中文2825字
1868单词
外文文献：
Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance
Dimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki 1
Abstract：This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.
Firm performance, capital structure and ownership
Conflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as those between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure remains largely unexplored. On the other hand, a voluminous literature is devoted to capital structure and its effects on corporate performance –see the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001). An emerging consensus that comes out of the corporate governance literature (see Mahrt-Smith, 2005) is that the interactions between capital structure and ownership structure impact on firm values. Yet theoretical arguments alone cannot unequivocally predict these relationships (see Morck et al., 1988) and the empirical evidence that we have often appears to be contradictory. In part these conflicting results arise from difficulties empirical researchers face in obtaining direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs that are not confounded by factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). In the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature in this area focusing on the main hypotheses of interest for this study.
Firm performance and capital structure
The agency cost theory is premised on the idea that the interests of the company’s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. These conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take
1来源：Journal of Banking & Finance , 2010 (34) : 621–632，本文翻译的是第二部分
excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies. This leads us to Jensen’s (1986) “free cash flow theory”where as stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323) “the problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.”Thus high debt ratios may be used as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash flows to service debt (Jensen, 1986). In these situations, debt will have a positive effect on the value of the firm.
Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“underinvestment”or “debt overhang”problem. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment problem. The model predicts that debt can have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance and presumably both effects are present in all firms. We allow for the presence of both effects in the empirical specification of the agency cost model. However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize this in terms of our first testable hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firm’s performance.
Reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure
But firm performance may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for debt in their capital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choose higher leverage ratios because higher efficiency is expected to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In essence, the efficiency-risk hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all else equal, enable firms to fine tune their optimal capital structure.
It is also possible that firms which expect to sustain high efficiency rates into the future will choose lower debt to equity ratios in an attempt to guard the economic rents or franchise value generated by these efficiencies from the threat of liquidation (see Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Thus in addition to a equity for debt substitution effect, the relationship between efficiency and capital structure may also be characterized by the presence of an income effect. Under the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) more efficient firms tend to hold extra equity capital and therefore, all else equal, choose lower leverage ratios to protect their future income or franchise value.
Thus the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2) and the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) yield opposite predictions regarding the likely effects of firm efficiency on the choice of capital structure. Although we cannot identify the separate substitution and income effects our empirical analysis is able to determine which effect dominates the other across the spectrum of different capital structure choices.
Ownership structure and the agency costs of debt and equity.
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance dates back to Berle and
Means (1932) who argued that widely held corporations in the US, in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of insiders tend to underperform. Following from this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop more formally the classical owner-manager agency problem. They advocate that managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders’wealth or to engage in other sub-optimal activities and thus helps in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders which in turn lowers agency costs. Along similar lines, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large external equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives to monitor and discipline management.
In contrast Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in insider share-ownership stakes may also be associated with adverse ‘entrenchment’effects that can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism at the expense of outside investors. Whether firm value would be maximized in the presence of large controlling shareholders depends on the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Several studies document either a direct (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens et al., 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008) or a non-monotonic (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Davies et al., 2005) relationship between ownership structure and firm performance while others (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) find no relation between ownership concentration and firm performance.
Family firms are a special class of large shareholders with unique incentive structures. For example, concerns over family and business reputation and firm survival would tend to mitigate the agency costs of outside debt and outside equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003) although controlling family shareholders may still expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Several studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; King and Santor, 2008) report that family firms especially those with large personal owners tend to outperform non-family firms. In addition, the empirical findings of Maury (2006) suggest that large controlling family ownership in Western Europe appears to benefit rather than harm minority shareholders. Thus we expect that the net effect of family ownership on firm performance will be positive.
Large institutional investors may not, on the other hand, have incentives to monitor management (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and they may even coerce with management (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak investor protection and less developed capital markets where they also classify Continental Europe.
We summarize the contrasting ownership effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment on firm performance in terms of two competing hypotheses. Under the ‘convergence-of-interest hypothesis’(H3) more concentrated ownership should have a positive effect on firm performance. And under the ownership entrenchment hypothesis (H3a) the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is expected to be negative.
The presence of ownership entrenchment and incentive alignment effects also has implications for the firm’s capital structure choice. We assess these effects empirically. As external blockholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial opportunism they may prefer to use debt
as a governance mechanism to control management’s consumption of perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982). In that case firms with large external blockholdings are likely to have higher debt ratios at least up to the point where the risk of bankruptcy may induce them to lower debt. Family firms may also use higher debt levels to the extent that they are perceived to be less risky by debtholders (Anderson et al., 2003). On the other hand the relation between leverage and insider share-ownership may be negative in situations where managerial blockholders choose lower debt to protect their non-diversifiable human capital and wealth invested in the firm (Friend and Lang, 1988). Brailsford et al. (2002) report a non-linear relationship between managerial share-ownership and leverage. At low levels of managerial ownership, agency conflicts necessitate the use of more debt but as managers become entrenched at high levels of managerial ownership they seek to reduce their risks and they use less debt. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that insider ownership by managers or families has no effect on leverage while King and Santor (2008) report that both family firms and firms controlled by financial institutions carry more debt in their capital structure.
外文翻译：
资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效
摘要：本文通过对法国制造业公司的抽样调查，研究资本结构、所有权结构和公司绩效的关系。我们采用非参数的数据包络分析方法来实证构建行业“最佳惯例”边界，衡量公司绩效与这一边界的距离。利用这些性能指标，我们可以检验越高效率的公司在资本结构中选择越多的债务或者越少的债务。我们总结在以下两个相互竞争的假说下资本结构效率截然不同的影响：效率风险假说和特许权价值假说。利用分位数回归我们可以检测杠杆效率的影响和这两个相互竞争的假说对不同资本结构的选择上的实证效度。我们也可以通过詹森和麦考林的代理成本模型规定来检测杠杆和效率的直接关系。通过这个分析我们考虑所有权结构的作用和资本结构和公司绩效的类型。
公司绩效、资本结构与所有权
所有权经理人和外部股东以及控股股东和少数股东之间的利益冲突是公司治理文化的核心(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986)。尽管有相当多的文献研究所有权对公司绩效的影响(例如，Morck 等, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg等, 1999)，但所有权结构与资本结构间的关系在很大程度上仍未发现。另一方面，大量的文献致力于资本结构和它对公司绩效的影响-- Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001)的研究，来自公司治理文献的新兴共识是资本结构和所有权结构影响公司价值的相互作用(Mahrt-Smith, 2005)。然而仅仅理论上的争论不能明确地预测这些关系(Morck 等, 1988)，经验证据表明似乎是矛盾的。在某种程度上这些冲突的结果来自于实证研究者面对的获得直接措施的代理成本的大小，不被管理成本之外的因素混淆(Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006)。在本节的剩余部分我们简要回顾这一领域的文献，焦点在于研究的主要假设前提。
公司绩效与资本结构
代理成本理论的前提是公司管理者和股东的利益不完全一致。Jensen and Meckling (1976)在他们的开创性论文中强调来自公司所有权与控制权分离的股权代理成本的重要性，管理者在意的是自身效用而不是公司价值的最大化。当管理者有动机将过多的风险转变成投资策略风险的情况下这些冲突就会发生。这就引出了Jensen的“自由现金流量理论”，Jensen (1986, p. 323)指出“问题是如何激励管理者流出现金而不是低于资金成本的投资或组织效率低下造成的浪费。”高负债率被当做是通过清算威胁减少管理者现金流浪费的纪律设备(Grossman and Hart, 1982)或者通过压力产生现金流量偿还债务(Jensen, 1986)。在这种情况下，债务对公司价值有积极的影响。
代理成本也存在于债务投资者和股权投资者的冲突中，这些冲突也来自于违约风险。Myers (1977)指出违约风险会造成“投资不足”或“债务负担”问题。在这种情况下，债务对公司价值有消极的影响。建立在Myers (1977)和Jensen (1986)的基础上，Stulz (1990)建立一个模型，债务融资被证明会缓解过度投资问题但是会加重投资不足问题。模型预测债务对公司绩效既有积极作用又有消极作用，推测这两种影响回在所有公司出现。我们允许代理成本模型存在实证规范的两个影响。然而我们期望杠杆作用是完全负面的。我们从第一个可检验假设得出结论。根据代理成本假设，高杠杆期望低的代理成本，减少低效率，因此导致公司绩效的改善。
资本结构与公司绩效的反向因果关系
公司绩效也会影响资本结构的选择，Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)规定效率越高的公司越有可能从给定的资本结构中获得更高的回报，高回报可以作为一对组合风险的缓冲，因此高效率的公司在资本结构上以一个更好的位置用股权代替债权。Hence根据效率风险假说，高效率的公司选择较高的杠杆比率因为高效率期望降低破产成本和财务困境。从本质上说，效率风险假说是资本结构权衡理论的一个剥离，其中效率不同，其他条件都相等，允许公司调节最优资本结构。
期望将来维持高效率的公司会选择降低债务与权益比率，尝试控制由清算威胁效率产生的经济租金或特许权价值(Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006)。除了公平的债务替代效应，效率与资本结构间的关系也可以被描述成收入效应的存在。根据特许权价值假说，高效率公司倾向于持有额外股本，在其他条件相同的情况下，选择较低的杠杆比率来保护未来收入和特许权价值。
效率风险假说和特许权价值假说反向预测关于公司效率在资本结构上的选择，尽管我们不能识别影响实证分析的单独替代和收入可以决定主导不同资本结构的选择范围。
所有制结构与债务和权益的代理成本
所有制结构和公司绩效的关系追溯到Berle and Means (1932)，他指出在美国被广泛持有的公司的资本所有权分散在小股东和控股股东之间，集中在内部人手中的公司表现不佳。这之后Jensen and Meckling (1976)发现更多正式传统所有者经理的代理问题。他们主张管理股份所有权会减少管理激励消耗额外补贴，剥夺股东的财富或从事其他次优活动，有助于调整管理者和股东之间的利益，从而降低代理成本。沿着类似的路线，Shleifer and Vishny (1986)表明外部大股东因为他们监督和纪律管理的强大动力可以缓解代理冲突。
与此相反，Demsetz (1983) 、Fama 和Jensen (1983)指出内部股份所有权的增加可以与不良“防御”影响联系在一起，它可以牺牲外部投资者导致管理机会主义的增加。依靠“防御”效果大量控股股东的存在会使公司价值的最大化(Claessens等, 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009)。几个学术研究指出所有制结构与公司绩效的关系是直接(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens 等, 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008)或者非单调(Morcketal., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Davies 等, 2005)，而其他研究发现所有制结构与公司绩效之间没关系(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg 等, 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001)。
家族企业是大股东和独特的激励结构特殊的一类。例如，关心家庭、商业信誉和企业的生存，倾向于减轻外部债务和外部权益的代理成本(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson等, 2003)，尽管控股家族股东依旧会侵吞中小股东(Claessens等, 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006)。几个研究指出家族企业尤其是大型个人所有者倾向于超越非家族企业。另外，Maury (2006)的实证结果说明西欧大型家庭控股所有制似乎有利于而不是损耗少数股东。我们期望家庭所有制对公司绩效的影响作用是正相关的。
大型机构投资者相反有动力监督管理(Villalonga and Amit, 2006)，甚至是强迫与管理(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens等, 2002; Cornett等, 2007)。另外，Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta 等(2002)指出股权集中度在大股东控制的情形下对公司绩效有积极的影响，扮演一国对弱投资者和不发达欧洲大陆资本市场法律保护的替代者。
我们在两个相互竞争的假设条件下总结激励调整和巩固的对比所有权对公司绩效的影响。根据“利益收敛假说”，比较集中的所有权对公司绩效有积极的影响。而在“所有权防御假说”下，所有权集中对公司绩效的影响是负相关的。
所有权预测和激励调整的存在对公司资本结构的选择也有影响。我们用实证分析这些影响。因为外部大股东对减少管理机会主义有强烈的激励作用，他们也许更喜欢使用债务作为治理机制来控制管理层额外补贴的消耗(Grossman and Hart, 1982)。在这种情况下，有大量
外部股权的公司可能拥有负债率至少达到破产风险降低债务的最高点。家族企业也许会将高负债率水平控制在他们认为是较少受到债权人风险的程度(Anderson等, 2003)。另一方面，当管理大股东选择低债务来保护他们非分散的人力资本和公司投资财富时，杠杆作用和内部股东之间的关系也许是负相关的(Friend and Lang, 1988)。Brailsford等(2002)发现管理股东和杠杆效率非线性关系。管理层持股的低水平下，代理冲突迫使使用更多的债务，但是当管理者确立高层次管理权时他们会寻求减少风险，并且使用较少的债务。Anderson and Reeb (2003)发现内部管理者或家族持股对财务杠杆率没有作用，而King and Santor (2008)却说家族企业和金融机构控制公司会给资本结构带来更多的债务。
股权结构与经营业绩和企业价值的关联性 国内有若干分析报告试图通过统计分析说明国有股比重大对经营业绩会计指标的负面影响。例如，Xu和Wang（1997）研究了中国上市公司股份结构与企业经营绩效会计指标之间的关系，发现股权集中程度与公司经营业绩正相关，而且法人控股的上市公司比国家控股的上市公司表现得更显著，公司业绩与公司法人股比例呈现高度正相关，国家股比例则与公司业绩呈负相关关系。孙永祥、黄祖辉（1999）以1998年底上海和深圳证券交易所503家上市公司为样本，研究托宾Q值与公司第一大股东控股比例的相关性，认为法人股为公司第一大股东时，公司托宾Q值和公司治理好于第一大股东为国家股的上市公司。上海证券交易研究中心（2001）的一份研究报告认为，"国有股比重过大与公司业绩呈负的相关关系，而法人股比重与公司业绩呈正相关关系。"国内研究的结论倾向于认为，"国有股权的集中对企业价值产生负面影响，将国有股法人多元化有助于改善公司治理和经营业绩。"但从个案角度看，不同股权结构均有优质和劣质上市公司。例如，家电行业国有控股、法人控股、流通股比例超过非流通股的三类股权结构中，分别有四川长虹、青岛海尔、粤美美的等名牌优质企业，也分别有ST黄河科技、ST双鹿电器和第一家退市的水仙电器等业绩差的企业。股权相对分散的上市公司，例如ST海洋以及郑百文（第一大股东只有14%）等，公司治理和经营业绩并不比国有控股的上市公司好，甚至更差。 此外，国内上市公司非流通股结构的形成机制和流通约束影响法人股的公司治理行为。（1）国内上市公司多元或分散的法人股权结构形成机制并
非国外公司上市前后根据竞争环境和融资需求动态、商业化选择，而是主要由国有或法人控股股东按照股份有限公司设立要求选择或按排，通常将客户、供应商、业务相关的金融机构或集团下属的关联企业选择为法人股东，形成名义上多元、分散的法人持股结构，控股股东以外的单独一家法人股的比例通常比例低，因此基本上是第一大股东控制。如胜利股份1999年末十大股东中，除两家后来进入的证券投资基金持有5%的股份外，其他股东都直接或间接为胜利体系成员。尽管胜利股份第一大股东仅为24%，但"胜利体系"实际控制的股权远高于此比例；（2）参与股份公司设立的法人股与控股股东股权一样不能上市流通，又没有控股股东的内部关联利益；（3）不少法人股东与控股股东有业务往来关系，入股往往为了保持业务关系。大多数法人股东缺乏经济参与治理、改善公司业绩的激励能力。因此仅以上市公司名义上的股权比例来说明股权结构与经营业绩及其市场价值的关系很不可靠，其结果难以断定国有股"一股独大"对经营业绩是否存在负面影响。此外，国有控股的境外上市公司同样"一股独大"，但其投资、关联交易和红利分配行为比国内A股公司规范得多。 实际上，不同股权结构的上市公司经营目的和管理行为相似，例如，（1）大多数上市公司都强调业主单一的风险，致力于寻求新的利润增长点，追求多元化，希望通过持续融资实现持续发展；（2）利润管理行为盛行。一方面努力达到配股资格的会计业绩要求，另一方面，获得较高的配股或增发新股的价格。上海证券交易所研究部2000年一项大范围的问卷调查显示：国内上市公司内部治理特征相似，普遍是关键人大权独揽的控制模式，法人结构基本上有名无实，形同虚设。关键人往往是控股股东代表、
英文文献及翻译 文献题目An Overview of Servlet and JSP Technology 文献作者Nagle ,Wiegley 题目翻译Servlet和JSP技术简述 参考人 院 (系) 专业班级 学号
1 A Servlet's Job Servlets are Java programs that run on Web or application servers, acting as a middle layer between requests coming from Web browsers or other HTTP clients and databases or applications on the HTTP server. Their job is to perform the following tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. Figure 1-1Web middleware role 1.1 Read the explicit data sent by the client. The end user normally enters this data in an HTML form on a Web page. However, the data could also come from an applet or a custom HTTP client program. 1.2 Read the implicit HTTP request data sent by the browser. Figure 1-1 shows a single arrow going from the client to the Web server (the layer where servlets and JSP execute), but there are really two varieties of data: the explicit data that the end user enters in a form and the behind-the-scenes HTTP information. Both varieties are critical. The HTTP information includes cookies, information about media types and compression schemes the browser understands, and so on. 1.3 Generate the results. This process may require talking to a database, executing an RMI or EJB call, invoking a Web service, or computing the response directly. Your real data may be in a relational database. Fine. But your database probably doesn't speak HTTP or return results in HTML, so the Web browser can't talk directly to the database. Even if it could, for security reasons, you probably would not want it to. The same argument applies to most other applications.You need the Web middle layer to extract the results inside a document.
上市公司股权激励与公司绩效实证研究 摘要 目前,随着我国上市公司治理机制的不断完善，越来越多的公司开始实施股权激励制度，上市公司管理层的股权激励制度作为最重要的长期激励制度，成为推进我国公司治理结构改善，促进我国资本市场与国民经济持续健康发展的重要机制之一。本文首先回顾了股权激励的国内外相关文献，其次简要介绍了股权激励的概念及模式等，结合目前我国股权激励的现状，然后以156家样本公司数据为基础分析了实施股权激励的中国上市公司的财务业绩，对股权激励与公司绩效的关系进行实证研究。 关键词：上市公司；股权激励；公司绩效
目录 第一章研究背景 (1) 1.1 研究目的 (1) 1.2 研究方法 (1) 1.2.1 委托——代理理论 (1) 1.2.2 人力资本理论 (2) 1.3 股权激励与公司绩效的相关概念 (2) 1.3.1 股权激励的相关概念 (2) 1.3.2 公司绩效的相关概念 (2) 第二章文献回顾 (3) 2.1 国外相关文献回顾 (3) 2.2 国内相关文献回顾 (4) 第三章股权激励与公司绩效的实证研究 (5) 3.1 股权激励的实证分析探究 (5) 3.1.1 样本选择和数据来源 (5) 3.1.2 研究假设 (5) 3.1.3 变量指标的确定 (5) 3.1.4 回归分析模型建立 (7) 3.1.5 统计结果分析 (7) 3.2 回归分析 (9) 3.2.1 上市公司股权激励与公司绩效存在相关关系 (10) 3.2.2 上市公司管理层持股比例对公司绩效的影响存在区间效应 (11)
第四章分析与结论 (14) 4.1 我国股权激励制度存在的问题 (14) 4.2 我国实施股权激励的对策 (14) 第五章研究的不足 (15) 参考文献 (16)
股权结构与公司业绩的实证研究 以万科股份有限公司为研究对象，采用描述性统计、相关分析及回归分析的方法，分别对其股权集中度和股权属性与公司业绩的影响进行实证分析。通过研究发现，分散所有权结构适度增加和流通股比例合理增加可以提高公司业绩。基于研究结果，提出了在研究成果的基础上改善股权结构，进而提高公司业绩的建议。 标签：公司业绩；股权集中度；股权属性 1引言 如今，人们越来越开始关注公司股权结构与公司业绩之间的关系，回顾过去几年，我国众多的公司因股权结构的问题，而遭遇了恶意收购的厄运。安邦在开始的时候选择收购民生银行，后期又选择万科股份有限公司作为收购对象，一是股权分散，股东持股比例低，没有绝对控股股东或实际控制人；其次，由于万科第一大股东仅持有15%左右的股权，股东实力相对较弱。从万科的股权之争可以看出，股权结构作为公司治理问题的关键，对于一个企业的经营业绩和未来发展也是至关重要的。 万科从上市以来一直作为房地产行业的领导者和龙头股，其每年的经营业绩在行业尤为突出。但是该公司属于是一个大众持股的股权结构，其持股较高的前几个股东也都是流通股，并且股权分散。另一方面，房地产行业的股权结构大多属于股权集中，而万科公司在股权设置有其自身的特点。综合上述考虑，万科有着特殊的股权结构与其较好的公司业绩，所以选用万科公司作为股权结构与公司业绩的研究内容，探讨分散的股权结构对公司业绩的影响，以期在理论上对改进公司治理提出一定的建议。 2研究假设 公司的股权结构就是指不同的股份所占的比例及其相互关系，主要包括两方面：股权集中度和股权属性。本文选用股权集中度和股权属性这两方面来研究对公司业绩的影响，提出以下假设： H1：前五大股东持股比例与公司业绩呈正相关关系 股东持股比例越高，则股东的利益就会受到公司发展的影响。在这种影响下，股东想要获得更多的利益，就会对公司的管理和发展更加重视，可以激励他们不断完善对公司的治理。而是股东为了更好的保护自己的利益，就会持有较集中的股权。因此，可以认为随着前五大股东持股比例的增加，公司的经营情况才会越好，业绩越高。 H2：流通股比例与公司业绩呈正相关关系
绩效考核制度 一、绩效管理制度 二、高层绩效考核表 三、中层绩效考核表 四、主管绩效考核表 五、基层绩效考核表
目录 第一章总则 第二章考核方法 第三章月度考核 第四章年度考核 第五章考核组织与申诉处理 第六章附则
第一章总则 第一条为提高珠联公司基础管理水平，建立科学的现代管理制度，充分调动员工的积极性和创造性，使员工紧紧围绕公司的发展目标，高效地完成工作任务，根据公司目前的实际情况，特制定本管理办法。 第二条适用范围 本办法适用于珠联公司全体员工。 第三条考核目的 1.通过目标逐级分解和考核，促进公司经营目标的实现； 2.通过考核合理计酬，提高员工的主观能动性； 3.通过绩效考核促进上下级沟通和各部门间的相互协作； 4.通过考核规范工作流程，提高公司的整体管理水平； 5.通过评价员工的工作绩效、态度、能力和素质，帮助员工提升自身工作水平和综合素质水平，从而有效提升公司的整体绩效和整体员工素质。 第四条考核原则 1.以提高员工绩效为导向； 2.定性考核与定量考核相结合； 3.多角度考核； 4.公平、公正、公开原则。 第五条考核用途 考核结果的用途主要体现在以下几个方面： 1、月度绩效奖金的发放； 2、年度绩效奖金的发放；
3、薪酬等级的调整； 4、岗位晋升及调整； 5、员工培训安排； 6、先进评比 具体实施方法参照《珠联公司薪资管理制度》 第二章考核方法 第六条考核周期 考核分为月度考核和年度考核。月度考核于每月的1-10日内完成上月的考核，年度考核于次年元月25日前完成。 第七条月度绩效考核 （一）绩效是指被考核人员所取得的工作成果，考核员工本职工作任务完成的情况，包括每个岗位的岗位职责指标和公司年度任务分解到部门及岗位的指标。 （二）月度考核的考核工具为绩效考核表格，各岗位均有岗位相对应的绩效考核表格。 第八条考核维度（即所占比例） 考核维度是考核对象考核的不同角度和不同方面，包括业绩维度、行为维度。 （一）业绩维度：业绩指被考核人员所取得的工作成果，考核范围包括每个岗位的岗位职责指标、任务目标完成情况、对下属的管理和工作指导的绩效。 （二）行为维度：即品行考核，对被考核人员的品行考核，考核范围为对岗位任职者在工作过程中表现出来的行为情况的考核。
汕头大学学报人文社会科学版（第26卷2010年）一、引言 1932年Berle 和Means ［1］在他们的著作《现代公司与与私人财产》中指出由所有权的分散而改变了 所有权与控制的联系，从而就破坏了公司利润最大化对资源配置的指导作用。股票所有权分散被说成股票所有者不再具有制约职业经营者的能力，这一观点受到Demsetz (1983)［2］强有力的挑战,他认为股权 结构是股东们寻求股东权益最大化的内生约束。股权结构的变化与公司业绩的变化之间并不存在系统的相关性。这一观点引起了学术界的注意，越来越多的学者对所有权结构与公司绩效之间的关系进行了研究，但得出的结论却不相一致。关于股权结构与公司绩效的关系一直是困扰公司金融学术界的一大难题，股权结构是如何可以通过影响公司内部的权力配置从而对公司治理产生影响，同时公司绩效是否对股权结构产生影响这样的问题直到今天没有得出统一的结论，在我国上市公司国有股与法人股不断流通的今天，是否有必要构建一个合理的产权结构，或是公司自然会在寻求价值最大化中形成一个合理的股权结构这样的问题具有很大的现实意义。本文对20世纪30年代以来国内外股权结构与公司绩效关系的理论与实证文献作一个综述。 二、关于股权结构与公司绩效的理论综述 （一）代理成本假说 代理成本的产生源自于两权分离造成的委托人和代理人之间目标的不一致。而在股权分散的企业中，多个股东的存在更加剧了代理问题的程度，从这个意义上讲，分散的所有权不是一种很好的公司治理结构。Jensen 和Meckling(1976)［3］进一步发展Berle 和Means （1932）［2］的观点，提出，当公司管理者同 收稿日期：2009-08-31 作者简介：杜沔（1959-），女，广东澄海人，汕头大学商学院教授，硕士研究生导师。 顾亮（1983－），男，江苏徐州人，汕头大学商学院硕士研究生。刘振杰（1984-），男，山东菏泽人，汕头大学商学院硕士研究生。 基金项目：广东省自然科学基金（2008）（8151503101000034） 汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）第２６卷第２期 SHANTOU UNIVERSITY JOURNAL （HUMANITIES ＆SOCIAL SCIENCES BIMONTHLY ）Vol.26.No.22010 股权结构与公司绩效关系文献综述 ———以一个内生的视角分析杜 沔，顾 亮，刘振杰 （汕头大学商学院，广东汕头 515063） 摘要：股权结构与公司绩效的理论有代理成本、信息不对称、管理者堑壕、大股东掏空与股权结构内生假 设，经过实证研究，其结果存在较大的分歧，各种结果都有理论支持，越来越多的文献发现股权结构与公司绩效是内生决定的，国内关于股权结构内生性的文章刚刚开始，不管是理论机理还是实证方法都需要进一步研究。 关键词：股权结构；公司绩效；内生性；文献回顾；综述中图分类号：F 121.26 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1001－4225（2010）02－0080-08
股权结构、公司治理与公司价值 (Ownership Structure，Corporate value) 一、引言 伯利和米恩斯(Berle & Means)1932年出版《现代公司和私有产权》一书，从此以后股权结构一直被视为公司治理研究的根本出发点。近年来的研究结果表明，除美国、英国、加拿大等少数国家外，大部分国家的上市公司都存在着家族、银行或国家等控股股东，这一现象在东亚、拉美、东欧等新兴市场国家最为普遍(LaPorta,1999)。 存在控制性股东的情况下，股权结构对公司治理和公司价值会产生两种相反的效应，即利益趋同效应和利益侵占效应。施而弗和维施尼(Shleifer & Vishny，1986)指出，股价上涨带来的财富使控股股东和中小股东的利益趋于一致，它们具有足够的激励去收集信息并有效监督管理层，从而避免了股权高度分散情况下的“免费搭车”问题；此外，大股东在某些情况下直接参与经营管理，解决了外部股东和内部管理层之间在投资机会、业绩表现上“信息不对称”问题。可见，控股股东既有动机去追求公司价值最大化，又有能力和必要对企业管理层施加足够的控制以实现自身利益，从而较好地解决了传统的代理问题，因而股权集中型公司相对于股权分散型公司要具有较高的盈利能力和市场表现。另一方面，德姆塞茨(Demsetz，1985)和拉波特等认为(LaPorta，1999)，控股股东的利益和外部小股东的利益常常并不一致，两者之间存在着严重的利益冲突。在缺乏外部控制威胁，或者外部股东类型比较多元化的情况下，控股股东可能以其他股东的利益为代价来追求自身利益，通过追求自利目标而不是公司价值目标来实现自身福利最大化。此时，股权分散型公司的绩效和市场价值要优于股权集中型公司。 根据上述两个相互对立的假说，理论显然无法对股权结构和公司绩效的关系给出唯一的结论，而大量的实证研究也并没有得到一致的结果。德姆塞茨(Demsetz，1983)1980年对511家美国公司进行的实证研究表明，利润率和股权集中度之间并没有显着的相关性存在。列维(Levy，1983)等人的研究发现，美国公司的股价和股权集中度之间存在正相关性。克拉塞斯(Claessens，1997)对捷克上市公司的研究表明，股权集中度和该公司的盈利能力及在二级市场上的表现之间存在正相关性。克拉塞斯(Claessens，1999)等对九个东亚国家中2980个上市公司的研究显示，家族绝对控制是许多东亚国家企业生产能
绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译____________________________________________________________________ ________________________ Performance management-how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means,
股权激励与公司绩效关系的文献综述 摘要: 股权激励作为一种长期激励机制，是否发挥了应有效用是理论界和实务界长期关注和争论的热点。为了检验股权激励机制的效用，国内外学者对股权激励与公司绩效的相关性问题进行了大量的研究，结论并不统一。不同的学者在研究问题时的政策环境、选择的样本、指标及分析方法等存在差异，导致研究得出不同的结论。国内外学者的观点主要有以下三种：1、股权激励与公司绩效存在正相关关系；2、股权激励对公司绩效没有显著影响；3、股权激励对公司绩效的影响具有区间效应，即存在非线性相关关系。 关键词：股权激励；公司绩效；综述 Review on the Relationship between Equity Incentive and Corporate Performance Abstract：Whether the equity incentive system, as a long term incentive, has played its due effect is concerned and debated long-term by theory and practice. To test the effectiveness of equity incentives，domestic and foreign scholars had done a lot of research on the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance．But the conclusions are not uniform, because of different scholars research policy environment，samples and research methods．Domestic and foreign scholars have the following three viewpoints, first of all, equity incentive is positively related to corporate performance．Secondly, equity incentive and corporate performance are not related．Thirdly, equity incentive has interval effect on corporate performance, which as to say that there is a non-linear relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance. Keywords：equity incentive；corporate performance；review 一、引言 股权激励作为一种长期激励机制，通过授予高级管理者一定比例的公司股份，将高管的个人收益与公司利益紧密联系，以激励高管努力工作，减少短视行为，从而改善公司治理，优化股权结构，提升公司绩效。股权激励使经营者能够以股东的身份参与企业决策、分享利润、承担风险，从而勤勉尽责地为公司的长期发展服务。中国股权激励的实践源于20世纪90年代，起步较晚，但发展较快。随着股权分置改革的完成，股权激励被越来越多的上市公司采用，国有控股上市公司股权激励与公司绩效之间的相互关系越来越受到关注。 二、国外关于股权激励与公司绩效关系的研究 Morck，Shleifer和Vishny (1988) 以美国1980年《财富》500强的371个公司研究样本，选取托宾Q值为被解释变量，以拥有的股份不少于0.2％的董事们的持股比例之和来衡量管理层持股比例，对样本的横截面数据运用分段回归，根据管理层持股的利益一致假说和战壕挖掘假说，提出管理层持股可能区间有效并设计模型实证检验得出：持股比例在0一5％范围内，托宾Q值与董事的持股比例正相关；持股比例在5％一25%范围内，托宾Q值与董事的持股比例负相关；超过25％，二者又正相关，但托宾Q值与持股比例的
龙源期刊网 https://www.doczj.com/doc/344173837.html, 上市公司股权结构对公司绩效的影响分析 作者：张小玉国慧 来源：《商情》2012年第21期 摘要不同股权结构下，由于委托人对代理人行为承担的风险和获取的收益不同，对代理 人的监控能力和积极性也就不同。因此，只有股权结构合理，才能完善公司治理结构，进而才能保证公司取得良好的经营绩效。 关键词股权结构公司业绩 一、引言 随着市场经济的发展，我国很多企业的股份制改造并不彻底，其中由于股权结构的不合理从而导致上市公司治理效率低下、公司绩效不佳等问题，所以，近年来，股权结构与公司治理问题受到了极大地关注，并寻求解决的办法，以提高公司绩效从而达到股东价值最大化。股权结构对公司治理、公司行为有着不可忽视的作用，进而影响到企业的经营成果。本文从股权结构出发分析了我国上市公司股权结构的现状及其对公司经营业绩的影响，以进一步推动我国上市公司规范化发展和公司股权结构的完善。 二、相关理论 （一）股权结构 1.股权属性：持股股东的经济类型就代表了其持有股份的股权属性，股权属性有三种类型：国有股、法人股和社会公众股。 2.股权集中度：指全部股东持股比例的不同所表现出的股权集中或是分散的数量化指标。一般的上市公司股权集中度分为三种：第一是股权高度集中，第二是股权相对集中，第三是股权相对分散。 （二）大股东理论之利益侵占效应 公司控股股东的利益与中小股东的利益在大部分情况下是不一致的，存在着很多冲突。 三、股权结构与公司绩效的关系 现代经济下，股东价值最大化就是公司利润最大化，股权结构是决定公司治理有效性最重要的因素，从而也使影响公司绩效好坏的根本。一个公司的股权结构决定了其委托代理关系的性质，现在我国上市公司大多是控股股东一股独大，其直接干预公司管理，有些治理措施无法
外文文献原稿和译文 原稿 Performance management - how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected
股权激励与企业绩效关系研究 专业：企业管理 学号：2013310355 姓名：孙纪寒 2014年1月
股权激励与企业绩效关系研究 摘要：随着股权激励在自主创新示范区的试点，许多上市企业都将股权激励视为吸引人才、留住人才、激励人才的重要手段。股权激励依据激励相容原理,为降低公司管理层的代理成本,俘获优质人力资本,激励核心人才而设计,属于薪酬的长期激励部分,其成败关系到公司高管激励约束机制的建设、薪酬制度的完善、企业绩效及长远发展。以期为上市公司及试点企业实施股权激励提供相应的建议。 关键词：股权激励；薪酬；企业绩效 1.引言 企业经营权和所有权的分离，产生了委托代理关系，代理人经常凭借信息优势为自己谋利，甚至侵害股东利益，因此，必须有一套长期的激励机制促使代理人向着股东利益最大化的目标努力。管理层股权激励机制作为长期激励机制的一种，旨在降低代理成本，提高经营效率，从理论上讲，该机制有助于解决股东与经营者之间的代理问题，有助于实现所有者与经营者的利益均衡，有助于引导经营者尽职尽责的进行公司经营管理，增加企业价值。 企业的激励、企业的绩效评价, 是企业提高核心竞争力, 保持可持续发展的重要环节, 弄清两者的意义, 辨析其关系, 有助于合理构建其基本模型, 落实 具体措施, 实现企业管理目标。伴随着对建立现代企业制度的积极探索，以管理层持股为代表的激励约束机制正在被引入到众多上市公司治理结构的改革中来。正确、公允地评价上市公司绩效是衡量上市公司治理效果的关键，有助于在理论上丰富和完善公司的治理结构理论，为改进我国目前的公司治理结构实践，提供切实有效的指导。上市公司高管的股权激励制度，作为最重要的长期激励机制已被提上日程，成为推进我国公司治理结构改善，促进我国资本市场与国民经济持续健康发展的重要机制之一。尽管国内外学者对股权激励机制的理论与实证分析己在过去几十年中取得了相当丰硕的研究成果，但在现实社会中，管理层持股是否能有效协调股东和管理者的利益冲突，并改善公司绩效这一问题，学术界却一直争论不休，那么管理层持股对改善我国上市公司绩效的作用到底是积极的、消极的？上市公司实施股权激励与公司绩效的关系究竟如何？本文期望就此展开 实证研究。 2.激励与绩效评价的基本描述 2.1激励与绩效评价的意义 人们认为, 激励就是委托人如何使代理人在选择或不选择委托人标准或目 标时, 从自身效用最大化出发, 自愿地或不得不选择与委托人标准或目标相一 致的行动[ 1]。作为委托人的股东为了实现自身的目标(如股东财富最大化), 必须针对代理人(经营者)建立激励机制。物质激励与精神激励作为激励的两种类型, 是相辅相承、缺一不可的。物质激励是指通过物质刺激的手段, 鼓励职工积极工作。它的主要表现形式有发放工资、奖金、津贴、福利、罚款等。物质激励是激励的主要模式, 也是目前我国企业内部使用得非常普遍的一种激励模式。精神激励则从主体理念、意识的启发上, 调动员工的主观能动性, 使之更自觉勤奋地工作, 整体协同, 实现企业的战略目标。在市场经济竞争激烈的背景下, 现代企业管理特别强调人力资源管理中的激励, 缘在于激励机制对企业的发展和战略目 标的实现, 具有重要的价值意义。企业的绩效, 是指企业在运作过程中, 所取得
外文文献翻译译文 一、外文原文 Corporate Performance Management Abstract Two of the most important duties of a chief executive officer are (1) to formulate strategy and (2) to manage his company’s performance. In this article we examine the second of these tasks and discuss how corporate performance should be modeled and managed. We begin by considering the environment in which a company operates, which includes, besides outside stakeholders, the industry it belongs and the market it supplies, and then proceed to explain how the functioning of a company can be understood by an examination of its business, operational and performance management models. Next we describe the structure recommended by the authors for a corporate planning, control and evaluation system, the most important part of a corporate performance management system. The core component of the planning system is the corporate performance evaluation model, the structure of which is mapped into the planning system’s database, simulation models and budgeting tools’ structures, and also used to shape information contained in the system’s products, besides being the nucleus of the language used by the system’s agents to talk about corporate performance. The ontology of planning, the guiding principles of corporate planning and the history of ”MADE”, the corporate performance management system discussed in this article, are reviewed next, before we proceed to discuss in detail the structural components of the corporate planning and control system introduced before. We conclude the article by listing the main steps which should be followed when implementing a performance planning, control and evaluation system for a company. 1.Introduction Two of the most important corporate tasks for which a chief executive officer is p rimarily responsible are (1) to formulate strategy and (2) to manage the company’s performance. In this article we examine the second of these tasks and discuss how
民营上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的实证分析现代企业的典型特征是公司所有权和控制权之间的分离。公司的所有权被大量的外部投资者(股东)所持有,而公司的经营管理权却掌握在并不持有或持有少量公司股份的职业经理人手中。由于信息不对称,职业经理人可能会为了最大化自身的利益而损害公司股东的利益,这样企业中的委托代理问题便产生了。通常认为,合理的公司治理结构能够减轻企业中职业经理人的道德风险行为,降低代 理成本,提高公司价值。 公司治理因而成为现代企业理论的核心和焦点。股权结构作为公司的内部组织结构,是治理结构的重要组成部分,因而股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系逐渐 成为学者们关注的重点。早期的研究假设股权结构是外生的,他们认为存在一个最佳的股权结构,通过这样的股权安排能够改善公司的治理水平,提高公司价值。随着研究的深入,越来越多的学者开始注意到股权结构的内生性问题,认为股权 结构的形成取决于股东基于自身利益最大化的选择,并在此基础上进一步研究股权结构与公司绩效的关系。 本文以2006-2011年沪、深两市的349家民营上市公司为考察对象,基于股权结构内生性的视角,对我国民营企业中股权结构与公司绩效之间的相关关系进行回归分析。本文首先阐述了公司治理问题的理论基础即委托代理理论,系统地梳理和总结了国内外学者关于股权结构和公司经营绩效之间关系的研究成果。在此基础上,指出了国内学者关于该问题研究的局限性,提出了本文的待解答问题。接下来,以2006-2011年我国部分民营上市公司的面板数据为基础详细说明了本文的研究设计,包括数据来源、变量的选择和模型的构建等,并对数据进行了初步的分析,同时详细说明了本文在实证中所采用的计量模型和回归方法的理论依据。 值得一提的是,联立方程模型通常用来解决变量的内生性问题,因此我们选 择联立方程模型来对民营上市公司的股权结构与经营绩效进行实证分析。在引入工具变量后,使用两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS)对模型进行估计。在对样本数据进行内生性检验和回归分析后,我们得出了如下结论：(1)股权结构具有内生性。但是股权结构的不同方面在内生性上表现出差异,股权集中度(包括第一大股东的持 股比例、前十大股东的持股比例的平方和)具有显著的内生性,而股权制衡度与经理人持股没有通过内生性检验。
绩效考核外文文献及翻译 外文文献 1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His or her line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. If you are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits down and talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often as you can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole process to be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; c orporate social responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would then