置作初步了解，从第二章基础资料读起，回头再读第一章。该管理软件的重点与难点是第二章，望读者详读。 第一章系统设置 打开此管理软件，在主界面上的左上方第一栏就是【系统设置】，如下图所示： 点击【系统设置】，在系统设置下方会显示【系统设置】的内容，包括操作员管理、数据初始化、修改我的登录密码、切换用户、选项设置、单据报表设置、导入数据、数据库备份、数据库恢复、压缩和修复数据库、退出程序。下面分别将这些功能作简要介绍： 1.1操作员管理 新建、删除使用本软件的操作员，授权他们可以使用哪些功能。此功能只有系统管理员可以使用。 1.1.1 进入界面 单击【系统设置】，选择其中的【操作员管理】，画面如下：
1.1.2、增加操作员 单击【新建】按钮，画面如下： 输入用户名称、初始密码、选择用户权限，可对用户进行适当描述，按【保存】后就点【退出】，就完成了新操作员的添加，效果如下图。
1.1.3 删除操作员 选择要删除的操作员，单击【删除】按钮。 1.1.4 修改操作员 选择要修改的操作员，单击【修改】按钮，可对操作员作相应修改，修改后需保存。 1.1.5 用户操作权限 选择要修改的操作员，单击【修改】按钮，出现以下画面，点击【用户权限】栏下的编辑框，出现对号后点【保存】，该操作员就有了此权限。 1.2数据初始化 1.2.1进入界面 单击【系统设置】，选择其中的【数据初始化】，画面如下：
1.2.2数据清除 选择要清除的数据，即数据前出现对号，按【确定】后点【退出】，就可清除相应数据。 1.3 修改我的登录密码 1.3.1进入界面 单击【系统设置】，选择其中的【修改我的登录密码】，画面如下： 1.3.2密码修改 输入原密码、现密码，然后对新密码进行验证，按【确定】后关闭此窗口，就可完成密码修改。 1.4 切换用户 1.4.1进入界面 单击【系统设置】，选择其中的【切换用户】，画面如下：
多文件夹的自动同步和各向同步工具 出处：小建の软件园作者：佚名日期：2008-06-25 关键字：同步 对于经常需要备份文件，同步文件的网友，Allway Sync 可谓不可多得，虽然不能激活其专业版，对文件数量多和经常性的同步操作可能会超过免费版的限制，不过对于一般文件数量不多同步操作可以完全满足，Allway Sync 使用相当简单，多种同步方式能满足你不同需求。对重要文件进行备份是文件恢复最好的方法，而 Allway Sync 可以简化你许多备份的过程，能实现自动备份，如果你“胃口”不大，免费版应当已经可以满足。 下载地址：https://www.doczj.com/doc/3413262505.html,/soft/23495.html Allway Sync 可以进行自动同步，可以对的文件/文件夹进行筛选，只备份需要的东东。
Allway Sync 备份方式介绍 - 同步方式有源文件夹同步和各向同步两种方式： 1、源文件夹同步方式将以一个文件夹为基准，删除或覆盖其余文件夹与源文件相比较不相同的文件。 2、各向同步方式则自动将更新的文件覆盖几个同步文件夹中的旧文件。软件带有一个小型数据库，监视每次更新后的文件状态。如果在一次同步之后，你删除了同步文件夹中某些文件，它在同步的时候将其它的几个文件夹的副本也删除，而不会将不需要的未删除文件重复拷贝到已更新的文件夹。由于软件自己会对文件进行删除和覆盖，它提供了使用回收站进行文件备份的措施，使用者可以在不慎执行错误的同步动作之后，从回收站将错误删除或覆盖的文件找回来（默认禁用该功能，请到软件选项处激活相应设置）。 主程序在 AllwaySync＼Bin＼里面，此为多国语言版，在语音选项那里选择中文即可。不过退出的时候会有错误提示（貌似没影响？）
系统需求分析和概要设计 1 系统需求分析 1.1 开发背景 过去很多人都喜欢写文章写日记以及交流自己的文章和作品，以求实现相互间的沟通、展现自己的才华和让别人了解自己的想法观点。现在的网络已经成为人们生活中不可或缺的一个元素，所以自然而然诞生了博客这样一个新兴事物，它不仅仅能取代前面所说的功能，还能加入图片，而且使得作者更能无所拘束地生动地写出自己想写的，旁人也能非常便捷地阅读并且加以评论，并且它还能作为展示个人个性的窗户。个人博客现在已经成为很多人生活中必不可少的一个部分，方便了人与人之间的沟通和交流。 1.2 系统实现目标概述 基于个人博客以上的特点，本系统要实现个人博客的主要基本功能有主界面，博客用户登录发表文章（心情、日志），用户登录/退出，游客发表评论，分页浏览文章和评论等。这里其中比较主要的是区分了个人博客用户和游客。博客用户可以在任何时候写下自己的主张，记录下自己的点点滴滴。而游客主要的权限是阅读博客所有注册用户写的文章，阅读后可以发表评论和留言，还可以分页浏览所有注册用户上传的图片。以上是个人博客的系统功能目标，当然由于个人博客的网络流行特点以及个人个性的展示，还适当要求界面比较漂亮轻快，直观便捷，操作方式简单以及人性化。 1.3 系统功能需求 根据对系统的特点和应用的分析，可以得到本系统主要有如下功能： （1）登录 这部分功能又分为用户登录、用户退出两个部分。 登录：主要用于验证博客网站用户信息的真实身份，以便对博客网站进行管
理和维护。通过系统管理员写入的用户名，密码登录到网站。网站检测用户的用户名，密码并给予其相应的权限对博客网站进行操作。 用户退出：已经登陆的用户可以退出，释放自己所占有的各种信息资源。 （2）文章管理 文章管理主要有文章的发表、查询、浏览、评论和删除功能。 博客的系统管理员除了可以查询、浏览和评论文章外，还可以对系统中的所有文章以及评论进行修改、删除操作。这些维护和管理拥有最高权限，并且系统自动更新在服务器端数据库中的数据。 文章的发表：博客用户可以发表自己的文章，文章包括主题、正文、表情、图片等信息，作者通过各种元素来展示自己的想法和思想。系统接受这些信息并且存储在服务器端的数据库中。 文章的删除：博客用户可以删除自己已经发表的文章内容和各项信息，系统自动在服务器端数据库中删除这些记录。 文章的浏览：游客和博客用户根据所获得的用户权限获取服务器端数据存储的各篇文章并且浏览阅读文章的所有信息，包括标题、正文、表情、图片以及其它读者的留言评论。 文章的评论：文章的读者可以评论和回复所阅读的文章，发表自己的看法。系统自动将这些评论存储在服务器端的数据库中，并且可供博客作者以及其它读者浏览。 文章的查询：博客用户可以按文章题目或作者来查询想要查的文章。 文章中还可能包含一些图片视频等多媒体,所以文章管理中还包含了网站中媒体的管理。 媒体管理有添加，浏览、删除和查询功能。博客用户可以添加自己喜欢的图片或视频等，还可以查询和浏览系统中的所有媒体信息。游客只能浏览博客系统中的媒体信息。系统管理员拥有以上的所有权限，除此之外还可以删除媒体信息。 （3）博客管理员管理 博客管理员可以添加、删除新用户，用户的角色又分为订阅者、作者、编辑、投稿者、管理员。 还可以对博客主页的外观、博客使用的插件、工具进行添加、删除、设置。
1.过滤信息 在这个网络信息泛滥的时代，网上的信息太多、太杂、太乱，学习者无法判别哪些信息是有价值的，哪些是重要的。教师可以通过博客将经过过滤过的信息传递给学生，而学生也可以通过博客将信息传递给他的伙伴。通过浏览别人的博客日志，知识获取的效率将得到很大的提高。 2.提供学习的丰富情境 通常的教辅网站，只是提供一些参考资料的链接，而博客则提供更多的评价，更广泛的背景资料。有一些学者通过博客日志反映他们对某些问题的认识，开始对于这些问题的看法可能也是粗糙的，但是他们将这些思想表达出来，然后在博客上发表后续的看法。在这一过程中，专家可以将最近看了哪些书，读了哪些人的文章，听取了哪些意见都通过博客方式表达出来。这样，阅读者了解的不仅仅是专家静态的、目前的观点，而重要的是可以把握专家思想的流程。同样，这一方式对于学生来讲也是有效的，学生的博客日志可以反映出他们在学习过程中产生的问题、关于问题的想法与思路、问题的解决过程，使得教师可以更有效地了解学生的学习状况。 3.提高学生的媒体文化水平 博客（blog）的个人化使得博客们（blogger）在信息发布的过程中，要采用最适当的方式对信息进行过滤与说明，使得他的博客日志能够为更多的人接受，使得他的思想和资源为更多的人所了解。与传统BBS相比，博客日志具有更强的规范性，博客们具有更强的自律性。由于博客一般是由个人或小组拥有的，通常具有共同的主题，所谓敝帚自珍，所以在博客的世界中，很少出现在BBS中常见的不负责任的"胡说八道"。 4.鼓励参与者发表自己不同的观点 博客的模式是平等的，博客更看重的是参与的过程而不是结果。对于教师或书本上的观点，学生可以通过博客的方式发表他对于这些问题的理解，博客并不要求意见的统一，但要求意见的针对性和独立性。另外，在课程设置的过程中可以设置多个不同的议题，允许学生自由地选择他们感兴趣的议题。 5.提供对信息的评价 博客的重要特征就是对信息的过滤，使得信息可以转换成有用的知识。但是
备份软件使用方法 一Bestsync2012使用说明 1 软件运行 点击BestSync2012运行软件 2 设置任务 在编辑菜单下点击追加任务（如果任务列表下没有任务可以在文件菜单下选择新建任务选项） 软件会弹出任务窗口，用来设置同步任务
以其中一个任务为例
选择好同步的文件夹和同步方向，点击下一步，按照要求设置任务即可。 3 查看任务 在以有任务中点击设置任务（任务必须是未在同步状态，否者不能点击设置任务选项）
点击后软件会弹出设置同步任务窗口，在这里可以在里面进行任务修改和设置
目前我们设置的同步任务只需要修改一般和日程两个窗口下的内容，其他暂时不需要修改。 BestSync2012这款同步软件目前还不是很稳定，需要不定期检查一下软件是否运行正常，如果发现软件出错，就关闭软件后在打开BestSync2012软件，因为打开软件后软件不会自动启动同步功能，所有需要手动启动所有任务 注意： 1 在修改任务在开启后，必须将修改的任务停止一下在开启，不然同步任务不能正常同步。 2 现有BestSync2012同步软件在16.15和151.247这两台机器上。
二Backup Exec 2010 R2 SP1使用说明 1 软件运行 点击Backup Exec 2010运行软件 2 设置任务 在作业设置选项中可以看到作业的作业名称、策略名称和备份选这项列表。 其中作业名称里放有现有作业，双击其中一个作业就可以看到作业属性。作业属性默认显示设备和介质窗口，在设备和介质窗口下可以选择设备和介质集。目前设备选项中因为只有一台磁带机工作，所有只有一个选项，而介质集一般选择永久保留数据-不允许覆盖选项。
博客系统需求分
一、系统概述 “博客”一词是从英文单词Blog音译（不是翻译）而来。Blog是Weblog 的简称，而Weblog则是由Web和Log两个英文单词组合而成。 Weblog就是在网络上发布和阅读的流水记录，通常称为“网络日志”，简称为“网志”。博客（BLOGGER）概念解释为网络出版（Web Publishing）、发表和张贴（Post-这个字当名词用时就是指张贴的文章）文章，是个急速成长的网络活动，现在甚至出现了一个用来指称这种网络出版和发表文章的专有名词——Weblog，或Blog。 在网络上发表Blog的构想始于1998年，但到了2000年才开始真正流行。而2000年博客开始进入中国，并迅速发展，但都业绩平平。直到2004年木子美事件，才让中国民众了解到了博客，并运用博客。2005年，国内各门户网站，如新浪、搜狐，原不看好博客业务，也加入博客阵营，开始进入博客春秋战国时代。起初，Bloggers将其每天浏览网站的心得和意见记录下来，并予以公开，来给其他人参考和遵循。但随着Blogging快速扩张，它的目的与最初已相去甚远。目前网络上数以千计的Bloggers发表和张贴Blog的目的有很大的差异。不过，由于沟通方式比电子邮件、讨论群组更简单和容易，Blog已成为家庭、公司、部门和团队之间越来越盛行的沟通工具，因为它也逐渐被应用在企业内部网络（Intranet）。目前，国内优秀的中文博客网有：新浪博客，搜狐博客，中国博客网，腾讯博客，博客中国等。 二、需求分析 博客系统是一个多用户、多界面的系统，主要包括以下几个模块组成。 1.匿名用户模块
漫漫教学路，博客伴我行能在互联网上拥有一个真正属于自己的空间，是我的梦想，而 今天这个梦想在“博客”中实现了。我怀着一颗好奇心，在博客上流连，申请了一方属于自己的免费空间，置身于梦幻秋天的背景下，设置自己喜欢的几个栏目，于是我便拥有了博客。当我第一次在博客中添加文章的时候，兴奋得无法入眠。我想：平素与网络无缘的我也终于拥有了一个网上家园。一个可以让我任意挥洒激情、记录人生轨迹的网上家园。感谢博客给我一块自由的空间，让我展翅飞翔！在与博客“亲密接触”的日子里，我深深地感觉到博客对教育的促进，对自身专业化成长的帮助。 在开始的时候，我也只是摘录一些自己感兴趣的信息，很少有经过自己思考的原创日志。随着对博客认识的加深，以及浏览其他著名博客所受到的启示，我也试着把自己在教育中的思考及时记录下来。就这样我在博客里“书写着，记录着，思考着，分享着，品味着，学习着”，在不断地积累中感受着学习的乐趣。在博客里写作已经逐渐成为我的一种习惯，在博客中我不断地阅读、书写，在阅读、书写中释放心情，这让我感到在博客中学习竟是如此快乐。我在博客中开设了心灵随笔，教学案例，教学反思，教学相长，教学设计，教学论文，主题中队会等栏目…… 作为一名教师，我深深地认识到：要想鼓励、指导学生写出好的文章，教师必须要有过硬的写作基本功，博客中的心灵随笔这个栏目正好为我提供了这样一个平台，我在这个栏目中及时捕捉教学生活中细微的瞬间，从中悟出深刻的道理，并马上形成文字。例如：《让心灵跟着爱飞翔》、《如何赏识学生》、《感动》、《怎样转变学生的不良习惯》等文章。心灵的感悟，出乎意料的发挥了作用，有了这样的历练，对学生进行写作指导和评改，就驾轻就熟了。学生也会在老师的指导下逐渐明白，写作并不是一件很难的事情，只要真实的记录自己在生活中的所见、所闻，有了自己的感悟，慢慢就会写出具有真情实感的文章。 在博客中记录教学过程是一个不断充实自己，提高自己的过程，教学中我也曾遇到过很多困惑，于是把这些困惑书写到我的博客中，期待与博友们交流和切磋。博友们的热心触发了我很多灵感，常常使我茅塞顿开……我现在博客中的教学案例就是平时点滴的积累。《位置与方向》《那只松鼠》《笔算除法》《商中间、末
目录 1 软件介绍...................................................... １ 2 软件运行环境 ................................................. １ 3 软件安装步骤 ................................................. １ 4 软件卸载步骤 ................................................. ４ 5 软件使用...................................................... ４5.1、创建数据库.............................................................................................................................. ４ 5.2、创建数据数据表................................................................................................................... ６ 5.3、历史数据读取 ........................................................................................................................ ７ 5.4、查看历史数据、通道信息.............................................................................................. ８ 5.5、打印数据、曲线或图片输出 .................................................................................... １３ 5.6、数据实时采集 .................................................................................................................... １５ 6 软件使用中可能出现的问题与解决方法.................. １８6.1、不出现对话框 .................................................................................................................... １８ 6.2、数据库不能建立............................................................................................................... １８ 6.3、U盘不能数据转存........................................................................................................... １８ 6.4、U盘上没有文件 ................................................................................................................ １８ 6.5、U盘数据不能导入计算机；...................................................................................... １８
GoodSync同步软件完美注册、本地同步图文教程 出处：西西整理作者：西西日期：2012-4-12 15:22:15 [大中小] 评论: 0 | 我要发表看法 文件管理这件看似简单的事，真的不简单，因为为了防止意外情况，你需要对文件进行备份，时间一久随着文件数量的增加，再加上有时也会临时队备份文件进行修改等。再想查出这个是最新的、文件有木有全部备份等….就没那么容易了吧！其实这一切说了很简单，因为你可以请：GoodSync软件来帮忙！ GoodSync是一款简单可靠的文件备份和文件同步软件，可以实现两台电脑或者电脑与U盘之间的数据文件的自动同步。GoodSync可以在本地U盘与电脑之间，以及U盘、移动硬盘或电脑与服务器、外部驱动器、W indowsM obile设备、网友、网盘等之间自动同步或单向备份数据。它能自动分析、同步、备份您的电子邮件、珍贵照片、联系人、电影视频、音乐文件、财务文件和其它重要文件。再也不会遗失您的电子邮件，照片，MP3等。 由于GoodSync为共享收费软件，所以这次西西带来的是官网原版+注册机（下载地址，下载的压缩包内含官网下载的GoodSync v9.1.5.5主程序和注册机以及注册说明），还是那句老话：如果你有能力请支持购买正版的GoodSync，如果….就低调吧！好吧！一起来看下注册方法吧！ GoodSync 注册方法： 1、首先下载压缩包，并解压运行GoodSync-Setup.exe 进行软件安装，软件默认安装为英文，如果要安装简体中文版，在安装时注意选择语言为：simpchinese项，安装完毕后运行GoodSync程序。 2、将你电脑的系统时间设置到2011年。 3、如下图所示，在软件主界面依次点击选择：帮助→ 激活专业版。
点击文章中飘蓝词可直接进入官网查看 大数据日志分析系统 大数据时代，网络数据增长十分迅速。大数据日志分析系统是用来分析和审计系统及 事件日志的管理系统，能够对主机、服务器、网络设备、数据库以及各种应用服务系统等 产生的日志进行收集和细致分析，大数据日志分析系统帮助IT管理员从海量日志数据中准确查找关键有用的事件数据，准确定位网络故障并提前识别安全威胁。大数据日志分析系 统有着降低系统宕机时间、提升网络性能、保障企业网络安全的作用。 南京风城云码软件公司（简称：风城云码）南京风城云码软件技术有限公司是获得国 家工信部认定的“双软”企业，具有专业的软件开发与生产资质。多年来专业从事IT运维监控产品及大数据平台下网络安全审计产品研发。开发团队主要由留学归国软件开发人员 及管理专家领衔组成，聚集了一批软件专家、技术专家和行业专家，依托海外技术优势， 使开发的软件产品在技术创新及应用领域始终保持在领域上向前发展。 审计数据采集是整个系统的基础，为系统审计提供数据源和状态监测数据。对于用户 而言，采集日志面临的挑战就是：审计数据源分散、日志类型多样、日志量大。为此，系 统综合采用多种技术手段，充分适应用户实际网络环境的运行情况，采集用户网络中分散 在各个位置的各种厂商、各种类型的海量日志。 分析引擎对采集的原始数据按照不同的维度进行数据的分类，同时按照安全策略和行 为规则对数据进行分析。系统为用户在进行安全日志及事件的实时分析和历史分析的时候 提供了一种全新的分析体验——基于策略的安全事件分析过程。用户可以通过丰富的事件分析策略对的安全事件进行多视角、大跨度、细粒度的实时监测、统计分析、查询、调查、追溯、地图定位、可视化分析展示等。
投标文件管理软件（V2.0.0.3） 用 户 使 用 手 册 深圳市斯维尓科技有限公司 二〇一三年三月五日
目录 1引言 (3) 2 程序运行环境 (4) 3 程序安装 (4) 4 软件启动 (9) 5软件整体说明 (12) 6 软件操作说明 (15) 6.1导入查看招标文件 (15) 6.2新建投标文件 (16) 6.3投标文件的管理功能 (23) 6.4校对工程量清单 (29) 6.5转换投标文件 (30) 6.6 电子签章 (32) 6.7生成投标文件 (34) 6.8查看数字签名信息 (41) 7 程序卸载 (42)
1引言 编写本手册的主要目的是为东莞市建设工程交易中心电子评标系统的投标文件管理软件的使用提供帮助。 投标文件管理软件主要提供给投标单位使用。投标单位通过投标文件管理软件将工程招标文件的一些主要内容导出，根据招标要求制作投标文件；加入已经制作好的工程投标文件所包含的所有文档（包括：技术标文件、工程量清单、工程图纸以及其它文件等），并进行管理，对文件包进行CA数字签名以防篡改，并生成压缩加密的电子投标文件包的功能。 投标文件管理软件的使用总体流程如下图所示：
2 程序运行环境 ?硬件环境：CPU: P4 2GHZ 内存2G,硬盘80GB ?软件环境：Windows 2000/XP/Windows Server 2003 ?软件支持：OFFICE2007+PDF转换插件/OFFICE2010 ?网络环境：带宽10/100Mbps 3 程序安装 东莞市建设工程交易中心网站(https://www.doczj.com/doc/3413262505.html,/)上下载最新安装包，点击安装程序，安装程序引导用户进行系统安装，主要有以下步骤： 一、启动安装程序，进入安装系统欢迎界面。如下图：
软件简介： FileGee之软件主界面(图一) FileGee个人文件同步备份系统是一款优秀的文件同步与备份软件。它集文件备份、同步、加密、分割于一身。协助个人用户实现硬盘之间，硬盘与移动存储设备之间的备份与同步。强大的容错功能和详尽的日志、进度显示，更保证了备份、同步的可靠性。高效稳定、占用资源少的特点，充分满足了用户的需求。不需要额外的硬件资源，便能搭建起一个功能强大、高效稳定的全自动备份环境，是一种性价比极高的选择。 一.软件安装 FileGee个人文件同步备份系统在使用前须对其进行安装才可进行使用，软件须按照提示进行安装，软件安装过程如下图所示： FileGee之接受安装协议(图二) FileGee之选择安装目录(图三) FileGee之完成安装(图四) 二.软件使用 FileGee在完成安装后双击桌面图标即可启动该软件，用户如要创建备份，即可点击软件左上角处的新建任务按钮来创建新任务，软件提供多种任务类型，如单向同步，双向同步，镜像同步，更新同步等等，用户鼠标停留在任务类型上即可看到相关的解释说明，如下图所示： FileGee之新建任务(图五) 用户在选择创建备份任务类型后，即可点击下一步按钮，点击后软件会自动弹出窗口，用户需在窗口中设置要进行备份的文件夹所在位置，如下图所示： FileGee之设置备份文件夹(图六) 设置完要进行备份的文件夹后，我们还需要对备份文件的存储位置进行设置保存，另外为了节省空间我们还可以对文件设置是否进行压缩，如下图所示：
FileGee之备份文件保存(图七) 在设置完毕后我们即可点击下一步按钮，在后面的设置选项中我们还可以对备份的文件进行详细设置，如是否包含源目录的子目录，还可以根据文件名对要备份的文件进行过滤，也可以对文件进行过滤设置，如下图所示： FileGee之备份设置(图八) 设置完毕后，我们即可点击软件上侧列表中的开始按钮对文件进行备份，，另外还可以点击软件上侧的定时自动功能设置定时对文件夹进行自动备份，如下图所示： FileGee之备份任务(图九) 小结：FileGee作为一款免费得文件夹自动同步备份工具，不但功能上比较强大，在使用上也是非常的方便，如果您也需要一款文件备份工具的话，那么就来试试FileGee吧，只需简单几步就可以完成文件夹同步备份，非常方便!