Chapter Three
Education as Direction
1. The Environment as Directive. We now pass to one of the special forms which the general function of education assumes: namely, that of direction, control, or guidance. Of these three words, direction, control, and guidance, the last best conveys the idea of assisting through cooperation the natural capacities of the individuals guided; control conveys rather the notion of an energy brought to bear from without and meeting some resistance from the one controlled; direction is a more neutral term and suggests the fact that the active tendencies of those directed are led in a certain continuous course, instead of dispersing aimlessly. Direction expresses the basic function, which tends at one extreme to become a guiding assistance and at another, a regulation or ruling. But in any case, we must carefully avoid a meaning sometimes read into the term "control." It is sometimes assumed, explicitly or unconsciously, that an individual's tendencies are naturally purely individualistic or egoistic, and thus antisocial. Control then denotes the process by which he is brought to subordinate his natural impulses to public or common ends. Since, by conception, his own nature is quite alien to this process and opposes it rather than helps it, control has in this view a flavor of coercion or compulsion about it. Systems of government and theories of the state have been built upon this notion, and it has seriously affected educational ideas and practices. But there is no ground for any such view. Individuals are certainly interested, at times, in having their own way, and their own way may go contrary to the ways of others. But they are also interested, and chiefly interested upon the whole, in entering into the activities of others and taking part in conjoint and cooperative doings. Otherwise, no such thing as a community would be possible. And there would not even be any one interested in furnishing the policeman to keep a semblance of harmony unless he thought that thereby he could gain some personal advantage. Control, in truth, means only an emphatic form of direction of powers, and covers the regulation gained by an individual through his own efforts quite as much as that brought about when others take the lead.
In general, every stimulus directs activity. It does not simply excite it or stir it up, but directs it toward an object. Put the other way around, a response is not just a re-action, a protest, as it were, against being disturbed; it is, as the word indicates, an answer. It meets the stimulus, and corresponds with it. There is an adaptation of the stimulus and response to each other. A light is the stimulus to the eye to see something, and the business of the eye is to see. If the eyes are open and there is light, seeing occurs; the stimulus is but a condition of the fulfillment of the proper function of the organ, not an outside interruption. To some extent, then, all direction or control is a guiding of activity to its own end; it is an assistance in doing fully what some organ is already tending to do.
This general statement needs, however, to be qualified in two respects. In the first place, except in the case of a small number of instincts, the stimuli to which an immature human being is subject are not sufficiently definite to call out, in the beginning, specific responses. There is always a great deal of superfluous energy aroused. This energy may be wasted, going aside from the point; it may also go against the successful performance of an act. It does harm by getting in the way. Compare the behavior of a beginner in riding a bicycle with that of the expert. There is little axis of direction in the energies put forth; they are largely dispersive and centrifugal.
Direction involves a focusing and fixating of action in order that it may be truly a response, and this requires an elimination of unnecessary and confusing movements. In the second place, although no activity can be produced in which the person does not cooperate to some extent, yet a response may be of a kind which does not fit into the sequence and continuity of action. A person boxing may dodge a particular blow successfully, but in such a way as to expose himself the next instant to a still harder blow. Adequate control means that the successive acts are brought into a continuous order; each act not only meets its immediate stimulus but helps the acts which follow.
In short, direction is both simultaneous and successive. At a given time, it requires that, from all the tendencies that are partially called out, those be selected which center energy upon the point of need. Successively, it requires that each act be balanced with those which precede and come after, so that order of activity is achieved. Focusing and ordering are thus the two aspects of direction, one spatial, the other temporal. The first insures hitting the mark; the second keeps the balance required for further action. Obviously, it is not possible to separate them in practice as we have distinguished them in idea. Activity must be centered at a given time in such a way as to prepare for what comes next. The problem of the immediate response is complicated by one's having to be on the lookout for future occurrences.
Two conclusions emerge from these general statements. On the one hand, purely external direction is impossible. The environment can at most only supply stimuli to call out responses. These responses proceed from tendencies already possessed by the individual. Even when a person is frightened by threats into doing something, the threats work only because the person has an instinct of fear. If he has not, or if, though having it, it is under his own control, the threat has no more influence upon him than light has in causing a person to see who has no eyes. While the customs and rules of adults furnish stimuli which direct as well as evoke the activities of the young, the young, after all, participate in the direction which their actions finally take. In the strict sense, nothing can be forced upon them or into them. To overlook this fact means to distort and pervert human nature. To take into account the contribution made by the existing instincts and habits of those directed is to direct them economically and wisely. Speaking accurately, all direction is but re-direction; it shifts the activities already going on into another channel. Unless one is cognizant of the energies which are already in operation, one's attempts at direction will almost surely go amiss.
On the other hand, the control afforded by the customs and regulations of others may be short-sighted. It may accomplish its immediate effect, but at the expense of throwing the subsequent action of the person out of balance. A threat may, for example, prevent a person from doing something to which he is naturally inclined by arousing fear of disagreeable consequences if he persists. But he may be left in the position which exposes him later on to influences which will lead him to do even worse things. His instincts of cunning and slyness may be aroused, so that things henceforth appeal to him on the side of evasion and trickery more than would otherwise have been the case. Those engaged in directing the actions of others are always in danger of overlooking the importance of the sequential development of those they direct.
2. Modes of Social Direction. Adults are naturally most conscious of directing the conduct of others when they are immediately aiming so to do. As a rule, they have such an aim consciously when they find themselves resisted; when others are doing things they do not wish them to do. But the more permanent and influential modes of control are those which operate from moment to moment continuously without such deliberate intention on our part.
1. When others are not doing what we would like them to or are threatening disobedience, we are most conscious of the need of controlling them and of the influences by which they are controlled. In such cases, our control becomes most direct, and at this point we are most likely to make the mistakes just spoken of. We are even likely to take the influence of superior force for control, forgetting that while we may lead a horse to water we cannot make him drink; and that while we can shut a man up in a penitentiary we cannot make him penitent. In all such cases of immediate action upon others, we need to discriminate between physical results and moral results.
A person may be in such a condition that forcible feeding or enforced confinement is necessary for his own good. A child may have to be snatched with roughness away from a fire so that he shall not be burnt. But no improvement of disposition, no educative effect, need follow. A harsh and commanding tone may be effectual in keeping a child away from the fire, and the same desirable physical effect will follow as if he had been snatched away. But there may be no more obedience of a moral sort in one case than in the other. A man can be prevented from breaking into other persons' houses by shutting him up, but shutting him up may not alter his disposition to commit burglary. When we confuse a physical with an educative result, we always lose the chance of enlisting the person's own participating disposition in getting the result desired, and thereby of developing within him an intrinsic and persisting direction in the right way.
In general, the occasion for the more conscious acts of control should be limited to acts which are so instinctive or impulsive that the one performing them has no means of foreseeing their outcome. If a person cannot foresee the consequences of his act, and is not capable of understanding what he is told about its outcome by those with more experience, it is impossible for him to guide his act intelligently. In such a state, every act is alike to him. Whatever moves him does move him, and that is all there is to it. In some cases, it is well to permit him to experiment, and to discover the consequences for himself in order that he may act intelligently next time under similar circumstances. But some courses of action are too discommoding and obnoxious to others to allow of this course being pursued. Direct disapproval is now resorted to. Shaming, ridicule, disfavor, rebuke, and punishment are used. Or contrary tendencies in the child are appealed to to divert him from his troublesome line of behavior. His sensitiveness to approbation, his hope of winning favor by an agreeable act, are made use of to induce action in another direction.
2. These methods of control are so obvious (because so intentionally employed) that it would hardly be worth while to mention them if it were not that notice may now be taken, by way of contrast, of the other more important and permanent mode of control. This other method resides in the ways in which persons, with whom the immature being is associated, use things; the instrumentalities with which they accomplish their own ends. The very existence of the social medium in which an individual lives, moves, and has his being is the standing effective agency of directing his activity.
This fact makes it necessary for us to examine in greater detail what is meant by the social environment. We are given to separating from each other the physical and social environments in which we live. The separation is responsible on one hand for an exaggeration of the moral importance of the more direct or personal modes of control of which we have been speaking; and on the other hand for an exaggeration, in current psychology and philosophy, of the intellectual possibilities of contact with a purely physical environment. There is not, in fact, any such thing as the direct influence of one human being on another apart from use of the physical environment as
an intermediary. A smile, a frown, a rebuke, a word of warning or encouragement, all involve some physical change. Otherwise, the attitude of one would not get over to alter the attitude of another. Comparatively speaking, such modes of influence may be regarded as personal. The physical medium is reduced to a mere means of personal contact. In contrast with such direct modes of mutual influence, stand associations in common pursuits involving the use of things as means and as measures of results. Even if the mother never told her daughter to help her, or never rebuked her for not helping, the child would be subjected to direction in her activities by the mere fact that she was engaged, along with the parent, in the household life. Imitation, emulation, the need of working together, enforce control.
If the mother hands the child something needed, the latter must reach the thing in order to get it. Where there is giving there must be taking. The way the child handles the thing after it is got, the use to which it is put, is surely influenced by the fact that the child has watched the mother. When the child sees the parent looking for something, it is as natural for it also to look for the object and to give it over when it finds it, as it was, under other circumstances, to receive it. Multiply such an instance by the thousand details of daily intercourse, and one has a picture of the most permanent and enduring method of giving direction to the activities of the young.
In saying this, we are only repeating what was said previously about participating in a joint activity as the chief way of forming disposition. We have explicitly added, however, the recognition of the part played in the joint activity by the use of things. The philosophy of learning has been unduly dominated by a false psychology. It is frequently stated that a person learns by merely having the qualities of things impressed upon his mind through the gateway of the senses. Having received a store of sensory impressions, association or some power of mental synthesis is supposed to combine them into ideas -- into things with a meaning. An object, stone, orange, tree, chair, is supposed to convey different impressions of color, shape, size, hardness, smell, taste, etc., which aggregated together constitute the characteristic meaning of each thing. But as matter of fact, it is the characteristic use to which the thing is put, because of its specific qualities, which supplies the meaning with which it is identified. A chair is a thing which is put to one use; a table, a thing which is employed for another purpose; an orange is a thing which costs so much, which is grown in warm climes, which is eaten, and when eaten has an agreeable odor and refreshing taste, etc.
The difference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a mental act is that the latter involves response to a thing in its meaning; the former does not. A noise may make me jump without my mind being implicated. When I hear a noise and run and get water and put out a blaze, I respond intelligently; the sound meant fire, and fire meant need of being extinguished. I bump into a stone, and kick it to one side purely physically. I put it to one side for fear some one will stumble upon it, intelligently; I respond to a meaning which the thing has. I am startled by a thunderclap whether I recognize it or not -- more likely, if I do not recognize it. But if I say, either out loud or to myself, that is thunder, I respond to the disturbance as a meaning. My behavior has a mental quality. When things have a meaning for us, we mean (intend, propose) what we do: when they do not, we act blindly, unconsciously, unintelligently.
In both kinds of responsive adjustment, our activities are directed or controlled. But in the merely blind response, direction is also blind. There may be training, but there is no education. Repeated responses to recurrent stimuli may fix a habit of acting in a certain way. All of us have many habits of whose import we are quite unaware, since they were formed without our knowing
what we were about. Consequently they possess us, rather than we them. They move us; they control us. Unless we become aware of what they accomplish, and pass judgment upon the worth of the result, we do not control them. A child might be made to bow every time he met a certain person by pressure on his neck muscles, and bowing would finally become automatic. It would not, however, be an act of recognition or deference on his part, till he did it with a certain end in view -- as having a certain meaning. And not till he knew what he was about and performed the act for the sake of its meaning could he be said to be "brought up" or educated to act in a certain way. To have an idea of a thing is thus not just to get certain sensations from it. It is to be able to respond to the thing in view of its place in an inclusive scheme of action; it is to foresee the drift and probable consequence of the action of the thing upon us and of our action upon it.
To have the same ideas about things which others have, to be like-minded with them, and thus to be really members of a social group, is therefore to attach the same meanings to things and to acts which others attach. Otherwise, there is no common understanding, and no community life. But in a shared activity, each person refers what he is doing to what the other is doing and vice-versa. That is, the activity of each is placed in the same inclusive situation. To pull at a rope at which others happen to be pulling is not a shared or conjoint activity, unless the pulling is done with knowledge that others are pulling and for the sake of either helping or hindering what they are doing. A pin may pass in the course of its manufacture through the hands of many persons. But each may do his part without knowledge of what others do or without any reference to what they do; each may operate simply for the sake of a separate result -- his own pay. There is, in this case, no common consequence to which the several acts are referred, and hence no genuine intercourse or association, in spite of juxtaposition, and in spite of the fact that their respective doings contribute to a single outcome. But if each views the consequences of his own acts as having a bearing upon what others are doing and takes into account the consequences of their behavior upon himself, then there is a common mind; a common intent in behavior. There is an understanding set up between the different contributors; and this common understanding controls the action of each.
Suppose that conditions were so arranged that one person automatically caught a ball and then threw it to another person who caught and automatically returned it; and that each so acted without knowing where the ball came from or went to. Clearly, such action would be without point or meaning. It might be physically controlled, but it would not be socially directed. But suppose that each becomes aware of what the other is doing, and becomes interested in the other's action and thereby interested in what he is doing himself as connected with the action of the other. The behavior of each would then be intelligent; and socially intelligent and guided. Take one more example of a less imaginary kind. An infant is hungry, and cries while food is prepared in his presence. If he does not connect his own state with what others are doing, nor what they are doing with his own satisfaction, he simply reacts with increasing impatience to his own increasing discomfort. He is physically controlled by his own organic state. But when he makes a back and forth reference, his whole attitude changes. He takes an interest, as we say; he takes note and watches what others are doing. He no longer reacts just to his own hunger, but behaves in the light of what others are doing for its prospective satisfaction. In that way, he also no longer just gives way to hunger without knowing it, but he notes, or recognizes, or identifies his own state. It becomes an object for him. His attitude toward it becomes in some degree intelligent. And in such noting of the meaning of the actions of others and of his own state, he is socially directed.
It will be recalled that our main proposition had two sides. One of them has now been dealt with: namely, that physical things do not influence mind (or form ideas and beliefs) except as they are implicated in action for prospective consequences. The other point is persons modify one another's dispositions only through the special use they make of physical conditions. Consider first the case of so-called expressive movements to which others are sensitive; blushing, smiling, frowning, clinching of fists, natural gestures of all kinds. In themselves, these are not expressive. They are organic parts of a person's attitude. One does not blush to show modesty or embarrassment to others, but because the capillary circulation alters in response to stimuli. But others use the blush, or a slightly perceptible tightening of the muscles of a person with whom they are associated, as a sign of the state in which that person finds himself, and as an indication of what course to pursue. The frown signifies an imminent rebuke for which one must prepare, or an uncertainty and hesitation which one must, if possible, remove by saying or doing something to restore confidence.
A man at some distance is waving his arms wildly. One has only to preserve an attitude of detached indifference, and the motions of the other person will be on the level of any remote physical change which we happen to note. If we have no concern or interest, the waving of the arms is as meaningless to us as the gyrations of the arms of a windmill. But if interest is aroused, we begin to participate. We refer his action to something we are doing ourselves or that we should do. We have to judge the meaning of his act in order to decide what to do. Is he beckoning for help? Is he warning us of an explosion to be set off, against which we should guard ourselves? In one case, his action means to run toward him; in the other case, to run away. In any case, it is the change he effects in the physical environment which is a sign to us of how we should conduct ourselves. Our action is socially controlled because we endeavor to refer what we are to do to the same situation in which he is acting.
Language is, as we have already seen (ante, p. 15) a case of this joint reference of our own action and that of another to a common situation. Hence its unrivaled significance as a means of social direction. But language would not be this efficacious instrument were it not that it takes place upon a background of coarser and more tangible use of physical means to accomplish results.
A child sees persons with whom he lives using chairs, hats, tables, spades, saws, plows, horses, money in certain ways. If he has any share at all in what they are doing, he is led thereby to use things in the same way, or to use other things in a way which will fit in. If a chair is drawn up to a table, it is a sign that he is to sit in it; if a person extends his right hand, he is to extend his; and so on in a never ending stream of detail. The prevailing habits of using the products of human art and the raw materials of nature constitute by all odds the deepest and most pervasive mode of social control. When children go to school, they already have "minds" -- they have knowledge and dispositions of judgment which may be appealed to through the use of language. But these "minds" are the organized habits of intelligent response which they have previously required by putting things to use in connection with the way other persons use things. The control is inescapable; it saturates disposition.
The net outcome of the discussion is that the fundamental means of control is not personal but intellectual. It is not "moral" in the sense that a person is moved by direct personal appeal from others, important as is this method at critical junctures. It consists in the habits of understanding, which are set up in using objects in correspondence with others, whether by way of cooperation and assistance or rivalry and competition. Mind as a concrete thing is precisely the
power to understand things in terms of the use made of them; a socialized mind is the power to understand them in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint or shared situations. And mind in this sense is the method of social control.
3. Imitation and Social Psychology. We have already noted the defects of a psychology of learning which places the individual mind naked, as it were, in contact with physical objects, and which believes that knowledge, ideas, and beliefs accrue from their interaction. Only comparatively recently has the predominating influence of association with fellow beings in the formation of mental and moral disposition been perceived. Even now it is usually treated as a kind of adjunct to an alleged method of learning by direct contact with things, and as merely supplementing knowledge of the physical world with knowledge of persons. The purport of our discussion is that such a view makes an absurd and impossible separation between persons and things. Interaction with things may form habits of external adjustment. But it leads to activity having a meaning and conscious intent only when things are used to produce a result. And the only way one person can modify the mind of another is by using physical conditions, crude or artificial, so as to evoke some answering activity from him. Such are our two main conclusions. It is desirable to amplify and enforce them by placing them in contrast with the theory which uses a psychology of supposed direct relationships of human beings to one another as an adjunct to the psychology of the supposed direct relation of an individual to physical objects. In substance, this so-called social psychology has been built upon the notion of imitation. Consequently, we shall discuss the nature and role of imitation in the formation of mental disposition.
According to this theory, social control of individuals rests upon the instinctive tendency of individuals to imitate or copy the actions of others. The latter serve as models. The imitative instinct is so strong that the young devote themselves to conforming to the patterns set by others and reproducing them in their own scheme of behavior. According to our theory, what is here called imitation is a misleading name for partaking with others in a use of things which leads to consequences of common interest.
The basic error in the current notion of imitation is that it puts the cart before the horse. It takes an effect for the cause of the effect. There can be no doubt that individuals in forming a social group are like-minded; they understand one another. They tend to act with the same controlling ideas, beliefs, and intentions, given similar circumstances. Looked at from without, they might be said to be engaged in "imitating" one another. In the sense that they are doing much the same sort of thing in much the same sort of way, this would be true enough. But "imitation" throws no light upon why they so act; it repeats the fact as an explanation of itself. It is an explanation of the same order as the famous saying that opium puts men to sleep because of its dormitive power.
Objective likeness of acts and the mental satisfaction found in being in conformity with others are baptized by the name imitation. This social fact is then taken for a psychological force, which produced the likeness. A considerable portion of what is called imitation is simply the fact that persons being alike in structure respond in the same way to like stimuli. Quite independently of imitation, men on being insulted get angry and attack the insulter. This statement may be met by citing the undoubted fact that response to an insult takes place in different ways in groups having different customs. In one group, it may be met by recourse to fisticuffs, in another by a challenge to a duel, in a third by an exhibition of contemptuous disregard. This happens, so it is said, because the model set for imitation is different. But there is no need to appeal to imitation.
The mere fact that customs are different means that the actual stimuli to behavior are different. Conscious instruction plays a part; prior approvals and disapprovals have a large influence. Still more effective is the fact that unless an individual acts in the way current in his group, he is literally out of it. He can associate with others on intimate and equal terms only by behaving in the way in which they behave. The pressure that comes from the fact that one is let into the group action by acting in one way and shut out by acting in another way is unremitting. What is called the effect of imitation is mainly the product of conscious instruction and of the selective influence exercised by the unconscious confirmations and ratifications of those with whom one associates.
Suppose that some one rolls a ball to a child; he catches it and rolls it back, and the game goes on. Here the stimulus is not just the sight of the ball, or the sight of the other rolling it. It is the situation -- the game which is playing. The response is not merely rolling the ball back; it is rolling it back so that the other one may catch and return it, -- that the game may continue. The "pattern" or model is not the action of the other person. The whole situation requires that each should adapt his action in view of what the other person has done and is to do. Imitation may come in but its role is subordinate. The child has an interest on his own account; he wants to keep it going. He may then note how the other person catches and holds the ball in order to improve his own acts. He imitates the means of doing, not the end or thing to be done. And he imitates the means because he wishes, on his own behalf, as part of his own initiative, to take an effective part in the game. One has only to consider how completely the child is dependent from his earliest days for successful execution of his purposes upon fitting his acts into those of others to see what a premium is put upon behaving as others behave, and of developing an understanding of them in order that he may so behave. The pressure for likemindedness in action from this source is so great that it is quite superfluous to appeal to imitation.
As matter of fact, imitation of ends, as distinct from imitation of means which help to reach ends, is a superficial and transitory affair which leaves little effect upon disposition. Idiots are especially apt at this kind of imitation; it affects outward acts but not the meaning of their performance. When we find children engaging in this sort of mimicry, instead of encouraging them (as we would do if it were an important means of social control) we are more likely to rebuke them as apes, monkeys, parrots, or copy cats. Imitation of means of accomplishment is, on the other hand, an intelligent act. It involves close observation, and judicious selection of what will enable one to do better something which he already is trying to do. Used for a purpose, the imitative instinct may, like any other instinct, become a factor in the development of effective action.
This excursus should, accordingly, have the effect of reinforcing the conclusion that genuine social control means the formation of a certain mental disposition; a way of understanding objects, events, and acts which enables one to participate effectively in associated activities. Only the friction engendered by meeting resistance from others leads to the view that it takes place by forcing a line of action contrary to natural inclinations. Only failure to take account of the situations in which persons are mutually concerned ( or interested in acting responsively to one another) leads to treating imitation as the chief agent in promoting social control.
4. Some Applications to Education. Why does a savage group perpetuate savagery, and a civilized group civilization? Doubtless the first answer to occur to mind is because savages are savages; being of low-grade intelligence and perhaps defective moral sense. But careful study has made it doubtful whether their native capacities are appreciably inferior to those of civilized man.
It has made it certain that native differences are not sufficient to account for the difference in culture. In a sense the mind of savage peoples is an effect, rather than a cause, of their backward institutions. Their social activities are such as to restrict their objects of attention and interest, and hence to limit the stimuli to mental development. Even as regards the objects that come within the scope of attention, primitive social customs tend to arrest observation and imagination upon qualities which do not fructify in the mind. Lack of control of natural forces means that a scant number of natural objects enter into associated behavior. Only a small number of natural resources are utilized and they are not worked for what they are worth. The advance of civilization means that a larger number of natural forces and objects have been transformed into instrumentalities of action, into means for securing ends. We start not so much with superior capacities as with superior stimuli for evocation and direction of our capacities. The savage deals largely with crude stimuli; we have weighted stimuli.
Prior human efforts have made over natural conditions. As they originally existed they were indifferent to human endeavors. Every domesticated plant and animal, every tool, every utensil, every appliance, every manufactured article, every esthetic decoration, every work of art means a transformation of conditions once hostile or indifferent to characteristic human activities into friendly and favoring conditions. Because the activities of children today are controlled by these selected and charged stimuli, children are able to traverse in a short lifetime what the race has needed slow, tortured ages to attain. The dice have been loaded by all the successes which have preceded.
Stimuli conducive to economical and effective response, such as our system of roads and means of transportation, our ready command of heat, light, and electricity, our ready-made machines and apparatus for every purpose, do not, by themselves or in their aggregate, constitute a civilization. But the uses to which they are put are civilization, and without the things the uses would be impossible. Time otherwise necessarily devoted to wresting a livelihood from a grudging environment and securing a precarious protection against its inclemencies is freed. A body of knowledge is transmitted, the legitimacy of which is guaranteed by the fact that the physical equipment in which it is incarnated leads to results that square with the other facts of nature. Thus these appliances of art supply a protection, perhaps our chief protection, against a recrudescence of these superstitious beliefs, those fanciful myths and infertile imaginings about nature in which so much of the best intellectual power of the past has been spent. If we add one other factor, namely, that such appliances be not only used, but used in the interests of a truly shared or associated life, then the appliances become the positive resources of civilization. If Greece, with a scant tithe of our material resources, achieved a worthy and noble intellectual and artistic career, it is because Greece operated for social ends such resources as it had.
But whatever the situation, whether one of barbarism or civilization, whether one of stinted control of physical forces, or of partial enslavement to a mechanism not yet made tributary to a shared experience, things as they enter into action furnish the educative conditions of daily life and direct the formation of mental and moral disposition.
Intentional education signifies, as we have already seen, a specially selected environment, the selection being made on the basis of materials and method specifically promoting growth in the desired direction. Since language represents the physical conditions that have been subjected to the maximum transformation in the interests of social life -- physical things which have lost their original quality in becoming social tools -- it is appropriate that language should play a large part
compared with other appliances. By it we are led to share vicariously in past human experience, thus widening and enriching the experience of the present. We are enabled, symbolically and imaginatively, to anticipate situations. In countless ways, language condenses meanings that record social outcomes and presage social outlooks. So significant is it of a liberal share in what is worth while in life that unlettered and uneducated have become almost synonymous.
The emphasis in school upon this particular tool has, however, its dangers -- dangers which are not theoretical but exhibited in practice. Why is it, in spite of the fact that teaching by pouring in, learning by a passive absorption, are universally condemned, that they are still so entrenched in practice? That education is not an affair of "telling" and being told, but an active and constructive process, is a principle almost as generally violated in practice as conceded in theory. Is not this deplorable situation due to the fact that the doctrine is itself merely told? It is preached; it is lectured; it is written about. But its enactment into practice requires that the school environment be equipped with agencies for doing, with tools and physical materials, to an extent rarely attained. It requires that methods of instruction and administration be modified to allow and to secure direct and continuous occupations with things. Not that the use of language as an educational resource should lessen; but that its use should be more vital and fruitful by having its normal connection with shared activities. "These things ought ye to have done, and not to have left the others undone." And for the school "these things" mean equipment with the instrumentalities of cooperative or joint activity.
For when the schools depart from the educational conditions effective in the out-of-school environment, they necessarily substitute a bookish, a pseudo-intellectual spirit for a social spirit. Children doubtless go to school to learn, but it has yet to be proved that learning occurs most adequately when it is made a separate conscious business. When treating it as a business of this sort tends to preclude the social sense which comes from sharing in an activity of common concern and value, the effort at isolated intellectual learning contradicts its own aim. We may secure motor activity and sensory excitation by keeping an individual by himself, but we cannot thereby get him to understand the meaning which things have in the life of which he is a part. We may secure technical specialized ability in algebra, Latin, or botany, but not the kind of intelligence which directs ability to useful ends. Only by engaging in a joint activity, where one person's use of material and tools is consciously referred to the use other persons are making of their capacities and appliances, is a social direction of disposition attained.
Summary. The natural or native impulses of the young do not agree with the life-customs of the group into which they are born. Consequently they have to be directed or guided. This control is not the same thing as physical compulsion; it consists in centering the impulses acting at any one time upon some specific end and in introducing an order of continuity into the sequence of acts. The action of others is always influenced by deciding what stimuli shall call out their actions. But in some cases as in commands, prohibitions, approvals, and disapprovals, the stimuli proceed from persons with a direct view to influencing action. Since in such cases we are most conscious of controlling the action of others, we are likely to exaggerate the importance of this sort of control at the expense of a more permanent and effective method. The basic control resides in the nature of the situations in which the young take part. In social situations the young have to refer their way of acting to what others are doing and make it fit in. This directs their action to a common result, and gives an understanding common to the participants. For all mean the same thing, even when performing different acts. This common understanding of the means and ends of
action is the essence of social control. It is indirect, or emotional and intellectual, not direct or personal. Moreover it is intrinsic to the disposition of the person, not external and coercive. To achieve this internal control through identity of interest and understanding is the business of education. While books and conversation can do much, these agencies are usually relied upon too exclusively. Schools require for their full efficiency more opportunity for conjoint activities in which those instructed take part, so that they may acquire a social sense of their own powers and of the materials and appliances used.
《民主主义与教育》读书心得前不久，我去图书馆借了本杜威的《民主与教育》，下面，结合大师们的研究，浅谈一下我的理解。 我非常赞同杜威关于“做中学”的观点，并不是说任何事情都要亲身经历，但若能促进其学习的发生，“做”一下又何妨？儿童期和青少年期更喜欢游戏或活动，在游戏活动中他们学得更快，并且能将所学运用到生活中去，紧密地与活相结合。关键是这样的教学方法适合什么阶段的学生，以及活动或游戏的方式。我认为在初级教育阶段，应该培养学生的动手能力，学习一些实用的知识，这样即使有的学生就此辍学，也不至于与社会脱节；而在中等教育阶段应该训练学生的思维能力和独立判断能力；高等教育的责任应培养具有社会责任的人，更加联系实际来教授一些理论知识，同时这些理论知识又能回到实际中，对实际生活中遇到的问题提出一些建议或方案。每个阶段活动的内容和方式都是不同的，我们不能要求儿童在还没有懂得这个社会的状况前，就去研究政治，这是荒唐可笑的。杜威的实用主义或经验主义我理解为生活主义，中国的成语叫“学以致用”，一种知识学习了如果没有实际的用处，只能作为炫耀或显示地位的东西，这种教育是极其失败的。现今中国的大学教育，文科专业学习的知识与现实脱节，理工科专业学的知识远远落伍于现今的科学发展，这样的教育有何用处？可是要让学习的知识与生活实际合拍，谈何容易。
首先，是中国传统教育的恶习——学而优则仕，学习有了一层功利性的色彩，而不是为了个人价值的实现。 其次，中国的政策制定者与实际生活的分离，教育改革只局限于教材不断频繁地变换，而没有触及实质性的东西——教育理念。 最后，要关注的是教育一线的工作者，我们的教师，他们思想的转变直接影响到祖国花朵的培养方式，如果还是老方式，如何能为祖国培养“实用”人才。 杜威的教育思想或者说《民主主义与教育》为代表的教育思想总纲所表现出来的是通过教育改革创新在美国创立更加适合学生的教育。通过这种教育，更多的人能够享有和接受民主的教育。力图实现民有民享民治的资产阶级民主社会。它不同于柏拉图的《理想国》中力图培养奴隶主阶级的统治者的哲学王而进行的阶级统治。也不同于卢梭的原著《爱弥尔》缺乏实践的支撑脱离实际，空想式的乌托邦。杜威的民主主义教育既有坚实的理论基础，又有丰富的教育实践及经验，可谓是理论和实践的完美结合。 纵观杜威的一生，其出生与青少年经历平淡无奇，才资平平。他在小学与大学却也没有学到什么实质意义的东西，倒是在这期间的课外阅读中学到了一些有用的东西。对人生有启迪作用的书籍有大量阅读。因为当时的美国教育已经深陷窠臼，走向僵化机制，已经没有多少吸引人的地方。这让我想到了当前我国的教育，与美国的老式教育有惊人的相似之处。在应试教育和高考指挥棒的作用之下，学生的成绩为了上好学校在学校里机械的学习，很多学生长期在这种教育作用
杜威：民主主义与教育 导读：一、教育即生长 发展概念的教育意义 本章到这里为止，很少谈到教育。我们一直在讨论生长的条件和含义。但是，要是我们的结论是正确的，它们就带来明确的教育结果。当我们说教育就是发展时，全看对发展一词怎样理解。我们的最后结论是，生活就是发展；而不断发展，不断生长，就是生活。用教育的术语来说，就是：（1）教育过程在它自身以外无目的；它就是它自己的目的；（2）教育过程是一个不断改组、不断改造和不断转化的过程。 （1）当我们用比较的术语，即从儿童和成人生活的特征，来解释发展时，所谓发展就是使能力引导到特别的渠道，如养成各种习惯，这些习惯包括执行的技能，明确的兴趣，以及特定的观察与思维的对象。但是比较的观点并不是最终的。儿童具有特别的能力；忽视这个事实，便是阻碍儿童生长所依靠的器官的发育或使它们畸形发展。成人利用他的能力改造他的环境，因此引起许多新的刺激，这些新的刺激又指导他的各种能力，使它们不断发展。忽视这个事实，发展就受阻挠，成为被动的适应。换言之，常态的儿童和常态的成人，都在不断生长。他们的区别不是生长和不生长的区别，而是各有适合于不同情况的不同的生长方式。关于专门应付特殊的科学和经济问题的能力的发展，我们可以说，儿童应该向成人方面发展。关于同情的好奇心，不偏不倚的敏感性和坦率的胸怀，我们可以说，成人应该成长得像儿
童的样子。这两句话都是同样正确的。 我们在本章已经评论过三种思想，这就是：一，把未成熟状态仅仅看做没有发展；二，把发展看做对固定环境的静止的适应；三，关于习惯的僵硬性。这三种思想，都和关于生长或发展的错误观点有关——都认为生长或发展乃是朝着一个固定目标的运动。它们把生长看做有一个目的，而不看做就是目的。这三种错误思想在教育上相应的错误就是：第一，不考虑儿童的本能的或先天的能力；第二，不发展儿童应付新情境的首创精神；第三，过分强调训练和其他方法，牺牲个人的理解力，以养成机械的技能。这三件事都是把成人的环境作为儿童的标准，使儿童成长到这个标准。 人们不是无视自然的本能，就是把它们看做讨厌的东西——看做应该受压制、或者无论如何应该遵守外部标准的可憎的特性。因为把遵守看做目的，所以青年人的个性都被忽视，或被看做调皮捣蛋、搞无政府主义的根源。同时，又把遵守等同于一律，从而导致青年对新鲜事物缺乏兴趣，对进步表示反感，害怕不确定的和未知的事情。由于生长的目的在生长过程之外，就不得不依靠外部力量，诱导青年走向这个目的。当一种教育方法被污蔑为机械方法的时候，我们可以肯定，这就是依靠外部的压力来达到外部的目的。 （2）既然实际上除了更多的生长，没有别的东西是与生长相关的，所以除了更多的教育，没有别的东西是教育所从属的。有一句平常话说，一个人离开学校之后，教育不应停止。这句话的要害是，学校教育的目的，在于通过组织保证继续生长的各种力量，以保证教育
《民主主义与教育》读后感 为响应国家大力倡导全民阅读、建设书香中国的号召，进一步提升教师群体的文化修养，让阅读成为教师的一种生活常态，20xx年4—11月渝中区教委、渝中区教育学会在渝中名师、特级教师工作室中重点推广教师阅读，开展“阅读阅快乐”读书交流及展示活动。该活动得到工作室主持人的大力推崇，收到50余份学员读书心得。本公众号将陆续发布优秀的读书心得，希望能带给用户借鉴与启发。 《民主主义与教育》是世界著名的教育理论专著，初读时觉得很难理解，但耐心读完后却有很多收获与启发。杜威在书中提出了许多与传统不同的教育观念，他以生活、生长和经验改造来解释教育，创造了崭新的教育理论。 这本著作的作者是杜威，杜威是美国实用主义哲学家和教育家，《民主主义与教育》全面地阐述了实用主义教育理论，是其教育着述的代表作。在教育史中既能提出新颖教育哲学，又能亲见其实施之获得成功者，杜威是第一人。 杜威认为：我们假定教育的目的在于使个人能继续他们的教育，或者说，学习的目的和酬报，是继续不断生长的能力。但是，除非一个社会人与人的交往是相互的，除非这个社会的
利益能平等地分配给全体成员，从而产生广泛的刺激，并通过这些刺激，适当地进行社会习惯和制度的改造，这个思想就不能适用社会的全体成员。这样的社会就是民主主义的社会。所以，我们探索教育目的时，并不要到教育过程以外去寻找一个目的，使教育服从这个目的。我们整个教育观点不允许这样做。我们所要做的，是要把属于教育过程内部的目的，和从教育过程以外提出的目的进行比较。当社会关系不平等均衡时，一定会出现后一种情况。因为，在这种情况下，整个社会的某部分人，将会发现他们的目的是由外来的命令决定的;他们的目的并不是从他们自己的经验自由发展而来，他们的有名无实的目的，并不真是他们自己的目的，而是达到别人隐藏着的目的的手段。 杜威提出“从做中学”，就是说教学不应该直接了当地注入知识，而应诱导儿童在活动中得到经验和知识，教学要从儿童的现实生活出发，并且附着于儿童的现实生活。而有些教师却脱离儿童生活向学生提出问题，或者有的老师把儿童视为容器而以高压手段灌输知识，其结果只能使儿童学而不思和记而不解，或招致学生的反感。想想我们现在的教育状况又何尝不是这样呢?不间断的模拟、各级统考，迫使老师不得不给学生布置大量的作业，挤占学生的体育、音乐、美术等其他课程的时间，学生真的要成为只会学习的机器了，哪里还有什么自
民主主义与教育 [美]约翰杜威著王承续译 一、序言 滕大春先生（1909.10.13-2002.12.16），1928年在北京接受高中教育。1929年考入北京大学教育系，受到北大伟大爱国精神和严谨治学传统的影响，在做人和求学的志趣上深受启发。1933年北京大学毕业后，赴济南任山东省立第一乡村师范学校教员兼附属小学主任。除在师范部任课外，主要精力投入附小改革工作，把美国实用主义教育家杜威的“教育即生活”、“教育即生长”、“教育即经验改造”和“从做中学”的理论落之于实际。1986年，获得全国外国教育史专业第一个博士学位授权点，任河北大学教育系外国教育史专业博士生导师。 滕大春先生在教育史学界享有崇高的声誉。曾任中国教育学会理事，中国高等教育学会理事，全国教育史研究会副理事长，全国比较教育研究会副理事长，河北省社科联副主席，河北省教育学会副会长，河北省高教研究会副理事长，河北省老年教授协会名誉会长等职。滕大春先生在教育史研究领域辛勤耕耘近70载，声名远播，建树非凡。在外国古代（东方）教育史、美国教育史、卢梭教育理论研究领域均有卓越成果，著述丰硕。出版了《美国教育史》《今日美国教育》《卢梭教育思想述评》等专著，《科技发达时代的大学教育》《德国教育史》等译著；主编多部著作，主要有《外国古代教育史》《外国近代教育史》《外国教育通史》（共六卷）。此外，还曾任《中国大百科全书·教育卷》“外国教育”分支主编和《教育大辞典·外国教育史》分卷主编。[1] 该书要把民主社会的意义、生物进化论的观点、产业革命带来的变化以及科学实验的方法，贯串一起，从而论证新教育的本质、目的、方法、内容和评断一些彼此矛盾的教育理论问题和实施问题。研究这本巨著必须掌握这一点。[2] 本书共分26章。依杜威在第24 章的划分, 约含3个部分。实际上，最初数章从非形式的教育谈到学校的兴起，概述了教育的社会职能和效用，指出了当前学校的严重缺陷以及改革的方向。其后各章便阐述民主社会的教育性质，明确教育即是生活、生长和经验改造的意义，并借着对过去各种教育理论的批判来反证民主教育的正确性和优越性。此外，这几章还说明民主教育的目的是获得更多更好的教育，别无其他目的，这就是教育无目的论。再后各章系以实用主义教育哲学来理顺长期存在的兴趣和努力、经验和思想、劳动和休闲、个人和自然界、教育和职业等等矛盾，并给课程、教材和教法作出新的解释。最末两章则分别论述实用主义的真理论和道德论。书中涉及的方面极为广泛，但对每项问题都从社会、历史和哲学的角度层层剖析和深入论证。[3] 看书不应仅仅从细节进行揣摩，因而在看书之前，对这本书的整体框架进行把握也非常重要。我们首先要学会顺着作者的角度去阅读这本著作。 杜威理解中的民主社会： 他说衡量社会不能单凭主观臆想来制定标准，应以社会成员共享利益的多寡为尺度，还应以本社会和其他社会能否交流互惠为尺度。优良社会应当便于和善于与其社会交通，是开放型而非封闭型的社会，是人类共存、共利和共赖的社会。杜威认为民主社会既要冲破阶级的和种族的界限，还要冲出国界，使人类出现与日俱多的接触点和互惠点。[4] [1]https://www.doczj.com/doc/277158490.html,/view/454001.htm?fr=ala0_1_1 [2] [美]约翰?杜威著.民主主义与教育[M]. 王承绪译.北京: 人民教育出版社,1990: 12. [3] [美]约翰?杜威著.民主主义与教育[M]. 王承绪译.北京: 人民教育出版社,1990: 12.
7．方法从来不是材料以外的东西（教学的情境性） (1)反对“教材与方法的二元论，“反对忽视经验的”具体情境。“教法与方法并无区别”。 (2)方法有两种：一是长期积累的、相当稳定的方法，并为过去经验和理智分析所认可的。一是个人的方法，是发挥个人主动性、创造性的方法，是个人做事的方法，是“直接的指南”、“最有效的方法。” 8．选择教材必须以改进我们共同生活为目的（教材生活化、实用化） (1)教材先由供给学生现代社会生活内容的种种价值所构成，它“把需要传递的当前社会生活的意义转化为具体的和详细的术语”。(2)一个课程计划必须考虑课程能否适应现在社会生活的需要，选材时必须以改进我们的共同生活为目的，保证将来比过去更美好。此外，还必须把社会最基本的事物放在第一位。 9．兴趣是有目的行动的动力，兴趣和训练是相联系的（内部动机的培养） (1)兴趣(爱好、关心、动机等)表示个人的选择态度，个人对某对象所持的态度——对所遇见事物的态度。兴趣是有目的行动的动力，看兴趣可以估量其推进某种工作的积极性。(2)兴趣与生长是一种过程，兴趣有开始的阶段和完成的阶段，中间阶段需要意志、努力。（3）兴趣与训练是彼此相连的，而非对立的。儿童对功课的反映，既取决于材料所引起的兴趣，又取决于各人的天性及正确经验。 10．从经验中学习(“做中学”)（重视直接经验） (1)“经验包含主动和被动两个要素”，即“尝试的行为”、试验、实验的要素和承受结果的要素。教师应把学生的“身体活动”和“精神活动”结合起来， (2)所谓反思思维是指：辩别“所尝试的事”与“由此发生的结果”之间有什么关系。“反思的经验”有五个步骤，简单地表述为：疑难、问题、假说、推论、验证。 11．打破两类科目的牵强划分（整体的知识观） 自然科目与人文科目牵强划分是二元论，目前教育仍把科学视为是讲物质的专门知识，把文学视为属于人本的性质，这是不对的。要认识到“自然科学的材料在人事方面也占有他的地位”，“利用自然科学可满足社会的需要，解决很多的社会科学的问题，教育应使两类科目互相增加彼此的效果。” 12．个人必须有他自己的目的和问题（主体性和个性） 教育所重视的个性有两个含义：第一，一个人必须有他的目的和问题，并能自行思考。第二，个人的见解，个人所喜欢学习的对象，个人应付问题的方法等都不同。凡是一个进步社会都视个人的变异如珍宝，因为社会进步依靠个人的变异。所以杜威主张：民主社会如要与它的理想相符，必须在他的教育规划里容许个人的自由，使特异的天才与兴趣各得发展。
民主主义与教育读书心得 Final approval draft on November 22, 2020
民主主义与教育心得体会 在这本书中，有着哲学功底和丰富的教育实践经验的杜威用睿智的话语来阐述教育与民主，简单的话中潜藏着深刻的含义，将教育的相关知识讲的深入浅出，能激发我们很多关于教育与生活的新的想法，值得我们细细品读。 “只要生物能忍受，它就努力为它自己利用周围的力量。它利用光线、空气、水分和土壤。所谓利用它们，就是说把它们变为保存它自己的手段。只要生物不断地生长，它在利用环境时所花费的力量得大于失：它生长着。”“生活的延续就是环境对生物需要的不断的重新适应。” 其实生存并不困难，难的是如何更好的生存，如何使生活变得体面，活的有尊严，有价值，得到他人的敬重和赞扬。尽管现在就业难，但是找一份足以糊口的工作还是不难的，找不到体面的非体力劳动工作，但是体力劳动还是很好找的，比如车间女工，再比如餐厅服务员，超市营销员等，但是这种工作会让我们觉得难以忍受，不想穷其一生在这种枯燥琐碎劳累的工作上，因为这种工作，不被人敬重，没有我们一直追求的价值感，所以难以忍受。我曾经在小学实习过，通过实习我发现自己很喜欢和小学生在一起，或许小学教师是我真正向往的工作，同学的信任的目光，真诚的心，还有学校老师的尊重，都让我体会到
一种前所未有的价值感，虽然小学老师也需要耗费脑力，甚至需要熬夜备课，但是我还是很快乐，一堂成功的授课就让我无比自豪。 “事实上，初生的孩子是那样不成熟，如果听任他们自行其是，没有别人指导和援助，他们甚至不能获得身体生存所必需的起码的能力。人类的幼年和很多低等动物的崽仔比较起来，原有的效能差得多，甚至维持身体所需要的力量必须经过教导方能获得。”所以教育成为一件必不可少的事，生活中的很多事情，只有通过主动学习或者长辈的示范或教导，我们才能知晓，不学习就是没有文化，没有文化就是未开化就是愚昧无知。因为个人的天生认识能力是有限的，必须通过后天的学习，才能具备生活所需要的能力。不管是初生的孩子还是世故的成人，都需要在生活中，在工作中继续学习。因为知识的海洋是无极限的，只有继续学习才能进步，不思进取是消极的人生态度，我们应该积极向上，树立终生学习的人生态度，这样我们才能不断进步，从而更好的生存。 “社会在传递中、在沟通中生存。”我十分赞同杜威的这种看法，沟通能创造奇迹，老师与学生之间的沟通，灵感的激发，也是来自于沟通，通过相互交流，就能帮助我们产生新的创意。很多作家写书没有灵感时，就会到人群中，朋友中去寻找灵感，往往朋友的无心的一句话就能激
杜威生平简介 约翰·杜威（John Dewey，1859—1952），美国著名哲学家、教育家，实用主义哲学的创始人之一，功能心理学的先驱，美国进步主义教育运动的代表。出生在佛蒙特州柏林顿市附近的农村，祖先三代都是佛蒙特州的农民。柏林顿市人口近一万五千人，其中约半数为本地人，半数来自爱尔兰和魁北克。本地出生的人包括在佛蒙特州或新英格兰其他地方居住很久的盎格鲁撒克逊中产阶级新教徒家庭的后裔。杜威就是在这样一个群体的传统中成长起来的。 杜威在柏林顿市上公立学校，毕业后入本地的佛蒙特大学。大学第四年，他学习了基本的政治、经济、哲学和宗教理论，并产生了浓厚的兴趣。大学毕业后，在中学任教三年。1882年进霍布金斯大学攻读哲学。受到来自密歇根大学客座教授、新黑格尔主义的主要倡导者莫理斯和19世纪德国哲学家黑格尔思想复兴的影响。他发现，这个哲学强调宇宙的精神的和有机的性质，正是他一直在模糊地探索着的东西，他热切地信奉这个哲学。 1884年，杜威获得霍布金斯大学哲学博士学位。同年秋，受聘为密歇根大学哲学和心理学讲师。除1888~1889年曾在明尼苏达大学任哲学教授以外，杜威在密歇根工作了十年。在此期间，他主要致力于黑格尔和英国新黑格尔主义哲学研究，对霍尔与詹姆斯在美国提出的新实验生理心理学进行了深入研究。 杜威对教育的兴趣始于在密歇根的年代。他发现多数学校正沿着早先的传统路线进行，没有适应儿童心理学的最新发现和变革中的民主社会秩序的需要。寻找一种能补救这些缺陷的教育哲学，成了杜威主要关切的事情。 1894年，他离开密歇根，任芝加哥大学哲学教授，哲学、心理学和教育学系主任。他在芝加哥的成就使他获得全国的名望。进化论的生物学和心理学在他的思想中越来越占优势，导致他抛弃黑格尔的理论，接受工具主义的认识论。他和同事的论文集《逻辑学理论研究》（1903）的发表，宣告一个新的哲学学派——芝加哥学派的诞生。詹姆斯热情地为这本书欢呼。他在1896年创办的芝加哥大学实验学校，使他的教育理论和实践得到检验，吸引了国内外广泛的注意。 1904年，由于对大学的教育计划管理和财务方面的意见和芝加哥大学校长不一致，改任哥伦比亚大学哲学教授。他和哥伦比亚的联系达47年之久，先是任哲学教授，后任哲学退休教授。在任教的25年中，吸引了国内外成千上万的学生，成为美国最闻名和最有影响
民主社会的教育 一、著作背景 1.写作背景 19世纪末，为适应工业革命、城乡变化、开发边疆和大量移民的需要，美国出现了一系列社会改革运动，其中一个重要方面就是教育革新运动。美国传统教育的问题有两点：一是脱离社会，二是脱离儿童。这次教育革新运动要代之以全新的课程设计和新颖的教学方法。 2.作者简介 约翰·杜威（John Dewey，1859—1952），美国哲学家、教育家、心理学家，实用主义的代表人物。出生于美国佛蒙特州的柏林顿。1875年进入佛蒙特大学学习，1882年进入约翰斯·霍普金斯大学继续学习并获得博士学位。曾先后在密歇根大学、明尼苏达大学、芝加哥大学任教。1896年他创办杜威实验学校，用以检验教与学和心理理论在实践中的效果。1904年，他到哥伦比亚大学任教，直至退休。其主要著作有：《学校与社会》（1899）、《民主主义与教育》（1916）、《哲学的改造》（1920）、《经验与自然》（1925）、《作为经验的艺术》（1934）、《经验与教育》（1938）等。 杜威于1894年至1904年担任芝加哥大学哲学、心理学和教育学系的系主任。这十年是他改革教育的尝试阶段。杜威顺应当时的新教育潮流，围绕两大中心进行探讨：一是使学校和社会发展的需要合拍，二是使学校和儿童青少年的身心发育的规律合拍。1896年，他创立了实验学校，进行课程、教材和教法上的实验，把教育理论和实际结合起来。他把以粉笔和口讲为形式的课堂改变为儿童由活动而求知的课堂。根据教育改革的实践，他于1897年发表《我的教育信条》，1899年发表《学校和社会》，1902年发表《儿童和课程》，虽都篇幅简短，但发人深省。之后因与芝加哥大学校长教育理念分歧，杜威离开芝加哥大学进入哥伦比亚大学任教。经历长期的教育实践和研究，他于1916年才著成《民主主义与教育》这一具有体系的实用主义教育哲学著作。 3.写作意义 该著作全面地阐述了杜威在芝加哥实验学校，以及当时教育改革理论研讨中基本形成的实用主义教育理论，为建设新式教育提出了明确的目的和方法。杜威
杜威《民主主义与教育》 杜威(J·Dewey，1859-1952)，美国哲学和教育哲学的代表人物，实用主义哲学和进步主义教育哲学的最主要的创始人。生于佛蒙特州柏灵顿市附近农村零售商家庭里。幼年和少年时代，他是一个偏僻乡村里的平凡而羞怯的孩子。他两岁时爆发了南北战争，其父应征入伍，参加了林肯总统的志愿兵。因家庭没有定居一处，他快满8岁才上小学。他度过青年时代的新开发中部地区，自从南北战争结束后，开始修建铁路和工厂，建设城市。年青的杜威在那里目睹了开拓者的积极生活，这对他经验主义、实用主义哲学思想的形成，产生了很大的影响。此外，1859年出版的达尔文《物种起源》的进化论也深刻影响了他的思想。1875年—1889年，就学于本州大学。1879—1881年，在南方石油城一所中学里当拉丁语、代数、自然科学教师。1881年—1882年，在本州一所乡村学校执教，这时期跟着佛蒙特大学教授托莱研究哲学史。1882年，在哈利斯主编的《思辨哲学杂志》上发表了一篇论文。题为《唯物主义形而上学的假说》。1882年，入霍金斯大学攻读学位。1884年，以《康德心理学》获得博士学位。1884—1888年，任密执安大学哲学讲师和助理教授。1888—1889年，担任明尼苏达大学哲学教授。1889—1894年，被聘到密执安大学担任哲学系主任。研究新黑格尔主义和实验生活心理学。1894—1904年，到芝加哥大学任哲学、心理、教育系主任，这期间他抛弃了黑格尔主义，转而接受工具主义。1896年—1903年，在芝加哥大学创办实验学校，起初办小学，后来一直办到大学预科，他的进步教育就在这里实地试验。1899—1900年，任美国心理学研究会会长。19 04年，哥伦比亚大学聘他为哲学教授，直至1930年退休。1905—1906年，任美国哲学学会会长。1915年，任美国进步教育协会名誉会长。1938年，被选为美国哲学协会终身名誉主席。杜威在一生中，曾到日本、苏联、中国、墨西哥、土耳其等很多国家进行讲学和访问，并留下很多著作。据统计，共有专著44种，论文815篇，传播于几十个国家。其中有关教育学的主要著作有：《我的教育信条》(1897年)、《学校与社会》(1899年)、《儿童与课程》(1902年)、《逻辑理论研究》(1903年)、《教育上的道德原理》(1909年)、《教育上的兴趣和努力》(1913年)、《明日之学校》(与他女儿合著)(1915年)、《民主主义与教育》(19 16年)、《进步教育与教育科学》(1928年)、《教育科学的资源》(1929年)、《我们怎样思维》(修订本，1933年)、《经验与教育》(1938年)、《人的问题》(1946年)。 杜威教育思想兼有儿童中心和社会改造思想，这与其经验主义、民主主义哲学思想是相适应的。杜威教育思想作为当时进步教育运动(资本主义改良主义)的一种产物和对传统教育思想的一种批判，对当时美国新教育体制的产生与建立做出了突出贡献。 《民主主义和教育》(Democracy and Education，1916)副标题是《教育哲学概论》，门罗(P．Monro e)编教育学教科书系列书之一，麦克米兰社出版，后由FPPE出版，有20多种译文。中译本《民本主义与教育》，1928年由商务印书馆印行，邹恩润译述，陶行知校订，1947年和1949年再版，全书共424页。1 990年10月，由人民教育出版社根据纽约麦克米兰社1937年版翻译出版，译者王承绪，共399页，30余万字。杜威的代表著《民主主义和教育》系统而全面地阐述了他在芝加哥实验学校实验以及当时教育改革理论研讨中基本形成的教育思想。该书被誉为教育的经典著作，进步教育理论的总纲。下边根据1990年中译本，全书的结构、主要观点介绍如下。 序 1915年，杜威写于哥伦比亚大学。简要地指出本书讨论所包括的范围：指出建设教育的目的与方法，探索和阐明民主主义社会所包括的思想和把这些思想应用于教育事业许多问题的努力。本书的指导思想是把民主主义与科学上的实验方法、生物学上的进化观念和工业的改造相互联系起来，并指出这些在教育中引起的变化。 除了序以外的26章的题目是：（1）“教育是生活的需要”；(2)“教育是社会的职能”； (3)“教育即指导”；(4) “教育即生长”；(5)“预备、展开和形式训练”；(6)“保守的教育和进步的教育”；(7)教育中的民主概念；(8)“教育的目的”；(9)“自然发展和社会效率作为教育目的”；(10)“兴趣和训练”； (11)“经验与思维”；(12)“教育中的思维”；(13)“方法的性质”；(14)“教材的性质”；(15)“课程
《民主主义与教育》读书笔记(精选多篇) 《民主主义与教育》读书笔记 杜威的《民主主义与教育》与柏拉图的《理想国》、卢梭的《爱弥儿》被西方学者称为三部不朽的教育瑰宝。但我认为三本书侧重点不同，拉图的《理想国》与卢梭的《爱弥儿》只是阐述了某种教育理想与理论，缺乏具体的实践，且难以落实。杜威的《民主主义与教育》则将理论与实际完美地结合在一起，亲身实践并取得了成功。 通读过杜威的《民主主义与教育》以后，首先我对整本书的脉络框架有了一个比较清晰的了解。本书以《民主主义与教育》为名，首先概述了教育的社会职能和效用，指出了当前学校的严重缺陷以及改革的方向。其次，阐述了民主社会的教育性质，明确教育即是生活、生长和经验的改造，并借着对过去各种教育理论的批判来反证民主教育的正确性和优越性。此外还说明了教育的无目的论。再次，以实用主义教育哲学来理顺长期存在的兴趣和努力、经验和思想、劳动和休闲、个人和自然界、教育和职业等等矛盾，并给课程、教材和教法作出新的解释。最后，分别论述了实用主义的真理论和道德论。 读书笔记 第一章的大标题是“教育是生活的需要”。我认为杜威先生写这一章的目的是为了说明教育的由来以及教育存在的意义。首先，作者区别了生物和无生物，认为他们之间最明显的区别在于“前者以更新维持自己”。一块石头，它无法实现自我更新，经过风吹日晒雨打，变为石子，最后变为沙子，成为大地的一部分，失去了它原本的属性。石块不能实现自我更新很快由石块他的命运就是走向衰亡。人类作为生物如果不能实现更新也会是同样的命运。 既然人类要生存下去就要不断更新，那么人类又是怎样实现更新的呢？这里杜威又引进了一个概念——“生活”。他认为“生活就是通过对环境的行动的自我更新过程。”“生活的延续就是环境对生物需要的不断的重新适应。”他认为前面讲的生活只是最低等的生活，它只包括物质，是“最低的生理学意义上的生活”，而人类的生活要比这复杂的多，它包括习惯、制度、信仰、胜利和失败、休闲和工作。也可以用“经验”来代替“生活”这个词。同时，他认为“教育在它最广的意义上就是这种生活的社会延续。” 这里又有一个问题：为什么教育会是这种生活的延续呢？对于这一点，杜威在文章里回答了我。他认为“社会群体每一个成员的生和死的这些基本的不可避免的事实，决定教育的必要性。”因为社会的每一个成员都会面临死亡，如果在临死之前没有将生活中的那些经验传递给下一代，那么毫无疑问生活将无法延
杜威的教育思想或者说《民主主义与教育》为代表的教育思想总纲所表现出来的是通过教育改革创新在美国创立更加适合学生的教育。通过这种教育，更多的人能够享有和接受民主的教育。力图实现民有民享民治的资产阶级民主社会。它不同于柏拉图的《理想国》中力图培养奴隶主阶级的统治者的哲学王而进行的阶级统治。也不同于卢梭的原著《爱弥尔》缺乏实践的支撑脱离实际，空想式的乌托邦。杜威的民主主义教育既有坚实的理论基础，又有丰富的教育实践及经验，可谓是理论和实践的完美结合。 杜威生于南北战争之前，卒于二战之后，在将近一个世纪的岁月之中他为美国教育的改革和创新做出了不可磨灭的贡献。其教育思想也对我们后世产生了深远重要的影响。纵观杜威的一声，其出生与青少年经历平淡无奇，才资平平。他在小学与大学却也没有学到什么实质意义的东西，倒是在这期间的课外阅读中学到了一些有用的东西。对人生有启迪作用的书籍有大量阅读。因为当时的美国教育已经深陷窠臼，走向僵化机制，已经没有多少吸引人的地方。这让我联想到当前我国的教育，与20世纪初的美国教育有惊人的相似之处。在应试教育和高考指挥棒的作用之下，学生的成绩为了上好学校在学校里机械的学习，很多学生长期在这种教育作用下，产生厌学心理，感到身心压力。当然，我不否定文化课的教与学，但我国何时能够出现一个杜威式的人物来引领中国的教育改革，不仅让学生能够学得更加快乐，教育形式灵活多样化，真正吸引到学生，而且能够更好地适应时代的发展，不能老是停留于过去的教育模式。世界的一切都在变，如
果不适时做出变革，又如何能跟上时代潮流。我们的学生需要解放，我们的教育需要解放，需要变革。国情当然有，国难当然有，但是我们尽最大努力去做，我相信绝对比现在要好得多。关键是要认真的履行好改革者与教育者的使命。大刀阔斧雷厉风行，彻底斩断与利益集团的联系。不是不能做到或者不能完全做到，而是想不想去做，决心与意志有多强大的问题。这些都考验着改革者与教育者的能力与良心。 杜威的教育思想与理论以心理学和教育学为基础，当然也包含哲学、社会学等。其中，杜威早期醉心于黑格尔的辩证法和德国理性主义哲学，并对其进行深入研究，发表过一些论文，获得好评。杜威在学校的教学实践中突破了传统的教育教学模式创办了实验学校，以哲学和心理学为依据，着手教育创新。他把以粉笔和扣讲为形式的课堂变为为儿童的活动而求知的课堂。把儿童静坐听讲的课堂变为儿童为听课而随时移动的课堂。气象一新。在这里，我又想说到我国的教育，教育的改革喊了这么多年，虽然也改，但是请注意他改的只是课堂上课的样式，分数多少的改变。这是过来人所知道的。然而教室上课了的形式和模式是传统和僵化的。固守传统，不知灵活变通。究竟我们的教育是怎么了。难道我们需要培养乖孩子，扼杀孩子的创造力 吗？美国人一百多年前就想进行了教育的改革，这也是今天的美国如此强大的一个非常重要的原因。而我国的教育改革依然固步自封，不求进取，我就怀疑是不是我们的教育部部长没有实权，或者没有多大能力。不然当前中国的教育现状又怎么会如此令人忧虑。当然
读书是每个人一生中非常有意义的事情，因为读书能够提升自身的水平。本站为大家整理的相关的《民主主义与教育》读书心得，供大家参考选择。 《民主主义与教育》读书心得 杜威提出以“儿童为中心”和“从做中学”这两个非常重要的观点，他在《民主主义与教育》中把儿童和青少年的学习分为三个层次，说教学是“连续重建的工作，应从儿童先有的经验进入有组织的真理研究的阶段。”他认为儿童由4岁到8岁为通过活动和工作而学习的阶段，所学的是怎样做，方法是从做中学，所得的知识得自应用，并为着应用，不是为了储备。由8岁到12岁为自由注意学习阶段，这时儿童能力渐强，可以学习间接的知识。但是间接知识必须融合在直接知识之中，须应生活之需而为生活所用，否则呆读死记就会成为大脑负担，就像不能利用从敌人那里缴获的战利品，反而被战利品所拖累一样。第三个阶段就是12岁以后，属于反省注意学习时期，学生从此开始掌握系统性和理论性的科学知识或事物规律，并且随而习得科学的思维方法。杜威指出，教育最初须是人类的，以后才是专业的。科学家的出发点是追求知识，儿童的出发点是生活生长。 现在的课堂依然提出以“学生为主体地位，教师只是学生学习的合作者、引导者、领路人。”这和杜威的“以儿童为中心”的观点是相一致的。现在很多课堂上老师都注重创设一定的教学情境，让学生自己去尝试，去实践，动手做一做，然后自己总结出公式或者数学规律，自己总结出的这些规律。学生不仅记忆深刻，而且理解很透彻。这样让学生“从做中学”的方法，学生依然受益匪浅。特别是小学，学生在学习空间与图形方面的知识，由于小学生的空间想象力不强，当我们学习这方面抽象知识的时候，都是借助一些简单的教具和学具，让学生动手摸一摸，做一做，然后和同学交流一下自己的想法和看法，通过小组合作学习来突破本节课的重点和难点。 儿童的知识虽然很疲乏，但当他全力以赴探讨那些感觉需要解决的疑难问题的时候，他会像真正的科学家那样肯于动脑筋和费心血。一般教师脱离儿童生活而仅仅为准备考试才向学生提出问题，儿童却是学而不思和记而不解的。实际上锻炼良好的大脑比在大脑中堆放不能消化的公式和定理有价值得多。如果单纯把儿童当成容器，以高压的手段向学生灌输知识的教学，就会招致学生反感，或则迫使他们敷衍应付。 在我们身边的确有很多非常负责任的老师，每天到班里就给孩子们辅导，让孩子们做题学习，教室里每天都能看到这些老师忙碌的身影。孩子们每天的作业他们都会认真批改，然后占用很多本该属于孩子们的休息时间或者上其他副科的时候，让孩子们做习题。这样利用死磨的方法，也能提高学生的学习成绩，毕竟孩子们已经熟能生巧了。但是这也剥夺了孩子们的自由学习时间，副科也是他们需要学习和掌握的一门技能。这样的教学方式是不可取的，也是学生所不喜欢的。这样也在无形中给老师增添了很多负担，每天不间断地辅导和批改作业，占用了老师大量的工作时间，让老师忙碌得没有时间阅读，拓展自己的视野，也没有时间去钻研教材，提高自己对教材的把控能力，更没有时间去搞教研，提高自己的专业素养。整天埋头于作业、试卷、辅导之中不能自拔。最后累垮了自己的身体，累哑了自己的喉咙，但是学生还不领情。
学习好资料欢迎下载 就教学方法讲，杜威的论述相当精辟，传统观念认为教学是传授知识的工作，杜威批驳说，犹如工具箱中取出锯子不是制造工具，从别人口中听来知识也非真正获得知识。犹如由工具箱中取出锯子不是制造工具，从别人口中听来也非真正获得知识。因为儿童坐在固定的座位上，静听讲解和记诵课本，全然处于消极被动地位，单凭教师灌输去吸取与生活无关的教条，绝谈不到积极自觉、爱好、兴趣，更不能自由探索和启发智慧。 这一点我深有感触，有时课堂上无论我怎样投入的去讲、反复讲，可是还是有学生不会做，还是有学生不注意听讲，显然我应该反思自己的教学方法是否恰当。坚决反对“学习知识从生活中孤立出来作为直接追求的事体”。杜威说教师应成为儿童活动的伙伴或参加者，而不是儿童活动的监督者或旁观者。“在这种共同参加的活动中，教师也是一个学习的人，学生虽自己不知道，其实也是一个教师，师生愈不分彼此愈好。”他们如果忘记谁是师和谁是生，就太理想了。我们目前教学中所倡导的以问题开启学生的思维，问题的引入越贴近学生的实际生活和经验越有效，而不能凭空来个问题让学生进行探讨，这样学生会茫然不知所措. 有些教育家认为经验和生活课程有损于智育水平，杜威便从古代和近代的哲学演变作了论证。他说，古希腊的柏拉图和亚里士多德都把经验和知识不恰当地对立起来，认为经验是纯属实物性质的，而知识是与事务无关的；经验表现为对物质的兴趣，而知识是关于精神和理性的；经验是附属于感觉器官的低级认识，而知识则是理智的、高超的；经验在于满足一时一事的欲望和需要，知识则探求永恒的普遍的真理。实际上，经验和知识是统一的，不是对立、两元的。 我们原来的教育观念受苏联的教育思想影响较大，从观念上排斥西方的教育
中外教育名著研读选修 《民主主义与教育》读后感 西方学者称柏拉图的《理想国》、卢梭的《爱弥儿》和杜威的《民主主义与教育》是三部不朽的教育瑰宝。杜威是美国现代著名的实用主义哲学家和教育家，创立了实用主义教育思想体系，被誉称为“实用主义巨人”。他的教育思想对我国有很大的影响，长期以来，我国教育界将杜威看作是现代教育思想的创始人。在杜威的教育著作中，民主主义占据了很重要的位置。在杜威看来，民主主义为了要继续存在，必须改变和前进，并对传统教育提出了挑战。杜威始终认为：民主社会必须有一种为了民主的教育体系；民主主义还为教育提供了发展的参照点，这样就为教育的发展指明了道路；同样，民主主义的发展依赖于教育，也就是说，民主主义和教育的关系是极其密切的、不可分割的。阅读了他的《民主主义与教育》,杜威在他的论著中概述了教育的社会职能和效用,指出了当前学校的严重缺陷以及改革的方向.明确教育即是生活、生长和经验改造的意义，并借着对过去各种教育理论的批判来反证民主教育的正确性和优越性。 可以得出主要有以下几个重要论点: （一）民主社会是什么？民主教育是什么？ 什么是民主主义社会？杜威指出，衡量社会不能单凭主观臆想来制定标准，应以社会成员共享利益的多寡为尺度，还应以本社会和其他社会能否交流互惠为尺度。杜威认为民主社会既要冲破阶级的和种族的界限，还要冲出国界，使人类出现与日俱多的接触点和互惠点。民主主义就是这种社会的原则和灵魂。 这种进步的社会急切需要人与人之间和社会与社会之间的思想感情的交通融合，当然这是顷刻离不开教育的。杜威一再明确指出，在无种族隔阂、无阶级隔阂的自由平等的社会，不容许少数人垄断教育机会，要通过教育使人人发挥其开拓创新的才能。民主社会是教育发展的沃壤，民主社会的教育是无比先进和无比优越的。 以上是杜威关于民主社会和民主教育的关系的前言论述。当前我们生活中的教育岂不是垄断，所谓的贵族学校，其实就是教育的垄断的表现，优越的师资被集中到一起，为少数人所利用，孩子们受教育的权利和机会是不平等的。民主社会并非人们有意识到的努力所产生的，而是科学发达、产业发达、国际贸易发达和各国移民众多等条件所促成的。 （二）教育是什么？学校应该怎样？ 杜威指出，人类和一般动物不同，是社会性动物，而社会的组成不是因为人们同处一地，
读《民主主义与教育》 08教育学王谋东 西方教育思想史中,柏拉图的《理想国》和卢梭的《爱弥儿》、杜威的《民主主义与教育》被称为三个里程碑。有人说，即使有关西方教育思想史的著作全部被烧毁， 只要保留下来了这三本书，损失是不大的。可见这三部著作在教育思想史中占据怎样 高的地位。从这些著作我们可以清晰的看到西方教育思想的一脉相承，既继承发扬精华，又剔除糟粕，使得西方的教育思想趋于完善，杜威的《民主主义与教育》就是站 在前人肩膀上总结前人经验，又结合当时的社会实际写出的，在当时轰动一时的一部 教育名著。 杜威的《民主主义与教育》共分二十六章，分别详细论述了教育性质、教育过程、教育价值、以及教育哲学。我匆匆看完一遍虽不能完全理解、把握作者的伟大教育思想，但有很多地方引起我与作者的共鸣，但有些观点也还有待商榷。 杜威的这本著作全面地阐述了实用主义教育理论，我们可以看出他的教育观集中 体现于他的“教育即自然发展”理论，这个理论最主要包括三个方面：教育即生长、 教育即生活、教育即改造。 教育即生长，杜威杜威发展了卢梭的天赋“自然生长”理论，扩充了“生长”概 念的内涵，他肯定了卢梭的自然教育法，他认为从儿童现实生活中进行教育，就和让 儿童感觉到学习的需要和兴趣，产生学习的自觉性和积极性。杜威所指的生长意思是 从一个未成熟的状态逐渐发展成一个成熟的状态，教育起决定性作用。他主张“儿童 中心”代替“教师中心”，一切以学生为中心。反对学校死记硬背的教育方式，让孩 子在自然中、劳动中成才。杜威说的生长不单单指身体方面，更看重的是一个人的智 力与道德方面的生长。他说：“生长，或者生长着即发展着，不仅指体格方面，也指 智力方面和道德方面。”杜威反对把生长看做有一个目的，而不是看做就是目的。欣 赏孩子有自己的个性，而不是千遍一律，孩子可以有自己的特点，在生长过程中按照 符合继续生长的原则，完善孩子的未成熟。 教育即经验改造，杜威说：“教育应该被认为是经验的继续改造，教育的过程和 目的是完全相同的东西。”在这里，杜威提出了教育无目的论，认为教育没有外在的 目的，教育唯一的目的就是教育本身，（对于教育无目的论，我的看法稍有不同，我 认为教育归根到底的目的就是为了培养一个有高尚道德情操、有丰富学识、掌握多种 生活所需要的而且能为社会作一定贡献的人，总而言之，教育是培养一个有用的人才。对于教育的目的，我更倾向于前苏联苏霍姆林斯基的教育目的：把青少年培养成为“全面和谐发展的人，社会进步的积极参与者。）教育过程是一个不断改组、改造和 转化的过程。生长的意义就是不断的获得经验，然后把经验不断的改组和改造，把学
《民主主义与教育》读书心得标准化文件发布号：（9312-EUATWW-MWUB-WUNN-INNUL-DQQTY-
《民主主义与教育》读书心得 顾燕叶 约翰·杜威是美国现代著名的实用主义哲学家和教育家。杜威于1919年5月至1921年曾来中国讲学，足迹遍及十一省，到处宣传他的实用主义哲学和教育学。杜威的教育思想对我国有很大的影响。他在漫长的事业历程中提出了一整套理论与实践相统一的哲学。他的思想基础是“民主即自由”这一道德观念，他为对此观念建立一种令人信服的哲学论证并为追求一种能确保这一信念在实践中得以实现的实用主义，贡献了他的一生。他在教育方面的论著很多，其中《民主主义与教育》全面地阐述了实用主义教育理论，是其教育著述的代表作。正如他所说，该书是最能概括其“全部哲学立场”的著作。 该书是杜威在1916年写成的。全书共分26章。这时美国面临着工业革命和科学技术革命的新阶段，正处在发展的时期。因此，要求研究与探索新的教育以适应工业革命的需要以及解决社会政治生活的各种问题，这是时代的需要，杜威《民本主义与教育》反映了美国资产阶级这种要求。《民主主义与教育》是把民主社会的意义、生物进行论的观点、产业革命带来的变化以及科学实验的方法，贯串一起，从而论证新教育的本质、目的、方法、内容和评判一些彼此矛盾的教育理论问题和实施问题。 他主要的观点有如下几个方面。首先，教育不是灌输知识，而是“诱发”、“引出”儿童的积极性和创造性。再也不应该“把教学看作把知识灌进等待装载的心理的和道德的洞穴中去填补这个缺陷的方法”，他认为教育的目的在于发展儿童的智力和具体操作能力，培养有创造精神和实际工作能力的人。为此，他十分注重为学生创设能够引起问题从而激发思维的情境。今天，教育界在深入研究的问题——发现教学模式正是受其启发而倡导的。 这一点我深有感触，有时课堂上无论我怎样投入的去讲、反复讲，可是还是有学生不会做，还是有学生不注意听讲，显然我应该反思自己的教学方法是否恰当。坚决反对“学习知识从生活中孤立出来作为直接追求的事体”。杜威说教师应成为儿童活动的伙伴或参加者，而不是儿童活动的监督者或旁观者。“在这种共同参加的活动中，教师也是一个学习的人，学生虽自己不知道，其实也是一个教师，师生愈不分彼此愈好。”他们如果忘记谁是师和谁是生，就太理想了。我们目前教学中所倡导的以问题开启学生的思维，问题的引入越