克鲁格曼中国演讲

评中国经济问题对世界影响-克鲁格曼2004专家评说中国经济问题对世界经济的影响（克鲁格曼）2004为中国经济灭火行政之手再一次遮住市场之手？在当前的宏观经济调控中，中央政府试图拉回正飞离视线的风筝宏观调控的13道金牌“我突然蒙了，好像一直良性运转的物体，突然离开了自己所掌控的视线。

”这本来是德隆集团董事局主席唐万里用来形容德隆系“资金链断裂”的一句话。

有意思的是，这句话同样可以用来形容当前中国经济的宏观形势。

中国宏观经济形势正在飞速地滑离政府所掌控的边界。

虽然3月份的全国人大会议把2004年经济增长目标定在7.2%，但4月15日国家统计局宣布的一季度实际增长，却出乎意料地高达9.7%，更为意料不到的是，中央政府明令缓行“投资拉动”，一季度全社会固定资产投资增长却高达43%。

国家发改委体改司有关人士表示，对于如此巨大幅度的增长，是很多人始料未及的。

“亚洲金融危机时，我们的投资增长也没有超过40%，现在却达到了43%以上，而且还在上升，没有一丝走稳的迹象。

”经济学家许小年忧心忡忡地向记者表示，“这是个危险的信号。

”在五一长假之前的几天，这种担忧因为中央政府的强力表态而蔓延开来。

4月26日，新华社发布消息，中共中央政治局当天召开会议，分析当前我国经济形势，提出必须清醒地看到目前经济运行中出现的一些新的矛盾和问题，尤其是固定资产投资规模过大、增长过快，导致信贷投放增幅过大，要求各地区各部门统一思想，集中精力抓好中央确定的各项宏观调控政策措施的落实，适度控制货币信贷增长，坚决遏制某些行业中的盲目投资和低水平扩张。

27日，新华社再次发表国务院通知，提高钢铁、电解铝、水泥、房地产开发固定资产投资项目资本金比例。

当日晚，互联网上开始流传，中国银监会给相关商业银行打招呼，要求五一之前暂停所有贷款发放，这一罕见举动曾短暂被认为是假新闻，但很快得到一些银行职员的确认。

与此同时，国务院开始高调查处江苏铁本项目，明显有杀鸡儆猴之意。

保罗•克鲁格曼中国周”5月12日下午上海交大演讲（全文）大家下午好，非常感谢交通大学邀请我来此演讲，也非常感谢中国的民生银行在整个中国周当中起了一个非常关键的作用，感谢所有的各位。

到中国来讲东西，这确实有一点难，因为很多人都期待可能我会讲中国的经济，当然有些人会讲中国的经济，但是我并不是中国经济的专家，所以我不会讲这个方面，要理解中国的经济对我来说很难。

但是我也能够和大家分享中国和世界的一些关系方面的想法，当然不仅仅包括中国和美国，中国和美国的关系只是中国和世界关系的一部分，在我的时间当中我跟大家回顾一下我们当前面临的危机，着重讲三个方面的内容，而且我认为这三个方面的内容未来几年越来越重要。

其中一个问题就是中国的贸易盈余问题。

在全球的经济环境当中，或者说全球的经济模式和问题当中，中国的盈余怎么来解决？第二个是中国的贸易的组成，以及要维护中国的开放的市场的状态所面临的挑战。

第三个方面的问题，就是在面对全球对于资源和环境越来越多的压力的情况下中国应该怎么做？就这三个方面问题，我先从其中一个，也就是说我们现在所处的环境或者所面临的情况。

金融危机引发国际贸易萎缩目前我们所面临的世界经济，我看到一个问题，也就是说危机的启示，对我来说也是很大的惊讶，我知道有很多的房地产的问题，我知道当这个房地产的泡沫破灭之后会带来经济的萎缩，但是现在已经发展成了真正的整个世界经济和金融体系的危机，我想大家都觉得是一个很意外的情况，尤其很重要的是，而且也是这个危机对中国影响的方式，这样一场全球性的经济危机已经对全球的贸易造成了重大的破坏，我用简单的幻灯片来说明一下我们所面临的前所未有的情况。

图里显示了全球的贸易量的年度增长率，随着经济周期贸易量有所起伏，尤其是90年代末期，由于亚洲的金融危机有所下跌，但是任何一次贸易量的下降，没有和我们现在所面对的世界贸易量的萎缩那么严重，从30年代以来，这是一个非常大的突然的大幅度地下降，包括每个国家的进出口量，都大幅度下降，这也反映了本次经济危机的程度和深度，而且金融危机已经对贸易融资产生了很大的影响，因此对全球的经济都产生了普遍性的影响。

首届八闽总裁营销大讲堂1.你想知道成为行业顶尖的秘诀吗？2.你想成为人际关系大王吗？3.你想知道一个人年轻大成功的秘诀吗？4.你想知道如何在一分钟内就了解一个人是什么样的类型吗？5.你想改变自己的命运吗？6.你想知道如何把话说出去就能把钱收回来吗？7.你想让家庭里更幸福吗？8.你想知道如何开发大顾客以及如何让大顾客为你疯狂转介绍的秘诀吗？9.你想知道如何让员工更有凝聚力、向心力和执行力的方法吗？10.你想达成并超越人生每一个目标，创造行业奇迹吗？如果您的企业没有获得超速增长，那么这堂课程就是您开启成功之门最好的钥匙！如果您的企业因为成本问题面临生或死，如果你的企业根本就没有打造团队而是成立一个团伙那么这堂课程就是您的救命索！这不仅是一个课堂，更是一片市场。

如果你是个成功的企业家，却把家庭经营的一团糟，还把孩子变成了坏孩子。

这是一堂让你将错误犯在课堂上，不要犯在家庭和市场上的竞技场！这是一个非常难得、让人激动的机会！因为这是一个以幸福为目标、以和谐为动力、以利润为导向的企业家必须上的课程！行业精英的顶峰论剑。

谁是下一个销售奇迹？和平使者，成功楷模呢？【学习地址】2011年7月9、10日龙岩市新罗区龙腾中路最佳西方财富酒店【参会对象】董事长、总裁、商业领袖、个体老板、营销精英、高层管理人员【协办企业】世界冠军俱乐部【论坛支持】世界华人工商促进会【贵宾席】1980元/人（限量）【普通席】1280元/人一、独家冠名主办职责、权利：A、承担独家冠名主办金额为：人民币4.5万元整；B、具有就本大讲堂自行宣传、发布、推广之权利；C、作为独家冠名单位可以享受以下政策：1）本次大讲堂冠以“首届**八闽总裁营销大讲堂”，主办：**有限公司；2）获赠大讲堂贵客票18张及普通席45张；3）主持人在开幕式及闭幕式中对冠名方予以鸣谢；4）冠名方享有论坛开幕式上5分钟致致辞的机会；5）冠名方LOGO及单位名称、业务出现在本次在讲堂的宣传品（会场外主宣传牌、场内背景板、讲义、门票）的显著位置；6）获赠两块广告宣传易拉宝，会场内可摆放冠名方广告牌及现场推介活动；7）获赠讲义封二16开宣传彩页；8）甲方的企业简介、产品宣传单等相关宣传品入资料袋。

新任央行行长易纲的一甲子作者：黄孝光来源：《廉政瞭望》 2018年第8期文／黄孝光为什么要回国？印第安纳州波利斯城一个叫赛多布鲁克的小区里，住着一群经常相互串门的华人学者。

他们当中，易纲是最早拿到美国终身教职的，一周两天班，每月5000美元薪水，折合当时人民币17264元。

大洋另一端，易纲的母亲在北京一所小学当校长，月薪99元。

所以，当易纲选择回国而缺席1994年的感恩节聚会时，他的教授朋友们都纳闷了。

要知道，“有钱有闲”的生活来得并不容易。

刚到美国求学那会儿，易纲兜里只揣了2美元。

他每周三次去学校食堂洗碗，只为填饱肚子顺便攒点零花钱。

有次他跟同学问道：“你们觉得我们的生活像不像乡下的农民？”从伙房到学堂“农民”是易纲年轻时候的身份。

上高三时，18岁的他赶上上山下乡的尾巴，被派去北京郊区顺义县插队。

在这儿，他担任过知青队长，也做过伙房管理员。

当时，一个壮男劳力每天赚10工分，但生产队给知青定的只有6或6 5工分。

第二年冬天，全国恢复高考，易纲的命运被改变。

包括他在内有570多万考生涌入考场，录取率仅为4.6%。

他成功入围，考入“没抱多大希望只是随便一填”的北大经济系。

同级学生当中，海闻、刘伟、张小强、石小敏等等都成为日后中国经济界响当当的人物。

易纲更是其中的佼佼者。

大三时，成绩优异的他被选派去美国留学。

留学期间，他先后在哈姆林大学工商管理专业、伊利诺大学经济学专业学习，获经济学博士学位。

学业圆满，易纲准备回国，突然收到北大校长张龙翔的一封信。

信里说，“别以为拿了博士文凭就了解美国大学了。

要去学校任教，好好了解下美国的教育。

”易纲于是在印第安纳大学经济系任教长达8年。

1992年，年仅34岁的他获得终身教职。

他在当地安家落户，娶妻生子；只要愿意，就像一众邻居学者的选择那样，他可以在美国一直生活下去。

彼时中国正值改革开放，政府出台了不少引才政策，但效果不明显。

据统计，1978年之后的十年间，中国留学人员有96万，回国的不到4成。

校长欢迎词三篇校长欢迎词（一）尊敬的泽尔滕教授、莫里斯教授，杨曹文梅女士，各位领导，各位嘉宾，女士们、先生们：在第三届公司治理国际研讨会隆重开幕之际，请允许我代表南开大学向与会的各位领导、各位嘉宾和远道而来的朋友们，表示热烈的欢迎和诚挚的问候。

公司治理是中国企业改革和社会主义市场经济体制不断完善所面临的重要课题，也是国际学术界关注的热点问题之一。

在经济全球化日益加速的背景下，为了推动相关领域的理论研究和实践，搭建中外学者相互交流和研讨的学术平台。

南开大学分别于20XX年11月、20XX年11月，主办了两届公司治理国际学术研讨会，在国内外引起了热烈的反响。

今天举行的第三届公司治理国际研讨会，再次得到来自美国、德国、英国、日本等地区，以及中国香港学者的热烈响应。

300多名海内外的专家学者汇聚南开，共同围绕公司治理改革与评价：国际化挑战这样一个主题，开展深入的研讨和广泛的交流，这必将在思想和智慧的交锋中碰撞中激烈的火花。

本次会议还得到国家自然基金委、管理科学部等部门的大力支持，美国百人会团还专门组团参会。

在这里，我对参加本次研讨会的单位和朋友表示衷心的感谢。

近年来，南开大学商学院在改革中求发展，在创新中求突破，取得了显着的成绩，已经成为我校最具活力和发展潜力的学院之一。

在拥有工商管理一级学科博士学位授权点和企业管理国家级重点学科的基础上，20XX年公司治理研究中心成功的入选全国高校人文社会科学重点研究基地，中国企业管理与制度创新基地也被列入教育部985工程二期哲学社会科学创新基地建设。

在不久前，我校工商管理博士后流动站被评为全国同类学科唯一的优秀博士后流动站。

特别是在公司治理研究领域，在李维安院长的带领下，深入实际调查，广泛开展学术合作与交流，形成了较强的研究团队，取得了一批标志性的成果，产生了广泛的影响。

这些成绩的取得和进步，都包含着商学院广大师生的不懈努力，也是与国内外各界朋友们的支持和鼓励分不开的。

中海油事件的魔鬼细节“在战略上，最漫长的迂回道路，常常是达到目的的捷径。

”——利德尔·哈特《间接路线战略》携1600亿元现金竞购优尼科，傅成玉把中国企业家大赌大赢的胆略和魄力演绎到了极致。

虽然没成，但参与豪赌的架势与果敢，则已经发生了魔力。

直接的经济效益是中海油的市值蹿升，从参与竞购伊始的220亿美元，截至9月底蹿升至300亿美元；间接的政治效应则是，中海油把一个价值取舍的尴尬抛给了美国民众和政府。

这个在全球到处推销自由市场竞争价值的国家，在中海油面前尴尬变线，祭起了“双重标准”，以政治封杀互利共赢的商业竞争。

一种莫名的受害者心态作祟，不惜否定了自己所崇尚的价值，其中必然包含着极大的痛苦。

一个中国企业的商业运作能够获得这样双重收获，实属难能可贵。

1600亿元，是一个令人肃然起敬的数字，640亿元人民币(80亿美元)的新增市值同样让人侧目。

在数字面前，中国媒体表现出了极大的驯服性。

一个得以动员1600亿元资源的竞购事件，被演绎成壮怀激烈的豪举，总导演傅成玉更是虽败犹荣。

他不断亮相各种大型会议和中央电视台的名牌访谈节目，现身讲述英明的决策，回忆那动荡起伏的历程。

在一次次谈不上精练的演讲中，一种盲目的自大情绪不断升腾蔓延，很有点站在高处指点江山的味道。

缺乏自省意识从傅成玉的系列反思中，我们看到从竞购的起始到最后的完美谢幕，中海油团队显示了世界一流大企业的风貌。

所以铩羽而归，则完全在于美国搞双重标准，以政治打压经济，而我们似乎则不懂把国家政治聚焦到大企业的重大并购上来的缘故。

起初，在总结竞购优尼科的失败时，傅成玉还能指出三点教训:未与政府达成更多默契、对外宣传不够、自身准备不足。

在最近的反思中，我们更看到了这样的言论:“政府职能部门不要各管一摊，否则中国企业很难在海外收购中取得胜利。

”比如中海油刚开始竞购优尼科时，中国外交部正参与“朝核会谈”；竞购进程中，央行提高了人民币汇率；退出竞购后，商务部宣布国内企业50亿美元采购了美国波音公司飞机。

American Economic Review 2009, 99:3, 561–571/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.3.561The Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography†By Paul Krugman*Thirty years have passed since a small group of theorists began applying concepts and tools from industrial organization to the analysis of international trade. The new models of trade that emerged from that work didn’t supplant traditional trade theory so much as supplement it, creat-ing an integrated view that made sense of aspects of world trade that had previously posed major puzzles. The “new trade theory”—an unfortunate phrase, now quite often referred to as “the old new trade theory”—also helped build a bridge between the analysis of trade between countries and the location of production within countries.In this paper I will try to retrace the steps and, perhaps even more important, the state of mind that made this intellectual transformation possible. At the end I’ll also ask about the relevance of those once-revolutionary insights in a world economy that, as I’ll explain, is arguably more classical now than it was when the revolution in trade theory began.I. Trade PuzzlesIn my first year as an assistant professor, I remember telling colleagues that I was working on international trade theory—and being asked why on earth I would want to do that. “Trade is sucha monolithic field,” one told me. “It’s a finished structure, with nothing interesting left to do.”Yet even before the arrival of new models, there was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with conventional trade theory. I used to think of the propagation of this dissatisfaction as the trade counterculture. There were even some underground classics. In particular, Staffan Burenstam Linder’s An Essay on Trade and Transformation (1961), with its argument that exports tend to reflect the characteristics of the home market, was passed hand to hand by graduate students as if it were a samizdat pamphlet. And there was also an important empirical literature on intra-industry trade, notably the work of Bela Balassa (1966) and Herbert G. Grubel and Peter J. Lloyd (1975), that cried out for a theoretical framework.Why did the trade counterculture flourish despite the apparent completeness of conventional trade theory? Call it the similar-similar problem: the huge role in world trade played by exchanges of similar products between similar countries, exemplified by the massive two-way trade in auto-motive products between the United States and Canada.In 1980, this similar-similar trade was still a relatively new phenomenon. Trade in the first great age of globalization—the age made possible by steam engines and telegraphs—was mainly dissimilar-dissimilar: trade in dissimilar goods between dissimilar countries. Comparative advantage, which one may define as the idea that countries trade to take advantage of their dif-ferences, clearly explained most of what was going on. It was only with the recovery of trade after World War II, and especially after the major trade agreements of the 1950s and 1960s, that the more puzzling trade patterns that fed the counterculture became prominent.† This article is a revised version of the lecture Paul Krugman delivered in Stockholm, Sweden, on December 8, 2008, when he received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. This article is copyright © The Nobel Foundation 2008 and is published here with the permission of the Nobel Foundation.* Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08554 (e-mail: pkrugman@).561JUNE 2009562THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Figures 1, 2, and 3 make this point, using data on British trade. Figure 1 shows the commod-ity composition of British exports and imports on the eve of World War I. The pattern of trade made perfect sense in terms of classical comparative advantage: Britain, a densely populated nation with abundant capital but scarce land, exported manufactured goods and imported raw materials.By contrast, Figure 2—which shows comparable data for 1990—offers no comparably easy interpretation: Britain both imported and exported mainly manufactured goods. One might have hoped that a look within the manufacturing sector would reveal a clearer pattern, but this brings us to the issue of intraindustry trade: trade in manufactured goods, especially between countries at similar levels of development, consists to a large extent of two-way exchanges within even narrowly defined product categories.And trade, as reconstituted after World War II, did take place to a large extent between similar countries, much more so than in the first age of globalization. Figure 3 illustrates this crudely, comparing Britain’s trade with Europe and with rest of the world in 1913 and 1990.Before World War I, Britain traded remarkably little, by modern standards, with its neighbors, instead focusing on distant lands able to produce what Britain could not—cheap wheat and meat, tea, jute, and so on. By 1990, however, while such trade had by no means vanished, Britain was part of a European economy in which nations seemingly made a living by taking in each other’s washing, buying goods that they could, and, at least as far as the statistics indicated, did produce for themselves.So what was going on?II. Increasing Returns and TradeIt shouldn’t have been that hard to make sense of similar-similar trade. Indeed, for some economists it wasn’t. In his seminal paper on the rise of intraindustry trade in Europe, Balassa (1966) stated it quite clearly: each country produced only part of the range of potential products within each industry, importing those goods it did not produce, because “specialization in nar-rower ranges of machinery and intermediate products will permit the exploitation of economies of scale through the lengthening of production runs.”100%50%0%Exports ImportsFigure 1. Composition of British Trade circa 1910Source: Richard E. Baldwin and Philippe Martin (1999).VOL. 99 NO. 3563KRUgMAN: THE INCREASINg RETURNS REVOLUTION IN TRAdE ANd gEOgRApHy Yet this straightforward-seeming explanation of similar-similar trade was not at all part of the standard corpus of international trade theory circa 1975. It was not so much that these ideas were rejected as that they seemed incomprehensible. Why?The answer was that unexhausted economies of scale at the firm level necessarily imply imper-fect competition, and there were no readily usable models of imperfect competition to hand. Even more to the point, there were no general equilibrium models of imperfect competition readily to hand—and trade theory, perhaps more than any other applied field of economics, is built around general equilibrium analysis.100%50%0%Exports Imports100%50%0%circa 1910 1990sFigure 2. Composition of British Trade in the 1990sSource: Baldwin and Martin (1999).Figure 3. Destination of British ExportsSource: Baldwin and Martin (1999).564THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWJUNE 2009 The result was the state of affairs almost triumphantly described by Harry Johnson (1967): “The theory of monopolistic competition has had virtually no impact on the theory of interna-tional trade.”Then came the new monopolistic competition models: Kelvin J. Lancaster (1979), Michael Spence (1976), and above all Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz (1977). All of these papers were intended by their authors as ways to address the classic welfare questions about whether monopolistic com-petition led to inefficient scale, or perhaps to production of the wrong mix of products. But when I learned about the new literature (in a short course taught by Robert Solow in 1976), I—like a number of other people working independently, including Victor Norman (1976) and Lancaster (1980) him-self—quickly saw that the new models provided “gadgets,” ways to think about the role of increasing returns in a variety of contexts. And there was, in particular, a near-perfect match between simple models of monopolistic competition and the stories already circulating about intraindustry trade.It quickly became apparent (Norman 1976; Krugman 1979; Lancaster 1980) that one could use monopolistic competition models to offer a picture of international trade that completely bypassed conventional arguments based on comparative advantage. In this picture, countries that were identical in resources and technology would nonetheless specialize in producing different products, giving rise to trade as consumers sought variety. A natural extension—although, like many things that seem obvious in retrospect, it was surprisingly hard at first to figure out how to do it—was to bring comparative advantage back in. This was most easily done by assum-ing that all the differentiated products within an industry were produced with the same factor proportions; one could then explain inter industry specialization in terms of Heckscher-Ohlin, with an overlay of intra industry specialization due to increasing returns. And this extension, as represented for example by Elhanan Helpman (1981) and Dixit-Norman (1980), in turn meant that the new models offered an intellectually satisfying explanation of similar-similar trade: similar countries had little comparative advantage with respect to each other, so their trade was dominated by intraindustry trade caused by economies of scale.What was really needed to get peoples’ attention, however, was a “killer ap”: a demonstration that the new view offered a fundamentally different insight into something that mattered. I found that killer ap in an empirical insight by Balassa (1966), who pointed out that trade liberaliza-tion among industrial countries had proved surprisingly nondisruptive, belying fears that, for example, there would be a major rearrangement of Europe’s industrial landscape after the forma-tion of the Common Market, and possibly large effects on income distribution. Because trade expansion had taken the form of intraindustry specialization rather than interindustry specializa-tion, Balassa noted, “the fears expressed in various member countries of the Common Market concerning the demise of particular industries have not been realized. There are no examples of declining manufacturing industries in any of the member countries.”In Krugman (1981) I built a special version of the emerging style of model to encapsulate this phenomenon. What the model showed was that the classic Stolper-Samuelson result, in which trade liberalization hurts scarce factors, can emerge—but only if comparative advantage is strong and/or economies of scale weak. In the reverse case, which seemed to describe the growth of trade among industrial countries, trade was win-win.There was one more significant insight from the application of Dixit-Stiglitz–based models to trade: Burenstam Linder was right! Once one added transport costs to the model, it was straight-forward to show that countries would, other things equal, tend to become exporters in the indus-tries in which they had large domestic markets. As is so often the case, the logic of this result was obvious once the result had been devised, but not at all obvious beforehand. Indeed, I began the research that led to Krugman (1980) with the strong presumption that countries would not tend to export goods for which they had a large home market—I came to bury Burenstam Linder, not to praise him. But the algebra said otherwise, and the intuition followed. Increasing returnsKRUgMAN: THE INCREASINg RETURNS REVOLUTION IN TRAdE ANd gEOgRApHy VOL. 99 NO. 3565provide an incentive to concentrate production of any one product in a single location; given this incentive to concentrate, transport costs are minimized by choosing a location close to the largest market, and this location then exports to other markets.Initially, the “new trade theory” seemed to consists of a series of special-purpose, incompat-ible models. It turned out, however, that it was possible to create a common ground for many though not all of the models, and extend that common ground to much traditional trade theory as well, using an insight originally due to Paul Samuelson (1949). In explaining factor price equal-ization, Samuelson reversed the usual way we think about trade, as a process of coming together. Instead, Samuelson thought of trade as the result of a process of coming apart. He envisaged a Tower of Babel scenario, in which an angel descends from Heaven and breaks up a previously unified economy: factors of production suddenly find themselves with national labels, and are able to work only with other factors that have the same national label. Samuelson pointed out that factor price equalization would take place if and only if the international distribution of factors of production was such that it was possible, even while obeying the angel’s new limits, to reproduce the production of the pre-angel integrated economy—and that in such circumstances specializa-tion and trade could be viewed as being about reproducing the integrated economy.Helpman and I (1985) used the same approach to think about trade involving both comparative advantage and increasing returns. The key insight was that in order to reproduce the integrated economy, it was necessary to locate all production of each good subject to economies of scale within one country. This approach united factor-proportions-based comparative advantage and specialization due to economies of scale: both could be viewed as part of how a world economy cursed by Samuelson’s angel undid the damage.This approach also, more or less en passant, made it clear that increasing returns ordinarily reinforce, rather than call into question, the argument that there are gains from trade. To be sure, in cases where the integrated economy is not reproduced, it’s possible to conjure up examples in which countries are worse off with trade than without, in a way that isn’t possible in pure com-parative advantage models. But the clear presumption is that trade is a good thing under increas-ing returns—indeed, better than previously thought.By the mid 1980s, then, the “new trade theory” had integrated increasing returns more or less seamlessly into our understanding of international trade. The impossible complexity that had previously daunted economists contemplating a major revision of trade theory had vanished, replaced by a surprisingly simple and elegant structure.But how did that happen? Why did the problems facing the trade counterculture seem to melt away? I’d argue that at the heart of the story was an attitude shift on the part of international economists.III. Some Meta ReflectionsThe emergence of the new trade theory was, in the first place, made possible by the new mod-els of monopolistic competition. But it did not remain confined to those models; by the mid-1980s recognizably “new trade” approaches had been taken to trade involving external economies, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, even contestable markets. What made it all possible was a shift in attitude among trade theorists, mainly consisting of two changes. First, there was a new willingness to explore the implications of illuminating special cases rather than trying to prove general results given some broad upfront assumptions. Second, there was a change in focus from detailed predictions—which country produces each specific good—to system-level or aggregate descriptions of the pattern of trade.On the first point: in the late 1970s many trade theorists thought of themselves as theorem-provers. Given big initial assumptions such as constant returns, so many factors, etc., what could566THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWJUNE 2009be proved true about trade, specialization, and welfare? There was, at least in the theoretical literature, a push for generality. Yet this generality was mainly spurious: the results were general given the big assumptions, but those assumptions were, in fact, highly restrictive, ruling out much of what was obviously true about real-world trade and specialization.The new trade theory, instead, focused on strongly special, even silly-seeming cases. (“Dare to be silly” became one of my principles for research.) There is no good reason to believe that the assumptions of the Dixit-Stiglitz model—a continuum of goods that enter symmetrically into demand, with the same cost functions, and with the elasticity of substitution between any two goods both constant and the same for any pair you choose—are remotely true in reality. The assumptions are instead chosen, with full self-consciousness, to produce a tractable example that contains what older trade theories left out—namely, the possibility for intraindustry specializa-tion due to economies of scale.The use of deliberately unrealistic assumptions is, of course, common in much of economics. Nonetheless, I can report from early experience that the new style of modeling was met with considerable hostility at first. Some discussants dismissed the whole enterprise as obviously pointless, given the unrealism of the setup. Some even insisted that if all the goods enter utility the same way, they must be perfect substitutes. There was a widespread sense that the new trade theorists were cheating.Meanwhile, even with all that cheating, the new models left some questions unanswered. Who produces which differentiated product within a monopolistically competitive industry? The mod-els, by construction, could not answer that question. We all invoked some notion of randomness, but without any explicit random mechanism in mind. Instead, what was crucially involved was a redefinition of the question. The detailed pattern of trade, the new theorists in effect argued, does not matter as long as aggregate measures like the volume of trade and the welfare effects of trade can be derived from the model. In effect, one had to step back from the blackboard and unfocus one’s eyes a bit, so as to grasp the broad pattern rather than the irrelevant details.And once the new way of doing trade theory had been established, it made its way into pure comparative advantage modeling as well. Most notably, the important work of Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum (2002) on world trade patterns is based on a Ricardian model of compara-tive advantage—but the way it makes predictions about the parameters of a gravity equation that predicts the volume of bilateral trade in a multilateral world, rather than about specific goods imported and exported, is very much “new trade theory” in spirit.Those who weren’t there, or haven’t participated in a comparable paradigm shift elsewhere in economics, probably can’t see why these “meta” changes in the way we did international trade theory were so hard, or made such a big difference. But they were, and they did. John Maynard Keynes famously described the process of arriving at his macroeconomic theory as a “struggle of escape”; the emergence of the new trade theory was a similar struggle, if less momentous, and had a profoundly liberating effect on the field.IV. Geography IgnoredBertil Ohlin’s classic 1933 work laying out the beginnings of factor proportions theory was, of course, titled Interregional and International Trade. It has always been obvious that the motives for shipment of goods within countries are similar to those for shipment of goods between coun-tries. It was also obvious, if one thought about it, that specialization within countries offered a new and possibly superior source of empirical evidence, if only because intra-national data are more likely to allow comparisons. So one might have expected the theory of international trade and the theory of economic geography to have developed in tandem, and in close relationship to each other, with a joint empirical research program.KRUgMAN: THE INCREASINg RETURNS REVOLUTION IN TRAdE ANd gEOgRApHy VOL. 99 NO. 3567In fact, however, as late as 1990 international economists took virtually no notice of trade within countries, or of the location of production in space. Nor was there really a strong inde-pendent presence of economic geography within the economics profession as a whole. Alfred Marshall (1890) may have devoted a whole chapter to “the concentration of specialized indus-tries in particular localities,” but that subject was barely touched on in the standard economics curriculum. Instead, if economic geography made any appearance at all, it was mainly urban economics, with a very limited discussion of location theory, with neither subfield having any significant interaction with the much more well-established discussion of international trade. Why was geography ignored by trade theorists? A large part of the explanation is the obvi-ous centrality of increasing returns to geographical patterns: nobody really thinks that Silicon Valley owes its existence to exogenously given factors of production or Ricardian comparative advantage. (God made the Santa Clara valley for apricots, not semiconductors.) As long as trade theorists shied away from increasing returns in general, economic geography wasn’t an inviting field.Also, while there was elegant work in urban economics—I particularly admired J. Vernon Henderson’s (1987) work on city systems—there was something deeply unsatisfying about the treatment of increasing returns in much of this literature. Essentially, the available techniques limited theorists to assuming external economies, leading to gibes that economists believed that agglomeration takes place as a result of agglomeration economies. A particular problem was that once one is simply assuming positive external economies, it’s not at all clear how to think about the spatial limits of spillover. Do you have to be in the same city to reap positive externalities from other producers in the same industry? If so, why?Over the course of the 1980s some researchers, notably Masahisa Fujita (1988), realized that the monopolistic competition models could be used to derive endogenous externalities, explain-ing urban concentration. But these models depended on the assumption that the monopolistically competitive goods were completely nontradable, again offering little help on the question of the spatial reach of agglomeration economies.But the analysis of the home market effect, already an established part of the new trade theory, suggested an approach to economic geography that did not depend on making goods strictly nontradable.V. New Economic GeographyTo lay out the logic of the “new economic geography,” I find it helpful to talk in terms of a “cheat” model—a sort of model of the model—I originally devised to get some intuition about the home market effect. In this model we consider the location decision of a single producer serving two markets. We assume that the producer has fixed sales of S, S* units of a good in the two markets, with S > S*. And it must pay a transport cost of τ for each unit shipped from one location to the other. The producer has the option of having either one or two plants; by opening a second plant, the producer can eliminate transport costs but must pay an extra fixed cost F. Clearly, if the producer opens only one plant, it will be in the larger market. But will it con-centrate production? Only if F>τS*.It goes without saying that this little exposition ignores market structure, pricing, the elasticity of demand, and more. But we know that we can put those things back in by doing a full Dixit-Stiglitz, and the cheat version conveys the essential intuition: if economies of scale, as captured by F/S*, are large enough compared to transport costs, production will be geographically con-centrated, and that concentration will, other things equal, be in the larger market.From there it’s an obvious, short step (which for some reason took me a decade to take) to a model of geographical concentration of factors of production. Think now of a world in which568THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWJUNE 2009 there are many firms making the same kind of choice I just described, and also in which some but not all resources are mobile. Let S be the size of the overall market, μ be the share of that market attributable to “footloose” production, and suppose that there are two symmetric loca-tions. Then we can think of a possible equilibrium in which all the footloose factors concentrate in one place. In that case the other location—the smaller market—would demand S(1 − μ)/2 units of our representative good.And this concentration of production would be self-sustaining if F> τS(1 − μ)/2, or F/S>τ(1 − μ)/2. So that’s our criterion for the creation of a self-sustaining concentration of produc-tion in space.As in the original home market effect exercise, this doesn’t quite get it right, because it fails to take account of market structure and demand elasticity. As I showed in Krugman (1991), it also misses a second reason for agglomeration: “forward linkages,” which in the simplest case would take the form of a lower cost of living for workers residing close to production concentrations. But the essential insights are right:(i) A self-sustaining concentration of production in space can occur if economies of scale(F/S) are large, transport costs low, and enough production is mobile.(ii) Which location gets the concentration of production is arbitrary, and can be presumed to be a function of initial conditions or historical accident.What was learned from this analysis? For one thing, it immediately cast light on some impor-tant aspects of economic history. Notably, the character of US economic geography is well known to have gone through a sort of phase change in the middle of the nineteenth century, as the nation became differentiated into a farm belt and a manufacturing belt. What was happening at the time of this phase change? The answer is a rise of large-scale production (economies of scale); railroads (lower transport costs); and a declining farm share in the economy (more mobile production). A simple model explains a major qualitative change in the economy.This “core-periphery” model, essentially a model of agglomeration, was the starting point for the new economic geography. It was immediately clear, however, that one also wanted to model other key aspects of geography, notably regional specialization in different industries and the system of cities. With a few tricks, especially by assuming increasing returns in the production of intermediate as well as final goods, it turned out to be possible to address many of these issues. As in the case of the new trade theory, a willingness to focus on tractable special cases was of the essence. In Fujita, Krugman, and Anthony Venables (1999), we described our method as “Dixit-Stiglitz, icebergs, evolution, and the computer.” We used Dixit-Stiglitz-type models to handle increasing returns and imperfect competition, “iceberg” transport costs that are propor-tional to FOB prices, simple adaptive dynamics to arrive at equilibria, and numerical simulation to deal with models that tended to be just past the edge of paper-and-pencil analysis.Also, as in the case of the new trade theory, the new economic geography created a style of work that reached well beyond the specifics of the initial models. New economic geographers rediscovered Marshall’s chapter, which contained a beautifully laid out trinity of reasons for industry localization: knowledge spillovers (“the mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are, as it were, in the air”), labor market pooling, and specialized suppliers. Only the last of these three could be modeled with the original, new trade theory–inspired models, but the new focus on location led to reinvigorated interest in the others.One gratifying result of the emergence of the new economic geography was a surge in empiri-cal work. Some of this was driven specifically by the new models, but there was also a broader effect: the new models sensitized economists to the fact that regional variations in industrial。

1994年克鲁格曼《亚洲奇迹的神话》,1994年美国经济处于极低潮1994年克鲁格曼《亚洲奇迹的神话》,1994年美国经济处于极低潮TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站按：通货膨胀2010.789第一轮恶化，2011.3第二轮恶化，2011.3的货币供应，表明了“台上唱控制通货膨胀，台下保经济增长，保项目的资金落实”，所以通货膨胀在2011.5 - 2011.9，会再次恶化，大豆和食用油就是其中的杰出代表。

TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站不玩到恶性通货膨胀，是不会收手的，放心好了，谁也挡不住这辆高速战车。

TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站######TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站1994年，美国经济处于极低潮，日本人均GDP是美国的1.8倍左右。

（所以日本低端产业外移，是不可避免的，否则日本一直是发展中国家了，发达国家的意思，就是这些国家的人均GDP高，人均收入高，人均福利高，法治化，公民社会）TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站我依旧认为，美国经济无法迅速恢复，大概要到2014年开始，美国经济才会再次出现高增长，和美元高利率抵御美国的高通货膨胀，黄金也在2014年左右，走入比较长的熊市，美国目前虽然房地产跌得慢了，但是库存太多，年房子开工量太少，要回复到200万套/年才正常。

房地产的去库存，使得美国2006，2007存在的地产相关300 到500万工作岗位消失。

TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站用更多的过剩，能解决以前的过剩吗？TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站中国的房子，2007年底，就相对过剩了。

（市场经济，并不是有人要房子，就不会过剩，有购买力的需求，才是真实刚需；就像以前一个笑话：没人分把枪，是不可能的，三人一把，才差不多；没人分个女人，也是不可能的，三人分一个，也是不够的）TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站######TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站TpD财聚网-专业的财经分析与趋势研究网站克鲁格曼1994年发表的这篇《亚洲奇迹的神话》，对于目前中国的处境非常有参考意义。

大家下午好！我非常兴奋也非常荣幸能被邀请到中国来，特别是我知道之前你们请过保罗克鲁格曼，我非常荣幸这一次又被邀请了。

我们都知道我写过一本书，我的这本书的名字叫做《伟大的博弈华尔街金融帝国的崛起》。

在这本书当中我就非常具体的讲授了华尔街的一些情况，那末同时也讲到在1792年华尔街证券交易所上市的情况，同时也讲到在后来华尔街所经历的一些情况。

在1918、1953年还有1927年和1987年，2008年我们都知道，在这些年份华尔街都经历了一些跌宕起伏。

我都知道每20、30年都会出现这样一些情况。

同时我们也都知道，很多对华尔街比较熟习的人来讲，我们都知道华尔街它是一个非常自由的金融市场，可以说在这里有很多的“冒险家”。

固然在每次华尔街经历衰落以后都会有一个复苏，这就是一个反复变化的进程。

固然，从这样的进程当中我们也学习了很多的经验教训。

对中国来讲，中国现在也有一个非常好的资本市场，我们的资本市场还不到20年的时间，我以为你们可以从华尔街来学习一些经验教训，而没必要要说是自己往尝试这些经验教训。

在讲华尔街之前，我知道华尔街是一个使人激动人心的故事了，别说我的祖父，他们都是华尔街证券交易所的交易员，做过很多年的时间。

所以我从他们那我也学到了很多东西。

我也记得我的祖父戈登他跟我讲到，在1901年的时候，当时在华尔街上有一个关于摩登铁路的股票，当时他们很多人都来购买这个股票。

当时由于各种各样的一些缘由。

所以他们只能从两个人手中往买股票，这是一个非常著名的事件，当时我的祖父才18岁，当时他还是一个跑腿员，下单的客户给他打电话，他替客户下单。

当时的情况发展有一点疯狂，由于当时进行低空空投，但是这些卖空的人都没有办法。

我的祖父当时也非常的繁忙，由于他当时也是纽约证券交易所的交易员。

当时他到证券交易所往问，现在情况怎样样了，由于空投遭到了逼空，而且每股可能都损失巨大。

当时比如说一共只有1万股的股票，可是这些卖空的人没有地方买进股票来平仓，来实行交割，当时有一个人愿意卖股票，这些想买股票的人太着急了，简直快把他衣服都撕光了，要让他卖出股票来，最后他只好裹着一个毯子出来，但是他还是把股票卖出往了，卖的价格非常高昂。