Strategic Japanese-Chinese Joint Research Program

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEENJAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'SREPUBLIC OF CHINAAugust 12, 1978Japan and the People's Republi c of China,Recalling with satisfaction that since the Governm ent of Japan and theGovernm ent of the People's Republic of China issued a Joint Comm unique inPeking on Septem ber 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the twoGovernm ents and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.Confirming that the above-m entioned Joint Comm unique consti tutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that theprinciples enunciated in the Joint Comm unique should be strictly observed.Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world.For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs Sunao SonodaPeople's Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang HuaWho, having comm unicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace andfriendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of m utualrespect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, m utual non-aggression,non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and m utual benefit and peaceful co-existence.2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conform ity wi th the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their m utual relations settle all disputes by peaceful m eans and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegem ony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegem ony.The Contracting parties shall, in the good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and m utual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop econom ic and cul tural relations between the two countries and to prom ote ex changes between the peoples of the two countries.The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instrum ents of ratifi cation whi ch shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall rem ain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until term inated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph2.2. Either Contracting Party m ay, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, term inate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any tim e thereafter.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respecti ve Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts beingequally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.For JapanFor the People's Republic of China:１９７２年中日邦交正常化后，双方在政治、经济等方面的交流发展很快。

中日韩合作（1999－2012）China-Japan-ROK Cooperation (1999-2012)目录Table of Contents序言Preface一、中日韩合作概况I. Overview of the trilateral cooperation二、政治安全领域II. Political and security affairs（一）伙伴关系1. Tripartite partnership（二）政策磋商2. Policy consultations（三）非传统安全3. Non-traditional security（四）地区和国际事务4. Regional and international affairs三、经贸财金领域III. Economy, trade and finance cooperation（一）贸易投资1. Trade and investment（二）财政金融2. Finance（三）交通物流3. Transport and logistics（四）信息通信4. Information and communications（五）海关合作5. Customs cooperation（六）知识产权6. Intellectual property rights（七）标准计量7. Standards and metrology四、可持续发展领域IV. Sustainable development（一）循环经济1. Circular economy（二）科技2. Science and technology（三）环保3. Environmental protection（四）农业4. Agriculture（五）水利5. Water Resources五、社会人文领域V. Social and cultural exchanges（一）文化1. Culture（二）教育2. Education（三）旅游3. Tourism（四）人事4. Personnel administration（五）卫生5. Health（六）新闻、地方和民间友好6. Media, local government and people-to-people exchanges六、展望VI. Outlook序言Preface中国、日本、韩国是一衣带水的邻邦。

中国与日本比赛作文英语China and Japan are two strong competitors in various fields, including sports, technology, and economy. Therivalry between the two countries is intense, and whenever they face off in a competition, the stakes are high.The sports rivalry between China and Japan isparticularly fierce, with both countries excelling in different sports. China dominates in table tennis, diving, and badminton, while Japan shines in judo, sumo wrestling, and baseball. When these two powerhouses meet on the fieldor court, it's always a thrilling match to watch.In terms of technology, both China and Japan are known for their innovation and advancements. China leads in areas such as artificial intelligence, e-commerce, and telecommunications, while Japan is a pioneer in robotics, automotive technology, and consumer electronics. The competition between the two countries drives them to constantly push the boundaries of technological development.Economically, China and Japan are major players in the global market. China is known for its manufacturing prowess and massive consumer market, while Japan is renowned forits high-tech exports and strong financial sector. The economic rivalry between the two countries has led to trade disputes and negotiations to secure their positions in the international economy.Despite their differences and rivalries, China andJapan also share a long history of cultural exchange and cooperation. Both countries have rich traditions, art forms, and philosophies that have influenced each other over the centuries. The cultural ties between China and Japan serve as a bridge that connects the two nations, even in themidst of their competitive spirit.In conclusion, the rivalry between China and Japan is multifaceted and complex, encompassing sports, technology, economy, and culture. While the competition between the two countries can be intense, it also drives them to strive for excellence and innovation in various fields. Ultimately,the relationship between China and Japan is a dynamic and evolving one, shaped by both rivalry and cooperation.。

抗日战争词汇标准翻译中国人民抗日战争（简称：抗日战争、抗战）the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against JapaneseAggression (the War of Resistance)抗日民族统一战线Chinese united front against Japanese aggression全面全民族抗战total resistance against Japanese aggression by the whole nation片面抗战partial resistance against Japanese aggression全国抗战nationwide war of resistance against Japanese aggression局部抗战regional war of resistance against Japanese aggression正面战场center stage battlefield敌后战场backstage battlefield战略防御/相持/反攻strategic defense/stalemate/counter-offensive世界反法西斯战争the Global War against Fascism国际反法西斯统一战线the international anti-fascist united front战争策源地hotbed of war中国战场China theater欧洲战场European theater太平洋战场Pacific theater东方主战场the main Eastern battlefield【例】中国开辟了世界反法西斯战争的东方主战场。

The main Eastern battlefield for the Global War against Fascism was developed in China.无条件投降unconditional surrender中国人民抗日战争胜利纪念日Victory Memorial Day for the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggre ssion (VMDay)事变Incidents九一八事变September 18th Incident七七事变（卢沟桥事变）July 7th Incident (Lugou Bridge Incident)会战、大战Battle/Campaign淞沪会战Battle of Shanghai平型关大捷Battle of Pingxingguan; victory at Pingxingguan台儿庄大捷Battle of Tai'erzhuang; victory at Tai'erzhuang武汉会战Battle of Wuhan百团大战Hundred-Regiment Campaign军队Army八路军Eighth Route Army新四军New Fourth Army东北抗日联军Northeast United Resistance Army华南人民抗日游击队Southern China People's Counter-Japanese Guerrilla Force中国远征军Chinese Expeditionary Force战术Tactics持久战protracted war游击战guerrilla warfare运动战mobile warfare地道战tunnel warfare地雷战landmine warfare地区Base/Area抗日根据地resistance base解放区liberated area游击区guerrilla area敌占区（沦陷区）enemy-occupied area; occupied area日军侵略政策aAggression policies“大东亚共荣圈”“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”“三光”政策“Three Alls” policy (kill all, burn all, loot all)“731部队”（满洲第731部队）“Unit731” (Unit 731 of Manchuria)南京大屠杀Nanjing Massacre“慰安妇”“comfort women”细菌战germ warfare化学战chemical warfare“扫荡”“mopping-up” operation“蚕食”“gnawing-away” operation“清乡”“pacification” operation。

Joint Statement of the Japan-United States-Australia Trilateral Strategic DialogueOffice of the SpokespersonWashington, DCJuly 25, 2016The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Fumio Kishida, the Secretary of State of the United States, John Kerry, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Julie Bishop, met in Vientiane, Laos, on 25 July 2016, for the sixth ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).The ministers welcomed the growing positive impact of the strategic partnership between Japan, the United States, and Australia, and reaffirmed the importance of TSD policy coordination and practical cooperation. They reiterated their commitment to further deepening their cooperation to ensure a peaceful, stable, and prosperous future for the Asia Pacific region and the world.The ministers reiterated the importance of upholding the rules-based maritime order including in the Asia Pacific region and the Indian Ocean. They called on all states to respect freedom of navigation and overflight. They reaffirmed the importance of states’ making and clarifying their claims based on international law, including the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), not using force or coercion in trying to advance their claims, and seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means including through legal processes such as arbitration.The ministers expressed their serious concerns over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The ministers voiced their strong opposition to any coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions, underlined the importance of refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment in areas pending delimitation, and urged all states to refrain from such actions as large-scale land reclamation, and the construction of outposts as well as the use of those outposts for military purposes. The ministers expressed their strong support for the rule of law and called on China and the Philippines to abide by the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award of July 12 in the Philippines-China arbitration, which is final and legally binding on both parties. The ministers stressed that this is a crucial opportunity for the region to uphold the existing rules-based international order and to show respect for international law.The ministers also opposed any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions in the East China Sea and will remain in close communication about the situation in the area.The ministers welcomed the development of trilateral cooperation on maritime security capacity-building in Southeast Asia. The ministers resolved to advance this cooperation through ongoing exchanges of information anddialogue on regional needs. They reiterated the commitment of the three nations to continue coordinating their respective assistance programs and to identify ways we can more closely collaborate in the future.The ministers condemned in the strongest terms North K orea’s nuclear test in January and its subsequent ballistic missile launches which were conducted in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. They urged North Korea to immediately and fully comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 2270, and the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and not to conduct any further provocation. They also urged North Korea to end its human rights violations and resolve the abductions issue immediately.The ministers resolved to work together to strengthen cooperation in regional fora. They welcomed the central role of ASEAN in the development of regional architecture and its contribution to the region’s stability and prosperity. They stressed the value of the East Asia Summit (EAS) as a Leaders-led forum for strategic dialogue and reiterated theimportance of strengthening the EAS as the premier forum in the region.The ministers strongly condemned terrorism in all forms and manifestations including recent attacks in Bangladesh, Iraq, Turkey, France, Afghanistan, and in many other places and expressed their deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims, and the governments of those affected. They expressed their strong support for the counterterrorism efforts by the international community.Recognizing that ISIL/Da’esh, Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations pose serious threats to peace and international security, as well as to common values and principles for all humanity, the ministers reaffirmed the importance of international counter-terrorism efforts such as the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The ministers expressed support for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, which is pioneering development-based approaches to countering violent extremism in conflict affected countries. The ministers also expressed their support for the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and called for its implementation. Japan, the United States, and Australia resolved to advocate for and strengthen existing information sharing mechanisms, such as those proposed by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), to combat the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.The ministers stressed the strategic importance of a free, fair and open international trade and economic system for the region’s stability and prosperity, and reconfirmed they would redouble their efforts to complete respective domestic processes for an early entry-into-force of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.The ministers resolved to further strengthen cooperation in the following fields:• Joint cyber capacity-building in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and coordination in such fora as the UN Group of Governmental Experts and the ASEAN Regional Forum.• Strengthening other countries’ capacity for UN peacekeeping operations.• Practical steps for achieving a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons, stressing the importance of achieving a successful outcome in the 2020 NPT Review Conference.• Imp lementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the Sustainable Development Goals and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development.• Effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, striving for entry into force in 2016.• Promoting quality infrastructure investment and to encourage the relevant stakeholders to do so in cooperation with other partners.The ministers resolved to continue to closely work together and with our partners to promote strong sustainable growth and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region and the world.。

日本外交新构想：“中道”外交高兰【英文标题】Japan's Middle Way Diplomatic Strategy【作者简介】高兰，上海社会科学院亚洲太平洋研究所东北亚研究室主任、副研究员，主要从事中美日关系、战略思想研究【内容提要】日本“中道”外交构想源于战后吉田路线，21世纪初随着自由主义思潮在日本的兴起，该构想逐步走向了政策前台。

定位为“中道”外交的日本外交新战略，其核心是解决对美对亚政策的平衡，最终实现日本的“自主外交”目标，从而使日本成为世界“经济政治大国”，实现“普通国家”战略。

新当选的日本鸠山政府作为“中道左派”政权，正在进行“中道”外交的实践，以求重新树立日本的新外交形象。

【关键词】日本新战略/“中道”外交/多极化/美亚政策平衡新当选的日本鸠山政府作为“中道左派”政权，正在进行“中道”外交的实践。

日本“中道”外交构想源于战后吉田路线，21世纪初随着自由主义思潮在日本的兴起，逐步从构想层面走向了政策前台。

定位为“中道”外交的日本外交新战略，其核心是解决其对美对亚政策的平衡，最终实现日本的“自主外交”目标，从而使日本成为世界“经济政治大国”。

由于“中道”外交具有一定的自由主义色彩及其挑战性，特别是其政策实践过程中显示出的对美、对华政策新的变革，引起世人高度关注。

一、日本“中道”外交战略溯源21世纪初以来，日本兴起了今后走“中间道路”的战略再思考。

日本自由主义战略家们提出，日本可以定位为“中道”国家，与东盟、澳大利亚等国一起，共同提出“中间国家方案”，以提高日本的话语权，确保日本的国家利益。

①日本的所谓“中道”外交，其本质是不将日本置于国际安全保障的中心位置，与大国间政治拉开距离，在中间领域发挥最大限度的作用。

②实行“中道”外交战略就是，在日本传统外交三原则(对联合国外交、对美国外交、对亚洲外交)上，日本同美国的关系和与亚洲国家的关系应是互为补充的，而不是互相排斥的。

今后在加强联合国外交的前提下，中日美的三角形关系图应从相互牵制的模式转变为相互依存、公平竞争的稳定结构，即美日同盟加上中日协商。

News words on Sino-Japanese relationship《中⽇联合声明》the China-Japan Joint Statement（1972）《中⽇和平友好条约》 the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship （1978）《中⽇联合宣⾔》the China-Japan Joint Declaration （1998）以史为鉴、⾯向未来 take history as a mirror and face forward to the future，learn from history and face up to the future正确对待历史face up to history只有⼀个尊重历史的国家、敢于对历史负责的国家、能够赢得亚洲以⾄于世界⼈民信任的国家，才能够在国际社会发挥更⼤作⽤。

Only a country that respects history, takes responsibility for past history and wins over the trust of people in Asia and the world at large can take greater responsibility in the international community."（温家宝总理）图谋进⼊联合国安理会常任理事国 bid for a permanent council seat，bid for UNSC seat，bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council东海油⽓开发 drill for gas and oil in East China Sea外交关系正常化 normalization of diplomatic relations⽇本⾃民党 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)南京*事件 the Nanking Massacre抗⽇战争 the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45)改编歪曲历史的教科书 to adopt a distorted history book靖国神社 Yasukuni shrine开倒车driving in reverse gearaggression 侵略apologize 道歉atrocity 残暴的⾏为boycott 抵制（产品等）compensate 补偿，赔偿conducive 有助的,有益的,促成的confrontation 对抗continental shelf ⼤陆架controversial 有争议的deep and profound reflections 深刻反省defuse 使除去危险性demarcation line 划界线demonstration *,*运动denounce 谴责diplomatic crisis 外交危机diplomatic negotiation 外交谈判endorsement 批准enshrine 供奉，把...置于神龛内Foreign Minister 外交部长，外相friction 摩擦，争执gloss 掩盖hard-won ⾟苦得来的,来之不易的invade，invasion 侵⼊,侵略massacre *militarism 军国主义mutual trust 互信norm 基准;规范occupation 占领one-China principle “⼀个中国”的原则press for 迫切需要protest *provocation挑衅reciprocate 酬答reiterate 重申respond 响应，回应retain 保留right-wing 右翼势⼒Self-Defense Forces ⽇本⾃卫队September 18 Incident 九·⼀⼋事件slaughter 宰杀,屠宰social disturbances 社会混乱social stability 社会稳定South Korea 韩国spokesman 新闻发⾔⼈State Councilor 国务委员the disputed areas 争议区域undeniable 不可否认的undermine 破坏unilaterally-conceived 单⽅⾯认定的war crimes 战争罪⾏whitewash 粉饰，掩盖真相。

How Japan’s Economic Class Views China and the Future of AsianRegionalismMireya SolisAlongside Japan’s contentious diplomatic relations with China are vibrant economic relations. While much is heard these days of the political bickering, the opinion of Japan’s economic class is less aired. How does Japan’s economic class view the implications of relations with China for constructing Asian regionalism? Scores of interviews I conducted with government officials in charge of industry, agriculture and foreign affairs, with national politicians, and with people in business, labor and the academy underscored how divided the economic class is on the key issues regarding China and Asian regionalism. My purpose here is to show the cluster and range of economic voices from Tokyo.Sino-Japanese competition is profoundly affecting the process of regional economic institution building in East Asia in all core dimensions: the nature of preferential trade ties between Northeast and Southeast Asian nations; the proliferation of overlapping FTA (free trade agreement) networks; and the rekindled debate on the inclusivity and exclusivity of integration processes.At the core of the matter is whether institution building in East Asia will entice cooperation among Japan and China to maximize economic benefits; or will it trigger competition to hinder the quality of regional integration by pursuing low quality FTAs creating significant transaction costs for the private sector through differing tariff regimes and hefty rules of origin, Japan and China, therefore, stand at a crossroads. The historical precedent is clear: the regional integration in Europe only took off after former arch-enemies –Germany and France—reached accommodation and shelved their mutual mistrust.In Asia, the answer to the most important question is still up in the air: Will Japan and China reach an understanding, use regional institutions to improve their relations, promote economic cooperation with other Asian nations, and exercise leadership, or will the opportunity be missed?Big Questions, Multiple Answers.Three dimensions in particular reveal the complexity of the bilateral relationship in the era of Asian regionalism. First, talks about regional integration and Sino-Japaneserelations take place in the broader context of security and global foreign policy concerns. Are Japan and China balancing one another, and regional integration policy becomes one more theater of this bilateral competition? Or, can free trade negotiations be isolated from broader geopolitical concerns, and be used to improve bilateral relations?Second, both Japan and China have exhibited a very active ASEAN policy of late, initiating and, in the case of China, concluding FTA negotiations. Why does ASEAN figure so prominently in Japanese and Chinese FTA diplomacy? What are the main differences in the Japanese and Chinese approaches?And third, what are the likely scenarios for Asian regionalism? Will an encompassing regional bloc develop, or will the current wave of bilateral agreements predominate? Will the general approach to institution-building in East Asia be of inclusion or exclusion?There is no easy answer to these questions, but perhaps more interestingly there is not a single answer to them either. Japanese economic elites are profoundly divided on all these key issues.Friends Or Foes?The ―rise of China‖ with the strengthening of Chinese economic and military capabilities and the protracted economic downturn in Japan led many to predict a fundamental structural shift in the regional distribution of power, with consequent increase of bilateral frictions. It is perhaps not surprising that critical voices of Chinese policy and pessimist views on the future of the bilateral relationship are so predominant in Japan.For instance, several of my interviewees in political circles and the economic bureaucracy expressed strong reservations about the ability of the Chinese government to comply with its WTO commitments, to crackdown on the rampant piracy problem, and to strengthen the rule of law in the country. Others complained about the unbridled competition for natural resources, particularly regarding the exploitation of disputed gas and oil deposits in the East China Sea. These voices argued for a more active Japanese policy to develop these resources and to closely monitor Chinese drilling activities. The sources of friction among neighbors are of course manifold, and one in particular stood out during these conversations: the pollution externalities suffered by adjacent nations from the breakneck pace of economic growth in China.Others proposed that it was time to reconceptualize Sino-Japanese relations to betterreflect current conditions. In essence, this meant breaking away from the old mold of Japan as the developed nation helping China overcome the challenges of development. Some expressed the view that if China is already capable of extending economic assistance to boost its regional leadership, it should no longer qualify as recipient of Japanese aid. The recent decision to phase out ODA (overseas development assistance) loans seems to derive from these views.Some argued that history, security, and global foreign policy concerns were large factors in the recent downturn in bilateral relations. These critics complained about Chinese manipulation of the ―history card.‖ In their view, the Chinese government has skillfully tapped the public’s anger over Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where the spirits of Japan’s w ar dead are enshrined, and over the Japanese government approval of controversial history textbooks to weaken Japan’s standing in the region. Moreover, they perceive such Chinese actions as affecting not only Japan’s Asia policy, but in fact harming Japan’s global foreign policy. Many believe that the Chinese government acquiesced to massive anti-Japanese riots in the spring of 2005 with the explicit aim of undermining Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.Others, however, take to task this interpretation of adverse geopolitical trends for Japan and to the unlikely prospects of building cooperative Sino- Japanese relations. In their view, talk about Chinese ascent and Japanese descent is overrated, and portraying a zero-sum game is also misleading. Any account that does not factor in the de facto economic interdependence between Japan and China is myopic. The extensive web of trade and investment relations ties the economic future of both nations. Regional institutions, therefore, can play a catalytic role in maximizing gains from economic exchange, and help diffuse mistrust in the security arena. These interviewees found Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni counterproductive.The heated debate in Japan on the essential nature of Sino-Japanese relations goes well beyond technocratic concerns over market access negotiations in the new FTA policy. It encompasses much larger questions regarding the regional balance of power and Japanese leadership in regional institution building. Domestic politics is no longer immune. The controversial visits to Yasukuni Shrine and the future of Japan’s Asia policy are coming to the fore as the quest for the prime minister’s office next fall heats up. The ironyof Japanese isolation at the heyday of East Asian integration is increasingly exposed. So far, the path to economic integration in Northeast Asia with China and South Korea has been blocked with strained diplomatic relations, making Southeast Asia the main theater for the Sino-Japanese rivalry.Courting Southeast Asia.Japan and China have adopted strikingly different approaches in their FTA initiatives towards Southeast Asia. China’s FTA initiative was the negotiation of a multilateral agreement with all ASEAN nations. In contrast, Japan decided to move first by signing bilateral agreements with several ASEAN countries, and only later to initiate the negotiation of a broader Japan-ASEAN FTA.Why have Japan and China adopted such radically different approaches in courting preferential trade partners? Three main arguments were advanced by my interviewees:1) Structural differences in the nature of economic involvement in the region. The pattern of Japanese and Chinese economic exchange with ASEAN is quite different. Japan has deeper roots in the region with the local operation of numerous subsidiaries of Japanese multinational companies. China, on the other hand, does not have such a direct manufacturing presence in the region with only modest outward investment flows.2) Dissimilar motivations guide FTA policy. Reflecting the different economic takes, Japan and China are not pursuing the same objectives in their free trade negotiations. China’s motives in FTA diplomacy are primarily political:to boost its credentials as regional leader. For Japan, the primary rationale is economic: to improve the business environment for Japanese multinationals. Therefore, for China a multilateral FTA is best suited to acquire regional stature, whereas for Japan the negotiation of more comprehensive bilateral FTAs was important to address the concerns of its multinational corporations.3) International constraints on FTA policy vary. China could more easily begin witha multilateral FTA with ASEAN because it did not have to pass as high a bar as Japan must. While industrialized nations such as Japan are bound to liberalize substantially all trade in their FTAs by article 24 of the WTO charter, an FTA between developing nations can be formed under the softer conditions of the ―enabling clause,‖ with limited sectoral coverage and contained adjustment costs.The modalities of FTA negotiation with ASEAN vary, but Japan and China are driventoward a common goal: to become the regional integration focal point. Frequently, my interviewees noted that Japan and China are racing one another for diplomatic and economic gains.Examples of competitive dynamics include the Chinese decision to go ahead with the ASEAN FTA after Japan successfully wrapped negotiations with Singapore, and the Japanese govern ment’s announcement to negotiate in the future with ASEAN as a bloc following China’s bolder initiative. First-mover gains are important not only in terms of diplomatic points scored, but also in terms of trade diversion.Some of my interviewees reported concern that the China-ASEAN FTA could further promote hollowing-out of the Japanese economy as Japanese companies adjust to the elimination of tariffs in China-ASEAN trade. However, others noted that this concern dwindled when it became known that a ten-year moratorium on liberalization in sectors such as automobiles and electronics radically reduces the impact of the China-ASEAN FTA.In short, FTA is a strategic game of matching and counter-matching moves. The stakes for both countries are diplomatic (cementing ties with Southeast Asian nations) and economic (avoiding trade discrimination). But it is also a broader quest for defining the parameters of the integration process in East Asia. It is about leadership and standard-setting. There is indeed wide variation in the multiple FTAs signed by East Asian nations today.An insightful point made by some of my interviewees was that Japan and China were offering different models of regional integration, and that the race is on to see which one disseminates further and faster.A common perception in Tokyo was that China is prepared to negotiate narrower FTAs affecting mostly tariffs on goods, while offering agricultural concessions through the early harvest program. On the other hand, Japan is interested not only in tariff elimination but rule-setting on issues such as government procurement and intellectual property. However, Japanese resistance to open agricultural markets has stood in the way of smooth negotiations.Which of these two formulas of regional integration is better? This is indeed a pressing question, but one for which we do not have yet the vantage point to be able toprovide sound answers. On the one hand, Japan has only one FTA in effect in Southeast Asia with Singapore, has inked one with Malaysia, has reached basic agreements with the Philippines and Thailand, and negotiations with ASEAN as a whole have moved slowly. On the other hand, China’s FTA with ASEAN will only enter into force in 2010 for ASEAN-6, and 2015 for the rest of ASEAN. Consequently, the impact of Japan’s and China’s FTAs with Southeast Asian countries on regional trade and investment patterns remains unknown at this point.But one major implication of Japan’s and China’s FTA overtures in Southeast Asia is already plainly visible. What we are witnessing so far is the proliferation of hub-and-spoke regionalism with Japan and China developing separate FTA networks and a large number of bilateral FTAs crisscrossing East Asia. The costs of such approach to regionalism are manifold, including the emergence of a ―noodle bowl‖ with unwieldy rules of origin. FTA quality could also be a casualty to this competition given the growing calls in Japan to emphasize speed and negotiate on occasion narrower FTAs.(Ms. Solis is an assistant professor of the School of International Service at American University, Washington D.C. and was a visiting fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs.)日本中产阶级如何看待中国和亚洲区域化的趋势日本和中国既有争议的外交关系也有充满生机的经济关系。