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accounting and finance专业介绍-概述说明以及解释1.引言1.1 概述概述部分的内容可以包括对accounting and finance专业的定义和简要介绍。
可以着重强调该专业的重要性和它在商业领域中的作用。
概述：accounting and finance是一门研究财务管理和会计原理的学科，其目的是培养学生具备在财务和会计领域工作所需的技能和知识。
这个领域的专业人士负责管理和监督组织的财务活动，确保其财务健康并为未来的决策提供有关财务数据和信息。
会计和财务专业具有深远的影响力，无论是在商业机构还是在非营利组织。
它们为决策制定者提供了必要的财务信息，以便他们能够作出明智的决策，规划战略并管理资源。
通过学习会计和财务知识，学生将掌握财务报告、预算编制、投资决策和风险管理等方面的技能。
在现代商业环境中，会计和财务专业人士扮演着关键的角色。
他们需要具备分析能力、问题解决能力和沟通能力，以便能够理解和解释复杂的财务数据，并为管理者和其他利益相关者提供准确的报告和建议。
因此，accounting and finance专业对于那些想要在商业领域取得成功的学生来说是非常有吸引力的选择。
无论是在投资银行、会计师事务所、企业财务部门还是其他金融机构，这个专业都提供了广阔的就业机会和职业发展空间。
在接下来的章节中，我们将更详细地介绍会计专业和财务专业，以便更全面地了解这两个领域的特点和要求。
1.2 文章结构文章结构部分的内容可以描述整篇文章的组织结构和各个章节的主要内容。
可以按照以下方式编写：在本文中，将介绍accounting and finance专业的相关知识和领域。
文章主要分为引言、正文和结论三个部分。
引言部分将为读者提供一个概述，简单介绍accounting and finance 专业的背景和重要性。
同时，还会阐述本文的目的，为读者提供一个清晰的阅读指南。
正文部分将详细介绍会计专业和财务专业。
1 办公自动化Office Automation3 保险会计Insurance Accounting4 保险学Insurance5 比较管理学Comparative Management6 比较审计学Comparative Auditing7 毕业实习Graduation Practice8 财务报表分析Financial Statements Analysis9 财务报告环境Financial Reporting Environment10 财务分析Financial Analysis11 财务风险控制Management of Financial Risks12 财务管理Financial Management13 财务会计Financial Accounting14 财务造假对策Countermeasure for Financial Fraudulence 15 财政概论Introduction to Fiscal Science16 财政学Fiscal Science17 财政与信贷Finance and Credit18 成本会计Cost Accounting19 程序设计语言Programme Design Language20 促销与广告Promotion and Advertising21 大学生活导论Guidance of Campus Life22 大学英语College English23 大学语文College Chinese24 当代国际经济Contemporary World Economy25 道德教育Moral Education26 邓小平理论Introduction to Deng Xiaoping’s Theory 27 电影美学Aesthetics of Cinema28 独立审计Independent Auditing29 对外贸易保险Foreign Trade Insurance30 对外贸易运输Foreign Trade Transportation31 发展经济学Development Economics32 法律Law33 法律基础Basics of Law34 法学概论Introduction to Law35 法学基础Fundamentals of Law Science36 房地产投资与金融Real Estate Investment & Finance 37 风险管理Risk Management38 概率论Mathematics - probability39 概率论与数理统计Probability & Mathematical Statistics 40 高等数学Advanced Mathematics41 高级财务会计Advanced Financial Accounting42 高级会计Advanced Accounting43 高级英语技能Advanced English44 高级英语阅读Advanced English Reading45 高级语言程序设计Advanced Language Programme Design46 工程经济学与管理会计Engineering economics and management accounting47 工程造价管理Project Pricing Management48 工程制图Engineering Drawing49 工业会计Industrial Accounting50 工业企业管理Industrial Business Management51 工业企业经济活动分析Analysis of Industrial Business Activities52 工业行业技术评估概论Introduction to Industrial Technical Evaluation53 公共关系Public Relations54 公共金融学Public Finance55 公关礼仪Etiquette for Public Relations56 公司财务Corporate Finance57 公司法Corporate Law58 公司理财Corporate Finance59 古代诗词曲赋选讲Selections of Ancient Poems60 古代文学作品赏析Analytical Application of Ancient Literary Works61 古汉语Ancient Chinese62 股份经济学Stock Economics63 管理沟通Managerial Communication64 管理会计Management Accounting65 管理经济学Managerial Economics66 管理伦理学Business Ethics67 管理心理学Management Psychology68 管理信息Management Information69 管理信息系统Management information system70 管理学Management71 管理学原理Principle of Management72 管理战略Management Strategy73 管理咨询Business Consulting74 国际工商管理International Business Management75 国际关系与政治International Relationship and Politics76 国际会计International Accounting77 国际货物买卖合同Contract of International Goods Sales78 国际技术贸易International Technology Trade79 国际结算International Settlement80 国际金融International Finance81 国际金融市场International Financial Market82 国际经济合作概论International Economic Cooperation83 国际经济合作原理Principles of International Economic Cooperation84 国际经济组织International Economic Organizations85 国际经营管理International Business Management86 国际贸易International Trade 87 国际贸易实务International Trade Practices88 国际企业管理International Business Management。
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高级语言程序设计Advanced Language Programme Design工程造价管理Project Pricing Management工业行业技术评估概论Introduction to Industrial Technical Evaluation 公共关系Public Relations公关礼仪Etiquette for Public Relations管理沟通Managerial Communication国际关系与政治International Relationship and Politics国际技术贸易International Technology Trade机械制图Mechanical Drawing计算机科学Computer Science技术创新Technological Innovation技术经济Technological Economics价格学Pricing建筑项目预算Constructive Project Budgeting金融管理软件Financial Management Software经济文献检索Economic Document Searching经济文写作Economic Article Writing经贸科研论文与写作Research Project on Economics & Trade伦理学Ethics逻辑学Logic社会保障Social Security社会调查Social Survey社会学Sociology世界经济概论Introduction to World Economy世界经贸地理World Geography for Economics and Trade世界市场行情World Market Survey世界政治经济与国际关系World Politics, Economy and International Relations 数据结构Database Structure数据库管理Database Management数据库及其应用Database and Applications数据模型与决策Digital Models and Decision-making外国经济地理Economic Geography of Foreign Countries外国经济史History of Foreign Economies外贸函电Business Correspondence for Foreign Trade外贸口语Oral English for Foreign Trade外贸实务Foreign Trade Practices物流运输计划管理Logistics Planning & management系统工程System Engineering现代国际政治与经济Contemporary International Politics and Economics信息分析Information Analysis信息技术与新组织Information Technology and New Organisations形式逻辑Formal Logic英语经贸文章选读Selected English Readings of Economic and Trade Literature营销管理Marketing Management营运管理Operation Management运筹学Operations Research战略管理Strategic Management职业道德伦理Professional Ethics中国对外经贸政策与投资环境Chinese Foreign Trade Policy and Investment Environment中国对外贸易史History of Chinese Foreign Trade中国外贸概论Introduction to Chinese Foreign Trade资刊选读Selected Reading from Foreign Magazines组织行为学Organisational Behaviour大学课程英文名称（做英文成绩单有用）Advanced Computational Fluid Dynamics 高等计算流体力学Advanced Mathematics 高等数学Advanced Numerical Analysis 高等数值分析Algorithmic Language 算法语言Analogical Electronics 模拟电子电路Artificial Intelligence Programming 人工智能程序设计Audit 审计学Automatic Control System 自动控制系统Automatic Control Theory 自动控制理论Auto-Measurement Technique 自动检测技术Basis of Software Technique 软件技术基础Calculus 微积分Catalysis Principles 催化原理Chemical Engineering Document Retrieval 化工文献检索Circuitry 电子线路College English 大学英语College English Test (Band 4) CET-4College English Test (Band 6) CET-6College Physics 大学物理Communication Fundamentals 通信原理Comparative Economics 比较经济学Complex Analysis 复变函数论Computational Method 计算方法Computer Graphics 图形学原理Computer Interface Technology 计算机接口技术Contract Law 合同法Cost Accounting 成本会计Circuit Measurement Technology 电路测试技术Database Principles 数据库原理Design & Analysis System 系统分析与设计Developmental Economics 发展经济学Digital Electronics 数字电子电路Digital Image Processing 数字图像处理Digital Signal Processing 数字信号处理Econometrics 经济计量学Economical Efficiency Analysis for Chemical Technology 化工技术经济分析Economy of Capitalism 资本主义经济Electromagnetic Fields & Magnetic Waves 电磁场与电磁波Electrical Engineering Practice 电工实习Enterprise Accounting 企业会计学Equations of Mathematical Physics 数理方程Experiment of College Physics 物理实验Experiment of Microcomputer 微机实验Experiment in Electronic Circuitry 电子线路实验Fiber Optical Communication System 光纤通讯系统Finance 财政学Financial Accounting 财务会计Fine Arts 美术Functions of a Complex Variable 单复变函数Functions of Complex Variables 复变函数Functions of Complex Variables & Integral Transformations 复变函数与积分变换Fundamentals of Law 法律基础Fuzzy Mathematics 模糊数学General Physics 普通物理Graduation Project(Thesis) 毕业设计（论文）Graph theory 图论Heat Transfer Theory 传热学History of Chinese Revolution 中国革命史Industrial Economics 工业经济学Information Searches 情报检索Integral Transformation 积分变换Intelligent robot(s); 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【英文教学参考书】⑴AICPA,1994,"Improving Business Reporting:A Customs Focus".⑵FASB,2001,"Improving Business Reporting:Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures".⑶Storey and Teague,1995,"Foundation of Accounting Theory and Policy",The Dryden Press.⑷Previts and Merino,1979,"A History of Accounting in American",John Wilet&Son Press.⑸Scott,1997,"Financial Accounting Theory",Prentice-Hall Publishing Company..⑺Upton,2001,"Business and Financial Reporting,Challenges from The New Economy",FASB.⑻Zeff and Dharan,1994,"Readings and Notes on Financial Accounting:Issues and Controversies", McGraw-Hill Company.外文经典文献：Watts , Ross , and Jerold L. Zimmerman. Toward a Positive Theory of Determination of Accounting standards .The Accounting review (Jan 1978)Watts , Ross , and Jerold L. Zimmerman. Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective. The Accounting review (Jan 1990)Sorter , George H. An Event Approach to Basic Accounting Theory . The Accounting review (Jan 1969)Wallman,1995.9,1996.6,1996.12,1997.6,"The Future of Accounting and Financial Reporting " (I ,II,III,IV),Accounting Horizon.Jenson ,M.C. , and W.H. Meckling . Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure . Journal of financial economics (Oct .1976)Robert sprouse “developing a concept framework for financial reporting” Accounting Review, 1988(12) Schuetze ,,Walter P.”what is an Asset ?” Accountinghorizons,1993(9)Samuelson ,Richard A. ,”The concept of Assets in Accounting Theory” Accounting horizons,1996(9)AAA ,”American Accounting Association on Accounting and Auditing Measurement:1989-1990” Accounting Horizons 1991(9)L.Todd Johnson and Kimberley R.Petrone “Is Goodwill an Asset?” Accounting Horizons1998(9)Linsmeier, Thomas J. and Boatsman ,Ja mes R. ,”AAA’s financial accounting standard response to IASC ED60 intangible assets” Accounting Horizons 1998(9)Linsmeier, Thomas J. and Boatsman,JamesR.”Response to IASC ExposureDraft ,’Provisions,Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’ ” Accoun ting Horizons1998(6)L.Todd Johnson and Robert. Swieringa “derivatives, hedging and comprehensive income” Accounting Horizons 1996(11)Stephen A. .Zeff ,”The Rise of Economics Concequences”, The Journal of Accountancy 1978(12)David Solomons “the FASB’s Conceptual Framework:An Evaluation ” The Journal of Accountancy 1986(6)Paul Miller , “Conceptual Framework:Myths or Realities” The Journal of Accountancy 1985(3)Part I Financial Accounting TheorySuggested Bedtime Readings:1. C.J. Lee, Lecture Note on Accounting and Capital Market2. R. Watts and J. Zimmerman: Positive Accounting Theory3. W. Beaver: Revolution of Financial ReportingAlthough these three books are relatively "low-tech" in comparison with the reading assignments, but they provide much useful institutional background to the course. Moreover, these books give a good survey of accounting literature, especially in the empirical area.1. Financial Information and Asset Market Equilibrium*Grossman, S. and J. Stiglitz, "On the Impossibility of Informationally EfficientMarkets," American Economic Review (1980), 393-408.*Diamond, D. and R. Verrecchia, "Information Aggregation in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Journal of Financial Economics, (1981), 221-35.*Milgrom, P. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, (1981): 380-91.Grinblatt, M. and S. Ross, "Market Power in a Securities Market with Endogenous Information," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1985), 1143-67.2. Financial Disclosure* Verrecchia, R. "Discretionary Disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics (1983),179-94.2Dye, R., "Proprietary and Nonproprietary Disclosure," Journal of Business, 59 (1986), 331-66.Dye, R., "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real Externalities," Accounting Review, (1990), 1-24.Bhushan, R., "Collection of Information About Public Traded Firms: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economics and Accounting, (1989), 183-206.Diamond, D. "Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Economic Theory (1985), 1071-94.Verrecchia, R. "Information Quality and Discretionary Disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1990.Trueman, B. "Theories of Earnings-announcement Timing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13 (1990), 1-17.Joh, G. and C. J. Lee "Timing of Financial Disclosure in Oligopolies," mimeo.* Joh, G. and C. J. Lee "Stock Market Reactions to Accounting Information in Oligopoly," Journal of Business, 1992.Darrough, M.N. and N.M. Stoughton, "Financial Disclosure Policy in an Entry Game," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1990), 219-243.Wagenhofer, A. "Voluntary Disclosure with a Strategic Opponent," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12 (1990), 341-363.Chang, C. and C.J. Lee, "Information Acquisition as a Business Strategy," Southern Economic Journal, 1992.Chang, C. and C.J. Lee, "Optimal Pricing Strategy in Marketing Research Consulting," International Economic Review, May 1994.Chang, C. and C.J. Lee, "Selling Proprietary Information to Rivaling Clients," mimeo.3. Earnings Manipulation and Accounting Choice* Watts, R. and J. Zimmerman,"Toward a Positive Theory of the Determination ofAccounting Standards," Accounting Review, January 1978, pp.112-34.*Healy, P.M. "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions" Journal of Accounting and Economics, April 1985, 85-108.*Chen, K. and C.J. Lee, "Executive Bonus Plans and Accounting Trade-off: The Case of the 3Oil and Gas Industry, 1985-86," Accounting Review, January, 1995.*Lee, C.J. and D. Hsieh, "Choice of Inventory Accounting Methods: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses," Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1985.*Lee, C.J. and C.R. Petruzzi, "Inventory Accounting Switch and Uncertainty", Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1989.*Chau, D. and C.J. Lee, “Big Bath and Dress Up in the Process of Chapter 11 Restructuring,” working paper.*Aharony, J., C.J. Lee, and T.J. Wong, “Financial Packaging of IPO Firms in China” Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 2000.Gu, Z. and C.J. Lee, “How Widespread is Earnings Management? A Measurement Based on Seasonal Heteroscedasticity.” working paperGu, Z. and C.J. Lee, “Cross-sectional Heteroscedasticity of Accounting Accruals,” working paper.Holthausen, R.W. and R.W. Leftwich, "The Economic Consequences of Accounting Choice: Implications of Costly Contracting and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting and Economics, August 1983, PP. 77-118.Moyer, S.E. "Capital Adequacy Ratio Regulations and Accounting Choices in Commercial banks," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1990), 123-154.Blacconiere, W.G., R.M. Bowen, S.E. Sefcik, and C.H. Stinson, "Determinants of the Use of Regulatory Accounting Principles by Savings and Loans," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1991) 167-202.Hand, J.R.M. and P.J. Hughes, and S.E. Sefcik, "Insubstance Defeasances," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1990), 47-89.Duke, J.C. and H.G. Hunt III, "An Empirical Examination of Debt Covenant Restrictions and Accounting-Related Debt Proxies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12 (1990), 45-64.Malmquist, D.H., "Efficient Contracting and the Choice of Accounting Method in the Oil and Gas Industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12 (1990), 173-207.Holthausen, R.W., "Accounting Method Choice: Opportunistic Behavior, Efficient Contracting, and Information Perspectives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12 (1990), 207-218.Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice Hall, 1985, Chapters 7-15.44. Measurement and Valuation Role of Accounting*Ball, R. and P. Brown, “Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers,” Journal of Accounting Research, 1968.*Lee, C.J. and A. Li, “Risk, Contrarian Strategies, and Analysts’ Over-reaction: A Study of B/M and E/P Anomaly in Cross-sectional Returns.” Working Paper.Lee, C.J. "Inventory Accounting and Earnings/Price Ratios: A Puzzle," Contemporary Accounting Research, Fall, 1988.Chen, K. and C.J. Lee, "Accounting Measurement of Economic Performance and Tobin's q Theory," Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, Spring, 1995.Gu, Z. and C.J. Lee, "Co-integration and Test of Present Value Model: A Revisit," mimeo.Ghosh, A. and C.J. Lee, "Accounting Information and Market Valuation of Takeover Premium," Financial Management, Forthcoming* Joh, G. and C. J. Lee "Stock Market Reactions to Accounting Information in Oligopoly," Journal of Business, 1992.Part II Managerial Accounting5. Agency Theory*Holmstrom, B. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, (1979), 74-91Rogerson, "The First Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, March 1985.*Jesen, M. and W. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economcs, (1976), 305-60.*Grossman, S. and O. Hart, "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, (1983), 7-46.Holmstrom, B. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, (1982), 224-40.Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," The Rand Journal of Economics, (1986), 18-32.Malcomson, J. "Rank-order Contract for a Principal with Many Agents," Review of Eonomic Studies, (1986), 807-817.Lambert, R. "Long-term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, (1983),5.441-452.Malcomson, J. and F. Spinnewyn, "The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem," Review of Economic Studies, (1988), 391-408.6. Theory of Firm and Organization*Coase, R.H. "The Nature of the Firm," Economica, (1937), 386-405.*Alchian, A.A. "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy,(1950), 211-21.*Alchian, A.A. and H. Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, (1972), 777-795.* Sah, R. and J. Stiglitz, "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review (1986), 716-727Aoki, M. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review (1986), 971-983.Tirole, J. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1986), 181-214.Christensen, J. "Communication in Agencies," Bell Journal of Economics, (1981), 661-674.Grossman, S. and O. Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Horizontal Integration," Journal of Political Economy, (1986), 691-719.Mookherjee, D. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies (1984), 433-46.Demski, J. and D. Sappington, "Optimal Incentives with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory (1984), 152-71.Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole, "The Theory of the Firm," in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1990.Williamson, O. Markets and Hierarchies, 1975Williamson, O. The Economic Institution of Capitalism, 1985, Ch.6, 9, 11.7. Accounting and Internal Control*Demski, J. and D. Sappington, "Hierarchical Structure and Responsibility Accounting," Journal of Accounting Research, 1989.6*Coase, R.H., "Accounting and the Theory of Firm," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1990), 3-13.Jordan, J., "The Economics of Accounting Information Systems," American Economic Review, 1989.Antle, R. and J. Fellingham, "Resource Rationing and Oganizational Slack in aTwo-Period Model," Journal of Accounting Research, (1990) 1-24.Demski, J., J. Patell, and M. Wolfson, "Decentralized Choice of Monitoring Systems," Accounting Review, (1984), 16-34.Penno, M. "Accounting Systems, Participation in Budgeting, and Performance Evaluation," Accounting Review, (1990), 303-314.Melumed, N.D. and S. Reichelstein, "Centralized vesus Delegation and the Value of Communication," Journal of Accounting Research, (1987 Supplement), 1-21.8. Field Studies of Management Accounting*Baiman, S., D.F. Larcker, and M.V. Rajan, "Organizational Design for Business Units," Journal of Accounting Research, 33 (Autumn 1995): 205-231.Lee, C.J. “Financial Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises in China: The Case of Shanghai Sunve Co.” Accounting, Organization and Society, fo rthcoming.Part 3. Auditing and Accounting Regulation9. Role of Auditing*R.A. Dye, B.V. Balachandran, and R.P. Magee, "Contingent Fees for Audit Firms," Journal of Accounting Research, (1990), 239-266.*L. DeAngelo, "Auditor Independence, 'Low Balling,' and Disclosure Regulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1981), 113-27.*Lee, C.J. and Z. Gu, " Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence,” Accounting Review, 1998.Magee, R.P. and M. Tseng, "Audit Pricing and Independence," Accounting Review, (1990), 315-336.Datar, S., G.A. Feltham, and J.S. Hughes, "The Role of Audits and Audit Quality in Valuing New Issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1991), 3-50.7Penno, M. "Auditing for Performance Evaluation," Accounting Review, (1990),520-536.Melumad, N.D. and L. Thoman, "On Auditors and the Courts in an Adverse Selection Setting," Journal of Accounting Research, (1990) 77-120.Baiman, S., J.H. Evans III, and N.J. Nagarajan, "Collusion in Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, (1991), 1-18.10. Financial Accounting Standards*Dye, R. and R.E. Verrecchia, "Discretion vs. Uniformity: Choices Among GAAP," Accounting Review, July 1995, 389-415.Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," Rand Journal of Economics. 16 (Spring 1985): 70-83.*Lev, B. "Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy," Accounting Review, January 1988.11. The Market of CPAs*Dye, R. "Incorporation and the Audit Market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19 (1995): 75-114.*Lee, C.J., C. Liu, and T. Wang, “The 150 Hours Rule,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999.Liu, C., C.J. Lee, and T. Wang, “Human Capital, Auditor Independence, and Legal Liability,” working paper.Riodan, M. and D. Sappington, "Information, Incentives, and Organizational Mode,"Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987): 243-264.*Gigler, F. and M. Penno, "Imperfect Competition in Audit Markets and its Effects on the Demand for Audit-Related Services," Accounting Review, 70 (April 1995):317-336.。
international review of finance and accountingThe International Review of Finance and Accounting is a peer-reviewed academic journal that focuses on research in the areas of finance and accounting. It aims to provide a platform for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to exchange ideas and disseminate high-quality research in these fields.The journal covers a wide range of topics including corporate finance, investments, financial markets, banking, financial reporting, auditing, taxation, and other related areas. It publishes both theoretical and empirical research papers, as well as literature reviews and book reviews.The International Review of Finance and Accounting is published by Emerald Publishing and has a global readership. It is recognized as a leading journal in the field and is widely cited by researchers and professionals worldwide.The journal follows a rigorous peer-review process, ensuring the quality and validity of the published articles. It has a distinguished editorial board consisting of renowned scholars and experts in finance and accounting.Overall, the International Review of Finance and Accounting plays a significant role in advancing knowledge and understanding in the areas of finance and accounting. It provides a valuable platform for researchers and professionals to contribute to the literature and promote the development of these disciplines.。
公司金融的理论与实践：来自实地的证据关于资本成本、资本预算和资本结构问题，我们调查了392位首席财务官。
大的公司主要依靠现值技术和资本资产定价模型，而小公司相对地比较喜欢使用回收期标准。
当发行债务时，公司比较注重维护财务弹性和比较好的信用等级；当发行股票时，比较注重每股收益稀释和近期股票价格升值情况。
我们发现了对于支持优序融资假说和交易资本结构假说的支持，但是却很少找到经理关心资产替换、不对称信息、交易成本、自由现金流或者个人税务方面的证据。
关键词：资本结构资本成本股权成本资本预算折现率项目估值调查1. 简介在这篇文章中，我们对一项描述公司金融的现行实践的综合调查作了一个分析。
在这个领域中，最著名的实地研究也许就是约翰.林特纳的开创新的股利分配策略分析理论。
那个研究的结论至今仍被引用，并深刻地影响着股利分配策略的研究方式。
在很多方面，我们的目标和林特纳的有点相似。
我们的调查描述了公司金融的现行实践。
我们希望研究者们能利用我们的结果来发展新的理论—并且潜在地修改或者放弃已经存在的观点。
我们也希望从业者们能够从我们的结果中得到启发，通过观察其他的公司是怎样运行的以及确认其他学术文献没有完成的地方。
我们的调查跟以前的一些调查在很多方面都有不同。
首先，我们的调查的范围很广。
我们检测了资本配置，资本成本和资本结构。
这让我们可以把跨领域的结果联系在一起。
例如，有些公司在考虑资本结构问题时会优先考虑财务弹性，我们就调查了这些公司在考虑资本预算决定时是否也会注重实物期权。
我们在每个领域都进行了深入的探索，总共询问了100多个问题。
其次，我们抽样调查了接近4440个公司的大范围截面数据。
总计有392为首席财务官回应了我们的调查，回复率为9%。
我们所知道的第二大范围的调查是摩尔和理查特做的，调查了298个大公司。
我们研究了可能的未回复偏差，得出结论是我们的样本可以作为全部人口的代表。
第三，我们依据公司特征对回复结果进行了分析。
53 Buff. L. Rev. 789Buffalo Law ReviewSummer 2005Essay*789 FINANCE THEORY AND ACCOUNTING FRAUD:FANTASTIC FUTURES VERSUS CONSERVATIVE HISTORIESLawrence A. Cunningham d1Copyright (c) 2005 Buffalo Law Review; Lawrence A. CunninghamA secret at many leading business schools in the United States is that there is a certain set of intellectual tensions between the accounting and finance departments. The secret should be shared, however, because the underlying reasons for these tensions may help to explain the explosion of public company frauds in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This possibility is important because policymakers responded to those frauds without awareness of the tensions. By ignoring how tools developed in the finance department retard those developed in the accounting department, the value of Congress's reforms is diminished.Finance theory's rise to intellectual and policy influence began in the 1970s. It threatened accounting's relevance. In essence, it denied that accounting forms matter, holding that markets pierce those forms to determine value independent of accounting presentation. Numerous side effects manifest this theory's dominance. Prominent among them are two practical accounting developments (a movement toward fair value measures and discounted cash flow analysis) and two widespread market practices (pro forma financial reporting and analyst earnings forecasts). These and other side effects reside under *790 the broad chapeau of the forward-looking disclosure regime inaugurated in the 1970s and expanded ever since.Reforms responding to financial fraud addressed the two pervasive market practices--targeting symptoms of pro forma reporting and analyst forecasting-- but failed to address the disease and have, quite possibly, made financial reporting worse. To correct this oversight, this essay recommends two steps: (1) the forward-looking disclosure regime should include delineation of probable variability in financial data and (2) financial data should be presented in ranges rather than discrete numerals.I. TensionsThe most powerful theory affecting modern accounting arose outside the discipline, in the competing department of finance. Dubbed modern finance theory, its key concept is the efficient market hypothesis. Under the efficient market hypothesis, all historical information, including accounting data, is rapidly impounded into a company's stock price. Moreover, under this hypothesis, all publicly-available information is accurately interpreted no matter how or where it is presented. Therefore, modernfinance theory, which is widely believed,1 implies that any effort to improve accounting theory or practice is meaningless. Finance theory's contribution to accounting is thus its retardation, for three specific reasons.2First, efficiency theory holds that the form of presenting accounting information does not matter. If so, there is no point searching for an optimal form. If identical data can be placed anywhere in a set of financial statements (the balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, footnotes, or MD&A) and generate the same interpretation and result on price, promoting accountingquality is *791 wasteful. The disincentives to develop superior accounting are enormous.3Second, efficiency theory holds that accounting information is instantly useless. Struggles that are central to accounting, such as allocating economic events to discrete time periods, become moot. Irrelevant are traditionally critical--and basic--matterssuch as rates of depreciation for long-lived assets and whether to measure inventory using the first-in-first-out method or the last-in-first-out method. It even removes questions about whether and how to account for stock options. Associated costs oftenare high and related values fluctuate over multiple periods.4Third, efficiency theory holds that market price responds to cash flow effects of managerial decisions and policy, not to the effect on reported earnings per share. Companies should, therefore, never seek to manage earnings because investors will seethrough it. If so, accounting does not have to develop tools to discourage or detect such massage because it won't happen.5 This implies, in turn, a relatively modest utility for elaborate systems of internal control over financial reporting (which are the heart of reforms adopted in the wake of financial frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s).*792 In short, efficiency theory invokes presentiation.6 To presentiate is “[t]o make or render present in place or time; tocause to be perceived or realized as present.”7 In efficiency theory, all numerical history is absorbed into the current stock price and becomes instantly irrelevant; all that matters is the future and even this gets “discounted” into the price. This model of presentiation pretends to make time disappear. Yet, its enormous power retarded accounting as numerical history and reoriented financial reporting to a forward-looking, less reliable, fraud-tempting emphasis on prognosis.Consider two leading examples of finance theory's force in driving accounting developments: the fair value movement and cash-flow elevation. Accounting traditionally measures most assets using historical cost. Recording assets at historical cost is appealing because cost usually is observable and thus provides objectivity. It is reliable. Advocates of more ambitious goalsfor accounting seek a fair value approach.8 This fair value movement favors *793 reporting all assets on the balance sheet at fair value. The key motivation for fair value accounting is its currency; it is more relevant.Accounting struggles with the trade-off between reliability and relevance. The result is an accounting system split between these aspirations, usually resolved under accounting's conservatism principle in favor of reliability over relevance. The rising influence of finance caused a shift in accounting to favor relevance over reliability. True, fair value can be reported using appraisals or comparable transactions, but the remaining subjective element puts it in tension with the cardinal accounting tenet of conservatism.The fair value movement also has implications for revenue determinations. Accounting holds that revenues are not to be recognized until the earnings process generating them is complete (or substantially complete). An exception arises for investments in marketable securities, where gains and losses are recognized according to periodic changes in related market values of the assets. This so-called mark-to-market accounting is quintessentially a quest to bring into accounting a component of the future: investment values are assumed to reflect the present value of the related asset's future cash flow.Enron's pathologically fiendish managers delighted in the corrosive effects that modern finance theory has on contemporary accounting. Enron persuaded the SEC to approve using mark-to-market accounting in most of its businesses. The company entered into long-term contracts and used fair value measures to assess contract value. Enron's managers then recorded those values as revenue upon contract formation. This practice shredded basic principles of revenue recognition. It made Enron's income statement and balance sheet look ridiculous. Enron's specific escapades reflect widespread cultural obsession with cash flows, justified, in turn, by systematic diminishment of another long-standing principle of accounting, the accrual system.Accounting's traditional accrual system allocates economic events to discrete fiscal periods based upon a link to underlying business activity. It contrasts with the cash-basis of accounting, which records events when cash is exchanged. The accrual system's key device--the matching *794principle--pursues this aspiration by insisting that expenses burden the income statement of the period in which they contribute to revenue generation (or earlier if this cannot be determined). The focus is on the income statement. The accrual system's theoretical basis includes the stewardship function of accounting information, a fundamentally historical perspective reflecting how well managers have operated a business.Spurred by finance theory in 1987, a separate statement of cash flows joined the balance sheet and income statement as anessential component of a set of general purpose financial statements.9 The accrual system obscures cash flows, and the cash flow statement makes them transparent. Financial statement analysts and finance theorists increasingly focus on cash flows, casting doubt upon the utility of the accrual basis of accounting and its focus on the income statement. Consider the followingassertion made by a leading financial economist: cash flow is a fact, while earnings are an opinion.10The cash flow statement's power opens up possibilities for accounting never plausible with the balance sheet and income statement alone. Some are desirable, but only when all three statements are used together. Thus, for example, the cash flow statement is often superior compared to the balance sheet for measuring accruals as a way to test for the presence of earningsmanagement in the income *795 statement.11 Historical cash flows are often better indicators of future cash flows than are earnings, although predictions can be improved by using the two together.On the other hand, a leading use of the cash flow statement is to help make valuation determinations.12 In fact, discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation became, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the dominant valuation method, rendering to history'sdustbins traditional valuation methods using assets or earnings. Despite resistance through the early 1980s,13 DCF is now routinely used to gauge fair value. Institutions ranging from U.S. courts to the World Bank endorse DCF valuation methods.14Two sets of assumptions are necessary to use DCF, both of which invoke finance rather than accounting concepts. First, on a cash flow statement amounts are usually specified--they are accounting facts--but when analyzing them a wide variety of possibilitiesappear. They all start with GAAP earnings but then exclude or include a host of discretionary items.15 Resulting expressions (like EBIT, EBIDTA, and so on) are not accounting concepts.16*796 Rather, they are recent inventions of investment bankers and other financiers.17 Second, DCF analysis projects cash flows into the distant future, at least five years, and often withestimates using growth rates extending into an infinite horizon period.18 The popularity of DCF thus underlines a shift in the balance of intellectual power towards finance and away from accounting.Despite finance theory's predictions, managers manipulate accounting forms and markets are fooled, as the late 1990sdramatically testify.19 Apart from such experience, a burgeoning theoretical and experimental literature draws upon behavioral psychology. Behavioral finance theory undercuts modern finance theory and explains realities that modern finance theorycannot.20 A key concept is frame dependence, which is a bias to comprehend information differently depending upon how it is presented. This literature's relation to accounting forms is clear. It can matter whether and how stock options are *797measured and reported on the income statement, even though no cash flows exchange hands.21A difficulty with behavioral challenges to efficiency theory is their inherent messiness, contrasted with the elegant beauty of efficient markets. Behavioral theories explain a wide range of often conflicting biases, whereas efficiency theory assumes a market behaving as if all actors were economically rational. Finance personifies the old economists' joke about looking for one's car keys under a light in a parking lot because the light is better--despite losing the keys in some other location. It takes too seriously Milton Friedman's specification that the test of an economic theory is not its descriptive accuracy but itspredictive efficacy.22 Even on these terms, moreover, efficiency theory's failure to predict--even affirmatively to obscure--market deception of the late 1990s suggests that it does not pass Freidman's test.In fact, however, both efficiency and behavioral accounts of market behavior may be partially correct, producing a middle ground. Markets may be substantially efficient, but prone to periodic bouts of moodiness better captured by behavioral theories.Such bouts appear to have characterized the late 1990s and early 2000s and their *798associated frauds.23If so, this experience suggests that accounting forms matter most when they are least likely to be obeyed. Accounting's traditional numerical history and its income statement are thus particularly important during innovative periods. The late 1990s and early 2000s were such a period, when market appetites grew for prognosis using forecasted cash flows.In this middle ground, reliable accounting is a central piston in the efficient market engine. Finance and accounting must be melded into complements, not jealous opponents. Attention would center on blending income statements, balance sheets, and cash flow statements, balancing numerical history with prognosis. Alas, the symptoms manifest in the late 1990s showing finance theory's dominance over accounting continues unabated, despite reforms. This is because reforms addressed only the symptoms, not the disease.II. SymptomsA simple illustration captures the difference between finance and accounting. If a company sold five widgets last year, it is clearly a lie for its management to report selling six. If management says it expects to sell six widgets next year, it is clearly not a lie to say that they hope to sell seven. Finance is most interested in expectations--focusing on six or seven; accounting is most interested in the facts--that five were sold.Finance theory thus feeds a common feature of accounting fraud, which is simply to paint rosy views of the future. A manager believes that certain targets can be reached--expecting six and hoping for seven. This belief supports the view that the future reporting of numerical history will be superior--better than five. This can create sufficient managerial optimism to doctor current pictures of numerical history (call it six this year); the tempted manager may believe that the rosier future will be capable of absorbing the difference between actual history and the imagined future. For example, if the company in fact sells *799 fivethis year but seven the year after, management can call it six apiece.24Two salient features of the late 1990s dramatize indulgence of finance theory over accounting practice. These were the proliferation of analyst earnings reports specifying expectations and corporate pro forma figures expressing hopes. Wall Street analysts are steeped in the finance school, not the accounting school. Analysts may actually believe that they, as the market, know better than the results that appear from applying traditional accounting principles. While some undoubtedly take accounting standards seriously and insist on evaluating performance using accounting information, many--during the late 1990s at least--pressured managers into making elaborate forecasts of future performance. This was delicately called “guidance” and led analysts to define and disseminate “expectations.” Many of these analysts, moreover, worked for securities firms whose investment banking department sought underwriting business from the companies that analysts followed. The coziness of the relationship magnified the inclination to extract rosy predictions of the future from the past. For the analyst community, social proof set in: if everyone believes a forecast, it must be true.These futuristic orientations pressured management to recast actual historical experience, to conform to and facilitate prognostications. The practice of pro forma financial reporting became widespread in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This involved presenting financial data in forms that deliberately varied from GAAP. While managers defended these forms using various obfuscating arguments, including that GAAP just didn't work well for their special business, underlying the practice was an impulse to show how the future would (hopefully) look. The practice was obnoxious, omitting items of ordinary expense and making other GAAP departures to display steadily growing sales, *800 net income, and--most importantly--cash flow. In an era of market bubbles such as the late 1990s, people wanted to believe these giddy pictures of the future. Efficiency theory reinforced the fantasies since participants were able to conclude that the market must be right--a whole new economy must have been born.These symptomatic practices spawned respective sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 cracking down on theirproliferation.25 These reforms, however, fail to rectify underlying demand for prognosis rather than history. Greater emphasis on the future is most evident in the longer-term trend begun in the mid-1970s with the advent of the forward-looking disclosure regime, the disease that breeds finance's dominance over accounting.III. DiseaseUntil the late 1970s, the SEC and federal securities law prohibited disclosure of forward-looking information.26 In that period,market appetite for forward-looking information intensified,27 and participants pressured the SEC to change its stance. After substantial resistance, the SEC relented, allowing forward-looking disclosure. Thereafter, the SEC went further, encouraging,and sometimes requiring, forward-looking information.28The SEC *801characterizes related disclosure as addressing“trends and uncertainties” in a business.29This opens up accounting's traditional conservatism towards finance theory's obsession with estimations and discounting the future.The movement for forward-looking disclosure blossomed in the early 1970s, as efficient market theory ascended.30 Opponents of forward-looking disclosure made three key arguments favoring the SEC's traditional stance prohibiting prognostication.31First, forward-looking statements are inherently unreliable and misleading per se.32 No one is clairvoyant; management can be no more clairvoyant than investors or other users of financial reports. Second, investors likely would assign undue credence to formal managerial disclosure of forward-looking information, despite this inherent unreliability. Third, forward-looking information is more susceptible to managerial manipulation than hard historical fact. All three objections have proven valid, underscored by the accounting frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s.Supporters of forward-looking disclosure emphasized that all investment valuation and related decisions are about the future, a point opponents did not dispute. Disagreement concerned whether managers or investors are better positioned to conduct prognostication. While supporters did not believe either group was clairvoyant, they opined that managers were somehowbetter equipped than *802 investors to provide reasonable forecasts.33 This represented a subtle shift in roles: traditionally, managers applied accounting to report results of known events and transactions and investors applied finance tools to make related investment decisions.Devotees of forward-looking disclosure also redefined the target audience for financial disclosure from the average ordinary investor to the sophisticated investor; this move sought to negate the claim that investors would give undue credence tomanagerial forecasts.34 Finally, manipulation risk could be neutralized by imposing on managers an obligation of good faith when providing forward-looking disclosure.35The debate's resolution led to a system requiring more and more forward-looking disclosure, with SEC releases in 1979, 1982,and 1989 increasing this orientation.36 Early proponents disagreed as to whether this regime should be voluntary or mandatory; the result was initially an experimental regime based on voluntary disclosure. It gradually moved to one mandating specifickinds of forward-looking disclosure.37As for whether forward-looking information should be targeted at the sophisticated investor or all investors, terms of debate shifted from the 1970s to the 1990s. Early on, supporters argued that managers should provide forecasts to sophisticatedinvestors outside formal SEC filings.38 While this approach dominated for two decades, the SEC *803 reversed course in the late 1990s by adopting Regulation FD to require that guidance provided to one investor must be provided simultaneouslyto the public at large.39 This step completed the circle that the forward-looking disclosure regime inaugurated: (1) managers were redirected from accounting to finance and (2) all investors were functionally brought inside the enterprise by mandates that managers supply finance-oriented information.Regulatory efforts ensuing from the forward-looking disclosure debate thus resolved numerous contentious questions. The resulting regime is mostly mandatory; it requires good faith and reasonable grounds for predictions; and makes the same predictions available to all investors whether sophisticated or not. Never resolved in this debate on the merits, however, isthe argument of opponents that forward-looking information is inherently unreliable. It remains true, after all, that no one is clairvoyant. The late 1990s and early 2000s also show that even so-called sophisticated investors are not immune from being fooled by managerial manipulations.Accordingly, the SEC's early cautious regulatory response to market demand for futuristic information showed prudence. In fact, the reality that forward-looking information is inherently unreliable manifested immediately upon implementation of the forward-looking disclosure regime. Managers would forecast various business developments for market participants eager to clarify their own cloudy crystal balls. When these judgments turned out differently, plaintiffs' lawyers sued. This litigation showed symptoms of the underlying reality that forward-looking information is inherently unreliable. Rather than ever confronting this reality squarely, the regulatory regime focused on these symptoms by designing devices to address associatedlitigation abuses.40Safe harbor provisions are the leading device to address litigation abuses associated with forward-looking *804 information. These insulate issuers from liability in private actions when forward-looking statements are accompanied by cautionary language underscoring their basic unreliability. The SEC, Congress, and courts all participated in developing relateddoctrines.41 The judiciary used the so-called bespeaks caution doctrine.42 It provided a case-by-case evaluation of whether forward-looking information was accompanied by sufficient cautionary language to alert a reasonable investor to the information's tentative quality. The SEC and Congress essentially codified this doctrine.While some evidence indicates that the forward-looking disclosure system enhanced overall quality of information and itsinterpretation,43 drawbacks have appeared.44 Managers forecast future earnings and equip analysts to do so; analysts then widely disseminate *805expectations across the marketplace; this creates pressure to meet these expectations. (When a company sold five widgets, it created a historical record; when managers say they expect to sell six and hope to sell seven, they create expectations and hopes.) Managers who fail to meet expectations and hopes are punished severely. This, in turn,increases pressure to enhance reports of numerical history to conform to the prognosis previously painted.45 The result is often escalating accounting pressure to repaint history to conform to increasingly out-of-reach prognosis.These effects are not met by regulatory efforts to police litigation abuse arising from prognostication. More problematic than second-guessing by litigation is the first-order stage on which this information is demanded and supplied. But this problem, likewise, has never been addressed. Demand for forward-looking information is demand for what is inherently unreliable. Supplying the information sets markers that are bound to result in disappointment. Specifying the targets creates pressure tomeet them, and when fundamental business strategies cannot do so, accounting massage becomes more tempting.46 In the extreme, finance destroys accounting.*806 Not only has inadequate attention been paid to this feature of the contemporary financial reporting environment,47 the safe-harbor mechanisms used to address the identified litigation problem appear equally inadequate to their task. What is needed is a policy to address both challenges. This must constrain undue second-guessing litigation and limit forecasting likely to pressure managers to report accounting figures in light of those estimates rather than based on subsequent business reality.IV. MetastasizingDespite limitations of peering into the future using forward-looking disclosure, reforms push further in that direction. This shows not only potential misdiagnosis of the disease and questionable prescription, it manifests the depth and ubiquity of modern culture's preoccupation with the future. Two reforms highlight this: movement towards a continuous disclosure system and development of an early warning system provided by auditors based on the quality of an entity's internal control over financial reporting.The apotheosis of modernity's future obsession in securities markets and law is the pressure for a continuous disclosure system.This is a concept designed to require real-time display of various financial developments.48 Long sought by market participants and recently encouraged by the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) adds force to this movement by directing the SEC to adopt rules to hasten the *807 phenomenon. Under SOX, companies must disclose publicly, on a “rapid and current basis,”all material changes in their financial condition or operations, including trends providing qualitative information and graphicpresentations.49SOX uses the word “disclose,” disguising its more profound shift in market appetite and regulatory philosophy--likewise disguising latent dangers. The innovation of the original federal securities laws was a move towards disclosure. Mandatorydisclosure, Louis Brandeis famously quipped, is the best disinfectant.50 Current pressures for real-time display go beyond disclosure. They move towards transparency. Again, this shift reflects finance-driven pressure towards real-time accounting, presenting enormous challenges to basic accounting concepts such as allocation of economic events to multiple fiscal periods. Accompanying these pressures, moreover, are appetites for systems and research designed to provide a continuous auditingfunction, despite numerous recognized obstacles to this undertaking.51Contemporary calls for heightened transparency across society often appear as unbounded virtues.52 But *808 good reasons appear to doubt this proposition.53 Otto van Bismarck reportedly cautioned that, “[i]f you like laws and sausages, you shouldnever watch either one being made.”54 The same is true for those who like financial reports. Consider how managers are to develop this continuous information-display.On a daily basis, companies generate internal financial data, such as sales, accounts receivable balances and charge-offs, inventory levels and obsolescence. These financial data reveal trends. These trends can amount, on a temporary basis, to material changes in financial condition and operation. Mandatory display of these trends is functionally equivalent to mandatory transparency of business operations on a daily basis. It opens for view daily financial recording, not periodic financial reporting. This echoes the process associated with the dawn of forward-looking disclosure era of managers generating finance data and distributing it to investors.Besides impairing the efficacy of accounting's fiscal-period assumption, daily changes are not indicative of quarterly or annual aggregates. This information is most useful to managers during an accounting/operating period. It equips them to make course corrections, taking such steps as strengthening sales efforts in lagging segments or improving collection practices when receivable charge-offs rise in certain customer bases. The information is useful to redirect trends and to manage the materiality and direction of financial condition and operation.*809 Whether corrections succeed takes more than a few days of dashboard data to sort out. Premature disclosure of adverse trends may sustain them, disabling managerial corrections. If sales are seen flat in one region, customers in adjacent regions may switch to competitor products; if receivables collections are seen slowing among some customers, other customers may join the laggards. Investors and other corporate constituents are likely better served by giving management time and leeway tomake improvements, not respond to them on a daily basis.55If the new rules under SOX only tinker with mandatory continuous display, consider a proposal for pure transparency made bya senior SEC official.56 It prescribes changing the existing financial reporting environment using two devices: (1) requiring companies to report real-time bookkeeping information on publicly-accessible websites (including real-time journal entries, ledger summaries, monthly aggregations and so on) and (2) requiring management to respond publicly to questions concerning this information.The theory of this substantive transparency (not mere disclosure) is to equip investors having requisite interest and resources to perform their own financial statement audits of companies, or engage their own auditor to do so. Apart from numerous other。
