THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW American Accounting Association Vol.87,No.1DOI:10.2308/accr-10159 2012
pp.149–171
Shareholder Voting on Auditor Selection, Audit Fees,and Audit Quality
Mai Dao
University of Toledo
K.Raghunandan
Dasaratha V.Rama
Florida International University
ABSTRACT:The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession(ACAP),formed by
the U.S.Department of the Treasury,has recommended that all public companies be
required to have shareholder ratification of auditor https://www.doczj.com/doc/2616561158.html,ing data from1,382firms
for the year ending December31,2006,we find that audit fees are higher in firms with
shareholder voting on auditor ratification.We also find that firms that started having a
shareholder vote pay higher fees than firms that stopped having a shareholder vote.In
the second part of our study,we find that in firms with shareholder voting on auditor
selection(1)subsequent restatements are less likely and(2)abnormal accruals are
lower.Our findings are consistent with the experimental results in Mayhew and Pike
(2004),and provide empirical grounding for the debate about mandating shareholder
voting on auditor selection.
Keywords:auditor selection;shareholder voting;audit fees;audit quality.
I.INTRODUCTION
T he objective of this study is to examine the association between shareholder involvement in auditor selection and(1)audit fees and(2)audit quality.Motivation for this study comes from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (DoT 2008) Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession(ACAP),which recently recommended that all public companies must have an annual shareholder rati?cation of the external auditor. The ACAP (DoT 2008, VIII:20) justi?ed this recommendation by stating that that the annual submission of auditor selection for rati?cation enhances‘‘competition in the audit industry.’’The ACAP did not provide any empirical evidence in support of the above recommendation,and research related to shareholder involvement in auditor selection is sparse.
We gratefully acknowledge many useful comments and suggestions from Steve Kachelmeier(senior editor)and two anonymous reviewers.We thank Abhijit Barua,Vishal Munsif,and Paul Tanyi for help with data collection and analysis. Editor’s note:Accepted by Steven Kachelmeier.
Submitted:October2009
Accepted:June2011
Published Online:August2011
149
The ACAP did not elaborate on exactly what bene?ts would accrue from any increased competition among auditors.However,the traditional view of the courts,legislators,and regulators has been that competition in any sector leads to higher quality and lower price (U.S. Supreme Court 1978; Federal Trade Commission 2003). In contrast, economic theory suggests that the joint effect of competition on price and quality is not uniform;the effect of increased competition on price and quality will depend on the relative elasticities of price and quality (Dranove and Satterthwaite 1992;Kranton 2003). Even within the context of professional services, prior studies examining different types of services have shown divergent results about the joint effects of enhanced competition on price and quality (Kwoka 1984; Haas-Wilson 1986; Rizzo and Zeckhauser 1992; Kessler and McClellan 2000).
While the ACAP recommends shareholder voting on auditor selection based on arguments about increased competition,the same recommendation can be arrived at by using a governance and accountability framework.We argue that any arrangement that strengthens the role of the shareholders in auditor selection also changes the incentives of the auditors and strengthens auditor independence.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, U.S. House of Representatives 2002) made audit committees formally responsible for the selection and compensation of the external auditor;however,evidence indicates that even in the post-SOX era,managers exercise signi?cant control over the hiring and ?ring of auditors (KPMG 2004; Cohen et al. 2010). If managers retain signi?cant in?uence over auditor selection,then auditors will be more likely to go along with the preferences of managers (Saul 1996). Hence, institutional arrangements that strengthen the role of shareholders in auditor selection will also strengthen auditor independence.
Mayhew and Pike (2004) examine, in a laboratory market setting, the effects of alternative auditor hiring rules on competition in the audit market.They ?nd that,in their experimental setting,investor involvement in auditor selection leads to both higher audit quality and an increase in audit fees. Mayhew and Pike (2004, 820) note that ‘‘further research into the institutional structures that promote audit committee independence or produce the types of incentives for auditor independence documented in our investor selection treatments is clearly warranted.’’
The ACAP recommendation represents a step in the direction toward increased shareholder involvement in auditor selection. Saul (1996, 135) suggests that having shareholder rati?cation of the auditor is ‘‘more than a symbolic act ’’in the context of strengthening auditor independence.Accordingly,our objective is to empirically examine the association between shareholder involvement in auditor selection and both audit fees and audit quality,using archival data.To the extent that increased shareholder involvement in auditor selection alters the governance and accountability dynamics between auditors,management,and shareholders,we ?nd that shareholder voting on auditor selection leads to both higher audit fees and better audit quality.
We use data from a sample of 1,382companies included in the 2006edition of the Board Analyst database.We ?nd that audit fees are higher in ?rms that submitted auditor selection for a shareholder vote,after controlling for other factors associated with audit fees.This ?nding is inconsistent with the argument generally advanced by legislators,regulators,and the judiciary,but is consistent with the experimental evidence in Mayhew and Pike (2004).
As noted by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), endogeneity is a pervasive problem in any governance-related archival-empirical research.For example,it is possible that the same factors that are associated with some ?rms voluntarily having a shareholder vote on auditor selection,since such a vote is not currently legally required,are also associated with higher audit fees.We perform a Hausman test of endogeneity between audit fees and shareholder voting on auditor selection,and ?nd that there is support for the two being endogenous.Accordingly,we perform two-stage regression analysis and ?nd that the positive relationship between shareholder involvement in auditor selection and audit fees persists.
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We also perform a different type of test,relying on changes in?rms’policies relating to shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation.Speci?cally,we focus on?rms that changed from not having a shareholder vote on auditor selection in2005to having such a vote in2006,and vice versa.Because auditor-selection-related issues are supposed to be the prerogative of the audit committee after SOX,we require that the?rms selected for such change analyses do not have a change in the composition of the audit committee.With this additional restriction,we have54?rms that newly initiated an auditor rati?cation vote in2006and45?rms that stopped having an auditor rati?cation vote in2006,and did not have a change in the membership of the audit committee.For this subset of99?rms,we perform the audit fee regression in the‘‘changes’’form.We?nd that the indicator variable measuring change in auditor rati?cation policy is positive and signi?cant, indicating that?rms that initiated an auditor rati?cation vote paid higher audit fees compared to ?rms that stopped having an auditor rati?cation vote.
While audit pricing is directly observable,audit quality is a more dif?cult construct.The quantity or quality of audit work is not directly observable,so researchers have used different measures for audit quality.In this study,we use subsequent restatements as our measure for audit quality.A restatement implies that the previously?led?nancial statements are unreliable and, hence,the presence(or absence)of a restatement can be viewed as a direct measure of audit quality. We restrict our analysis to restatements with a negative effect on?nancial statements.We?nd that ?rms with a shareholder vote on auditor rati?cation during2006were less likely to have a subsequent restatement of?scal year2006?nancial statements.
Hennes et al. (2008)point out that not all restatements are the same, and suggest using stock price reactions as a direct measure of problem restatements.Accordingly,we further restrict our analysis to subsequent restatements that also had a negative stock price reaction.With this analysis we also?nd that?rms with a shareholder vote on auditor rati?cation were less likely to have a later restatement that elicits a negative market reaction.
As with audit fees,we conduct Hausman tests of endogeneity but cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity between subsequent restatements and shareholder involvement in auditor selection. Unlike with audit fees,we do not perform the analyses with only the subset of?rms changing auditor rati?cation policies because only four?rms from each of the change groups had a subsequent restatement.
As additional analysis,we use clients’abnormal accruals as another measure of audit quality. Although using accruals measures as a proxy for audit quality is subject to many limitations (Ball 2009), previous studies have used clients’ abnormal accruals as a measure of audit quality given the paucity of observable measures related to audit quality (e.g., DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999). Following this tradition, we examine the association between shareholder voting on auditor selection and abnormal accruals.We?nd that performance-matched abnormal current accruals are lower in?rms that submit auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation.A Hausman test indicates the presence of endogeneity,but the association between shareholder voting and accruals quality persists after controlling for endogeneity.
In summary,we examine an issue that is currently of interest to regulators and the accounting profession but lacks relevant archival evidence.Research methods involve trade-offs,and the bene?t of an experimental setting such as the one used by Mayhew and Pike (2004)is that it enables researchers to control and manipulate factors of research interest while ignoring other external factors that are present in the real-world setting.Conversely,the bene?ts from archival research are the use of more natural settings that currently exist and greater external validity. Ideally,results from multiple methods should complement each other and there is greater con?dence in the inferences when different research methods yield the same basic?ndings.The results from our archival tests validate the experimental results of Mayhew and Pike (2004)in a closely related setting—that increased shareholder involvement in auditor selection leads to an Shareholder Voting on Auditor Selection,Audit Fees,and Audit Quality151
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increase in both audit fees and quality—but are inconsistent with the traditional arguments of legislators,regulators,and the judiciary in the U.S.that enhanced competition will lead to lower prices and higher quality.
Section II discusses the background.This is followed by a description of hypotheses,research method,data,and discussion of results related to the two issues examined in this study:audit fees in Section III and audit quality in Section IV.Section V concludes with a summary and discussion.
II.BACKGROUND
Shareholder Voting:Competition Perspective
Even when there were eight large international auditing ?rms,legislators had expressed concerns about the (lack of ) competition in the audit market (U.S. Senate 1976, 1977; U.S. House of Representatives 1985). Such concerns have become more pronounced as the Big 8 have now become the Big 4since 2002.For example,Section 701of SOX mandates the General Accounting Of?ce (GAO)to study and report back to Congress about the concentration of the audit market and the problems resulting from limited competition among public accounting ?rms. The GAO (2003,Highlights)concluded that ‘‘the signi?cant changes that have occurred in the profession may have implications for competition and public company choice,especially in certain industries,in the future. ’’ In a follow-up report, the GAO (2008, Highlights) stated that ‘‘the loss of another large ?rm would further reduce large companies’auditor choice and could affect audit fee competitiveness.’’
Thus,it is clear that the extent of competition in the market for audit services for public companies (and the resultant impact on fees)continues to be an issue of signi?cant interest to legislators and regulators.Such concerns led to the U.S.Department of the Treasury forming,in October 2007,an Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP).The ACAP held a series of meetings during 2007and 2008,and issued a report in October 2008,proposing six recommendations related to concentration and competition in the audit market.Recommendation #5suggests the adoption of ‘‘annual shareholder rati?cation of public company auditors by all public companies ’’ and notes as follows (DoT 2008, VIII:20–21):
The Committee believes shareholder rati?cation of auditor selection through the annual meeting and proxy process can enhance the audit committee’s oversight to ensure that the auditor is suitable for the company’s size and ?nancial reporting needs.This may enhance competition in the audit industry ...The Committee also urges exchange self-regulatory organizations to adopt such a requirement as a listing standard.
Competition,Price,and Quality
From an economic perspective,increased competition generally leads to higher quality and/or lower price.However,if price and quality are jointly determined,then the effect of increased competition on price and quality is not clear-cut;the effects of increased competition on price and quality will depend on the relative elasticities of price and quality (Dranove and Satterthwaite 1992;Kranton 2003).
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court (1978, 695) noted in a case brought by the National Society of Professional Engineers:‘‘The Sherman Act re?ects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices,but also better goods and services ...The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality,service,safety,and durability—and not just the immediate cost,are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.’’Similarly,the Federal Trade Commission (2003, 1) states that ‘‘vigorous competition forces producers to
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minimize costs and prices and to increase quality.’’Thus,the legislative,judicial,and executive views appear to be that increased competition will lead to lower prices and higher quality.
Empirical evidence on the joint effects of competition on price and quality is sparse and mixed (Kranton 2003; Kallapur et al. 2009). Prior research shows that, when the ban on advertising was removed(i.e.,competition increased),the price of optometric services declined without an adverse impact on quality (Kwoka 1984; Haas-Wilson 1986). However, in the case of physicians’ services, the removal of the ban on advertising led to higher prices and an increase in at least some measures of quality (Rizzo and Zeckhauser 1992). Similarly, Kessler and McClellan (2000)show that in the case of hospitals,prior to1991,higher levels of competition led to both higher costs and improved quality.1
Shareholder Voting:Governance and Accountability Perspective
While the ACAP recommendation is based on the effects of increased competition,there is an alternative perspective that is useful in the context of shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation. Until the enactment of SOX,client management was responsible for selecting the auditor.Under Section301of SOX,audit committees are directly responsible for the appointment,compensation, and oversight of the auditor.
Accordingly,Section301of SOX is a recognition of the governance and accountability perspective of auditor selection.Speci?cally,if management is responsible for hiring or?ring the auditor and negotiating the audit fee,then it is more likely that the auditor will go along with the wishes of management (Saul 1996). Mayhew and Pike (2004, 798) note that the auditor’s ‘‘?nancial dependence on the client depends heavily on the client’s ability to hire and?re the auditor.As a result,the control over hiring and?ring the auditor serves as the core incentive for auditors to maintain or compromise their independence.’’By removing the authority to hire and?re the auditor from management,and vesting such authority with representatives of shareholders,Section301of SOX sought to shift the locus of power in the auditor-manager relationship—and thereby enhance auditor independence.
However, as noted by Mayhew and Pike (2004), in many companies, the board of directors is dominated by management.This enables management to retain signi?cant in?uence over auditor-related decisions,including the hiring and?ring of auditors.In these circumstances,auditors’natural response is to be more likely to go along with managements’preferred accounting choices. Along these lines, a survey of audit committee directors and executives by KPMG (2004, 5) found that,even after SOX,‘‘69percent of respondents said the chief executive of?cer or the chief ?nancial of?cer had the most in?uence over the compensation of the external auditor,and only27 percent thought the audit committee had the most in?uence.’’In a later study based on interviews with 30 audit partners and managers from the Big 4 ?rms, Cohen et al. (2010, 752) report that ‘‘management continues to be seen as a major corporate governance actor and,contrary to the intent of SOX,often the driving force behind auditor appointments and terminations.’’The ACAP noted that,even though SOX gives the audit committees the responsibilities related to the appointment and compensation by the auditor,shareholders should have a say in auditor selection and that‘‘rati?cation allows shareholders to voice a view on the audit committee’s work, including the reasonableness of audit fees and apparent con?icts of interest ’’(DoT 2008, VIII:20). Thus,shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation,while perhaps not as effective as direct shareholder selection of the auditor,is a step toward increasing the role of shareholders in the auditor selection process.Re?ecting this view,shareholder activists have continued to press companies to let 1This is the so-called‘‘Medical Arms Race’’hypothesis,and this logic has been used by the courts in litigation involving hospital mergers.See,for example,U.S.vs.Carilion Health System,892F2d1042. Shareholder Voting on Auditor Selection,Audit Fees,and Audit Quality153
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shareholders vote on auditor selection because this is considered to be a good corporate governance practice (Krishnan and Ye 2005; Institutional Shareholder Services [ISS] 2007a, 2007b ).
Support for this governance-and-accountability-based perspective comes from the actions of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)in the United Kingdom.The FRC established the Market Participants Group (MPG)in October 2006to provide advice on ‘‘possible actions that market participants could take to mitigate the risks arising from the characteristics of the market for audit services to public interest entities in the United Kingdom ’’ (FRC 2006, 1). The MPG issued its report in October 2007with a set of recommendations;Recommendation #8notes that the FRC should amend the rules ‘‘to include a requirement for the provision of information relevant to the auditor re-selection decision,’’while Recommendation #10states that ‘‘investor groups,corporate representatives,?rms,and the FRC should promote good practices for shareholder engagement on auditor appointment and re-appointments ’’ (FRC 2007, 10). The MPG report noted that the recommendations were ‘‘directed at improving the accountability of boards for their auditor selection decisions ’’ (FRC 2007, 10).
Finally,we interviewed three audit partners from three of the Big 4audit ?rms and a subcommittee chair of the ACAP about shareholder involvement in auditor selection.Of the audit partners,one is a regional managing partner,the second is an of?ce managing partner of a large metropolitan of?ce,and the third is a regional leader for audit practice.Two of the audit partners and the ACAP member noted that shareholder voting on auditor selection led to slightly higher risks for the auditor.To paraphrase,the partners and the ACAP member noted that ‘‘everyone expects the auditor to receive 98or 99percent approval from the shareholders,so even if you get 90or 95percent approval,there are bound to be questions from the audit committee;in addition,even if remote,there is a non-zero probability of a signi?cant proportion of shareholders voting against the auditor.’’Two partners also discussed anecdotal evidence about Ernst &Young,which had 38percent of Sprint shareholders voting against rati?cation in 2003,resulting in unfavorable media coverage.2To the extent that perceptions affect auditors’judgments and actions,we can expect both audit quality and price to be higher when there is a shareholder rati?cation vote on auditor selection.
III.SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND AUDIT FEES
Regulators in the U.S.and U.K.are considering recommendations to require all public companies to have a shareholder vote on auditor selection.Some recent studies have examined issues related to shareholder rati?cation of the auditor,including characteristics of ?rms submitting auditor selection for a shareholder vote (Krishnan and Ye 2005) and the determinants of shareholder votes for rati?cation (e.g., Raghunandan 2003; Hermanson et al. 2009). However, there is little archival evidence related to the effect of having a shareholder vote on price and/or quality in the market for audit services.This study seeks to ?ll this void,given the calls from regulators to require companies to have such a shareholder vote.
As noted earlier, the experimental evidence in Mayhew and Pike (2004) and the governance/accountability perspective suggest that shareholder voting on auditor selection leads to higher audit fees and improved audit quality.Nevertheless,given the paucity of evidence on this issue,and given the stated opinions of the judiciary and the executive that increased competition is expected to result in lower price and better quality,we do not make a directional prediction for our ?rst hypothesis.Formally stated,our ?rst hypothesis is:
H1(null form):There is no association between shareholder involvement in auditor selection
and audit fees.
2Following the shareholder vote,Ernst &Young was replaced as the auditor for Sprint.
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Model
We use the following regression model to test H1:
LogeAuditFeesT?a0ta1?LogeTotalAssetsTta2?InvRecTAta3?SqrtSegments
ta4?Foreignta5?CurrentRatiota6?Leverageta7?ROA
ta8?GCta9?ICWta10?Big4ta11?Initialta12?VOTEterror:e1TThe variables are de?ned as follows:
Log(AuditFees)?natural logarithm of audit fees;
Log(TotalAssets)?natural logarithm of total assets;
InvRecTA?ratio of assets in inventory plus accounts receivable to total assets;
SqrtSegments?square root of the number of business segments;
Foreign?1if foreign income is reported,0otherwise;
CurrentRatio?ratio of current assets to current liabilities;
Leverage?ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
ROA?ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets;
GC?1if the?rm receives a going-concern modi?ed opinion,0otherwise;
ICW?1if the?rm has an adverse SOX404opinion,0otherwise;
Big4?1if the auditor is a Big4audit?rm,0otherwise;
Initial?1if the audit engagement is a?rst-or second-year audit,0otherwise;
VOTE?1if the?rm submits auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation vote,0otherwise.3 Starting from Simunic (1980), prior research has used various measures related to client size, complexity,and risk as control variables in audit fee models.We use the same audit fee model as in Raghunandan and Rama (2006). Following a long tradition in the auditing literature, we use the log transformed audit fees,Log(AuditFees),as the dependent variable.Log(TotalAssets)is employed to measure client size,and we expect the coef?cient of Log(TotalAssets)to be positive.Three variables—InvRecTA,SqrtSegments,and Foreign—proxy for client complexity,and we expect positive coef?cients for these three variables.
Five variables,CurrentRatio,ROA,Leverage,GC,and ICW,control for client?nancial condition and internal control;the coef?cients of CurrentRatio and ROA are expected to be negative,while the coef?cients of Leverage,GC,and ICW are expected to be positive.A large body of literature has shown that there is a Big N audit fee premium,so we include Big4and expect the coef?cient of this variable to be positive.Prior research also suggests that audit fees are discounted for initial years of audit engagements (e.g., Simon and Francis 1988; Whisenant et al. 2003); however,recent research suggests that initial audit engagements have an audit fee premium in the post-SOX period (Huang et al. 2009), so we include Initial in the model but do not make a prediction about the sign of the coef?cient.
The independent variable of interest is VOTE.The governance/accountability perspective and experimental results of Mayhew and Pike (2004)suggest that the coef?cient of VOTE should be positive.
Data
We start our sample with all https://www.doczj.com/doc/2616561158.html,panies that are included in the2006version of Corporate Library’s Board Analyst database.As part of our analyses of audit quality,we examine subsequent restatements;since it takes some time before restatements are discovered and disclosed,using data 3Continuous variables(used in this and any subsequent regression)are winsorized at the1st and99th percentiles. Shareholder Voting on Auditor Selection,Audit Fees,and Audit Quality155
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from ?scal year 2006enables us to examine subsequent restatements over a three-year period (until the end of 2009).Section 404of SOX ?rst became applicable for ?scal years ending on or after November 15,2004,and auditors have noted that there has been a steep learning curve related to audits in the post-Section 404period.Hence,we restrict the analysis to the 2,084companies with ?scal years ending December 31,2006.4Consistent with prior research related to audit fees and because ?rms in ?nancial sectors have different ?nancial statement reporting formats (and are subject to additional regulations),we exclude 602?rms with SIC codes from 6000–6999.
We obtain data about audit fees,audit opinions,and auditor changes from the Audit Analytics database,while ?nancial data are from the Compustat database and 10-K ?lings available on the SEC’s website.We manually collect data about submission of auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation voting from proxy ?lings available on the SEC’s website.After eliminating 100observations with missing data,our ?nal sample includes 1,382?rms.
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1provides descriptive statistics about the variables used in the audit fee regression model.The mean (median)audit fees for the sample ?rms are $2.86($1.53)million.The mean and median values for the control variables are generally in line with those found in other studies (e.g., Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006; Raghunandan and Rama 2006) that examine audit fees in the post-
SOX period.5Seventy-?ve percent of the sample ?rms submitted auditor selection for shareholder
rati?cation in 2006.As seen in Panels B and C of Table 1,?rms that submitted auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation tend to be larger,are more likely to be audited by a Big 4auditor,and are less likely to have adverse Section 404reports,going-concern modi?ed audit reports,or auditor changes.
We test for multicollinearity between the independent variables by examining the correlation matrix (untabulated).We ?nd that all of the bivariate correlations are less than 0.50.We also ?nd that the variance in?ation factors for the variables in the regression model are all less than 2.0,indicating that multicollinearity does not cause problems with our inferences.
Audit Fee Regression Results
Table 2presents the regression results for the model with Log (AuditFees )as the dependent variable.The overall model is signi?cant,and the adjusted R 2of 71percent is in line with prior audit fee studies.All control variables in the model (except for Leverage and Initial )are signi?cant and have the expected coef?cient signs.The variable of interest,VOTE ,is positive and signi?cant (p ,0.05).The magnitude of the coef?cient of VOTE is 0.085,indicating that companies 4
There are two reasons why we restrict the analysis to clients with a 12/31?scal year-end.First,the Big 4?rms noted in submissions to the SEC in 2005and 2006that SOX 404-related work had a signi?cant impact on audit fees and that there is a steep learning curve effect for SOX 404-related work;hence,a ?rm with a 12/31/2006?scal year-end would be in the initial phase of the third year of SOX 404work,while a ?rm with a 2/28/2006(6/30/2007)?scal year-end would still be in the second year (later phase of the third year)cycle of SOX 404.We do not want to contaminate our sample by mixing ?rms that would have been in different stages of the learning curve.The second reason relates to the change from AS 2to AS 5;the PCAOB approved the change in May 2007to use a more top-down approach,and this had a pronounced effect on audit work and fees;the PCAOB provided permission for immediate application of the standard.5We also compared our ?rms with the overall Compustat population (after excluding foreign ?rms and ?rms in ?nancial sectors). In terms of industry, when we use the 12 industry groups based on Professor French’s (http://mba.tuck https://www.doczj.com/doc/2616561158.html,/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) classi?cation, our sample has fewer ?rms in the ‘‘wholesale,retail,and some services ’’category (5.9percent in our sample versus 10.4percent in Compustat).However,75percent of the sample ?rms from this sector had a shareholder rati?cation of the auditor—identical to the proportion for the rest of the sample.Firm size in our sample is,however,larger than in the Compustat population (e.g.,average total assets are $1.00billion for our sample compared to $199million for the Compustat sample).
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TABLE1
Descriptive Data
(n?1,382)
Panel A:Sample Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation25th Percentile Median75th Percentile Audit Fees($000)2,863.053,969.04805.221,528.922,996.57 Log(Audit Fees)14.31 1.0013.6014.2414.91 Log(TotalAssets)20.88 1.6619.6720.7322.01 InvRecTA0.220.170.080.180.32 SqrtSegments 1.440.53 1.00 1.00 2.00 Foreign0.290.450.000.00 1.00 CurrentRatio 2.64 2.38 1.25 1.87 3.07 ROA0.010.180.010.050.09 Leverage0.530.270.340.530.68 GC0.020.140.000.000.00 ICW0.090.280.000.000.00 Big40.900.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 Initial0.150.350.000.000.00 VOTE0.750.430.00 1.00 1.00 Panel B:Comparison of Subsamples Partitioned by VOTE:Mean(Median)of Continuous Variables Used in the Audit Fee Regression Model
VOTE?0 (n?346)VOTE?1
(n?1,036)
p-value for t-test
(Mann-Whitney U test)
Log(TotalAssets)20.4921.02,0.01
(20.39)(20.93)(,0.01) InvRecTA0.230.210.07
(0.20)(0.17)(0.10) SqrtSegments 1.48 1.430.14
(1.41)(1.00)(0.06) CurrentRatio 2.54 2.670.39
(1.89)(1.86)(0.65)
ROA0.010.010.85
(0.05)(0.04)(0.86) Leverage0.530.540.74
(0.51)(0.53)(0.30) Panel C:Comparison of Subsamples Partitioned by VOTE:Proportion with Value of1for Discrete Variables Used in the Audit Fee Regression Model
VOTE?0 (n?346)VOTE?1
(n?1,036)
p-value
(Chi-square test)
Foreign0.290.290.98
GC0.050.01,0.01 ICW0.130.07,0.01
Big40.840.93,0.01 Initial0.230.12,0.01
The p-values are two-tailed.
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submitting auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation pay,on average,9percent higher audit fees.This result is consistent with the evidence in Mayhew and Pike (2004) that increased shareholder involvement in auditor selection is associated with higher audit fees.
Further Analyses:Endogeneity
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) note that almost all research related to corporate governance is subject to the problems associated with endogeneity.Thus,it is possible that the same factors that are associated with greater shareholder involvement in auditor selection are also associated with higher audit fees. Krishnan and Ye (2005) ?nd that audit committee characteristics are associated with the likelihood of shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation.Prior research also shows that good corporate governance is associated with higher audit fees (e.g., Carcello et al. 2002), possibly due to the demand for higher quality or quantity of monitoring by auditors.To the extent that good corporate governance—such as,an audit committee with a greater number or proportion of accounting experts—is associated with both greater shareholder involvement in auditor selection and higher audit fees,the association documented earlier could re?ect the same underlying governance characteristics.
Hence,we perform the following two-stage analysis.In the ?rst stage,in addition to the audit fee model discussed above,we use the following PROBIT regression model:
VOTE ?c 0tb 1?Log eTotalAssets Ttb 2?ACExpert tb 3?DirectorVote tb 4?Return
tb 5?CEOCHR tb 6?InsiderOwn tb 7?Big4tb 8?Initial terror :e2T
The variables VOTE,Log (TotalAssets ),Big4,and Initial are as de?ned earlier.Other variables are de?ned as in Krishnan and Ye (2005), as follows:
ACExpert ?proportion of audit committee directors who are accounting or auditing experts;DirectorVote ?minimum percent of votes against the election of a director in the prior year;Return ?prior-year common stock return minus the mean of two-digit SIC’s common stock
return for the prior year;
CEOCHR ?1if the CEO is also the Chair of the Board of Directors,0otherwise;
InsiderOwn ?proportion of common stock held by of?cers and directors.
TABLE 1(continued)
This table provides descriptive statistics about variables used in the audit fee model.The sample includes 1,382?rms that
(1)are in the 2006edition of the Corporate Library database,(2)are U.S.?rms,(3)have a December 31?scal year-end,
(4)are in non?nancial industries,and (5)have required data.
Variable De?nitions:
Log (TotalAssets )?natural logarithm of total assets;
InvRecTA ?ratio of assets in inventory plus accounts receivable to total assets;
SqrtSegments ?square root of the number of business segments;
Foreign ?1if foreign income is reported,0otherwise;
CurrentRatio ?ratio of current assets to current liabilities;
ROA ?ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets;
Leverage ?ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
GC ?1if the ?rm receives a going-concern modi?ed opinion,0otherwise;
ICW ?1if the ?rm has an adverse SOX 404opinion,0otherwise;
Big4?1if the auditor is a Big 4audit ?rm,0otherwise;
Initial ?1if the audit engagement is a ?rst-or second-year audit,0otherwise;and
VOTE ?1if the ?rm submits auditor selection for rati?cation vote,0otherwise.
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Our control variables are based on results from prior research. Krishnan and Ye (2005) ?nd that the likelihood of having shareholder voting on auditor selection is (1)positively related to Log (TotalAssets ),ACExpert ,Return ,and CEOCHR ,and (2)negatively related to DirectorVote and InsiderOwn .We include Big4and Initial based on the evidence in Table 1that ?rms with and without shareholder voting on auditor selection differ along these dimensions.6
TABLE 2
Audit Fee Regression Results
Model:
Log eAuditFees T?a 0ta 1?Log eTotalAssets Tta 2?InvRecTA ta 3?SqrtSegments
ta 4?Foreign ta 5?CurrentRatio ta 6?Leverage ta 7?ROA ta 8?GC
ta 9?ICW ta 10?Big4ta 11?Initial ta 12?VOTE terror :
Variable
Expected Sign Coef?cient p-value Intercept
4.049,0.01Log (TotalAssets )
t0.455,0.01InvRecTA
t0.750,0.01SqrtSegments
t0.186,0.01Foreign
t0.350,0.01CurrentRatio
àà0.0150.02Leverage
tà0.0220.74ROA
àà0.379,0.01GC
t0.323,0.01ICW
t0.458,0.01Big4
t0.182,0.01Initial
?0.0560.23VOTE ?0.0850.01Model F ?283.9;p ,0.01;Adjusted R 2?0.71.
p-values are two-tailed.
The sample includes 1,382?rms that (1)are in the 2006edition of the Corporate Library database,(2)are US ?rms,(3)have a December 31?scal year-end,(4)are in non?nancial industries,and (5)have all required data.
Variable De?nitions:
Log (TotalAssets )?natural logarithm of total assets;
InvRecTA ?ratio of assets in inventory plus accounts receivable to total assets;
SqrtSegments ?square root of the number of business segments;
Foreign ?1if foreign income is reported,0otherwise;
CurrentRatio ?ratio of current assets to current liabilities;
ROA ?ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets;
Leverage ?ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
GC ?1if the ?rm receives a going-concern modi?ed opinion,0otherwise;
ICW ?1if the ?rm has an adverse SOX 404opinion,0otherwise;
Big4?1if the auditor is a Big 4audit ?rm,0otherwise;
Initial ?1if the audit engagement is a ?rst-or second-year audit,0otherwise;and
VOTE ?1if the ?rm submits auditor selection for rati?cation vote,0otherwise.
6Table 1shows that ?rms with and without auditor rati?cation also differ in terms of GC and ICW .However,we do not include them in the model because these two variables are not known until the end of the year (after the decision to have a shareholder rati?cation vote).
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The regression results (untabulated)indicate that Log (TotalAssets )and Return are positive and signi?cant (p ,0.10),while InsiderOwn and Initial are negative and signi?cant (p ,0.01).The overall model is signi?cant (Chi-square ? 79.8, p , 0.001; Pseudo R 2 ? 0.06).
We then use the same procedure as in DeFond et al. (2002). We examine if audit fees and shareholder involvement in auditor selection are endogenous by ?rst using the Hausman test for endogeneity.The test indicates that the null hypothesis of exogeneity can be rejected (p ,0.05).Hence,we use the ?tted values for VOTE from the ?rst-stage regression as the predictor in the second-stage fee regression.We ?nd that the coef?cient of the ?tted values of VOTE continues to remain positive and signi?cant in the second-stage regression (p ,0.05).The sign and signi?cance of all other variables in the regression attain the same levels of statistical signi?cance as those in Table 2.
Further Analysis:Change Sample
If shareholder voting on auditor selection is associated with audit fees,then changes in shareholder voting should be associated with changes in audit fees.7We focus on ?rms that changed from not having a shareholder vote on auditor rati?cation in 2005to having such a vote in 2006,and vice versa .We are able to obtain data about the presence or absence of an auditor rati?cation vote in 2005for 1,341of our sample ?rms.There are 934?rms that had a shareholder vote in both years,and 274?rms that did not have a vote in both years.There are 77?rms that did not have an auditor rati?cation vote in 2005,but had such a vote in 2006;conversely,there were 56?rms that had an auditor rati?cation vote in 2005but did not have such a vote in 2006.
Insofar as audit committees are involved in the hiring and compensation of the external auditor,it is possible that changes in audit committee composition could be driving both changes in shareholder voting policies and audit fees.Hence,from the sample discussed in the previous paragraph,we delete ?rms with a change in the composition of the audit committee.This yields a sample of 54?rms that started shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation in 2006and 45?rms that stopped shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation in 2006,with available data to conduct a changes analysis of audit fees.
For the changes model,we use the same model (1)discussed above,except that the dependent and independent variables are all measured in changes form (i.e.,value for 2006minus the value for 2005).The results from the changes regression are presented in Table 3.The overall model is statistically signi?cant,with an adjusted R 2of 0.41.The coef?cient of D_VOTE is 0.04,indicating that ?rms that changed from not having a vote in 2005to having a vote in 2006(i.e.,D_VOTE ?1)had,on average,changes in audit fees that were about 8percent higher than ?rms that changed from having a vote in 2005to not having a vote in 2006(i.e.,D_VOTE ?à1).
Additional Analyses
Prior research suggests that the level of competition is higher in the small-client segment of the audit market (Francis and Simon 1987). Thus, we partition our sample into two subsamples: small (?rms with total assets less than the median)and large (?rms with total assets more than the median).We ?nd that the primary result—namely,audit fees are higher in ?rms that submitted auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation—continues to hold in both groups.
Many prior studies have documented that the market for audit services is segmented,with a pronounced difference between the Big N and non-Big N ?rms (e.g., Ferguson and Stokes 2002).7A changes regression is particularly appropriate for audit fees because,in general,last year’s audit fees predicts well this year’s audit fees;for example,in our sample a regression of last year’s fees on this year’s fees yields a regression coef?cient of 0.91.
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We therefore delete non-Big 4clients from the sample.The overall results with this subsample are substantively similar to those reported in Tables 3and 4.
Summary
In summary,our analyses indicate that shareholder involvement in auditor selection is associated with higher audit fees.We ?nd that the coef?cient of VOTE is positive and signi?cant in the levels model for 2006audit fees.This ?nding persists after controlling for endogeneity.Finally,the change in shareholder voting policy variable is signi?cant in the audit fee changes model.Overall,the results are consistent with the results reported by Mayhew and Pike (2004) from an experimental laboratory setting,but are inconsistent with the view that shareholder voting on auditor selection will lead to lower audit fees.
IV .SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND AUDIT QUALITY
Mayhew and Pike (2004) ?nd that shareholder selection of the auditor is also associated with better quality audits. Speci?cally, Mayhew and Pike (2004) show that average auditor effort is TABLE 3
Audit Fee Change Regression Results
Model:D Log eAuditFees T?b 0tb 1?D Log eTotalAssets Ttb 2?D InvRecTA tb 3?D SqrtSegments
tb 4?D Foreign tb 5?D CurrentRatio tb 6?D Leverage
tb 7?D ROA tb 8?D GC tb 9?D ICW tb 10?D Big4
tb 11?D Initial tb 12?D VOTE terror :
Variable
Coef?cient p-value Intercept
0.0130.70D_Log (TotalAssets )
0.386,0.01D_InvRecTA
1.511,0.01D_SqrtSegments
à0.0040.98D_Foreign
à0.0270.85D_CurrentRatio
à0.0390.02D_Leverage
à0.1590.47D_ROA
à0.3050.19D_GC
0.0830.42D_ICW
0.1080.08D_Big4
0.802,0.01D_Initial
0.400,0.01D_VOTE 0.0400.08Model F ?6.73,p ,0.01;Adjusted R 2?0.41
p-values are two-tailed.
This table presents the results from a ‘‘changes ’’regression.The sample includes 54?rms that changed from not having a shareholder rati?cation vote of the auditor in 2005to having such a vote in 2006,and 45?rms that went vice versa (i.e.,had a rati?cation vote in 2005but not in 2006).In addition,the change ?rms did not have any change in the composition of the audit committee.The dependent variable is the change in Log (AuditFees ),measured as Log (AuditFees )for 2006minus Log (AuditFees )for 2005.All the independent variables are measured as the change in the value of the relevant variable (value for 2006minus the value for 2005).The variables are de?ned as in Table 2.
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TABLE4
Shareholder Voting on Auditor Rati?cation and Subsequent Restatements Panel A:Shareholder Voting and Subsequent Restatements
Shareholder Voting
Subsequent Restatement
Yes No
Yes53983
(5.1%)(94.9%) No28318
(8.1%)(91.9%)
Chi-square?4.17,p?0.04
Panel B:Shareholder Voting and Subsequent Restatements with Negative Market Effect
Shareholder Voting Subsequent Restatement with Negative Five-Day CAR Yes No
Yes361,000
(3.5%)(96.5%) No21325
(6.1%)(93.9%)
Chi-square?7.78,p?,0.01
Panel C:Comparison of Subsamples Partitioned by VOTE:Mean(Median)Values
VOTE?0 (n?346)VOTE?1
(n?1,036)
p-value
(t or Chi-square test)
ACExpert0.210.220.49 SpecialistAud0.240.33,0.01 Raise0.160.150.51 Panel D:Logistic Regression Results
Model:
RESTATE?c0tc1?LogeTotalAssetsTtc2?ACExperttc3?Leverage
tc4?SpecialistAudtc5?Raisetc6?VOTEterror:
Variable Expected
Sign
All Negative
Effect Restatements
Negative Effect and
Negative Market
Reaction Restatements Coef?cient p-value Coef?cient p-value
Intercept 1.5080.34 2.5350.18 Log(TotalAssets)àà0.214,0.01à0.279,0.01 ACExpertà0.4580.40à0.0660.46 Leveraget0.5530.080.6420.08 SpecialistAudàà0.1440.300.0900.78 Raiset0.2730.260.2000.35 VOTEàà0.3850.06à0.3850.06
Chi-square?14.7,
p?0.02,Nagelkerke R2?0.03
Chi-square?13.7,
p?0.03,Nagelkerke R2?0.03
(continued on next page)
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higher,and auditor independence violations are lower,when there is shareholder involvement in auditor selection.Economic theory suggests that enhanced competition can also have an effect on the quality of a product,so another implication from the ACAP’s suggestion (that shareholder involvement in auditor selection will lead to enhanced competition)is that shareholder voting should be associated with higher quality audits.Further,the governance and accountability perspective suggests that greater shareholder involvement in auditor selection should strengthen auditor independence and lead to improved audit quality.
Audit quality is not directly observable,so prior studies have used a variety of measures as proxies for audit quality.We use restatements as a measure of audit quality because a restatement is an admission by the company that previously reported ?nancial statements were materially misstated (Srinivasan 2005). Prior research shows that restatements increase the cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins 2004) and are associated with signi?cant negative market reaction (Hennes et al. 2008). Several prior studies have used restatements as a proxy for ?nancial reporting problems (e.g., Kinney et al. 2004; Srinivasan 2005;Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Desai et al. 2006; Hennes et al. 2008). Finally, in our interviews, the audit partners and the ACAP member recommended using restatements because (to paraphrase)they are publicly observable and involve less of a judgment by a researcher about audit quality.
In the context of our study,both the ACAP/governance arguments and prior results from Mayhew and Pike (2004) suggest that shareholder involvement in auditor selection should be associated with higher quality audits.Hence,shareholder voting on auditor selection should be associated with fewer restatements of ?nancial statements in the future.
Formally stated,our second hypothesis (in the alternative form)is:
H2(alternative form):Subsequent client restatements will be less likely in ?rms with
shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation.
Method and Data
Because we focus on shareholder voting for ?scal year 2006,we analyze restatements that are related to ?scal year 2006and were disclosed in SEC ?lings after the audited ?nancial statements TABLE 4(continued)
p-values are two-tailed.
Panel A provides the association between shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation during 2006,and subsequent restatements relating to 2006that were disclosed in ?lings with the SEC until December 31,2009.We include only those restatements that had a negative effect on ?nancial statements.
Panel B provides the association between shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation during 2006,and subsequent restatements relating to 2006that were disclosed in ?lings with the SEC until December 31,2009.We include only those restatements that had a negative effect on ?nancial statements and had a negative stock price reaction,as measured by the ?ve-day Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)with value-weighted market adjustment.
Panel C compares three of the control variables used in the logistic regression model to explain subsequent restatements.Panel D provides the results from a logistic regression where the dependent variables take the value of 1if there is a subsequent restatement with a negative effect on ?nancial statements (subsequent restatement with both negative effect on ?nancial statements and a negative ?ve-day cumulative abnormal return)in the ?rst (second)regression,and 0otherwise.
Variable De?nitions:
Log (TotalAssets )?natural logarithm of total assets;
ACExpert ?proportion of audit committee members who are accounting or auditing ?nancial experts;
Leverage ?ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
SpecialistAud ?1if the auditor is an industry specialist (de?ned as having more than 33.3percent of the market share,
using two-digit SIC codes),and 0otherwise;
Raise ?(sum of cash raised by issuing common and preferred stock and long-term debt)/average total assets;and VOTE ?1if the ?rm submits auditor selection for rati?cation vote,0otherwise.
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for ?scal year 2006were ?led with the SEC.We examine SEC ?lings until December 31,2009.We obtain restatement data from Audit Analytics,and we consider only those restatements that had a negative effect on ?nancial statements.
Hennes et al. (2008) note that not all restatements are equal, and point out the advantages of relying on market reaction to determine the severity of a restatement.Accordingly,as an alternative measure,we use a more stringent criterion by including only those restatements that,in addition to having a negative effect on ?nancial statements,also elicited a negative market reaction.We obtain the ?ve-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR)surrounding the restatement announcement date,using a value-weighted market adjustment.8
Unlike for audit fees,there is no standard model that has been consistently found to be good at explaining restatements over multiple years and studies.Recent studies that have used the occurrence of a restatement as a dependent variable include Abbott et al. (2004), Kinney et al.(2004), Larcker et al. (2007), Archambeault et al. (2008), Romanus et al. (2008), Scholz (2008),and Chin and Chi (2009). For our logistic regression model, we include as control variables all those factors that are signi?cant in at least two of the above studies.Accordingly,our model is as follows:
RESTATE ?c 0tc 1?Log eTotalAssets Ttc 2?ACExpert tc 3?Leverage tc 4?SpecialistAud
tc 5?Raise tc 6?VOTE terror
e3T
where:
RESTATE ?1if there is a subsequent restatement relating to ?scal year 2006that had a
negative effect on ?nancial statements (and,in the second test,also had a ?ve-day negative cumulative abnormal return);
SpecialistAud ?1if the auditor is an industry specialist (with more than 33.3percent of the
market share,using two-digit SIC codes),0otherwise;and
Raise ?(sum of cash raised by issuing common and preferred stock and long-term debt)/
average total assets.
The other variables,Log (TotalAssets ),ACExpert ,Leverage ,and VOTE ,are as de?ned earlier.Results
Panel A of Table 4presents the univariate association between shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation and subsequent restatements.Fifty-three of the 1,036(5.1percent)?rms with shareholder rati?cation vote of the auditor had a subsequent restatement,while 28of the 346(8.1percent)?rms without a rati?cation vote had a subsequent restatement.The difference is statistically signi?cant (Chi-square ?4.17,p ?0.04).
Panel B of Table 4presents the results when we use only those restatements that elicited a negative market reaction.Thirty-six of the 1,036(3.5percent)?rms with shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation had a subsequent restatement that elicited a negative market reaction;21of the 346(6.1percent)?rms without a rati?cation vote had a negative market reaction.This difference is statistically signi?cant (Chi-square ?7.78,p ,0.01).
Panel C of Table 4presents data about univariate differences between the two groups of ?rms partitioned by VOTE .This panel shows that there is no signi?cant difference between the two 8As part of sensitivity analyses,we use the three-day or seven-day CAR and classify a restatement as negative only if such CAR is negative.The results with such alternative speci?cations are substantively similar to those presented in Table 4;VOTE continues to be negatively related to a subsequent restatement.
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groups in terms of ACExpert or Raise;however,?rms that have a shareholder vote are more likely to have an industry-specialist auditor.
Panel D of Table4presents the results from two logistic regressions.In both regressions,the dependent variable is the presence of a subsequent restatement relating to?scal year2006?nancial statements.In the?rst regression,the dependent variable equals1if there is a subsequent restatement that has a negative effect on?nancial statements;in the second regression,the dependent variable equals1only if,in addition to having a negative effect on?nancial statements, the restatement announcement has a?ve-day cumulative market-adjusted return that is negative. Both regressions are signi?cant at conventional levels,although the explanatory powers of the models are low.In both regressions,the coef?cient of VOTE is negative and signi?cant at p?0.06, indicating that?rms that had a shareholder vote on auditor rati?cation are less likely to have a future restatement.The coef?cient of VOTE isà0.385,so having a shareholder vote on auditor rati?cation is associated with a32percent reduction in the likelihood of a later restatement,on average.
It is possible that?nancial reporting quality and having a shareholder vote on auditor selection are endogenously determined.Hence,as with audit fees,we perform a Hausman test for endogeneity using the restatement model and the shareholder voting model discussed earlier.We ?nd that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected(p?0.22).
Unlike for audit fees,we do not perform a formal test focusing on those?rms that changed their rati?cation policies in2006.This is because only four?rms from each of the two groups—the group of54?rms that started auditor rati?cation in2006and the group of45?rms that stopped auditor rati?cation in2006—have a subsequent restatement.
Additional Analysis:Abnormal Accruals
Prior studies in a variety of contexts have used client discretionary accruals as the proxy for audit quality (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999). Following this line of research, we use performance-matched discretionary accruals as an alternative proxy for audit quality and examine the association between shareholder involvement in auditor selection and client abnormal accruals.
We follow the same approach as in Geiger and North (2006), who examine accruals quality after the hiring of a new CFO. As in Geiger and North (2006), we use a measure of abnormal current accruals after adjusting for performance as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). Following Geiger and North (2006), we estimate abnormal current accruals by using the cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991)model introduced by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). We estimate the following model by two-digit SIC industry and by year:9
TCA it=A ità1?u0tu1e1=A ità1Ttu2eD REV itàD REC itT=A ità1te ite4Twhere:
TCA it??rm i’s total current accruals in year t measured as?(D CA itàD CL itàD Cash itt
D STDEBT it),where:
D CA it?change in current assets for?rm i from year tà1to year t;
D CL it?change in current liabilities for?rm i from year tà1to year t;
D Cash it?change in cash and short-term investment for?rm i from year tà1to year t;
D STDEBT it?change in current portion of long-term liabilities for?rm i from year tà1to
year t;
9We use the Compustat population to calculate abnormal accruals.
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A it à1?total assets of ?rm i for year t à1;
D REV it ?change in revenues for ?rm i from year t à1to year t ;
D REC it ?change in receivables for ?rm i from year t à1to year t ;and
e it ?error term.
The residuals from the industry and year-speci?c regressions using Equation (4)are a measure of abnormal current accruals (ACA ).We then adjust ACA it for performance matching following the approach used by Francis et al. (2005). We form performance decile groups by industry based on the current year’s ROA (income before extraordinary items divided by total assets).We estimate performance-matched abnormal current accruals (PMACA it )as the difference between ACA it and median ACA for the ROA decile to which ?rm i belongs (where the median is calculated excluding ?rm i ).
Following Geiger and North (2006), we then use the model below to examine the association between shareholder involvement in auditor selection and audit quality:
PMACA ?h 0th 1?MVE th 2?BM th 3?Distress th 4?CFFO th 5?Growth th 6?Finance
th 7?ACQ th 8?LROA th 9?VOTE terror :
e5T
The variables are de?ned as in Geiger and North (2006), as follows:
PMACA ?performance-matched abnormal current accruals;
MVE ?natural logarithm of market value of equity;
BM ?book-to-market ratio;
Distress ? ?nancial distress measure (calculated from Zmijewski [1984]);
CFFO ?cash ?ow from operations divided by total assets;
Growth ?sales growth rate;
Finance ?1if the number of outstanding shares increased by at least 10percent or long-term
debt increased by at least 20percent during the year;
ACQ ?1if the company engaged in an acquisition,0otherwise;
LROA ?return on assets from the prior year;and
VOTE ?1if the ?rm submits auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation vote,0otherwise.Panel A of Table 5presents descriptive details about abnormal current accruals when the sample is partitioned based on shareholder involvement in auditor selection.The sample size for the abnormal current accruals analysis drops to 1,261,of which 945?rms submitted auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation.Firms that submitted auditor selection for shareholder rati?cation have signi?cantly (p ?0.02)lower abnormal current accruals.
Panel B of Table 5presents the results from the regression model (5)above.The model is signi?cant (p ,0.01),and the coef?cients of the control variables generally have the signs expected based on prior research.The coef?cient of VOTE is negative and signi?cant (p ,0.01),indicating that performance-matched abnormal current accruals are lower in ?rms with shareholder rati?cation of the auditor.
As with the audit fee model,the same factors that are associated with shareholder involvement in auditor selection may also be associated with accruals quality.We address the endogeneity issue using 2SLS analysis as before.We ?nd that (1)the null hypothesis of exogeneity can be rejected (p ,0.05),and (2)in the second-stage analysis,the coef?cient for ?tted values of VOTE is negative and signi?cant (p ,0.05)in the regression.
We also examine if abnormal accruals differ for ?rms that changed their rati?cation policies.For such analyses, as in Geiger and North (2006), we use changes in discretionary accruals as the dependent variable;the control variables are also measured in changes form,and the variable of
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interest is the change in shareholder rati?cation policy.However,unlike for audit fees,we ?nd that there are no signi?cant differences between the ?rms that started and the ?rms that stopped auditor rati?cation in 2006when we examine (1)in univariate analysis,the levels of abnormal accruals in 2006or changes in abnormal accruals from 2005to 2006,or (2)the changes version of the regression model for abnormal accruals.
TABLE 5
Abnormal Accruals Regression Analysis
Panel A:Descriptive Data for Abnormal Current Accruals
Shareholder Vote
on Auditor Rati?cation
Mean Standard Deviation 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile p-value from t-test Yes (n ?945)
à0.01960.0941à0.0476à0.01250.01830.015
No (n ?316)à0.00560.0850à0.0409à0.00530.0332Panel B:Regression Results
Model:
PMACA ?h 0th 1?MVE th 2?BM th 3?Distress th 4?CFFO th 5?Growth
th 6?Finance th 7?ACQ th 8?LROA th 9?VOTE terror :
Variable
Coef?cient p-value Intercept
à0.02760.03MVE
0.00430.02BM
à0.00050.93Distress
à0.0076,0.01CFFO
à0.2659,0.01Growth
à0.0197,0.01Finance
à0.00390.47ACQ
0.00140.79LROA
0.0816,0.01VOTE à0.0161
,0.01
n ?1,261;Model F ?19.95,p ,0.001;Adjusted R 2?0.12p-values are two-tailed.
Panel A provides descriptive data about portfolio-matched abnormal current accruals,calculated using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model as applied in Kothari et al. (2005).
Panel B provides results from a regression where the dependent variable is portfolio-matched abnormal current accruals,calculated using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model as applied in Kothari et al. (2005).
Variable De?nitions:
MVE ?natural logarithm of market value of equity;
BM ?book-to-market ratio;
Distress ? ?nancial distress measure (calculated from Zmijewski [1984]);
CFFO ?cash ?ow from operations divided by total assets;
Growth ?sales growth rate;
Finance ?1if the number of outstanding shares increased by at least 10percent or long-term debt increased by at least
20percent during the year;
ACQ ?1if the company engaged in an acquisition,0otherwise;
LROA ?return on assets from the prior year;and
VOTE ?1if the ?rm submits auditor selection for rati?cation vote,0otherwise.
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V .SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The U.S.Department of the Treasury appointed an Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP)in 2007because of concerns about the market for public company audits.In October 2008,the ACAP issued a set of recommendations related to human capital,?rm structure and ?nances,and concentration and competition.As a part of the recommendations,the ACAP suggests that all public companies be required to have shareholder rati?cation of auditors.This recommendation is based on the belief that shareholder involvement in auditor selection will ‘‘enhance competition in the audit industry ’’ (DoT 2008, VIII:20).
The ACAP did not provide any empirical support for recommending mandatory shareholder involvement in auditor selection.However,the traditional argument espoused by legislators,the executive,and the judiciary in the U.S.is that enhanced competition leads to lower price and higher quality.While the ACAP used the language of competition,an alternative perspective is to view shareholder voting from a governance and accountability framework.In this view,when there is shareholder involvement in auditor selection,the investors become monitors of the auditor’s work.Such an arrangement makes the auditor more a direct agent of the shareholder than of the board of directors and/or management.Shareholder voting can be viewed as aligning the auditor’s incentives more with shareholders than in cases where the audit committee or management makes the auditor hiring decision without shareholder approval.Increased shareholder participation is likely to strengthen auditor independence and lead to both higher audit quality and higher audit fees.
We examine if ?rms that have shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation pay lower (or higher)audit fees than ?rms without such shareholder https://www.doczj.com/doc/2616561158.html,ing data from 1,382?rms for the year ending December 31,2006,we ?nd that audit fees are about 9percent higher for ?rms that have shareholder voting on auditor rati?cation.Our results continue to hold after we control for potential endogeneity between audit fees and shareholder voting on auditor selection.When we restrict the analysis to ?rms that changed their auditor rati?cation policy in 2006and did not have a change in the composition of the audit committee,we ?nd that ?rms that started auditor rati?cation pay higher audit fees than ?rms that stopped auditor rati?cation in 2006.
We also examine the association between shareholder voting and audit quality.We ?nd that ?rms with a shareholder vote on auditor rati?cation are less likely to have subsequent restatements that have a negative effect on ?nancial statements.Our results hold when we restrict the analysis to restatements that elicit a negative ?ve-day cumulative abnormal return.Further tests indicate that having a shareholder vote is not endogenous with a subsequent restatement.However,we are unable to perform a change analysis with restatements because only four ?rms from each the two groups of ?rms,that started or stopped auditor rati?cation in 2006,had a restatement relating to ?scal year 2006in the subsequent three years.
We ?nd that abnormal accruals are lower in ?rms with shareholder involvement in auditor selection.Having a shareholder vote appears to be endogenous with accruals,but the association between having a shareholder vote and abnormal accruals persists after we control for endogeneity.
Taken together,the results indicate that shareholder involvement in auditor selection is associated with higher audit fees and improved audit quality. As in Mayhew and Pike (2004), our conjectures (based on interviews with three audit partners and an ACAP subcommittee chair)are as follows.Shareholder involvement in auditor selection strengthens the power of the auditor in any negotiations with management and increases the ‘‘pressure to perform ’’on the auditor.As noted by the audit partners and the ACAP member,if there is a shareholder vote,then questions will be raised if an auditor who routinely gets 98percent rati?cation drops down to 95or 90percent support from shareholders;further,a shareholder vote means there is a non-zero probability of receiving a negative vote from shareholders,which increases the risk to the auditor.If auditors are likely to be more careful to avoid the possibility of any criticism (as may be the case when a higher
168Dao,Raghunandan,and
Rama
The Accounting Review
January 2012
一次换代一步飞跃详解奥迪A4历史 2008-11-16 13:40:46来源: 网易汽车频道网友评论17 条进入论坛 08年对于奥迪是重要的一年，众人熟识的奥迪A6L迎来中期改款，奥迪R8一款划时代的产品在国内上市，A5、S5入华又引爆了国内豪华轿跑车市场的争夺，现如今备受期待的国产新一代奥迪A4如期而至，成为了众人心中的明星。回首奥迪A4的发展历程，才只有10余年，不过若要揭开奥迪A4的发展历史，还要从A4的前生奥迪80开始说起。 第一代奥迪80掀开了大众平台化生产的新篇章 历史追溯到1972年，第一代奥迪80车型于这一年的夏天诞生，这也是近代汽车工业飞速发展的开端。奥迪首席设计师Ludwig Kraus推出秉承奥迪100设计理念的奥迪80。此时的奥迪80采用了和大众第一代帕萨特相同的B1平台生产，配备四缸单顶置凸轮轴发动机，排量设计1.3升、1.5升、1.6升多款发动机。而奥迪80成为了大众“平台化生产方式”的开端，此举使得大众与奥迪极大的削减了产品开发的成本。刚一诞生的奥迪80立即在欧洲市场风靡一时，截止至1978年第二代奥迪80车型的诞生，第一代奥迪80共生产了110多万辆，为此奥迪80车型为奥迪乃至大众集团赚取了大把的资金。 第二代奥迪80车型，两厢掀背版成为一代经典
1978年，奥迪推出了第二代奥迪80轿车，此时，大众的模块化设计思想越发成熟，为此，奥迪80车型同第二代帕萨特车型共同采用了大众的B2平台生产，这也使得大众与奥迪共平台生产得到了进一步的发展。第二代奥迪80车型，增加了双门两厢运动版车型，命名为Coupe GT。该车型源自Audi Quattro独特的两厢造型掀背式的造型，成为当时运动型轿车的经典造型。第二代奥迪80的生产维持了8年，配备了从1.3升至2升多款发动机，随后，奥迪还推出了1.6升燃油喷射发动机的奥迪80 GLE车型，该车型也代表了当时汽车发动机最先进技术。 Coupe GT该车型源自Audi Quattro的两厢掀背式的造型(本文来源：网易汽车频道) 一次换代一步飞跃详解奥迪A4历史 2008-11-16 13:40:46来源: 网易汽车频道网友评论17 条进入论坛
实用标准文案（盲点监测系统，变道辅助系统）在车辆行驶时对车辆两摄像头等装置，就是通过雷达、所谓盲点监测系统，会在后视镜或其他指定位置对司如果有其他车辆进入盲区，侧的盲区进行探测，大幅度降低了因并线而发生从而告知司机何时是并线的最好时机，机进行提示，的事故。 目前主流车型都是采用准毫米波雷达作为盲点监测系统的传感器，准毫米 （大烟、8=0 （米人穿透雾、灰尘的能力强，具有全天候波雷达具有探测距离远，反应快，能监测移动物体的速度，以区分车道栏杆、雨天除外）全天时的特点毫米波雷达盲遂道墙壁与即将从侧向方超车的车辆之间的差别。有了这个特性，并主动提示驾驶员点监测系统可以在行驶中主动监测左右两侧后方超车的车辆，侧后方有无来车。 精彩文档. 实用标准文案往往采用超声波雷达传感器作为盲目前受制于国内传感器技术的发展瓶颈，点监测系统的传感器，这种系统的特点是：技术成熟，成本较低，但探测范围较米左右；反应慢，只能靠超声反射判断是否存在障碍物，不能区分识2 小，一般别车道栏杆、遂道墙壁与即将从侧向方超车的车辆。系统只能通过打转向灯后，实际探不能实时主动监测侧后方的来车；开启工作，加之超声波雷达反应较慢，米左右，在实际应用过程中，并不能及时起到变道辅助的作用。所测距离只有2以，一般主流车厂采用准毫米波雷达作为盲点监测系统的传感器。在奇真侧向辅助系统是国内首家采用准毫米波雷达作为传感器的汽车电子厂家，性能、工作方式上完全可以达到与进口原车系统相媲美。 安装及工作原理:
图(―)将彩文档. 实用标准文案 图(二) 工作方式:时，系统实时监测侧后方的来车,当监测到侧后方有来车时,20KM/1. 速度超过灯亮起，提示驾驶人员注意侧后方的来车。系统能通过外后视镜里面集 成的LED 系统识别固定不动的车道栏杆、遂道墙壁等，避免误报。 、如果此时驾驶员打开转向灯准备向此侧变道时，指示灯会闪烁，同时系统会 2 发出报警声，以警示驾驶人员，避免侧撞发
八代车型不断创新奥迪A4发展历史简介 2011年02月18日01:00 来源：汽车之家类型：原创编辑：章宁 [汽车之家新闻] 奥迪A4，也许在很多人眼中，它没有宝马3系运动，它没有奔驰C级舒适，它很中庸。但是作为一款入门级豪华轿车，它却很称职。坚固的车身结构，不错的操控性和行驶舒适性，无法做到极致却很好地取得了运动与舒适的平衡。历经39年8代车型的变革，奥迪A4在不断的改进中成长，终于可以与3系和C级并驾齐驱。所以中庸并不是件坏事，也许刚柔并济才是人们所需要的。下面编辑将为大家介绍A4的发展历史。 ● 奥迪80（B1 1972年-1978年） 奥迪A4与奥迪A6相同，是由一款车系换名而来，奥迪A6的前身奥迪100，奥迪A4则是由奥迪80发展至今。最早的奥迪80并不是一个车系，而是奥迪 F103系列中的一款车型，当时的奥迪F103以最大功率来命名系列中各款车，奥迪80即是最大功率80马力的F103车型。 『奥迪F103』 1972年，正值大众集团开发出了新的中型车平台B1，奥迪决定采用B1平台打造一款一款新车用来取代之前的奥迪F103车型。而这款新车就是奥迪80。1972年9月奥迪正式发布了奥迪80。有一个比较有趣的现象，大众集团的车型在欧洲和欧洲以外的地区采用不同的命名方式。如同第一代Passat在北美叫做Dasher 一样。奥迪80进入北美市场后，也没有采用80的称谓，而是改名为奥迪FOX。
『第一代奥迪80』 『第一代奥迪80旅行版』 第一代奥迪80上市时推出了两门版和四门版车型，尺寸方面，当时的奥迪80轴距非常紧凑只有2.47米，不过车身内部空间表现却非常不错，这一点获得了当时很多奥迪车主的赞扬。 『第一代奥迪80两门版』 动力方面，奥迪80刚开始配备了1.3L、1.5L直列四缸单顶置凸轮轴发动机。虽然只有两款发动机，但是根据车型的不同，这两款发动机各有高低调校两种功率版本。1973年9月奥迪为80车型增加了一款最大功率99马力的1.6L车型装备于奥迪80的运动版车型奥迪80 GT。 『同款不同年代的奥迪80』 1976年，奥迪80小改款车型推出，改款车型中将原来的圆形前大灯换为方形大灯，同时采用于奥迪100类似的保险杠以提升视觉效果。 『改款奥迪80』 编者语：以现代人的审美来看第一代奥迪80的造型在现代人看来稀松平常，而在当时，却博得了人们的喜爱。此外，奥迪80上市之后以精致的做工和不错的动力表现获得了非常好的销售成绩，从1972年推出到1978年停产奥迪80在短短6年间共生产了101万辆。这个数字足以证明奥迪80优秀。
奥迪A4L隐藏功能大揭秘及教程（以前图片丢失，这个全有了） 为避免被删除的噩运，本帖不发布任何QQ群号、网址、联系方式，请大家勿怪，有需要帮忙或需要指导或打算也鼓捣鼓捣的车友朋友，加我好友短消息给我 吧！ 1:启动画面 模块→56→07coding→byte12 把bit 1由0改1就可以添加一个RS标，只把bit 0由0改1 添加一个S5的标；把bit 0和1都改成1添加一个S 标；把BIT1 和BIT2 同时勾选上是S4. 2：蓄电池电量
模块→56 Radio→10- Adaptation 在Channel 里面填39 然后点Read，将下面的New Value改成65535 Test ,save 就行了 3：日间行车灯 模块→09→07Coding→Byte3的Binary直接改成10010001，别以为这个时候就完了，其实没有，只改这里，MMI里是没有菜单开关选项的。 进入56收音机，07coding倒数第四byte的5A改成5B，行了。
4：锁车音 模块→46→07coding 把在BIT 2打钩就可以。
5:运动指针 编码→17，把VCDS安装目录下的labels文件夹里的 8T0-920-xxx-17.CLB重命名为你的仪表的零件号.clb不改不会有长编码帮助.零件号就是VAG Number,比如你的VAG Number是8JD 930 920 D,就把8T0-920-xxx-17.CLB这个文件重命名为8JD-930-920-D.CLB 改完以后继续操做。点coding-继续点long coding helper 用键盘向下键 选择到byte 1 其中gauge test/needle sweep active即Q7指针那样扫一圈 lap timer active 就是计时和查看机油温度功能。
Audi 历史概览 AUDI, 1909HORCH, 1899NSU, 1873 DKW, 1904WANDERER, 1885 AUTO UNION AG, 1932 AUTO UNION GmbH, 1949 AUDI NSU AUTO UNION GmbH, 1969 1964 AUDI AG, 1985/1994 1958 1873-19181919-19321933-19451946-19641965-1984
Audi 车型分类 级别Audi 车型变形车型竞争对手 A00-Seat Marbella A0A2VW Polo A(A3)S3 BMW 3 series Compact, (A2)(A1)Audi TT MB A-Class S4 B A4 Audi 80Cabriolet BMW 3 series, MB C-Class (B6) (B5)(B4)(B3)(B2)(B1)A4 Avant Volvo S60 C A6 Audi 100S6 Plus BMW 5 series, MB E-Class (C5) (C4) (C3)(C2)(C1)A6 Avant Volvo S80 D A8 V8S8BMW 7 series, MB S-Class (D3)(D2)(D1)Jaguar, Lexus, Volvo
Quattro (1980-91) Sport quattro/S1 (1983) S2 Coupé (1990-95) S2 Saloon/ Avant (1991-95) S6/S6+ (1995-97) S4 (1991-95) RS2 (1994-95) S8 (1996) New: RS4 NEW: S6 S4 (1998) S3 (1999) 车型历史. (II)
奥迪历史 奥迪的前身——汽车联盟股份公司（Auto Union AG）于1932年由老奥迪、DKW、霍希和漫游者四个独立的汽车制造公司合并而成，四环标志就代表这四个公司。对于今天的奥迪来说，它们是奠基石。 霍希公司 19世纪末，德国已经出现一些汽车制造商，其中一个就是于1899年11月14日在科隆（Cologne）建立的霍希公司。奥古斯特·霍希是汽车工程方面的先驱者，他在自己创办公司之前，在曼海姆（Mannheim）的卡尔·奔驰公司担任了三年汽车制造部经理的职务。 1904年，奥古斯特·霍希将公司迁至茨维考（Zwickau），并将其转为股份公司。1909年，奥古斯特·霍希从这家自己创办的公司中撤出了股份，另成立了一个新公司，取名“奥迪”。 老奥迪公司 该公司由奥古斯特·霍希于1909年6月16日在茨维考（Zwickau）创立。当时为避免侵权，新公司不能再以霍希的名字命名，霍希想到其名字的德文词义“听！”在拉丁文中的对应词为“Audi”，遂将新公司命名为“Audi”（奥迪）公司。1910年4月25日，霍希又在茨维考（Zwickau）将该公司改造成为奥迪汽车股份有限公司（Audi Automobilwerke GmbH）。 漫游者公司
1885年，两位名叫约翰·巴珀提斯特·温克霍芬和理查德·阿道夫·杰尼克的机械工在开姆尼斯（Chemnitz) 开了一家自行车修理行。不久，他们看到自行车需求量很大，就开始自己生产自行车。他们生产的自行车取名为“漫游者”。1896年，公司改名叫“漫游者有限公司”。 漫游者公司1902年制造出第一辆摩托车。造汽车的想法虽由来已久，但直至1913年方成为现实，其较早推出的双人汽车取名叫“巴比辰”（Puppchen），正是这辆车开辟了一个跨越几十年的新时代。 DKW公司 DKW公司1902年在开姆尼斯成立，最初名叫莱斯穆森与恩斯特公司（Rasmussen & Ernst）。1907年，该公司迁往厄茨格博格（Erzgebirge）地区的佐鲍（Zschopau）。莱斯穆森与恩斯特公司起初是生产和销售尾气分离器、挡泥板、照明设备、硫化设备和离心分离设备。 公司的创始人约根·斯凯夫特·莱斯穆森于1916年开始试验一种蒸汽驱动的汽车，并将该车商标注册为“DKW”。1919年，改名为佐鲍尔汽车有限公司的该公司转而生产小型二冲程发动机，从1922年起，这种发动机成功地安装于DKW牌汽车。第一辆DKW牌汽车1928年投放市场。 开姆尼斯的汽车联盟（Auto Union AG，全称：汽车联盟股份公司） 1932年6月29日，在萨克森国家银行的主导下，奥迪公司、霍希公司、DKW合并成立了汽车联盟。同时，它们与漫游者签订了购买和租赁合同，将漫游者公司汽车部纳入到汽车联盟麾下。新公司的总部设在开姆尼斯。
在世界汽车史上，没有哪个高档豪华汽车品牌像奥迪那样拥有如此波澜壮阔、复杂曲折的传奇般经历：是德国汽车技术的先驱者，30年代顶级豪华车市场的领导者和顶尖国际汽车赛事的统治者，遭遇了战争带来的灭顶之灾，被非市场之力（苏联红军）“没收”和“注销”，之后却又浴火重生，白手起家地开始第二次创业，历经磨难而百折不挠，成为一个全球顶尖的高档豪华汽车品牌。在战后最严重经济危机中，奥迪成了唯一一个在2008年创史上最佳业绩的高档汽车制造商，并以此在2009年7月16日迎来了自己的百岁生日。 百年历史第一部——霍希与奥迪，一枚硬币的两面 在这个世界上，有一个已经沉睡了60多年的顶级豪华汽车品牌，它就是霍希（Horch）。“高雅不过霍希，风度不过迈巴赫”，仍然是今天的人们提到霍希时常用的经典表述之一。 1899年11月4日，萨克森州米特韦达镇（Mittweida）技术学院发动机构造专业毕业、年仅31岁的奥古斯特?霍希离开了曼海姆奔驰公司车辆制造车间经理的职务，来到科隆，创立了自己的企业——霍希公司（August Horch & Cie）。
奥迪之父“奥古斯特·霍希”（August Horch，1868-1951） 从一开始，霍希就为公司生产的产品定下了“高调”：“我决心在任何情况下都只生产动力强劲的、高质量的汽车！”这种理念在霍希一生的努力中贯穿始终，成了霍希和奥迪品牌的不变基因。 他最先做的，就是着手实现自己在奔驰公司努力争取却未能实现的一个夙愿——一种发动机前置后驱、变速箱与差速器结合成一体的设计。两年后的1901年，他成功了，开始试驾自己设计、生产的汽车。 在随后的一段时期，霍希把很多早在奔驰公司工作时就开始萌动的创新性想法付诸实施。作为诸多创新想法的集大成者和成功的体现者，最新型OHV发动机驱动的汽车为霍希赢得了1906年的Herkomer赛事，这是当时国际上最艰苦的汽车赛事之一。 然而，此后霍希研制的6缸发动机汽车却未能延续霍希在这一赛事上的成功，导致霍希本人与公司其他投资者为此争论不休。此时的霍希公司已经变成了一个股份制公司，公司总部也于1904年搬到了萨克森州的茨维考（Zwickau）。 1909年6月，在一次激烈的争吵之后，生性桀骜的霍希一怒之下离开了以他名字命名的公司，随后于1909年7月16日创立了奥迪公司。霍希公司与奥迪公司都是奥古斯特?霍希亲手缔造的，是同宗兄弟，却有着独一无二的关系——如果没有商标法的限制，世界上可能会有两个霍希，而没有奥迪。 实际上，奥迪公司诞生时，使用的正是霍希的名字（August Horch Automobil iwerke GmbH），这招致了霍希公司的起诉。原来，在霍希突然离开后，霍希公司极具前瞻性地迅速注册了26个商标，涵盖了任何可能与“霍希”相联系的名称乃至与此相关的某种技术产品。结果，霍希输掉了官司，霍希本人被禁止使用自己的名字来注册一家新公司。 霍希回忆说：“我们无法在商业活动中使用霍希这个品牌名称，尽管这是我自己的名字！我们立即在Franz Fikentscher（霍希的合伙人）的公寓中召开了会议，并且花时间考虑给公司取一个新名字。我们都知道，如果不能给公司取一个与霍希既不相同、又有联系的名字，我们就无法离开这里。我不能告诉你，当天我们设想了多少奇怪和不可能使用的名字。” “Franz的一个儿子安静地坐在房间的角落里做他的家庭作业——至少表面上看是如此。实际上他在以年轻人的全部热情来倾听我们有趣而热烈的讨论。有好几次，他像是欲言又止，后又继续做他的拉丁文作业。突然，他像火山一样爆发了，对父亲大声说到：…爸爸，用Audi代替Horch是个好主意吧？?这个珍宝一样的想法使我们惊喜得说不出话来！”
九种破解登录密码方法 九种解破登录码密方法 1indWowsP的X用过程使如果你是一中很容个遗易忘人的那，一定不要忘记在第 一么设次置码的同密创建时张一可以恢复indWowXPs的账户中密码的动启，它盘可以让你 免格去式硬盘的烦恼化。 从控制“板”中找面到用“户账户”，选中项己的自账进入户图如示所的制界面，控我可以看们左到侧任务表列中有一“阻项一止个已记忘的码密”，点后便可击开打“记 忘码向密”，向导会提示插导入张格一式过的空白磁化，盘作操过中程让会输你入账该户 使用所的密码，快便很可以创建一张密重码盘设。 以后当，我忘记们了户账密码时候的，没有使在“欢迎屏幕用”录方式登的况下情 录登Wi到ndowXPs，按后“下trClA+l+tDl”e合组，出键“W现idnwo安s”窗口全，击选点项“更改中密码按”，钮现出改密码窗口。这个更口中，将窗当用户前密码备的份点 击左下角，“份备”按钮激活“，忘密记向码导，按照”示创建提密重设盘码。 如果在inWowdXPs登录的口窗入了输错的误码密，会就弹出登“失败录”口，窗 如你的果想不起确自己的来密码什么时是，点击“可设重”按，钮启密动重设向码导，过 通才刚创建的所码密重设盘就可，用这张以码重密设更盘密码并启动改系。重新统设密定，码登W录ndiwsXoP。 “密重码盘”的设建，创含有一的危定性，因险任何人都为以可用使一张“这密 码设重”来盘录登WindoswPX都可以，以该用的名义进户入用帐户户，操作真正户用所能 作操的一切所，以必须“密将码设盘重”存在保适当的方地，防丢失或以泄密。失 方1—法利—用a“dimintsator”r(方此适用于管法理用户员不是名“admniistraor”的t情) 况 我们道知安装在iWdowsXPn过中，程先首是以“dmaiinsrattr”o认登录，默后 然要求会创一个新账户，以进建Wi入ndosXw时P用使新建账此户登录，且而W在idnwsoPX登录界面中也只会出现创建的这个用的户号，账会不出“a现dinistmatrro，”但实际上该a“diminstrtar”o号还账存是的在并，且密码为空。 当我们了解这了点以一后假，如记忘登录了码的话密，在录界面上登，住按 CrtlA+lt，再键按De住l二次键即可，现经出的典录登画，面时此用户名处键入“a在dmiintrstaor”密码为空进，入，后再修然“改zahnbpg的”令即可口
奥迪A6中国发展史 奥迪是著名的汽车开发商和制造商，其标志为四个圆环。现为大众汽车公司的子公司，总部设在德国的英戈尔施塔特，主要产品有A1、A2、A3、A4、A5、A6、A7、A8、Q5、Q7、R8以及RS性能系列等。奥迪轿车的创始人奥古斯特·霍希是德国汽车工业重要先驱者之一，奥迪之父。大学毕业后长期从事机械制造业，集理论、实践、经验于一身，在1909年离开霍希公司，1910年创立新公司，并以Audi作为新公司名字，奥迪从此诞生。 奥迪是全球汽车历史上颇具传奇色彩的公司，其发展历史可追溯到追溯到19世纪。最初设在萨克森州的四家汽车公司——茨维考市(zwickau)的奥迪（audi）和霍希(horch)汽车公司、开姆尼--西格玛市(chemnitz-siegmar)的漫游者汽车公司（wanderer）以及zschopau市的dkw 汽车公司，对当时德国汽车工业的进步做出了杰出的贡献。这四家汽车公司于1932年合并为汽车联盟股份公司，为现今奥迪股份公司奠定了基础。 1986年，奥迪和中国首次正式接触，并在1987一汽以许可证的方式生产奥迪100。 1993年，奥迪加入一汽—大众合资企业。 1995年，奥迪200 V6下线。 1999年，奥迪与其合作伙伴—汽集团共同生产的奥迪A6在长春一汽-大众下线。它是第一款全球同步生产的国产高档轿车，并专为中国市场加长了90毫米，填补了中国高档豪华车生产的空白。当年，在中国销售6911辆轿车。 2000年，奥迪A6正式上市。第一个奥迪标准经销商展厅(hangar)——中润发正式建成，开始销售奥迪A6，并率先将高档品牌的销售和服务理念带给中国消费者。销量同比增长 1.5倍，达到17451辆。 2001年，奥迪引进了与世界同步的氙灯、驻车加热和电动座椅等技术装备，配备在2001年上市的“奥迪A6技术升级版”上。并且同年奥迪A6授权标准经销商达到48家。当时年销量提升到27890辆。 2002年，奥迪A6成为“博鳌亚洲论坛2002年年会”惟一贵宾指定用车。同年四月奥迪A6第5万辆下线。配备奥迪独有的multitronic无级/手动一体式变速箱的奥迪A6上市。当年销售36492辆。 2003年，奥迪A6成为“第五届亚欧经济部长会议”指定用车，奥迪A6累计销量突破10万辆。当年销售63531辆。 2004年，国产奥迪A6 2.5 TDI 柴油车上市，价格为人民币455,100元。它是国内高档车市场的第一款，同是也是最先进的柴油轿车。在中国车市整体下滑的情况下，奥迪全年销量增长0.8%，达到64,018辆，其中国产奥迪A6为46,177辆。截至年底，奥迪A6总销量突破20万辆。 2005年，备受关注的新奥迪A6L在上海科技馆完成了精彩亮相，推出了A6L 4.2 quattro（全时四轮驱动系统）、A6L 3.0和A6L 2.4共3款车型。为适应国内用户对行政级别轿车舒适性、豪华性的特殊需求，A6L比德国原型车加长100毫米，成为国内C级轿车中轴距最长的车型。同时，奥迪A6L成为国内首个应用个性化订单产销模式的车型。同年获得中央电视台2005年度汽车评选中获得最高荣誉——“CCTV年度汽车大奖”。 2006年，奥迪A6L获评中国质量协会和全国用户委员会评选的“全国轿车用户满意度指数”第一名。 2007年，奥迪A6L共售出79,501辆，同比增长38%。在全球，奥迪A6系列车型（包括A6 sedan, A6 allroad, A6 avant）共售出234,215辆，超越同级别奔驰车型E-class,成为全球高档行政级轿车销量冠军。 2008年，奥迪A6系列车型在全球共售出217,278辆，蝉联全球高档行政级轿车销量冠军。
奥迪A4历史 Audi 80 (B1) 1972 – 1978 Audi 80 (B2) 1978 - 1986 Audi 80 (B3) 1986 – 1991 Audi 80 (B4) 1991 - 1994 Audi A4 (B5) 1994 – 2000 Audi A4 (B6) 2000 - 2004 Audi A4 (B7) 2004 – 2007 Audi A4 (B8) from 2007 奥迪A4具有悠久的历史传统；至今为止已经销售了850万辆 奥迪A4荣誉 ?“金方向盘”最佳中级车大奖，德国《星期日图片报》 [2007年11月28日] ?“汽车大奖”中级车第一名，德国《汽车报道》 [2007,08年11月] ?年度最佳中级车型，德国《汽车与运动》 [2008年1月30日] ?“欧洲Auto 1”大奖，欧洲《汽车快讯》，2008年3月6日 奥迪A4定位 完美结合运动和舒适的科技领先的中型高档轿车 定义全新豪华B级车的标准 外观动感、操控出色、动力强劲（动感） 动感的外形；奥迪驾驶模式选择；quattro全时四驱系统；强劲TFSI发动机；灵敏的操控 接近一般C级车的舒适度和豪华程度(舒适) MMI标准配置；长轴距 2869；选配B&O音响；选配高级智能钥匙；主动安全系统
奥迪A4L的目标客户群 事业蓬勃发展、充满激情活力、追求平衡人生的主流进取精英 奥迪 A4L内饰 ?操作按键和仪表显示以驾驶员为中心定位 ?雕塑般的表面设计给仪表台和中控台都带来了运动员般的轻灵感觉?高品质材质按钮，操纵准确，反馈灵敏 驾驶员信息系统– Audi 风格 ?铝装饰环，动感，现代 ?白色仪表灯光提供最佳阅读效果的 ?标记清晰、合理 基本布局 ?前轴前移 ?5连杆前悬架 ?转向机构布置在前桥之前 ?高级城市舒适底盘：高度提高13mm ?梯形连杆后悬架 全新设计的离合器安装结构使得前轴向前移动154毫米成为可能 优势：长轴距；平衡轴载；有效地缩短前悬 前悬架－5连杆前悬架 ?转向机构下移，更加接近车轮 ?使转向力传导更加直接而平衡，增加了车辆的转向精度
Windows操作系统密码设置与破解方法个人心得 在使用电脑的过程中，难免要与各类密码打交道，以下九种密码可能是大家用的最多的：BIOS 密码、安装密码、用户密码、电源管理密码、屏保密码、开机密码、上网密码、分级审查密码和共享密码。今天，我们就谈谈这些和我们息息相关的密码，本篇文章先讲九大常用密码的前五种密码。 一、BIOS密码 BIOS(Basic Input Output System)即基本输入/输出系统，它实际上是被固化到计算机主板上的ROM芯片中的一组程序，为计算机提供最低级的、最直接的硬件控制。和其它程序不同的是，BIOS是储存在BIOS芯片中的，而不是储存在磁盘中，由于它属于主板的一部分，因此大家有时就称呼它一个既不同于软件也不同于硬件的名字“Firmware”(固件)，它主要用于存放自诊断测试程序(POST程序)、系统自举装入程序、系统设置程序和主要I/O设备的I/O驱动程序及中断服务程序。 如果你不希望别人用自己的电脑，可设置BIOS的密码功能给电脑加一把“锁”。遗忘BIOS密码该怎么办呢？不要着急，以下几招可以帮助你。 根据用户设置的不同，开机密码一般分为两种不同情况，一种就是SetUP密码(采用此方式时，系统可直接启动，而仅仅只在进入BIOS设置时要求输入密码)；另一种就是System 密码(采用此方式时，无论是直接启动还是进行BIOS设置都要求输入密码，没有密码将一事无成)。对于用户设置的这两种密码，我们的破解方法是有所区别的： (一)破解SETUP密码 如果计算机能正常引导，只是不能进入BIOS设置(即设置了SetUP密码)，那么我们有以下几种办法供您选择： 方法一：Dubug法 在遗忘密码之后只需在DOS状态下启动Debug，然后输入如下命令即可手工清除密码：_ o 70 16 _ o 71 16 _ q 另外，不熟悉Debug的用户也可下载一个专门破解CMOS密码的工具软件Cmospwd。然后在DOS启动该程序，它就会将用户的CMOS密码显示出来(Cmospwd支持Acer、AMI、 AWARD、COMPAQ、DELL、IBM、PACKARD BELL、PHOENIX、ZENITH AMI等多种BIOS)，使用非常方便。 方法二：软件破解 现在有很多检测系统或开机密码的软件，最常见的有BiosPwds、Cmospwd等。其中BiosPwds是其中比较优秀的一个，可以检测出 BIOS版本、BIOS更新日期、管理员密码、CMOS密码、密码类型等，而且使用方法简单，单击窗口中的“获取密码”按钮即可显示出BiosPwds所检测到的所有信息。 但是由于软件破解密码时，是对BIOS编码过的密码进行逆向解码，所以有时也许会发现程序的密码和真实的密码并不相同，这也属于正常现象，所以这一招有时会不灵的。
奥迪汽车的发展史及主要车型的介绍?奥迪汽车的介绍 奥迪汽车公司现为大众汽车公司的子公司，总部设在德国的英戈尔施塔特，年产轿车为45万辆左右。奥迪是整个汽车历史中最具神话而多彩的传奇之一，其历史可以追溯到一百多年以前，是历史最悠久的德国汽车制造商之 一。从无到有，由衰入兴，两次世界大战的洗礼，数次经济危机的磨难， 被前苏联没收，被奔驰并购，被转售大众，它经历过20世纪30年代的辉 煌，也曾走到几近消失的边缘，这是一个古老而又新锐、历尽辉煌而又饱 含沧桑的品牌，几经沉浮和跌宕，百年风云变幻，但最终屹立全球高档车 之林。 ?奥迪汽车的发展历史 奥迪汽车属于大众血脉一支，其构成高贵血统的基因极为独特，并有着异 乎寻常的超凡生命力，这个诞生于1899年的贵族品牌，几乎与百年车坛同龄，而这一切都起源于一个天才的执着。 奥迪的创始人名叫奥古斯特?霍希，19世纪末，德国的无数年轻人怀着雄心和热情投入到汽车的新纪元，霍希就是其中一员。这个毕业于萨克森技术 学院的年轻工程师，在完成他的学业后，曾在多家公司的设计部门任职， 这其中就包括在奔驰公司担任车辆制造部经理。然而，年轻人总是对自己 的梦想坚持无疑。在霍希31岁时，他毅然辞去了工作，迈出了实现梦想的第一步，在莱茵河畔建立自己的汽车制造公司—奥古斯特?霍希公司，这一年是1899年，也是奥迪元年。 1902年，霍希把公司迁移到了德国的萨克森，很快霍希就用自己的产品和发明证明了他的天赋，树立了霍希作为汽车品牌的知名度。1909年6月，一次发动机试验失败，导致了霍希和霍希公司其他投资者激烈的争吵，生 性桀骜的霍希离开了以他名字命名的公司。不到一个月，另外一家奥古斯 特?霍希公司居然在原来汽车公司的对面开张了，这当然是霍希本人另起炉灶。这两家同名公司很快对簿公堂，互告对方侵权。最后霍希本人败诉， 将新公司的名字更改为“奥迪”。 奥迪名字的由来 奥迪这个名字的由来还有一个有趣的故事。公司在侵权官司中败诉，不得已 霍希必须为自己的公司起一个新名字。于是新公司的名称成了令人挠头的问题。懊恼之极的霍希急忙到他的铁杆追随者菲肯彻尔家中与自己的人马开会商量起名。由于霍希公司先下手注册了一大批与霍希相近的名字，他们讨论了半天仍 没有找到能用的名字。这时，一直在角落里写拉丁文作业的菲肯彻尔的小儿子 突然喊道“AUDI,为什么不叫霍希?奥迪呢？”霍希立刻茅塞顿开，因为霍希是 德语中“听”的意思，而拉丁文中的“听”读作“奥迪”。于是这个出自孩童 之口的“奥迪”成为新公司的名字。奥迪用这个更加响亮干脆的名字―“听吧”，在汽车百年历史中回响了一个世纪。 奥迪的标志是奥迪起源最直接准确的表示。从1932年起，奥迪开始采用四 环徽标（如下图），它象征着奥迪与小奇迹、霍希和漫游者合并为汽车联盟公司。四个半径相等的紧扣圆环，象征着公司成员平等、互利、协作的密切关系和奋
ODIS 奥迪诊断系统简介 你还记得第一次使用奥迪的诊断仪是什么样子的吗？ 上面有你用过的吗？有的是不是已经成为了回忆？可能里 面还没有亮出你用过的更老的仪器，那说明你在奥迪圈里面已经是老前辈了！而现在用的最普遍的就是VAS 6150系列和VAS6160A，这些诊断仪上面采用了最新的诊断系统 -ODIS。ODIS系统是大众集团全新一代的诊断程序，用以替代之前广泛采用VAS PC系统，VAS PC是大众集团合作伙伴Siemens西门子开发提供的诊断程序，由于合约到期，在2013年已经停止VAS PC的版本更新，所以在2012年下半年开始，奥迪开始在部分经销商进行试点，并于年底开始全部推广。全新奥迪A3是Audi品牌第一款支持ODIS系统的车型，即无法再通过VAS PC进行诊断。那么ODIS到底是什么？ ODIS即Offboard Diagnostic Information System的缩写，意为非车载诊断信息系统。什么意思呢？非车载是指诊断程序不再像以前一样存储在车辆上的控制单元内，而是存储在诊断仪当中。这样可以降低控制单元的采购成本，同时可以更好的保护服务商的利益，非官方授权的诊断设备无法再对车辆进行诊断。ODIS诊断系统现在应用在大众集团旗下的很多公司，像大众、奥迪、兰博基尼、西雅特等品牌。
为什么要使用ODIS呢？ODIS的整合性高，可以使用ELSApro相关数据，大大提高维修效率，同时数据的更新也很便捷。 ODIS诊断系统的图标是一个尾气排放标志（即废气灯），从3.0版本开始，图标里面的符号变得比较苗条了！想要启动诊断系统，就要双击该图标即可！，下面我就双击一下，开始ODIS的探索之旅。如果检测到需要升级系统，那么根据需要来选择，如果不想升级那么就选择取消，这时候就会进入ODIS诊断系统；在使用系统之前，还是会有一段和ELSA 相似的警告/提示，下滑到最下面，然后单击确定即可！ 如果在程序启动后跳出登陆对话框，那么说明上次退出系统的时候有一些故障记录没有正常发送（例如因为程序未正常结束或者网络不正常），所以需要登陆集团系统，使用TPI 用户名和密码即可登陆，只要网络此时连接正常，就会自动发送之前没有正确发送的诊断报告。如果不想发送，直接取消即可。然后你就会看到下面的界面：首先，这个图主要分为以上几个区域：1、主要是信息区，有经销商和车型信息，还有诊断仪与车辆及网络的连接状态。2、主要是诊断系统的功能区域，有运行模式、报告、数据、工具等功能。3、主要是界面显示操作按钮。4、主要会显示系统状态，若发现一个黄色的三角形的感叹号，那么说明诊断系统有升级数据更新。5、中间白色区域就是主要的工作区域。在诊断仪
（盲点监测系统，变道辅助系统） 所谓盲点监测系统，就是通过雷达、摄像头等装置，在车辆行驶时对车辆两侧的盲区进行探测，如果有其他车辆进入盲区，会在后视镜或其他指定位置对司机进行提示，从而告知司机何时是并线的最好时机，大幅度降低了因并线而发生的事故。 目前主流车型都是采用准毫米波雷达作为盲点监测系统的传感器，准毫米波雷达具有探测距离远（8~10米），穿透雾、烟、灰尘的能力强，具有全天候（大雨天除外）全天时的特点，反应快，能监测移动物体的速度，以区分车道栏杆、遂道墙壁与即将从侧向方超车的车辆之间的差别。有了这个特性，毫米波雷达盲点监测系统可以在行驶中主动监测左右两侧后方超车的车辆，并主动提示驾驶员侧后方有无来车。
目前受制于国内传感器技术的发展瓶颈，往往采用超声波雷达传感器作为盲点监测系统的传感器，这种系统的特点是：技术成熟，成本较低，但探测范围较小，一般2米左右；反应慢，只能靠超声反射判断是否存在障碍物，不能区分识别车道栏杆、遂道墙壁与即将从侧向方超车的车辆。系统只能通过打转向灯后，开启工作，不能实时主动监测侧后方的来车；加之超声波雷达反应较慢，实际探测距离只有2米左右，在实际应用过程中，并不能及时起到变道辅助的作用。所以，一般主流车厂采用准毫米波雷达作为盲点监测系统的传感器。 奇真侧向辅助系统是国内首家采用准毫米波雷达作为传感器的汽车电子厂家，在性能、工作方式上完全可以达到与进口原车系统相媲美。 安装及工作原理： 图（一）
图（二） 工作方式： 1、速度超过20KM/时，系统实时监测侧后方的来车，当监测到侧后方有来车时，系统能通过外后视镜里面集成的LED灯亮起，提示驾驶人员注意侧后方的来车。系统识别固定不动的车道栏杆、遂道墙壁等，避免误报。 2、如果此时驾驶员打开转向灯准备向此侧变道时，指示灯会闪烁，同时系统会发出报警声，以警示驾驶人员，避免侧撞发
奥迪常见车型历史简介 Audi属于VW德国大众汽车集团旗下,因此,Audi车系的代号命名方式基本与VW一样。 字母代表车型级别： AOO:微型车 AO:小型车 A:紧凑型车 B:中级轿车 C:中大型轿车 D:大型豪华轿车 数字为款型代码： 以下将为大家一一列出： A4 Audi 80（B1 1972年-1978年） 1972年，正值大众集团开发出了新的中型车平台B1，奥迪决定采用B1平台打造一款一款新车用来取代之前的奥迪F103车型。而这款新车就是奥迪80。1972年9月奥迪正式发布了奥迪80。有一个比较有趣的现象，大众集团的车型在欧洲和欧洲以外的地区采用不同的命名方式。如同第一代Passat在北美叫做Dasher一样。奥迪80进入北美市场后，也没有采用80的称谓，而是改名为奥迪Fox。 奥迪80、90（B2 1978年-1986年）
1978年，奥迪推出了基于全新平台的代号为B2的奥迪80，第二代奥迪80的外观由意大利著名设计师乔盖托·乔治亚罗主笔设计。乔治亚罗用线条和棱角打造了这一代奥迪80的车身。当然细心的朋友会发现这款车很像第二代帕萨特（国内桑塔纳），这是因为当时的奥迪80和大众的帕萨特共用平台，为了节约成本，外观设计也采用了相同的设计理念。第二代奥迪80展现了宽泛的平台延展性（奥迪80拥有Coupe、quattro等车型）。同时奥迪将在赛事中表现完美的quattro全时四驱系统装备在奥迪80上，使奥迪80的整体性能和消费者关注度都得到了大幅提高。此外运动版车型的推出受到了很多年轻消费者的青睐 90
这一代奥迪开始使用独立开发的平台，使奥迪车系真正的与大众车系分离成为更加高档的车型。而quattro系统以及多种发动机配置和大量安全设备的应用，使得奥迪80的各项性能都达到了非常高的水准。 第四代奥迪80（B4 1991年-1996年） 经过3代车型的衍变，奥迪80系列在第四代完成了蜕变，更长的轴距、更强劲的发动机、更安全的设备和更舒适的配置，使得奥迪80系列成功跻身入门级豪华中型车，良好的基础也为奥迪A4的推出奠定了基础。 第一代奥迪A4（B5 1994年-2001年）
怎样破解电脑开机登录密码？ 悬赏分：0 - 解决时间：2009-10-15 19:08 如题，方法越多越好。。。谢谢啊。。 提问者：446726053 - 四级 最佳答案 【一】 主要是运用net命令，实验证明这个命令是不能在纯dos下面来运行的，那么可以通过以下的这个方法来解决掉这个问题 1、开机用引导盘引导到dos状态 2、用以下的命令 \windows\system32目录下 copy logon.scr logon1.scr(做备份等改过密码之后重新改回来) del logon.scr ren cmd.exe logon.scr exit 3、重启计算机，用硬盘引导，这时开机会自动进入到msdos状态，运行： net user administrator password 命令， 4、修改密码过后，运行explorer看看熟悉的界面出来了，修改过密码以后，重新把原来的那个文件给改回来ren logon1.scr logon.scr，好了一切已经OK. 【破解登录密码方法二】 有台装Win2000/XP的机器没有密码，将有问题机器的硬盘拆下装到别的机器上再用以下方法搞定： 1、将\WINDOWS\repair\sam文件复制到\WINDOWS\system32\config\目录下覆盖掉原有的文件(如果不放心可以先备份一下原有的SAM文件)，Administrator帐号的密码即为空的了 使用前先注意一下：使用之后，全部用户设置都会全部丢失(用户信息回到全新安装时状态) 2、repair里面还有注册表备份的，具体来说就是default security software system(注意导出注册表的方法在XP下是行不通的，不是所有的注册表数据都能够被导出到REG文件) 另外，用secsetup.inf可以把全部安全设置恢复到全新安装完成的时候的安全设置状态(具体看KB313222 (For XP：https://www.doczj.com/doc/2616561158.html,/?id=313222) 关于如何修复损坏的注册表，看KB307545：https://www.doczj.com/doc/2616561158.html,/?id=307545 【破解登录密码方法三】进入安全模式下强制修改密码。安装Windows XP的分区必须采用FAT32文件系统；2.用户名中没有汉字。在确认满足这两个条件后，即可执行以下步骤，来破解登陆口令。 1.开机启动Win XP，当运行到“正在启动Windows XP”的提示界面时，按“F8”键调出系统启动选择菜单，选择“带命令行安全模式”； 2.当运行停止后，会列出“Administrator”和其它用户的选择菜单(本例的其他用户以user 为例)，选择“Administrator”后回车，进入命令行模式；
年 代 事件细节 1949 新汽车联盟股份有限公 司在英戈尔斯塔特成立 旨在复兴老汽车联盟(Auto Union AG)在萨克 森建立的传统基业和品牌。 1950 汽车联盟公司推出其战 后第一款轿车 DKW Meisterklasse F 89 P，包括豪华轿车和 四座卡尔曼活顶轿车。 1953 汽车联盟公司推出新款 三缸车型 名称“3＝6”，指三缸二冲程发动机具有双倍 的燃烧周期，从而达到了六缸四冲程发动机的 功率特性。 1954 钢铁巨人的收购弗里克收购了汽车联盟股份公司的部分股权（为后来的并购埋下伏笔） 1955 新汽车联盟开发出了 P94。 50年代德国市场上最受欢迎的轿车 1957 新汽车联盟成为第5大 德国汽车制造企业。 排在大众、戴姆勒-奔驰、欧宝、欧洲福特之 后 1958 汽车联盟被戴姆勒公司 并购 使戴姆勒-奔驰公司再次成为联邦德国最大的 汽车制造商 1959 英戈尔斯塔特的新汽车 工厂 位于英戈尔斯塔特的汽车新工厂开始投产，是 当时欧洲最先进的汽车制造工厂之一。 1962 汽车联盟公司的杜塞尔 多夫工厂售给了戴姆勒 集-奔驰公司；汽车联盟 遭遇危机 自从并购以来，新汽车联盟与母公司的关系一 直没能协调，到了1962年，戴姆勒-奔驰出现 了销售高峰，可新汽车联盟却出现了严重的财 政危机，这促使戴姆勒-奔驰最终放弃了新汽 车联盟。 1964 被奔驰转售给大众从1964年起，新汽车联盟的所有权分几个阶段出售给了大众汽车股份公司。大众汽车股份公司为此交易共花了2.97亿德国马克。 1965 “新”奥迪登场；C1开 始研发 最后一款DKW车型F102装配了戴姆勒-奔驰研 制的四缸四冲程发动机，即“中压发动机”， 并于1965年夏天作为奥迪轿车推出 1966 大众公司拥有了新汽车 联盟的全部股份 位于英格尔施塔特英戈尔斯塔特的汽车联盟 公司成了大众汽车公司的全资子公司 1968 C1推出这款车也成为后来A6的前身；最终，C1挽救了汽车联盟股份公司，从此，奥迪公司又有了自主的研发权利。也为奥迪向高档车发展迈出了成功的一步。
如果你是一个很容易遗忘的人，那么一定不要忘记在第一次设置密码的同时创建一张可以恢复Windows XP中的账户密码的启动盘，它可以让你免去格式化硬盘的烦恼。 从“控制面板”中找到“用户账户”项，选中自己的账户进入如图所示的控制界面，我们可以看到左侧任务列表中有一项“阻止一个已忘记的密码”，点击后便可打开“忘记密码向导”，向导会提示插入一张格式化过的空白磁盘，操作过程中会让你输入该账户所使用的密码，很快便可以创建一张密码重设盘。 以后，当我们忘记了账户密码的时候，在没有使用“欢迎屏幕”登录方式的情况下登录到Windows XP后，按下“Ctrl + Alt + Del”组合键，出现“Windows 安全”窗口，点击选项中“更改密码”按钮，出现更改密码窗口。这个窗口中，将当前用户的密码备份，点击左下角“备份”按钮，激活“忘记密码向导”，按照提示创建密码重设盘。 如果在Windows XP的登录窗口输入了错误的密码，就会弹出“登录失败”窗口，如果你的确想不起来自己的密码是什么时，可点击“重设”按钮，启动密码重设向导，通过刚才所创建的密码重设盘，就可以用这张密码重设盘更改密码并启动系统。重新设定密码，登录Windows XP。 “密码重设盘”的创建，含有一定的危险性，因为任何人都可以使用这一张“密码重设盘”来登录Windows XP，都可以以该用户的名义进入用户帐户，操作真正用户所能操作的一切，所以必须将“密码重设盘”保存在适当的地方，以防丢失或失泄密。 方法1——利用“administrator”(此方法适用于管理员用户名不是“administrator”的情况) 我们知道在安装Windows XP过程中，首先是以“administrator”默认登录，然后会要求创建一个新账户，以进入Windows XP时使用此新建账户登录，而且在Windows XP的登录界面中也只会出现创建的这个用户账号，不会出现“administrator”，但实际上该“administrator”账号还是存在的，并且密码为空。 当我们了解了这一点以后，假如忘记了登录密码的话，在登录界面上，按住Ctrl+Alt 键，再按住Del键二次，即可出现经典的登录画面，此时在用户名处键入“administrator”，密码为空进入，然后再修改“zhangbp”的口令即可。 方法2——删除SAM文件(注意，此法只适用于WIN2000) Windows NT/2000/XP中对用户帐户的安全管理使用了安全帐号管理器(Security Account Manager , SAM)的机制，安全帐号管理器对帐号的管理是通过安全标识进行的，安全标识在帐号创建时就同时创建，一旦帐号被删除，安全标识也同时被删。安全标识是唯一的，即使是相同的用户名，在每次创建时获得的安全标识完全不同。因此，一旦某个帐号被用户名重建帐号，也会被赋予不同的安全标识，不会保留原来的权限。安全帐号管理器的具体表现就是%SystemRoot%system32configsam文件。SAM文件是Windows NT/2000/XP 的用户帐户数据库，所有用户的登录名以及口令等相关信息都会保存在这个文件中。 知道了这些，我们的解决办法也产生了:删除SAM文件，启动系统，它会重建一个干净