THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW
V ol.82,No.5
2007
pp.1141–1170
Accruals Quality and Internal Control
over Financial Reporting
Jeffrey T.Doyle
Utah State University
Weili Ge
University of Washington
Sarah McVay
University of Utah
ABSTRACT:We examine the relation between accruals quality and internal controls
using705?rms that disclosed at least one material weakness from August2002to
November2005and?nd that weaknesses are generally associated with poorly esti-
mated accruals that are not realized as cash?ows.Further,we?nd that this relation
between weak internal controls and lower accruals quality is driven by weakness dis-
closures that relate to overall company-level controls,which may be more dif?cult to
‘‘audit around.’’We?nd no such relation for more auditable,account-speci?c weak-
nesses.We?nd similar results using four additional measures of accruals quality:dis-
cretionary accruals,average accruals quality,historical accounting restatements,and
earnings persistence.Our results are robust to the inclusion of?rm characteristics that
proxy for dif?culty in accrual estimation,known determinants of material weaknesses,
and corrections for self-selection bias.
Keywords:earnings quality;accruals quality;internal control;material weaknesses.
Data Availability:All data used in the paper are available from publicly available sources
noted in the text;the data on internal control weaknesses are avail-
able in machine-readable form from the authors upon request.
I.INTRODUCTION
I n this paper we examine the relation between accruals quality and the internal control
environment of the?rm.By de?nition,when there is a material weakness in internal control,there is‘‘more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the
We thank two anonymous reviewers,Dan Cohen,Patty Dechow,Dan Dhaliwal(the editor),Ilia Dichev,Kalin Kolev,Russ Lundholm,Matt Magilke,Zoe-V onna Palmrose,Christine Petrovits,Cathy Shakespeare,Tom Smith, and Suraj Srinivasan for their helpful comments and suggestions.This paper has also bene?ted from comments received at the20054-School Conference at Columbia University,the2005AAA Midwest Regional Meeting,the 2006AAA FARS Midyear Meeting,the2006Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand Annual Meeting,the2006International Symposium on Audit Research Conference,and the University of Michigan. Editor’s note:This paper was accepted by Dan Dhaliwal.
Submitted August2005
Accepted January2007
1141
1142
Doyle,Ge,and McVay
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 1143
The Accounting Review,October 2007
Although there are several plausible explanations for the weaker results using the Section
404disclosures,one obvious difference between Sections 302and 404is the increased level
of scrutiny under Section 404,which requires an audit opinion on the internal controls by
the external auditors.It is possible that external auditors applied a lower effective threshold
for Section 404compared to management’s threshold under Section 302and therefore
identi?ed a greater number of material weaknesses that lacked real ?nancial reporting con-
sequences.We discuss these results and other possible explanations later in Section IV .
Our paper makes two primary contributions.First,we extend the literature on earnings/
accruals quality.Conceptually,it makes sense that a good internal control system is the
foundation for high-quality ?nancial reporting,since strong internal controls likely curtail
both procedural and estimation errors,as well as earnings management.Our ?ndings present
empirical evidence to support this fundamental link between internal controls and accruals
quality.In addition,our paper extends this basic research question by (1)examining the
types of material weaknesses (company-level versus account-speci?c),(2)distinguishing
between the Section 302versus 404reporting regimes,(3)using a cross-section of ?ve
earnings/accruals quality measures,and (4)controlling for self-selection bias through the
use of both a Heckman (1979)two-stage process and a propensity score matching approach
(LaLonde 1986).
Second,our paper provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of Sections 302
and 404of Sarbanes-Oxley.These sections have been among the most cumbersome of the
new legislation,with many critics alleging that the costs of compliance far exceed any
bene?ts.We ?nd that the most informative material weakness disclosures (i.e.,those that
are associated with real economic events such as lower accruals quality)are those
that relate to more serious,company-level problems for both Sections 302and 404.Fur-
thermore,the company-level disclosures made under Section 302seem to be more strongly
related to lower accruals quality than the company-wide disclosures under Section 404.The
disclosures of material weaknesses that report less serious,account-speci?c problems under
both Sections 302and 404do not appear to be effective in our tests at identifying ?rms
with lower ?nancial reporting quality.
Since the implementation of Sections 302and 404of Sarbanes-Oxley is fairly new,
there are a number of concurrent papers in this area.Our ?ndings are generally consistent
with and complementary to these other papers.First,our main ?nding—that material weak-
nesses are associated with lower accruals quality—is consistent with several other papers
that examine this relation employing varying time periods,accruals quality proxies,and
types of de?ciencies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.2006;Bedard 2006;Chan et al.2005;Hogan
and Wilkins 2005).2Second,our ?nding that the more auditable account-speci?c weak-
nesses are not associated with lower accruals quality is complementary to Hogan and
Wilkins (2006)who ?nd that audit fees are abnormally high for ?rms with an internal
control de?ciency in the year preceding the de?ciency disclosure,indicating that auditors
are able to reduce the impact of poor controls through substantive testing.Finally,our
conclusion that it is the internal control problem that is the root cause of the lower accruals
quality is supported by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.(2006)and Bedard (2006)who ?nd that
accruals quality improves in the year following the reported internal control problem for
2This ?nding also complements and motivates recent studies that examine market reactions to these disclosures as well as differences in the implied cost of capital for ?rms with weak internal controls (e.g.,Beneish et al.2006;DeFranco et al.2005;Hammersley et al.2008;Ogneva et al.2007).
1144Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The Accounting Review,October 2007
?rms that appear to have remediated their de?ciencies.3In sum,the papers in this area
jointly present a fairly cohesive picture of how internal controls affect accruals quality.
The paper proceeds as follows.The next section motivates our hypotheses,and Section
III describes our sample selection and variable de?nitions.Section IV presents our main
results,and Section V describes our robustness tests.A summary and concluding remarks
are offered in the ?nal section.
II.HYPOTHESES
Internal control over ?nancial reporting is de?ned as ‘‘a process ...to provide reason-
able assurance regarding the reliability of ?nancial reporting’’(PCAOB 2004)(emphasis
added).By de?nition,good internal control is supposed to result in more reliable ?nancial
information.Internal controls aim to prevent and/or detect errors or fraud that could result
in a misstatement of the ?nancial statements.However,there is limited empirical evidence
in the existing literature regarding the relation between the quality of internal control and
the quality of accounting information.4A major reason is lack of data on internal control;
in general,it is dif?cult to directly observe or verify internal control quality (Kinney 2000).
Our sample is generated from the disclosures of material weaknesses in internal controls
that ?rst appeared as a result of Section 302of Sarbanes-Oxley,which requires that of?cers
certify the ?nancial statements,including the effectiveness of the internal control over
?nancial reporting,and any material changes in internal control.Material weaknesses have
also been disclosed in conjunction with Section 404requirements,which became effective
for accelerated ?lers for ?scal years ending after November 15,2004.5Section 404requires
that management issue a report on internal control over ?nancial reporting,and that auditors
attest to their ?ndings.The unaudited internal control disclosures under Section 302are
meant to be a transition to the full ‘‘attestation’’regime under Section 404,with Section
404becoming the ongoing internal control reporting mechanism.However,as the date for
non-accelerated ?lers to comply with Section 404has been extended several times (most
recently to December 15,2008for full attestation),internal control disclosures continue to
be reported under Section 302for these smaller companies.Regardless of the origin of the
material weakness disclosure,all else equal,we expect these disclosures to be informative
about the quality of ?rms’accruals.
3
Altamuro and Beatty (2006)examine the impact of the FDICIA-mandated internal control reforms within the banking industry and ?nd that these reforms led to improvements in earnings quality for banks affected by the regulation relative to unaffected banks during the same period.Their ?ndings are also consistent with poorer internal control resulting in lower earnings quality.4
In related work,Krishnan (2005)?nds that internal control problems are negatively associated with the quality of the audit committee.To the extent that audit committee quality and internal control quality are positively associated,this ?nding supports our hypothesis.As noted in the introduction,there are several concurrent works examining earnings quality and internal control problems (e.g.,Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.2006;Hogan and Wilkins 2005).5Section 302of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became effective for ?scal years ending after August 29,2002for all SEC registrants.Section 404became effective for ?scal years ending after November 15,2004for accelerated ?lers,a classi?cation that generally includes public ?rms with a market capitalization of at least $75million (the due date was extended an additional 45days for accelerated ?lers with a market capitalization of less than $700million in November 2004).For non-accelerated ?lers,Section 404will be effective for years ending on or after December 15,2007for management assessment of the effectiveness of internal control and December 15,2008for the auditor’s attestation report.Since the reporting requirements differ on important dimensions that are likely correlated with accruals quality,we conduct sensitivity analyses that differentiate between Section 302and 404disclosures.These alternative results are discussed in Section IV .
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting1145 Prior research on earnings quality is generally related to accruals quality(Dechow and Schrand2004),and that is also the focus in this paper.Accruals can be of poor quality for two basic reasons:(1)management could intentionally bias accruals through earnings man-agement and(2)unintentional errors in accrual estimation could occur because it is dif?cult to predict an uncertain future,or simply because there are insuf?cient controls in place to detect errors.Both of these roles have been investigated in the existing literature.With respect to earnings management,managers have been shown to use‘‘discretionary accruals’’to manage earnings in various settings,such as prior to equity offerings(e.g.,Rangan1998; Teoh et al.1998).As for unintentional errors,Dechow and Dichev(2002)point out that the quality of accruals and earnings are not limited to managerial opportunism,but are also related to the inherent dif?culty in estimating accruals for?rms with certain characteristics (e.g.,longer operating cycles).They measure the quality of accruals by the extent to which the accruals map into cash?ows.In general,they?nd that the quality of accruals is poorer for?rms with certain characteristics,such as a high proportion of losses,more volatile sales and cash?ows,lower total assets,and longer operating cycles.
We expect that weaknesses in internal control will result in lower accruals quality because,by de?nition,they have the potential to allow errors in accrual estimation to occur and impact the reported?nancial statements.These potential errors include both intentional (earnings management)and unintentional(poor estimation ability)errors.For a company with weak controls,intentionally biased‘‘discretionary’’accruals could be greater by failing to limit management’s ability to manage earnings(e.g.,by segregating duties).Uninten-tional errors could be higher if weak controls result in more estimation errors for dif?cult to estimate accruals(e.g.,by failing to ensure that quali?ed personnel are calculating es-timates)and allow more procedural errors(e.g.,by failing to have appropriate reconcilia-tions and reviews in place).As an example,Cardiodynamic International disclosed a ma-terial weakness related to the frequency of their analysis of the inventory obsolescence provision.This material weakness most likely resulted in estimation errors related to its inventory accounts,which may have been intentional to allow the understatement of ex-penses.These estimation errors,caused by the material weakness in internal control,likely resulted in lower overall accruals quality for Cardiodynamic.This leads to our?rst hypothesis:
H1:Material weaknesses in internal control are negatively associated with accruals quality.
Our?rst hypothesis is based on the notion that good internal control over?nancial reporting is an effective internal monitoring device and results in higher quality?nan-cial reporting.However,the hypothesis does not consider external monitors.It is possible that auditors increase substantive testing when encountering weak internal controls.In other words,internal controls and substantive testing could be substitutes in producing high-quality accruals(e.g.,Wright and Wright1996).Our next hypothesis,therefore,is related to the‘‘auditability’’or potential severity of the internal control weaknesses.
While a material weakness is the most severe type of internal control de?ciency,within the material weakness classi?cation the severity of internal control problems varies sub-stantially.Moody’s(the bond-rating company)proposes that material weaknesses fall into one of two categories.Account-speci?c material weaknesses relate to controls over speci?c account balances or transaction-level processes.Moody’s suggests that these types of ma-terial weaknesses are‘‘auditable,’’and thus do not represent as serious a concern regarding the reliability of the?nancial https://www.doczj.com/doc/078248760.html,pany-level material weaknesses,however,
The Accounting Review,October2007
1146Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The Accounting Review,October 2007
relate to more fundamental problems such as the control environment or the overall ?nancial
reporting process,which auditors may not be able to ‘‘audit around’’effectively.Moody’s
suggests that company-level material weaknesses call into question not only management’s
ability to prepare accurate ?nancial reports,but also its ability to control the business (Doss
and Jonas 2004).6The disclosure by Nitches,Inc.,illustrates a typical ‘‘company-level’’
material weakness:
In October 2004,our management concluded that there were certain material weak-
nesses in our internal controls and procedures.The material weaknesses noted related
to segregation of duties in the payroll process and in the monthly closing process;
inadequate review and approval of management-level adjustments and entries.We have
discussed these material weaknesses with our auditors,Moss Adams,LLP,who have
recommended taking steps to alleviate the inadequate segregation of duties within these
areas.
This internal control problem could feasibly affect accruals quality.The lack of proper
checks and balances might result in procedural errors,while inadequate review of mana-
gerial adjustments might facilitate earnings management.Thus,we expect Nitches to exhibit
poorer accruals quality than a similar ?rm (with respect to size,operating cycle,etc.)
without a material weakness in internal control.A seemingly less severe ‘‘auditable’’ma-
terial weakness was reported by I-Flow Corporation:
As part of the annual audit process,a material weakness was identi?ed in our controls
related to the application of generally accepted accounting principles,speci?cally re-
lated to the classi?cation of the Company’s short-term investments,resulting in the
Company reclassifying approximately $34million of cash and cash equivalents to short-
term investments.
It is not clear that this weakness would result in lower accruals quality.The distinction
between company-level and account-speci?c material weaknesses is especially important
for the more recent material weakness disclosures in our sample.These disclosures appear
to be more conservative,and,per discussions with auditors,might be overly conservative.
This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2:Company-level material weaknesses have a stronger negative relation with accruals
quality than account-speci?c material weaknesses.
III.DATA,SAMPLE SELECTION,AND V ARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Identifying and Classifying Firms with Material Weaknesses
As mentioned above,material weaknesses in internal control have only been widely
disclosed in SEC ?lings since August 2002.To collect our test ?rms,we search 10-K
Wizard (10-Ks,10-Qs,and 8-Ks;https://www.doczj.com/doc/078248760.html,)using the keywords ‘‘mate-
rial weakness’’and ‘‘material weaknesses’’from August 1,2002through October 31,2005.
6It might seem that auditors should also be able to substantively test company-level weaknesses,however,the general nature of these weaknesses does not pinpoint where additional substantive testing should occur,while the account-speci?c weaknesses highlight a speci?c area where auditors can then focus more attention.
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 1147
The Accounting Review,October 2007
We include only those ?rms that classify their internal control problem(s)as a material
weakness,the most severe internal control de?ciency.7We focus on material weaknesses
for two reasons.First,it is the most severe type of de?ciency in internal control and the
most likely to affect accruals quality.Second,the disclosure of material weaknesses is
effectively mandatory,while the disclosure of lesser ‘‘signi?cant de?ciencies’’is unambig-
uously voluntary (see footnote 19).Focusing on the more mandatory disclosures helps avoid
self-selection issues associated with voluntary disclosures.
This procedure identi?es 1,210?rms that disclosed at least one material weakness from
August 2002to November 2005,outlined in Table 1,Panel A.Of these ?rms,164are not
covered by Compustat,and 79companies in our sample disclosed a material weakness
related to lease accounting in 2005.These disclosures were responses to the views expressed
by the Of?ce of the Chief Accountant of the SEC in a February 7,2005letter to the AICPA.
Due to the narrow,technical nature of this issue,we exclude these ?rms from our analysis
(the inclusion of these ?rms leads to very similar results).If a parent and subsidiary both
?le with the SEC and report the same material weakness,then we include only the parent
company and remove the subsidiary from our control ?rms if the subsidiary is covered by
Compustat (17?rms).We also exclude from our control sample the 100?rms identi?ed
by Compliance Week (https://www.doczj.com/doc/078248760.html,)as having a signi?cant de?ciency
that does not reach the severity of a material weakness,in order to create a more powerful
test between ?rms with clear internal control problems (?rms reporting material weak-
nesses)and those with no apparent internal control problems.Next,259(1,974)of our
material weakness (control)sample ?rms have insuf?cient data to calculate our measure of
accruals quality.We also eliminate three material weakness ?rms and 14control ?rms that
were involved in a signi?cant merger (greater than 50percent of sales)during the accruals
quality estimation period,because the merger could result in mismatched current accruals
and future cash ?ows (Hribar and Collins 2002).A signi?cant merger is identi?ed in Com-
pustat footnote 1as ‘‘AB.’’These restrictions result in a sample of 705(3,280)material
weakness (control)?rms with non-missing accruals quality data and 645(2,943)mater-
ial weakness (control)?rms in our multivariate tests.8We summarize our sample selection
process in Table 1,Panel A.
We next classify ?rms as having either a company-level or account-speci?c material
weakness in order to test the hypothesis that more severe,company-level weaknesses will
be more negatively associated with accruals quality.We provide examples of each category
in Appendix A.These classi?cations are mutually exclusive;if a ?rm has both company-
level and account-speci?c weaknesses,then we code the ?rm as having a company-level
material weakness.In some cases,it is straightforward to categorize a disclosure as
company-level;for example,when ‘‘ineffective control environment’’or ‘‘management
7
A material weakness is ‘‘a signi?cant de?ciency,or combination of signi?cant de?ciencies,that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim ?nancial statements will not be prevented or detected,’’as de?ned by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)under Auditing Standard No.2.A signi?cant de?ciency is de?ned as ‘‘a control de?ciency,or combination of control de?cien-cies,that adversely affects the company’s ability to initiate,authorize,record,process,or report external ?nancial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the company’s annual or interim ?nancial statements that is more than incon-sequential will not be prevented or detected’’(PCAO
B 2004,para.9).8Of the 645material weakness ?rms in our ?nal sample,eight were disclosed in 2002,55in 2003,207in 2004,and the remaining 375in 2005.Of the 375disclosures in 2005,276(74percent)correspond to our estimate of 404?lers (a ?oat greater than or equal to $75million).Only 15(7percent)of the disclosures from 2004correspond to 404?lers (a ?oat of greater than or equal to $75million and a ?ling date after November 14,2004).
1148
Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The Accounting Review,October 2007TABLE 1
Sample Selection and Variable De?nitions
Panel A:Sample Selection
Material Weakness Sample Identi?ed material weakness ?rms from August 2002to November 20051,210Less ?rms not covered by Compustat
(164)Total material weakness ?rms covered by Compustat
1,046Less ?rms with material weaknesses related only to accounting for leases (79)Less ?rms with unavailable data on accruals quality (259)Less ?rms with extreme merger and acquisition activity in the accruals quality estimation period (3)Total material weakness ?rms examined in univariate tests
705Less ?rms with unavailable data for control variables
(60)Total material weakness sample used in multivariate regressions
645Compustat Control Sample
All Compustat ?rms with 2003data 6,431Less ?rms identi?ed as having a material weakness (1,046)Less ?rms identi?ed as having an internal control weakness other than a material weakness by Compliance Week (100)Less ?rms identi?ed as the subsidiary of a material weakness ?rm (17)Less ?rms with unavailable data on accruals quality (1,974)Less ?rms with extreme merger and acquisition activity in the accruals quality estimation period (14)Total control ?rms examined in univariate tests
3,280Less ?rms with unavailable data for control variables
(337)Total control sample used in multivariate regressions
2,943Panel B:Variable De?nitions
Variable
De?nition Material Weakness Disclosures
MW
An indicator variable that is equal to 1if the ?rm disclosed a material weakness in internal control in our sample period (August 2002to November 2005),and 0otherwise.MW Account-Speci?c (Company-Level)An indicator variable that is equal to 1if the ?rm disclosed a material weakness in internal control in our sample period (August 2002to November 2005)related to an auditable account (a more pervasive company-wide problem),and 0otherwise.
Accruals Quality Measures Accruals Quality (AQ)The standard deviation of the residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002)accruals quality measure,as adjusted by McNichols (2002)and Francis et al.(2005),measured from 1996–2002(see Section III).
Discretionary Accruals The average of the absolute value of discretionary accruals from 1996–2002,where discretionary accruals are calculated following Becker et al.(1998).
Average Accruals Quality
The average of the absolute value of the residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002)accruals quality measure,as adjusted by McNichols (2002)and Francis et al.(2005),measured from 1996–2002.
(continued on next page )
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
1149The Accounting Review,October 2007TABLE 1(continued)
Variable
De?nition Historical Restatement
An indicator variable that is equal to 1if the ?rm was listed by the GAO as having restated their ?nancial statements from 1997–2002,and 0otherwise.Earnings Persistence The coef?cient on earnings from a cross-sectional regression of current earnings on one-year-ahead earnings estimated from 1996–2002.
Innate Firm Characteristics That Affect Accruals Quality
Loss Proportion
The ratio of the number of years of losses (Compustat annual data item #123)relative to the total number of years of data from 1996–2002.Sales Volatility
The standard deviation of sales (data item #12),scaled by average assets (data item #6),from 1996–2002.CFO Volatility
The standard deviation of cash from operations (data item #308),scaled by average assets,from 1996–2002.Total Assets
The log of total assets (data item #6)from 2003Compustat.Operating Cycle The log of the average of [(Sales/360)/(Average Accounts Receivable)?(Cost of Goods Sold/360)/Average Inventory)],calculated from 1996–2002.
Additional Material Weakness Determinants That Could Be Related To Accruals Quality
Firm Age
The log of the number of years the ?rm has CRSP data as of 2003.Segments
The log of the sum of the number of operating and geographic segments reported by the Compustat Segments database for the ?rm in 2003.Extreme Sales Growth
An indicator variable that is equal to 1if year-over-year industry-adjusted sales growth (data item #12)from 2002to 2003falls into the top quintile,and 0otherwise.Restructuring Charge The aggregate restructuring charges [data item #376?(?1)]in 2003and 2002,scaled by the ?rm’s 2003market capitalization.
override’’is speci?cally identi?ed as a material weakness in the disclosure.However,most
disclosures are not so forthcoming.Thus,if a ?rm has material weaknesses related to at
least three account-speci?c problems,we classify the ?rm as having a company-level ma-
terial weakness.In two cases,the ?rm has insuf?cient information to code the disclosure;
we classify both of these disclosures as company-level.Of our 705?rms with non-missing
accruals quality data,426are classi?ed as account-speci?c and 279as company-level.
Accruals Quality Measures
We use the measure of accrual estimation error developed in Dechow and Dichev
(2002)and modi?ed in McNichols (2002)and Francis et al.(2005)as our main measure
of accruals quality.This measure de?nes the quality of accruals as the extent to which they
map into past,current,and future cash ?ows.We assume that this measure can capture the
effect of internal control on accruals quality for two reasons.First,a large number of
disclosed material weaknesses are related to speci?c accounts (e.g.,inventory [Ge and
McVay 2005]).These speci?c accounts could have estimation errors that will be captured
by this measure.For example,if the inventory account is overstated,then the obsolete
inventory will not result in cash in?ows in the next period,resulting in a low correlation
between the accrual and realized cash ?ows.Second,compared to other measures of ac-
cruals quality,the measure in Dechow and Dichev (2002)does not rely solely on earnings
1150Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The Accounting Review,October 2007
management or assumptions related to market ef?ciency (e.g.,value-relevance).This mea-
sure can capture both biased ‘‘discretionary’’accruals and unintentionally poorly estimated
accruals,which we predict will be the result of an internal control system with material
weaknesses.9
Speci?cally,the proxy for accruals quality is measured by estimating the following
regression by industry and year:
?WC ????CFO ??CFO ??CFO ???REV ??PPE ?ε.(1)
t 01t ?12t 3t ?14t 5t t The residuals from the regression measure the extent to which current accruals (?WC )do
not effectively map into past,present,or future cash ?ows (CFO ).10Following both
McNichols (2002)and Francis et al.(2005),we also include the current year change in
sales (?REV ??(data item 12))and the current year level of property,plant,and equipment
(PPE ?data item 7)in Equation (1).The inclusion of these two variables links the Dechow
and Dichev (2002)measure to the Jones (1991)model of discretionary accruals.
Following Francis et al.(2005),we estimate the above regression cross-sectionally,by
year,within each of the 48Fama and French (1997)industry classi?cations.If an industry
group has fewer than 20observations in any given year,then those observations pertaining
to that industry are deleted.We use annual Compustat data spanning 1995–2003,which
results in seven years of observations (1996–2002),since the regression requires data from
the past and future years.We then aggregate the residuals by ?rm and calculate the standard
deviation of residuals (AQ ),by ?rm,requiring a minimum of four years of data out of the
seven years.A higher standard deviation indicates lower accruals quality.
As with any proxy,our measure of accruals quality has limitations.As noted in
McNichols (2002),the Dechow and Dichev (2002)approach limits the applicability of the
model to accruals that are short term in nature (i.e.,working capital accruals).In addition,
the de?nition of accruals quality is symmetric for estimation errors that overstate and un-
derstate cash ?ow realizations by an equal amount,which may be problematic in certain
settings,although less of a concern in our setting as unintentional errors are not expected
to be systematically over-or understated.Moreover,a sizable fraction of the explanatory
power of the measure is attributable to the negative contemporaneous association between
accruals and cash ?ows.To the extent that this contemporaneous component does not
capture accruals quality,it can handicap the ability of the Dechow and Dichev (2002)model
to capture accruals quality (Wysocki 2006).Finally,as with any measure,to the extent that
we do not properly control for the joint determinants of both accruals quality and material
weaknesses,our conclusions would not be warranted.
In order to further validate our results and to enhance comparison with other research
on earnings quality,we also examine four additional proxies of earnings/accruals quality.
9
Roychowdhury (2006),among others,shows that ?rms appear to manipulate real operating activities in order to ‘‘manage’’earnings.However,such an action is not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles,and thus we do not expect good internal control to constrain this behavior.10We de?ne the change in working capital accruals from year t ?1to t as ?WC ??Accounts Receivable ??Inventory ??Accounts Payable ??Taxes Payable ??Other Assets,or ?WC ??(data item 302?data item 303?data item 304?data item 305?data item 307).CFO is cash ?ow from operations (data item 308).All variables in Equation (1)are scaled by average total assets (data item 6)and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles,by year.
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 1151
The Accounting Review,October 2007
The ?rst is Discretionary Accruals ,which is the average of the absolute value of discre-
tionary accruals,estimated following Becker et al.(1998)and Kothari et al.(2005).11Our
second alternative proxy,Average Accruals Quality ,is suggested in Dechow and Dichev
(2002).This measure,the average of the absolute value of the ?rm residuals from Equation
(1),is estimated in the cross-section and is highly correlated with our main accruals quality
measure (the standard deviation of the residuals).The third alternative proxy of accruals
quality is Historical Restatement ,which is an indicator variable that is equal to 1if the
?rm was listed by the General Accounting Of?ce (GAO)as having had a restatement from
January 1997through December 2002.Intuitively,in order for a restatement to occur,an
error (either intentional or unintentional)must have been made.Therefore,while our
Dechow and Dichev (2002)measure attempts to capture these errors through the realization
of cash ?ows,restatements provide explicit evidence of these errors.12Our ?nal alternative
measure of accruals quality is Earnings Persistence (Dechow and Dichev 2002;Schipper
and Vincent 2003).These four alternative measures are de?ned in Table 1,Panel B.
Timing of the Measurement of Accruals Quality
Since internal control disclosures were not widely available prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,it is dif?cult to determine how long the newly disclosed weaknesses have
existed in the company.This has implications for the time period over which we measure
our accruals quality variable.In our paper,we assume that the weaknesses,on average,
have existed several years prior to their disclosure,if not since the ?rm’s inception.Each
of our proxies for accruals quality is measured from 1996to 2002,which results in almost
no overlap with the ?nancial periods in which the weaknesses were reported.We can infer
from the descriptions that many of the disclosures have been around for some time.For
example,3D Systems had the following disclosure:
Speci?cally,our revenue recognition policies and procedures were poorly documented
and not readily accessible to most of our employees.Our documentation for machine
sales transactions was inconsistent and not adequately de?ned.Furthermore,the then
existing policies and procedures [were]broad-based,and did not include speci?c pro-
cedures and controls by department or function.Moreover,our accounting and ?nance
staff were inadequate to meet the needs of an international public company.
It seems unlikely that 3D Systems did not have these problems in the recent years preceding
the disclosure.Rather,it seems likely that Sarbanes-Oxley led to the disclosure of a situation
that had existed for some time.As another example,Sonix Research Inc.,reported the
following:
Due to its small size and limited ?nancial resources,however,the Company’s chief
?nancial of?cer,a member of management,has been the only employee involved in
11
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the following OLS regression:Total Accruals t /Total Assets t ?1??0??1(1/Total Assets t ?1)??2(?Revenue t /Total Assets t ?1)??3(PPE t /Total Assets t ?1)?εt .Total Accruals are calculated as the difference between income before extraordinary items (Compustat item 123)and operating cash ?ows (Compustat item 308).We estimate the above regression by two-digit SIC code,requiring at least 20observations in each industry group.Our main tests present the Becker et al.(1998)speci?cation.We also consider the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals prescribed by Kothari et al.(2005)as a robustness check.12It is possible that the causality is reversed.Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.(2007)suggest that a recent restatement results in increased auditor and regulator scrutiny,which may result in additional search procedures or increase the likelihood of a voluntary disclosure of a signi?cant de?ciency.
1152Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The Accounting Review,October 2007
accounting and ?nancial reporting.The Board of Directors has recognized that as a
result,there is no segregation of duties within the accounting function,leaving all
aspects of ?nancial reporting and physical control of cash and equivalents in the hands
of the same https://www.doczj.com/doc/078248760.html,ually,this lack of segregation of duties represents a material
weakness in a company’s internal control over ?nancial reporting;however,based on
the demonstrated integrity and trustworthiness of the Company’s chief ?nancial of?cer,
the Board of Directors has had con?dence that there have been no irregularities in the
Company’s ?nancial reporting or in the protection of its assets.
The above condition has probably existed since the ?rm’s inception.Clearly,not all the
material weakness disclosures are long-standing;however,in our study we operate under
the assumption that,on average,these problems have been around for multiple years,and
measure our accruals quality proxies over the preceding seven years (1996–2002).
An alternative approach is to measure accruals quality in the same period that the
material weakness was reported.We choose not to use this approach because the impending
disclosure of an internal control weakness may cause management and/or the auditor to
intensify their search for misestimated accruals,resulting in more write-downs and thereby
lower accruals quality (Hogan and Wilkins 2005).If these low-quality accruals do not result
from the company’s poor internal controls per se,then a lower concurrent accruals quality
measure could be misattributed to the control system.Our use of an accruals quality mea-
sure that is calculated in the periods preceding the material weakness disclosure helps to
address this competing explanation that auditors applied additional scrutiny and conserva-
tism to the ?rms that they knew would be publicly disclosing their internal control problems.
Innate Firm Characteristics that Affect the Quality of Accruals
Dechow and Dichev (2002)?nd that accruals quality is poorer for ?rms with certain
characteristics,such as for smaller ?rms.We expect that internal control weaknesses will
reduce accruals quality beyond that explained by these innate ?rm characteristics.While
Dechow and Dichev (2002)?nd that smaller ?rms tend to have lower quality accruals,we
expect that,for two equally small ?rms,the company with weak internal controls will have
lower accruals quality.For this reason,we include these ?ve innate ?rm variables as controls
in our analysis:Loss Proportion ,Sales Volatility ,Cash Flow (CFO)Volatility ,Total Assets ,
and Operating Cycle ,as our focus on the effect of the internal control problem,rather
than generic volatility or a ?rm’s operating cycle (see Table 1,Panel B for variable
de?nitions).
Prior research has also identi?ed determinants of material weaknesses in internal con-
trol.Material weakness ?rms tend to be less pro?table,smaller,younger,more complex,
growing rapidly,or undergoing restructuring (e.g.,Krishnan 2005;Ge and McVay 2005;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.2007;Doyle et al.2007).13As these characteristics may have a
direct effect on accruals quality,we include one proxy for each of these constructs in our
main regressions as follows:the size of the ?rm (Total Assets ),the age of the ?rm (Firm
Age ),pro?tability (Loss Proportion ),the complexity of the ?rm’s operations (Segments ),
rapid growth (Extreme Sales Growth ),and restructurings (Restructuring Charge );see Table
1,Panel B for de?nitions.
13Krishnan (2005)?nds that internal control problems and audit committee quality are negatively associated.We examine this variable in a sensitivity analysis in Section V;our results are not sensitive to its inclusion.
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 1153
The Accounting Review,October 2007
IV .RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Table 2,Panel A presents descriptive statistics for our sample of ?rms reporting material
weaknesses.As our comparison group,we present all 2003Compustat ?rms that were not
identi?ed as having an internal control de?ciency and do not have missing data for our
accruals quality measure;we report the results of a difference in means under a two-tailed
t-test for each of the variables.Turning ?rst to Accruals Quality (AQ ),a higher AQ indicates
a higher standard deviation of residuals,and thus lower accruals quality.The mean of AQ
is higher for the material weakness ?rms compared to the control sample (0.070versus
0.057;p-value of 0.001),providing initial support for H1.This univariate result extends to
each of our proxies for accruals quality.The average absolute value of discretionary accruals
is signi?cantly higher for material weakness ?rms (0.166versus 0.133;p-value of 0.001),
and their proportion of historical accounting restatements is also higher (0.139versus 0.092;
p-value of 0.001).Finally,earnings persistence is lower for the material weakness ?rms
(0.697versus 0.736;p-value ?0.001under an F-test).
Overall,the univariate results support H1;however,as noted above,we expect material
weakness ?rms to also have lower innate accruals quality,an expectation supported by
Table 2,Panel A.Material weakness ?rms have more losses,have higher sales and cash
?ow volatility,and are smaller than the control ?rms.In addition,in results measured from
1996through 2002(scaled by average total assets and not tabulated),material weakness
?rms have lower average cash ?ows from operations (?0.012versus 0.020)and lower
average earnings before extraordinary items (?0.100versus ?0.063),but higher average
working capital accruals (0.072versus 0.057).Since the material weakness ?rms tend to
be more volatile and in worse ?nancial condition,it is vital to control for these innate
characteristics in our multivariate tests.14
In Table 2,Panel B we compare account-speci?c material weakness ?rms to company-
level material weakness ?rms.AQ is signi?cantly higher for ?rms that disclose
company-level material weaknesses than for ?rms that disclose account-speci?c material
weaknesses (mean of 0.080versus 0.063).Discretionary Accruals (0.191versus 0.149),
Average Accruals Quality (0.069versus 0.056),and Historical Restatement (0.183versus
0.110)are all higher for the company-level weakness ?rms as well.Finally,Earnings Per-
sistence is lower for the company-level group at 0.668versus 0.728.Overall,the univariate
results seem to provide initial support for H2;?rms with company-level weaknesses have
lower accruals quality than ?rms with account-speci?c weaknesses.The innate variables
associated with lower accruals quality also tend to be higher for the company-level disclo-
sure ?rms,supporting the need for these control variables when testing H2.For example,
?rms with company-level disclosures tend to have more losses and greater sales and cash
?ow volatility compared to their account-speci?c counterparts.They also have lower av-
erage cash ?ows and earnings before extraordinary items,and higher working capital ac-
cruals (not tabulated).Account-speci?c disclosure ?rms tend to be slightly larger and older
and have more segments than company-level disclosure ?rms,consistent with the notion
that the additional complexity associated with size and decentralization creates unique chal-
lenges for these ?rms (Doyle et al.2007).
14Interestingly,while the bulk of the determinants of material weaknesses in internal control are consistent with prior literature,our sample does not exhibit univariate differences for rapid growth.Upon further inspection,this difference is a function of our stringent data requirements to calculate accruals quality;if the means are compared before requiring accruals quality data,then results are consistent with prior research.
1154Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The Accounting Review,October2007
TABLE2 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A:Descriptive Statistics of Material Weakness Firms versus2003Compustat Firms
Variable Material Weakness
Firms
Mean Median
Predicted
Difference
2003Compustat
Firms
(Excluding
Material
Weakness Firms)
Mean Median
t-test of
Mean
Differences
Two-tailed
p-value
Accruals Quality0.0700.055?0.0570.0420.001 Discretionary Accruals0.1660.114?0.1330.0920.001 Average Accruals Quality0.0610.048?0.0490.0370.001 Historical Restatement0.1390.000?0.0920.0000.001 Earnings Persistence0.697NA?0.736NA0.001 Loss Proportion0.4300.4290.3430.2500.001 Sales Volatility0.2910.2220.2390.1700.001 CFO Volatility0.1130.0790.0980.0640.001 Total Assets(in millions)2,097.070197.3363,652.640290.1570.001 Operating Cycle147.539115.301144.209111.4000.544 Firm Age16.49611.00019.22014.0000.001 Segments 4.982 4.000 4.658 4.0000.005 Extreme Sales Growth0.1790.0000.1790.0000.993 Restructuring Charge0.0400.0000.0190.0000.001 Panel B:Descriptive Statistics of Account-Speci?c versus Company-Level Material Weakness Firms
Variable
Account-Speci?c
Material Weakness
Firms
Mean Median
Predicted
Difference
Company-Level
Material Weakness
Firms
Mean Median
t-test of
Mean
Differences
Two-tailed
p-value
Accruals Quality0.0630.052?0.0800.0620.001 Discretionary Accruals0.1490.106?0.1910.1240.003 Average Accruals Quality0.0560.044?0.0690.0570.001 Historical Restatement0.1100.000?0.1830.0000.009 Earnings Persistence0.728NA?0.668NA0.001 Loss Proportion0.3870.2860.4950.4290.001 Sales Volatility0.2720.2110.3200.2350.017 CFO Volatility0.1030.0710.1290.0920.003 Total Assets(in millions)2,457.460248.4711,546.800130.0710.151 Operating Cycle145.683114.359150.382116.4200.645 Firm Age17.49812.00014.93111.0000.008 Segments 5.127 5.000 4.760 4.0000.075 Extreme Sales Growth0.1930.0000.1590.0000.243 Restructuring Charge0.0380.0000.0420.0000.659
(continued on next page)
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
1155
The Accounting Review,October 2007TABLE 2(continued)In this table,we present the untransformed values (rather than the natural log)of Total Assets,Operating Cycle,Firm Age ,and Segments for ease of interpretation.The t-test results for the logged values are similar,except for Total Assets in Panel B,where the log of Total Assets is signi?cantly smaller for the company-level material weakness ?rms.The t-test of means uses the pooled method when the underlying variances are equal and the Satterthwaite method when they are unequal.The test on Earnings Persistence is an F-test on the difference in incremental power of the Earnings ?MW Account-Speci?c and Earnings ?MW Company-Level interaction coef?cients.In Panel A,for the Accruals Quality t-test there are 705material weakness ?rm observations (from August 2002to November 2005)and 3,280control ?rm observations (see Table 1,Panel A).In Panel B,for the Accruals Quality t-test there are 426account-speci?c material weakness ?rm observations and 279company-level observations.For both Panels A and B,for the other four accruals quality proxies the sample requirement is the number of observations with data for the particular accruals quality metric.For the control variables,the sample requirement is to have suf?cient data to calculate Accruals Quality .Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at 1percent and 99percent to mitigate outliers.All variables are described in Table 1,Panel B.
Turning to Table 3,which presents a correlation matrix for the main variables,material
weakness ?rms are positively correlated with most of the innate characteristics of ?rms
with poor accruals quality identi?ed in Dechow and Dichev (2002).Material weakness
disclosures are positively associated with a higher proportion of losses,higher cash ?ow
and sales volatility,and longer operating cycles,which raises the possibility that these innate
?rm characteristics are driving the lower accruals quality,and not the material weaknesses
per se.Our multivariate analyses below investigate our hypotheses further.15
Multivariate Analysis of Accruals Quality and Material Weaknesses
The ?rst column of results in Table 4contains the regression estimates of accruals
quality on an indicator variable,material weakness (MW ),where MW is equal to 1if the
?rm reports a material weakness,and 0if the ?rm is in the control group.We present our
primary accruals quality measure (AQ )as the dependent variable (recall that a higher value
represents lower accruals quality)and control for the innate ?rm characteristics related to
accruals quality as well as the determinants of material weaknesses.As noted above,we
include only one proxy for each of the determinants of material weaknesses for succinct-
ness.Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the comprehensive list of variables;the
coef?cient on MW is 0.004with a p-value of 0.003when all variables are included.
Our main variable of interest,MW,is positively related to the accruals quality measure
(t-statistic ?2.51),supporting H1and suggesting material weakness ?rms have poorer
accruals quality.The economic magnitude of the coef?cient on MW (??0.004)is also
signi?cant.For the typical control ?rm (median Accruals Quality of 0.042from Table 2,
Panel A)a switch from MW ?0to MW ?1results in a 9.5percent (0.004divided by
0.042)increase in the accruals quality metric (implying poorer accruals quality),after con-
trolling for other known determinants of accruals quality.Turning to our control variables,
each of the variables measuring innate ?rm characteristics that are expected to affect ac-
cruals quality is signi?cant in the predicted direction (Dechow and Dichev 2002).Finally,
15As several of our variables are correlated at 0.40or more,we examine the variance in?ation factors (VIFs)for each of our multivariate regressions below to help ensure that multicollinearity is not a major concern.None of our calculated VIFs exceed 2,which is well below the level indicating harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy 1998,190).
1156Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The
Accounting Review,October 2007TABLE 3
Spearman/Pearson Correlation Matrix
MW AQ Disc.Accruals Loss Proportion Sales Volatility CFO Volatility Total Assets Operating Cycle Firm Age Segments Extreme
Sales Growth Restructuring Charge
MW 0.0910.0820.0930.0870.053?0.0490.025?0.0810.0630.0000.090(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0007)(0.0019)(0.1135)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.9925)(0.0001)
AQ 0.1130.5800.4570.4790.697?0.5510.119?0.270?0.2090.1270.013(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.4137)Discretionary 0.1130.6750.455?0.138?0.127?0.4050.045?0.352?0.1580.1180.061Accruals (0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0002)
Loss 0.1070.4860.5200.2450.535?0.5240.073?0.413?0.2420.1290.125Proportion (0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)Sales 0.0930.539?0.3880.2860.416?0.373?0.095?0.199?0.1140.0670.052Volatility (0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0013)CFO 0.0830.757?0.3450.5670.529?0.5400.112?0.298?0.2580.184?0.005Volatility (0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.7457)Total Assets ?0.053?0.595?0.517?0.522?0.403?0.614?0.0970.3040.416?0.0960.039(0.0008)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0174)Operating 0.0260.1920.1210.092?0.0510.146?0.1590.0010.1090.098?0.009Cycle (0.1024)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0014)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.9387)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.5648)Firm Age ?0.080?0.312?0.448?0.393?0.190?0.3670.2940.0160.191?0.101?0.041(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.3369)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0128)Segments 0.066?0.194?0.161?0.223?0.077?0.2510.4020.1330.186?0.0420.042(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0085)(0.0100)Extreme Sales 0.0000.1120.1090.1160.0590.166?0.0900.092?0.100?0.040?0.081Growth (0.9925)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0109)(0.0001)Restructuring 0.056?0.0050.0300.1110.041?0.0150.1760.032?0.0310.221?0.093Charge (0.0005)(0.0001)(0.063)(0.0001)(0.0114)(0.3729)(0.0001)(0.0473)(0.0624)(0.0001)(0.0001)
Pearson correlations are reported above the diagonal,and Spearman correlations are reported below.Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at 1percent and 99percent to mitigate outliers.All variables are described in Table 1,Panel B.
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 1157
The Accounting Review,October 2007TABLE 4
Accruals Quality and Material Weaknesses
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Dependent Variable ?Accruals Quality (AQ )
Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)
Intercept 0.026(5.22a )
0.026(5.21a )
MW ?0.004(2.51b )MW Account-Speci?c ?0.002(0.94)
MW Company-Level ?0.007(3.09a )
Loss Proportion ?0.006(2.93a )0.006(2.89a )
Sales Volatility ?0.047(16.13a )0.047(16.12a )
CFO Volatility ?0.233(31.78a )0.233(31.78a )
Total Assets ??0.004(?12.28a )?0.004(?12.22a )
Operating Cycle ?0.004(5.26a )0.004(5.23a )
Firm Age ?0.001(?1.11)?0.001(?1.08)
Segments 0.002(1.80c )0.002(1.79c )
Extreme Sales Growth 0.000(0.05)0.000(0.13)
Restructuring Charge 0.001(0.21)0.001(0.21)
Number of Material Weakness Obs.645645
Number of Total Obs.3,5883,588
Adjusted R 2
54.82%54.85%a,b,c Signi?cant at a two-tailed p-value ?0.01,0.05,or 0.10,respectively.Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at 1percent and 99percent to mitigate outliers.All variables are de?ned in Table 1,Panel B.
the additional controls we identi?ed through our examination of the internal control liter-
ature are largely insigni?cant.
We next examine the relation between accruals quality and the different types of internal
control de?ciencies.Hypothesis 2predicts that company-level material weaknesses will
have a stronger association with accruals quality than will account-speci?c material weak-
nesses,since company-level internal control de?ciencies are less ‘‘auditable’’and thus more
likely to result in erroneous accruals in the ?led ?nancial statements.As in our earlier tests,
we control for the innate ?rm characteristics that proxy for the inherent dif?culty in accrual
estimation and the determinants of material weaknesses.
1158Doyle,Ge,and McVay
The Accounting Review,October 2007
Referring to the second column of results in Table 4,account-speci?c material weak-
nesses are not signi?cantly associated with accruals quality (t-statistic ?0.94)while
company-level material weaknesses are positively related to AQ (t-statistic ?3.09).Con-
sistent with H2,the magnitude of the coef?cient on account-speci?c weaknesses (?
?0.002)is signi?cantly lower than the magnitude of the coef?cient on company-level weaknesses (??0.007)under an F-test (p ?0.057,two-tailed).Economically speaking,
the presence of a company-level (account-speci?c)material weakness is expected to result
in an AQ that is 16.7(4.8)percent larger than the control ?rms.
Our ?nding that account-speci?c internal control problems are not signi?cantly asso-
ciated with lower accruals quality complements Hogan and Wilkins (2006),who ?nd that
auditor fees were signi?cantly higher for material weakness ?rms in the year prior to the
disclosure of a signi?cant de?ciency.Thus,our combined results are consistent with au-
ditors historically ‘‘auditing around’’the account-speci?c internal control problems,thereby
mitigating the negative impact on accruals quality.
Multivariate Analysis of Additional Accruals Quality Variables
In Table 5,we replicate our main results for our four additional measures of accruals
quality.Referring to the ?rst column of results in Table 5,consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al.(2006),material weakness disclosures are positively associated with Discretionary
Accruals (t-statistic ?1.89).16We parse out account-speci?c and company-level problems
in the second column of results.While the coef?cient on company-level problems appears
to be larger in magnitude than that on account-speci?c weaknesses,consistent with our
main results,the coef?cients are not signi?cantly different from one another under an F-
test (p ?0.410,two-tailed).
Our second alternative proxy,Average Accruals Quality ,is presented in the third and
fourth columns of results in Table 5.Given the fact that this variable is highly correlated
with our primary accruals quality measure,it is not surprising that the results are very
similar to those shown in Table 4and continue to support H1and H2;the coef?cients on
account-speci?c and company-level weaknesses are signi?cantly different under an F-test
(p ?0.063,two-tailed).
In the third set of columns in Table 5we present the estimates from a logistic regression,
where Historical Restatement is equal to 1if the company had a restatement from 1997–
2002.The coef?cient on MW is positive and signi?cant (?2?12.21),and the breakdown by type is consistent with the results above—the lower accruals quality is driven by
company-level weaknesses.The difference between the coef?cients is statistically signi?-
cant under an F-test (p ?0.008,two-tailed).
Our ?nal alternative measure of accruals quality is Earnings Persistence ,presented in
the ?nal two columns in Table 5.We interact MW with Earnings (Compustat data item
#123scaled by average total assets)to evaluate the incremental persistence of material
weakness ?rms for 2002.The interaction term on MW is negative and signi?cant (?0.067;
t-statistic ?2.73),suggesting again that the earnings/accruals quality of material weakness
?rms is poorer than that of our control ?rms.Finally,referring to the ?nal column of results,
MW is only negatively related to earnings persistence for company-level weaknesses,and
this coef?cient is statistically different from that on account-speci?c weaknesses under an
F-test (p ?0.001,two-tailed).
16The results remain similar if we use performance-matched discretionary accruals (t ?1.82)following Kothari et al.(2005).
Accruals
Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 1159
The Accounting Review,October
2007TABLE 5
Alternative Measures of Accruals Quality and Material Weaknesses
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables Predicted Sign
Discretionary Accruals Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)Average Accruals Quality Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)Historical Restatement Coef?cient Estimate (?2)Future Earnings (Persistence)Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)Intercept
0.302(17.03a )0.301(17.01a )0.028(6.32a )0.028(6.32a )?4.118(90.25a )?4.132(90.51a )0.065(2.43b )0.058(2.17b )MW ?d
0.011(1.89c )0.005(3.66a )0.433(12.21a )?0.018(?1.88c )MW Account-Speci?c ?
0.006(0.82)0.003(1.91c )0.177(1.16)?0.004(?0.31)MW Company-Level ?
0.018(2.17b )0.008(3.83a )0.748(20.58a )?0.031(?2.15b )Earnings
0.647(45.30a )0.654(46.28a )Earnings ?MW ?
?0.067(?2.73a )Earnings MW Account-Speci?c ?
0.262(6.47a )Earnings MW Company-Level ?
?0.207(?7.30a )Loss Proportion
0.102(13.36a )0.101(13.33a )0.001(0.63)0.001(0.59)0.432(4.49b )0.415(4.14b )?0.067(?4.87a )?0.058(?4.29a )Sales Volatility
0.000(1.60)0.000(1.56)0.040(16.00a )0.040(15.99a )0.600(6.79a )0.606(6.87a )0.090(5.66a )0.085(5.39a )(continued on next page )
1160Doyle,Ge,and
McVay
The
Accounting Review,October 2007TABLE 5(continued)
Dependent Variable:Independent Variables Predicted Sign Discretionary Accruals Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)Average Accruals Quality Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)Historical Restatement Coef?cient Estimate (?2)Future Earnings (Persistence)
Coef?cient Estimate (t-statistic)CFO Volatility 0.000(4.14a )0.000(4.16a )0.178(27.85a )0.178(27.84a )?0.62(0.011)?0.088(0.02)?0.429(?10.60a )?0.419(?10.48a )
Total Assets ?0.019(?14.31a )?0.019(?14.25a )?0.003(?11.22a )?0.003(?11.16a )0.085(8.31a )0.086(8.64a )0.004(2.24b )0.004(2.30b )
Operating Cycle ?0.002(?0.88)?0.002(?0.90)0.004(6.27a )0.004(6.25a )0.046(0.52)0.045(0.50)?0.006(?1.49)?0.004(?1.15)Firm Age ?0.040(?11.74a )?0.040(?11.71a )?0.003(?3.48a )?0.003(?3.45a )0.178(5.62b )0.182(5.89b )?0.010(?2.15b )?0.011(?2.29b )Segments 0.008(1.94c )0.009(1.93c )0.001(0.97)0.001(0.95)0.279(7.09a )0.279(7.03a )0.000(0.01)?0.000(?0.03)Extreme Sales Growth 0.020(3.56a )0.020(3.61a )0.002(1.49)0.002(1.57)?0.566(12.99a )?0.554(12.38a )0.043(5.01a )0.043(5.01a )Restructuring Charge 0.053(2.14b )0.052(2.12b )?0.002(?0.36)?0.002(?0.36) 1.023(4.75b ) 1.017(4.68b )?0.049(?1.20)?0.032(?0.80)Number of Material Weakness Obs.650650645645757757716716Number of Total Obs.3,5813,5813,5883,5884,2894,2894,1494,149Adjusted R 2/Pseudo R 227.69%27.69%50.15%50.19% 4.01% 4.35%59.50%60.46%a,b,c Signi?cant at a two-tailed p-value ?0.01,0.05,or 0.10,respectively.
d Not
e that the main effect o
f MW has no prediction when the dependent variable is Future Earnings .For this model,the variable of interest is the interaction between Earnings and MW .
Earnings ?earnings before extraordinary items (data item 123);and Future Earnings ?one-year-ahead earnings.
Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at 1percent and 99percent to mitigate outliers.All other variables are de?ned in Table 1,Panel B.
幼儿家长教养方式调查问卷 尊敬的家长：我们是科研课题组，想了解当前你们关于教养幼儿的一些想法和观点，以利于我们对幼儿的教育更有针对性，并促动我们之间的交流与合作，特在全园展开这次调查。请你如实回答，谢谢你的合作！ 在回答问卷之前，请你认真阅读下面的指导语： 父母的育儿态度和育儿方式对子女的发展和成长是至关重要的，为了更好的教育幼儿，使你的孩子全面发展，请你根据问卷题目如实填写（以平时行为为准，不做过多考虑）。你的回答没有好坏之分，对你的孩子没有丝毫的影响。 问卷有很多题目组成，你们的回答能够用1、2、3、4四个等级表示，其中1表示从不；2表示偶尔；3表示经常；4表示总是。请你们分别在每题后面的括号里填上最适合自己的等级（父亲、母亲分别填写，请勿代写），每题只准选1个答案。 下面举例说明对每个题目的回答方法： 例：你常常打孩子吗？父亲（1）母亲（2） 你觉得对自己的孩子亲热吗？父亲（2）母亲（3） 幼儿姓名：性别：民族：年龄： 父亲是否健在：（是/否） 母亲是否健在：（是/否） 父母是否离异：（是/否） 父亲的文化水准：
父亲的职业： 母亲的文化水准： 母亲的职业： 家住：农村/ 城市 经济年收入： 幼儿日常生活主要由谁安排：父母/ 爷爷奶奶/ 外公外婆/ 保姆/ 其他 家庭特殊情况备注： 第二部分 一、选项 1、从不 2、偶尔 3、经常 4、总是 二、题目 1、你干涉孩子做的每一件事。父亲（）母亲（） 2、即使是很小的过失，你也要惩罚你的孩子。父亲（）母亲（） 3、你总是试图使你的孩子成为出类拔萃的人。父亲（）母亲（） 4、你允许孩子在某些方面有独到之处。父亲（）母亲（） 5、你觉得你是一个严厉的家长。父亲（）母亲（） 6、你总是左右你的孩子穿什么衣服或打扮成什么样子。父亲（）母亲（） 7、你不允许孩子做一些他能做的事，因为害怕他受伤。父亲（）母亲（） 8、你当着别人的面打孩子或训斥孩子。父亲（）母亲（）
关于幼儿家庭品格教育的调查报告 一、问题的提出 家庭是幼儿社会化的第一途径，也是人可塑性最强时期的生活环境。父母是幼儿的第一任教师，他们教育素质将直接影响到孩子的身心发展。家庭教育的影响先于幼儿园教育的影响。家庭教育在幼儿发展中有特殊的地位、作用，是幼儿教育机构无法代替的，家庭教育不等于幼儿园教育。家庭教育是整个教育系统中不可缺少的部分，提高幼儿家庭教育质量成为提高幼儿教育质量的关键。 为了更好地了解并掌握本园幼儿家庭教育的情况，针对家长所受教育程度的差别，对幼儿家庭教育的影响做了调查。 二、调查方法 1、调查对象：乐山市市中区翡翠实验幼儿园（大、中、小班） 2、调查时间和地点：2018年4月—5月 3、调查手段：采用问卷调查 4、调查内容：家长基本情况 三、调查结果与分析 1、基本情况（调查显示） (1)教养者：母亲占65% 父亲占30% 其他：5% (2)教养者学历；大专毕业占40% 中专毕业占30% 高中毕业30% (3)家庭结构：以核心家庭为主，有20%的是以三代家庭 2、大专、中专、高中家长在家庭教育观念上的差异 在调查中发现，许多家庭由于家庭背景和父母素养及环境的差异，大多数家庭都认为把孩子培养成“才”，将来有出息，有个好的职业，一生能在顺境中度过。还有许多家庭认为时间和精力不足，与家校沟通不够，教育观念的冲突，两代家长教育的不一致。 (1)经调查显示，有绝大多数家庭认识到家庭教育的重要性，认识到家庭教育是教育孩子不可缺少的一部分，但是大专、中专、高中家长看法有显著的差异。 (2)经调查显示，大专以品德为主，中专高中以知识为主。 (3)经调查显示，大多数家长主张对孩子要以民主平等的方式教育，大专、中专、高中家长对民主平等观念有差别的。还有许多家长认为“没有规矩不成方圆”
家庭如何对孩子进行品德养成教育 【摘要】在学生品德养成教育中，我们要大力发挥家庭教育的作用。在具体工作中，家长一定要根据品德教育的生活性和多样性特点，寓教育于生活中，充分发挥自身的示范引领作用，同时要注意教育的即时性、渐进性和多样性，使孩子逐步养成良好的行为习惯，形成良好的道德品质。 【关键词】家庭品德养成教育 俗话说，要成才，先成人。要使孩子成才，首先要引导小孩养成良好的道德品质。《小学德育纲要》指出，“实施教育，学校教育与家庭教育、社会教育要密切配合”。因此，在学生品德养成教育中，在发挥学校主导作用的同时，我们还要大力发挥家庭教育的作用，以进一步提高工作的有效性。家庭是孩子的第一所学校，父母是孩子的第一任老师。父母对孩子的教育有着先入为主的特点，他们对孩子良好道德品质的形成起着重要的启蒙作用。那么，在家庭教育中，家长应如何有效地对孩子进行品德养成教育呢？ 一、联系生活，适时教育——体现生活性 陶行知先生指出，“生活即教育”。新课程理念也大力提倡加强教育与现实生活的联系。作为生活教育的重要组成部分，家庭生活教育是孩子一生中所受到的最早的教育，其教育内容恰恰主要是道德品质方面。但一些家长往往错误地认为，对孩子的品德教育就是口头的说教。其实不然，教育机会在家庭生活中无处不在。适时抓住这些机会并进行教育，往往能取得比我们刻意进行的教育更好的效果。 例如，孩子放学回家应主动跟大人打招呼。刚开始，孩子不懂这一点，回家后见到长辈一声不吭。发现这种情况，家长应立即向他（她）指出：“小孩子应该尊敬长辈，放学回家后应主动向家里的长辈打招呼呀。”而且要求他（她）立即改正。经过几次反复，孩子就能逐步形成这种意识了。 由此可见，家长应当高度重视一日生活的教育价值，挖掘生活常规中的教育因素，让幼儿在日常活动中逐步形成良好的品德。 二、榜样示范，潜移默化——体现示范性 英国教育家洛克主张，“在教育孩子的时候，与其让孩子记住规则，还不如给孩子树立榜样”。榜样示范是进行家庭品德教育的一种生动而有效的方法。常见的示范性教育有以下几种。 一是家长自身示范。就是由家长以身作则，以自己的言行直接为幼儿提供一个活生生的行为榜样，使幼儿在模仿过程中获得一定的价值观念。例如，如果要引导孩子养成读书的好习惯，那么家长自己就必须每天在家抽出一定的时间来读书看报。对孩子来说，第一次看到父母看书，也许感觉不到什么；第二次看到，
主管职责: 1. 依据公司的战略目标及年度计划，制定部门年度工作计划； 2. 对计划执行情况进行检查和检讨；及时处理影响计划达成的问题； 3. 协同产品工程部对新产品开发制定检测方法及检测标准； 4. 对新制样品检测标准、检测结果的审核； 5. 成品检测过程的监督及检测结果的审核； 6. 督导部门人员对制程实施稽查（工艺流程的抽检、生产异常判定）； 7. 对品质异常状况进行处理，制定纠正、预防措施并督促相关人员进行追踪； 8. 对客户投诉品质问题的回复及处理，以及纠正预防措施的及时跟进； 9. 对库存产品重检的呈报反映及处理； 10. 对来料不良的供应商进行备案及改善追踪； 11. 负责对新制样品回馈结果的分析； 12. 成品最终检测异常的处理，并督促相关人员进行追踪； 13. 依据纠正预防措施的汇总，对“改善措施”的有效性进行分析； 14. 负责了解行业国际标准动态，了解并学习行业国家标准动态，完善标准之建立； 15. 负责客户检测标准、资讯的收集，建立满足客户要求的的品质标准文件； 16. 监督、审核部门内人员各种品质记录，完善质量体系运行； 17. 建立并改善本部门所涉及相关工作知识、技能之知识管理系统，进行上述知识之 标准化与文书化，同时进行组织及人员培训； 18. 建立、完善、维护本部门工作相关之作业规范与流程；审签部门各项责任文件； 19. 完成总经理交办的其他临时事项。 QA职责： 1.直接向品质中心主管负责。 2.认真负责对新产品投产前后做相关的产品安全性及可靠性测试。 3.负责对原材料,在制品,成品品质检验标准与规范的制定. 4.负责不合格品的纠正预防措施的制定。 5.负责对各部门QC送交的首件产品进行首件测试,并将其测试结果记录在其首件报告上. 6.制定《年度校验计划表》,定期对全厂的量规/检验仪器的内部校正和保养,定期安排仪器送外部校正.登记在《检 测仪器一览表》上. 7.编制各项产品的检验作业指导书. 8.负责对各部门工作进行内部品质稽查. 9.认真维护实验室的7S工作. IQC职责： 1、直接向品质中心主管负责，
家庭教养方式对孩子的影响 美国心理学家戴安娜·鲍姆林德(Diana Baumrind)通过“响应程度”和“要求程度”两个维度把家庭教育模式分为四类——权威型、独裁型、放任型（即溺爱型）、不作为型（也称忽略型）。 响应程度：即父母给予孩子爱、接纳和支持的程度，父母能否对孩子表达爱，对孩子的需要敏感的程度。响应程度高的父母会经常微笑地面对孩子，表扬和鼓励孩子，与孩子交流他们喜欢和欣赏的事物。响应程度低的父母则经常忽视、拒绝和批评孩子。 要求程度：即父母父母是否对孩子的行为实施严格控制的程度，指父母是否对孩子的行为建立适当的标准，并督促其达到这些标准。 研究表明权威型教养方式与各种积极的发展结果相关。权威型的家长为了能让孩子执行他们的要求，喜欢给孩子讲道理，与孩子一起商讨制定规则并遵守之。这样的家长往往能培养出能力较强且适应性较好的孩子。 鲍姆林德的这一研究在发展心理学上具有里程碑的意义，它告诉我们：儿童良好的发展不仅需要关爱还需要适当的限制。 四种教养方式具体如下： 一、权威型教养方式：对孩子高要求、高反应。 一种具有控制性但又比较灵活的教养方式。 这种类型的父母会对孩子提出明确的、合理的要求，并且会谨慎地说明要求孩子遵守的理由。会为孩子设立一定的行为目标，对孩子不合理的行为做出适当的限制，并督促孩子努力达到目标。 同时，他们并不缺乏应有的温情，能主动关爱孩子，耐心地倾听孩子的述说，能够晓之以理、动之以情。能够接纳孩子的观点，会征求孩子的意见。孩子在权威型父母合理、民主的教养之下，会慢慢养成自信、独立、合作、积极乐观、善于交流等良好的人格品质。 “权威”二字是翻译过来的，它并不完全等同于我们汉语中的“权威”的含义。汉语的“权威”一词，往往与“威严”“权力”“服从”联系在一起。这里的“权威型”更像我们所理解的“良师益友”。 二、独裁型教养方式：对孩子高要求、低反应。 一种限制性非常强的教养方式。 这类父母会提出很多规则，期望孩子能够严格遵守。他们很少向孩子解释遵从这些规则的必要性，而是依靠惩罚和强制性策略迫使儿童顺从。他们不能接受孩子的反馈，对孩子缺少热情和尊重，不能敏感觉察到孩子的不同观点，而是希望孩子一味地听他们的话，并服从他们的权威。 父母专制型的教养方式将导致儿童缺乏独立思考的能力，做事优柔寡断，学习上缺少灵活性，心理上产生抑郁和焦虑，自卑、退缩等不良的人格品质。 我们这一代人不少是在这种教养方式下长大的。当代大学生里出现心理问题的也有不少出自这类家庭。记得在中科院心理所学习时，分析神经症的案例里，几乎都有相似的一条：童年时期父母过于严厉。高压之下情绪易出问题。 三、溺爱型教养方式：对孩子低要求、高反应。 即我们说的溺爱型的教养方式。 这类父母尽自己最大的可能满足孩子的要求，但他们很少对孩子提要求，不会密切监控孩子的行为。他们对孩子有求心应，孩子得到太容易，也就不懂得珍惜。溺爱下的孩子会形成依赖、任性、冲动、幼稚、没有恒心、不能吃苦、不能体谅别人等不良的人格品质。 这也是今天独生子女的家庭比较容易出现的，最后自食恶果的还是家长。 四、忽略型教养方式：对孩子低要求、低反应。 也称忽视型的教养方式。 这类父母或者会拒绝孩子的要求，或者会由于过度关注自己的事情而对孩子投入极少的时间和精力。他们不会对孩子提出什么要求和行为标准，对孩子缺少教育。在感情上也表现得比较冷漠，对孩子的需要不予理睬或者不敏感。 这是最不成功的教养方式。在这种教养类型下成长的孩子，自控能力差，对生活会采取消极的态度。容易表现出较高的攻击性、易于发怒等问题，常发展为行为失调，课堂表现非常差。更为严重的是，这些孩子有可能成为充满敌意、自私、叛逆的青少年，他们缺少远大的目标，易出现如酗酒、逃学等反社会行为，甚至多种犯罪行为。
浅谈家庭教养方式对幼儿性格的影响 孩子从呱呱落地的那一刻起，父母就担任起了孩子的第一任教师这个重要角色。家庭是孩子的第一个课堂，父母对孩子的教养态度和教养方式对孩子性格的形成起着重要作用。弗洛姆说过：“家庭是社会的精神媒介，是通过自己适应家庭，儿童获得了后来在社会生活中使他适应其所必须履行的职责的性格。” 由此可见，家庭对幼儿性格影响的重要作用。父母是孩子接触社会和认识社会的媒介，孩子的成长过程，父母为其提供了生理和物质的需要，而且也提供了心理需要。父母在教养子女的过程中所表现的各种态度，潜移默化地影响着幼儿的性格。一、家庭教养方式和性格的界定 根据资料表明：“所谓家庭教养方式是指父母在抚养、教育儿童的活动常使用的方法和形式，是父母各种教养行为的特征概括，是一种具有相当稳定性的行为风格。” 家庭教养方式是在父母与孩子的互动过程中形成并发展的。这种互动的结果不仅从父母对儿童的生理养育活动中体现，而且也从父母对孩子的行为规中传递体现。 性格是一种心理特征，帼眉教授认为：“性格主要是表现在人对现实的态度和惯常的行为方式中的比较稳定的心理特征；幼儿性格是在先天气质类型的基础上，在幼儿与父母相互作用中逐渐形成的。” 幼儿性格形成起源于婴幼儿期的生活。每位父母都以自己独特的教
养方式教养幼儿，使幼儿产生固定性反应，即形成了习惯，每个习惯统一起来，作为一种素质存在，便构成了幼儿的性格特征。 因此，父母的教养方式对幼儿性格的形成起着制约和导向的作用，它与幼儿的性格有密切联系。 二、家庭教养方式的类型、特点及对幼儿性格的影响。 （一）家庭教养方式的类型 据调查研究发现，家庭教养根据父母的教养方式不同，可分为常见的以下几种类型：专制型、溺爱型、严厉型、保护型、型这五种类型。（二）家庭教养方式的类型特点及对幼儿性格的影响 据调查显示，不同类型的父母教养方式的特点对幼儿性格的影响是不同的。 1、专制型的父母教养方式 （1）专制型父母教养方式的特点 这种类型的父母要求孩子绝对服从自己，一切听自己的，并用权利强制孩子听自己的，孩子没有绝对的自由，父母已经为孩子勾画出了他们“理想”的蓝图，只要孩子照做就行了，父母希望对孩子的所有行为永远加以保护和监督。他们对孩子的理解和温暖少、强制作风比较多、批评多于表扬；与子女之间的关系是“管”与“被管”的关系；两代人之间有一层隔阂，有一条代沟。实际上家长的出发点是好的，也都是为了孩子，可是孩子并不能够理解和接受家长的所有做法。 （2）专制型父母教养方式对孩子性格的影响 这种类型的父母们，认为“棍棒底下出孝子”“不打不成器”，可
四种不同的家庭教养方 式 Revised as of 23 November 2020
四种不同的家庭教养方式 每个家庭都有自己个性化的教养方式。早在1978年，美国心理学家戴安娜·鲍姆林德提出了家庭教养方式的两个维度，即要求性和反应性。要求性指的是家长是否对孩子的行为建立适当的标准，并坚持要求孩子去达到这些标准。反应性指的是对孩子和蔼接受的程度及对孩子需求的敏感程度。根据这两个维度，可以把教养方式分为权威型、专制型、溺爱型和忽视型四种。一般而言，权威型是对孩子最有利的一种教养方式。他们会给孩子提出合理的要求，并对孩子的行为进行适当的限制。与此同时，他们会表现出对孩子的爱，并认真听取孩子的想法。在这种教养方式下长大的孩子，有很强的自信和较好的自我控制能力，并且会比较乐观、积极。专制型的家长要求孩子无条件服从自己。在这种教养方式下长大的孩子，会较多地表现出焦虑、退缩等负面情绪和行为，但他们在学校中可能会有较好表现，比较听话、守纪律。放纵型的家长对孩子则表现出很多的爱与期待，但是很少对孩子提要求和对其行为进行控制。在这种教养方式下长大的孩子，容易表现得很不成熟且自我控制能力差。忽视型的家长对孩子不很关心，对于孩子，他们一般只是提供食宿和衣物等物质，而不会在精神上提供支持。在这种教养方式下长大的孩子，很容易出现适应障碍，他们的适应能力和自我控制能力往往较差。以上四种类型是比较典型的，整体而言，在孩子小的时候，家长应该对其多给予爱和关怀，并且应在这时更多地控制孩子的不良行为。当孩子长大一些时，家长应及时听取孩子的想法，对孩子自己的事情，要多和孩子商量，共同制定合适的解决方案。
家庭教育方式对儿童品德发展的影响 Abstract Children stage is the key period of moral development，good family education has an important role in the development of children's good moral character. This paper from a comprehensive understanding of family education of to explore the way of family education on children's moral behavior habits of an important role，influence of family education on primary school students' moral behavior habits， at last， based on the research， put forward the improvement way of family education and the basic countermeasures of high effect of family education. 童年是品德发展的最重要阶段，也是道德教育最有难度的阶段。②教育是由家庭教育、社会教育和学校教育组成，其中家庭教育是教育的核心，尤其对儿童时期的教育，它所起到的作用更为重要。在家庭教育中，家庭教育方式的正确与否，不仅关系到家庭教育的成功与失败，而且直接影响着儿童的品德是否得到健康发展。 1 家庭教育方式及类型 已有文献资料的研究表明，对家庭教育方式的分类有多种方法，根据研究需要，本文选取从亲子关系的角度，将家庭教育方式分为专制型、放任型、民主型三种。③ 第一，专制型教育方式是指父母在家里操纵着子女们的一切，强制性使孩子听命于父母，有着无上的权威。这种类型的父母对子女太过于严厉，孩子做什么事情都不会很自信，特别是在处理问题的时候，自己会变得没
关于幼儿家庭教育的调查报告 一、问题的提出 家庭是幼儿社会化的第一途径，也是人可塑性最强时期的生活环境。父母是幼儿的第一任教师，他们教育素质将直接影响到孩子的身心发展。家庭教育的影响先于幼儿园教育的影响。家庭教育在幼儿发展中有特殊的地位、作用，是幼儿教育机构无法代替的，家庭教育不等于幼儿园教育。家庭教育是整个教育系统中不可缺少的部分，提高幼儿家庭教育质量成为提高幼儿教育质量的关键。 为了更好地了解并掌握本园幼儿家庭教育的情况，针对家长所受教育程度的差别，对幼儿家庭教育的影响做了调查。 二、调查方法 1、调查对象：市某幼儿园儿童100名（大、中、小班） 2、调查时间和地点：2007年7月—9月 3、调查手段：采用问卷调查 4、调查内容：家长基本情况 三、调查结果与分析 1、基本情况（调查显示） (1)教养者：母亲占65% 父亲占30% 其他：5% (2)教养者学历；大专毕业占40% 中专毕业占30% 高中毕业30% (3)家庭结构：以核心家庭为主，有20%的是以三代家庭 2、大专、中专、高中家长在家庭教育观念上的差异
在调查中发现，许多家庭由于家庭背景和父母素养及环境的差异，大多数家庭都认为把孩子培养成“才”，将来有出息，有个好的职业，一生能在顺境中度过。还有许多家庭认为时间和精力不足，与家校沟通不够，教育观念的冲突，两代家长教育的不一致。 (1)经调查显示，有绝大多数家庭认识到家庭教育的重要性，认识到家庭教育是教育孩子不可缺少的一部分，但是大专、中专、高中家长看法有显著的差异。 (2)经调查显示，大专以品德为主，中专高中以知识为主。 (3)经调查显示，大多数家长主张对孩子要以民主平等的方式教育，大专、中专、高中家长对民主平等观念有差别的。还有许多家长认为“没有规矩不成方圆”持有很明显的比例，大专家长占37%，中专家长占20%，高中家长占20%，这说明许多家长又要给孩子民主平等，又要有制约性的教育孩子，这就是新旧观念的矛盾，也是我们家庭面对的问题。 3、大专、中专、高中家长在教育内容上的差异： (1)教育方面：家长在保证让幼儿吃好及有病得到治疗的基础上，有70%的家长只重视智力教育，把大量的时间和精力放在孩子的学习上，有85%的家长都有非常注意儿童的生活有规律性的培养。还有78%的家长都鼓励幼儿通过户外活动增强身体素质，其余的家长则由于周围环境的安全因素而不鼓励孩子进行户外活动。在调查中发现，有90%的家长认为教育孩子的最好方法是“民主平等、表扬鼓励、耐心说理、正确的教育指导”。但是在这些家庭中，家长虽然懂得教育
部门职责说明书模板
职位说明书模板 一、业务管理 组织进行原材料的品质检验，并严格把关； 组织进行对原材料供应商的材料品质水平评估，以及稽查和推进改善； 组织设定各关键控制工序，对产品的品质进行检验和把关； 组织对生产过程异常进行反馈，并进行跟踪，推进相关单位分析改进； 组织相关单位，对生产异常进行品质分析，跟进改进效果； 参与制定公司质量方针目标； 协调公司相关部门，组织各项质量体系的正常实施； 组织安排定期汇报生产过程的产品品质，以及客户反馈信息； 组织安排公司检测仪器设备的定期计量维护工作 制定部门的工作计划、目标以及跟进落实工作计划的执行和完成情况。 二、部门管理 组织制定本部门年度计划与预算； 根据部门工作计划下达任务，对执行情况进行督导，定期总结工作执行情况； 参与制定/修订本部门职责，组织制定、修订本部门职位说明书； 根据公司要求，提出本部门员工的招聘、任免、晋升、调配、人员培训需求等意见； 按照公司要求，组织本部门内部绩效考核工作； 对直接下属员工工作进行绩效考核，并进行绩效反馈与谈话； 组织本部门内部培训工作。 负责部门的团队建设 三、员工培养 培养本部门经理接班人； 协助公司人力资源部制定后备人才培养计划； 对下属员工的工作进行工作指导。
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家庭教养方式对幼儿性格的影响
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浅谈家庭教养方式对幼儿性格的影响 孩子从呱呱落地的那一刻起，父母就担任起了孩子的第一任教师这个重要角色。家庭是孩子的第一个课堂，父母对孩子的教养态度和教养方式对孩子性格的形成起着重要作用。弗洛姆说过：“家庭是社会的精神媒介，是通过自己适应家庭，儿童获得了后来在社会生活中使他适应其所必须履行的职责的性格。” 由此可见，家庭对幼儿性格影响的重要作用。父母是孩子接触社会和认识社会的媒介，孩子的成长过程，父母为其提供了生理和物质的需要，而且也提供了心理需要。父母在教养子女的过程中所表现的各种态度，潜移默化地影响着幼儿的性格。 一、家庭教养方式和性格的界定 根据资料表明：“所谓家庭教养方式是指父母在抚养、教育儿童的活动中通常使用的方法和形式，是父母各种教养行为的特征概括，是一种具有相当稳定性的行为风格。” 家庭教养方式是在父母与孩子的互动过程中形成并发展的。这种互动的结果不仅从父母对儿童的生理养育活动中体现，而且也从父母对孩子的行为规范中传递体现。 性格是一种心理特征，陈帼眉教授认为：“性格主要是表现在人对现实的态度和惯常的行为方式中的比较稳定的心理特征；幼儿性格是在先天气质类型的基础上，在幼儿与父母相互作用中逐渐形成的。” 幼儿性格形成起源于婴幼儿期的生活。每位父母都以自己独特的教
养方式教养幼儿，使幼儿产生固定性反应，即形成了习惯，每个习惯统一起来，作为一种素质存在，便构成了幼儿的性格特征。 因此，父母的教养方式对幼儿性格的形成起着制约和导向的作用，它与幼儿的性格有密切联系。 二、家庭教养方式的类型、特点及对幼儿性格的影响。 （一）家庭教养方式的类型 据调查研究发现，家庭教养根据父母的教养方式不同，可分为常见的以下几种类型：专制型、溺爱型、严厉型、保护型、民主型这五种类型。 （二）家庭教养方式的类型特点及对幼儿性格的影响 据调查显示，不同类型的父母教养方式的特点对幼儿性格的影响是不同的。 1、专制型的父母教养方式 （1）专制型父母教养方式的特点 这种类型的父母要求孩子绝对服从自己，一切听自己的，并用权利强制孩子听自己的，孩子没有绝对的自由，父母已经为孩子勾画出了他们“理想”的蓝图，只要孩子照做就行了，父母希望对孩子的所有行为永远加以保护和监督。他们对孩子的理解和温暖少、强制作风比较多、批评多于表扬；与子女之间的关系是“管”与“被管”的关系；两代人之间有一层隔阂，有一条代沟。实际上家长的出发点是好的，也都是为了孩子，可是孩子并不能够理解和接受家长的所有做法。 （2）专制型父母教养方式对孩子性格的影响
怎样对幼儿进行品德教育 一、渗透日常生活 2、在一日活动中对幼儿进行德育教育。 二、教师的示范教育 对孩子进行道德教育，教师起着至关重要的作用，首先教师应该成为幼儿的一面镜子，向幼儿灌输任何东西，自己都先做出好的榜样，严格要求自己，作孩子的表率，努力培养孩子好的品德，就会 为他们美好的前程创造条件。让自己的一举一动对幼儿产生潜移默 化的作用。由于幼儿年龄较小的缘故，他们离开家庭、离开父母会 产生一种不安全感，老师就成了他们唯一的依靠。这就要求教师要 象妈妈一样去细心呵护、关心、帮助每一个孩子，消除他们的恐惧 心理，创设一种宽松和谐、民主平等的精神环境，用爱心去温暖孩 子的心田，孩子在获得爱、感受爱的同时，逐渐也学会了如何去关心、帮助别人，同时一种互敬互爱、懂礼守纪的良好个性、行为品 质也在逐渐的形成。作为教师的我们要意识到自身行为的榜样作用，加强品德修养和心理修养，随时注意自己的言行态度对幼儿潜移默 化的影响。 三、建立家园互动桥 父母是孩子的第一任老师，大家都认可一句话："最了解孩子的 莫过于父母"。所以，作为孩子的父母，要身正，注意自己的一言一行，或许我们的一句话、一个手势、甚至一个眼神就会影响甚至改 变他们的一生。特别是家庭成员间在生活中应相互尊重、相互谦让，与邻里、同事友好相处，关心别人，为孩子营造一个温暖和谐的家 庭氛围，在生活中无形的为孩子做出榜样。有的家长脾气急躁，只 要孩子犯错了，不管什么原因，先劈头盖脸的责骂一顿，或者是暴 打一通。这样家庭的孩子很容易丧失自信，不愿意去改正错误。而 有的家长却"性情温和"，无论孩子犯了什么样的错误，他都会"耐心
细致"的说教，哪怕是同样的错误短期内重复发生了若干次。这样家 庭里的孩子很容易形成错误的道德判断，认为无论做什么事情，只 要是爸爸妈妈说教过了那么事情就此完结了。所以父母应从家庭实 际出发，根据孩子身心发育的特点和品德形成的规律，从日常生活 中的小事抓起，对孩子进行生动的渗透性的道德启蒙教育。 一、教师以身作则，让幼儿在模仿中进步。 二、多表扬少批评，让幼儿在开心中进步。 想得到老师的喜欢和表扬是每个幼儿的心愿，当他们得到表扬和夸奖时，心情会感到轻松愉快，并会继续努力表现出好的思想行为，当他们受到老师的批评和训斥时，则会表现出了羞愧或反感，胆小 的会改正，但更多的是屡教不改，甚至是变本加厉，因此，我们在 对幼儿进行教育时，要尽量多用表扬少用批评，要留心观察每一个 幼儿在一日活动中的行为表现，经常把那些有好行为好习惯的幼儿 或有进步的幼儿提出来进行表扬和鼓励，这样不仅会增强那些受到 表扬的幼儿的自信心和荣誉感，在今后会继续表现出良好的思想品 德和行为习惯，其他幼儿看到同伴得到表扬，也会向他们学习，积 极做出好的行为表现，以求得到老师的表扬和夸奖。在这种相互学习、争先恐后的激励机制中，具有好行为和好习惯的幼儿会越来越多，我们的德育教育就会收到良好的效果。比如：这个学期我到大(6)班代保育工作时，贺敏然等几个幼儿特别爱帮老师收拾餐具、打 扫卫生，我就抓住这个机会当着全班小朋友的面表扬他们的好行为，结果后来有许多小朋友在吃晚午餐后都争先恐后地帮着老师收餐具、擦桌子、叠凳子，甚至拖地、扫地，看他们那一个个热爱劳动的身 影真是可爱极了，虽然他们因年龄太小，打扫得不太干净，但我也 表扬了他们那种热爱劳动、乐于做事的好思想、好行为，并趁机教 会了他们收拾碗筷、桌椅、扫地拖地的正确方法。 三、学规范、明是非，在知识中进步。 四、家园一致，让幼儿在同心中进步。 培养孩子的行为习惯，家庭的教育和影响不容忽视，试想：如果一个家长满口脏话、动手就打人，那他的孩子怎么可能做到文明礼
品质部职责与岗位说明书 Prepared on 22 November 2020
第一部部门使命与职能品质部 部门使命 严格执行我司企业检验标准对物料进行检验并不断完善企业检验标准，负责材料，半成品和成品的检验，负责报表的整理归档，负责处理过程中不良问题并跟进。 主要职能 1.来料检验 ?严格执行原材料、外购、外协件的验收制度，对因违反制度而造成的质量事故及经济损失负责。 ?做好进料验收、检验、试验记录的存档保管工作，确保原始记录准确、清晰、完整。 ?及时将来料验收中的发现的不合格情况向经理报告，并提出处理意见。 ?做好进料检验状态的标识工作，并符合可追溯性。 ?负责材料品质异常的反馈、跟进、处理、验证与相关部门沟通协调处理好相关事情。 ?跟进品质异常发出的纠正预防措施报告是否及时回复。 2.制程检验 ?严格执行制程检验规程，对因违反制度而造成的质量事故及经济损失负责。 ?认真执行巡检制度，做好巡检工作，对所检查的产品，按规定做好产品的检验状态标识，对错检、漏检负责。 ?做好检查中发现的不合格品的隔离工作。 ?负责新产品试产和首件确认工作，填写相关报表,并跟进新产品。 ?及时向经理汇报检查中发现的不合格情况，对因不汇报造成的后果负责。 ?参与生产线质量改进工作,并提出质量改进建议。 ?督促生产员工遵守工艺纪律，对不遵守工艺纪律的情况及时向班长或经理汇报。 ?积极配合主管领导处理客户投诉，品质检讨和纠正预防措施工作。 ?负责培训在线检验员检验水平和能力。
?协调车间搞好日常检验和5S工作。 3.出货检验 ?严格执行出货检验规程，对因违反制度而造成的质量事故及经济损失负责。 ?执行产品入库质量检验流程，做好入库产品(半成品或成品)的检验工作，对错、漏检负责。 ?按出货检验规范检验，并做好记录，做好产品的检验状态标识。 ?及时将出货检验中发现的不合格情况向经理汇报，并提出处理意见，对因不汇报造成的后果负责。 ?做好仓库成品检验状态的标识，对仓库中超过检验有效期的成品进行复检。 ?及时跟进客户反馈。 第二部分岗位说明书 （一）IQC进料检验员 IQC岗位说明书
1、，即父母与未婚子女一起居住。家庭结构较为简单，家庭结构成员之间交往增多，容易形成亲密感情，这是父母对儿女实施教育的基础。在这种家庭中，父母对孩子的教育思想、教育认识容易达成一致。但由于家庭成员少，孩子的交往对象单一，不利于形成较强的交往能力。 2、，即由祖辈、父辈、孙辈三代人构成的家庭类型。由于人口较多，规模较大，层次较复杂，儿童可以同时和几代人交往，学习长辈们的相处方式，锻炼各种适应社会生活的交往能力，促进个体社会化。但在这种家庭中，家长之间容易引起冲突从而影响孩子的成长。这两种家庭结构又被称为“完整家庭”。 3、，即父母一方或双方死亡，或者由于种种原因导致离异等造成的家庭结构缺损。生长在这类家庭中，儿童的社会化所受的影响取决于儿童的性别、年龄失去父亲或母亲的原因以及父母的态度。如果父母离异了，但在教育孩子问题上仍能进行沟通，双方能就孩子成长过程中的问题及时交流，这样对孩子的影响将会大大降低。 家庭教养方式摘要：近些年来，许多人认识到培养性格健全的孩子非常的重要，然而要培养一个性格健全的孩子并非一件容易的事。孩子小，思想行为都容易受到外界环境的影响。父母不同的教养方式会对孩子以后形成一个什么样的性格有着直接的关系。本文主要为大家展示了现代社会普遍存在的三种父母教养方式，即：专制型、放任型、民主型。 关键词：教养方式、成长、性格 父母教育问题自古以来就受到人们的关注，但被做为一种学科进行研究，在我国也就是近年来的事情。这是时代的发展，人才的需求，国民整体素质提高所必须涉及的问题。这里与家长们探讨父母教育的重要性，目的是要父母与社会、教育部门共同担负起教育下一代的任务。 一父母教养方式及其分类 父母教养方式是父母教养观念、教养行为及其对儿童的情感表现的一种组合方式。这种组合方式是相对稳定的，不随情境的改变而变化，它反映了亲自交往的实质。 在心理学中，把父母教养方式归纳为两个维度：接受—拒绝维度和控制—容许维度，根据这两个维度的不同组合，可以形成四种教养方式：权威型、专断型、溺爱型、忽视型。 在多数情况下，权威型最有利于孩子的成长，这是一种理性且民主的教养方式，父母在孩子心目中有权威，这种权威来自父母对孩子的理解与尊重，来自他们与孩子的经常交流及对子女的帮助。父母为孩子设立恰当的目标，对孩子的行为作出适当限制，并且奖惩分明。这种教养方式下的儿童独立性较强，自尊感和自信心较强，善于自我控制和解决问题，喜欢与人交往并具有一定的社会责任感。 专断型父母则要求孩子绝对地服从自己，对孩子的要求很严厉，提出很高的行为标准，稍有不顺，非打即罚。这种教养方式下的儿童常常表现出焦虑、退缩和不快乐，自我调节能力和适应性都比较差，缺乏社会责任感。长此以往，将会与父母关系疏远，产生叛逆心理。 溺爱型的父母对孩子充满了爱与期望，但对孩子缺乏控制和要求，对孩子违反规则的行为采取忽视或接受的态度，很少发怒或训斥儿童。这种教养方式下成长起来的儿童表现得很不成熟，自我控制能力很差，常以哭闹等方式寻求即时的满足，对父母依赖性很强，缺乏自信、恒心、毅力和责任感，具有较强的冲动性和攻击性，对父母缺乏孝心。 忽视型的父母对孩子的成长表现出漠不关心的态度，既缺乏爱的情感和积极反应，又缺少行为方面的要求和控制。跟孩子在一起的时间很少，有时会对孩子流露出厌烦、不愿搭理的态度。不管出于何种原因，这种极端的忽略也可以视为对孩子的一种虐待，这是对孩子情感生活和物质生活的剥夺。它会使孩子出现
品质部职能分解 品质部管理职责 品质部职责： a.企业品质制度的建立及推动执行； b.品质活动之执行与推动； c.进料、在制品、成品品质规范的制定与推动执行； d.制程品质管制能力的分析，异常的改善； e.制程品质的巡回检验与控制； f.客户投诉与退货的处理与调查、分析、回复原因及改善措施； g.企业品质异常的仲裁及处理； h.量规、检验仪器的校正与管制； i.产品开发与试制的参与； j.不合格品预防措施的订立与执行； k.协力厂品质能力的辅导、品质能力与品质管制绩效的评估； l.品质培训计划的制定与推动及执行； m.品质报告与成本的分析； n.品质保证方案的拟定并推动全面质量管理活动的进行； o.其他品质管制事项的制定。 1．品质部主管 a. 品管系统之研究、完善；品质异常之研究、改善。 b.负责组织产品全过程的检验和试验的质量检验工作，对所有交付产品的质量符合性负责。 c.组织指导检验员对所有检验情况进行记录，并填写产品检验记录和有关检验报告。 d. 客户投诉之调查、处理及改善对策之提出；参与日常不合格品的处理、评审、会签。
e.对错、漏检造成的批次性问题及质量事故负领导责任。 f. 训练计划之提出、执行；组织检验员的培训学习考核工作，保证检验员合格上岗，提高技术水平。 g.做好质量印章管理工作，对印章管理混乱而造成质量问题负责。 h.参与工模夹具、工艺装备验证、验收和维修的质量检验。 i.参与对分供方质量保证能力的考核、验证工作。 j.教育职工坚持“质量第一”，严格执行检验制度 k.教育检验员当好产品质量的检验员、“质量第一”的宣传员和生产技术的辅导员。 l.及时处理质量问题和反馈质量信息；全面质量管理之推进。 m．品质方针、制度之遵守与推动；品质计划之制定。 n. 完成公司和上级交代的其它工作，并对上级负责。 2．进料检验IQC a.公司所有原材料进厂检验。 b.公司所有外协件进厂检验。 c.及时准确的判定物料是否合格，避免影响生产。 d.及时对检验不合格品进行处理、控制、标识、反馈、要求改善并追踪改善效果。 e.及时准确完成IQC日报、供应商履历表登记，报表需记录管理要求。 f.对生产中出现的不良品退货进行准确判定，生产及来料不良不可混放，外协加工厂退货的判定及请示。G．完成公司和上级交代的其它工作，并对上级负责。 3.生产过程检验IPQC a.对公司所有工序产品品质进行巡查，及时发现问题。 b.对每一生产单首件进行材料、外观、结构、功能的确认，新产品交工程部确认签字。 c.对每小时出现的前二项不良进行追踪原因，并跟催改善。 d.对成品进行抽检及时发现不稳定现象。 e.依BOM单、生产单对包装首件进行确认。
1父母教养方式对幼儿发展影响的研究
华中师范大学高等教育自学考试 毕业论文 父母教养方式对幼儿发展影响的研究 准考证号： 013712212453 姓名：徐婷 专业：学前教育 办学点：郧阳师专 指导教师：王凤 2014年10月18日 华中师范大学高等教育自学考试办公室印制
父母教养方式对幼儿发展影响的研究内容摘要：在我国，对幼儿的引导、教育，往往被认为是幼儿教师的事情。在这一传统思想的支配下，忽视了父母的教养方式对幼儿的影响。父母是孩子的第一任老师，父母的教养方式的好坏对孩子有着重要的影响。国内外的一些研究表明父母通过言传身教潜移默化地影响着子女的行为，积极的家庭教养方式使儿童形成积极地人格特征，而长期不当的家庭教养方式易使子女形成难于适应社会的不良人格特征，如何选择正确的教养方式，如何根据幼儿不同成长阶段调整教养方式，是当代幼儿教育的重要课题。本文从权威型、专断型、溺爱型和忽视型四种典型的家庭教养方式深入分析了不同的父母教养方式的特点及其影响因素以及不同的教养方式对幼儿心理发展、社会性发展和个性发展三个方面的重要影响，深刻的阐述了良好的父母教养方式对于幼儿全面、健康的发展的重要作用，并且很好地诠释了建立良好教养方式的策略与方法。 关键词：教养方式幼儿发展成长影响
目录 前言 (1) 1父母教养方式分类及其影响因素 (2) 1.1父母教养方式的分类 (2) 1.1.1权威型 (2) 1.1.2专断型 (3) 1.1.3溺爱型 (3) 1.1.4忽视型 (4) 1.2影响父母教养方式的因素 (4) 1.2.1幼儿的年龄与性别 (5) 1.2.2父母的受教育程度 (5) 1.2.3父母的经历 (5) 1.2.4社会经济地位 (5) 1.2.5父母的个性特征 (6) 2父母教养方式对幼儿发展的影响 (7) 2.1对幼儿心理过程发展的影响 (7) 2.2对幼儿社会性发展的影响 (9) 2.3对幼儿个性发展的影响 (10) 3建立良好教养方式的策略 (11) 3.1加强对幼儿心理素质的养成教育 (11) 3.2提倡民主型家庭教养方式 (11)
幼儿园小班思想品德教育 大家都知道，幼儿期的思想品德教育可以为人一生打下坚实的基础。而小班幼儿刚入园，是由家庭教育过渡到幼儿园教育的承上启下的时期，因此，我们抓住这一重要时期，培养幼儿自理能力、良好的行为习惯、谦让合作、关心他人的优良品德，养成良好的文明习惯，陶冶幼儿情操，培养幼儿的集体主义精神，为幼儿进入一生打下良好的基础。 一.日常生活中渗透品德教育幼儿园的品德教育工作不是单独的说教，它是渗透在幼儿一日生活的各个环节之中的。我们每时每刻都在对他们进行教育。晨间活动：我们教会幼儿简单的礼貌用语，如早晚跟老师说“早上好”“再见”，。让幼儿学习礼貌用语，增强文明意识。课间活动：在这时，我们教育孩子要相互关心、互相照顾，帮助他们复习课上所学的内容；要学会谦让，好玩的玩具大家一起玩。进餐：进餐时，我们培养幼儿良好的进餐习惯，指导幼儿独立进餐，吃饭时不掉米粒、不剩饭菜，吃完后能自觉地将餐具放好，让幼儿克服“饭来张口、衣来生手”的不良习惯。午睡：教育幼儿睡前将脱下的衣服叠整齐，并迅速入睡。离园活动：要求幼儿不追逐、不吵闹，安安静静等父母来接。 二.教育活动中的品德教育 1.培养幼儿适应集体生活的能力，让他们感受到周围成人的关
心爱护。学期初，为了使小班幼儿尽快适应集体生活，我们首先组织他们参观幼儿园，故事《高高兴兴上幼儿园》、歌曲《我爱我的幼儿园》。是幼儿尽快适应了幼儿园的集体生活。 2.培养幼儿的生活自理能力。小班幼儿的生活自理能力较差，虽让他们能够独立进餐，但由于家长的过渡爱护，大部分幼儿都不会独立进餐，独立性较差。因此，我们针对幼儿的这些特点，在语言活动《大公鸡和漏嘴巴》、看图讲述《吃得真干净》常识《认识餐具》，音乐歌曲《好娃娃》。等活动，有计划、有步骤地引导幼儿独立的进餐、盥洗、睡觉等良好的自理能力。 3.学会简单的礼貌用语，进行礼貌教育.。礼貌教育是德育的重要内容，为此，我们在语言《有礼貌的好宝宝》故事《两只羊》歌曲《我的好妈妈》《好娃娃》认识《老师》。认识《家庭》，向幼儿进行礼貌教育。 三.节日中的品德教育九月十日”教师节”让幼儿绘画<红花>送给老师，让幼儿知道老师的辛苦劳动，教育幼儿热爱老师，尊重老师。十月一日“国庆节”让幼儿了解国庆节的来历，知道我们中国的历史，要热爱祖国，爱家乡的情感。一月一日“元旦”通过家园同乐庆新年联欢活动，让幼儿感受到新年的快乐，培养爱父母的情感。增进家庭成员的感情。鼓励幼儿大胆参加集体活动，感受新年的乐趣。 四、家园联系共同教育对幼儿进行品德教育，靠学校单方面的努力是不行的，必需保持教育的一致性。因此，家庭、幼儿园
2012-02-22 13:44 论家庭教养方式的四种类型 家庭是儿童最初的生活场所，儿童的社会性发展首先从家庭开始。通过家庭成员特别是父母的抚养与教育，儿童逐渐获得了知识和技能，掌握了各种行为规则和社会规范。但在诸多影响儿童社会化发展的家庭因素中，父母教养方式是最重要的一个。正是通过父母对子女的教养行为，才把社会的价值观念、行为方式、态度体系及社会道德规范传递给儿童。 一般来说，可以把父母教养方式归纳为两个维度：其一是父母对待孩子的情感态度，即接受---拒绝维度；其二是父母对孩子有要求和控制程度，即控制---容许维度。在情感维度的接受端，家长以积极肯定、耐心的态度对待孩子，尽可能满足孩子的各项要求；在情感的拒绝端，家长常以排斥的态度对待孩子，对他们不闻不问。在要求与控制维度的控制端，家长为孩子制订了较高的标准，并要求他们努力达到这些要求；在要求与控制维度的容许端，家长宽容放任对孩子缺乏管教。 根据这两个维度的不同组合，可以形成四种教养方式：权威型、专断型、放纵型和忽视型。不同的教养方式无疑会对孩子的社会性发展和个性形成产生重大影响。具体可见下表所示。 教养方式 维度类型 可能后果 权威型 接受+控制 儿童期：心情愉悦，幸福感；高自尊和高自我控制 青少年期：高自尊，高社会和道德成熟性；高学术和学业成就 专断型
拒绝+控制 儿童期：焦虑，退缩，不幸福感；遇到挫折易产生敌对感 青少年期：与权威型相比，自我调整和适应较差；但与放纵型和忽视型相比，常有更好的在校表现 放纵型 接受+容许 儿童期：冲动,不服从,叛逆；苛求且依赖成人；缺乏毅力 青少年期:自我控制差,在校表现不良与权威型或放纵型相比，更易产生不良行为 忽视型 拒绝+容许 儿童期：在依赖、认知、游戏、情绪和社会技巧方面存在缺陷；攻击性行为 青少年期：自我控制差；学校表现不良 ▲权威型教养方式 这是一种理性且民主的教养方式。权威型的父母认为自己在孩子心目中应该有 权威。但这种权威来自父母对孩子的理解与尊重，来自他们与孩子的经常交流及对孩子的帮助。父母以积极肯定的态度对待儿童，及时热情地对儿童的需要、行为做出反应，尊重并鼓励儿童表达自己的意见和观点。同时他们对儿童有较高的要求，对儿童不同的行为表现奖惩分明。