资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响[外文翻译]

外文翻译

The influence of corporate governance on the relation between

capital structure and value

Material Source:Corporate Governance Author:Maurizio La Rocca Researches in Business Economics, and in particular, in Business economics and Finance have always analyzed the processes of economic value creation as their main field of studies. Starting from the provocative work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure became one of the main elements that following studies have shown as being essential in determining value. Half a century of research on capital structure attempted to verify the presence of an optimal capital structure that could amplify the company’s ability to create value.

There is again quite a bit of interest in the topic of firm capital structure, on whether or not it is necessary to consider the important contribution offered by corporate governance as a variable that can explain the connection between capital structure and value, controlling opportunistic behavior in the economic relations between shareholders, debt holders and managers. In this sense, capital structure can influence firm value.

Therefore, this paper examines the theoretical relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, formulating an interesting proposal for future research. The second paragraph describes the theoretical and empirical approach on capital structure and value, identifying the main threads of study. After having explained the concept of corporate governance and its connection with firm value, the relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, as well as the causes behind them, will be investigated.

Capital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streams When looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones. Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value

Capital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity,

governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and corporate governance instruments. (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists are particularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000).

How corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.

On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firm governance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when d efining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.

On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firm financing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt. Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel (1996) has observed that managers don’t voluntarily accept the ‘‘discipline’’ of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to

‘‘reassure’’ stakeholders that its governance decisions are ‘‘proper’’.

The B-C-A relation that indicates the relation between capital structure a nd value is actually explained thanks to a third variable (corporate governanc e) that ‘‘intervenes’’ (and for this reason is called an ‘‘intervening variable’’) in the relation between capital structure and value. This would create a ‘‘bri dge’’ by mediating between lever age and value, thus showing a connection th at otherwise would not be visible. It can not be said that there is no relation between capital structure and value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), but the c onnection is mediated and, in an economic sense, it is formalized through a causal chain between variables. In other words, it is not possible to see a dir ect relation between capital structure and value, but in reality capital structure influences firm governance that is connected to firm value.

Furthermore, the relation between capital structure and corporate governan ce becomes extremely important when considering its fundamental role in val ue generation and distribution (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). Through its interact ion with other instruments of corporate governance, firm capital structure bec omes capable of protecting an efficient value creation process, by establishing the ways in which the generated value is later distributed (Zingales, 1998); i n other words the surplus created is influenced (Zingales, 2000).

Therefore, the relation between capital structure and value could be set u p differently if it were mediated or moderated by corporate governance. None theless, capital structure could also intervene or interact in the relation betwee n corporate governance and value. In this manner a complementary relationshi p, or one where substitution is possible, could emerge between capital structu re and other corporate governance variables. Debt could have a marginal role of disciplining management when there is a shareholder participating in own ership or when there is state participation. To the contrary, when other forms of discipline are lacking in the governance structure, capital structure could be exactly the mechanism capable of protecting efficient corporate governance, while preserving firm value.

Conclusion

This paper defines a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, whi le they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital str ucture represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governa

nce efficiency and protect its ability to create value . Therefore, this thread o

f research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation, financin

g policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that invest ment policies are carried out efficiently while firm value is protected from op portunistic behavior.

In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to c larifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting, as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this model through application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms, loo k at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations shoul d be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-spe cific factors.

译文

资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响

资料来源:公司治理作者：莫里吉奥拉罗卡在商业经济的研究中，尤其是经营经济学和金融学，总是将分析创造经济价值的进程作为他们研究的主要领域。从Modigliani和Miller(1958)具有挑战性的工作开始，资本结构成为随后研究中确定价值的主要因素之一。半个世纪以来对资本结构的研究意在寻求最佳的资本结构，以用来增强企业创造价值的能力。

在企业资本结构方面有相当多的专题，就是否有必要考虑，由公司治理提供的重要贡献，作为一个变量能解释资本结构和公司价值之间的关联，控制投机行为在股东、债权人和管理者之间的经济关系。从这个意义上讲，资本结构会影响公司价值。

因此，本文探讨了资本结构、公司治理和企业价值之间的理论关系，阐述了一个对未来研究的建议。介绍了资本结构和价值的理论和实证方法确定了研究的主要思路。解释公司治理的概念与公司价值的关联，资本结构、公司治理和企业价值之间的关系，以及针对它们背后的因素的研究。

资本结构：与企业价值关系的主要研究

当我们关注于资本结构和企业价值之间的关系最重要的理论贡献，早期的理论和近期的理论之间很大的不同就显而易见了。

资本结构和企业价值之间的关联，对公司治理的影响

资本结构的分析可以通过观察它用来描述公司资产及其影响的权力和归属，通过不通的层次的强度，和治理活动。因此股本和债务必须被认为是财务工具和公司治理工具。（Williamson, 1988）：债务下属的治理活动，以严格的管理，同时允许股权功率更大的灵活性和决策。由此可以推断，当资本结构变成公司治理的一个工具时，不仅仅是债务和股本的混合，并且它们著名的税收结合应该被加以考虑。经过审核的方式分配的现金流量，更重要的是如何作出决定的权利和管理公司将是必须同时处理。例如，风险资本家是如何对资本结构和融资合同的布局特别敏感，这样最佳企业管治能得到保证，并且建立激励机制和管理行为的检查（津加莱斯，2000）。

公司治理如何潜地影响资本结构和公司价值，从而起到一个调节和控制的效果。

一方面，通过修改公司激励和管理控制的结构，使得债务和股本是如何影响公司处理治理活动的方面发生改变。如果通过混合债券和股票，不同类别的投资者就会聚集在公司的内部，他们对公司治理决定有着不同的影响，然后在定义公司的资本结构时，管理者在确定哪一个类别会占上风时会有一个倾向。更重要的是，通过合同的债务和股票的具体设计可以大大提高公司治理效率。

另一方面，公司治理甚至影响资本结构的选择。迈尔斯（1984）和迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫（1984）表示如何选择企业融资是由管理的优先顺序排列决定的；在这种情况下，如果管理者选择的资金来源，可以推定，她是通过接受纪律所代表的债务来避免她的决策权的减少。内部资源融资在他们的决策过程中允许管理者防止其他科目的干预。德容（2002）揭露在荷兰管理者尽量避免使用债务，那样他们的决策权仍然不会受到抑制。兹维贝尔（1996）观察到管理者不自觉地接受债务的“纪律”；其他治理机制强迫债券的发行。詹森（1986）指出，决定增加企业债务是管理者自主的意志，当它趋向于利益相关者的“保证”那它的治理决定是适合的。

基本能力评估的关系表明了，资本结构与价值的关系是由于公司治理的干预和中介变项在资本结构和企业价值上的关系。这将创建一个调解和价值之间的杠杆，从而显示出一个与不可见的“桥梁”的连接。这不能说是没有资本结构与价值的关系（莫迪利亚尼和米勒，1958），但连接在从经济意义上讲，它是通过一个正式的变量之间的因果链。换句话说，它是不可能看到的资本结构和价值之间的直接关系，但在现实中的资本结构影响公司治理的连接到公司价值。