Congress&the Presidency,36:148–163,2009Copyright C American University,Center for Congressional and Presidential StudiesISSN:0734-3469print/1944-1053onlineDOI:10.1080/07343460902948105C ONSTITUTIONALD ESIGN OF THE E XECUTIVE:V ICE P RESIDENCIES IN C OMPARATIVEP ERSPECTIVEJ ODY C B AUMGARTNERR HONDA E V ANS C ASEDepartment of Political Science,East Carolina University,Greenville,North Carolina Given the history of the institution in the U.S.,it is perhaps not surprising that fewdemocracies have adopted a vice presidency.But,why do any countries have vice pres-idencies?What,if any,functions do they fulfill?In this paper we examine constitutionalprovisions for vice presidencies in29presidential democracies throughout the world.Specifically,we examine the extent to which the office of the vice presidency fulfills threepossible institutional purposes:succession,legislative,or executive functions.Almostall vice presidencies included in our analysis fulfill the role of successor in the event ofa presidential vacancy.Of those that have additional duties,most are assigned execu-tive functions,while a few are assigned legislative functions.On the whole,the paperprovides empirical evidence that vice presidencies seem to be marginal institutions. Presidential government is no longer an anomaly.In what Samuel Huntington has referred to as the“third wave”(1991)of democracy,many countries are demon-strating a decided“preference for presidentialism”(Easter1997).Most of these countries,however,are not showing a preference for vice-presidentialism.Rela-tively few presidential democracies,in other words,have vice presidents.To note that there are few democratic vice presidents,however,may miss the point.Given what we know about the history of the office in the U.S.,why does any country decide to institute a vice presidency?In this article we provide a preliminary answer to that question by examining the constitutional provisions for vice presidencies in29presidential democracies throughout the world.The research is primarily descriptive,in large part because we found little variation in the variables of interest among our cases.However, Address correspondence to Jody C Baumgartner,Brewster A-124,East Carolina University,Greenville,NC 27858.E-mail:jodyb@148V ICE P RESIDENCIES IN C OMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVE149 the research does allow us to get some sense of what constitutional designers may have had in mind for the office.Restricting our attention to constitutional provisions for the vice presidency,wefind that most of our cases conceive of the office primarily in terms of the succession function.Beyond this,the office seems to be marginal in its place in the scheme of governance.The research is important because the decision to have a vice president can be an institutional choice of some consequence.Nowhere is this clearer than in a discussion of presidential succession.For example,from1841to1975,more than one-third of U.S.presidents did not complete their terms of office and their vice presidents assumed the presidency.In Brazil,President Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached and removed from office in1992and Vice President Itamar Franco completed his term(October2,1992,to January1,1995)(Kada2003). Filipino Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo became president after Joseph Estrada’s impeachment in2001(Kasuya2003).Bolivian President Hugo Banzer resigned office for health reasons and turned power over to his vice president, Jorge Quiroga,in2001(“Bolivian President Banzer Resigns on Health Grounds”2001).In Botswana,President Ketumile Masire did the same in1998,paving the way for Vice President Festus Mogae to assume the presidency(“Botswana”1998).A second,and related reason why this research is important is because U.S. democracy is often held up as a set of institutional arrangements other countries should emulate.“Americans have long been guilty of this crime....On the eve of our entry into World War I,William Jennings Bryan,president Woodrow Wilson’s first secretary of state,described the United States as‘the supreme moral factor in the world’s progress.’”(Johnson2006).Promoting democracy was,in fact,one of the central elements of the Bush administration’sfight against terrorism.Although this overall objective may or may have been sound policy,it is questionable whether the institutional arrangements set out in the U.S.Constitution are a goodfit for other countries.For example,virtually no other democracy with an elected president selects the chief executive by way of an institution similar to the Electoral College, an institution that was in large part responsible for the decision to institute a vice presidency.Beyond their role in presidential succession,what are the constitutional func-tions assigned to vice presidents?In the next section of the article we discuss the origins,development,and provisions for the office of the American vice presi-dency and review the small amount of scholarship that exists on the American and other vice presidencies.Becuse the American vice presidency is the world’s old-est example of the institution,it will serve as our base for comparison.Following this we discuss our methodology and present ourfindings.In thefinal section we discuss ourfindings,suggesting that the sole rationale for instituting a vice presi-dency in most countries seems to be to provide a convenient manner of presidential succession.150J.B AUMGARTNER AND R.E.C ASEA BRIEF HISTORY OF THE VICE PRESIDENCYRelatively little research examines the institution of the vice presidency.Much of the earlier scholarship on the American vice presidency tended to be rather crit-ical of the office and the men who occupied it(Barzman1974;Witcover1992; Young1965).Other works were more balanced(Dorman1968;Harwood1966; Williams,1956),but the very dearth of scholarship on the subject reflected a pre-vailing view that the institution was largely insignificant.Works that have taken the institution seriously focus on the vice president’s role in presidential succession (Bayh1968;Nelson1988;Schlesinger1974;Sindler1976)or how the vice pres-idency has changed in the past few decades(Baumgartner2006;Goldstein1982; Light1984;Natoli1985;Walch1997).Importantly,none of the changes in the institution have been constitutional in nature.1It is not entirely clear why the framers of the U.S.Constitution created the office of the vice presidency(Goldstein1995:510–13).Although several colonies or states had lieutenant governors,this institution may or may not have served as a model for the vice presidency(Milkis and Nelson1998:52).The notes of James Madison during the Constitutional Convention reveal that it was not until the closing days of the convention(September4,1787)that an office of the vice presidency was even mentioned(Madison1984:574).Consensus suggests that the U.S.vice presidency was created to satisfy con-cerns about presidential selection(Milkis and Nelson1998).Hugh Williamson suggested that the office was“introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time”(Madison1984: 596).This refers to the fear that each state’s electors would be tempted to cast their Electoral College votes for a“favorite son”(someone from their home state).This would have the effect of fragmenting the vote,and perhaps more importantantly, might lead to a situation in which someone less than fully qualified would win the presidency.Thus,each elector was required to cast two votes,one of which was to go to a candidate from a state other than his own.Under this arrangement,each state’s electors could“waste”one vote on a favorite son,and presumably,the other vote would go to a capable candidate who could more truly represent the entire nation.Having arrived at this solution,the question became what to do with the second-placefinisher?While the system did not necessitate it,the determination was to award a vice presidency to the second placefinisher(Milkis and Nelson 1998:52–53).This decision,however,presented another problem:what would the vice president do?The fact that the constitutional functions of the vice presidency were added after the decision to institute the office bolsters the notion that the 1Strictly speaking this is not true.The25th Amendment to the Constitution(1967)formalized the vice president’s role in the event of presidential vacancy,temporary or permanent,as well as dealing with the problem of vice presidential vacancy(Bayh,1968).V ICE P RESIDENCIES IN C OMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVE151 institution was an afterthought.Moreover,whereas both of the vice president’s constitutional functions resolved other constitutional dilemmas,neither was the only solution to these problems.Thefirst and primary function of the vice president(VP)is to assume the office of the president in the event of presidential vacancy(death,disability,resignation,or impeachment and removal).Although this solution provides for continuity in gov-ernment,there were several other proposals for dealing with presidential vacancy. These included having a president of the Senate act as provisional successor,allow-ing Congress to name a provisional successor,assigning the role to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,or empowering a Council of State to assume presidential duties(Madison1984:535).The vice presidency also seemed to resolve the problem of who would act as president of the Senate,and in particular,how to break tie votes in that body. The rationale for assigning this function to the VP centered around the fact that the VP had a national constituency and(since political parties had yet to develop) would therefore be more likely to be neutral(Goldstein1995:511).However,here again,this was not a necessary solution.For example,the rules of the Senate could have been crafted in such a way as to deal with tie votes,or some other neutral party could have been assigned the task of breaking them.A VP was clearly not necessary to simply preside over the Senate,as the practice of having a President pro tempore(typically a junior senator)doing so suggests.To reiterate,both of the constitutional functions assigned to the U.S.vice president were added as an afterthought.In fact debate occurred as to whether to institute the office.James Monroe,for example,argued that there was no need for the office.Others,like Elbridge Gerry(who ironically served as James Madison’s second vice president)objected on the grounds that the institution was not only unnecessary,but also because it seemed to violate the principle of separation of powers(Madison1984:596).The almost superfluous nature of the office was reflected in the fact that“the First Congress even wrangled over the question of whether the Vice President should even be paid a salary”(Schlesinger1974:49).To make matters worse,many believed that because vice presidents had so little to do,the office would not attract capable individuals,and the passage of the Twelfth Amendment in1804all but ensured that for the next century this would be the case.Henceforth,electors were required to“name in their ballots the person voted for as president,and in distinct ballots the person voted for as vice-president.”This meant that vice presidential candidates were assigned the second spot,and if elected,would be relegated to a functionally vacuous office for four years.This was in contrast to the original system,in which all candidates(theoretically)had a chance to win the presidency.In other words,the new system provided a powerful disincentive for capable individuals to consider running for the vice presidency (Goldstein1982:514–15;Schlesinger1974:491–92).The fear that the vice presidency would be marginalized as the result of the passage of the Twelfth Amendment were quickly realized.Throughout152J.B AUMGARTNER AND R.E.C ASE most of American history electoral considerations were the primary—if not the exclusive—consideration in vice presidential selection.The question of qualifica-tions was all but ignored.Indeed,most of the“cranks,criminals,tax cheats,and golfers”(Tally1992)who have held vice presidential office were from this period. Little wonder,then,that many questioned the relevance of the vice presidency.Of course,over the past half century American vice presidents have grown considerably in influence and authority,formally and otherwise(Baungartner2006; Goldstein1982;Light1984).However,as noted,most of this growth has been extra-constitutional.“Practice and precedent have by far been the most important determinants of vice-presidential roles”(Pika1995:503).Constitutionally,the office remains fairly insignificant.Given this fact,and the dismal history of the American vice presidency,why have other countries seenfit to institute a second-in-command?The answer would be difficult to discern in English-language political science literature.There is now a fairly large comparative presidentialism literature that focuses mainly on how the choice between presidential or parliamentary regimes relates to democracy,party and electoral systems,and regime stability(e.g.,Lijphart 1992,1999;Linz and Valenzuela1994;Shugart and Carey1992;Cheibub2007, provides an excellent overview of this literature).Even here,however,the seminal works—perhaps understandably,given their focus—say little about the institution of the vice presidency.Shugart and Carey,for example,devote only three pages to the subject,Linz and Valenzuela,only two(1992:91–93;1994:32–34).In both cases,the discussion focuses on the vice president’s role in presidential succession and whether the VP is selected as part of the presidential ticket.In short,compared to scholarship on the American vice presidency,the study of the institution in comparative perspective is virtually nonexistent.Our attempt to answer the question of why other countries adopt vice pres-idencies is based in a search of their constitutions.Of course,to determine the true intentions of the writers of these countries’constitutions it would be better to consult source documents,interviews,and memoirs of these individuals,but this strategy will allow us to make some reasonable initial inferences about intentions and design.In the following section we discuss in more detail our data sources and methodology.Following this,thefindings of the analysis are presented and discussed.DATA AND METHODSOur research examines constitutional provisions for vice presidencies;thus,our data sources were constitutions.Many of these were found from online sources,includ-ing Axel Tschentscher’s“International Constitutional Law”site(oefre.unibe.ch/ law/icl/),the“Political Database of the Americas”at Georgetown University’s Cen-ter for Latin American Studies(),and“Constitution Finder”at the University of Richmond’s School of Law(confi).V ICE P RESIDENCIES IN C OMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVE153 Our analysis is restricted to vice presidencies in democratic presidential regimes.To identify democracies we relied on ratings provided by Freedom House (FH).Although strictly speaking the organization does not measure democracy, they do measure political rights and civil liberties that are“integral to democratic institutions.”Their classification derives from a series of questions(15concerning civil liberties,10concerning political rights)that are answered by country special-ists.These scores are then combined to produce a rating from1to7.Countries that fall into the range of1to2.5are labeled“free”;3to5,“partly free”;and,5.5to7,“not free.”Although one might object to their methodology(which is available,in detail,at their Web site,),the advantage of using the FH index is that it has a consistent measure for virtually every country in the world since 1972.We used a fairly generous interpretation of FH results to determine which cases to include in our analysis.To control for any possible inconsistencies in measurement,as well as to ensure that we selected relatively stable regimes,we counted as democracies countries that received either a“free”or“partly free”rating for a minimum offive consecutive years.Some few cases were selected having met only this minimum standard(e.g.,Ecuador,partly free from2000to2005).Some cases,most notably Zimbabwe(1978–2000),have since been classified by FH as“not free.”Others cases were selected based on meeting the standard for two distinct,noncontiguous time periods,under the same constitution(e.g.,Ghana, partly free from1992–99,and free from2000–05).Some few others had longer periods of being rated either free or partly free(e.g.,the U.S.,Costa Rica).This methodology allowed us to identify a total of236cases from1972to2005,of which111were classified as free,125as partly free.Of these democratic regimes,a total of170had presidents,and37of these countries had vice presidents(Central Intelligence Agency1972,2005).Eight of the countries with a VP had a dual executive,in which a president serves as chief of state and a prime minister serves as head of government:Bulgaria,Egypt,Fiji,Guyana, India,Kiribati,Mauritius,and Tanzania.Because of the conceptual difficulties in defining the difference between semi-presidential systems and parliamentary systems with a ceremonial president(Cheibub2007;Elgie1999),and,in an attempt to ensure we were examining like systems,we dropped these eight cases.Our initial focus is on presidential systems in which a president is both chief of state and head of government.This left us with a total of29cases.Of these,24countries(82.8%)have one vice president,while four(13.8%)have two(Costa Rica,Panama,Peru,and Zimbabwe).Honduras has three vice presidents.See Table1,where vice presidential democracies are broken down by region,below.As Table1illustrates,relatively few democracies have vice presidencies.Only five countries in Africa and the Asia/Pacific regions,and only two in Europe,have adopted the institution.A total of17countries in the Americas have done so.Atfirst glance this suggests the possibility that one reason these countries instituted a vice154J.B AUMGARTNER AND R.E.C ASET ABLE1.Presidential Democracies with Vice Presidents(1972–2005)Country Years FH Rank Yr.Const. AFRICA(5)Botswana1973–2005Free1966 The Gambia2001–2005Partly free1996 Ghana1992–1999;2000–2005Partly free;free1992 Zambia1993–2005Partly free1991 Zimbabwe1978–2000Partly free1979 THE AMERICAS(17)Argentina1983–2000Free1998 Bolivia1981–1994;1996–2002Free1967 Brazil1985–1992;1993–2001Free;partly free1988 Colombia1972–1988Free2005 Costa Rica1972–2005Free1949 Dominican Republic1978–1992;1993–1997Free;partly free2002 Ecuador2000–2005Partly free1998 El Salvador1997–2005Free1983 Honduras1999–2005Partly free1991 Nicaragua1972–2005Partly free2000 Panama1994–2005Free1994 Paraguay1989–2005Partly free1992 Peru1980–1988;1989–2000;2001–2005Free;partly free;free1993 Suriname1989–1999;2000–2005Partly free;free1987 United States1972–2005Free1787 Uruguay1985–2005Free1996 Venezuela2000–2005Partly free1999 ASIA/PACIFIC(5)Indonesia1972–1992;1998–2004Partly free1945 Micronesia1991–2005Free1979 Palau1994–2005Free1981 Philippines1990–1995;1996–2004Partly free;free1987 Taiwan1996–2005Free1947 EUROPE(2)Cyprus(Greek)1981–2005Free1960 Switzerland1972–2005Free1874 presidency is because the United States,the world’sfirst presidential democracy and an influential neighbor,did so.However,there are several other possibilities as to why these countries adopted a vice presidency.One possibility is that some functions assigned to the vice pres-idency are not or cannot be performed by other government actors or institutions; however,we do not expect this to be the case.Another is that the institution was designed to be part of the executive branch—an assistant to the president,so to speak.Alternatively,it might have been intended to fulfill a legislative role.It is also possible that the constitution outlines a hybrid executive-legislative role for the vice presidency.Finally,it is conceivable that the VP has little or no constitutional role beyond being next in line for the presidency in the event of a presidential vacancy.V ICE P RESIDENCIES IN C OMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVE155T ABLE2.Major Constitutional Requirements for Holding Vice Presidential OfficeNumber Constitution has requirement stating that VP:(Percentage) Cannot hold any other government office11(37.9%) Cannot have served in certain government positions in the recent past10(34.5%) Military experience required3(10.3%) Must be a layperson6(20.7%) Limitations on relations to other government officials(past or present)10(34.5%) Cannot have any type of criminal record11(37.9%) Cannot have any type of mental disability6(20.7%) We looked to the U.S.Constitution for guidance with respect to provisions for vice presidencies.In particular,we were looking for provisions for vice presidential selection,tenure and removal,in addition to presidential succession,executive and legislative functions.In the next section we present ourfindings.FINDINGSOur analysis begins with the constitutional provisions for vice presidential selection, tenure,and removal.In general the requirements for holding vice presidential and presidential office in our cases are the same.Atfirst blush this might suggest that vice presidents are more valued in these countries than we expected.Minimum qualifications typically include age and citizenship requirements.With respect to the former,the average minimum age requirement is34years,ranging from a low of18in two cases(Botswana and Switzerland)to a high of40in four cases (Ghana,the Philippines,Taiwan,and Zimbabwe).Most countries(55.2%)require that VPs be natural-born citizens,whereas another four(13.8%)require that the VP demonstrate national lineage.Other requirements for vice presidential(and presidential)office in various countries include not having held certain government positions in the past,not holding any other government office while in vice presidential office,not having a criminal record,a familial relationship to another government official(past or present),mental disability,or not being a member of the clergy or military.Table2 summarizes major disqualifications for holding vice presidential office in these29 countries.We observed several different modes of vice presidential selection in these 29countries,but for our purposes,we categorized them according to whether vice presidential selection was explicitly tied to the president,the legislature,or was independent of either.The logic here was that if constitutional designers were attempting to create an office that had an executive or legislative function,it might be reflected in the mode of selection.However,little variation was found in this respect.156J.B AUMGARTNER AND R.E.C ASE Twenty-one countries(72.4%)link the selection of the VP to that of the president,either by way of a popular election(as in the U.S.)or by allowing the president to select the VP after the election(with or without legislative approval). Of the remaining eight countries,four provided for some manner of legislative selection,and four selected the VP independent of the president.In these four (Columbia,Cyprus,Palau,and the Philippines),both the president and the VP are popularly elected,but separate from each other.This introduces the possibility that the two might be from different parties,as was the case in the U.S.prior to the Twelfth Amendment(e.g.,John Adams and Thomas Jefferson).This occurred in the Philippines in1998,with the election of President Joseph Estrada and Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.Two other types of constitutional provisions for vice presidential selection and tenure might inform,if only at the margins,our examination of the logic for instituting a vice presidency.As most democratic constitutions typically specify the mechanisms through which important officials may be removed from office,we looked to see if there were such provisions for vice presidential removal.Here we found that a significant proportion of the29constitutions examined(10,or34.5%) did not contain provisions concerning vice presidential removal.Moreover,24.1% of the constitutions did not contain provisions for replacing the VP in the event of a vacancy in that office.The presence of both of these types of provisions does not necessarily suggest that the vice presidency is a valued institution.However,the absence of both might suggest the opposite.Here we see thatfive of the countries (Indonesia,Peru,Suriname,Switzerland,and Zambia)that did not provide for vice presidential removal had no provisions for replacing a VP either.Looking beyond vice presidential selection and tenure,we focused next on vice presidential functions.Here,presidential succession is probably the VP’s simplest and most obvious function.Succession provisions were measured by determiningfirst if the VP succeeded the president in the event of a presidential vacancy.If this is the case,we then looked to see if such succession was limited in terms of tenure or the exercise of power.We found that the VP succeeds the president in27(93.1%)of the29cases.Switzerland and Cyprus constitute the two exceptions.Although some countries limit the terms of vice presidential succession, most do not.Of the27cases in which the VP succeeds the president,21(77.8%) provide that the VP succeeds the president without limitation as to either tenure or power.Three countries(Botswana,Zambia,and Zimbabwe)limit the VP’s power upon his succession to the presidency.The nature of these limitations is similar. Botswana,for example,prohibits the vice president,or any officialfilling in for the VP in his or her absence,from revoking the appointment of the vice president or dis-solving parliament(Article36(3)).Zimbabwe adds several additional limitations, specifying that unless a majority of the cabinet provides its support by means of a resolution,the VP is prohibited from dissolving or proroguing parliament,appoint-ing or revoking the appointment of a vice president,minister,or deputy minister,V ICE P RESIDENCIES IN C OMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVE157 or reassigning the functions of these offices;in addition,he is also prohibited from declaring war and entering into any international agreements(Article31).Four countries(Palau,Peru,Venezuela,and Zambia)limit the VP’s tenure as president.In Zambia,a new presidential election must be held within90days from the date of the office becoming vacant.Upon a presidential vacancy in Palau,a new presidential election is required if more than180days remain in the presidential term when the vacancy occurs(Article11).Similarly,in Venezuela,a new election must be held if the presidential vacancy occurs during thefirst four years of the six-year term(Article233).Peru provides that upon the“permanent impediment”of the pres-ident,“the President of the Congress calls for immediate elections”(Article115).In eight(27.6%)of our cases(Columbia,the Dominican Republic,Ecuador, Honduras,Micronesia,Nicaragua,Peru,and Taiwan)succession constitutes the vice president’s sole function.However beyond succession,VPs may also perform executive or legislative functions.To determine whether the vice presidency fulfilled executive functions,we asked the following questions,coding each variable as yes/no in order to perform a simple count:•Does the constitution specify that the VP is the assistant to the president or shall assist the president?•Does the VP have the power to appoint or remove any executive officials?•Does the VP have the power to pardon?•Is the VP a member of a“security council”(or an equivalent body)?•Is the VP a member of the cabinet(or an equivalent body)?•Is the VP a member of any other executive branch unit?Legislative functions of the vice presidency were determined in a similar fashion,measured according to the following:•Is the VP the president of any house of the legislature?•Does the VP have a vote in any house of the legislature?•Can the VP preside in any house of the legislature?•Does the VP have power to propose legislation?In addition to these specific executive and legislative functions,we also looked for any other functions that may have been assigned to the vice presidency.In these very few cases we labeled these functions either as executive or legislative.Results are presented in Table3,below.Sixteen(55.1%)cases assign the VP some type of executive function,but the number of executive duties assigned to the VP varies.Cyprus and Venezuela assign their VPs eight and nine different executive duties,respectively.By contrast,five cases assign their VPs only a single executive function.Infive countries(Botswana, Panama,Paraguay,Venezuela,and Zimbabwe)the VP serves in the cabinet,and in one,the Philippines,provides that he may be appointed to the cabinet.Four countries(Brazil,the Gambia,Ghana,and Suriname)provide that the VP serve。
