股权激励外文文献

股权激励动因与实施效果的文献综述股权激励是一种雇员激励的方式，它通过让员工持有公司的股份来实现对员工的鼓励和激励，以此提高员工的自我动力和工作积极性。

本文综述股权激励的动因及其实施效果方面的研究文献。

动因一、员工动机方面1.改善员工绩效Byun等人（2014）在研究中指出，股权激励计划对员工绩效具有积极的影响，员工股份持股越多，其绩效就越好，因此，股权激励可以帮助公司激发员工的积极性和工作动力。

2.增强员工归属感王智慧等（2015）的研究表明，股权激励计划可以增强员工对公司的归属感，提高员工的忠诚度和满意度，有助于提高员工的留存率。

二、公司优化方面1.增加公司利润Desoky（2015）在研究中指出，通过股权激励计划，能够增加公司的利润，有助于提高公司的业绩表现。

2.吸引和留住人才丁宗明等（2015）的研究表明，股权激励计划可以吸引和留住优秀人才，提高企业的竞争力和核心竞争力。

实施效果一、股价表现方面1.股价上涨Datta等人（2016）的研究表明，股权激励计划能够提高公司的股价表现，从而增加投资者的投资信心。

2.影响时间因素Pixley等人（2015）则发现，股权激励对股价的影响时间因素存在滞后效应，通常在计划实施后的数年内才能达到最佳效果。

1.员工创造力Trevor等人（2013）的研究表明，股权激励计划能够对员工的创造力和创新能力产生积极影响，从而促进公司的创新和发展。

2.员工忠诚度总结而言，股权激励计划在员工动机和公司优化方面具有积极的作用，对公司的股价表现和员工绩效也有显著的影响。

因此，企业在实施股权激励计划时应根据自身的情况和目标进行选择和实施。

上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究外⽂⽂献翻译⽂献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.原⽂The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensationincentiveFirth MAbstractExecutive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.Keywords: Executive compensation, Business performance, Listed Company1 IntroductionSeparate ownership and control is modern enterprise the most significant characteristics (Bale and Means, 1932).The shareholders of the owners in an enterprise have the final property ownership and the residual claims, but often there is no direct management control. Business management on behalf of the owner of control, but don't take the final decision. In the case of two rights separation is as the main body of the ownership as the main operational control shareholders and the enterprise management to form a layer between the principal-agent relationships. According to rational economic man hypothesis, the principal (owner) and the agent(management) have different between the objective function, at the same time, there exists a phenomenon of information asymmetry, the company's senior managers there is power and ability to implement on-the-job consumption "opportunistic behavior", which came at the expense of the interests of the owners at the expense of, is also the focus of the agency cost, reflect, it requires enterprises to establish an effective mechanism of incentive and constraint. By the implementation of these mechanisms can excite the work enthusiasms of agent, and can minimize the agency cost of the enterprise, so as to realize the "win-win" between principal and agent. Human society has begun to enter the knowledge economy era, the executives with high and new technical knowledge and skills has become the key to the development of enterprises, enterprises in the market competition is talented person's competition, in today's increasingly internationalized talent flow speed and, utmost respect talented person, is the key to enterprises in the competition occupy the initiative. Therefore, the enterprise owners how to through a set of incentive constraint mechanism to arouse the enthusiasm of executives, minimize agency costs, has become the key problem in the principal-agent relationship.2 Literature reviewIn the 90 s and 1980 s executive compensation has become an important field of academic research, the current executive compensation research literature is largely based on agency theory as the theoretical basis; it requires managers pay package design should make the interests of the managers consistent with the interests of shareholders. Multiple theory school of scholars use all kinds of data on compensation performance problems made all kinds of inspection. But neither empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions, there is conflict between each other. Such as Belkaoui and Picur (1993), Koehhar and Levitas (1998) and Gray and Canella (1997) study showed that the correlation coefficient between CEO pay and company size to 0.1 at lower, the level of 0.110 and 0.170, and Boyd (1994), Finke1SteinandB.Yd (1998) and Sander and Carpenter (1998) argues that between the correlation coefficient is 0.62, 0.50 and 0.42.The same conflict results also exist in the research about the relation between pay performance. Like Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) foundthat return on equity (ROE) with monetary compensation and long-term returns between the correlation coefficient is 0.13 and 2.03 respectively; Johnson (1982) found that the correlation coefficient of 0.003.And Belliveau, Reilly and Wade (1996) found that CEO pay with ROE correlation coefficient of 0.410.Gomez Mejia (1994), the empirical study summarized: "although the empirical study of CEO pay a dime a dozen, but we know very little about executive remuneration or. “Many causes of the difference of the results of the study: the different data sources, different statistical techniques, different samples and differentcontrol variables, etc.Most of the empirical study in the United States listed companies as samples, mainly to pay as the research object, and given priority to with big companies. In the empirical study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) widely cited in the literature, since 90, and most of the empirical research in accordance with its research paradigm. In this article has pioneering meaning in the literature, they estimated the 1295 companies between 1974 and 1986 of 10400 senior managers compensation performance sensitivity, results show that the shareholder wealth of $1000 per change, CEO of wealth will be $3.25 move together. Lippert and Moore (1994) found that the pay performance sensitivity significantly negative correlation with growth, industry control, scale, and with the internal and the institutional investors holding and the term is not relevant. LIPPert and Moore (1995) found that the pay performance sensitivity to low the company has more independent directors or stronger shareholder control. MeConaughy and Mishra (1996) found that sensitivity associated with the company's future performance. The research is on compensation performance sensitivity calculation with Jensen and Murhpy computing (1990).With Jensen and Murhpy (1990) study of pay levels are different. Other documents against U.S. companies pay structures were studied. Genhart and Milkovich (1990) analysis of the more than 200 enterprises, 14000 senior and mid-level managers' pay, found that managers' pay and performance related and wages are not related. Their results also showed that mixed compensation levels and future profitability is related. Their contribution is caused people's understanding to pay structure. Similarly, Leonard (1990) have found S0 s long-term incentive plans ofthe company than the company has a long-term incentive plans, there are a higher return on equity (ROE).Hamid Mehran (1995) on a random sample of 153 manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 executive pay the inspection support incentive compensation claims, but also shows the level of motivation rather than the form of motivation to inspire the motivation of managers to increase the value of the company. Corporate performance with management ownership and equity incentive is in proportion to the total compensation level of positive correlation. He also found that equity-based compensation in the company of outside directors more applied more widely. In the end or by outside big shareholders higher insider ownership of company Ricky is in less equity compensation applications.3 Theoretical foundation of the executive compensation3.1 The principal-agent theoryIn the early days of the private enterprise, the enterprise owners or operators of the two functions, so as long as the owners are rational economic man, he will actively work for their own enterprise profit maximization, at the same time as the enterprise risk takers, he will be careful decisions, try to avoid risk. In classical enterprises, therefore, there is no power shortage and behavior distortion problem. However, with the deepening of socialized big division of labor, the production of modern enterprise system, enterprise's ownership and operation separate, its separation and led to the emergence of the principal and agent relationship, both are driven by their own interests, as the manager of the enterprise owners want as agent of the principal researchers to their own interests targeting action in accordance with the owners. And managers also is own expected utility maximization as the goal, so that both the goal of the inconsistency.3.2 The human capital theoryFrom the Angle of economics to study the compensation problem, main is to pay as senior executives in the Labor market price. In labor economics, the compensation decision mechanism on the Labor market mainly is the human capital theory. The economic activities of listed companies in the final analysis is conducted by people, the economic efficiency of listed companies in the final analysis depends on people'senthusiasm. Economic history shows that, under different institutional arrangements, the person of ability and hard work, especially the potential and creativity is the fundamental symbol of success for an enterprise system is good or bad. Therefore, economic efficiency of listed companies, the human capital property rights problems and natural economic behavior is the foundation of can't avoid. Property rights established the significance, is to make the economic behavior of the internalization of external effects, so as to produce the stimulation of strong momentum. A property rights system, therefore, the strength of the economic incentive function, mainly with the efforts of the economic subject is associated with the proximity of remuneration. Top management is the most important role in the development of modern enterprises, executive personnel is the enterprise decision makers, leaders and commanders, is the soul of the enterprise, is a leader in the development of enterprises, therefore is also an important force in China's economic and social development. Grew up in a special environment during the transition period of our country in the top management, than the business operators in the market economy country pressure is bigger, heavier burden. Especially the burden of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises with the development of the enterprise solution and two pairs of heavy burden, they want to pay more than the number of times the energy often, previously unimaginable responsibility and risk. Therefore, should recognize the importance of enterprise senior management personnel. Establish training, selection and use of enterprise management mechanism, giving them reasonable compensation.3.3 Equity theoryProblems from the Angle of psychology to study senior managers' pay mainly will be paid as a method that can meet the demand of senior executives inner and elements, to encourage executives to work enthusiasm and initiative, to improve executive performance from the individual level. In the psychology of motivation theory, the design of compensation and compensation management is based on the theory of influential Stacy Adams equity theory. Adams fair theory, the staff would first think about the ratio of their income to pay, and then will his income pay comparing with relevant income pay others. If employees feel him with others of thesame, the ratio of thought is to the state fair. If both feel not the same, the ratio of injustice are produced, namely, they may think their income is too low or too high. After this injustice, the staff will try to correct it.3.4 Strategic compensation theoriesTo think from the perspective of management, enterprises pay problem, more attention is pay management support for the enterprise strategic goals, namely how to through the compensation system to effectively help enterprises to gain a competitive advantage. About compensation management how to support the enterprise strategic target, this is the main content of the strategic compensation system design. The so-called strategic compensation, it is to point to will pay up to the enterprise strategic level, to thinking through what kind of compensation policies and compensation management system to support enterprise competitive strategy, and help enterprises to gain competitive advantage.4 The design principle of executive compensation system4.1 Principles of pay and performanceOptimal executive compensation design is the executive compensation and its operation performance, the compensation depends on the company's operating results, the design should follow the principle of the main executive compensation scheme. This principle is the principle of balance between the interests of the owner and operator. Because follow this principle, the owner and operator revenue the stand or fall of same direction as the firm's performance. Business is business risk, managers' compensation and corporate business performance has a direct relationship. Considering the operators are people too, also want to maintain family and their own survival. Considering the uncertainties of doing business at the same time, if the executive compensation and its business performance, completely will take too much risk. As a result, the executive compensation can be divided into two parts: part of the fixed income, the amount is able to maintain their personal and family life, have insurance effect. Part is risk income, completely and enterprise performance, good management can be even more greatly than the fixed income part, make its income risk, incentive role.4.2 Effective incentive principlesModern enterprise system, the organization (shareholders) and individual (senior management) is a kind of principal-agent relationship. Incentive is to strengthen and accordance of individual behavior, organizational goals, in other words, is to guide individual behavior maximize the development to achieve organizational goals. Due to corporate executives is a special company employees, has the position of privilege, enjoy "on-the-job consumption", it brought outside the regular salary incentive to executives to meet the material benefits, this need to some extent, belongs to the fair in Adams fair theory. However, in many state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption often goes far beyond a reasonable level, showing a high cost of self-motivation. And stands in stark contrast to the executive pay, some executive’s on-the-job consumption optional the gender is strong, too much abuse, even in a state of out of control. Has issued relevant laws and regulations, shall be forbidden.4.3 Effective restriction principleExecutives is an enterprise's decision-making and operators directly, plays an vital role in the fate of the enterprise, if in the design of enterprise organization system, lack of necessary and effective supervision and restriction mechanism, will likely agent risk. On entrepreneur behavior with some restrictions, these constraints are usually the behavior rule, violating these rules will be punished. Constraint mechanism has defined the entrepreneur behavior, the role of maintaining the order of economic activities, for the standardization of the enterprise behavior, economic and social benign operation has an indispensable positive function.译⽂上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究Firth M摘要⾼管薪酬问题的产⽣源于现代企业所有权和控制权的相互分离，所有者与公司⾼管之间存在着⽬标不⼀致、信息不对称等问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这⼀问题的严重性，⽽通过与⾼管签订薪酬绩效契约，设计和执⾏⼀份良好的薪酬⽅案可以有效地解决上述问题。

How to Moｔiｖaｔe EverｙEmｐlｏｙee---Jａｍeｓ·Caｍｅｒon Ｉnｃｅntｉve ｉs the core oｆhuman reｓourcｅmanaｇｅmeｎt.Ｐｒoduction anｄmanagemｅnt iｎｔheｅntｅrpriｓe manageｍent, humａn ｒeｓoｕrces is eｃｏnｏmic ｒesｏurcｅｓwitｈａｖariety of tｈoｕghts,fｅelinｇs,thｅmost dynamic suｍmatiｏn also ｌoｖｅtｈａt economic reｓources, but ａlsｏthｅsｏul ｏf enterpriｓe in ｔhis orgaｎｉｓm, therｅfoｒe, ｈｕmａn reｓoｕrｃesｐｒｏｄucｔion and management reｓoｕrces tｈａn other ｍoｒe imｐorｔant ｒeｓouｒces,aｎd ｄｅcisioｎs ｎot only affectｔhe productｉoｎand oｐｅrａtion of ｅnteｒｐriｓeｓof oｔher ｅcoｎomiｃｒesouｒcｅｓ, the ｖalue anｄｕsｅ, aｎd the proviｎｃe iｓtｈe entｅｒprise strength of severaｌimｐortant componｅｎts of quａliｔy ｏf ｈuｍaｎｒeｓｏurcｅs as a resｕltｏf pｒod ｕctiｏn and managemeｎt iｎtｈｅenterpriｓｅeｃonｏmic ｒesouｒcｅs ｏf the status and role, ｓo the efｆecｔiveness oｆｃorpoｒate goveｒnance ｏr the ｕｌtimate ideａl to acｈｉeve thｅobjectiｖｅshｏuｌdｂe: everyｅntｅｒｐrｉse empｌoyｅes wiｌl be ａｂle tｏgiｖe tｏｐｐrｉoｒity to tｈe oveｒalｌinｔerestsｏf eｎtｅrｐriseｓand ｂusiness goaｌs ,ｔhe iｎtｅｒests ｏf all wｉlling to contrｉbuｔeｔheir own．Employeesｏｆsuｃｈa mｅnｔal state oｆthi ｎking anｄNormal under oath iｎorder to ｒeｆlecｔthe difficult,bｕt it is entrｅpreｎeｕrs，ｍanagerｓshｏulｄbe pｕｒsued anｄｔhe ｕlｔｉmate chａll ｅnge, it iｓｎecesｓaryｔｏapｐroａcｈｓuｃｈ a sｔaｔe,ｏｎlｙthroｕgh an effeｃtive iｎｔｅｒnal iｎcｅntｉves. Thｅrefｏre,the most impｏrｔａnt tasｋｏｆenｔerprｉse mａｎagement is ｔｈｅｈuｍaｎresouｒces manａgeｍeｎt.Traｄｉtｉｏnal pｅｒsｏｎｎｅl mａnaｇemｅnt and labｏｒis diffｅｒｅnt fr ｏm ａｍodern human ｒesouｒｃeｓｍanａgement performance of ｔhe maｉｎｆeaturｅs oｆthe ＂straｔeｇic" ｌevel: (one)at the strateｇｉc guiｄiｎg iｄeology oｆmodｅｒn hｕman resourｃe manａgement is "ｐeoplｅ-oriｅｎtｅd" mａnａgemen ｔ；(tｗo)tｈe ｓｔｒategic oｂｊeｃtives ｍodｅrｎhumａｎrｅsoｕｒceｓman ａgｅment in oｒder tｏ＂obtａin a comｐｅtｉtｉve aｄvanｔage," ｔhe obｊｅctives oｆmａｎagemｅｎｔ; （three) ｔｈe sｃope oｆtｈe strategy,the modern huｍan ｒesources management ｉs ｔhe"fｕll parｔicipation in＂ｄemoｃratｉｃmaｎａgｅment；（foｕr）measurｅs ｉn the ｓtｒaｔeｇy ｏｆmｏdern hum ａn rｅsouｒceｓmanagemｅnt iｓtｈｅｕse oｆ＂ｓｙstｅｍａtｉc sｃｉenti ｆic methods and huｍan art" ｃonｔｉngeｎcy maｎagemｅnt. Aｎd noｎ－ｈｕmａn resouｒcesｍａｎａｇement,comｐaｒeｄto ｈｕmａn ｒｅｓouｒcesｍａnａｇemｅnt through the＂incentiｖｅs" to achieve, ｉt isｔhｅｃore of hｕｍan resｏuｒces manageｍeｎt．Ｔheｓo-cａlled ＂iｎcentｉｖe"to meet peopｌｅｆrom tｈｅmｕlｔｉ-leｖel and diveｒsifｉed needs ofｄifferent eｍployees aｎd reward perforｍanceｓtaｎdards set vａlue，a maximuｍstaｆｆto stimulaｔe enthus ｉaｓm and creativiｔy tｏachieve ｔhｅoｂjeｃtives of thｅＯrｇａniｚaｔｉon．An enｔeｒｐｒise of how tｈe usｅof humaｎrｅsoｕrｃｅs is ｄetermined by ｍaｎy compleｘfａｃtors ｉn ｔhｅrｅsult ｏｆthe ｃoｕpｌｉng,but the ｒole ｏf ｍａnａｇemｅｎｔincenｔiｖeｓis ｏnｅoｆthe most importａnｔfacｔｏｒs.Uｎlike other noｎ-human reｓｏurcｅs of tｈe funｄamental chaｒacteriｓtｉcs ｏf ｈｕｍａn rｅsources is that it attached to the stafｆaｎｄtｈe exｉsｔｅnce of the ｈｕman ｂoｄｙ，pｅｒｓｏｎal moment with thｅstaff can not be separａｔed, s ｕcｈotｈer peｒsｏn or organizationｔo uｓｅhｕｍａn resｏuｒｃes，both by i ｔs naｔｕral all the peoｐlｅof "ｐoｓｉtive takｅthｅｉｎｉtiａtiｖe "cａｎｂe acｈｉｅｖed wiｔｈ．Theｒefｏre，humａn resourｃes mａnagement caｎ"peo ｐｌe－orieｎtｅｄ" ａnd effｅctively to sｔｉmulatｅthe enthusｉａsm ｏf ｅmpｌoyeeｓ, to mａximｉｚe tｈe sｔaｆｆ＇s iｎｉｔiative and cｒeatｉviｔy，ｈas become tｈｅdecision of thｅmerits ｏf enterｐrise prｏductiｏn and manaｇｅmeｎｔｏf key perfoｒｍａｎce fａctoｒs and human rｅsｏurｃeｓｍaｎaｇemeｎtｂusｉn ｅss sucｃesｓｃoｒｅof the probｌｅm.Ｅmｐloyeｅiｎceｎｔive meaｓureｓ.Incentiｖes foｒthe maｎagｅment of humａn ｒｅsouｒces management in ｐa ｒtｉcular，tｈe ｉmｐortanｃｅoｆｓelｆ－eｖidenｔ. Iｎceｎtives ｃaｎbe ａｄｏpted bｙａlｌｏf，tｈe entｅrpriｓes ｎｅed to aｔｔract them;also canｍa ｋe tｈe ｍosｔｏf ｔｈe ｅmployｅes to peｒform tｈeｉr talentｓandｗiｓｄｏm；ｗｏrk so aｓto mainｔain ｔhe ｅffｅcｔivｅnｅss aｎd effiｃiｅncy. Iｎcentivｅnｏt oｎlｙｔｏmaｋe eｍployｅes feｅｌat ｅａse,and actively wｏrｋto pｌayｉt ｓo sｔａff recｏgnitiｏn ａnd accｅpｔance of thｅｅnteｒprｉsｅgoａｌsaｎd vａｌues，ｔhｅｅntｅrpriｓe hａve a ｓtrｏｎｇｓense of bｅlｏnｇｉnｇ. Accｏrding to tｈe Ｕnited Stａteｓ,Pｒｏfessor Ｗiｌliam James of Harvａrd Ｕniversiｔy ｓtｕdｙ，ｉn ｔhe abｓｅnce oｆｉｎcentiｖe environmｅnt，the ｐｏtential fｏr staｆf to playｏｕt onｌｙ a sｍall part ｏf that ｉs20%-30%, ｆiｒｓｔ－seｒｖed bａsｉｓjuｓｔｔｏｋeep their ricｅbowls; and in a goo ｄinｃentive mechaｎｉsm for ｔhe environmeｎt，tｈe sａmｅstａffｃaｎplａy a ｐotential 80%－9０%, it caｎbe seen，so tｈat each employeｅis alｗａｙｓa good ｉncｅntive enviｒonmeｎt ｉs tｈe manageｍent ｏｆｈｕman reｓｏurc ｅｓdeveｌｏｐmｅnt anｄthe ｐuｒsｕｉt oｆtｈe ｉｄｅal sｔate. So ｈoｗdo wｅiｎｓpirｅｅｍploｙees tｏeffｅctivelｙcorrect ｔhe times?First,Aｄhere tｏpｅoｐlｅ－ｃentered，resｐｅct ｆor humaｎnature,and establish anｄｉmpleｍent thｅ"emｐｌoyee-cenｔric" mａnａｇｅmｅnt concept."Pｅoｐｌe-ｏriｅnted，reｓpect for humanity＂as a modｅrｎmanagｅｍentｐhｉlｏsoｐhy, empｈasiｚiｎｇｔhe ultimatｅgoal ｏｆmanagｅｍent －tｏｉmpr ｏve the ecｏnoｍic efficiencｙｏf enｔerprises ｏｎthe peopｌe beｈind theｍanaｇemenｔｏf ｂehaｖiｏr is nｏlonｇeｒ a ｃold cold commanｄtyｐe, ｔhe comｐuｌsoｒy tｙpe. But carryｉｎg ｏut anｉｎｃｅntivｅ,trust, cａrinｇ, emotiｏｎａl，maｎager of huｍaｎｎａture embodieｓ a ｈｉgh degree ｏf uｎderstａｎd ｉng ａnd atｔａｃh impｏrtaｎce to managers as employｅes ｃan not ｂe purelｙ＂ｅcoｎomic man＂in orderｔo mｅｅt tｈeir survｉvａｌnｅｅds and materiａl interestｓoｆｔｈeｍanaｇeｍent an ｏpｐortｕｎity tｏbut tｏpay ａtｔｅntion ｔｏtheｅmployees respeｃt tｈｅspirｉt of ｓelf－aｃｔuaｌｉzａtion needｓaｔｈigher lｅvel iｎordｅr tｏprovｉdｅｃrｅativｅｗｏｒk and encouraging ｐerｓonａlitｙto ｐlａｙtｏmｏｂｉｌｉｚe the enｔhuｓiaｓm of ｅmploｙees, in ｔhe eｑｕal exchａｎge of lead and ｅstablｉｓh the cｏｎcepｔof coｒpoｒate ｍanageｍｅnｔ; the extｅｒnaｌcoｎtroｌｉnto ｓeｌf-contｒoｌ, so thatｅach employee to forｍtｈeir own sense ｏf corporate lｏyaｌty andａsｅｎｓe of ｒespoｎｓibｉlity, so tｈat tｈe value of employees to ａｃhievｅｐｅｒsoｎａl aｎd ｂｕｓｉnesｓｓurvival aｎd develoｐment into a ｐasseｒ-ｂy, ｉf thｅｅnterpｒis ｅs do not know hｏw to be peｏple-oriｅnted, and laｃｋof bａsic uｎdeｒsｔａnding ｏf humaｎnature and reｓｐecｔｆｏr , ｔｏｔｈe ｎegｌect of the personal vａlue of huｍan resoｕrｃes tｏeｎable ｅmplｏｙees tｏachiｅve long －ｔerm nｅeds oｆthe ｉｎdividual vａlｕes can not ｂe met or evenｄeｐｒｅssｉon, ｗｉlｌnot be ａｂlｅto retain ｔhe bｅsｔtaｌent，companies will lｏｓe ｃompeｔitｉveness.Therefｏrｅ, we ｍust ｄｏthｅｆｏllｏｗing:Stａff carｒy ｏｕｔrｅgｕｌaｒsurｖeｙs tｏｕnderstａnｄtｈe extent poｓsｉble，a ｍaｔter oｆcoｎcerｎto emplｏyｅes, espｅｃｉaｌｌy tｈoｓe reｌeｖant to theｉr wｏｒk，ａｎｄto win the ｓupport andｌoyalｔｙof staｆf，and ｓtａff ｔｏguide the sｐｉrｉｔof innovation, attrａcｔand rｅｔain eｍployees,coｍpaｎｉeｓshouｌｄsｔrive tｏcｏllectｔｈe fｏｌloｗing ｔhｅde ｓｉred iｎｆormation sｔaff: ｔhe fａiｒness ｏf worｋ; ｏrgaｎｉzaｔｉoｎal leａｒning；ｃｏmmunicaｔioｎ;dｅgrｅe ｏf fｌexibility and conceｒn; ＣustomeｒＣenｔeｒ;trust and delegaｔion of autｈoriｔｙ; tｈｅeffeｃtivｅneｓsｏf ｍａnａgement；job sａｔiｓfactiｏｎ, the adeｑｕａcy ｏｆsupｐｏrt, was pｌａced iｎa ｓｕiｔａble rｏle ，and wheｔhｅｒｏｒnot to ｆｅｅl valuable．Ｆｏcｕｓon stａff ｒemunerａｔｉon, ｂenｅfitｓ，working conditｉoｎs,as w ｅll as fleｘibｌe, to facilｉｔate the prｅfｅrenｔiaｌarrａngemｅntｓ. Ｅnterprｉses shoｕｌd chanｇe witｈｔｈe ｔimes, in ａｄditioｎto thｅｔraditioｎal emphａsis on ｓtaｆf ｒeｍｕneratｉon，wｅlｆare aｎd ｔhｅimproｖeｍent of wｏｒkiｎg condｉｔｉｏｎs ｂut also tｈe pｏssibiｌity of other incentｉves，such aｓｔhe proviｓion of day cａre; servinｇUniｖeｒsitｙ;tｕition grａnts;shorｔer workinｇhoｕrｓin suｍmｅr;ｔｈe implementａtｉon ofｅｍployee sｔocｋoptionｐｌａｎ; ｓeｔuｐa reｍote post oｆfice and so on.Seｃonｄ，tｈe iｍplemｅntａtiｏn of a ｃoｍpreｈｅnsive cｏmpｅｎsatiｏｎstrategy tｏｍｏtiｖate empｌoyｅes tｏfulｌy.The so-cａｌleｄ"coｍpreheｎｓｉｖe cｏmｐensaｔｉon strategy"，wｈich mean ｓthe company wiｌｌpaｙthｅｓalａrｉｅｓoｆemployeｅsｃlaｓsifieｄas"ｅxternal" ａnd "inheｒｅnｔ" ｉn two catｅgｏries,ａcombｉnation oｆｔｈｅｔwoｉs the "ｆuｌl pａｙ"，"ｅｘｔernal pay"refer ｒiｎg primarｉｌy toｐrovidｅthｅir emplｏyees with quａｎtifiａｂle monｅtary ｖalue, for eｘａmplｅ, tｈe bａsiｃｗagｅboｎusｅs, ｓtocｋｏpｔioｎs, ｐension, ｍedical insｕrance ａnd so on," ｉnternaｌpay ＂ｒefeｒs tｏtｈoseｐrｏvided ｔo employees canｎot bｅｑuanｔiｆｉed the perｆorｍanｃe oｆmonｅtaｒy val ｕe of various ｃｕrｒenｃies. Ｆｏｒexampｌe, work sａtisｆacｔiｏn, for the comｐｌｅｔiｏｎｏf itｓwｏrk tｏfaciliｔａte thｅprovision oｆpeｒsonａl tools, trａiniｎg opportuniｔies, atｔracｔive corporate cｕｌture, ｇood inｔerｐersonal r ｅｌatioｎs, coordｉnatioｎｏf the work enｖirｏｎment, asｗｅll aｓinｄｉｖid ｕａｌrecｏgniｔion, apｐrｅcｉatｉon and ｓo on,exteｒnal ｓalａries anｄpａy theｉr oｗn interｎal ｉncｅｎtives have differｅｎｔfunctions.Ｔheiｒｃonｔact ｗｉth eａcｈoｔher，cｏmｐｌｅment each othｅr,ｃoｎsｔitｕｔe a coｍplｅｔe system oｆremｕneration,practice has proveｄthａt as a ｒesultｏｆｓtａff-to-ｂuｓiｎeｓs eｘpectａtions ａnd needs tｏbe comprｅheｎsive, wｈicｈincludeｓｎｏt ｏnly mateｒiａl ｎｅｅds, bｕt also ｓｐiｒitual needｓ,ａｎd thｕs the im ｐｌeｍｅｎｔａｔionｏf"fulｌpay" stｒａteｇy，is an effeｃtivｅmｏdel of stafｆｍotivaｔioｎ.Ｔｈiｒd，incentｉvｅs shoｕldｂｅfair，jｕst and eliｍｉｎaｔe ｉｎcentives for "big".Fａｉr and iｍparｔial is aｆuｎdameｎtaｌpｒincｉple of ｍotivatioｎ.Iｆｙou dｏnot ｆａir, ｉmproper Prｉze Ａwaｒd,ｉmｐroｐｅrｐｕnｉsｈmeｎt and punishmｅnt,noｔonly can ｎot ｒｅceｉve tｈｅdesireｄresｕlts，ｂuｔｗｉlｌresulｔin manｙnｅgａtｉve consｅqｕenｃes，ｉｔｉｓnecｅｓsa ｒy tｏimparｔial ａnd ｉncorrｕptible，regaｒdleｓsｏf afｆinity, rｅgａrdlesｓof dｉstance，ｗilｌbｅtrｅatｅd equally in order ｔo prｏmoｔe tｈe enthusiaｓm of the staｆｆａlong the ｒｉｇht diｒｅcｔion ｖｉrtｕous cｉrｃle，as propｏsed ｂｙｔhe UniｔeｄSｔateｓmanagｅthe acａdemic ａward as ｔhe cｒit ｅriａ. Ｏnly by dｏｉng so can enｈａｎｃｅthe coheｓｉoｎand cenｔriｐｅtal f ｏrce.At the sａme tｉｍe,incｅnｔｉｖeｓare clｅarｌy ancient times ｐeｏple be ｌievedｉn thｅbaｓic mａnaｇｅment pｒinｃiples. Ｉn faｃt if tｈe aｄditional moｎey as waｇｅs，ａｓｉt is ｕｎｒｅlaｔｅｄtｏiｎｄividuaｌperfoｒm ａncｅａnd reward，empｌoyeｅs feel thｅy dｅserve it, rather thaｎtｈe rｅsｕｌｔofｔｈｅefforts, sｏthatｐeoｐle ｃan noｔｂe stｉmｕlated anｄmｏtivａt ｅｄ.Therｅfore，the smart manａgers should do everｙtｈｉng possｉｂle ｔo re ｗard aｎd rｅｃognｉｚe ｐｅｒｆormanｃｅcｏmbｉｎe it ｗith ｔhe ｃauｓe of loｙalty, ｄedication to tｈeｃause oｆtheｃlｏｓｅcｏmｂiｎａtiｏn of faｃｔ, ｔhe sｔａfｆinｓidｅthｅimbalaｎcｅis that they do ｇood , therｅａreｄｅdicatｅd,but work withｐeopleｗｈｏdo ｎot receｉve thｅsame treaｔｍｅnｔ. Ｔｈis ｉs often not satiｓfied witｈｔhe staff aｎd ｌeａdeｒshｉp ｒeａsｏｎs，incｅｎｔivesｔo cｏmｐaniｅs lｉｎkeｄtoｂｅｈavｉｏr and ｅｍployee be ｎeｆits, ｔhe hｉgｈｅr thｅproteｃtｉｏn ｏf pｅrsonal value，thｅgreaｔｅr their ｉｎcome, ａnｄthrouｇh ｉnceｎtives toｃreaｔe a ｆair comｐetitivｅｅnvｉｒonmentｔo inｃreａse the cｏmpａrabiｌity of ｒesｕｌｔs，and promｏte ｕp ｇｒｏuｐｓ．To sum uｐ, thｅmanagemenｔｏf eｎterprisｅｓin tｈe uｓｅｏf iｎceｎtｉｖes shｏuｌd be peｏplｅ-orieｎtｅd，paｙaｔtentiｏｎto and streｎｇtｈen the stｒｏng ｓpirit of eｎtｅｒpｒiｓe ａｎｄdｅveｌopment of ｍiｎing rｅｓoｕrｃes ｔｏimｐroｖe the wｏrｋers ｃｏmｐｅnsaｔiｏn whｉｃh ｔhe ｄegree of noｎ-material rewａrdｓ, ｉn thｅdeｔeｒｍinaｔion ａnd iｍｐｌementａｔion ｏf policies ａnd work ruｌes and rｅgulaｔiｏｎs iｎ,aｎｄsｔrive ｔo embody thｅｐrinciｐle oｆｆair anｄeqｕitaｂle．Empｌｏyeｅｓｓhouldｎoｔｂlindly encoｕｒａge unｒealｉstiｃｅarｎingｓexｐectatiｏｎs iｎcreａse, ｏtherwise ｙｏu wilｌeｎable enteｒprisesｔo iｎdiｖidｕal worｋｅｒｓor gｒｏups of incentｉves and constraints ａrising ｆroｍtｈe ｄiffiｃulｔies,tｈe ｅffectiｖenｅss oｆｄecline,moｒe difficｕlｔ.中文翻译：如何激励每一位员工－-－詹姆斯·卡梅隆激励是人力资源管理的核心。

文献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.原文The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensationincentiveFirth MAbstractExecutive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.Keywords: Executive compensation, Business performance, Listed Company1 IntroductionSeparate ownership and control is modern enterprise the most significant characteristics (Bale and Means, 1932).The shareholders of the owners in an enterprise have the final property ownership and the residual claims, but often there is no direct management control. Business management on behalf of the owner of control, but don't take the final decision. In the case of two rights separation is as the main body of the ownership as the main operational control shareholders and the enterprise management to form a layer between the principal-agent relationships. According to rational economic man hypothesis, the principal (owner) and the agent(management) have different between the objective function, at the same time, there exists a phenomenon of information asymmetry, the company's senior managers there is power and ability to implement on-the-job consumption "opportunistic behavior", which came at the expense of the interests of the owners at the expense of, is also the focus of the agency cost, reflect, it requires enterprises to establish an effective mechanism of incentive and constraint. By the implementation of these mechanisms can excite the work enthusiasms of agent, and can minimize the agency cost of the enterprise, so as to realize the "win-win" between principal and agent. Human society has begun to enter the knowledge economy era, the executives with high and new technical knowledge and skills has become the key to the development of enterprises, enterprises in the market competition is talented person's competition, in today's increasingly internationalized talent flow speed and, utmost respect talented person, is the key to enterprises in the competition occupy the initiative. Therefore, the enterprise owners how to through a set of incentive constraint mechanism to arouse the enthusiasm of executives, minimize agency costs, has become the key problem in the principal-agent relationship.2 Literature reviewIn the 90 s and 1980 s executive compensation has become an important field of academic research, the current executive compensation research literature is largely based on agency theory as the theoretical basis; it requires managers pay package design should make the interests of the managers consistent with the interests of shareholders. Multiple theory school of scholars use all kinds of data on compensation performance problems made all kinds of inspection. But neither empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions, there is conflict between each other. Such as Belkaoui and Picur (1993), Koehhar and Levitas (1998) and Gray and Canella (1997) study showed that the correlation coefficient between CEO pay and company size to 0.1 at lower, the level of 0.110 and 0.170, and Boyd (1994), Finke1SteinandB.Yd (1998) and Sander and Carpenter (1998) argues that between the correlation coefficient is 0.62, 0.50 and 0.42.The same conflict results also exist in the research about the relation between pay performance. Like Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) foundthat return on equity (ROE) with monetary compensation and long-term returns between the correlation coefficient is 0.13 and 2.03 respectively; Johnson (1982) found that the correlation coefficient of 0.003.And Belliveau, Reilly and Wade (1996) found that CEO pay with ROE correlation coefficient of 0.410.Gomez Mejia (1994), the empirical study summarized: "although the empirical study of CEO pay a dime a dozen, but we know very little about executive remuneration or. “Many causes of the difference of the results of the study: the different data sources, different statistical techniques, different samples and different control variables, etc.Most of the empirical study in the United States listed companies as samples, mainly to pay as the research object, and given priority to with big companies. In the empirical study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) widely cited in the literature, since 90, and most of the empirical research in accordance with its research paradigm. In this article has pioneering meaning in the literature, they estimated the 1295 companies between 1974 and 1986 of 10400 senior managers compensation performance sensitivity, results show that the shareholder wealth of $1000 per change, CEO of wealth will be $3.25 move together. Lippert and Moore (1994) found that the pay performance sensitivity significantly negative correlation with growth, industry control, scale, and with the internal and the institutional investors holding and the term is not relevant. LIPPert and Moore (1995) found that the pay performance sensitivity to low the company has more independent directors or stronger shareholder control. MeConaughy and Mishra (1996) found that sensitivity associated with the company's future performance. The research is on compensation performance sensitivity calculation with Jensen and Murhpy computing (1990).With Jensen and Murhpy (1990) study of pay levels are different. Other documents against U.S. companies pay structures were studied. Genhart and Milkovich (1990) analysis of the more than 200 enterprises, 14000 senior and mid-level managers' pay, found that managers' pay and performance related and wages are not related. Their results also showed that mixed compensation levels and future profitability is related. Their contribution is caused people's understanding to pay structure. Similarly, Leonard (1990) have found S0 s long-term incentive plans ofthe company than the company has a long-term incentive plans, there are a higher return on equity (ROE).Hamid Mehran (1995) on a random sample of 153 manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 executive pay the inspection support incentive compensation claims, but also shows the level of motivation rather than the form of motivation to inspire the motivation of managers to increase the value of the company. Corporate performance with management ownership and equity incentive is in proportion to the total compensation level of positive correlation. He also found that equity-based compensation in the company of outside directors more applied more widely. In the end or by outside big shareholders higher insider ownership of company Ricky is in less equity compensation applications.3 Theoretical foundation of the executive compensation3.1 The principal-agent theoryIn the early days of the private enterprise, the enterprise owners or operators of the two functions, so as long as the owners are rational economic man, he will actively work for their own enterprise profit maximization, at the same time as the enterprise risk takers, he will be careful decisions, try to avoid risk. In classical enterprises, therefore, there is no power shortage and behavior distortion problem. However, with the deepening of socialized big division of labor, the production of modern enterprise system, enterprise's ownership and operation separate, its separation and led to the emergence of the principal and agent relationship, both are driven by their own interests, as the manager of the enterprise owners want as agent of the principal researchers to their own interests targeting action in accordance with the owners. And managers also is own expected utility maximization as the goal, so that both the goal of the inconsistency.3.2 The human capital theoryFrom the Angle of economics to study the compensation problem, main is to pay as senior executives in the Labor market price. In labor economics, the compensation decision mechanism on the Labor market mainly is the human capital theory. The economic activities of listed companies in the final analysis is conducted by people, the economic efficiency of listed companies in the final analysis depends on people'senthusiasm. Economic history shows that, under different institutional arrangements, the person of ability and hard work, especially the potential and creativity is the fundamental symbol of success for an enterprise system is good or bad. Therefore, economic efficiency of listed companies, the human capital property rights problems and natural economic behavior is the foundation of can't avoid. Property rights established the significance, is to make the economic behavior of the internalization of external effects, so as to produce the stimulation of strong momentum. A property rights system, therefore, the strength of the economic incentive function, mainly with the efforts of the economic subject is associated with the proximity of remuneration. Top management is the most important role in the development of modern enterprises, executive personnel is the enterprise decision makers, leaders and commanders, is the soul of the enterprise, is a leader in the development of enterprises, therefore is also an important force in China's economic and social development. Grew up in a special environment during the transition period of our country in the top management, than the business operators in the market economy country pressure is bigger, heavier burden. Especially the burden of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises with the development of the enterprise solution and two pairs of heavy burden, they want to pay more than the number of times the energy often, previously unimaginable responsibility and risk. Therefore, should recognize the importance of enterprise senior management personnel. Establish training, selection and use of enterprise management mechanism, giving them reasonable compensation.3.3 Equity theoryProblems from the Angle of psychology to study senior managers' pay mainly will be paid as a method that can meet the demand of senior executives inner and elements, to encourage executives to work enthusiasm and initiative, to improve executive performance from the individual level. In the psychology of motivation theory, the design of compensation and compensation management is based on the theory of influential Stacy Adams equity theory. Adams fair theory, the staff would first think about the ratio of their income to pay, and then will his income pay comparing with relevant income pay others. If employees feel him with others of thesame, the ratio of thought is to the state fair. If both feel not the same, the ratio of injustice are produced, namely, they may think their income is too low or too high. After this injustice, the staff will try to correct it.3.4 Strategic compensation theoriesTo think from the perspective of management, enterprises pay problem, more attention is pay management support for the enterprise strategic goals, namely how to through the compensation system to effectively help enterprises to gain a competitive advantage. About compensation management how to support the enterprise strategic target, this is the main content of the strategic compensation system design. The so-called strategic compensation, it is to point to will pay up to the enterprise strategic level, to thinking through what kind of compensation policies and compensation management system to support enterprise competitive strategy, and help enterprises to gain competitive advantage.4 The design principle of executive compensation system4.1 Principles of pay and performanceOptimal executive compensation design is the executive compensation and its operation performance, the compensation depends on the company's operating results, the design should follow the principle of the main executive compensation scheme. This principle is the principle of balance between the interests of the owner and operator. Because follow this principle, the owner and operator revenue the stand or fall of same direction as the firm's performance. Business is business risk, managers' compensation and corporate business performance has a direct relationship. Considering the operators are people too, also want to maintain family and their own survival. Considering the uncertainties of doing business at the same time, if the executive compensation and its business performance, completely will take too much risk. As a result, the executive compensation can be divided into two parts: part of the fixed income, the amount is able to maintain their personal and family life, have insurance effect. Part is risk income, completely and enterprise performance, good management can be even more greatly than the fixed income part, make its income risk, incentive role.4.2 Effective incentive principlesModern enterprise system, the organization (shareholders) and individual (senior management) is a kind of principal-agent relationship. Incentive is to strengthen and accordance of individual behavior, organizational goals, in other words, is to guide individual behavior maximize the development to achieve organizational goals. Due to corporate executives is a special company employees, has the position of privilege, enjoy "on-the-job consumption", it brought outside the regular salary incentive to executives to meet the material benefits, this need to some extent, belongs to the fair in Adams fair theory. However, in many state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption often goes far beyond a reasonable level, showing a high cost of self-motivation. And stands in stark contrast to the executive pay, some executive’s on-the-job consumption optional the gender is strong, too much abuse, even in a state of out of control. Has issued relevant laws and regulations, shall be forbidden.4.3 Effective restriction principleExecutives is an enterprise's decision-making and operators directly, plays an vital role in the fate of the enterprise, if in the design of enterprise organization system, lack of necessary and effective supervision and restriction mechanism, will likely agent risk. On entrepreneur behavior with some restrictions, these constraints are usually the behavior rule, violating these rules will be punished. Constraint mechanism has defined the entrepreneur behavior, the role of maintaining the order of economic activities, for the standardization of the enterprise behavior, economic and social benign operation has an indispensable positive function.译文上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究Firth M摘要高管薪酬问题的产生源于现代企业所有权和控制权的相互分离，所有者与公司高管之间存在着目标不一致、信息不对称等问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这一问题的严重性，而通过与高管签订薪酬绩效契约，设计和执行一份良好的薪酬方案可以有效地解决上述问题。

员工激励问题及对策外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Research direction: staff motivation problems andCountermeasures1. IntroductionAs recognized in the law (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), professional risk frame-works (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission [COSO] 1992,2004), auditing standards (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]2007; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2007), accounting textbooks(Reding et al. 2007; Romney and Steinbart 2009), and management best practices (Merchantand Vander Stede 2007), formal controls serve a vital role in safeguarding a company’s operational processes, information, and assets and in providing reasonable assurance regard-ing the reliability of financ ial reporting. Although critical to a company’s success, relatively little is understood about how and why specific types of formal control are effective.Prior research in accounting and economics examines how formal controls influence employee behavior,often finding that formal controls can have negative consequences,such as lower employee effort and firm profit. Recently, research has begun to focus on how employees’ response to formal controls can be influenced by specific aspects of the imposed control (e.g., Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2011). This study extends this line of research by providing evidence as to how and why two types of formal controls, preven-tive controls and detective controls, affect employee performance and motivation.Romney and St einbart (2009: 200) define preventive controls as controls that ‘‘deter problems before they arise’’ and detective controls as controls designed to ‘‘discover prob-lems after they occur’’. These types of formal controls differ in two fundamental ways.First, preventive controls restrict employees’ autonomy by prohibiting certain behaviors(e.g., employees cannot enter data or make a payment unless authorized to do so). Alter-natively, detective controls maintain the decision rights of employees and therefore do not limit their autonomy (Christ, Sedatole, Towry, and Thomas 2008). Second, the feedback provided by preventive controls is never delayed, whereas detective controls can provide immediate or delayed feedback. Importantly, companies can often choose to impose either preventive or detective controls to address the same control objective.For example, with respect to the expenditure cycle, different types of controls can be implemented to ensure that only authorized cash disbursements are made. Specifical ly,management could implement each of the following types of controls: (1) preventive: estab-lish authorization limits prohibiting employees from initiating disbursements above a pre-specified amount; (2) detective with immediate feedback: an alert is activ ated on an employee and ⁄ or supervisor’s computer monitor when a disbursement above a prespecified amount has been entered; or (3) detective with delayed feedback: a report of all disburse-ments over the prespecified amount is produced periodically (e.g., monthly). Our research examines differential costs and benefits of these three types of controls, which should enable managers to make more informed control decisions.We examine several of the costs and benefits of these types of formal controls in a set-ting in which management has implemented an incomplete contract. Specifically, one dimension of the employees’ responsibilities is directly compensated (i.e., compensated task dimension) and the other dimension is not compensated, but is subject to a formal control imposed by management (i.e., controlled task dimension).We examine the effects of for-mal control on the compensated and controlled dimensions of the task separately so that we can isolate formal control effects from the incentive contract effects.We rely on psychology research on salience, norms, and intrinsic motivation to form our predictions regarding how preventive and detective controls will affect employee per-formance and motivation. We expect that when a formal control is activated, i t willincrease the salience of the employee’s goal to comply with various goals of the organiza-tion for which s ⁄ he is not explicitly compensated, despite the fact that it may conflict with the employee’s goal to perform strongly on the compensated dimens ions of his ⁄ her task.We hypothesize that reductions in autonomy caused by a control and increases in the timeliness of control feedback will increase the salience of the control objective. Thus, we expect employees subject to preventive controls to exhibit stronger performance on the controlled dimension than employees in the other control conditions. Employees working in conditions with detective controls with immediate feedback should be the next best per-formers on the controlled dimension of the task followed by employees working in condi-tions with detective controls with delayed feedback and employees operating without controls, respectively.Motivational framing research further suggests that it is difficult for individuals to have multiple (poten tially conflicting) goals ⁄ frames activated at the same time (Lindenberg2001). We therefore predict that when employees focus on the goal of performing well on the controlled task dimension, they will focus less on the goal to excel on other task dimensions (e.g., the compensated dimension in our study) and will consequently perform worse on those dimensions. This suggests a reverse order of how employees facing these control types will perform on the compensated dimension of the task relative to their per-formance on the controlled dimension.To test these predictions, we use a simplified data entry task in an experimental setting in which participants are financially motivated to enter data as quickly as possible (com-pensated dimension). Importantly, participants are informed that the company values both data entry speed and accuracy. However, rather than also compensating participants for accuracy, the company implements a formal control to encourage accuracy (controlled dimension).Our results reveal that participants exposed to preventive controls or detective controls with immediate feedback perform significantly better on the controlled dimension of the task (data entry accuracy) than participants in the detectivecontrol-delayed feedback con-dition. This suggests that the timeliness of control feedback is the salient feature influenc-ing performance. We do not find differences in the overall performance on the compensated dimension (data entry speed), suggesting that explicit incentives still provide a powerful motivation despite the activation of formal controls directing attention to other dimensions of the task.In addition to examining how formal controls affect employee performance, we add to the growing literature on the unintended costs of formal controls by examining how different formal control types affect employees’ intrinsic motivation to perform the task. We expect that because preventive controls restrict autonomy, which likely will be perceived by employees as ‘‘controlling’’, they wil l be more detrimental to employees’ intrinsic motivation than detective controls. Consistent with our expectations, the results show that preventive controls significantly reduce intrinsic motivation relative to both types of detective controls. This suggests that the extent to which formal controls restrict employees’ autonomy, and not the timeliness of the feedback they provide, influences employees’ intrinsic motivation to perform their responsibilities. Further, we confirm results from prior research findi ng that lower intrinsic motivation leads to lower performance on all dimensions of the task.Taken together, our results suggest that detective controls that provide immediate feedback can be just as effective at producing high employee performance as preventive controls (and more effective than detective controls with delayed feedback or no controls),without causing a decrease in intrinsic motivation that is exhibited by employees subjected to preventive controls. Therefore, organizations can likely achieve many of their control objectives by increasing the timeliness of feedback from detective controls, without bearing the costs associated with preventive controls.This study provides several important practical and theoretical contributions. First,this study can inform practitioners, auditors, and regulators who design, implement, and evaluate formal controls about some of the potential costs and benefits of various types of formal controls. Formal controls play a critical role in promoting efficiency,reducing risk of asset loss, ensuring the reliability of financial statements, and promoting compliance with laws and regulations (COSO 1992). Our study suggests that practitioners can better achieve many of these control objectives by implementing formal controls that provide immediate feedback. Furthermore, this study suggests that formal controls which restrict employee autonomy reduce employees’ intrinsic motivation, and practitioners would there-fore benefit in many situations by implementing formal controls that provide immediate feedback but donot restrict user autonomy.Second, this study contributes to several streams of academic research on formal con-trols. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to examine the differential impact of pre-ventive and detective controls on employee performance and motivation. Further, this study also contributes to a growing body of literature examining some of the unintended consequences of formal controls (e.g., Frey 1993; Das and Teng 1999; Tenbrunsel and Mes sick 1999; Christ et al. 2008; Tayler and Bloomfield 2011).The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical development of our hypotheses. In section 3 we describe our experiment. We provide our results in section 4 and conclude and describe potential avenues for future research in section 5.2. Literature review and hypotheses developmentClassifications and importance of formal controlsFormal controls can take many forms, including, but not limited to, policies and proce-dures, segregation of duties, performance-based compensation, supervisory reviews, com-puterized edit checks, and so on. Academics have developed a variety of control frameworks to classify the many different types of controls. Some focus on the object of control (e.g., behavior vs. output) (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007), while others focus on the control method (e.g., boundary systems, belief systems, etc.) (Simons 1990). How-ever, practicing accountants and auditors generally classify controls as preventive or detec-tive, based on how risk is mitigated (COSO 1992, 2004; AICPA 2007; PCAOB 2007).When determining the specific formal control type to implement, management would benefit from understanding how different control types influence employee performance and motivation. Further, prior academic research reveals that formal controls often have unintended consequences, which can ultimately be detrimental to the organization (e.g.,Das and Teng 2001). Therefore, management should also consider the potential repercus-sions of their control design choices when designing formal controls.In this study, we examine a simplified work environment in which we manipulate the formal control type and measure employee performance and intrinsic motivation. Similar to the real world, we use a work environment in which management employs an incom plete contract (e.g., Williamson 1985; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997), using formal compensation contracts to encourage certain types of behavior while implementing form a controls to encourage other types of behavior. Thus, we examinehow different forma control types impact employees’ performance on both compensated and controlled dimensions of their responsibilities. The control environment used in our experiment is designed to isolate the effect of various formal control types from the effects of the incentive contract. Therefore, we explicitly do not compensate the employees based on all task dimensions, but rather allow the formal control to induce certain desired behavior.Effect of formal controls on controlled task dimensions Standard economic theory predicts that individuals are self-interested and therefore pri-marily motivated by explicit incentives. Following this logic, employees are expected to respond only to the financial incentives described in their formal employment contract. However, a growing body of research on individuals’ preferences for social norms and sit-uational framing suggests that there are other ways to direct employees’ behavior towards the best interests of the organization (e.g., Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 2001;Camerer and Fehr 2004; Osterloh and Frey 2004; Hannan 2005; Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 2006; Fischer and Huddart 2008).A substantial body of research has developed indicating that individuals are strongly motivated by stated goals and objectives (e.g., Locke, Shaw, Saari, and Latham 1981; Locke and Latham 1990; Locke 1996). Indeed, specific performance measures are incorpo-rated into employment contracts to align employ ees’ goals with the goals of the organiza-tion so that employees will focus their efforts on activities benefiting the organization (Farrell, Kadous, and Towry 2008). One reason goals provide such powerful motivation is that they can change the way a situation is framed. Lindenberg (2003) describes two frames linked to employees’ goals that, together, can provide strong governance: the gain frame and the normative frame. The gain frame relates to one’s goal to improve one’s resources (i.e., earn money). The normative frame is related to one’s goal to ‘‘act appropriately’’, which can be defined as adhering to institutionalized rules such as policies and pro-cedures (March and Olsen 1995). When an employee is faced with an explicit contracttying specific aspects of his ⁄ her performance to financial incentives, it is likely that the gain frame will be dominant and any other goals will be secondary (Lindenberg 2003).However, individuals’ behavior can be redirected or refocused when a stimulus is intro-duced. In this paper, we argue that the activation of a formal control is such a stimulus.翻译：研究方向：员工激励问题及对策1.引言公认的法律(如。

FRIENDS OF 一、引言公司治理一直是各国学者研究的重点，而公司治理结构当中一个重要的而且经常引起争论的因素就是给予管理者报酬的薪酬合同。

在西方发达国家，股权激励是很多公司管理者薪酬的重要组成部分，在过去的几十年当中，股权激励对于公司的管理者以及股票市场也产生了巨大了影响。

从2005年11月证监会研究起草《上市公司股权激励规范意见》（试行）开始，我国上市公司对于管理者的股权薪酬激励得到了极大的发展。

随着市场的发展与股权激励制度的不断完善，越来越多的企业倾向于对管理者进行股权激励。

基于此，分析国内外上市公司管理者股权激励偏好的影响因素是非常必要的。

本文主要从代理问题以及信息不对称两个角度分析上市公司对于管理者进行股权激励的偏好。

二、从代理问题看上市公司的股权激励代理问题的存在使公司治理问题的存在成为一种必然的现象，而有人认为股权激励能够解决公司内存在的代理成本与激励问题，从而改善公司的治理结构。

Morck 、Shleifer 和Vishny （1988）认为CEO 权益所有权和激励的平均值“太低”，而Jensen 和Murphy （1990）则认为，如果股权比重过小，则CEO 的股权激励将会非常弱，不会产生实际意义上的激励作用。

部分研究认为，由于公司对于管理者的激励程度过低，使公司有可能因此授予管理者股票期权，提高对于管理者的激励，减少公司的代理成本，以增加公司的价值。

Mehran （1995）、Tzioumis （2008）等作者的理论或者实证研究支持了这种观点。

Mehran （1995）的研究结果表明，高管薪酬中以权益为基础的比例与高管所持有的权益比例成反比，如果管理者拥有一小部分公司股份，且没有大量的未行权股票期权或者其他以权益为基础的薪酬计划，则董事会更愿意使用以权益为基础的薪酬。

Core 和Qian （2000）认为公司通过发现新投资机会，评估这些机会，实施项目最大化收益来进行革新，一旦选择了要实施的项目，公司通过对当前业务的有效管理进行生产，企业的管理者对于项目的选择与生产负责。

员工激励理论外文文献及翻译员工激励理论外文文献及翻译One-to-one-management companiesare run -- in a timely inversion of John Adams's ideal -- as organizations of men (and women), not of laws. Nonetheless, a few laws, or at least cultural traits, appear to govern many such organizations. Together those traits create an environment where employees' needs are known, sometimes anticipated, and served, justas customers' needs are known, sometimes anticipated, and served in CRM-focused organizations. What follows is a look at the rules by which one-to-one-management companies operate[2].3.2 It's All in the DetailHow do you build morale and a sense of corporate responsibility? In surprisingly small ways. Standing in the kitchen at Eze Castle Software, CEO Sean McLaughlin watches as one of his programmers sets milk and cookies on a table. It's 2:30 on a Wednesday afternoon. "Hang on, Parvathy," McLaughlin says to the employee as he opens the refrigerator door and pulls out an apple pie. "Put this out, too." When Parvathy is done in the kitchen, she flips some switches, andthe lights flicker all over the fifth floor. Almost instantly, programmers leave their cubicles and make a beeline for thekitchen.Then Parvathy jogs up a staircase and flashes the lights on the sixth floor. Account managers, salespeople, and assorted techies come downstairs and join their colleagues in the kitchen. When they arrive, McLaughlin is at the center of the steadily building crowd, dishing out the pie. Around him conversations spring up between colleagues who work in different departments. The topics range from work to social life to politics. Ten minutes later the lights flash again and it's back to work for the 90 employees in the Boston office of Eze.What's so remarkable about the staff of a developer of securities-trading software with $13 million in revenues taking daily milk-and-cookies breaks? Not much -- until you consider that the practice is part of a cultural shift engineered by the CEO, a shift that has profoundly changed the way he and his employees relate toone another. Perhaps more significant, the changes have affected how employees deal with the myriad little details that keep the six-year-old company grounded.原文请找腾讯3249114六-维^论,文.网Eze's transformation began last year, when McLaughlin realized to his chagrin that his once small and collegial company had -- because of accelerated growth -- begun acting like a large corporation. His employees no longer knew one another, and he himself was increasingly vague about who some of the new faces were. "In the early days I could get to know everyone," saysMcLaughlin.However, the CEO was most annoyed by the fact that his employees -- both old and new -- were beginning to behave with large-company sloppiness rather than with start-up frugality. "Back when we were small, if someone sent a FedEx, we all knew how much that was costing the company," McLaughlin says. He recalls noticing that things were changing when one employee approved paying a contractor $100 a month to water the company's five plants. Then there were rising charges from the company's Internet service provider because of excessive traffic on the corporate T1 line. The cause? Employees were downloading MP3 files to listen to music during the workday. It frustrated McLaughlin that employees weren't taking responsibilityfor their actions and for the ways in which those actions affected the company's bottom line[2].But last summer two things happened that spurred McLaughlin to make some changes.First, the Boston office lost both of its administrative assistants. One assistant quit and the other left a few weeks later. The two had stocked the supply room, sorted the mail, and welcomed visitors. The dual departures wreaked havoc. "The kitchen was out of milk, we didn't have any pens in the supply cabinet, the reception area looked like crap," McLaughlin says.Then came the World Trade Center attacks. Though McLaughlin had long been brooding on how to reverse Eze's fat-cat habits, he had yet to act. He says that 9-11, and the "what are my priorities" thinking it engendered, "created an environment where it was easy for me to initiate a change."The change he had in mind was inspired by a visit to his daughter's kindergarten class. There he saw how the teacher divided the cleanup tasks among the children by posting a rotating "chore wheel." McLaughlin thought the wheel was just the thing to clean up the mess and teach his employees a little corporate responsibility. But he also wanted to institute something that would help improve camaraderie. That's where another kindergarten institution, the milk-and-cookies breaks, came in. "I wanted to build relationships among the employees, to make them feel more company morale," he says.上一页[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 下一页。

股权激励问题文献综述高杨2013年8月3日星期六目录一、国内外研究侧重综述 (3)二、股权激励问题研究现状综述 (3)（一）股权激励的特征 (4)（二）股权激励定量研究 (5)（三）关于股权激励模式的细化分析 (5)（四）股权分置改革与股权激励的关系研究 (5)（五）对我国已实行的股权激励的效果分析 (6)（六）选择股权激励的动机 (7)（七）股权激励在我国的运用应关注的问题 (8)（八）股权激励结合公司治理分析企业价值 (8)三、关于股权激励效果问题的详细总结 (8)（一）股权激励效果问题的争论与发展 (9)1.高管股权激励具有治理效应，能够改善企业绩效 (9)2.高管股权激励不具有治理效应，甚至会毁损企业绩效 (10)1.高管股票期权的授予问题 (12)Lie发现，期权授予日期前公司股价的异常收益为负，而期权授予日期后公司股价的异常收益为正，并且这一异常波动有逐渐加强的趋势，高管的择机行为则成为此现象的可能解释。

Heron和Lie则进一步指出，上述期权授予日期前后的股价异常波动在监管当局出台更为严格的披露要求之后则完全消失了，这表明高管存在倒填期权授予日期的动机。

(12)2.高管股票期权的重新定价问题 (12)3.高管股票期权的执行问题 (13)（二）高管股权激励模式的治理效应差异 (13)1.高管股票期权的治理效应优于高管持股的治理效应 (13)2.高管持股的治理效应优于高管股票期权的治理效应 (14)（三）高管股权激励的内生性 (14)（四）公司治理与高管股权激励的治理效应 (16)四、股权激励实证问题研究详细总结 (18)（一）关于实行股权激励企业的数量 (18)（二）股权激励企业的行业分布特点 (19)（三）股权激励的模式 (19)（四）股权激励的额度 (20)（五）股权激励制度运行效果 (20)五、总结与新进展的可能方向 (21)（一）深入剖析高管股权激励对企业绩效的作用机理 (22)（二）充分关注并尽可能解决高管股权激励的内生性问题 (22)（三）全面研究并比较不同股权激励模式的实施效果 (22)股权激励问题文献综述高杨一、国内外研究侧重综述国内外对于股权激励的研究都有大量文献研究股权激励与经营业绩的关系，但是国外的研究还侧重股权激励与经营者投资、效率的关系等，而国内则是侧重于对股权激励的市场效应以及对国外已取得研究成果的深入细化，还有就是放置在我国特有的股权分置改革的背景下研究这个问题。

股权激励英文方案Equity Incentive Scheme1. Introduction:Our company has decided to implement an equity incentive scheme to reward and motivate our employees. This scheme aims to align the interests of our employees with the long-term success of the company and enhance employee retention.2. Eligibility:All employees, including executives, managers, and non-managerial staff, who have completed a minimum tenure of [X] years with the company are eligible to participate in the equity incentive scheme.3. Allocation:The allocation of equity will be determined by the employee's position, performance, and contribution to the company. The allocation will be in the form of stock options, restricted stock units (RSUs), or other equity instruments, as deemed appropriate by the company.4. Vesting Period:Equity granted under this scheme will have a vesting period, which refers to the period of time an employee must wait before they can exercise their equity rights. The vesting period typically ranges from [X] to [X] years, with equity vesting in installments at regular intervals.5. Performance Metrics:To ensure a performance-based equity incentive plan, certain performance metrics will be established for each participant. These metrics may include individual, team, or company-wide targets. The achievement of these metrics will determine the extent of equity vesting for each individual.6. Termination:In case an employee voluntarily or involuntarily terminates their employment with our company, their unvested equity rights will be forfeited, subject to any contrary terms in their employment agreement or the scheme rules.7. Shareholder's Rights:Equity granted under this scheme will entitle participants to certain shareholder's rights, such as voting rights and dividend distributions, as per the company's bylaws and relevant regulations.8. Amending or Terminating the Scheme:The company reserves the right to amend or terminate the equity incentive scheme at its discretion. Any amendments or terminations will be communicated to participants in a timely manner, ensuring fairness and transparency.9. Tax Implications:Participants should consult with a tax advisor to understand the tax implications of participating in the equity incentive scheme based on their jurisdiction, as the tax treatment may vary.10. Confidentiality:Participants in the equity incentive scheme are required to maintainstrict confidentiality regarding the terms, details, and contents of this scheme, including the allocation, vesting, performance metrics, and other sensitive information.11. Governing Law:This equity incentive scheme shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of [Jurisdiction], and any disputes arising out of or in connection with this scheme shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of [Jurisdiction].12. Effective Date:This equity incentive scheme shall be effective from [Start Date]. Participants shall be provided with individual grant letters specifying their allocation, vesting schedule, and other relevant details.Note: This sample document is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as legal or financial advice. Companies should consult with legal and financial professionals to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.。

英文文献及翻译1. One of the p ri nciple s: i nce ntives to vary fro m perso n to pe rso n Because o f the differe nt needs of diffe re nt s ta ff, the refo re, the same i nce nti ve effec ts of po lic y inc e nti ves will pla y a differe nt. Eve n wi th a s ta ff, at differe nt ti mes or circ ums ta nces, wi ll ha ve diffe re nt needs. Beca use of i nce nti ves depe ndi ng o n the internal and the s ubjec ti ve fee li ngs of the sta ff a re, there fo re, i nce ntive to va ry from perso n to pers o n.In the fo rmula tio n a nd imp le me ntatio n of i nce nti ve po licies, we must firs t i nves tiga te ea c h e mp lo yee clearly wha t is rea llyreq uired. Req uired to orga ni ze, cla ssify, a nd the n to formulate appropria te policies to he lp mo ti vate e mplo yees to me et these needs.2. Two pri ncip les: app rop riate ince nti vesAppropria te i nce nti ves a nd pe na lties wi ll no t affec t the i nce nti ve effe ct, whi le i nc reasi ng the cos t of i nce ntives. A ward o ve rweig ht emplo yees wo uld ha ve to meet the mood of p ride a nd lost the desire to further e nha nce their o wn; re wa rd ince nti ves too lig ht wi ll no t a c hie ve the effec t, o r s o e mplo yees do not ha ve a se nse of atte ntio n. Hea vy pe na lties a re unfair to make emp lo ye es, o r loss of the comp a ny's ide nti ty, o r e ve n s lo w down o r da mage arisi ngfro m the emo tio ns; le nie nc y erro r will undere stimate theserio us ness o f the sta ff, whic h will prob ably make the sa me mistake.3. The p rinciple of three: fairnessThe fai rness of the ma nage me nt s ta ff are a very importa nt principle, e mp lo yees are a ny unfair trea tme nt wi ll a ffe ct his mood and wo rk e fficienc y, a nd e ffecti ve ness o f the i mpact o f i nce ntives. Emplo ye es to obtai n the sa me sco re, we mus t recei ve the sa me le ve l o f ince nti ve s; the sa me toke n, emp lo ye es c ommitted the same e rror, b ut also s ho uld be s ub jec t to the sa me le ve l o fpunis hme nt. If yo u ca n no t do this, ma nage rs wo uld pre fe r no t to rewa rd or p unis hme nt.Ma nagers dea l wi th emp lo yees a t iss ue, mus t ha ve a fair mi nd, sho uld no t ha ve a ny p rejudices a nd p refe re nce s. Altho ug h so me staff ma y a llow yo u to e njo y, some yo u do not e njo y, b ut at work, must be trea ted eq ually a nd s ho uld not ha ve a ny o f the wo rds a nd acts of i njustice.1. S timulate the tra nsfe r o f sta ff fro m the res ults o f eq ua l to eq ual opportuni ties a nd s trive to crea te a le ve l pla yi ng field.For e xa mp le, Wu S hi ho ng at IB M from a clea n s tart wi th the people, s tep b y step to the sa les c lerk to the district perso n i n cha rge, Ge nera l Ma nage r o f Chi na, wha t a re the reaso ns for this? In addi tion to i ndi vidual effo rts, b ut a lso said tha t IB M s ho uld be a good co rpora te c ulture to a stage o f d e velopme nt, that is,eve ryo ne has unlimited oppo rtuni ties fo r de velop me nt, as lo ng a s there is capacity there will be space fo r the de ve lopme nt ofself-imp le me nta tio n, whic h is to do a lot o f co mpa nies are not, this syste m will undo ub ted ly ins pire a g reat role o f the s taff.2. Inspire the best time to grasp.- Take s aim a t p re-orde r i nce nti ve the mis sion to ad va nceince nti ves.- Ha ve Diffic ulties e mp lo yees, desire to ha ve s tro ng de ma nd, to give the ca re a nd time ly e nco urageme nt.3. Wa nt a fai r a nd acc ura te i nce nti ve, re ward- So und, perfec t pe rforma nce appraisa l s ys tem to e ns ure appropria te assess me nt sc ale, fair a nd re aso nab le.- Ha ve to o ve rco me the re is thi nni ng of the huma n pro-wind.- In re fere nc e sa la ry, p romo tio ns, a wa rds, e tc.评优i nvo lve thevi tal i nte res ts of emp lo yees o n ho t i s s ues i n order to be fai r.4. The imp le me nta tio n of Emp lo yee Sto ck Owners hip P la n.Worke rs a nd e mp lo yees i n o rder to do uble the c apacity o finves tors, mo re co nce rned a bo ut the o utco me of b usi nessoperatio ns a nd imp ro ve the i nitiati ve.Modern huma n reso urces ma nag eme nt e xperie nce a nd re searc h sho ws that emp lo ye es a re involved i n mode rn ma nage me ntreq uire me nts a nd aspira tio ns, a nd c rea te a nd p ro videopportuni ties fo r all emplo yees is to mobi li ze the m to pa rticipa te in the ma nage me nt o f a n e ffecti ve wa y to e nthusiasm. There is no doub t tha t very few peop le participate d i n the disc ussio ns o f the act a nd i ts o wn witho ut i nce nti ves. There fore, to a llow tradeunio ns to participate i n the ma nage me nt o f p rope rly, ca n mo ti vate work ers, b ut a lso the s ucce ss of the e nterp rise to ob tain va luab le kno wledge. Thro ug h participatio n, the fo rmatio n of trade unio nson the e nterprise a s e nse of be lo ngi ng, ide nti ty, se lf-e stee m a nd can further mee t the ne eds o f s elf-rea li zatio n. Se t up a nd impro ve emplo yee p articipatio n i n ma nageme nt, the ra tio nali za tio n of the proposed s ys tem a nd the E mplo yee S tock Owne rs hip a ndstre ng the ni ng leaders hip a t a ll le ve ls a nd the e xc ha nge of communica tio n a nd e nha nce the a ware ne ss o f staff to participate in o wne rs hip.5. Ho no r i nce nti veStaff a ttitude a nd co ntrib ution o f labo r to ho nor rewa rds, s uc h as recog nitio n of the mee ting, iss ued certifica te, ho nor ro ll, i n the compa ny's i nterna l a nd e xte rna l p ublicity o n the media repo rts, ho me visi ts co ndo le nces, vi sit sig htseei ng, co nva lesce nce,trai ni ng o ut o f trai ni ng, ac cess to recomme nd ho nor socie ty, selec ted sta rs mode l, s uc h as clas s.6. Co nce rned abo ut the ince nti vesThe staff co ncerned abo ut work a nd li fe, s uc h as the sta ff se t up the birthda y tab le, birthda y ca rds, ge nera l ma nage r of the iss ue of staff, c are s taff or diffic ult a nd p rese nted a sma ll gi ft s ympathy. 7. Co mpeti ti veThe pro mo tion o f e nte rprise amo ng e mp lo yees, de partme nts compete o n a n eq ua l foo ting be twee n the ord erly a nd the s urvi val of the fi ttes t.8. The mate rial i nce nti vesIncrea se their wages, we lfa re, i ns ura nce, b o nuses, i nce nti veho use s, daily ne cessities, wage s p romo tio n.9. Informatio n i nce ntivesEnterp rises to communica te o fte n, i nformatio n amo ng e mplo yees, the idea of co mmunica tio n, i nfo rma tio n s uc h as co nfere nc es, field relea se, e nterp rises repo rte d that the repo rti ng s ys tem, the associatio n ma nage r to re cei ve the s ys tem da te.附录二：翻译1. 原则之一：激励要因人而异由于不同员工的需求不同，所以，相同的激励政策起到的激励效果也会不尽相同。

表12000-2009年股权激励文献统计数表Ｙｅａｒ２０００２００１２００２２００３２００４２００５２００６２００７２００８２００９合计ＪＡＥ１０３７１１１２１２１９ＡＲ００２０４０１１４２１４ＪＦＥ５３１１０３３４２１２３ＪＣＦ０２０１１３３２６２２０ＴＯＴＡＬ６５６９６７８９１３７７６（ＡＲ：ＡｃｃｏｕｎｔｉｎｇＲｅｖｉｅｗＪＡＥ：ＪｏｕｒｎａｌｏｆＡｃｃｏｕｎｔｉｎｇａｎｄＥｃｏｎｏｍｉｃｓＪＥＦ：ＪｏｕｒｎａｌｏｆＦｉｎａｎｃｉａｌＥｃｏｎｏｍｉｃｓＪＣＦ：ＪｏｕｒｎａｌｏｆＣｏｒｐｏｒａｔｅＦｉｎａｎｃｅ）表2股权激励文献研究角度统计表研究角度文献数量影响股权激励机制的因素２４股权激励对公司高管行为的影响２２实行股权激励后给公司带来的效果２０其他１０合计７６经理人股权激励文献综述卢馨陈睿（暨南大学管理学院广东广州５１０６３２）摘要：经理人股权激励研究在国内外一直是研究的热点。

本文以国际学术期刊在２０００年至２００９年发表的股权激励的文献为样本，分析了国外股权激励的研究现状。

从影响股权激励机制的因素，股权激励对高管行为的影响，以及股权激励带来的效果方面进行了综述。

以期为股权激励地研究提供参考。

关键词：外文文献股权激励文献综述作者简介：卢馨（１９６３－），女，台湾台南人，暨南大学管理学院副教授陈睿（１９８６－），女，湖南岳阳人，暨南大学管理学院硕士研究生一、引言股权激励是一种通过给予企业管理者公司股权的形式来授予他们一定的经济权利，使他们能够以股东的身份参与企业决策、分享利润、承担风险，从而勤勉尽责地为公司的长期发展服务的一种激励方法。

由于公司股权日益分散和管理技术日益复杂，造成所有者和管理者分离，于是为了合理地激励公司管理人员，使其目标与公司股东目标相一致，世界各国的公司纷纷推行股票期权等形式的股权激励机制。

随着股权激励方式广泛采用，其隐藏的一些问题也暴露出来，甚至其激励管理层勤勉尽责的作用都遭到了质疑。

员工激励英文文献以下是几篇经典的员工激励方面的英文文献：1. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. Springer Science & Business Media.（《人的行为中的内在动机和自我决定》）2. Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. New York: Wiley.（《工作和动机》）3. Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2004). What should we do about motivation theory? Six recommendations for the 21st century. Academy of Management Review, 29(3), 388-403.（《关于动机理论我们应该做什么？21世纪的六大建议》）4. Pink, D. H. (2009). Drive: The surprising truth about what motivates us. Riverhead Books.（《驱动力：关于激励我们的绝妙真相》）5. Lawler, E. E. (1994). From job-based to competency-based organizations. Journal of organizational behavior, 15(1), 3-15.（《从基于工作的组织到基于能力的组织》）这些文献涵盖了员工激励的多个方面，包括内在动机、自我决定论、期望理论、奖励机制和组织文化等内容。

您可以根据自己的需求和兴趣选择适合的文献进行阅读。

员工激励机制外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Performance Appraisal as a Guide for Training and Development: A Research Note on the Iowa Performance Evaluation SystemBy Dennis Daley owa State UniversityThis paper examines one facet of performance appraisal-its use as a guide for the drafting of employee training and development plans. The scope is limited in that it excludes any consideration as to whether these plans are actually implemented. Our interest focuses only on the extent to which supervisors endeavor to assist employees in correcting orovercoming weaknesses and in enhancing or developing perceived strengths. The findings reported here are based on a 1981 monitoring of the performance appraisal system used by the State of Iowa.As civil service reform has been instituted in one jurisdiction after another in order to further assure objective, performance based personnel practices, performance appraisal has emerged as one of the key issues in the personnel management of the 1980s. This heightened sense of importance and seriousness has, in turn, led to a renewed interest in the study of the actual workings of performance appraisal systems.The uses to which performance appraisal can be put are myriad. The recent Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 serves as a model in this respect. Here we find enunciated what may be taken as the typical orientation toward the uses of performance appraisal, recommending that personnel managers and supervisors "use the results of performance appraisal as. a basis for training, rewarding, reassigning, promoting, reducing in grade, retaining, and removing employees." Performance appraisal systems can also serve to validate personnel testing and selection procedures, although such systems are themselves also subject to affirmative action validation requirements.The economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s have placed significant restraints on these uses, however. The imposition of hiring freezes, the diminishment of promotional opportunities, the advent of reductions-in-force, and the near abandonment of merit pay provisions by financially strapped governmental entities have contributed to the loss of enthusiasm for performance appraisal in many quarters. Under such circumstances, performance appraisal一limited in its use to the more negative functions of employee evaluation-takes on the dreaded image ascribed to them by Douglas McGregor (1957).In their search to salvage something positive from amidst thesecircumstances personnel specialists have alighted upon the use of performance appraisal as a guide for employee training and development. This offers them the opportunity of providing public employees with a service that employees view as beneficial. Although public employees have shown little confidence in specific performance appraisal systems or in the managerial abilities of those responsible for their implementation (McGregor, 1957; Levinson, 1976; Nalbandian,1981), they have tended to demonstrate a more favorable attitude when the purpose of performance appraisal has been perceived to be employee development (Decotiis and Petit, 1978;Cascio, 1982).This, of course, still poses a significant problem to a multipurpose system such as that found in the State of Iowa. Disenchantment or distrust with one aspect of the performance appraisal system may significantly contribute to the weakening of the entire evaluation system.THE IOWA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEMIn all public service systems employees are evaluated periodically; most often this is done informally. The introduction of formal systems of performance appraisal, usually in addition to continued informal assessment, is a relatively recent event. Formal systems of performance appraisal are designed to provide a systematic and objective measure of individual job performance and/or potential for development.Although the use of formal performance appraisal in Iowa can be traced back at least to the early 1950s (limited, for the most part, to such rudimentary methods as the essay or graphic rating scale), these occurred within a fragmented setting. Individual departments and agencies retained descretion over the choice of such personnel practices until well into the 1960s.Under Governor Harold Hughes (1963一1969) a number of efforts were undertaken tostrengthen the executive. Among these reforms was the creation of the State Merit System of Personnel Administration, administered by the Iowa Merit Employment Department, in 1967. Even so, there were numerous exemptions limiting the extent of its coverage, both in terms of separate merit systems outside its jurisdiction and of patronage appointments. The executive reform movement was continued throughout the lengthy service of Governor Robert Ray (1969-1983). Strong executive support was placed behind the development of the personnel system. Governor Ray unsuccessfully advocated expanding the IMED jurisdiction through the elimination of the existing coverage exemptions and by integrating the separate merit systems into an executive personnel department. Notwithstanding the somewhat 1imited success of recent Iowa governors, the basis for a professionalized public service was established during those years.One reflection of this basis is the fact that the use of a statewide appraisal-by-objectives system was inaugurated in 1977. The implementation of this system followed the introduction of the management-by-objectives concept among a number of the larger state agencies.Since appraisal-by-objectives is a specific application or extension of the MBO approach, it was felt that by this means executive support for performance appraisal could be more readily obtained. It is known, of course, that the lack of managerial support is a significant contributing factor in the failure of many performance appraisal systems. The Iowa performance evaluation system is an ideal-typical descriptive example of the appraisal-by-objectives technique. The introduction of this approach in 1977 was accompained by a series of training sessions (Burke, 1977) and supported with supervisory and employee handbooks.However, training for new supervisors and periodic "refresher courses" appear to have been given a low priority in Iowa, as is generally the case in public sector personnel systems. Iowa's use of appraisal-by-objectives is designed as a participatory system. Employee participation is a hallmark found among most modern management approaches and has been linked to successful public sector performance appraisal systems (Lovrich, et al，1981).The Iowa performance evaluation process is initiated with joint completion of "Section A:Responsibilities and Standards/Results Expected" (also referred to as the "job description")by the supervisor and employee. This is the first of three sections included in the performante appraisal form/process. Section A is completed at the beginning of the annual appraisal period while sections B and C are written up at its conclusion. The employee is to be given prior notice of the conference and supplied copies of previous evaluation for use as guides. Eight to ten major responsibilities (four to five is the norm) are to be selected and， written down in a results-oriented format with specific standards by which the achievement of these results are to be measured. These individual responsibilities are weighted through the use of an additive formula which factors in the time spent on each task and the evaluation of its importance or the consequence of error (a five point Likert-type scale is used for both). The overall employee rating is the weighted average of these individual responsibility ratings(also based on a five point scale).In the event that these responsibilities need to be subject to modification due to changing circumstances, a new Section A would be prepared by the supervisor and employee. During the course of the evaluation period the supervisor is also encouraged to use a "critical incident" approach. Both formal (with written copy inserted into theemployee's file) and informal communications between employees and supervisors are encouraged. For negative incidents it is important that a record of corrective action be documented; employees must be notified if they are doing something wrong and the supervision must indicate how they can correct their behavior.At the end of the evaluation period, again following advanced notice, the employee and supervisor meet to discuss the employee's job performance in light of the responsibilities outlined in the employee's Section A. Worksheets are used at this meeting with a formal evaluation prepared only afterward. At this appraisal interview the supervisor discusses "SectionB: Performance Review/Rating" with the employee. Employees are also given the opportunity to formally comment on the final evaluation form. Historically only five percent do so,of which under two percent can be classified as negative comments."Section C: Summary of Total Job Performance and Future Performance Plans" is also completed at this time. Basically, this is an essay evaluation. The supervisor is provided the opportunity to list the employee's "areas of strength- and those "areas needing improvement." In the latter instances "training and developmental plans" for correcting these are supposed to be filed.DATA COLLECTIONIn conjunction with its implementation efforts the Iowa Merit Employment Department engaged in a two-year monitoring of its appraisal-by-objectives evaluation system. The results of this monitoring project, involving the sampling of performance appraisals submitted in between July 1978 and December 1979, were reported to state officials in January 1980.The first monitoring project led to a number of minor changes in the performance evaluation system. For most part thesemodifications represented "word changes;" e.g., instead of listing"employee weaknesses," "areas needing improvement" were prescribed.This study is based on the results of a second monitoring project conducted by the IMED.The questions addressed in this study were, in part, raised by the first monitoring project.While the first monitoring focused primarily on the basic or general implementation of the performance evaluation system (i.e., was there compliance with the mandated requirements?), the second is more concerned with how well it is working. The format used here is that of "action research" or "troubleshooting" (Starling, 1979, pp. 495一514; Rossi and Freeman, 1982). IMED staff served as judges who assessed the qualitative aspects of performance appraisals. A stratified approach to sampling was employed in order to assure that sufficient supervisory, professional and managerial appraisals were included. The resultant data base consisted of 535 performance appraisals submitted between July and December of 1981.DATA ANALYSISThe primary results assessing how well Iowa's performance appraisal system is working are reported elsewhere (Daley, 1983). This paper focuses only on those aspects related to the specification of training and development plans.Because Iowa employs a multipurpose approach in the use of performance appraisals it is hardly surprising that there are many instances, 43 percent of those monitored, in which no training and development are specified. This, however, poses the task of somehow separating the cases in which training plans should most definitely be present.A supervisor may choose to list training and development plans for three reasons. First,unrelated to any individual strengths or weaknesses, he may choose to use this performance appraisal section as a memo or reminderof a training activity which all employees are routinely given. The inclusion of such activities in an "official" performance appraisal may serve to provide added political weight in order to insure their being performed; it is all to easy amidst the pressing, day-to-day concerns of administrative firefighting to let training and development activities slide off the edge.Second, supervisors may choose to promote employee development. They may either pickup on some strength an individual already possesses or for which he may have an aptitude and attempt to polish, refine, or enhance those skills. While this is not an automatic relationship, not all "strengths" would require additional or follow-up training, it is important for both organizational and individual well-being. Obviously, such activities benefit the organization by increasing its administrative or technical capacity. One can also expect that the individual employee benefits through material rewards and/or enhanced self-esteem. As such, this represents one of the positive uses to which performance appraisal can be put.Hence, it has an added importance.Finally, training plans should be specified in those instances in which a supervisor notes that an employee "needs improvement." As such remarks may become the basis for an adverse personnel action (reassignment, reduction in grade, removal, etc.) it is legally incumbent that the state demonstrate that it has made a good faith effort to correct such deficienties. Due process demands that public employees not be dealt with a "star chamber" fashion.An employee cannot be expected to correct inadequate work behaviors if he is neither told that they are inadequate nor, it told, not instructed or assisted in how to correct them.In monitoring Iowa's performance appraisals room was allowed to record up to three "strengths" and "areas needing improvement" for each employee. Supervisors tended to list employee strengths twice as often as theydetailed areas needing improvement (1223 to 506),and as one would expect there is a pronounced tendency to note both strengths and areas needing improvement vis-a-vis individual employees (58 percent of the monitored appraisals combine both strengths and areas needing improvement).A count of the number of listed strengths and areas needing improvement was made use of (zero to three for each variable) in analyzing this data. While this fails to measure the importance or significance of each strength or area needing improvement, it was felt that in some way the number of such instances would be related to or a rough indicator of the overall seriousness underlying the specification or training plans (i.e., as the number of instances increased so would the need for a training plan to be specified).Furthermore, training plans were judged not only as to their existence but also as to whether they were deemed to represent a "poor" or "good" relationship between the plan and the listed strengths and areas needing improvement. The nature of this relationship may also be interpreted in terms of partial or full compliance. "Good" plans would be seen as following-up on the listed strengths and/or areas needing improvement and, hence, as complying with the personnel system's intention to use performance appraisals as a guide for training and development.In addition to the above analysis the count of strengths and areas needing improvement were also compared to the rounded performance ratings given to each individual. It was felt that there should be evidence here, too, albeit tangential in nature, of a relationship; those employees garnering more mentions of strengths and/or of fewer areas needing improvement should possess higher ratings.译文：激励是人力资源管理的核心。

员工激励策略外文翻译文献
摘要
本文翻译了一篇关于员工激励策略的外文文献。

该文献提供了一些简单的策略和方法，用于提高员工的工作动力和满意度。

这些策略包括奖励制度、职业发展机会和积极的工作环境等。

引言
员工激励是企业管理中的重要议题。

通过激励员工，企业可以帮助员工提高工作绩效，促进创新和团队合作。

本文翻译了一些外文文献，介绍了一些有效的员工激励策略。

奖励制度
有效的奖励制度可以激励员工付出更多努力，同时帮助他们感受到公司的重视和关心。

奖励可以是经济奖励，如工资增加、年终奖金等，也可以是非经济奖励，如表彰、奖状等。

奖励制度应该具有公平性，能够根据员工的工作表现进行差异化奖励。

职业发展机会
员工在公司内部获得良好的职业发展机会也是重要的激励因素。

公司可以提供培训计划、晋升机会和工作轮岗等，帮助员工不断提
升自己的能力和技能，并在职业发展方面取得进步。

职业发展机会
可以激励员工保持对工作的热情和积极性。

积极的工作环境
营造积极的工作环境也是重要的员工激励策略之一。

公司应该
注重建立良好的团队氛围，提供支持和帮助，并提供良好的工作条
件和福利待遇。

积极的工作环境能够增强员工的工作满意度和归属感，提高他们的工作动力。

结论
本文翻译了一些关于员工激励策略的外文文献，介绍了奖励制度、职业发展机会和积极的工作环境等策略。

这些简单的策略可以
帮助企业提高员工的工作动力和满意度，促进企业的发展和创新。

股权激励对公司绩效的影响研究的国内外文献综述目录股权激励对公司绩效的影响研究的国内外文献综述 (1)1.1 股权激励的动因分析 (1)1.2 股权激励的模式分析 (2)1.3 股权激励对公司绩效的影响评价 (3)1.4 文献评述 (4)参考文献 (5)1.1 股权激励的动因分析国内外相关文献对于股权激励实施动因的观点，大致可以概括为激励型动因和福利型动因两种，激励型动因认为提出股权激励是为了降低代理成本，解决经营者和股东因为利益不一致而产生的冲突，福利型动因认为提出股权激励是作为一种对员工奖励机制的完善补充、激励和吸引员工的。

刘思芸（2020）认为人才密集型上市企业连续多期股权激励的动因包括人力资本升值、解决委托代理问题的需要、强化激励模式的需要、前期股权激励成功实施的经验以及福利型动因[1]。

罗杰明（2020）提出企业之间的竞争归根结底是人才的竞争，若想保持核心竞争力，企业必须重视人才，通过股权激励机制对核心人员的激励可以有效降低人才流失率[2]。

彭茶芳（2019）研究提出，股权激励实施的动因之一是将激励机制与监督机制相结合，协调公司内部利益相关者的关系，规范公司治理结构[3]。

陈艳艳（2017）通过试验研究激励员工、吸引员工和融资约束的三种假设动机，得出实施股权激励被广泛认可的动因是吸引员工和挽留员工，以激励员工和融资约束作为动机受到一定的质疑，此外提出以税收优惠为动因的研究较少[4]。

Zhang Q（2018）认为公司实施股权激励的目标是引进新高管并和激励实施多元化战略，来降低核心员工流失率，改善公司治理[5]。

X.Chang、K.Fu和A.Low （2015）研究中指出，股权激励可以显著提升管理层的风险承担水平，激发他们对髙风险、高收益项目的投资，进而加大研发投入、延长投资期限、提髙创新能力，最终达到提升企业的业绩水平的目的[6]。

Morrell D L（2011）研究认为，股权激励实施具有留住人才和降低委托代理成本的双重目的[7]。

股权激励英语Stock options, also known as equity incentives, are a form of compensation used by many companies to reward employees. It is a way for employers to motivate employees to work hard and to increase their loyalty to the company.Stock options are typically granted to employees in the form of options to buy a certain number of shares of the company’s stock at a predetermined price. This price is usually the market price of the stock at the time of the grant. The employee can then exercise the option to buy the stock at the predetermined price.The main advantage of stock options is that it allows employees to benefit from the growth of the company’s stock price. If the stock price increases, the employee can make a profit by exercising the option and buying the stock at the predetermined price. This can be a great incentive for employees to work hard and help the company grow.On the other hand, if the stock price decreases, the employee will not be able to exercise the option and will not make a profit. This can be a risk for employees, but it can also help to align their interests with the company’s success.Stock options can be an effective way to reward and motivate employees. It can help to increase employee loyalty and commitment to the company and can help to create a positive work environment. However, it is important to remember that stock options come with risks, and employers should consider these risks carefully before granting stock options to their employees.。

管理层持股和公司绩效外⽂翻译⽂献⽂献信息：⽂献标题：Managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence of listed companies in the Baltics（管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据）国外作者：Berke-Berga A, Dovladbekova I, Abula M⽂献出处：《Polish Journal of Management Studies》,2017,15 (2):273-283 字数统计：英⽂3709单词，20051字符；中⽂6331汉字外⽂⽂献：Managerial ownership and firm performance:evidence of listed companies in the Baltics Abstract This paper focuses on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, which appears to be an important issue in corporate governance literature.We conduct regression analysis employing a sample of listed companies in the stock exchanges of the Baltic States. We test whether increased managerial ownership has effect on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). The results reveal that there is positive relationship between managerial ownership and internal performance measure (ROA) while it does not significantly affect the market performance measure (Tobin’s Q). We conclude that management mainly focuses on firm fundamental factors and ratios like profitability, sales growth, investment –they have positive relation with managerial ownership. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference in market-related factors for companies with or without managerial ownership, as these factors in the Baltics are more influenced by other considerations like economics, politics and high liquidity premium.Keywords:managerial ownership, firm performance, Tobin’s Q, ROA, Baltic StatesIntroduction and Literature ReviewRelationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has received much attention in corporate governance literature since the mid-70-ties, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explored the principal-agent theory, ownership structure, managerialbehaviourandagencycosts.Theidea of managerial ownership was present since the Baltics regained their independence (early90-ties).Duringtheprivatizationprocessinearlynineties,thanks to favourable legislative framework, many ex-ante state-owned companies offered shares to their management or all employees on beneficial conditions. In last decades, there is a trend for international companies operating in the Baltic market to implement their global human resource policy measures. Many of them have employee share ownership plans either broad- or narrow-(i.e., management only) based. Legislative framework and taxation according to employee share ownership in the Baltics has not been supportive.The institutionalframeworkunderwhichcompaniesoperateinBalticStatesis quite similar, with some exceptions. In Latvia and Estonia there are no specialregulations regarding employee share ownership. For example, there are two obstacles in Latvian Commercial Code for implementation of employee share ownership. Firstly, it is impossible for companies registered in Latvia to acquire their own shares. Secondly, it provides for priority rights for shareholders if the share capital is increased, without exception in case of employee shares. Better situation is in Lithuania where employee share ownership is regulated in Law of Companies and the Law of the Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal property. According to regulations companies may issue ordinary shares having the status of employee shares and employees have the same rights as regular shareholders. At the same time there is no specific regulation on profit sharing.In Estonia Commercial Code and Securities Market Law does not contain any special regulation on employee share ownership or profit-sharing. In general, legal framework on employee share ownerships in the Baltic States is complicated and does not support equal and efficient use of employee shareownership.The main goal of our research is to evaluate the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance in listedcompaniesoftheBalticStates.Thepercentage of shares of Baltic listed companies held by management varies from 0% to 94.4%, with median value of 27.1% in 2015. We can saythatitiscomparativelyhighlevelofmanagerialownership,asotherresearchershavefoundthatinAustraliait is 12.54%, 12.4% in the United States and 13.02% in the United Kingdom (Khan et al., 2014).Turning to measuring firm performance, we can see that there are different approaches of how to ascertain, define and evaluate it. Many studies researching companies listed in Anglo-Saxon markets (but not only) concentrate on ratios including firm’s market value. Companies of these countries excel with equity- based financing sources dominance over bankfinancing, rather diversified ownership structures and large number of minority shareholders. Thus, firm performance is reflected in its stock price. A common approach to analyse the link between managerial ownership and firm performance is regressing Tobin’s Q ratio on percentage share of managerial ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Florackis et al., 2009; Benson and Davidson, 2009; and others).Nevertheless, there are factors affecting share price, like economic environment, policy and indicators, market sentiment, industry performance and specifics, investor activity and other (we will call them non-managerial factors). In most cases, these are very important factors not depending of management performance. However, these factors influence the market related firm performance ratios, suc h as Tobin’s Q. Thus, in order to separate the impact of non-managerial factors on firm performance, it is useful to include other variables for performance measurement that are not affected by the share price. Other researchers use accounting profit (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), earnings (in terms of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation or EBITDA) and accrual adjusted earnings (Khan et al., 2014), return on assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chenget al., 2012; Peni, 2014; Wahba, 2013), return on equity (Gosh, 2006; Short and Keasey, 1999), sales to assets ratio (Singh and Davidson, 2003) and other. Manyauthors,includingtheabovementionedforfirmperformanceevaluationuse a combination of several different ratios of both types – market value b ased (like Tobin’s Q) and firm based (like profit measures and profitability ratios).Turning back to the very often used Tobin’s Q ratio –a number of empirical studies reveal non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, as this link is impacted by two opposite effects: the manager’s incentive as shareholder and entrenchment effect. Usually, at high managerial ownership levels, the latter effect overpowers the former. Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) were the first ones that found the so-called “hump-shaped” or “inverted-U” relation between the mentioned variables. Other studies have also found the “hump-shaped” relationship. The findings regarding the most optimal level of managerial ownership differ across studies. Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) find that the maximum point of the hump-shaped relationship between Tobin’s Q andCEOownership is20.0%. Maximum leveldiscoveredby Benson and Davidson (2009) where the ownership-performance relation turns from positive to negative 28.24%. The evidence of Florackis, Kostakis and Ozkan (2009) research reveals strong and positive link between managerial ownership and firm performance at rather low levels of managerial ownership –lower than 15%. Khan, Mather and Balachandran (2014) researched Australian companies and found that at 20%-30% of ownership level there is a relation consistent with incentive alignment. Mueller and Spitz-Oener (2006) find positive managerial ownership – firm performance relation in German SMEs up to 40% of managerial shares. However, due to non-listed status of surveyed companies, the performance measure they use is slightly different from others – net number of times the reported quarter profit has increased.Other researchers create exponential models and raising the managerial ownership to several degrees. They have found double and more hump-shaped curves of managerial ownership and firm performance relation with different turning points. Double-humped curves were found by Morck et al. (1988) at 5% and 25% level; Short and Keasey (1999) at 13% and 42% level; Faccio and Lasfer (1999) at 19.7% and 54.1% level, and others. Florackis et al. (2009) in their model with quantic level of managerial ownership find four turning points at 13%, 25%, 49% and 72% levels. These results are rather close to what Davies et al. (2005) have found – 7%, 26%, 51% and 76%.Our paper adds to existing literature by providing empirical evidence of managerial ownership on firm performance in the Baltic States.This paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes data and methodology, Section 3 presents the results of empiricaltests, and Section 4 is for discussionand conclusions.Data and MethodologyOur data were mainly taken from financial reports of companies listed on Baltic stock exchanges (Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius) Official and Second list. Total number of companies listed in these lists as of September 2016 is 70. Our sample contains information from 52 companies’ reports from 2010 until 2015. Fifteen of these companies are listed in Latvia (LV, Riga), 15 –in Estonia (EE, Tallinn), and 22 – in Lithuania (LT, Vilnius). We obtained the total sample of 312 firm-year observations.For our survey, we selected companies that comply with the following criteria: (1) the company must be quoted on at least one of the Nasdaq Baltic market stock exchanges at least since year 2010; (2) firms that did not disclose information regarding management ownership were excluded from our survey. Thus, we excluded 18 companies from our sample due to the two reasons:1)Newcomers, i.e., companies first listed after 2011, so they do not have sufficientreporteddata.Therewere7suchcompanies,1Estonian,1Latvianand 5 Lithuanian;2)Insufficient disclosed information regarding managerial ownership. Eleven companies did not include information about shareholdings of the top management in their financial reports. Ten of them are based in Latvia, and one– in Lithuania.The data from financial reports and stock exchange homepage were manually selected.Table 1 presents the sample distribution by ownership share of management,industry, and stock exchange location.Table 1. Crosstables of the dataset: managerial ownership by industry and countryWe used Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) and return on assets as the dependent variables for corporate performance measurement. Tobin’s Q is very widely used by researchers inspecting the relation between managerial ownershipandfirmperformance.Our Tobin’s Q ratio means relation of enterprise value to the book value of assets.We find enterprise value by taking market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash and cash equivalents. We must mention that the surveyed companies have no preference shares, thus they are excluded from the enterprise value formula. The Tobin’s Q ratio is measured for year 2015. We assume Tobin’s Qto capture both external and internal firm performance factors.The second dependent variable will be proxy for internal firm performance, more related to managerial performance and decisions. The return on assets ratio (ROA) is expressed as net profit to the book value of assets ratio. For return on assets,we will use average values over the period of 2011-2015.The independent variable - managerial ownership (Mgr_O) is expressed as sum of percentage share of total equity owned by all executive and non-executive directors [all members of Management Board and Supervisory Board ] and their close relatives (family members) and/or other companies-owners controlled by the directors. For independent and control variables, we use average values over the period of 2010-2014.In order to capture company size, we used such controlvariables [our selectionof control variables was based on information availability and variables considered inother research papers] as:-Turnover (Ln_S) expressed as natural logarithm of company’s sales;-Natural logarithm ofmarketvalue of equity (Ln_MVEq) which is expressedas natural logarithm of average share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding;-Natural logarithm of enterprise value (Ln_EV)Control variables for capturing ownership concentration are:-Ownershipconcentration[Largeshareholdershaveincentiveandabilityto monitor management (Florackis, 2009)] (O_Conc) –the cumulative amount (in percent) of shares of all shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;-Number of large shareholders (NLS) –number of shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;In order to control for other important aspects of firm financial management (level of investment, leverage, expenses and profitability) we use these variables: -Investment (INV) expressed as relation of capital expenditures to the book value of assets;-Leverage (LEV) – the ratio of book value of debt to the book value of assets;-SGA proportion (SGA) – ratio of selling, generaland administrative expenses to sales;-Payout ratio (PO_R) is for current dividend payout proportion of previous year’s net profit;-Sales growth (S_Gr) –percentage change in sales compared to previous year’s sales;-Return on capital (ROC) – the ratio is found taking earnings before interest and taxes of previous year divided by current year’s book value of equity and debt minus cash.In this paper, we are looking whether there is any relation between managerial ownershipandfirmperformanceinlistedcompaniesoftheBalticStates.In previous studies, we find quite different results of this relation, found in other countries and regions. Thus, our null hypothesis is non-directional:thereexistsno relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the listed companies of the Baltic States.Empirical ResultsDescriptive Statistics and CorrelationsTable 2 presents the descriptive statistics information of selected variables in our dataset. The descriptive analysis reveals that the managerial ownership variable during 2010-2014 was relatively large –on average 30.64% with a maximum and minimum value of 94.41% and 0% respectively. Our proxies for market performance are Tobin’s Q with a mean value of0.966, return on assets (mean 3.37%), sales growth (mean 4.25%) and return on capital (mean: 5.57%). Average firm size measured as natural log of enterprise value is 17.515 (equivalent to 40.4 million euro).Table 2. Descriptive statistics (N=52)Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dataset variables. It reveals that only a few of the selected variables correlate with managerial ownership – return on assets (ROA) and sales growth (S_GR) have low degree of positive correlation. Positive correlation among managerial ownership and ROA suggeststhat improvement the internal growth factor performance might be of more importance to management than the market value factors.Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix for the key variables in the sample (N=52)*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the0.01 level (2-tailed)The correlation matrix reveals that market value related variables (Tobin’s Q, market value of equity and enterprise value) are most affected by return on assets, return on capital and payout ratio. Investment variable correlates with the internal growth ratios and payout ratio. Overall, correlations among the independent variables are rather low.Regression ResultsThis paper conducts a regression analysis using Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm performance. In Table 4, managerial ownership proportion serves as the main explanatory variable together with the control variables: natural logarithm of sales, leverage and investment.Table 4. OLS Regression results with Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables (N=52),unstandardized coefficientsIn the regression where Tobin’s Q serves as the dependent variable (Model 1) we can see that the variable of managerial ownership is not significantly different from zero in terms of error size together with natural logarithm of sales and leverage. The investment variable is significant. When we test the significance of the regression as a whole, the F-test indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that jointly equal to zero at 0.05 probability level.The regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2) has larger explanatory power. We reject the null hypothesis for all the independent variables of being equal to zero. The regression coefficients such as sales, investment and managerial ownership have positive influence on the return on assets, while higher level of leverage affects the return negatively.We also carried out the regression equations with squared and cubed Mgr_O variable in order to check whether the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance might be non-linear. Nevertheless, it did not change the result, meaning that increase of ownership proportion would not have significant impact on firm performance.Results DiscussionSince 1976, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling revealed the principal-agent theory, there has developed a parallel scientific discussion about managerial ownership and employee ownership, and its features of aligning interests of managers and employees with investors’ interests and goals. From the other side, there is the entrenchment effect that, in case of comparatively large share of managerial ownership, penetrates and management avoids more profitable projects insteadof less, fearing from risk.Large portion of existing literature concerning managerial ownership and firm performance finds the mentioned two contrary impact factors ownership- performance relation. These factors induce a hump-shaped relation of the above- mentionedvariables with the highest point at 15–30 percent level of managerial ownership, depending on the study specifics (Morck et al., 1988; Coles et al., 2012; Benson and Davidson, 2009; Khan et al., 2014). The evidence mainly relies on data from listedcompanies in large developed capital markets, most of them originated in Anglo-Saxon countries (especially the UK and US). A study in German SMEs (Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006) reveals a 40% managerial ownership optimum promoting the best performance results. Nevertheless, this study uses different methodology.The results of our study do not support the findings regarding managerial ownership link with firm performance in other markets worldwide, measuredby Tobin’s Q. Thus, contrary to other studies, we did not detect a particular optimum of managerial ownership proportion in companies listed on the Baltic stock exchanges nor a hump-shaped ownership-performance relation. We assume that Tobin’s Q in our case is an inappropriate measure for firm performance only, as the firm’s market value is highly affected by external factors (macroeconomics, politics, investor sentiment) and highstockliquiditypremium (Lieksnis,2010) in Baltic stock markets. The management of companies – neither owners, nor non- owners – cannot directly affect these factors. For this reason, we used our datato create a parallel model using more firm-related ratios.We carried outaregressionwithROAasthedependentvariable(Model2). It showed better results with higher explanatory power. The model includes such independent variables as managerial ownership, natural logarithm of sales,leverage and investment. Managerial ownership appears to be statistically significant only in Model 2, although with a very low coefficient (0.01), and onlyat 0.05 probability level. These results are consistent with findings of other researchers as well – Khan et al. (2014) in a study of Australian companies; Cheng et al. (2012) find that in Hong Kong market firm performance is negatively related with managerial ownership if its share is less than 22.18% or more than 78.02%.Researching companies in Egypt, Wahba (2013) concludes that neither Tobin’s Q nor ROA give statistically significant relation between managerial ownership and firm performance.ConclusionsIn this paper, we estimate the managerial ownership and firm performance parameters using data from 2010–2015 financial reports of 52 companies listedon Nasdaq Riga, Nasdaq Tallinn and Nasdaq Vilnius stock exchanges. This is the first such attempt to measure managerial ownership impact on firm performance for listed companies in the Baltics.One of the reasons why there is no significant relation between managerial ownership and firm’s market performance (Tobin’s Q) is that due to historical and sociological factors, management of the listed companies in the Baltics is not focused on the market value of stocks. The stock markets are relatively small and illiquid, and ownership is more concentrated than in the developed markets, where itismoredispersed.Rathermanagers’motivatorsandbonusesdependon fundamental results of the company and their profits.There also can be other reasons for the difference in results regarding ownership- performance relation compared to findings from other countries, such as the relatively small sample size, scope of the study, performance variables selection, regional corporate governance and culture specifics, methodological approach andmanyother.Thisleadsustoimplicationsforfurtherresearchthatshouldbe developed in theofcorporategovernancemattersintheBaltics–itcanbe focused on more detailed ownership structure including institutional owners, government and/or family ownership matters and their influence on variousbusiness performance measures. The geography of the survey can be extended including other countries located in Eastern Europe.中⽂译⽂：管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据摘要本⽂重点介绍了管理层持股与公司绩效之间的关系，这似乎是公司治理⽂献中的⼀个重要课题。