投资者保护和企业盈余管理财务外文文献翻译2014年3000多字

金融体制、融资约束与投资——来自OECD的实证分析R．SemenovDepartment of Economics，University of Nijmegen，Nijmegen（荷兰内梅亨大学，经济学院）这篇论文考查了OECD的11个国家中现金流量对企业投资的影响.我们发现不同国家之间投资对企业内部可获取资金的敏感性具有显著差异,并且银企之间具有明显的紧密关系的国家的敏感性比银企之间具有公平关系的国家的低.同时，我们发现融资约束与整体金融发展指标不存在关系.我们的结论与资本市场信息和激励问题对企业投资具有重要作用这种观点一致，并且紧密的银企关系会减少这些问题从而增加企业获取外部融资的渠道。

一、引言各个国家的企业在显著不同的金融体制下运行。

金融发展水平的差别(例如，相对GDP的信用额度和相对GDP的相应股票市场的资本化程度），在所有者和管理者关系、企业和债权人的模式中，企业控制的市场活动水平可以很好地被记录.在完美资本市场,对于具有正的净现值投资机会的企业将一直获得资金。

然而，经济理论表明市场摩擦，诸如信息不对称和激励问题会使获得外部资本更加昂贵，并且具有盈利投资机会的企业不一定能够获取所需资本.这表明融资要素，例如内部产生资金数量、新债务和权益的可得性，共同决定了企业的投资决策.现今已经有大量考查外部资金可得性对投资决策的影响的实证资料（可参考，例如Fazzari（1998）、 Hoshi(1991)、 Chapman（1996）、Samuel(1998））.大多数研究结果表明金融变量例如现金流量有助于解释企业的投资水平。

这项研究结果解释表明企业投资受限于外部资金的可得性。

很多模型强调运行正常的金融中介和金融市场有助于改善信息不对称和交易成本，减缓不对称问题,从而促使储蓄资金投着长期和高回报的项目,并且提高资源的有效配置（参看Levine（1997)的评论文章）。

因而我们预期用于更加发达的金融体制的国家的企业将更容易获得外部融资.几位学者已经指出建立企业和金融中介机构可进一步缓解金融市场摩擦。

盈余管理与公司业绩盈余管理与企业绩效有趣的是，协会之间的预回购异常预提费用及回购后性能出现将在很大程度上推动这些公司的报告中最购回前的负异常应计。

这些结果是一致的路易斯（2004）的论点，因为盈利的复杂性管理和遵守一定的管理行为，投资者的困难可能会感到惊讶实现增长时低于或超过操纵收益数字的基础上形成的期望。

随后的分析也表明，一旦我们控制的效果再回购的盈余管理，是没有证据显示性能的提高，和回购之间呈显着负相关性能和预回购异常预提费用基本上消失。

这种额外的证据进一步支持了我们的猜想，采购后优越的性能，至少部分是由于前回购盈余管理。

研究的其余部分安排如下：下一节将讨论相关的研究和我们的动力。

第二节介绍我们的变量的测量的过程。

第三节介绍样本选择过程。

第四节后回购的性能进行了分析。

第五节分析的证据回购前盈余管理。

第六节分析之间的关联购买前盈余管理和回购后的表现。

这项研究的结论在第七节。

相关的研究和动机谎言（2005）认为，公司报告经营效益显着改善相对公开市场回购公告后他们的同龄人。

他推断，经理启动股票回购计划时，他们期望未来的经营业绩是资本市场的预期。

我们猜想，回购后改善报告的经营业绩也有可能被下调盈利预回购管理驱动。

我们假定经理人进行回购的目的是可能有奖励办法，以减少回购价格。

扣除回购价格有效地转移股东财富卖出（即离开股东）（即那些将他们的股份持有其余股东）。

这种财富转移管理者受益，因为他们的利益更容易被其余的对齐在企业，事业的关注，他们的股权的股东通过将来的赔偿。

经理涉嫌操纵股票价格的方法之一是通过“盈利管理“（见，例如，希利和Wahlen的（1999））。

因此，我们主张经理们可能会使用他们的报告酌情紧缩股价之前公开市场回购。

财经杂志经理必须在其财务的自由裁量权，因为在目前的会计准则所提供的灵活性报告。

例如，现行的会计规则往往提供酌情经理关于如何核算交易和/或估计未变现收益或损失。

因此，经理人的机会主义行事，可以使用他们的报告可酌情暂时扣除收入减少的回购价格在季度和/或回购公告之前的季度。

附录A财务管理和财务分析作为财务学科中应用工具。

本书的写作目的在于交流基本的财务管理和财务分析。

本书用于那些有能力的财务初学者了解财务决策和企业如何做出财务决策。

通过对本书的学习，你将了解我们是如何理解财务的。

我们所说的财务决策作为公司所做决策的一部分，不是一个被分离出来的功能。

财务决策的做出协调了企业会计部、市场部和生产部。

无论企业的形式和规模如何，财务原理和财务工具均适用。

就像对小规模的私营企业而言存在如何筹资的问题，大企业面临所有权和经营权分离时出现的代理问题。

不管公司的规模和形式是如何的，公司财务管理的基本原理是一样的。

例如，无论是独资企业做出的决策还是大企业做出的决策，今天一美元的价值都高于未来一美元的价值。

我们所说的财务原理和财务工具适用于全球的企业，不仅限于美国的企业。

虽然国家习惯和法律可能与国家的原则理论存在着不同，但财务管理用到的工具是一样的。

例如，在评估是否要买一个特殊设备的价值时，你需要评估企业未来现金流的发生（设备成本和支出的时间和设备的不确定性），这个企业位于美国、英国还是在其他的地方?此外，我们相信拥有强大的财务原理和数学相关工具的依据对于你了解如何做出投资和财务决策十分必要。

但是建立这种依据比不费力。

我们试图帮你建立这种依据的途径是通过直觉提出财务原理和财务理论。

而不是原理和证据。

例如，我们引导你通过数字和真实例子对资本结构原理产生直觉，而不是利用公式和证据。

再者我们试图帮助你通过仔细的逐步的例子和大量数据处理财务工具。

财务管理和财务分析分为7个部分。

前两个部分（第一部分和第二部分）涉及到基础部分，它包括财务管理、估价原则的目标以及风险和回报之间的关系。

财务决策涉及到第三、四、五部分的内容，我们提出了长期投资管理（通常被称为资本预算）的长期来源、管理和资金管理工作。

第六部分涉及到财务报表分析，它包括财务比率的分析，盈利分析和现金流量分析。

最后一个部分（第七部分）涉及到一些专业论题：国际财务管理，金融结构性金融交易（例如资产证券化），项目融资，设备租赁贷款和财务规划策略。

盈余管理的动机国外文献综述一、引言盈余管理是指企业经理通过对财务报表数据的操控，更改企业财务报表数据，从而影响企业财务报告利润，最终影响企业信息外部使用者对企业的决策的行为。

Roychowdhury （2006年）通过解释盈余管理的目的而对盈余管理进行了定义。

经理人是被企业所雇佣的高级员工，他们必须尽力使股东对他们的经营成果满意；此外，企业管理人员也需要完成已经制定的财务目标。

为了实现以上的目标，企业管理人员往往会通过特殊手段进行盈余管理，这个手段实施的过程就是盈余管理。

关于企业管理层为什么进行盈余管理，国外学者各抒己见。

Watts和Zimmerman（1986年）明确指出有激励因素导致管理层进行盈余管理。

他们列明报酬契约、债务契约以及政治原因都是管理层进行盈余管理的动因。

Aharony等人（2000年）选取中国B股和H股的IPO公司作为样本，他们确认了在IPO公司当中存在着盈余管理现象。

Hunton等人（2006年），Libby和Kinney（2000年）指出企业管理层会为了满足财务分析师的预测而进行盈余管理，而这直接促成了企业股价的增长。

在此基础上，其他学者对盈余管理的动机进行了进一步的研究。

二、契约动机（一）债务契约Defond和Jiambalvo（1994年）以及Sweeney（1994年）论证了契约是盈余管理的动机之一。

Defond和Jiambalvo（1994年）通过对有债务契约的公司的研究，发现公司管理层会为了避免违反债务契约而进行盈余管理。

具体来说，那些有可能违反债务契约的公司的管理层会通过盈余管理来虚增企业财务报表的利润，由此避免因违反契约对企业造成的不良影响。

Sweeney（1994年）也阐述了盈余管理和债务契约之间存在联系。

研究表明，违约的公司更有可能进行盈余管理。

（二）报酬契约Holthausen等人（1995年）提出契约可以被视为盈余管理的动机之一。

报酬契约促使企业管理层进行盈余管理。

IPO公司盈余管理研究国内外文献综述国外研究现状国外学者对盈余管理的研究相对较早，美国学者Schipper于1989年提出了“盈余管理”的概念，他认为企业管理当局会对公开披露的财务信息进行粉饰调节，以实现自身利益的最大化，不同于利润操纵，盈余管理是在不违反会计准则的前提下，对会计政策和会计估计进行主观选择Scott William R (1997)认为盈余管理就是企业管理层为了实现公司利益或者市场价值最大化的目的，而选择相应的会计政策的行为。

PaulM Healy和James M Wahlen (1999)指出盈余管理具体表现在企业管理当局通过调整具体的交易活动，影响公司会计报告信息，以此实现误导利益相关方决策的目的。

企业管理层会出于种种目的操纵盈余信息，Watts和Zimmerman(1990)认为管理层会出于报酬契约、债务契约和政治方面的考虑，会采取一定的手段影响企业对外披露的财务信息。

Healy (1999)发现，一些上市公司管理者会为了获得奖金报酬，对公司业绩进行调整，扮靓财务数据。

Jones (1991)研究发现，一些企业会为了申请政府税收减免而递延当年收益。

外部的监管与监督是影响企业IPO盈余管理的重要外部因素，严格的外部监管会在一定程度上约束IPO公司的盈余管理活动。

Cohen (2000)研究发现在萨班斯法案颁布后，由于管理单位加大对于上市公司盈余管理的监管和处罚，上市公司更倾向于采用真实活动的盈余管理。

Rowchoydhury C 2006研究发现，成熟的机构投资者会识别影响公司长远利益的盈余管理活动，并采取相应的遏制措施。

国内研究现状顾明润和田存志(2012)认为由于我国一级资本市场证券定价市场功能相对较弱，许多IPO公司会为了提高股票的发行价格而对公司财务报告进行粉饰。

同时，由于我国资本市场IPO制度仍处于核准制向注册制过渡的阶段，对公司IPO 资格仍有较高的要求，张征和崔毅(2014)认为IPO公司会出于满足发行条件和获得更多的发行收入的目的，在会计准则允许的范围内对盈余进行调整。

The Optimization Method of Financial Statements Based on Accounting Management TheoryABSTRACTThis paper develops an approach to enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was fundamentally flawed by fair value accounting and asset-impairment accounting. According to legal theory and accounting theory, accounting data must have legal evidence as its source document. The conventional “mixed attribute” accounting system should be re placed by a “segregated” system with historical cost and fair value being kept strictly apart in financial statements. The proposed optimizing method will significantly enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements.I.. INTRODUCTIONBased on international-accounting-convergence approach, the Ministry of Finance issued the Enterprise Accounting Standards in 2006 taking the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter referred to as “the International Standards”) for reference. The Enterprise Accounting Standards carries out fair value accounting successfully, and spreads the sense that accounting should reflect market value objectively. The objective of accounting reformation following-up is to establish the accounting theory and methodology which not only use international advanced theory for reference, but also accord with the needs of China's socialist market economy construction. On the basis of a thorough evaluation of the achievements and limitations of International Standards, this paper puts forward a stand that to deepen accounting reformation and enhance the stability of accounting regulations.II. OPTIMIZA TION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEM: PARALLELING LISTING OF LEGAL FACTS AND FINANCIAL EXPECTA TIONAs an important management activity, accounting should make use of information systems based on classified statistics, and serve for both micro-economic management and macro-economic regulation at the same time. Optimization of financial statements system should try to take all aspects of the demands of the financial statements in both macro and micro level into account.Why do companies need to prepare financial statements? Whose demands should be considered while preparing financial statements? Those questions are basic issues we should consider on the optimization of financial statements. From the perspective of "public interests", reliability and legal evidence are required as qualitative characters, which is the origin of the traditional "historical cost accounting". From the perspective of "private interest", security investors and financial regulatory authoritieshope that financial statements reflect changes of market prices timely recording "objective" market conditions. This is the origin of "fair value accounting". Whether one set of financial statements can be compatible with these two different views and balance the public interest and private interest? To solve this problem, we design a new balance sheet and an income statement.From 1992 to 2006, a lot of new ideas and new perspectives are introduced into China's accounting practices from international accounting standards in a gradual manner during the accounting reform in China. These ideas and perspectives enriched the understanding of the financial statements in China. These achievements deserve our full assessment and should be fully affirmed. However, academia and standard-setters are also aware that International Standards are still in the process of developing .The purpose of proposing new formats of financial statements in this paper is to push forward the accounting reform into a deeper level on the basis of international convergence.III. THE PRACTICABILITY OF IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEMWhether the financial statements are able to maintain their stability? It is necessary to mobilize the initiatives of both supply-side and demand-side at the same time. We should consider whether financial statements could meet the demands of the macro-economic regulation and business administration, and whether they are popular with millions of accountants.Accountants are responsible for preparing financial statements and auditors are responsible for auditing. They will benefit from the implementation of the new financial statements.Firstly, for the accountants, under the isolated design of historical cost accounting and fair value accounting, their daily accounting practice is greatly simplified. Accounting process will not need assets impairment and fair value any longer. Accounting books will not record impairment and appreciation of assets any longer, for the historical cost accounting is comprehensively implemented. Fair value information will be recorded in accordance with assessment only at the balance sheet date and only in the annual financial statements. Historical cost accounting is more likely to be recognized by the tax authorities, which saves heavy workload of the tax adjustment. Accountants will not need to calculate the deferred income tax expense any longer, and the profit-after-tax in the solid line table is acknowledged by the Company Law, which solves the problem of determining the profit available for distribution.Accountants do not need to record the fair value information needed by security investors in the accounting books; instead, they only need to list the fair value information at the balance sheet date. In addition, because the data in the solid line table has legal credibility, so the legal risks of accountants can be well controlled. Secondly, the arbitrariness of the accounting process will be reduced, and the auditors’ review process will be greatly simplified. The independent auditors will not have to bear the considerable legal risk for the dotted-line table they audit, because the risk of fair value information has been prompted as "not supported by legalevidences". Accountants and auditors can quickly adapt to this financial statements system, without the need of training. In this way, they can save a lot of time to help companies to improve management efficiency. Surveys show that the above design of financial statements is popular with accountants and auditors. Since the workloads of accounting and auditing have been substantially reduced, therefore, the total expenses for auditing and evaluation will not exceed current level as well.In short, from the perspectives of both supply-side and demand-side, the improved financial statements are expected to enhance the usefulness of financial statements, without increase the burden of the supply-side.IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThe current rule of mixed presentation of fair value data and historical cost data could be improved. The core concept of fair value is to make financial statements reflect the fair value of assets and liabilities, so that we can subtract the fair value of liabilities from assets to obtain the net fair value.However, the current International Standards do not implement this concept, but try to partly transform the historical cost accounting, which leads to mixed using of impairment accounting and fair value accounting. China's accounting academic research has followed up step by step since 1980s, and now has already introduced a mixed-attributes model into corporate financial statements.By distinguishing legal facts from financial expectations, we can balance public interests and private interests and can redesign the financial statements system with enhancing management efficiency and implementing higher-level laws as main objective. By presenting fair value and historical cost in one set of financial statements at the same time, the statements will not only meet the needs of keeping books according to domestic laws, but also meet the demand from financial regulatory authorities and security investorsWe hope that practitioners and theorists offer advices and suggestions on the problem of improving the financial statements to build a financial statements system which not only meets the domestic needs, but also converges with the International Standards.基于会计管理理论的财务报表的优化方法摘要本文提供了一个方法，以提高财务报表的可靠性和实用性。

盈余管理和盈利质量外文文献及翻译摘要从犯罪现场调查员的视角来看盈余管理的检测，启蒙了早期对盈余管理的研究和它的近亲：盈利质量。

Ball和Shivakumar的著作（2008在会计和经济学杂志上出版的《首次公开发行时的盈利质量》）和Teoh et al .的著作(1998在金融杂志53期上刊登的《盈利管理和首次公开发行后的市场表现》)被用来阐释将犯罪现场调查的七个部分应用于盈利管理的研究。

关键词:市场效率盈余管理盈利质量会计欺诈1、引言在诸多会计和金融的研究课题中,可能没有比盈余管理更具有刺激性的议题。

为什么?我认为这是因为这个主题明确涉及了潜在的不法行为、恶作剧、冲突、间谍活动以及一种神秘感。

正如Healy和Wahlen在1999年(Schipper在1989也下过类似的定义)定义道:“盈余管理的发生是在管理者针对财务报表和交易建立，运用判断力来改变财务报告之时。

盈余管理要么会在公司潜在的经营表现上误导一些利益相关者，要么影响合同结果，这取决于会计报告数字。

”简而言之，有人做伤害别人的事情。

审计人员、监管机构、投资者和研究者们试图找到这些违法者并解开这个谜团,而这个谜团可能会演变成涉及欺诈(或犯罪,在此使用解决犯罪谜团的隐喻)的事件。

如果我们将盈余管理看成是一个潜在的欺诈性(犯罪性)活动,那么我们可以在利用比解决神秘谋杀案的福尔摩斯,或犯罪现场调查(CSI)更现代的条件下，考虑对盈余管理的探查。

这样的调查涉及到以下七个要素：一场犯罪是否已经实施，嫌疑人的责任，使用的凶器,犯罪活动的受害者,犯罪的动机，开展行动的机会和替代性解释。

替代性解释是指除了欺诈或犯罪活动，整个事件的起因。

这个起因能够证实在目击证据的基础上得出欺诈或犯罪的结论将是错误的。

我在讨论破解盈余管理的谜团的各种要素时，所举的例子主要来自Ball和Shivakumar(2008)和Teoh et al.(1998)。

(这些要素显然是相互关联的,以下的讨论中也有一些不可避免的重复)。

股权激励与盈余管理外文文献翻译2014年译文4500字文献出处：Scott Duellman. Equity Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Account. Public Policy ,2014(32):495–517.原文Equity Incentives and Earnings ManagementScott DuellmanaAbstractPrior studies suggest that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. Using three distinct proxies for earnings management we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases). Furthermore, using the accrual-based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecast models we find that the opportunistic financial reporting effect of equity incentives dominates the incentive alignments effect for firms with low monitoring intensity. Using proxies for real earnings management, we find that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. However, for low monitoring intensity firms the opportunistic reporting effect mitigates, but does not completely offset, the benefits of the incentive alignment effect. Overall, these findings are consistent with the level of monitoring affecting the relation between equity incentives and earnings management.1. IntroductionClassical agency theory suggests that equity incentives align managers’interests with shareholders’in terests (see forexample, Mirlees, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Holmstrom, 1979). However, recent theoretical papers suggest that equity incentives may also motivate managers to boost short term stock prices by manipulating accounting numbers (see for example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003 and Goldman and Slezak, 2006). Empirical studies examining the effect of equity incentives on earnings management, a proxy for opportunistic reporting, yield mixed results. For example, Gao and Shrieves, 2002,Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Weber, 2006, and Cornett et al. (2008) document a positive relation between equity incentives and accrual-based earnings management; while Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that after controlling for cash flow volatility the relation between equity incentives and earnings management becomes insignificant.1 Furthermore, Cohen et al. (2008) find a negative relation between equity incentives and real earnings management. Thus, whether equity incentives are associated with opportunistic financial reporting is an open empirical question that warrants further study.We view equity incentives as one element of the firm’s governancestructure and argue that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. We investigate how the relation between equity incentives and earnings management changes with respect to the intensity of firms’monitoring systems. More specifically, we expect that when monitoring intensity is relatively high, equity incentives will have more of an incentive alignment effect leading to lower earnings management in comparison with low monitoring intensity firms. Conversely, when monitoring intensity is relatively low, equity incentives will have more of anopportunistic financial reporting effect leading to higher earnings management in comparison to high monitoring intensity firms. Thus, we predict that the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increases as monitoring intensity increases (decreases).Using a sample over the time period 2001–2007, we proxy for earnings management using three different measures common in the literature: (i) absolute abnormal accruals, (ii) real earnings management measures, and (iii) the likelihood of meeting/beating an analyst forecast. We measure equity incentives, in a manner consistent with prior studies such as Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) as the percentage of total CEO compensation for the year that would come from a 1% increase in the company’s stock as of the end of the previous fiscal year.To measure the intensity of monitoring mechanisms, we focus on threemechanisms that are most directly involved in monitoring managers’financial reporting decisions (board of directo rs, external auditors, and institutional investors). We identify six board characteristics, one auditor characteristic, and two institutional investor characteristics that could potentially affect monitoring effectiveness. Using principal component analysis we collapse these nine characteristics into two monitoring intensity measures (principal components) which capture 51.1% of the variance in these characteristics.2 We classify firms as high (low) monitoring intensity firms if both monitoring intensity measures are above (below) median values while firms with only one monitoring factor above the median are classified as moderate monitoring intensity firms. We use this approach as different monitoring attributes may be substitutes or complements to oneanother and principal component analysis effectively reduces the redundancy in these variables.We regress our measures of earnings management on lagged equity incentives, monitoring intensity classifications (moderate and low), the interaction between them, and a set of control variables. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases) across all three earnings management measures. Second, in tests using accrual based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecasts, we find that forlow monitoring intensity firms, the opportunistic reporting effect dominates the incentive alignment effect of equity incentives; and equity incentives and earnings management are unrelated when monitoring intensity is moderate or high.Third, with respect to real earnings management, we find a negative relation between equity incentives and real earnings management for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. Furthermore, for low intensity monitoring firms the negative relation is mitigated, but not completely offset, by the incentive alignment effect. In contrast with our abnormal accrual results, these findings suggest that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect with respect to real earnings management. A potential explanation for these findings is that both monitors and managers are aware of the higher potential long-term costs of real earnings management and thus tend to avoid cuts to discretionary expenses (research and development) or increase production.Our primary contribution to the literature on the relationbetween equity incentives and earnings management is that we provide evidence on how this relation varies with the level of oversight by monitoring mechanisms. This is in contrast with most prior studies in this area that either overlook the effects of monitoring (or governance) mechanisms or simply use one or more governance characteristics as control variables (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Cornett et al., 2008).3 However, a prior study by Weber (2006) also investigates the effects of governance on the relation between CEO wealth sensitivity and earnings management using a random sample of 410 S&P 1500 firms. Weber (2006) finds that CEO wealth sensitivity is positively related to abnormal accruals and that governance does not significantly affect this relation. Weber (2006) defines monitoring intensity by only using the factor that explains the most variance from the principle component analysis. However, this methodology could misclassify firms because monitoring has multiple dimensions and using only one factor ignores the presence of substitutive monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, in contrast to Weber (2006), using two monitoring intensity factors, we find that monitoring intensity has a significant effect on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Additionally, our study uses a broader sample of firms, a longer sample period, and multiple proxies for earnings management.In addition to our primary contribution, we add to the literature in two ways. First, while prior studies on equity incentives and accrual-based earnings management document that the results are dependent on controlling for operating cash flow volatility, we show that for firms with low monitoring, equity incentives are positively related to accrual-based earningsmanagement even after controlling for operating cash flow volatility. Second, we add to the literature by providing evidence on theeffects of monitoring intensity on the relation between equity incentives and real earnings management. To our knowledge, the only other study that investigates the relation between equity incentives and real earnings management is Cohen et al. (2008).4However, Cohen et al. (2008) do not consider the mitigating effects of monitoring intensity on this relation.An important limitation of our study (and other work in this area more generally) is that equity incentives and other governance mechanisms are likely to be chosen endogenously with the firm’s other corporate policies, structures, and features. Thus, while we attempt to mitigate the effects of endogeneity, we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that our results could be affected by endogeneity bias.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of prior research and our hypothesis development. Section 3 presents our research design choices and their rationale. The evidence is presented in Section 4 and the conclusion in Section 5.2. Prior research and hypothesis development2.1. Prior researchEquity incentives are an important part of firms’governa nce structures that are used to align managers’ interests with shareholder interests (Mirlees, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Holmstrom, 1979). However, recent studies suggest that they also motivate managers tofocus on boosting stock price in the short term (see for example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003 and Goldman and Slezak,2006).Prior studies document mixed evidence on the effect of equity incentives on earnings management. On the one hand, Gao and Shrieves, 2002, Cheng and Warfield, 2005, Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Weber, 2006, and Cornett et al. (2008) find that equity incentives are positively related to the absolute value of abnormal accruals. On the other hand, Hribar and Nichols (2007) demonstrate that findings of earnings management in studies that are based on absolute abnormal accruals no longer hold once controls for cash flow volatility are added. Furthermore, in contrast with studies documenting opportunistic effects of equity incentives, Cohen et al. (2008) find a negative relation between real earnings management methods and stock ownership, CEO bonuses, and unexercisable options consistent with incentive alignment effects dominating opportunistic effects. Armstrong et al. (2010a, 226) summarize the findings on the relation between equity incentives and accounting irregularities of all types (including accrual based earnings management) by stating that “no conclusive results have emerged from the literature.”Thus, whether equity incentives result in earnings management remains an open question.2.2. Equity incentives and other governance mechanismsWe view equity incentives as one element of a firm’s overall governancestructure. Furthermore, we note that equity incentives have both an incentive alignment effect as well as an opportunistic financial reporting effect. The incentive alignment effect follows from agency theory which suggests that managerial stock ownership align their interests with shareholders (Jensen andMeckling, 1976). The opportunistic financial reporting effect arises because managers with high equity incentives are motivated to overstate accounting performance and boost stock prices in the short-run. For example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) show that when managers can sell shares in the short-run, they will be motivated to misreport performance and misreporting will be an increasing function of the fraction of management-owned shares that could be sold (also see Goldman and Slezak, 2006 and Ronen et al., 2006).If firms choose their governance structures to maximize value, and optimally use equity incentives in conjunction with other governance mechanisms, there will be either a negative relation or no relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Intuitively, any opportunistic effects of equity incentives would be exactly offset by other governance or monitoring mechanisms. However, adjusting governance structures is costly so it is unclear whether most firms end up with optimal equity incentives and monitoring mechanisms in a dynamic environment. Deviations from optimal monitoring raises the possibility that under some conditions the opportunistic effects of equity incentives may dominate or mitigate the。

内部治理结构与盈余管理本文探讨了公司的内部治理结构对盈余管理的约束作用。

这是假设盈余管理系统地涉及到公司内部治理机制的各个方面的前提下进行的研究，研究包括董事会的力量，审计委员会，内部审计职能的变化与外部审计师的选择四个方面。

基于横截面模型以2000年末在澳大利亚上市的434家公司为样本，将可控性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理的水平，发现董事会及审计委员会的非执行董事的人数越多盈余管理的可能性越低。

内部审计职能和审计机构的选择与盈余管理没有显著的相关性。

我们进一步分析还发现，利用收入的增加作为盈余管理的替代变量时，盈余管理和审计委员会的存在具有负相关关系。

关键词：审计委员会；公司治理；盈余管理；内部审计职能1 前言最近在澳大利亚及海外的操纵会计行为的案件表明公司治理机制的重要性，强有力的公司治理涉及到与公司绩效水平监测的一个适当的平衡(Cadbury,1997)。

在本论文中，我们以澳大利亚的公司治理为例探索治理机制与盈余之间的关系，因此，我们的重点是治理的监督作用。

我们研究的是独立的董事局（ShleiferandVishny，1997），独立委员会主席，一个有效的审计委员会（MenonandWilliams，1994年），内部审计（Clikeman，2003年）和外部审计师的选择使用（贝克尔埃塔尔，1998；弗朗西斯埃塔尔，1999）对盈余管理产生的影响。

在此之前的研究已经调查了治理机制可以减少欺诈性财务报告的产生（比斯利，1996; Dechowetal，1996年）。

这些研究认为有效的治理机制和真实的财务报告与违反一般公认会计原则（GAAP）呈负相关关系。

不过，相对较新的研究领域是公司治理与盈余管理。

Peasnell等（2000）研究表明盈余管理与董事会的独立性是负相关的，而另一些研究发现审计委员会与盈余管理之间存在显着的关系（Chtourouetal.2001; Xieetal，2001）。

澳大利亚公司内部治理结构和盈利管理实践检验是具有前提条件的，而Peasnell使用的数据主要是研究美国的。

基于国内外文献分析我国上市公司盈余管理研究摘要：企业管理层为了实现利益最大化，会选择不同的会计政策，以尽可能地进行盈余管理。

西方国家的会计理论界很早就开始了盈余管理的研究，对于这样一个复杂的社会问题，国内外理论界有诸多论述，本文基于国内外文献，对于盈余管理、金融资产分类政策与盈余管理关系进行研究，并对盈余管理体系进行分析，提供建议。

关键词：会计政策选择；盈余管理；金融资产；文献综述一、研究背景及研究意义早在二十世纪七十年代，西方国家的会计理论界就开始了盈余管理的研究。

对于盈余管理这样一个复杂的社会问题，国内外理论界有诸多论述，但究其共同之处，在于如下几点：（1）盈余管理中，无论是会计政策的选择，会计估计的变更或者交易事项的发生时点的控制，都是企业管理层在决策。

（2）盈余管理的对象是企业交易或事项有关会计信息。

（3）管理层进行盈余管理的目的是追求其自身利益最大化。

（4）盈余管理的主要途径是运用职业判断和规划利益来调整可操纵性应计利润。

1998年，国际会计准则委员会（iasc）发布《国际会计准则第39号——金融工具：确认和计量》（以下简称ias39）。

2006年2月，财政部颁布了新《企业会计准则》，其中《企业会计准则第22号——金融工具确认与计量》（以下简称cas22）是一个很大的亮点。

如cas22规定的交易性金融资产和可供出售金融资产的后续计量的不同，使得管理层在选择金融资产分类政策的时候存在很大自主操纵的利己空间。

纵观金融资产盈余管理的研究，绝大多数集中在资产减值损失与盈余管理的关系，而对于金融资产分类中管理者意图这一不容易量化的因素，却很少有所涉及。

本文正是在这种情况下，选择国内外文献进行分析，对于管理层盈余管理行为的研究以及治理问题有一定的建设性意义。

二、国内外文献综述（一）盈余管理研究文献综述healy（1985）发现所有权与经营权分离导致的股东与经理之间的利益冲突，使得薪酬契约对管理层从股东利益出发从事经营管理活动产生激励作用。

摘要：我们依据(参考、吸收)投资者保护相关文献资料去识别财务报告环境中的结构性因素，这些因素有可能解释年度盈利报告的信息内涵在跨区域的差异。

通过使用分布于26个国家超过50000份的年度盈利报告数据，我们发现，在那些盈利质量更高或内幕交易法规得到更好执行的国家其年度盈利报告具有更佳的信息质量(内涵)(对投资者更有益)，而在那些要求披露更频繁中期财务报告的国家其年度盈利报告具有较少的信息量(信息价值较低)。

我们还发现，平均而言在具备更强大有力的投资者保护机构的国家，其年度盈利报告信息质量更佳(具备更多信息量)。

P381. 简介大量的研究检验了不同国家之间股票收益和会计盈余两者之间长期联系的差异，发现不同国家收益价值的相关性差异很大。

但由于这篇研究报告检验了收益与盈余之间的长期相关性，所以没有向我们展示投资者是否实际使用了包含在定期进行的盈余公告中的信息，或者什么因素影响了该类信息的使用。

本文的研究目的有以下两点：1）运用事件研究方法来，检验不同国家的投资者对于公告信息的反应差异；2）检验各国财务报告环境的差异，这些环境能够影响报告的信息含量。

我们利用了那些对投资者保护协会进行审查的文献，以了解那些在一国财务报告环境中很可能影响投资者对盈余公告反应的结构性因素。

具体来说，我们假设市场在下面两种情况中，对于年度盈余公告的反应会比较强烈：1）收益是有高质量保障的，这能够给收益的以较大的真实性；2）内部交易法规被较好的执行，这使得盈余信息不太可能在报告前已经反应在股价中。

同时，我们假设市场对年度盈余公告的反应在下面情况中会比较弱：3）期间财务报告的频率更加频繁，这主要由于盈余信息很可能已经被提前在股价中反应。

最后，在无法有效进行预测时，我们假设市场对年度盈余公告的反应会被更为完善的财务披露所影响，因为它能够通过增强或削弱市场对公告的反应来影响财务报告的环境。

为了检验本文假设，我们对年报信息含量从四个结构性因素进行了回归。

Financial Risk ManagementAlthough financial risk has increased significantly in recent years, risk and risk management are not contemporary issues. The result of increasingly global markets is that risk may originate with events thousands of miles away that have nothing to do with the domestic market. Information is available instantaneously, which means that change, and subsequent market reactions, occur very quickly. The economic climate and markets can be affected very quickly by changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices. Counterparties can rapidly become problematic. As a result, it is important to ensure financial risks are identified and managed appropriately. Preparation is a key component of risk management.What Is Risk?Risk provides the basis for opportunity. The terms risk and exposure have subtle differences in their meaning. Risk refers to the probability of loss, while exposure is the possibility of loss, although they are often used interchangeably. Risk arises as a result of exposure.Exposure to financial markets affects most organizations, either directly or indirectly. When an organization has financial market exposure, there is a possibility of loss but also an opportunity for gain or profit. Financial market exposure may provide strategic or competitive benefits.Risk is the likelihood of losses resulting from events such as changes in market prices. Events with a low probability of occurring, but that may result in a high loss, are particularly troublesome because they are often not anticipated. Put another way, risk is the probable variability of returns.Since it is not always possible or desirable to eliminate risk,understanding it is an important step in determining how to manage it. Identifying exposures and risks forms the basis for an appropriate financial risk management strategy.How Does Financial Risk?Financial risk arises through countless transactions of a financial nature, including sales and purchases, investments and loans, and various other business activities. It can arise as a result of legal transactions, new projects, mergers and acquisitions, debt financing, the energy component of costs, or through the activities of management, stakeholders, competitors, foreign governments, or weather. When financial prices change dramatically, it can increase costs, reduce revenues, or otherwise adversely impact the profitability of an organization. Financial fluctuations may make it more difficult to plan and budget, price goods and services, and allocate capital.There are three main sources of financial risk:1. Financial risks arising from an organization’s exposure to changes in market prices, such as interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices.2. Financial risks arising from the actions of, and transactions with, other organizations such as vendors, customers, and counterparties in derivatives transactions3. Financial risks resulting from internal actions or failures of the organization, particularly people, processes, and systemsWhat Is Financial Risk Management?Financial risk management is a process to deal with the uncertainties resulting from financial markets. It involves assessing the financial risks facing an organization and developing management strategies consistent withinternal priorities and policies. Addressing financial risks proactively may provide an organization with a competitive advantage. It also ensures that management, operational staff, stakeholders, and the board of directors are in agreement on key issues of risk.Managing financial risk necessitates making organizational decisions about risks that are acceptable versus those that are not. The passive strategy of taking no action is the acceptance of all risks by default.Organizations manage financial risk using a variety of strategies and products. It is important to understand how these products and strategies work to reduce risk within the context of the organization’s risk tolerance and objectives.Strategies for risk management often involve derivatives. Derivatives are traded widely among financial institutions and on organized exchanges. The value of derivatives contracts, such as futures, forwards, options, and swaps, is derived from the price of the underlying asset. Derivatives trade on interest rates, exchange rates, commodities, equity and fixed income securities, credit, and even weather.The products and strategies used by market participants to manage financial risk are the same ones used by speculators to increase leverage and risk. Although it can be argued that widespread use of derivatives increases risk, the existence of derivatives enables those who wish to reduce risk to pass it along to those who seek risk and its associated opportunities.The ability to estimate the likelihood of a financial loss is highly desirable. However, standard theories of probability often fail in the analysis of financial markets. Risks usually do not exist in isolation, and theinteractions of several exposures may have to be considered in developing an understanding of how financial risk arises. Sometimes, these interactions are difficult to forecast, since they ultimately depend on human behavior.The process of financial risk management is an ongoing one. Strategies need to be implemented and refined as the market and requirements change. Refinements may reflect changing expectations about market rates, changes to the business environment, or changing international political conditions, for example. In general, the process can be summarized as follows:1、Identify and prioritize key financial risks.2、Determine an appropriate level of risk tolerance.3、Implement risk management strategy in accordance with policy.4、Measure, report, monitor, and refine as needed.DiversificationFor many years, the riskiness of an asset was assessed based only on the variability of its returns. In contrast, modern portfolio theory considers not only an asset’s riskiness, but also its contribution to the overall riskiness of the portfolio to which it is added. Organizations may have an opportunity to reduce risk as a result of risk diversification.In portfolio management terms, the addition of individual components to a portfolio provides opportunities for diversification, within limits. A diversified portfolio contains assets whose returns are dissimilar, in other words, weakly or negatively correlated with one another. It is useful to think of the exposures of an organization as a portfolio and consider the impact of changes or additions on the potential risk of the total.Diversification is an important tool in managing financial risks.Diversification among counterparties may reduce the risk that unexpected events adversely impact the organization through defaults. Diversification among investment assets reduces the magnitude of loss if one issuer fails. Diversification of customers, suppliers, and financing sources reduces the possibility that an organization will have its business adversely affected by changes outside management’s control. Although the risk of loss still exists, diversification may reduce the opportunity for large adverse outcomes.Risk Management ProcessThe process of financial risk management comprises strategies that enable an organization to manage the risks associated with financial markets. Risk management is a dynamic process that should evolve with an organization and its business. It involves and impacts many parts of an organization including treasury, sales, marketing, legal, tax, commodity, and corporate finance.The risk management process involves both internal and external analysis. The first part of the process involves identifying and prioritizing the financial risks facing an organization and understanding their relevance. It may be necessary to examine the organization and its products, management, customers, suppliers, competitors, pricing, industry trends, balance sheet structure, and position in the industry. It is also necessary to consider stakeholders and their objectives and tolerance for risk.Once a clear understanding of the risks emerges, appropriate strategies can be implemented in conjunction with risk management policy. For example, it might be possible to change where and how business is done, thereby reducing the organization’s exposure and risk. Alternatively, existingexposures may be managed with derivatives. Another strategy for managing risk is to accept all risks and the possibility of losses.There are three broad alternatives for managing risk:1. Do nothing and actively, or passively by default, accept all risks.2. Hedge a portion of exposures by determining which exposures can and should be hedged.3. Hedge all exposures possible.Measurement and reporting of risks provides decision makers with information to execute decisions and monitor outcomes, both before and after strategies are taken to mitigate them. Since the risk management process is ongoing, reporting and feedback can be used to refine the system by modifying or improving strategies.An active decision-making process is an important component of risk management. Decisions about potential loss and risk reduction provide a forum for discussion of important issues and the varying perspectives of stakeholders.Factors that Impact Financial Rates and PricesFinancial rates and prices are affected by a number of factors. It is essential to understand the factors that impact markets because those factors, in turn, impact the potential risk of an organization.Factors that Affect Interest RatesInterest rates are a key component in many market prices and an important economic barometer. They are comprised of the real rate plus a component for expected inflation, since inflation reduces the purchasing power of a lender’s assets .The greater the term to maturity, the greater theuncertainty. Interest rates are also reflective of supply and demand for funds and credit risk.Interest rates are particularly important to companies and governments because they are the key ingredient in the cost of capital. Most companies and governments require debt financing for expansion and capital projects. When interest rates increase, the impact can be significant on borrowers. Interest rates also affect prices in other financial markets, so their impact is far-reaching.Other components to the interest rate may include a risk premium to reflect the creditworthiness of a borrower. For example, the threat of political or sovereign risk can cause interest rates to rise, sometimes substantially, as investors demand additional compensation for the increased risk of default.Factors that influence the level of market interest rates include:1、Expected levels of inflation2、General economic conditions3、Monetary policy and the stance of the central bank4、Foreign exchange market activity5、Foreign investor demand for debt securities6、Levels of sovereign debt outstanding7、Financial and political stabilityYield CurveThe yield curve is a graphical representation of yields for a range of terms to maturity. For example, a yield curve might illustrate yields for maturity from one day (overnight) to 30-year terms. Typically, the rates are zero coupon government rates.Since current interest rates reflect expectations, the yield curve provides useful information about the market’s expectations of future interest rates. Implied interest rates for forward-starting terms can be calculated using the information in the yield curve. For example, using rates for one- and two-year maturities, the expected one-year interest rate beginning in one year’s time can be determined.The shape of the yield curve is widely analyzed and monitored by market participants. As a gauge of expectations, it is often considered to be a predictor of future economic activity and may provide signals of a pending change in economic fundamentals.The yield curve normally slopes upward with a positive slope, as lenders/investors demand higher rates from borrowers for longer lending terms. Since the chance of a borrower default increases with term to maturity, lenders demand to be compensated accordingly.Interest rates that make up the yield curve are also affected by the expected rate of inflation. Investors demand at least the expected rate of inflation from borrowers, in addition to lending and risk components. If investors expect future inflation to be higher, they will demand greater premiums for longer terms to compensate for this uncertainty. As a result, the longer the term, the higher the interest rate (all else being equal), resulting in an upward-sloping yield curve.Occasionally, the demand for short-term funds increases substantially, and short-term interest rates may rise above the level of longer term interest rates. This results in an inversion of the yield curve and a downward slope to its appearance. The high cost of short-term funds detracts from gains that would otherwise be obtained through investment and expansion and make the economyvulnerable to slowdown or recession. Eventually, rising interest rates slow the demand for both short-term and long-term funds. A decline in all rates and a return to a normal curve may occur as a result of the slowdown.财务风险管理尽管近年来金融风险大大增加，但风险和风险管理不是当代的主要问题。

毕业论文材料：英文文献及译文课题名称会计政疆择与上市公司专业财务管理学生姓名________________班级____________________学号指导教师________________专业系主任______________完成日期Earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulationquality evaluation[Abstract] In this paper, earnings management and earnings manipulation the described relationship between the Analysis of earnings quality, accounting quality, and profitability, revealed a surplus of quality in accounting information systems in place given the level of earnings quality assessment framework. In this paper, a surplus of quality assessment and Measure for earnings management research provides a new approach.[Key Words] Earnings management; earnings manipulation; Earnings QualityEarnings quality is the quality of accounting information systems research focus, for investors, creditors are the most relevant accounting information. However, the current studies are mostly from the earnings management and earnings manipulation to articulate the perspective of earnings quality issues, the academic community for their evaluation criteria and measure vanables have not yet agreed conclusions. Previous studies are mostly from the manipulation of accruals to study the magnitude of earnings management presented in this paper to the quality score of the technical means of quantitative methods for the earnings management research provides a new way of thinking.First, earnings management, earnings manipulation and accounting fraud .The results of earnings management affect the earnings quality, accounting quality requirement is that the accounting fraud in order to control behavior, so sort out differences between earnings quality and accounting quality before the first explicit earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulation of the relationship between the fraud. Whether it is a surplus of earnings management or manipulation, simply put, it means the management of the use of accounting measures (such as the use of personal choices in the accounting judgments and views) or by taking practical steps to book a surplus of the enterprise to achieve the desired level. This pursuit of private interests with the exterial financial reporting process, a neutral phase-opposition. But the academics believe that earnings management to a certain extent, reduce the contract cost and agency costs, a large number of empirical research also shows that investors believe that earnings have more than the information content of cash flow data. To shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of the management to take some earnings management measures, we can bring positive effects to the enterprise to increase the companies value. Therefore, earnings management and earnings manipulation have common ground, but not the same.Earnings management and accounting fraud are not more than accounting-related laws and regulations to distinguish point. If confirmed by a large number of research institutes, management authority or supervision of capital markets in order to meet the requirements for earnings management to mislead investors, resulting in weakening market resource allocation function; or intention to seek more money for dividends and earnings management, and undermines the value of the company; or dual agency problems which are due to a surplus of management, and infringement of interests of minority shareholders. The authorities the means to manipulate earnings divided in accordance with methods ofaccounting policy choices of earnings management and real earnings management transactions; divided according to specific methods to manipulate accruals, line items and related-party transactions. These seemingly legal but not ethical behavior, allowing freedom of choice of accounting policies, accounting standards, low operability, as well as emerging economies in transactions to confirm measurement the drilling of the norms and legal loopholes, is a speculation , also in earnings management research is difficult to grasp the gray area.First try, and then trust. Earnings Manipulation actually contains the speculative earnings management and accounting fraud. Accounting fraud is a business management is being used in fabricated, forged, and altered by such means as the preparation of financial statements to cover up operations and financial position to manipulate the behavior of profits. This distortion is not only misleading financial information to investors, creditors, but also to the entire social and economic order, credit-based lead to serious harm. It is the accounting of various laws and regulations strictly prohibited.Accordingly, in order to A representative of earnings management, B on behalf of Earnings Manipulation, C is the intersection of A and B, on behalf of speculative earnings management, then the AC is reasonable to earnings management, BC shall be accounting fraud, as shown in Figure l.A thing is bigger for being shared.Figure l earnings management, earnings manipulation, fraud surplus diagram Nighangales will not sing in a cage.Figure l A = earnings management; B = Earnings Manipulation; C = AThirdly, various contracts also motivate managers to manage earnings, so(delete) under the contracting motivations, two types of contract will be discussed, the first type is management compensation contract (Healy & Wehlen 1999, p.376). Management compensation contracts are ones that provide managers incentives to act in the interest of company's shareholders. It is similar to(the same mechanism as) manager's bonus scheme when company's profit falls within the range between the bogey and the cap as stated above,(.) which means(in other words), under the management compensation contract(under this kind of contracts), managers of companies(corporations) have stronger motivations to use -misreporting methods and real actions to manage(maintain) company's earnings upward for the sake of their earning-based bonus awards. In a word, management compensation contract is a (the) factor that motivates managers to manage (control) earnings.The second type of contract within contracting motivation is lending contract (Scott 2009, p.411). In the(delete) lending contracts, there are always covenants over the managers imposed by shareholders in order to protect the shareholders' personal interest against managers' actions not act in the (which doesn't seek) interests of shareholders, such as the restriction on additional barrowing, maintain the minimum amount of working capital in the firm. Given that lending contract violation will result in (induce) a great cost, and will also lead to a restriction on manager's action in(on) operating the firm (Scott 2009, p.412),(.) Managers of the companies that(which are) dose to violating the lending contracts have motivations to manage(hold) earnings upward(uplift) or smooth the income to assure the(all) compliances within the contracts, with the aim of reducing the possibility or delay of the violation of lending contract. Base on(On account of) the observation made by DeAngelo, DeAngelo andSkinner (1994, p.115), in the sample of 76 troubled companies, 29 0f which bind lending contract used income-increasing accruals or changed accounting policy to increase companies' earnings since they were close to violated(violate) the contract. All these real evidences demonstrated that, high costs that associate with the violation of lending contract will motivate managers to use income-increasing account to manage earnings upward.Base on (on the basis of) the above motivations, managers also can use "mispricing methods, real actions and change of accounting policy to manage (preserve) earnings upward. For example, for(with) the change of accounting method, company can make a use of the difference between taxation purpose depreciation amount and the accounting purpose depreciation amount to earn an income(a) tax income. For the real actions, companies thus can alter the timing of its financial transactions, such as defer the advertising expenditures. Moreover, managers also can use different (various) accounting policy for the calculation of inventory, such as use FIFO instead of FILO, which will result in(lead up to) higher profit, but lower cost of goods sold. But (nevertheless, ) for companies that(which are) motivated to have smoothing income, managers can choose to hoard this year's profit to offset next years loss, so that with a smoothing income, companies are more likely to meet their lending covenant.Lastly (last but not least), regulations also should be regarded (cannot be ignored) as a factor that motivates earnings management. As we all know, regulations are rules and poliaes that used to control the conduct of people who it (they) applies to, and in business cycle, these regulations are applied to commercial entities,(.)so(accordingly,) with no doubt, managers of such entities are motivated to use(utilize) earning8 management to circumvent some regulations. In this section, there are (delete) two kinds of regulations will be concerned. The first one is industry regulations (Healy & Walhen 1999, p.377). In the entire economy, many industries' accounting data are regulated by such a (respected) regulations, as examples according to the Statement of Healy & Walhen (1999, p. 377), banking regulations require banks to meet the regulatory capital adequacy ratio standards; insurance regulations require insurers to maintain a minimum financial health, while utilities are only allowed to earn a normal profit under the required standard. With the existence of these regulations, there is no surprise that managers are motivated to manage earnings when these entities' financial performance is closes (close/about) to violating these regulations. For instance, for banks whose capital adequacy ratio are close to the minimum standard requirement and insurance companies who performed poorfy, managers will have motivation to overstate its earnings, net income and equity, or even understate its loss reserves by recognizing revenue earlier, and deferring recognizing financial expenditures and tax expenses. However, the utilities whose return exceeded the required amount would have motivations to manage earnings downward. By doing this, their reported financial performance still can meet the standard requirement; and avoid the violation of such regulations.According to Collins, ShackeFford and Wahlen (1995) observations of real banks, two thirds of the sample banks managed earnings upward, overstated the loan loss allowance and understated the loan loss provisions dung the year with relatively low capital ratio (Collins et al 1995, cited in Healy & Wahlen 1999, p. 378). Adiel (1996, p.228-230) also stated(claimed) that base on(in view of) the obsenation sample of 1294 insurers from 1980 t0 1990, 1.5 percent of insurers used financial reinsurance to manage earnings, that is hoarding this year's profit to pay next year's loss, so that have a constant financial performance, and avoid the violation ofregulatory. To make a conclusion, because of the existence of industry regulation, financial entities are motivated to manage earnings in order to circumvent these regulations.Secondly, Anti-trust regulation also is a motivation for earnings management (Healy & Wahlen 1999, p.378). Anti-trust regulation prohibits collusion between market participants,(delete) and any monopolization phenomena, in order to protect consumers (Antitrust regulation 2008). Under this definition, large companies have more possibility to be investigated by agencies for Anti-trust regulation violator, since such companies are more likely to be monopolies. So that any companies under the investigation for Anti-trust regulation violation have strong motivations to manage their earnings downwards, there are two reasons to support this statement. Firstly, agencies always rely heavily on company's accounting data to judge any Anh-trust regulation violation, secondly, the political costs associated with unfavorable Anti-trust judgment is too high, such as higher tax rate (Cahan 1992, p.80). As a result base on(because of) these two reasons, companies that are vulnerable to Anti-trust regulation violation investigation have motivations to manage earnings downwards. Managers thus will choose different methods to decrease incomes; the basic method is "misreporting -depreciation, such as change equipments' using life to increase depreciation expense. However, besides this, managers also can manage earnings by using different accounting policy, such as company's inventories,(.) Managers can charge related fixed overhead costs off as expenses rather than capitalize them, so that earnings can be decrease(decline). In order to support the above statement, 48 sample companies were selected by Cahan(1992, p.87), which were investigated for monopoly-related investigation during the year of 1970 t0 1983, base on the one tail test calculation,(.) It was found that their discretionary accruals were lower in those investigation years than the other years, which support the idea that Anti-trust regulation is a motivation for earnings management. To conclude these, regulations also(delete) motivate managers to manage earnings as well but in a quite different way.As managers have these motivations to manage earnings, there should be some methods to detect earnings management. The empirical one is by using total accruals.Total accruals are composed of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. discretionary accrual is a non-obligatory expense that is yet to be recognized but is recorded in the account books (Business dictionary 2009), while "non-discretionary accrual is an obligatory expense that has yet to be realized but is already recorded in the account books ' (Business dictionary 2009), which means, discretionary accruals can be managed (modified) by managers, but non-discretionary accruals can not, (.) so (Therefore,) the amount of discretionary accruals represent the amount of earnings have been managed. That is to say, researchers can detect earnings management by the amount of discretionary accruals, which is the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals-expected total accruals. Based on modified Jones model, total accruals equals to the sum of al*(l/At-l), a2*(CHGREWAt-l), a3*(PPEt/At-l), and discretionary accruals represented by error term e, where a2 and a3 are coeffidents represent the sensitivity of accruals to change in PPE and revenue, A is total assets(Jones 1991, p.211). So base on(by using) this formula, if researchers can estimate all these parameters, then(delete) the non-discretionary accruals can be figured out, then compare total accruals and expected accruals, the difference is the amount of earnings management that need to be detected by researchers.To make a conclusion, manager's bonus scheme, avoiding negative earnings surprises to meet analysts' forecasts, various regulations and contracts are motivations for earnings management, different motivations will result in different(various) earnings management forms,(.) Basic form is 'mispricing- method, which is using(uses) discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward and(or) downward with different conditions given. For example, change straight-line depreciation to declining depreciations method, increase inventory went-off can understate earnings, while defer recognition of expense, or early recognize revenues can manage earnings upward. Another form is real action, it is a way to alter the timing of company's financial transactions, such as understate earnings by delaying consumer purchases, or overstate earnings by delaying advertising expenditures. Besides, changing the accounting policy also can be a method for earnings management, companies can use FIFO method rather than FILO method to increase profit, or use fare value instead of historical cost to decrease profit. With the existence of these earnings management forms, researchers can make a use of Jones' model to calculate the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals, which is expected total accruals to detect whether companies did manage earnings.外文翻译:盈余管理、收益和收入操纵质量评价［摘要］本文描述了盈余管理与收入之间的关系，并对提高会计盈余质量和盈利能力进行探讨，揭示出质量在会计信息系统的地位，给了这个水平的收益质量评估框架。

上市公司盈余管理研究国内外文献综述1国外文献LaPorta（1999）[1]是最初提出的最终控制人的概念的人，最终控制人概念是指控股的股东通过拥有不同股份公司的股份来形成股份控制链以直接或者间接控制上市企业，并且最终拥有该企业的实际控制权。

国外属于资本主义国家，所以专门研究产权性质对盈余管理的文献较少。

国有企业属于国家，所以国有企业天然就拥有政策优势。

所以从国家政策的角度来看，国有企业的盈利情况会比非国有企业好。

Jones（1991）[2]认为有控制权的股东在企业有重要地位和不对称的信息优势。

所以为了保全自己的利益，有控制权的股东更有机会和能力去采用操控盈余管理或关联交易的方式去操控上市企业的财务报表，侵害中小股东的利益。

Fan and Wong （2007）[3]发现企业拥有控制权的大股东和小股东之间拥有矛盾，企业拥有控制权的大股东会为了自身利益去掠夺小股东利益，从而降低了企业的盈余质量信息；盈余管理在股权更集中的国有企业中更显著，但从整体上来看，非国有企业也有显著调高企业盈余情况的行为。

Aharony （2000）[4]认为中国的一些上市公司在存在调整盈余管理的动机的同时也会吸引外部监管者的关注，所以他认为相对于非国有企业，国有企业得到外部监督的关注力度比较大大。

Chen 和 Yuan(2006)［5］认为，盈余管理是上市公司衡量市场信息透明度的重要指标。

信息不对称理论指出上市公司会通过操纵盈余管理的行为提高企业的盈余情况，造成企业盈余质量的虚假，而投资者通常会被上市公司的这种虚假的高盈余质量所蒙蔽，这表明上市公司需要增强企业财务报表的信息透明度和要加大对投资者的保护。

而分析师关注在资本市场上起到了信息中介的作用，分析师可以向投资者传递上市公司的有效盈余信息，所以分析师关注可以在一定程度上减少管理层的信息优势，缓和管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称。

Yu(2008)［6］认为，分析师关注能减少上市公司管理层的盈余管理行为。

Earnings Management concerning the Impairment Decision: A quantitative empirical analysis of German listed companies between 2004 and 2009AbstractThis study investigates the determinants of the impairment decision of German listed companies between 2004 and 2009. We analyze the influence of economic factors and reporting incentives on this decision using a probit regression, reporting results for total impairments as well as separated by tangible and intangible asset impairments. We find strong evidence for a negative relationship between EBITDA as well as market to book ratio change and impairments, while intangible asset impairments show a positive relationship to operating cash flow. Additionally we find that for both tangible and intangible asset impairment income smoothing is an important determinant. Furthermore, intangible asset impairments are more probable in years of management changes.Keywords: impairment loss, impairment probability, earnings management, reportingincentive, income smoothing, management change, probit regression.EARNINGS MANAGEMENT CONCERNING THE IMPAIRMENT DECISION: A quantitative empirical analysis of German listed companies between 2004 and 20091 IntroductionIn this paper we investigate the determinants of the impairment decision of German listed companies.Despite the relatively strict regulations for the Impairment of Assets (IAS 36), managers still have a non-negligible discretion over the impairment decision. This results from the definition of the recoverable amount, which we will discuss in more detail at a later stage. Prior studies which mainly focus on the U.S.-American market find strong evidence for the existence of earnings management (i.e. income smoothing, big bath accounting, etc.) regarding the impairment decision as well as the respective magnitude. In our study we focus on the factors that influence the impairment decision only. We therefore examine the impairment behavior of German listed companies between 2004 and 2009. Excluding the years before mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 does not change our findings (see section 5.3). In our study we assume that besides economic factors there are several other factors influencing a management‟s decision to write off, such as management incentives,, which were not incorporated in the regulations. As the decision to take an impairment is a dichotomous variable, we design our study using a probit regression.We find that the impairment decision regarding total impairments on long-termassets is influenced negatively by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) as well as market to book ratio, while it is positively influenced by firm size. Additionally, we find significant evidence for income smoothing. Factors like management changes and big bath accounting, which prior studies have found to have a significant influence on the decision to write off as well as on the magnitude of impairments , do not seem to influence the decision itself. Differentiating in tangible and intangible assets, we find that management changes play an important role in the intangible setting.We enrich the existing literature in two important ways. First we examine the impairment behavior at the German market. To our knowledge no research has been conducted on publicly listed companies in Germany. Models that were developed for the U.S.-American market could have less validity in the German setting. Regarding the national background, German companies are affected by a long history of principles like prudence (…Vorsichtsprinzip‟) and creditor protection(…Gläubigerschutz‟) (see Hoffmann (2010)) and thus may have another approach to the impairment decision. Secondly, we focus on the impairment decision and thus explicitly differentiate between those factors that influence the impairment decision and those that may have influence on the respective magnitude. One important technical distinction is that we use a panel analysis for our panel data, contrasting a lot of prior studies in which the panel data was pooled to conduct a cross-sectional analysis.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section two we will give a brief overview of the underlying accounting regulations and of prior literature. Section three presents the hypotheses development. In section four we describe our research designselection. Section five reports our results and some sensitivity analysis, while section six concludes.2 Background2.1. Accounting for impairmentsAccording to IAS 36, a company has to evaluate for all assets annually if a triggering event has occurred, except for those that are explicitly excluded from the scope. If this is the case an impairment test has to be conducted. Besides, goodwill and intangible assets with an indefinite useful life have to be tested for impairment annually. If an impairment test has to be conducted, the carrying amount is compared with the recoverable amount, the latter being defined as the higher of fair value less costs to sell and value in use. The fair value less costs to sell has to be derived from an active market if this is possible. Alternatively, it can be calculated using a discounted cash flow approach. The value in use is defined as the present value of future cash flows. Discretion arises because in the vast majority of cases both value in use and fair value less costs to sell are calculated based on subjective estimates of either company internal or external cash flow predictions. Even though IAS 36 requires extensive disclosures on the parameters used to calculate the impairment losses, there mostly remains enough room for earnings management regarding the impairment decision, especially if the non-compliance with the disclosure requirements is takeninto consideration see Carlin, Finch (2008)).2.2 Prior researchIn this section we want to give a short overview on existing literature regarding the factors influencing the impairment of assets. We are aware that there has been an extensive amount of research conducted in this area and thus try to concentrate our literature review on the most influential studies which additionally use similar regression models as we do.Most of the prior literature examines the U.S.-American market and little research has been done which focuses on the impairment decision itself. Minnick (2004) examines the impairment decision from a corporate governance point of view, finding that there is a significant positive relationship between CEO turnover and the write-off probability. Additionally, she finds that the CEO compensation system is an important factor influencing the impairment decision process, and that companies with better governance are more likely to take a write-off and thus to rather show smaller amounts of impairment losses. Loh and Tan (2002) analyze macroeconomic and firm specific factors that influence the impairment decision of companies in Singapore. They find that the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate, and the occupancy rate of properties and management changes are important determinants, whereas variables like the debt to asset ratio seem to be insignificant. Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) analyze the causes of discretionary asset write-offs ofU.S.-American companies before the adoption of SFAS 121 …Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed Of‟ and find significant evidence for the influence of management incentives, such as management changes, big bath accounting and income smoothing on the magnitude of impairments. Riedel (2004) compares the impairment characteristics ofU.S.-American companies before and after the adoption of SFAS 121. He finds that impairments were more closely related to management incentives and less closely related to economic effects after the change in accounting regulations. Among other things, he shows that there is a significant relationship between management changes as well as big bath accounting and the magnitude of impairment losses recognized. Beatty and Weber (2006) conduct a two-stage analysis estimating a joint probit and censored regression to analyze factors influencing the goodwill impairment decision and the respective magnitude in the SFAS 142 …Goodwill and other Intangible Assets‟ adoption period. They find that the impairment decision is influenced significantly by management reporting incentives like the existence of an earnings based bonus system, the manager‟s tenure, or the listing in an exchange with explicit delisting requirements affected by goodwill impairments. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998) investigate the determinants of the magnitude of asset write-offs of Australian companies focusing on management incentives. They find that an association between impairment magnitude and management incentives exists. They also find a relation to the amount of cash reserves, which they interpret as the capacity to write off. Garrod, Kosi and Valentincic (2008) analyze the impairment decision and magnitude of small privately held companies in Slovenia. They report that, in the absence of agency problems and in an environment with high alignment between financial and taxreporting, companies tend to manage earnings using current asset write-offs, whereas fixed asset impairments seem to be influenced mostly by regulatory factors.Taken together, these studies report that for large listed companies there do exist strong incentives to use the impairment decision and the respective magnitude to manage earnings and thereby influence stakeholders in a given direction, independent of the accounting standards that apply.3 Hypothesis Development3.1 Impairment decisionFrom our point of view, two different motivations influence the impairment decision of a company‟s management. First there are economic factors (e.g. earnings, cash flow) which should have significant influence. The counterparts are reporting incentives which can be either explicit or perceived. The significance that is ascribed to these factors varies depending on the research referred to. Rees, Gill and Gore (1996) find evidence for impairments reflecting a change in the company‟s economic environment, consistently Loh and Tan (2002) find the return on assets to be the most significant influence factor on the impairment decision. Other analyses reveal a strong relationship of reporting incentives and the impairment decision (e.g. Strong and Meyer (1087) find management changes to be an important determinant, Riedl (2004) finds evidence for the influence of big bath accounting as well as management changes on impairments and Beatty and Weber (2006) find that covenants, earnings based bonus payments, and CEO tenure as well as the listing on exchanges with financial-based listing requirements are determinants of the impairment decision). We assume that if there is not a reporting incentive calling for a different treatment, companies will take a write-off if economic factors appear to make it necessary.3.2 Economic factors influencing the impairment probabilityAccording to IAS 36, companies have to realize an impairment loss if the carrying amount of an asset exceeds its recoverable amount, the recoverable amount being calculated based on the expectations of either the market or the company. As these expectations are based on the actual economic situation of the company, we include different economic factors and related hypotheses in our analysis to reflect the necessity of realizing an impairment loss.Accounting regulations demand for the calculation of a net present value of the cash flows that can be generated by further use of the asset either by the company under consideration or by a third company, meaning that we would ideally need knowledge on the management‟s expectations of future performance. As these expectations are presumably based on today‟s knowledge, we include actual performance measures in our analysis. Thus our first proxy for the impairment probability is the actual cash flow from operations, which allows us to model the cash-related performance attributes:H1: Companies with a lower cash flow from operations have a higher impairmentprobability.Even though companies are obliged to base their impairment decision on estimated cash flows it is possible that companies which use earnings to control atleast certain assets will also base their impairment decision mainly onearnings-measures. To incorporate accrual-related performance attributes, too, we include earnings before impairments in our analysis, delivering our second hypothesis:H2: Companies with lower earnings before impairments have a higher impairmentprobability.As the necessity to realize an impairment loss follows from the relation of the market value to the carrying amount of the asset we would optimally need a measure for the relation of these two values. Unfortunately, no such measure is available on the asset or cash generating unit base. To proxy for this, we include the market to book ratio as well as its change from the prior year in our analysis, which leads to the next hypotheses:H3a: Companies with a lower market to book ratio have a higher impairment probability.H3b: Companies with a decreasing market to book ratio have a higher impairmentprobability.3.3 Reporting incentivesThe focus of our analysis lies on incentives which could lead the management to make a decision that does not in the first place follow from economic factors. This is what we call earnings management. The notion of earnings management is based on the assumption of asymmetric information. Managers can make accounting decisions independently of the economic situation if and only if the information necessary to undo earnings management is not publicly known (see Schipper (1989)). In the case of the impairment decision, we can assume that the respective information, namely the expected future cash flows, is not public. The shareholders‟ perception is one of the most important targets for the management as actual and potential shareholders are making the share price. Thus positively influencing their perception is probably one of the management‟s main incentives. One way to achieve this goal could be to manage the actual year‟s earnings p erformance. Following the extensive income smoothing literature, we assume that a good earnings performance is related with a high impairment probability. The idea behind this is that the management tries to meet the shareholders' expectations. According to Moses (1987), we can define income smoothing as an “effort to reduce fluctuations in reported earnings”, meaning that the management uses the impairment decision as …smoothing device‟ to reduce the divergence of reported earnings from an expected number. The income smoothing theory is based on the assumption that shareholders perceive actual earnings as a signal for future earnings, and that smoothed earnings allow for more precise forecasts which the capital market rewards with higher share prices. Consistently, Kasznik and McNichols (1999) report that even though financial analysts do not adjust their forecasts for companies that consecutively meet their expectations the market grants a market premium.Prior research has found that under certain circumstances income smoothing isalways worthwhile (see Trueman, Titman (1988)). Some empirical studies (e.g. Francis Hanna and Vincent (1996)) find significant evidence for the existence of income smoothing; other studies find that there is no such relationship (e.g. Riedl (2004)). We assume that managers apply income smoothing, meaning that impairments will be conducted in years with unexpected high income before impairments:H4: The management uses income smoothing to positively influence the shareholders’ perception.Closely related to the assumption of income smoothing is that of big bath accounting. Big bath accounting means that the management accumulates problems until it finally realizes a huge impairment loss in a year in which the company has realized an unexpectedly low income anyway. Following this approach offers several advantages (see Strong and Meyer (1987)). First the management in this way establishes a safety cushion for the next years in which it will be easier to meet the shareholders‟ expecta tions. Secondly, it is argued that realizing a large one time loss signals that past problems have been solved. The third advantage is a mere mathematical one: lowering earnings in the actual year ensures high earnings growth for the future. Another more psychological argument on which the big bath technique may be based is that if earnings are already small or negative, making the situation a little worse will in most cases do no harm, neither to management reputation nor to earnings expectations (see Walsh, Craig and Clarke (1991)). Thus we assume that managers apply big bath accounting, meaning that impairments will be conducted in years with unexpectedly low income before impairments:H5: The management uses big bath accounting to positively influence the shareholders’ perception.While H4 and H5 seem to be contradictory at first sight, Kirschenheiter and Melumad(2001) prove that if the reporting environment permits discretion the optimal strategy of management is to smooth income if good news occur and use big bath accounting if bad news occur.Another important target group of the management consists of actual as well as potential creditors. The relation to actual creditors is mainly based on the design of credit agreements. The leverage of the company under consideration influences these contracts in two ways. First the magnitude of borrowing costs is based on the assessment of financial risk for which the leverage is an important determinant, meaning that higher leverage can result in higher borrowing costs. Secondly, most credit agreements contain strict regulations concerning the leverage, called debt covenants. The breach of a given covenant can lead to an immediate repayment claim of the creditor which would result in extensive liquidity problems for most companies. Following the results of Duke and Hunt (1990), the leverage can be used to proxy for the closeness to debt covenant restrictions. Consistently, Sweeney (1994) provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that managers of firms approaching technical default respond with income-increasing accounting changes. Regarding the impairment decision, this means that the impairment probability decreases, deliveringour sixth hypothesis:H6: Companies with higher leverage have a lower impairment probability.In addition to the motivation to enhance the stakeholders‟ perception of the company, the management has different own motivations to manage earnings. First there are earnings based bonus payments. In most companies, management payment is divided in a fixed and a variable part where the latter has a short term and a long term oriented component. The short term component is commonly based on a measure of the company…s success, whereas the long term component contains a stock option plan. If impairment losses influence the figure standing for the success (e.g. EBIT, profit) we assume that the management has an incentive to delay impairments to later years. Consistently, Beatty and Weber (2006) find that bonus plans that do not explicitly exclude impairments reduce the impairment probability.H7: Companies that grant managers earnings based bonuses that are affected by impairmentshave a lower impairment probability. Another incentive that influences the impairment decision is a change in management. There are different reasons for incoming managers to realize impairment losses in their first year (see Wells (2002)), first of which is that they are not held responsible for past performance and thus may explicitly attribute the impairment losses to the preceding management. This is often referred to as …cleaning the decks‟, illustrating the fact that new managers tend to conduct impairments that have been delayed in prior years. This way it is possible to anticipate future losses without any loss of reputation, resulting in increasing earnings in subsequent years. As the year of the management change mostly is a partial year for the incoming manager, accounting income in that year is irrelevant to managerial compensation which is another reason to conduct impairments in exactly that year. The result of high impairments in the first year is that future years‟ income is relieved of these expenses so that an improving earnings trend can be reported from the first year of tenure on. Consistently,Moorje (1973) finds that companies with management changes show a significantly greater proportion of income reducing discretionary accounting decisions. A number of studies report the same result for the relationship of management changes and impairments (e.g. Riedl (2004), Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996), Beatty and Weber (2006)), whereas others find no significant relationship (e.g. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998)).译文：有关减值盈余管理决策：定量的实证分析德国2004年至2009年上市公司摘要这项研究调查了2004年和2009年间德国上市公司减值的决定因素。

财务管理外文文献及翻译2附录A:外文文献(译文)跨国公司财务有重大国外经营业务的公司经常被称作跨国公司或多国企业。

跨国公司必须考虑许多并不会对纯粹的国内企业产生直接影响的财务因素，其中包括外币汇率、各国不同的利率、国外经营所用的复杂会计方法、外国税率和外国政府的干涉等。

公司财务的基本原理仍然适用于跨国企业。

与国内企业一样，它们进行的投资项目也必须为股东提供比成本更多的收益，也必须进行财务安排，用尽可能低的成本进行融资。

净现值法则同时适用于国内经营和国外经营，但是，国外经营应用净现值法则时通常更加复杂。

也许跨国财务中最复杂的是外汇问题。

当跨国公司进行资本预算决策或融资决策时，外汇市场能为其提供信息和机会。

外汇、利率和通货膨胀三者的相互关系构成了汇率基本理论。

即:购买力平价理论、利率平价理论和预测理论。

跨国公司融资决策通常要在以下三种基本方法中加以选择，我们将讨论每种方法的优缺点。

(1) 把现金由国内输出用于国外经营业务;(2) 向投资所在国借贷;(3) 向第三国借贷。

1专业术语学习财务的学生通常会听到一个单词总在耳边嗡嗡作响:全球化( g l o b a l i z a t i on )。

学习资金市场的全球化必须首先掌握一些新的术语，以下便是在跨国财务中，还有本章中最常用到的一些术语:(1) 美国存托证(American Depository Receipt,ADR)。

它是在美国发行的一种代表外国股权的证券，它使得外国股票可在美国上市交易。

外国公司运用以美元发行的ADR，来扩大潜在美国投资者群体。

ADR以两种形式代表大约690家外国公司:一是在某个交易所挂牌交易的 ADR，称为公司保荐形式;另一种是非保荐形式，这些ADR通常由投资银行持有并为其做市。

这两种形式的ADR均可由个人投资和买卖，但报纸每天只报告保荐形式的存托证的交易情况。

(2) 交叉汇率(cross rate)。

它是指两种外国货币(通常都不是美元)之间的汇率。

发现了技术独立董事对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。黄芳 余管理和真实盈余管理的双重视角研究了投资者保护与
等[6]发现独立董事本地化可以抑制应计盈余管理并约束 盈余管理的关系，发现投资者保护有利于抑制盈余管理，
真实盈余管理。王兵[4]却发现，独立董事并不能提高公司的 但对真实盈余管理却起到促进作用，不过该作用只限于国
高上市公司的盈余质量，更多是扮演“花瓶”角色；而胡元 木等[5-6]则认为独立董事可以提升公司盈余质量，抑制盈余 管理。
证监会要求上市公司所聘用的独立董事中至少包含 一名财务背景独立董事，财务背景亦是独立董事发挥盈 余管理识别作用的关键因素，因此财务背景独立董事逐 渐成为近年独立董事制度研究的着眼点。然而，独立董 事想要在“中国土壤”真正发挥作用，不仅需要从内部完 善独立董事制度本身，而且也需要从外部为其提供制度 保障。许多学者均认为缺乏完善的外部制度建设是我国 独立董事制度难以发挥有效性的原因之一 （阎达五， 2003），但是目前的文献中还缺乏从法治环境角度考察 独立董事制度有效性的实证研究。投资者保护是为防止 中 小 股 东 和 债 权 人 的 利 益 被 企 业 侵 占 的 法 律 约 束（La Porta et al.，2002；Leuz et al.，2003），而证监会对独 立董事制度的期望之一就是维护中小股东利益。故本文 从投资者保护角度出发，研究财务独立董事对盈余管理 的抑制作用，以考察外部法治因素对于独立董事制度有 效性的影响。
盈余质量。
有企业。
绝大多数的中小股东由于获取会计信息的渠道受限
应计盈余管理主要是通过会计政策选择或调整应
和自身专业素质的欠缺，难以识别上市公司的盈余管理行 计项目以影响公司盈余信息，更容易受到法律法规等外
为，自身利益更容易遭受损害。而独立董事制度的初衷之 部约束的制约，如李增福等[14]发现新会计准则的实施使