中小银行竞争力分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
What drives the persistent competitiveness of small banks?
Abstract：Several trends in the financial industry could have weakened the competitiveness of small banks in recent years including consolidation and improved financial strength of large banks, competition from nonbank financial firms, and a decline in the real value of deposit insurance. Despite those challenges, small banks have grown more rapidly than larger banks over the period from 1985 to 2001, and their profitability has been sustained at high levels. However, small banks have needed to increase the interest rates offered on deposit accounts in order to attract progressively more deposit funding. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that this increased interest cost primarily reflects the higher rate of return that small banks were able to earn on their assets. Moreover, we show with an arbitrage model that the decline in the real value of deposit insurance has only a small effect on deposit rates as long as bank failure rates are in the low range of recent years.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) proposal for the modernization of
deposit insurance has recently been the focus of considerable attention (FDIC 2000). As part of its proposal, the FDIC would raise the current $100,000 ceiling on coverage in order to account for the erosion of its real value by inflation since it was set in 1980 (Chart 1). The decline in the real value of deposit insurance would tend to raise the cost of funding assets with deposits, and thus could adversely affect banks that tend to rely heavily on deposits. Large banks, which fund themselves relatively more in the uninsured wholesale markets, could be less affected than small banks.
The decline in the real value of deposit insurance, however, is only one of several trends in the financial industry that could have weakened the competitiveness of small banks in recent years. Among these other developments have been the return to health of large banks, numerous mergers that have increased the size and scope of large banks, and the continued increase in competition from mutual funds and other nonbank financial companies.
Mergers and acquisitions have reduced the number of banks in the United States from more than 14,000 in 1985 to about 8,300 at the end of 2000, and during this time the share of domestic banking assets held by the largest 100 banks rose from about half to almost three-fourths (Chart2). Studies of consolidation in the banking industry and of its impact on small bank competitiveness have reached differing conclusions. However, consolidation interacts with the decline in the real value of deposit insurance to create another potentially adverse impact on the competitiveness of small banks. The creation of “mega-banks” increases the possibility that depositors would consider these larger banks to be “too big to fail” (TBTF), which would implicitly confer a greater level of deposit insurance upon large bank customers than those of small banks. Smaller banks contend that an increase in the nominal value of deposit insurance is needed to help offset this perception of a TBTF policy (Independent Community Bankers Association [2000]).
The evolution of large, complex banking organizations has led federal bank regulators to warn that these institutions create the potential for unusually large systemic risks to the national and international economies should they fail (Greenspan [1999]). However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement A ct of 1991 (FDICIA) circumscribed regulators’ ability to invoke TBTF. It required that the FDIC pursue the resolution method that poses the least cost to its insurance fund when dealing with a failed bank, and stipulated that exceptions to the “leastcost” method must garner the approval of super majorities of both the Federal Reserve and FDIC
boards plus that of the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President of the United States. Angbazo and Saunders [1997] found the cost of funds to large banks increased after FDICIA was implemented, suggesting that bank creditors believed that FDICIA reduced the likelihood of a large bank benefiting from a TBTF policy. Moreover, bank regulatory agencies maintain that no bank is too large for shareholders and nondeposit liability holders to face complete loss, and for uninsured depositors to be subject to less than 100 percent reimbursement, should the decline in bank asset values be large enough (Greenspan [2001]).
In addition to the consolidation of the banking system, the continued growth of nonbank financial institutions may have weakened the competitive situation of small relative to large banks in recent years (D'Arista and Schlesinger [1993]). Although savings and loan associations, credit unions, mutual funds and finance companies compete with banks of all sizes, they likely pose a greater competitive challenge to smaller banks. In addition to being more dependent on deposit funding than the larger banks, small banks also tend to be more concentrated than large banks in the types of loans extended by finance companies (Dynan, Johnson, and Slowinski [2002]). Over the period studied, however, an outright decline in thrift industry assets offset the added competition from other types of nonbank financial companies, particularly money market mutual funds.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the competitive position of small banks likely was boosted as a result of the more severe deterioration in asset quality at large banks, and the wider gap at large banks between actual capital levels and those being demanded by markets and the new Basle accord (Chart 3). However, the subsequent economic recovery and brisk expansion of the second half of the 1990s caused delinquency rates to drop dramatically, particularly at large banks. At the same time, the gap between the leverage ratios small banks and large banks also narrowed noticeably, as large banks boosted their capital following the implementation of the Basle Accords in 1991.
Despite the aforementioned headwinds affecting small banks’ competitiveness, Bassett and Brady [2001] found that small banks have grown more rapidly than larger banks over the period from 1985 to 2000. Moreover, they showed that small banks have largely maintained or even increased their levels of profitability throughout much of the period studied, despite paying increasingly large premiums on their deposits relative to large banks in order to fund their more
rapid asset expansion. The purpose of this study is to extend this research by more formally examining the differential impact of the influences mentioned above on the competitive performance of small banks over the period from the mid-1980s to 2001.
First, we employ an arbitrage model to examine the relationship between relative average interest rates on deposits at small and large banks, the level of deposit insurance, bank failure rates, and perceptions about TBTF. The model demonstrates that the sensitivity of relative deposit rates to the level of deposit insurance or views about the importance of TBTF is quite low when bank failure rates are low, as they have been in recent years. We then present econometric evidence suggesting that the rising relative cost of deposits at small banks vis-à-vis large banks over the past decade larg ely reflects small banks’ need to attract funding to sustain their aggressive and profitable asset expansion. The share of uninsured deposits, which has risen as the real value of deposit insurance has declined, and a marked improvement in the balance sheet health of large banks during the 1990s played somewhat smaller roles in boosting deposit rates at small banks.
The next section describes the data used in the article and identifies some key balance sheet differences between large and small banks. Section III illustrates that small banks have been able to grow faster than large banks by offering better deposit rates and that the premium they pay has been rising over time. Section IV presents an arbitrage model of deposit pricing at large and small banks that incorporates deposit insurance and “T oo Big To Fail” effects. Section V presents regression estimates from a reduced form model of deposit rate determination at large and small banks. Conclusions are presented in section VI.
II. Data and Summary Statistics
Except where otherwise indicated, data in this paper are from the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) for the domestic offices of insured domestically chartered commercial banks and nondeposit trust companies (hereafter, banks). In this article, large banks are those ranked 1 through 100 based on assets at the start of each quarter. Small banks are those ranked outside of the largest 1,000. At the start of the fourth quarter of 2000, large banks had assets of at least $6.94 billion, while all small banks had assets of less than $331 million.
A. Key balance sheet differences between small and large banks.
Small banks rely considerably more on deposits than do large banks. In particular, small time
deposits (those issued in amounts of less than $100,000) funded almost 30 percent of loans and other assets at small banks in 2000, while at large banks the share was 10 percent (Table 1). The share of small banks' assets funded with large time deposits, 13 percent, also exceeds that at large banks, 8 percent. Other interest-bearing deposits, which consist of savings and transactions accounts, also were somewhat more important funding vehicles at small banks, while noninterest-bearing deposits funded comparable shares of small and large banks' assets in 2000.
Large banks funded about one-third of their assets with "other" nondeposit liabilities in 2000,whereas at small banks the share was just 3 percent. Small banks availed themselves somewhat more of FHLB advances, although these represent a fairly small share of liabilities at both groups of banks. Equity also funded a larger share of assets at small than at large banks, 10.3 percent and 8 percent respectively.
Reliance on deposits changed little between 1987 and 1992, but both bank groups shifted toward nondeposit liabilities and capital as sources of funding during the 1990s. Between 1992 and 2000, deposits as a share of assets fell about 4 percentage points at small banks and 10 percentage points at large banks. For both bank groups, "other interest-bearing deposits" was the deposit category that fell most in the 1990s, although at large banks “non-interest-bearing deposits” declined almost as much. Small time deposits (which are fully insured) declined by similar amounts at both bank groups, a drop probably reflecting the increased popularity of alternative household investment vehicles such as mutual funds. However, the share of assets funded by large time deposits actually increased at both bank groups, with a larger increase posted at small banks.
At small banks, the type and average size of large deposit accounts (all those of at least $100,000) are notably different from those at large banks (table 1, memo). At large banks, only about 30 percent of such balances were held as large time deposits in 2000; the remaining 70 percent were in transaction and savings accounts. At small banks, large balances are split about evenly between large time and other deposits. The average size of large deposits at large banks in 2000 was $425,000, and at small banks it was $229,000; however, over the 1990s the average size declined at large banks and rose at about the rate of inflation at small banks.
B. Growth patterns for large and small banks.
As noted, the mergers that have been the vehicle of consolidation typically have involved the
acquisition of smaller banks by much larger banks. This, of course, boosts measured growth of large banks and diminishes that of small banks. To account for this in examining the balance sheet growth and profitability of small vis-à-vis large banks, we merger-adjust data from the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income, filed by all federally insured commercial banks.
Balance sheet data adjusted for mergers show that small banks generally have grown faster than either medium-sized or large banks over the past fifteen years (chart 4, top panel). Indeed, in every year, the growth of assets has been significantly faster at small banks than at large banks. Of course, banks securitize and sell a significant portion of the consumer and real estate loans that they originate and thereby move them off their balance sheets. But data available since 1997 indicate that restoring securitized credit card loans to large banks' balance sheets would not narrow the difference in growth rates significantly. Of course, adding securitized assets to the balance sheet for purposes of comparison presumes that the securitizing bank still would have chosen to originate the loans even if the opportunity to securitize was not available.
In addition, an average of about 350 new, or "de novo," banks were formed each year during the 1997-2000 period, compared with about 150 per year during the preceding four years. Although de novo banks tend to grow rapidly, the growth rate of all small banks is not significantly affected if de novo banks are excluded from the calculation. Moreover, the accelerated pace of entry into a fast growing sector provides substantial evidence of the attractiveness of small banks to investors.
As suggested by the relative rates of merger-adjusted asset growth, the expansion of total deposits at small banks has also exceeded the growth rate at large banks in every year since 1985, after adjusting for mergers (chart 4, middle panel). Uninsured deposits also grew significantly faster at small banks than at large banks (chart 4, bottom panel). Furthermore, the growth rate of uninsured deposits at small banks has been high and steadily increasing during the second half of the past decade, whereas at larger banks the growth of these liabilities shows no trend. However, the growth of assets tended to exceed that of deposits, as the use of nondeposit liabilities grew for all bank size groups.
III. How Have Small Banks Expanded Deposits Faster Than Large Banks?
Chart 5 examines the connection between relative rates paid on deposits at small and large banks and relative deposit growth rates, for various definitions of deposits. The solid line in all four
panels is the difference, expressed in basis points, between the average interest rates paid for deposits by small and large banks. Similarly, the dotted line depicts the growth rate of deposits at small banks less the growth rate at large banks, expressed in percentage points.
Growth of total interest-bearing deposits at small banks consistently exceeded that at large banks between 1985 and 2000 by amounts that tended to reflect movements in the spread between deposit rates paid at small relative to large banks (Chart 5, upper left)。As the period began, small banks were outbidding large banks for deposits, but this relationship reversed in the late 1980s and into 1990, a shift that seemed to prompt a relative acceleration of growth of deposits at large banks. During the 1991-93 period, small banks raised their average rate paid on interest bearing deposits by about a full percentage point relative to rates at large banks, restoring the premium paid by them in the mid-1980s. Evidently as a result, the growth rate of deposits at small banks rose substantially compared with that at large banks during these years. However, even though the deposit rate spread favoring small banks remained elevated and, on balance, rose somewhat over the course of the 1990s, the amount by which deposit growth at small banks exceeded that at large banks trended down over most of the decade.
The remaining panels present the same relationship between relative deposit offering rates and relative deposit growth rates for deposits disaggregated into small time, large time, and other interest-bearing deposits. This greater detail reveals that the positive correlation between relative offering rates and relative deposit growth rates at small banks generally held up for small time deposits over the entire period examined, but tended to diminish during the latter 1990s in the large time and “other” deposit components. The difference between the behavior of small time and the remaining categories of interest-bearing deposits may reflect the fact that small time deposits are (by definition) fully insured while the other categories have large uninsured components.
The relative rise in deposit interest rates, however, did not significantly affect small banks’ profitability, as the rise was apparently offset by higher rates earned on assets at small banks. Net interest margins (NIM) at small banks have traditionally been substantially greater than at the largest 100 banks, and during most of the second part of the 1990s, the NIM at small banks held steady, while it edged down at large banks (Chart 6). In part, small banks maintained their NIM by increasing the share of their portfolios held as loans—which, on average, earn higher yields than securities—throughout the 1990s. Although the NIM at small banks began to narrow somewhat
more over the past three years and fell below its late 1980s level, that decline has been matched by a similar fall off at large banks.
Turning to broader measures of profitability, return on equity (ROE) at large banks has stabilized around an average of about 15 percent throughout the mid- to late-1990s. Small banks ROE has also been fairly stable during the 1990s, and is uniformly above the returns earned during the late-1980s. While ROE at large banks has been significantly greater than ROE at small banks since 1992, this is in large part due to the much greater levels of capital relative to assets held by small banks.
In terms of the return on assets (ROA), small banks have generally been more profitable than large banks (Chart 6, bottom right panel), an achievement that is especially impressive given the greater (and growing) earnings on off-balance-sheet activities at large banks. Indeed, the jump of large banks' ROA over that of small banks in 1999 is attributable to large gains in revenue from capital markets business and trading operations; such revenue is not a significant portion of income at small banks.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Consolidation within the banking industry over the last decade and a half has increased the size and scope of large banks and produced some banks that are perhaps large enough to fuel depositors’ perceptions that they could be “too big to fail.” In conjunction with the decline in the real value of deposit insurance since 1980, the return to heath of large banks after the early 1990s, and the continued increase in the assets of nonbank financial companies, the competitive position of small banks would appear to have been seriously challenged.
Merger-adjusted Call Report data, however, indicate that small banks prospered throughout the 1990s. Small bank assets have grown at rates exceeding their large bank competitors and they have maintained historically high levels of profitability, even as the average cost of deposits at small banks relative to large banks has increased over the past decade. The results of this paper shed some light on why small banks have remained so competitive.
First, we developed an arbitrage model of deposit pricing with risk-averse investors who choose whether to deposit uninsured funds in a “Too Big T o Fail” institution or a s maller bank on the basis of deposit rate spreads. This model indicates that when the probability of failure for small banks is at the low levels that have prevailed since the early 1990s, then the subsidy provided by
deposit insurance and TBTF is tiny. Although the model suggests that these subsidies become large when the probability of failure reaches elevated levels, it is precisely at those times when deposit insurance creates the greatest degree of moral hazard. That is, it allows a troubled institution to continue to attract insured funding that is subsequently invested in risky assets with the hope that the profits earned on the new investments will return the troubled bank to health, but also creating a larger loss for the bank insurance fund if the bank does not recover.
Second, regression analysis suggests that the increased cost of deposits at small banks relative to large banks during the 1990s stemmed mostly from small banks’ need for deposits to fund their aggressive and apparently more profitable loan growth. Another reason deposit rates may have climbed at small banks relative to large is the improved health of the large bank sector, reflected in their much-improved capital ratios, during the 1990s. Competition from nonbank financial firms is also estimated to have a statistically significant impact on the deposit offering rates at small banks, although it is generally not estimated to affect the deposit rates at large banks. However, the decline in the assets of the thrift industry more than offset the increased assets of money market mutual funds. Thus, on balance, the reduced competition from these sources held down deposit rates at small banks over the period studied.
The growing share of uninsured deposits (which was used as a proxy variable for the decline in the real value of deposit insurance over the 1988 to 2000 period) also had a positive and statistically significant effect on the price of deposits at both large and small banks. Moreover, the regression analysis suggests that the increase in the share of uninsured deposits had a larger effect on small banks than on large banks, particularly for savings and interest-bearing transaction deposits. The arbitrage model suggests that these coefficient estimates could be influenced by the high rate of bank failures in the early 1990s; however, a statistical test of that hypothesis was inconclusive. This factor is estimated to account for roughly the same overall increase the deposit rate spread between small and large banks as the improved balance sheet health at large banks, and about half of the increase owing to the change in their average return on loans.
是什么推动中小银行的持久性竞争力？
彼利巴塞特和汤姆布雷迪[摘要]近年来，金融业在几个方面可能发展较薄弱，包括巩固和完善大型银行，非银行金融机构的竞争，小银行在财务实力方面的竞争力，其存款保险的实际价值下降。尽管有这些挑战，中小银行增长速度在1985年至2001年期间仍然超过了较大的银行，其利润率一直维持在高水平。然而，小银行需要增加存款账户的利息率，以逐步吸引更多的存款资金。在本文中，我们提供的经验证据表明，这种利息成本增加主要反映了小银行可以赚取较高的资产。此外，我们将呈现一个套利模型，存款保险的实际价值下降只会对存款利率产生很小的影响，因为在最近几年银行倒闭率在较低范围内。
简介
美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的存款保险为现代化的建议，最近一直是关注的焦点（联邦存款保险公司2000年）。作为其建议的一部分，FDIC将提高对当前覆盖10万美元的上限，其真正的价值受通货膨胀的侵蚀，因为它是在1980年的设置（图1）。存款保险的实际价值下降，往往会提高资金的存款资产的成本，从而可能造成负面影响往往依赖银行存款严重。大型银行，其基金本身相对没有保险的批发市场，可以比小银行的影响较小。
在金融行业，存款保险的实际价值下降，削弱了一些小银行竞争力，成为近年来的趋势之一。在其他方面，有许多通过并购健康增长的大规模影响范围广的银行，从共同基金和其他非银行金融公司的竞争中获得不断增加的回报。
与1985年14000多个银行相比，2000年底的通过兼并和收购，银行数量已经减少到8300多个。在此期间，国内银行由最大的100家银行持有的资产的份额上升到近四分之三（图2）。综合研究银行业和其对小银行竞争力的影响已达到不同的结论。但是，巩固交互中的存款保险的实际价值下降，导致了另一个对小银行的竞争力可能造成的不良影响。对“超级银行“创造的可能性，增加存款的客户会考虑将这些大银行“太大而
文献出处: Waitz M. The small and medium-sized enterprise financing under P2P finance [J]. Journal of Business Research, 2016, 8(6): 81-91. 原文 The small and medium-sized enterprise financing under P2P finance Waitz M Abstract Small and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult is worldwide difficult problem. Article introduces the concept of the Internet financial, mainly summarized the P2P financial in the development of financial innovation and integration of science and technology, a combination of academic research on P2P financial now of the five directions of various views and opinions. Points out the current P2P financial problems in the development of risk control, and analyses the trend of the Internet financial. Keywords: P2P financial; Financial innovation; Risk control 1 Introduction Look from the history of enterprise development, a large enterprise originate from small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) is the most dynamic part of the national economy, often walk in the forefront of technology development, in the high-tech industry, clean energy, green economy, etc, have good performance, play an important role in the economic transformation. Small and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult is worldwide difficult problem. These small and medium-sized enterprise financing environment and narrow channels, more than 60% are unable to get a bank loan. At present, science and technology enterprises and the characteristics of light assets, financing difficulties, become a huge bottleneck of sustainable development. 2 The concept of the Internet financial In the past two years, the Internet financial show explosive growth, since 2014, the Internet financial sector performance strength. Current economic field exists the phenomenon of two special contradiction, one is the small and medium-sized
零售企业营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
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译文 银行业是必要的而银行不是，互联网时代的金融中介机构的未来 摘要 本文探讨了互联网时代下金融机构和银行作为特殊的金融机构的未来可能是怎样的问题。由于互联网而导致的交易费用的减少会降低进入金融产品市场的壁垒，因为有可能不再需要运行成本密集型的分支的大型系统。但是，对金融机构的职能研究表明，不是每个人都可以销售和经销金融产品。这是真的，因为金融业务中的信息不对称问题需要一个拥有良好信誉的中介，也因为需要限制大型资本基金转换资产的风险。这两个要求变现了进入金融中介市场的重要壁垒。并不是每一个金融产品会因为互联网的崛起而将面临更多的竞争，只有那些标准化和低风险的产品。此外，那些拥有可观资本和良好声誉的大公司可能被视为银行的新竞争者。 关键字：银行业，银行，金融机构，互联网 1、引言 “银行业是19世纪的钢铁行业。”当谈到关于新的信息技术对银行的影响的谈论时，这句话经常被提起。更一般来说，可能有人会问，新信息技术是如何成功的，特别是互联网的，可能会改变商业和金融机构的市场情况。在互联网的帮助下，人们可以执行所有银行的业务，而不需要银行。这意味着传统银行分支机构的中介。此外，互联网已经使客户直接从网上购买股票而不需要访问当地的分支银行。从更广泛的意义上来说，在互联网的帮助下，金融市场的供给和需求可能通过互联网满足，而不需要金融中介机构。互联网的崛起是否真的是金融中介机构的威胁？在急剧减少的交易成本情况下，商业和竞争将如何变化？本文考察了互联网的成功对金融机构和银行的影响。 2、金融机构的发展 几个世纪以来，许多金融交易需要个人的存在。随着现代信息技术的发展，这些都被改变了。如今，客户可以在不进入当地分支银行的情况下进行任何金融交易。转移支付和支付账单可以通过网络进行，个人金融交易以及关于金融问题的信息咨询业可以通过网络进行。此外，互联网创新类似智能卡或者其他电子支付系统消除了为了得到一些现金而访问分支银行的需要。 但是互联网也会改变咨询活动：在许多情况下，它甚至可能减少个人存在的
市场营销价格策略外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
DESIGNING PRICING STRATEGIES All for-profit organizations and many nonprofit organizations set prices on their goods or services. Whether the price is called rent (for an apartment), tuition (for education), fare (for travel), or interest (for borrowed money), the concept is the same. Throughout most of history, prices were set by negotiation between buyers and sellers. Setting one price for all buyers arose with the development of large-scale retailing at the en d of the nineteenth century, when Woolworth’s and other stores followed a “strictly one-price policy” because they carried so many items and had so many employees. Now, 100 years later, technology is taking us back to an era of negotiated pricing. The Internet, corporate networks, and wireless setups are linking people, machines, and companies around the globe, connecting sellers and buyers as never before. Web sites like https://www.doczj.com/doc/cd11213899.html, and https://www.doczj.com/doc/cd11213899.html, allow buyers to compare products and prices quickly and easily. On-line auction sites like https://www.doczj.com/doc/cd11213899.html, and https://www.doczj.com/doc/cd11213899.html, make it easy for buyers and sellers to negotiate prices on thousands of items. At the same time, new tech- nologies are allowing sellers to collect detailed data about customers’ buying habits, preferences—even spending limits—so they can tailor their products and prices. 1 In the entire marketing mix, price is the one element that produces revenue; the others produce costs. Price is also one of the most ?exible elements: It can be changed quickly, unlike product features and channel commitments. Although price competi- tion is a major problem facing companies, many do not handle pricing well. The most common mistakes are these: Pricing is too cost-oriented; price is not revised often
顾客满意策略与顾客满意营销 原文来源：《Marketing Customer Satisfaction 》自20世纪八十年代末以来, 顾客满意战略已日益成为各国企业占有更多的顾客份额, 获得竞争优势的整体经营手段。 一、顾客满意策略是现代企业获得顾客“货币选票”的法宝随着时代的变迁, 社会物质财富的极大充裕, 顾客中的主体———消费者的需求也先后跨越了物质缺乏的时代、追求数量的时代、追求品质的时代, 到了20世纪八十年代末进入了情感消费时代。在我国, 随着经济的高速发展,我们也已迅速跨越了物质缺乏时代、追求数量的时代乃至追求品质的时代, 到今天也逐步迈进情感消费时代。在情感消费时代, 各企业的同类产品早已达到同时、同质、同能、同价, 消费者追求的已不再是质量、功能和价格, 而是舒适、便利、安全、安心、速度、跃动、环保、清洁、愉快、有趣等,消费者日益关注的是产品能否为自己的生活带来活力、充实、舒适、美感和精神文化品位, 以及超越消费者期望值的售前、售中、售后服务和咨询。也就是说, 今天人们所追求的是具有“心的满足感和充实感”的商品, 是高附加值的商品和服务,追求价值观和意识多元化、个性化和无形的满足感的时代已经来临。 与消费者价值追求变化相适应的企业间的竞争, 也由产品竞争、价格竞争、技术竞争、广告竞争、品牌竞争发展到现今的形象竞争、信誉竞争、文化竞争和服务竞争, 即顾客满意竞争。这种竞争是企业在广角度、宽领域的时空范围内展开的高层次、体现综合实力的竞争。它包括组织创新力、技术创新力、管理创新力、产业预见力、产品研发力、员工向心力、服务顾客力、顾客亲和力、同行认同力、社会贡献力、公关传播沟通力、企业文化推动力、环境适应力等等。这些综合形象力和如何合成综合持久的竞争力, 这就是CSft略所要解决的问题。CS寸代,企业不再以“自己为中心”,而是以“顾客为中心”；“顾客为尊”、“顾客满意”不再是流于形式的口号, 而是以实实在在的行动为基础的企业经营的一门新哲学。企业不再以质量达标, 自己满意为经营理念, 而是以顾客满意, 赢得顾客高忠诚度为经营理念。企业经营策略的焦点不再以争取或保持市场占有率为主, 而是以争取顾客满意为经营理念。因此, 营销策略的重心不再放在竞争对手身上而是放在顾客身上, 放在顾客现实的、潜在的需求上。当企业提供的产品和服务达到了顾客事先的期望值, 顾客就基本满意；如果远远超越顾客的期望值, 且远远高于其他同行, 顾客才真正满意；如果企业能不断地或长久地令顾客满意, 顾客就会忠诚。忠诚的顾客不仅会经常性地重复购买, 还会购买企业其它相关的产品或服务；忠诚的顾客不仅会积极向别人推荐他所买的产品, 而且对企业竞争者的促销活动具有免疫能力一个不满意的顾客会将不满意告诉16-20个人, 而每一个被告知者会再传播给12-15个人。这样, 一个不满意者会影响到二、三百人。在互联网普及的今天, 其影响则更大。据美国汽车业的调查, 一个满意者会引发8笔潜在的生意, 其中至少有一笔会成交。而另一项调查表明, 企业每增加5%的忠诚顾客, 利润就会增长25%-95%。一个企业的80%的利润来自20%的忠诚顾客；而获取一个新顾客的成本是维持一个老顾客成本的6倍。所以,美国著名学者唐?佩 珀斯指出: 决定一个企业成功与否的关键不是市场份额, 而是在于顾客份额。 于是, 企业纷纷通过广泛细致的市场调研、与消费者直接接触、顾客信息反馈等方式来了解顾客在各方面的现实需求和潜在需求。依靠对企业满意忠诚的销售、服务人员, 定期、定量地对顾客满意度进行综合测定, 以便准确地把握企业经营中与“顾客满意” 目标的差距及其重点领域, 从而进一步改善企业的经营活动。依靠高亲和力的企业文化、高效率的人文管理和全员共同努力, 不断地向顾客提供高附加值的产品, 高水准的亲情般的服
正确地点和时间下新媒体伴随的社会营销Jay M. Bernhardt 佛罗里达大学健康教育与行为系，佛罗里达州Gainesville Darren Mays乔治敦大学医学中心肿瘤科，哥伦比亚特区华盛顿Amanda K. Hall佛罗里达大学健康教育与行为系，佛罗里达州Gainesville 摘要： 目的：本文的目的是寻求讨论新媒体革命以何种方式将“渠道”更贴近消费者从而提高社会营销。 研究思路：这篇论文描述当前有关的社交媒体和移动通信技术的新媒体发展趋势，并通过运用商业营销，社会变革和公众健康实例分析讨论其对社会营销产生的影响。 成果：快速增长的在线社交网络和世界大部分地区无处不在的手机为社会营销人员提供了巨大的潜力，以全新方式吸引消费者。这些新的通信平台的性质不同于传统媒体是可以使他们更有效地为市场营销服务，最明显的是更深层次消费者参与、多方位信息交流、和基于位置跟踪和消息传递的重要方式。 现实作用：本文所描述的趋势正在快速，从根本上改变商业营销人员、品牌经理和客户关系经理如何与当前的和潜在的消费者相处。社会营销活动应该从中学习，并利用这些新媒体更深入地联系大量的消费者，上述从业人员比以往任何时候都更接近“正确的地点和正确的时间”。 独创性/价值：本文探讨已经介绍了在爱尔兰都柏林的全球非营利和社会营销大会于2011年4月的一个话题。讨论应鼓励社会营销重新考虑“渠道”的作用，并探讨新媒体如何令地方更贴近消费者。 关键词：社会营销，新媒体，社交媒体，移动电话，4P理论，移动通信系统 市场营销组合（或4P理论）是旨在鼓励行为改变的社会营销计划规划和实施的中心结构(Grier and Bryant,2005)。尽管价格、产品和促销策略通常是社会营销活动的主要元素,达到期望的目标受众的地方卫生决策往往是一个挑战(GrierandKumanyika,2010)。地方经常困惑在营销组合那些寻求社会营销作为一个框架申请健康行为改变。常见的想法是,位置被定义为地理位置,然而,在社会营销不一定是一个人的业务所在处或其中一个产品的销售点,而是消费者的利益做出决定并采取行动(Storey et al., 2008)。 新的通信媒体能给社会营销个性化的机会,接触目标消费者在关键行为决策点。这些新媒体为社会营销人员提供多个移动渠道到达消费者在非常情况下做出决定,通过创建直接,双向沟通渠道。这些双向交流现在可以发生在实时决策是在何时何地。第一次社会营销人员可以利用这些新渠道接触数以千计甚至数以百万计的人们在相对较低的成本促进健康的生活方式和影响社会变革(Thackeray et al., 2008)。 传统上,社会营销努力促进健康行为改变很大程度上依赖于地方定义为物理位置来分发产品(KreuterandBernhardt,2009)。他们在公共厕所上放置安全套自动售货机推广安全性行为或将营养标志放置在杂货店以期说服客户选择更健康的食品(Storey et al., 2008)。这些例子需要大量投资时间和物质资源从而成功地到达消费者。此外,确定一个是否会购买和使用避孕套或者被营养信息标志广告影响的合适的目标客户是一个具有挑战性的判断过程。相比之下,新媒体可
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述 一、外文文献 标题: Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance 作者: Caffard, Christophe 期刊名称: International Financial Law Review 卷: 20；期: 3；页: 20-24 Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance 1 Regulated brokers Regulated brokers are legal entities which have an investment services licence and are subject to the prudential regulations of the Comite de Reglementation Bancaire et Financiere (CRBF) and the Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF). * Choice of legal form: regulated brokers are not required to be incorporated in a specific legal form; however, under article 13 of the MAF Law, the CECEI checks whether the legal form of the brokerage company is appropriate for providing investment services. In practice, any type of commercial company is admitted: societes de capitaux (limited companies) or societes de personnes (partnerships). The formalities of share transfer, tax and the scope of liability of a company's management will be relevant factors to the choice of legal form. * Application for an investment services licence from the CECEI: the most important part of the application is the description of the investment services, and a business plan including prospective financial statements for the following three years. The CMF will check whether the business plan is consistent with the investment services licence requested by the broker. The CECEI will ensure that the applicant's own initial funds are consistent with the business plan. The scope of the investment services licence is variable and covers one or more ofthe following investment services: Reception and transmission of orders to another investment services provider on behalf of investors, for execution. This is the core investment service provided by the
文献出处: Dalman, M. Deniz, and Junhong Min. "Marketing Strategy for Unusual Brand Differentiation: Trivial Attribute Effect." International Journal of Marketing Studies 6.5 (2014): 63-72. 原文 Marketing Strategy for Unusual Brand Differentiation: Trivial Attribute Effect Dalman, M. Deniz & Junhong Min Abstract This research investigates that brand differentiation creating superior values can be achieved not only by adding meaningful attributes but also meaningless attributes, which is called "trivial attribute effect." Two studies provided empirical evidences as following; first, trivial attribute effect creates a strong brand differentiation even after subjects realize that trivial attribute has no value. Second, trivial attribute effect is more pronounced in hedonic service category compared to the utilitarian category. Last, the amount of willingness to pay is higher when trivial attribute is presented and evaluated in joint evaluation mode than separate evaluation mode. Finally, we conclude with discussion and provide suggestions for further research. Keywords: brand differentiation, evaluation mode, service industry, trivial attribute Introduction Problem Definition Perhaps the most important factor for new product success is to create the meaningful brand differentiation that provides customers with superior values beyond what the competitors can offer in the same industry (Porter, 1985). Not surprisingly, more than 50 percent of annual sales in consumer product industries including automobiles, biotechnology, computer software, and pharmaceuticals are attributed to such meaningful brand differentiation by including new or noble attributes (Schilling &Hill, 1998). However, the brand differentiation that increases consumer preference is not only by introducing meaningful attributes but also meaningless attributes. For
互联网金融对传统金融业的影响外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译) 译文： 互联网金融对传统金融业的影响 摘要 网络的发展，深刻地改变甚至颠覆了许多传统行业，金融业也不例外。近年来，金融业成为继商业分销、传媒之后受互联网影响最为深远的领域，许多基于互联网的金融服务模式应运而生，并对传统金融业产生了深刻的影响和巨大的冲击。“互联网金融”成为社会各界关注的焦点。 互联网金融低成本、高效率、关注用户体验，这些特点使其能够充分满足传统金融“长尾市场”的特殊需求，灵活提供更为便捷、高
效的金融服务和多样化的金融产品，大大拓展了金融服务的广度和深度，缩短了人们在时空上的距离，建立了一种全新的金融生态环境；可以有效整合、利用零散的时间、信息、资金等碎片资源，积少成多，形成规模效益，成为各类金融服务机构新的利润增长点。此外，随着互联网金融的不断渗透和融合，将给传统金融行业带来新的挑战和机遇。互联网金融可以促进传统银行业的转型，弥补传统银行在资金处理效率、信息整合等方面的不足；为证券、保险、基金、理财产品的销售与推广提供新渠道。对于很多中小企业来说，互联网金融拓展了它们的融资渠道，大大降低了融资门槛，提高了资金的使用效率。但是，互联网金融的跨行业性决定了它的风险因素更为复杂、敏感、多变，因此要处理好创新发展与市场监管、行业自律的关系。 关键词：互联网金融；商业银行；影响；监管 1 引言 互联网技术的不断发展，云计算、大数据、社交网络等越来越多的互联网应用为传统行业的业务发展提供了有力支持，互联网对传统行业的渗透程度不断加深。20世纪末，微软总裁比尔盖茨就曾断言，“传统商业银行会成为新世纪的恐龙”。如今，随着互联网电子信息技术的发展，我们真切地感受到了这种趋势，移动支付、电子银行早已在我们的日常生活中占据了重要地位。 由于互联网金融的概念几乎完全来自于商业实践，因此目前的研究多集中在探讨互联网金融的具体模式上，而对传统金融行业的影响力分析和应对措施则缺乏系统性研究。互联网与金融行业一向是风险
市场营销策略外文文献及翻译 Marketing Strategy Market Segmentation and Target Strategy A market consists of people or organizations with wants,money to spend,and the willingness to spend it.However,within most markets the buyer' needs are not identical.Therefore,a single marketing program starts with identifying the differences that exist within a market,a process called market segmentation, and deciding which segments will be pursued ads target markets. Marketing segmentation enables a company to make more efficient use of its marketing resources.Also,it allows a small company to compete effectively by concentrating on one or two segments.The apparent drawback of market segmentation is that it will result in higher production and marketing costs than a one-product,mass-market strategy.However, if the market is correctly segmented,the better fit with customers' needs will actually result in greater efficiency. The three alternative strategies for selecting a target market are market aggregation,single segment,and multiple segment.Market-aggregation strategy involves using one marketing mix to reach a mass,undifferentiated market.With a single-segment strategy, a company still uses only one marketing mix,but it is directed at only one segment of the total market.A multiple-segment strategy entails
Marketing Strategy Market Segmentation and Target Strategy A market consists of people or organizations with wants,money to spend,and the willingness to spend it.However,within most markets the buyer' needs are not identical.Therefore,a single marketing program starts with identifying the differences that exist within a market,a process called market segmentation, and deciding which segments will be pursued ads target markets. Marketing segmentation enables a company to make more efficient use of its marketing resources.Also,it allows a small company to compete effectively by concentrating on one or two segments.The apparent drawback of market segmentation is that it will result in higher production and marketing costs than a one-product,mass-market strategy.However, if the market is correctly segmented,the better fit with customers' needs will actually result in greater efficiency. The three alternative strategies for selecting a target market are market aggregation,single segment,and multiple segment.Market-aggregation strategy involves using one marketing mix to reach a mass,undifferentiated market.With a single-segment strategy, a company still uses only one marketing mix,but it is directed at only one segment of the total market.A multiple-segment strategy entails selecting two or more segments and developing a separate marketing mix to reach segment. Positioning the Product Management's ability to bring attention to a product and to differentiate it in a favorable way from similar products goes a long way toward determining that product's revenues.Thus management needs to engage in positioning,which means developing the image that a product projects in relation to competitive products and to the firm's other products. Marketing executives can choose from a variety of positioning strategies.Sometimes they decide to use more than one for a particular product.Here are several major positioning strategies:
互联网网络营销外文文献翻译 (含：英文原文及中文译文) 文献出处：Peter Kenzelmann. Technical Consultancy in Internationalization[J]. International Marketing Review, 2006, 4(3):20-29. 英文原文 The technical basis of network marketing Peter Kenzelmann Network marketing is based on the technology infrastructure of computer network technology, as represented by information technology. Computer networks of modern communications technology and computer technology to the product of combining it in different geographic regions and specialized computer equipment for external interconnection lines of communication into a large, powerful networks, thus enabling a large number of computers can easily transmit information to each other, share hardware, software, data and other resources. And network marketing is closely related to the computer network there are three types: the Internet, Extranet and Intranet. The theoretical basis for the network marketing Theoretical foundation of network marketing is direct marketing network theory, network theory of relationship marketing, marketing theory and network software to integrate marketing theory. (A) Direct Response Network Marketing Theory
互联网金融安全中英文对照外文翻译文献 中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
Database Security in a Web Environment Introduction Databases have been common in government departments and commercial enterprises for many years. Today, databases in any organization are increasingly opened up to a multiplicity of suppliers, customers, partners and employees - an idea that would have been unheard of a few years ago. Numerous applications and their associated data are now accessed by a variety of users requiring different levels of access via manifold devices and channels – often simultaneously. For example: ? Online banks allow customers to perform a variety of banking operations - via the Internet and over the telephone – whilst maintaining the privacy of account data. ? E-Commerce merchants and their Service Providers must store customer, order and payment data on their merchant server - and keep it secure. ? HR departments allow employees to update their personal information –whilst protecting certain management information from unauthorized access. ? The medical profession must protect the confidentiality of patient data –whilst allowing essential access for treatment. ? Online brokerages need to be able to provide large numbers of simultaneous users with up-to-date and accurate financial information. This complex landscape leads to many new demands upon system security. The global growth of complex web-based infrastructures is driving a need for security solutions that provide mechanisms to segregate environments; perform integrity checking and maintenance; enable strong authentication and non-repudiation; and provide for confidentiality. In turn, this necessitates comprehensive business and technical risk assessment to identify the threats,