A resource-based view of the firm

战略管理与竞争优势英文版 (2)

3-5
The Resource-Based View
Resources and Capabilities
Firm Assets:
Are these resources or capabilities?
Machinery
?
Collective Product Design Skill
?
Recruiting Skill
• used to help firms achieve competitive advantage and superior economic performance
• assumes that a firm’s resources and capabilities are the primary drivers of competitive advantage and economic performance
• The practical: Does the resource result in an increase in revenues, a decrease in costs, or some combination of the two? (Levi’s reputation allows it to charge a premium for its Docker’s pants)
w If a firm has a competitive advantage, others will attempt to imitate it. (Razor scooters
• Each question is considered in a comparative sense (competitive environment).

01A Resource-Based View of the Firm

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resource-based view of the firm copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. resource-basedview firm:summary wernerfelt, birger strategic management journal (pre-1986); apr-jun 1984; abi/informglobal pg. 171 reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. reproduced copyrightowner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. sharonwxhz 分享于 2013-09-01 13:21:0 暂无简介文档格式: .pdf 文档页数: 10页文档大小: 475.71k 文档热度: 文档

战略管理英文版最新版教学课件第8章

LO 8-3 Describe two types of vertical integration along the industry value chain: backward and forward vertical integration.
LO 8-4 Identify and evaluate benefits and risks of vertical integration. LO 8-5 Describe and examine alternatives to vertical integration. LO 8-6 Describe and evaluate different types of corporate diversification. LO 8-7 Apply the core competence – market matrix to derive different
• Economies of scope
➢ Savings that come from producing more outputs or providing different services at less cost
❖ Ex: Amazon range of products & services
➢ Explains and predicts the scope of the firm ➢ "Market vs. firms" have differential costs
• Transaction costs
➢ Costs associated with economic exchanges
➢ Competitive bidding process ➢ Less than one-year term ➢ Lower prices cost advantages

A Natural-resource based view of the firm

c Academy01Management Review1995.Vol.20.No.4.986-1014.A NATURAL-RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OFTHE FIRMSTUARTL.HARTUniversity of MichiganHistorically,management theory has ignored the constraints imposedby the biophysical(natural)environment.Building upon resource-based theory,this article attempts to flll this void by proposing anatural-resource-based view of the flrm-a theory of competitive ad-vantage based upon the firm's relationship to the natural environ-ment.It is composed of three interconnected strategies:pollution pre-vention,product stewardship,and sustainable development.Propositions are advanced for each of these strategies regarding keyresource requirements and their contributions to sustained competi-tive advantage.There has been an active debate among management scholars con-cerning the relative importance of internal firm capabilities(e.g.,Gal-braith&Kazanjian,1986;Peters&Waterman,1982;Prahalad&Hamel. 1990)versus environmental factors(e.g.,Hannan&Freeman,1977;Pfeffer &Salancik,1978;Porter,1980,1990)to sustained competitive advantage. Evidence suggests,however,that both internal and external factors are crucial to competitive success(Fiegenbaum,Hart,&Schendel.In press; Hansen&Wernerfelt,1989).In fact,many recent contributions attempt an integration of the internal and external perspectives under the banner of the"resource-based"view of the firm(e.g.,Barney,1991;Wernerfelt, 1984).Resource-based theory takes the perspective that valuable,costly-to-copy firm resources and capabilities provide the key sources of sus-tainable competitive advantage.Without question,the resource-based view has generated a produc-tive dialogue among previously isolated perspectives(Conner,1991). However,this theory(like its more limited internal and external prede-cessors)still contains one serious omission:It systematically ignores the constraints imposed by the biophysical(natural)environment(e.g., Brown,Kane,&Roodman,1994;Meadows,Meadows,&Randers.1992). Historically,management theory has used a narrow and parochial con-cept of environment that emphasizes political.economic,social.andThe author would like to thank Jane Dutton.Xavier Martin.Gautam Ahuja.Lynn Wooten.Susan Svoboda.Charles Hill.and the anonymous referees for their valuable com-ments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.The University of Michigan Business School provided support for the research.9861995Hart987 technological aspects to the virtual exclusion of the natural environment (Shrivastava,1994;Shrivastava&Hart,1992;Stead&Stead,1992).Given the growing magnitude of ecological problems,however,this omission has rendered existing theory inadequate as a basis for identifying impor-tant emerging sources of competitive advantage.The goal of this article is,therefore,to insert the natural environment into the resource-based view-to develop a natural-resource-based view of the firm.Accordingly,the first section of the paper reviews resource-based theory,highlighting the relationships among firm resources,capabilities, and sources of competitive advantage.Next,I discuss the driving forces behind the natural-resource-based view-the growing scale and scope of human activity and its potential for irreversible environmental damage on a global scale.The natural-resource-based view is then developed with the connection between the environmental challenge and firm re-sources operationalized through three interconnected strategic capabili-ties:pollution prevention,product stewardship,and sustainable devel-opment.Propositions are then developed connecting these strategies to key resource requirements and sustained competitive advantage.The article closes with suggestions for a future research agenda.THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEWResearchers in the field of strategic management have long under-stood that competitive advantage depends upon the match between dis-tinctive internal(organizational)capabilities and changing external(en-vironmental)circumstances(Andrews,1971;Chandler,1962;Hofer& Schendel,1978;Penrose,1959).However,it has only been during the past decade that a bona fide theory,known as the resource-based view of the firm,has emerged,articulating the relationships among firm resources, capabilities,and competitive advantage.Figure1provides a graphical summary of these relationships and some of the key authors associated with the core ideas.The concept of competitive advantage has been treated extensively in the management literature.Porter(1980,1985)thoroughly developed the concepts of cost leadership and differentiation relative to competitors as two important sources of competitive advantage:a low-cost position enables a firm to use aggressive pricing and high sales volume,whereas a differentiated product creates brand loyalty and positive reputation, facilitating premium pricing.Decisions concerning timing(e.g.,moving early versus late)and commitment level(e.g.,entering on a large scale versus more incrementally)also are crucial in securing competitive ad-vantage(Ghemawat,1986;Lieberman&Montgomery,1988).If a firm makes an early move or a large-scale move,it is sometimes possible to preempt competitors by setting new standards or gaining preferred ac-cess to critical raw materials,locations,production capacity,or custom-ers.Preemptive commitments thus enable firms to gain a strong focus and988Academy of Management Review OctoberFIGURE 1The Resource-Based View•Andrews (1971)•Hofer and Schendel (1978)•Prahalad &Hamel(1990)•Ulrich &Lake (1991)J ·Wernerfelt (1984)•Deirickx &Cool(1989)•Reed &DeFillippi(1990)•Barney(1991)J Competitive Advantage •Cost or differentiation •Preemption •Future position Capabilities •Technology •Production •Design •Distributio •Procurement •Service ResourcesBasic Requirements Key Characteristics•Valuable ~•Tacit (causally•Nonsubstitutable ambiguous)•Socially complex•Rare (firm specific)•Porter (1980.1985)•Ghemawat (1986)•Lieberman &Montgomery (1988)•Hamel &Prahalad(1994)•Polanyi (1962)•Rumelt (1984)•Teece (1987)•Itami (1987)dominate a particular niche.either through lower costs.differentiated products.or both (Ghemawat.1986;Porter.1980).Finally.Hamel and Pra-halad (1989.1994)have emphasized the importance of "competing for the future"as a neglected dimension of competitive advantage.According to this view.the firm must be concerned not only with profitability in the present and growth in the medium term.but also with its future position and source of competitive advantage.This view requires explicit strate-gizing about how the firm will compete when its current strategy config-uration is either copied or made obsolete.The connection between firms'capabilities and competitive advan-tage also has been well established in literature.Andrews (1971)ter.Hofer and Schendel (1978)and Snow and Hrebiniak (1980)noted the centrality of "distinctive competencies"to competitive success.More re-cently.Prahalad and Hamel (1990)and Ulrich and Lake (1991)reempha-sized the strategic importance of identifying.managing.and leveraging "core competencies"rather than focusing only on products and markets in business planning.The resource-based view takes this thinking one step further:It posits that competitive advantage can be sustained only if the capabilities creating the advantage are supported by resources that are not easily duplicated by competitors.In other words.firms'resources must raise "barriers to imitation"(Rumelt.1984).Thus.resources are the basic units of analysis and include physical and financial assets as well as employees'skills and organizational (social)processes.A firm's capabilities result from bundles of resources being brought to bear on1995Hart989 particular value-added tasks(e.g.,design for manufacturing,just-in-time production).Although the terminology has varied(Peteraf,1993),there appears to be general agreement in the management literature about the resource characteristics that contribute to a firm's sustained competitive advan-tage.At the most basic level,such resources must be valuable(Le.,rent producing)and nonsubstitutable(Barney,1991;Dierickx&Cool,1989).In other words,for a resource to have enduring value,it must contribute to a firm capability that has competitive significance and is not easily ac-complished through alternative means.Next,strategically important re-sources must be rare and/or specific to a given firm(Barney.1991;Reed& DeFillippi,1990).That is,they must not be widely distributed within an industry and/or must be closely identified with a given organization.mak-ing them difficult to transfer or trade(e.g..a brand image or an exclusive supply arrangement).Although physical and financial resources may produce a temporary advantage for a firm,they often can be readily acquired on factor markets by competitors or new entrants.Conversely,a unique path through history may enable a firm to obtain unusual and valuable resources that cannot be easily acquired by competitors(Bar-ney,1991).Finally,and perhaps most important,such resources must be diffi-cult to replicate because they are either tacit(causally ambiguous)or socially complex(Teece,1987;Winter.1987).Tacit resources are skill based and people intensive.Such resources are"invisible"assets based upon learning-by-doing that are accumulated through experience and refined by practice(Itami,1987;Polanyi,1962).Socially complex resources depend upon large numbers of people or teams engaged in coordinated action such that few individuals,if any,have sufficient breadth of knowl-edge to grasp the overall phenomenon(Barney,1991;Reed&DeFillippi, 1990).The strategic significance of firms'resources and capabilities has been heightened by recent observations that companies that are better able to understand,nurture.and leverage core competencies outperform those that are preoccupied with more conventional approaches to strate-gic business planning(Prahalad&Hamel,1990).However.a firm's com-mitment to the existing competency base also may make it difficult to acquire new resources or capabilities.Put another way,the resource-based view may lead to an organization that is like the proverbial"child with a hammer"-everything starts looking like a nail.Technological discontinuities or shifts in external circumstances may render existing competencies obsolete or,at a minimum,invite the rapid development of new resources(Tushman&Anderson,1986).Under such circumstances, core competencies might become"core rigidities"(Leonard-Barton.1992). In this article,I argue that one of the most important drivers of new resource and capability development for firms will be the constraints and challenges posed by the natural(biophysical)environment.990Academy of Management ReviewOctober THE CHALLENGE OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENTWhat defense has been to the world's leaders for the past40years,the environment will be for the next40.(The Economist,1990)The above quote summarizes the immensity of the challenge posed by the natural environment.Consider that since the end of World War II,•the human population has grown from about2billion to over5billion(Keyfitz,1989);•the global economy has grown over IS-fold(WorldBank,1992);•consumption of fossil fuels has increased by a factor of25(Brown,Kane&Hoodman,1994);a nd•industrial production has increased by a factor of40(Schmidheiny,1992).Unfortunately,the environmental impacts associated with this activ-ity also have multiplied.For example,air and water pollution,toxic emis-sions,chemical spills,and industrial accidents have created regional environmental and public health crises for thousands of communities around the world(Brown,Kane,&Roodman,1994;Shrivastava,1987).The composition of the atmosphere has been altered more in the past100 years-through fossil-fuel use,agricultural practices,and deforesta-tion-than in the previous18,000(Graedel&Crutzen,1989).Climate changes,which might produce both rising ocean levels and further de-sertification,could threaten the very fabric of human civilization as we know it(Schneider,1989).The world's18major fisheries already have reached or exceeded maximum sustained yield levels(Brown&Kane, 1994).If current consumption rates continue,all virgin tropical forests will be gone within50years,with a consequent loss of50percent or more of the world's species(Wilson,1989).Reduced quality of life in the devel-oped world,severe human health problems,and environmentally in-duced political upheaval in the developing world could all result(Homer-Dixon,BoutwelL&Rathjens,1993;Kaplan,1994).In short,the scale and scope of human activity have accelerated during the past40years to the point where they are now having impacts on a global scale.Consider,for example,that it took over10,000gener-ations for the human population to reach2billion,but only a single lifetime to grow from2to over5billion(Gore,1992).During the next40 years,the human population is expected to double again,to10billion, before leveling off sometime in the middle of the next century(Keyfitz, 1989).Even with world GNP currently at about$25trillion,it may be necessary to increase economic activity five-to tenfold just to provide basic amenities to this population(MacNeill,1989;Ruckelshaus,1989). This level of economic production probably will not be ecologically sus-tainable using existing technologies and production methods-a tenfold increase in resource use and waste generation would almost certainly1995Hart991 stress the earth's natural systems beyond recovery(Commoner,1992; Meadows,Meadows,&Randers,1992;Schmidheiny,1992).The next40years thus present an unprecedented challenge:either alter the nature of economic activity or risk irreversible damage to the planet's basic ecological systems.This portends nothing less than a"par-adigm shift"for the field of strategic management because it appears that few,if any,of our past economic and organizational practices can be continued for long into the future;they are simply not environmentally sustainable.Over the next decade,businesses will be challenged to cre-ate new concepts of strategy,and it seems likely that the basis for gaining competitive advantage in the coming years will be rooted increasingly in a set of emerging capabilities such as waste minimization,green product design,and technology cooperation in the developing world(Gladwin, 1992;Hart,1994;Kleiner,1991;Schmidheiny,1992).For the resource-based view to remain relevant,its creators must embrace and internalize the tremendous challenge created by the natural environment:Strategists and organizational theorists must begin to grasp how environmentally oriented resources and capabilities can yield sustainable sources of com-petitive advantage.A NATURAL-RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OF THE FIRMIn the future,it appears inevitable that businesses(markets)will be constrained by and dependent upon ecosystems(nature).1In other words, it is likely that strategy and competitive advantage in the coming years will be rooted in capabilities that facilitate environmentally sustainable economic activity-a natural-resource-based view of the firm.In this sec-tion,I introduce a conceptual framework composed of three intercon-nected strategies:pollution prevention,product stewardship,and sus-tainable development.The significant driving forces behind each of these are briefly discussed,and an introduction to the key resources and sources of competitive advantage associated with each strategy is given (Table1).Key resources and capabilities also affect the ability of the firm to sustain its competitive advantage.These theoretical linkages are de-veloped in much greater depth in the section titled"Theory Develop-ment."I In the long run.I argue that a natural-resource-based view is a physical(not a legal or regulatory)requirement.However.there may be temporary policy reversals that serve to slow this evolutionary path.For example,the current antiregulatory stance in the U.S. Congress suggests that domestIc firms and international firms operating in the United States may be under less direct environmental regulatory pressure.at least for the next few years.This anomaly,however.neither nullifies the drivers for greening in other parts of the developed world.nor does it slow the need for rethinking corporate behavior in developing markets.992Academy of Management ReviewTABLE1A Natural-Resource-Based View:Conceptual FrameworkOctoberStrategic Capability PollutionPrevention ProductStewardship SustainableDevelopmentEnvironmentalDriving ForceMinimize emissions.effluents.&wasteMinimize life-cycle cost ofproductsMinimize environmentalburden of firm growthand developmentKeyResourceContinuous improvementStakeholder integrationShared visionCompetitiveAdvantageLower costsPreempt competitorsFuture positionPollution PreventionDuring the past decade there has been tremendous pressure for firms to minimize or eliminate emissions,effluents,and waste from their oper-ations.In1986,for example,the Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-zation Act(SARA)was passed in the United States,requiring that com-panies publicly disclose their emission levels of some300toxic or hazardous chemicals through what has become known as the toxic re-lease inventory(TRI).Managers now understood the extent of their firms' impact on the environment and recognized that pollution stems from in-efficient use of material and human resources.Indeed,the first year that the TRI was used(1988)revealed that panies alone emitted10.4 billion pounds of toxic materials to the environment.This sobering real-ization caused management in the most affected industries-petro-chemicals,pulp and paper,automotive,and electronics-to fundamen-tally rethink its approach to pollution abatement.In fact,since the late 1980s,a focus on emissions reduction and pollution abatement has swept industrial operations worldwide(Smart,1992).Pollution abatement can be achieved through two primary means:(a) control:emissions and effluents are trapped,stored,treated,and dis-posed of using pollution-control equipment or(b)prevention:emissions and effluents are reduced,changed,or prevented through better house-keeping,material substitution,recycling,or process innovation(Cairn-cross,1991;Frosch&Gallopoulos,1989;Willig,1994).The latter approach reduces pollution during the manufacturing process while producing saleable goods.The former approach entails expensive,nonproductive pollution-control equipment.Pollution prevention thus appears analo-gous,in many respects,to total quality management(TQM);it requires extensive employee involvement and continuous improvement of emis-sions reduction,rather than reliance on expensive"end-of-pipe"pollu-tion-control technology(lmai,1986;Ishikawa&Lu,1985;Roome,1992).Through pollution prevention,companies can realize significant sav-ings,resulting in a cost advantage relative to competitors(Hart&Ahuja, 1994;Romm,1994).Indeed,pollution prevention may save not only the cost of installing and operating end-of-pipe pollution-control devices,but1995Hart993 it also may increase productivity and efficiency(Smart,1992;Schmid-heiny,1992).Less waste means better utilization of inputs,resulting in lower costs for raw materials and waste disposal(Young,1991).Pollution prevention also may reduce cycle times by simplifying or removing un-necessary steps in production operations(Hammer&Champy,1993;Stalk &Hout,1990).Furthermore,pollution prevention offers the potential to cut emissions well below required levels,reducing the firm's compliance and liability costs(Rooney,1993).Thus,a pollution-prevention strategy should facilitate lower costs,which,in turn,should result in enhanced cash flow and profitability for the firm.Indeed,pioneering programs like3M's Pol-lution Prevention Pays(3P)and Dow's Waste Reduction Always Pays (WRAP)have produced hundreds of millions of dollars in cost savings over the past decade(Smart,1992).At Dow,for example,it has been estimated that"end-of-pipe"pollution-control projects lose16%on every dollar invested.Conversely,the return on pollution-prevention projects has averaged better than60%for the past10years(Buzzelli,1994).Evidence also suggests that in the early stages of pollution preven-tion,there is a great deal of"low hanging fruit"-easy and inexpensive behavioral and material changes that result in large emission reductions relative to costs(Hart&Ahuja,1994;Rooney,1993).As the firm's environ-mental performance improves,however,further reductions in emissions become progressively more difficult,often requiring significant changes in processes or even entirely new production technology(Frosch&Gal-lopoulos,1989).For example,a pulp plant might make significant reduc-tions in emissions through better housekeeping,equipment maintenance, and incremental process improvement.Eventually,however,diminishing returns set in,and few significant additional reductions are possible without entirely new technology such as chlorine-free bleaching equip-ment to eliminate organochloride emissions.Thus,as the firm moves closer to"zero emissions,"reductions will become more capital intensive and may require broader changes in underlying product design and tech-nology(Walley&Whitehead,1994).Product StewardshipAs noted previously,pollution prevention focuses on new capability building in production and operations.However,activities at every step of the value chain-from raw material access,through production pro-cesses,to disposition of used products-have environmental impacts, and these will almost certainly need to be"internalized"in the future (Costanza,1991;Daly&Cobb,1989).Product stewardship thus entails integrating the"voice of environment,"that is,external(stakeholder)per-spectives,into product design and development processes(Allenby,1991; Fiksel,1993).Indeed,during the past decade,virtually every major industrialized country in the world(except the United States)has adopted a government-sponsored program for certifying products as environmentally responsi-994Academy of Management Review October ble(Abt Associates.1993).In the United States.several competing private initiatives rate products on environmental criteria.including organiza-tions such as Green Cross and Green Seal.A common feature of such programs is the use of some form of life-cycle analysis(LCA)(Davis,1993). LCA is used to assess the environmental burden created by a product system from"cradle to grave"(Keoleian&Menerey.1993).For a product to achieve low life-cycle environmental costs.designers need to(a)mini-mize the use of nonrenewable materials mined from the earth's crust,(b) avoid the use of toxic materials.and(c)use living(renewable)resources in accordance with their rate of replenishment(Robert.1995).Also,the product-in-use must have a low environmental impact and be easily com-posted.reused.or recycled at the end of its useful life(Kleiner,1991; Shrivastava&Hart.In press).Such life-cycle thinking is being pushed even a step further.In1990. for example.the German government proposed the first product"take-back"law(Management Institute for Environment and Business.1993). According to this law.for selected industries(e.g..automobiles),custom-ers were given the right to return spent products to the manufacturer at no charge.In turn.manufacturers would be prevented from disposing of these used or"junk"products.The specter of this law created a tremen-dous incentive for companies to learn to design products and packaging that could be easily composted.reused.or recycled in order to avoid what would become astronomical disposal costs and penalties.Similar initia-tives are now being considered by the European Union.Japan.and even the United States.It thus seems reasonable to conclude that firms in the developed markets will be driven increasingly to minimize the life-cycle environ-mental costs of their product systems.Through product stewardship. firms can(a)exit environmentally hazardous businesses,(b)redesign existing product systems to reduce liability.and(c)develop new products with lower life-cycle costs.The relative importance of these three activi-ties will vary according to the nature of the firm's existing product port-folio.Proctor and Gamble.for example.has dedicated much of its prod-uct-stewardship efforts toward altering its core detergent and cleaning products.which historically have been based on phosphates and sol-vents.Church and Dwight,however.whose core products are based on environmentally benign baking soda.has been able to orient its product stewardship efforts around new product development in both the con-sumer and industrial markets.For start-up firms.product stewardship can form the cornerstone for firm strategy.because there are no pre-existing commitments to products,facilities.or manufacturing processes.However.because the market for"green"products is seldom large or lucrative early on(Roper.1992).competitive advantage might best be secured initially through competitive preemption(Ghemawat.1986;Lie-berman&Montgomery.1988).This advantage can be achieved through two primary means:(a)by gaining preferred or exclusive access to1995Hart995 important,but limited resources(e.g.,raw materials,locations,produc-tive capacity,or customers)or(b)by establishing rules,regulations,or standards that are uniquely tailored to the firm's capability.Preferred access has provided the backbone for many successful com-petitive strategies(e.g.,Wal-Mart's location-based preemption of rural markets for discount stores,Dupont's capacity-based preemption of the world titanium dioxide business).Several recent start-up ventures have used preferred access as a basis for product-stewardship strategies.For example,"Reclaim"is a start-up company whose proprietary product-cold-patch paving material for road repair-is made from recycled as-phalt shingles.Although this product is patented and is highly functional at a reasonable cost,a key to the company's product-stewardship strategy was its ability to gain preferred access to the raw material(asphalt shin-gles from abandoned buildings).2The second means for competitive preemption-raising barriers through the setting of rules,regulations,or standards-also has provided the basis for many successful competitive strategies(e.g.,Matsushita's VHS strategy in video cassette recorders).BMW's product-stewardship strategy in automobile recycling offers a good example of preemption, both through preferred access and standard setting.In1990,BMW initi-ated a"design-for-disassembly"process in Germany that it hoped would preempt the proposed government"take-back"policy described previ-ously.By acting as the first mover,it was able to capture the few sophis-ticated German dismantler firms as part of an exclusive recycling infra-structure,thereby gaining a cost advantage over competitors who were left to fight over smaller,unlicensed operations or devote precious capital to building their own dismantling infrastructure.This move enabled BMW to build an early reputation by taking back and recycling its products that were already on the.road as a precursor to the introduction of its new line of design-for-environment(DfE)automobiles.Once the company had de-veloped and demonstrated the take-back infrastructure through its exclu-sive BMW dismantlers and disassemblers,executives succeeded in es-tablishing the BMW approach as the German national standard.This move required other car companies to follow BMW's lead,but at substan-tially higher costs.Market research suggests there is a vast amount of unclaimed repu-tation"space"with respect to corporate environmental performance.A2Reclaim chose the New York/NewJersey region as its supply source,given the exten-sive building demolition and high landfill tipping fees in this area.Previously,scrap ma-terials from demolished buildings were hauled to the landfill,at substantial cost to the contractor.Reclaim negotiated with the contractors for these asphalt shingles.The company gained exclusive access to a virtually free raw material.and the contractors avoided steep tipping fees.Furthermore,extensive building demolition and high tipping fees did not exist in any other major metropolitan area in the United States,making Reclaim's preemptive strategy virtually impregnable.。

RBV(资源基础理论)的经典文献及摘要

Theory in RBV♦◆☐a) Penrose, 1959. "Theory of the Growth of the Firm".●Theme:1) The internal resources of a firm - the productive services available to a firm from its own resources, particularly the productive services available from management with experience within the firm.2) As management tries to make the best use of the resources available, a truly 'dynamic' interacting process occurs which encourages continuous growth but limits the rate of growth.●RQ: Assuming that some firms can grow, what principles will govern their growth, and how fast and how long can they grow? Alternatively, assuming that there are opportunities for expansion in an economy, what determines the kind of firm that will take advantage of them and to what extent?●What is a "firm":a) Economics: Price (p) and Output (q) --> Optimal size problem.(Size=output)b) The Firm as an administrative organization (central management)c) The Firm as a collection of productive resources.-- Resources: physical resources and human resources.-- Services yielded by resources-- The size of a firm should be measured with respect to the present value of the total of its resources used for its own productive purposes.●The motivation of the firm:a) The profit motive: The financial and investment decisions of firms are controlled by a desire to increase total long-run profits.b) Growth and profits become equivalent as the criteria for the selection of investment programs.●Inherited Resources and the Direction of Expansion1) Firm Growth: External and Internal inducement / obstacles- Internal obstacles arise when services (in particular the managerial capacity and the technical skills) required for expansion are not available in sufficient amounts within the firm.- Internal inducements arise largely from the existence of a pool of unused productive services, resources, and special knowledge.2) The continuing availability of unused services:强调人与资产的循环互动,相互推动,相互开发.a) So long as any resources are not used fully in current operations, there is an incentive for a firm to find a way of using them more fully.b) No "equilibrium position"Indivisibility of resources: There's always unused servicesIn the process of utilizing unused services, new types of resources will always be added to the firm's collection of resources.c)'Idle' services and 'specialized' services: Specialization leads to higher common multiplies, higher common multiplies leads to greater specialization. -- Specialization --> Diversification --> Specialization......d) New services will also become available from existing resources.Interaction between personnel and material resources: Not only can the personnel of a firm render heterogeneous varieties of services, but also the material resources can be used in different ways, if the people who work with them get different ideas.e) The creation of new productive services. The services that resources will yield depend on the capacities of the men using them, but the development of the capacities of men is partly shaped by the resources men deal with.3) Demand and ResourcesDemand is a necessary condition of entrepreneurial interest in any product, but the original incentive to a great deal of innovation can be found in a firm's desire to use its existing resources more efficiently.4) The Direction of ExpansionNew combinations previously acquired or inherited resources and other resources which must be obtained from the market.♦◆☐b) Wernerfelt, 1984. "A Resource-Based View of the firm".●Theme: to look at firms in terms of resources rather than products; & Sequential entry.●Resource: anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm. Definition: Tangible or intangible assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm.●1. Resource and profitability1) General effect: monopolistic bargaining power, substitution2) First Mover Advantage - Resource position barriers (VS. entry barrier- entry barrier是针对incumbent和potential entrants,未考虑diversifier.)3) Attractive resources (difficult for others to catch up)4) Mergers and Acquisitions: to trade otherwise non-marketable resources and to buy or sell resources in bundles.●2. Dynamic resource management1) The resource-product matrix2) Sequential entry - to develop the resource in one market and then to enter other markets from a position of strength.3) Exploit and develop - a balance between exploitation of existing resources and development of new ones.4) Stepping stones - diversification step must be evaluated in terms of short-term balance effect and long-term function as stepping stones to further expansion.c) Barney, 1986. "Strategic factor markets: expectations, luck and business strategy".●Theme: Above normal economic returns comes from more accurate expectations (originated from unique skills and capabilities) or luck from the strategic factor market.●1. Strategic factor markets: where firms buy and sell the resources necessary to implement their strategies.●2. Expectation and luck in strategic factor market●3. To obtain above normal returns: a) must be consistently better informed concerning the future value of those strategies; b) there are some ways to be better informed1) by analysis of competitive environment: less likely to systematically generate the expectation advantages because the methodologies for collecting this information and the conceptual models for analyzing it are in the public domain.2) by analysis of unique skill and capabilities: to analyze information about the assets a firm already controls but are not available to other firms (special manufacturing know-how, business experience, TMT...).♦◆☐d) Barney, 1991, "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage".●Assumptions: Firms may be heterogeneous and resources may not be perfectly mobile.●Key concepts:-Firm Resource: include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. (or, strengths) controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. (physical capital resources, human capital resources and organizational capital resources)-Sustained Competitive Advantage: 1) compared with current and potential competitors; 2) notduplicable by others; 3) not necessarily survive in Schumpeterian Shocks.●4 attributes of resources to have potential SCA:-Valuable-Rare-Imperfectly imitable: path dependent, causally ambiguity and socially complexity.-Non substitutable: substituted by similar resources or different strategic resources.♦◆☐ePriem and Butler, 2001. "Is the Resource-Based 'View' a useful perspective for strategic management research?"●1. RBV as a Theory? - lawlike generalizationa) Generalized conditionsb) Empirical context (tautology)c) Nomic necessity●2. An elemental fallacy of RBVThe 'value' attribute and environmental side●3. For strategy researcha) Operational validity and implement abilityb) RBV boundaries ( context)c) All-inclusive Resourcesd) The process from resource to SCAe) Static RBV - limitations (hard to evaluate resource, process black box, difficult to practice,...) ●4. Discussion:Formalizing RBV towards a theoryAnswering the How questionIncorporating the temporal component - path dependentIntegrating demand heterogeneity model♦◆☐f) Barney, 2001. 'Is RBV a useful perspective for strategic management research? Yes.' Admitting market-side consideration♦◆☐g) Amit and Schoemaker, 1993. "Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent".●RQ: How to identify, develop and deploy firm-specific Strategic Assets?●Main Contributions: Strategic assets and Strategic Industry Factors●Firm level - Strategic assets: the set off difficult to trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized Resources and Capabilities.●Market level - Strategic Industry Factors: Certain resources and capabilities that have become the prime determinants of economic rents. (ex post)●Problem: how to identify, ex ante, a set of Strategic Assets.●Multidimensional view:1) Industry Analysis: the focus is on rent distribution2) RBV: the focus is internal evolutionary path; trade-off between specialization and robustness3) Behavioral view: uncertainty, complexity, conflict. --> suboptimal♦◆☐f) Dierickx and Cool, 1989. "Asset stock accumulation and Sustainability of competitive advantage". (early dynamic RBV article)●Main points:-Critical resources that are imperfectly imitable are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor market (Barney, 1986). Asset accumulation process: time compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, inter-connectedness, asset erosion and causal ambiguity.-Accumulation of asset stocks: the strategic asset stocks are accumulated by choosing appropriate time paths of flows over a period of time.-Strategic asset stocks: non-tradable, nonimitable and nonsubstitutableEmpirical in RBVA. Topic: Managerial Ability and firm performance♦◆☐Holcomb et. al, 2009. "Making the most of what you have: managerial ability as a source of resource value creation".●This article goes back to Penrose (1959)'s seminal work, investigating the effect of managerial ability on resource productivity, interacting with resource quality. There are 3 main contributions:1. Managerial ability is a potential source of value creation.2. Managerial ability interactive with resource quality influences value creation.3. The process of managerial ability to optimize firm performance -- synchronization of combinations of resource bundles.●Data source: football team.B. Topic: Non-scale free capabilities and diversification♦◆☐Levinthal and Wu, 2010. "Opportunitycosts and non-scale free capabilities: profit maximization, corporate scope, and profit margins".●This study provides an alternative explanation for diversification discount, which relies on an opportunity costs logic to distinguish between non-scale free and scale free capabilities, and also provides a rational explanation for the divergence between total profits and profit margins.1. RBV logic: The fungibility of resource is the basis for the explanation of related diversification. --> Assumption: scale free.2. Opportunity cost of resources --> non-scale free resources3. Market demand and resource allocation - Diversification is also impacted by the market opportunities: when the current industry becomes mature, firms make rational decisions to increase total profit (profit maximization) via diversification. However, firms need to allocate their non-scale free resources to new business, which may lead to lower average returns.4. Diversifying firms are 'good types' (i.e., high capabilities) operating in 'bad' market context. (i.e., generalist firm)C. Topic: Formality and SME performance♦◆☐Terziovski, 2010. "Innovation practice and its performance implications in small and medium enterprises (SEMs) in the manufacturing sector: a resource-based view."●Theory: Schumpeterian's two-phase innovation theory; the benefits of formality (efficiency) and informality (flexibility).●Results: innovation strategy and formal structure are positive predictors of SME performance.D. Mergers and Acquisitions♦◆☐a) Puranam and Srikanth, 2007. "What they know VS. What they do: how acquirers leverage technology acquisitions".●Theme: to reconcile the integration paradox - Leveraging what they know (learning) & Leveraging what they do (disruption).●Main effect: Post acquisition integration (structural integration/structural separation) --> the success of leveraging.●Moderating effect: acquisition experience●Logic: integration mechanism both enhances coordination and harm leveraging technology.●Arguments:1. Structural integration enhances the leveraging of knowledge via coordination effect.2. Structural integration harms the leveraging of capability (ongoing innovations of the acquired firm) via the decrease of autonomy.3. Acquisition experience of acquirer moderates the relationship.4. Some solutions of post acquisition: rich unstructured communication, in the form of frequent face-to-face interactions, acids the disruptive consequences of administrative and cultural integration while also enabling high levels of coordination.♦◆☐b) Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999. 'Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspective on mergers and ac questions: a case survey of synergy realization'.●Arguments: Synergy realization is a function of the similarity and complementarity of two merging businesses (combination potential), the extent of interaction and coordination during the organizational integration process, and the lack of employee resistance the combined entry.♦◆☐c) Haunschild, 1994. "How much is that company worth?: Interorganizational relationship, uncertainty and acquisition premiums."- Network perspective●Arguments:1. Firm managers will look to both their interlock partners and professional firms when deciding how much to pay.2. The impact of interlocks and professional firms on the premium decision will be stronger when managers are uncertain about the value of the Acquisition target.♦◆☐d) Stearns and Allan, 1996. "Economic behavior in institutional environments: the corporate merger wave of the 1980s".-Network and institutional perspective●A model: First, economic and political changes create conditions for merger wave; second, challengers (marginal actors) who lack status and resources exploit these conditions; third, the methods of successful challengers are imitated through the business community.。

战略管理经典文献

1. A Resource-Based View of the Firm2.An appreciation of industrial dynamics产业动态升值3.Corporate Diversification公司多元化4.Dynamic capabilities and strategic management动态能力与战略管理5.Dynamic capabilities-what are they动态能力- 它们是什么6.Economic analysis and strategic management7.Evolving Strategic Behaviors through Competitive Interaction不断发展的战略，通过竞争互动行为8.Strategy,Value Innovation and Knowledge Economy战略，价值创新与知识经济9.The Core Competence of the Corporation公司的核心竞争力10.Toward Knowledge-based Theory of Firm1.How Does Knowledge-based Interaction Affect Relationship Strategy2.Innovative management-A conversation with Gary Hamel and Lowell Bryan3.Integrated strategy Market and nonmarket components4.Is the resource-based view a useful perspective for strategic management research Yesanizational strategy, structure, and process6.Reflecting on the strategy process7.Strategy Innovation and the Quest for Value8.The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage- A Resource-based View 竞争优势- 基于资源观的基石9.The resource-based view of the firm Ten years after 1991 公司十多年的1991年以后的资源基础观10.Three Responses to the Methodological challenges of studying strategizing 三个反应方法研究策略的挑战1. Arriving at the high-growth firm2. Corporate Strategy - A Manager's Guide3. Game Theory and Industrial Organization4. Hidden flaws in strategy (McKinsey Quarterly)5. The five competitive forces that shape strategy6. Ownership structure and the strategic decision 股权结构和战略决策7. Strategic management and economics8. The core's competence 核心竞争力9. Theory and research in strategic management 战略管理的理论10. Towards a dynamic theory of strategy 动态战略管理1．A fresh look at Strategy under UnCertainty - an interview2．A historical comparison of resourced-based theory and five schools of thought within industrial organization economics 资源基础理论和五个学派的历史比较3. An evolutionary perspective on strategy-maling in organization theory,comparative analysis ,research directions 4．An examination of the 'sustainable competitive advantage ' concept ——past,present and future 可持续的竞争优势的概念,过去、现在和未来5．An incremenatal approach to strategic change6．Assessing core intangible resources7．Building Your Company's Vision8．Cognitive change, strategic action and organizational renewal9．Comparative Strategy Process Research -a methodological approach 比较战略过程研究——方法论的方法10．Competing for the Future1．Competing On Resources - Strategy In The 1990s2．Competitive Advantage-Logical And Philosophical Considerations 竞争优势- 逻辑与哲学思考3．Crafting Strategy4．Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage 公司资源与持续竞争优势5．First-Mover Advantages6．From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy 从竞争优势到企业战略7．Industrial ecology as a strategic instrument for sustainability8．Is The Resource-Based View A Useful Perspective For Strategic Management Research9．Strategic intent 战略目的10．Strategy and the internet - Michael Porter 战略和互联网1．Strategy as ecology 战略生态学2．Strategy as Revolution3．The Dynamics of Diversification4．The fall and rise of strategic planning5．The resource-based theory of competitive advantage - implications for strategy formulation以资源为基础的竞争优势理论- 对战略制定的影响6．The Strategic Analysis of Intangible Resources7．Time—The Next Source of Competitive Advantage8．Using Game Theory To Shape Strategy 博弈论塑造战略9．Strategic intent 10．What Is Strategy。

运用RBV之分析企业衰退期战略选择

摘要本文运用ＲＢＶ（Ｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅ－－ｂａｓｅｄＶｉｅｗｏｆｔｈｅＦｉｒｍ）分析企业面临衰退时所应采取的战略。

本文对企业衰退期概念作了界定，对企业衰退期和产业衰退作了区分，文中介绍了ＲＢＶ的主要观点，采用ＲＢＶ模式分析了企业面临衰退的原因，并对迈克尔·波特使甩ＳＣＰ模式褥出的衰退产业中的企业战略提出了不同意见。

根据造成企业面临衰退的因素，本文提出了企业摆脱衰退的短期和长期战略。

根据ＲＢＶ模式，借鉴博弈论的理论，本文推导出企业应采用短期战略和长期战略结合的方式摆脱衰退困境：短期内，企业主要采用战略调整是建立在企业现有战略资源基础上的营销创新等低成本战略；长期内，企业应进行战略创新，增加新的战略资源和提升组织创新、优化配置资源的能力，建立起企业持续竞争优势，从根本上摆脱衰退困境。

本文运用ＲＢＶ模式对战略创新进行了新的探讨，讨论了战略创新的三个基本要素：基于资源的顾客价值观、基于资源和能力的技术创新战略和基于资源的组织创新能力。

最后，本文认为战略创新应通过四个层面的模式实现：１、基于企业资源优化配置的目的，退出某些不具有优势的业务；２、基于能力的流程再造（能力就是使组织具有竞争优势的业务流程）；３、基于资源和能力的相关多元化，认为应根据企业战略资源和能力的相关性迸行多元化延伸：４、培育新的核心竞争力，刨造全新的产业，成为新产业的规则制定者，使企业最大限度地获得战略资源所仓Ｕ造的价值。

关键词：ＲＢＶ企业衰退期衰退战略ＡｂｓｔｒａｃｔＴ１１ｉＳｔｅｘｔＵＳｅＳＲＢＶ（Ｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅ－ｂａｓｅｄＶｉｅｗｏｆｔｈｅＦｉｒｍ）ｔｏａｎａｌｙｚｅｔｈｅｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｔｈａｔｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｓｈｏｕｌｄａｄｏｐｔｗｈｉｌｅｆａｃｉｎｇｄｅｃｌｉｎｉｎｇ．Ｔｈｅｔｅｘｔｄｅｆｉｎｅｔｈｅｃｏｎｃｅｐｔｏｆｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｄｅｃｌｉｎｅａｎｄｄｉｓｔｉｎｇｕｉｓｈｔｈｅｆａｃｔｔｏａｃｔａｓｔｏｉｎｄｕｓｔｒｙｄｅｃｌｉｎｅａｎｄｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｄｅｃｌｉｎｅ．ＩｔｉｎｔｒｏｄｕｃｅｔｈｅｍａｉｎｖｉｅｗｏｆＲＢＶａｎｄａｄｏｐｔＲＢＶｍｏｄｅｔｏａｎａｌｙｚｅｔｈｅｒｅａｓｏｎｔｈａｔｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｄｅｃｌｉｎｅ．ＣｏｍｐａｒｅｔｏＭｉｃｈａｅｌ’ＰｏｔｔｅｒｕｓｅＳＣＰｍｏｄｅ，ｉｔｄｒａｗｄｉｆｆｅｒｅｎｔｓｕｇｇｅｓｔｉｏｎｓｏｆｔｈｅｄｅｃｌｉｎｅｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｔｏｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓ．Ａｃｃｏｒｄｉｎｇｔｏｔｈｅｆａｃｔｏｒｃａｕｓｉｎｇｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｔｏｄｅｃｌｉｎｅ，ｔｈｉｓｔｅｘｔｈａｓｐｒｏｐｏｓｅｄｔｈａｔｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅＳｈｏｕｌｄａｄｏｐｔｓｈｏｒｔｔｉｍｅａｎｄｌｏｎｇ－ｔｅｒｍｄｅｃｌｉｎｉｎｇｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｔｏｂｒｅａｋａｗａｙｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｐｒｅｄｉｃａｍｅｎｔｏｆｄｅｃｌｉｎｉｎｇ．ＡｃｃｏｒｄｉｎｇｔｏＲＢＶｍｏｄｅ．ｄｒａｗｌｅｓｓｏｎｓｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｔｈｅｏｒｙｏｆｇａｍｅｔｈｅｏｒｙ，ｔｈｉｓｔｅｘｔｓｕｇｇｅｓｔｔｈａｔ：ａｄｏｐｔｓｔｒａｔｅｇｉｃａｄｊｕｓｔｍｅｎｔｉｎａｓｈｏｒｔｔｉｍｅ，ａｎｄａｄｏｐｔｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｔｏｉｎｎｏｖａｔｅｆｏｒａｌｏｎｇｔｉｍｅ．Ｉｎａｓｈｏｒｔｔｉｍｅ，ｔｈｅｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｓｈｏｕｌｄｍａｉｎｌｙａｄｏｐｔｔｈｅｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｓｕｃｈａｓｍａｒｋｅｔｉｎｎｏｖａｔｉｎｇｗｈｉｃｈｓｅｔ叩ｏｎｔｈｅｂａｓｉｓｏｆｓｔｒａｔｅｇｉｃｒｅＳＯＵｒｃｅｓｏｆｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓ．Ｉｎｂｅｉｎｇｌｏｎｇ－ｔｅｒｍ，ｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｈｏｕｌｄｃａｒｒｙｏｎｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｉｎｎｏｖａｔｅ，ｉｎｃｒｅａｓｅｎｅｗｓｔｒａｔｅｇｉｃｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅａｎｄｉｔｓｏｒｇａｎｉｚｉｎｇ，ｄｉｓｔｒｉｂｕｔｉｎｇａｂｉｌｉｔｙｏｆｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅｒａｔｉｏｎａｌｌｙｔｏｐｒｏｍｏｔｅｔｏｓｅｔｕｐｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓａｎｄｃｏｍｐｅｔｅｆｏｒｔｈｅａｄｖａｎｔａｇｅｃｏｎｔｉｎｕｏｕｓｌｙ，ＴｈｉＳｇｏａｌｏｆｔｈｅｓｔｒａｔｅ：ｇｉｃｉｎｎｏｖａｔｅｉＳｔｈａｔｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｃａｎｂｒｅａｋａｗａｙｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｐｒｅｄｉｃａｍｅｎｔｏｆｄｅｃｌｉｎｉｎｇｃｏｍｐｌｅｔｅｌｙ．ＴｈｉｓｔｅｘｔＵＳｅＳＲＢＶｍｏｄｅｔｏｉｎｎｏｖａｔｅｎｅｗｄｉｓｃｕｓｓｉｏｎｔｏｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙ，ａｎｄｄｉｓｃｕｓｓｔｈｒｅｅｂａｓｉｃｋｅｙｅｌｅｍｅｎｔｓｔｈａｔｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｉｎｎｏｖａｔｅｓ：Ｂａｓｅｄｏｎｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅｃｕｓｔｏｍｅｒｖａｌｕｅｓ．ｂａｓｅｄｏｎｒｅｓｏＵｒｃｅａｎｄａｂｉｌｉｔ－／ｔｅｃｔｍｏｌｏｇｉｃａｉｉｎｎｏｖａｔｉｏｎｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙａｎｄｂａｓｅｄｏｎｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅｉｎｎｏｖａｔｉｏｎａｂｉｌｉｔｙｏｆｏｒｇａｎｉｚｉｎｇ．Ｆｉｎａｌｌｙ，ｔｈｉｓｔｅｘｔｔｈｉｎｋｓｔｈａｔｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙｉｎｎｏｖａｔｅｓａｎｄｓｈｏｕｌｄｂｅｒｅａｌｉｚｅｄｔｈｒｏｕｇｈｔｈｅｍｅｄｅｏｆｆｏｕｒａｓｐｅｃｔｓ：ｌ，Ｏｎｔｈｅｂａｓｉｓｏｆｔｈｅｐｕｒｐｏｓｅｏｆｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅ＋Ｓｒｃｓｏｕｌ℃ｅｒａｔｉｏｎａｌｄｉｓｔｄｂｕｔｉｏｎ，ｗｉｔｈｄｒａｗｆｒｏｍｓｏｍｅｂｕｓｉｎｅｓｓｎｏｔｈａｖｉｎｇｔｈｅａｄｖａｎｔａｇｅ；２ｐｒｏｃｅｄｕｒｅｂａｓｅｄｏｎａｂｉｌｉｔｙｉｓｇｉｖｅｎａｎｅｗｌｅａｓｅｏｆｌｉｆｅｔｏ，ａｂｉｌｉｔｙｉｓｔｏｅｎａｂｌｅｏｒｇａｎｉｚｉｎｇｔｈｅｂｕｓｉｎｅｓｓｐｒｏｃｅｄｕｒｅｖｄｔｈｃｏｍｐｅｔｉｔｉｏｎａｄｖａｎｔａｇｅ；３．ＯｎｔｈｅｂａｓｉｓｏｆｒｅｓｏＵｒｃｅｔｓａｎｄａｂｉｌｉｔｙ’Ｓｐｌｕｒａｌｉｓｍｏｆｄｅｐｅｎｄｅｎｃｅ．ｉＳｉｔｓｈｏｕｌｄｇｏｏｎｄｅｐｅｎｄｅｎｃｅｅｘｔｅｎｄａｃｃｏｒｄｉｎｇｔｏｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｔｒａｔｅｇｉｃｒｅｓｏＵｒｃｅａｎｄａｂｉｌｉｔｙｉｎｐｌＵｒａｌｉｓｍｔｏｔｈｉｎｋ；４ｆｏｓｔｅｒｓｔｈｅｎｅｗｋｅｙｃｏｍｐｅｔｉｔｉｖｅｎｅｓｓ，ｃｒｅａｔｅｔｈｅｎｅｗｉｎｄｕｓｔｒｙ．Ｉｆｔｈｅｆｏｒｍｕｌａｔｉｏｎｏｆｔｈｅｎｅｗｉｎｄｕｓｔｒｙｒｕｌｅｍａｋｅｅｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｓｏｂｔａｉｎｐｅｒｓｏｎｗｈｏｂｅｃｏｍｅｓｖａｌｕｅｔｈａｔｔｈｅｓｔｒａｔｅｇｉｃｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅｃｒｅａｔｅｓｔｏｔｈｅｍａｘｉｍ啪ｅｘｔｅｎｔ．Ｋｅｙｗｏｒｄｓ：ＲＢＶＥｎｔｅｒｐｒｉｓｅｄｅｃｌｉｎｅｔｉｍｅＤｅｃｌｉｎｅｓｔｒａｔｅｇｙ．咝望查兰塑圭塑窒生兰焦堡壅笺！墨——＿—————————‘－－————●－－——＿—————＾＿————————●—＿●—－——●——＿————Ｉ●——一一第１章绪论自然界中的幸存者不是最强悍的物种，也不是最智慧的物种，而是那些最能应对变化的物种。

RBV回顾(资源基础理论的系统梳理)

（一）理论溯源:理论发展（2）
3.Barney, J.B. 1986. “Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and Business Strategy.” Management Science 32:1231-1241. 引入“战略性要素市场”:企业获取或培育其实施产品市场战略所需资源的场所。“The ability to create imperfectly competitive product markets also depends on the cost of implementing the strategy” 如果战略要素市场是完全竞争的，那么，在这些市场中对资源的获取将会反映该资源用于实施产品市场战略时所能够创造的绩效。如果战略性要素市场总是完全竞争的，企业则不可能获得经济租。 (对 Porter研究的质疑) 获取经济租之所需资源两种途径：（1） Fortune and luck；（2）More accurate expectations（unusual insights about the future value of the resources）企业已控资源比其他类型的资源更可能成为经济租来源。
解释企业为何存在，并聚焦于企业获取经济租的能力。探究了企业的寻租和配租特性。将寻租理论、交易成本理论及随后出现的治理理论联系起来，致力于发展一种企业的基于资源或基于知识的理论。将企业定义为一串生产性资源束，且这些资源的价值将会依其应用情境变化而变化。他强调，这些资源的可模仿性取决于它们被“隔绝机制”所保护的程度。甚至还提出了一系列的隔绝机制并开始探讨那些能够增强不可模仿性的资源属性。
1.理论基础:特质能力理论（1）

中国新技术企业在产品开发绩效营销策略创新的权变价值(英文中文对照翻译)

The contingent value of marketing strategy innovativeness for product development performance in Chinese new technology venturesAbstractThis study extends research on entrepreneurial behavior by investigating the relationship between the marketing strategy innovativeness (MSI)and new product performance in technology-based new ventures in China. Specifically, premised on contingent resource-based view we argue thatMSI is a firm capability that must be bundled with external managerial relationships and be deployed in the appropriate environment to ensure itssuccess. We found that the team's extra industry relationships and market dynamism enhanced the impact of MSI on new product performance. Incontrast, top management team's intraindustry relationships, financial relationships, and technology dynamism hindered the impact of MSI on newproduct performance.1. IntroductionThe vast majority of research on organizational innovationadopts a resource-based perspective that predicts positive returnsto organizational resources and capabilities. This work has beenrestricted, however, to the narrow context of product innovation.Although product innovation enhances firm performance onlywhen it is successfully commercialized, prior research tends topay little attention to accompanying marketing innovations(Shervani & Zerrillo, 1997). The current study concerns aneglected, yet potentially positive entrepreneurial strategicactivity —marketing strategy innovativeness (MSI) —whichrefers to the degree to which the marketing strategy whichaccompanies a new product differs from competing strategies andconventional practices (Andrews & Smith, 1996; Hambrick, Cho,& Chen, 1996; Menon, Bharadwaj, Adidam, & Edisonet, 1999;Sethi et al., 2001). Examples of MSI practices include the use ofnew packaging, new distribution methods and channels, new advertising media and content, ingenious pricing and paymentmethods. MSI ensures the new product enjoys a uniquecompetitive position because it is radical, departs from the statusquo, is proactive, unconventional and unpredictable (Andrews &Smith 1996; Hambrick et al., 1996; Menon et al., 1999). Thus,MSI is likely to strengthen the position of the new product in themarketplace above and beyond the value conveyed by its physicalcharacteristics (Andrews & Smith, 1996).MSI is classed as capability because it is the outcome of afirm's specialized knowledge, unique understanding of theenvironment and idiosyncratic processes (Eisenhardt & Martin,2000). As Verona (1999: 139) posits, the ability to creatively andimaginatively make strategic decisions regarding a product'sdevelopment and its marketing are rent-generating routines thatenhance performance. MSI may enhance product developmentperformance by creating uncertainties for competitors throughvariation in the bases of competition (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi,1995). Capturing the contribution of MSI at the product develop-ment level is also consistent with the idea that resources'contribution to performance should be investigated by disaggregating firm performance into processes which are less distalfrom the focal resources (Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004).However, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1110) suggest thatdespite their value, capabilities aresubstitutable because there aremultiple paths through which firms can acquire the same dynamiccapabilities independent of other firms. Hence, capabilities maybe necessary, but not sufficient, sources of sustained competitiveadvantage. This implies that a focal capability needs to be madeinimitable through combination with other organizational skillsand capabilities and deployment in the appropriate environment(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). As Barney (1991) argues, eventhough a firm's capability may be valuable, rare and inimitable, itsability to provide sustainable competitive advantage often lies inits configuration with complementary internal and externalresources. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997: 515) also argue thatperformance outcomes of a firm's capability depend on its ma-nagement ability to deploy the capability in an appropriateenvironment. Finally, Porter (1991: 108) warns against internalfocus on resources because the competitive value of resources canbe enhanced or eliminated by changes in technology, competitorbehavior or buyer needs.Drawing on this contingent resource-based view of the firm,we advance and test the idea that, particularly in new ventures inan emerging economic environment, the impact of MSI on newproduct performance is conditional upon its top managementteam's external relationships and environmental conditions.New ventures tend to have higher failure rates than establishedfirms. Stinchcombe (1965) provided several reasons for thisliability of newness. They have limited resources, lack of infor-mation processing structures, and stable links with clients,supporters and customers. Given their liabilities of newness,new ventures need to be creative and learn new roles and tasksand this may conflict with constraints on their resources.Moreover, as a form of first-moving, MSI is inherently risky(Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004). First, it takes time andresources (i.e., increased salesforce efforts) to educate customersto the new marketing strategy features; further, MSI can exposenew ventures to strong and unpredicted reactions by incumbents; lastly, MSI can be imitated by competitors, who cancapitalize on the early errors made by the new venture. Thesecontrasting arguments reinforce the need to understand underwhich circumstances (i.e., on which internal and externalcontingencies) MSI will contribute to new product performance.In contrast to developed market economies, the complexityand dynamism of the transitional environment in China meansthat firms must confront the challenges of new (oftendysfunctional) competition and also collapsing capabilities (Li& Atuahene-Gima, 2001, 2002). Thus, scholars suggest thatsuccess in China market requires significant explorationinvolving experimentation and innovation (Luo, 2002; Luo &Park, 2001, p. 145). We contend that to sustain the viability oftheir innovative marketing strategies in China, new venturemanagers may need to leverage their external relationships.Research suggests that external relationships are particularlyimportant sources of valuable resources and information thatcan augment firm performance in transitional economies likeChina (Park & Luo, 2001; Peng & Luo, 2000). Because of theirliabilities of newness, we posit that a venture's top managementteam's external social capital (i.e., the ability to mobilizefinancial resources, information and support through externalrelationships with managers inside and outside the industry, andwith officials of government and financial institutions) maydetermine the degree of success of MSI. In support of this idea,Lee, Lee, and Pennings (2001) found that external relationshipswith venture capitalists and universities enhanced the perfor-mance effects of the entrepreneurial orientation and technologycapabilities of new ventures, respectively. Further, consideringthat the value of afirm's capabilities and resources is contextspecific (Eisenhradt & Martin, 2000; Porter, 1991; Teece et al.,1997), we propose that technology and market uncertainty willplay an important role in the effectiveness of MSI.This study contributes to the literature in three importantareas. First it contributes to the abovementioned debate on theinherent value of MSI and its relationship with performance.For example, prior research has assumed a positive relationshipbetween MSI and new product performance (Andrews & Smith,1996). However, such an assumption tends to ignore thetransaction costs associated with MSI and, more generally,overlooks the potential problems associated with the deviationfrom industry practices. Hence, determining when MSI willincrease new product performance offers a direct test of thecontingency view of internal firm capabilities espoused inresource-based theory (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997).Second, despite recent theoretical developments (Blyler & Coff,2003), few empirical studies model the firm's social capital as apotential complement of internal capabilities; this study extendsour understanding by for the first time examining managerialrelationships both inside and outside the industry, as called forby Peng and Luo (2000). Finally, this study extends and lendssupport to recent work that integrates resource-based and socialcapital theories as an explanation for new venture performancein the Chinese context (Lee et al., 2001).2.Conceptual model and hypotheses2.1. Resource-based theory and MSI in technology-based newventures in ChinaAccording to the resource-based theory, performance differ-ences across firms are the result of variance in their resources and capabilities that are rare, valuableandinimitable(Barney,1991).This theory implies that to outwit competitors, new ventures needtodevelop distinct and innovative strategies and processes.Ensley, Pearson, and Amasone(2002:367) contend that, becauseof their liability of newness, “the task of the new venture TMT[top management team] is largely one of creativity and learning,where the ability to produce novel and integrated solutions is animportant attribute” for high performance. New ventures are at acompetitive disadvantage against large and established firms intheir traditional domains because of lack of resources, immatureorganizational processes and limited operational experience (Leeet al., 2001: 617). Hence, reliance on traditional products,marketing methods, and organizational processes is bound to leadto failure.The survival of new ventures depends largely on the intro-duction of new and differentiated products, processes andmarketing innovations. Such innovations may be rare andvaluable capabilities because the knowledge needed to developand successfully implement them involves socially complexlearning and relational skills in strategy making that are uniqueto the firm (Eisenhradt & Martin, 2000). For example, MSIinvolves the interaction of a group of individuals with differentexpertise and sources of knowledge, the use of integrativeprocedures to coordinate and combine their skills, knowledgeand abilities, and idiosyncratic reward, training and controlsystems. In addition, such a process involves firm's initiativesbased on managerial discretion formed on the basis ofunderstanding of the environment. Decision-makers attend tothe environment, interpret the conditions and assign meaning tothe actions they take in idiosyncratic ways (Verona, 1999).Furthermore, MSI is path dependent. It results from theidiosyncratic culture,experience,and history of the firm andfrom functional,educational,and tenure backgrounds of thedecision-makers(Andrews&Smith,1996;Hambrick et al.,1996).The availability of a group of executives with therequisite characteristics to develop innovative strategic actionsishighly constrained:it can neither be easily developed withinthe firm nor acquired from outside(Eisenhardt&Martin,2000).Following these arguments,the central premise of this study isthat MSI is a key capability of a new venture.New ventures must develop innovative strategies but thepossession of an innovative strategy does not assure commercialsuccess of a product.Rather,consistent with the contingentresource-based view of the firm,the productive capacity of MSIis determined by its congruency with other organizationalcapabilities and the environmental conditions.In particular,effective implementation of MSI and its effects on performancecannot be assumed by new ventures in a transitional economy,such as China.Market reforms in China have led to the entry ofa great number of foreign firms increasing the competitivepressures for local firms.This has led to increased control ofmarketing resources,such as outdoor advertising space,byforeign firms and increased marketing costs(EIU,2002).Also,Chinese consumers tend to perceive that foreign brands are ofhigher quality,reliability,and are more sophisticated thanlocally produced products(Li and Atuahene-Gima,2002).Further,given the transitional nature of the economy,the Chinese government plays an important role in regulating firms'marketing activities.For example,the pricing,packaging,distribution,and advertising of products are increasingly beingcontrolled by central and local governments with the objectiveof preventing activities or messages that contradict or divulgestate policies and secrets or may be harmful to the dignity of theChinese(People's Daily,2002);though public regulations onmarketing strategydomains(e.g.,packaging,advertising)existin developed market economies as well,the degree of controlput forth by Chinese authorities is tighter and highlydiscretional and therefore represents an additional constraintto the implementation of innovative marketing strategies in theChinese context.We believe that although these environmental conditionsmake it imperative for new ventures to develop innovativestrategies,they nevertheless pose significant obstacles in theimplementation phase.Chinese new ventures also facesignificant external obstacles in obtaining the resources thatmay be required to implement an innovative strategy.China'stransitional economy is characterized by weak capital marketstructures,institutional instability and lack of coherent businesslaws.In comparison with well-established firms,new ventureshave less legitimacy in terms of relationships with suppliers,customers,and government institutions.Under these circum-stances,new ventures have greater external difficulties inraising resources,licenses and approvals for their activities(Li&Atuahene-Gima,2001),and face increased uncertainty andcosts in consummating market exchanges(Xin&Pearce,1996).Following the contingent resource-based view,we argue that toharness the advantages of MSI,Chinese new ventures mustovercome these obstacles by relying on the external relation-ships of their top management(Lee et al.,2001)and bydeploying their resources in an appropriate technology andmarket environment(Teece et al.,1997).2.2.Moderating role of top management team externalrelationshipsExternal relationships are capabilities that are difficult toduplicate by competitors because they are socially complex.Hence,they constitute effective sources of information andresources for new ventures that augment their meager resourcesin implementing strategic innovations(Lee et al.,2001).Thus,external relationships contribute to the effectiveness oforganizational action by reducing transaction costs within andbetween firms,notably information search anddecision-makingcosts.The idea that external relationships may provide valuablesources of information and influence for organizations has beenparticularly important in work on transitional economies such asChina.Researchers have argued that guanxi relations in Chinaprovide vital sources of information and influence that can beused to promote company performance(Park&Luo,2001;Peng&Luo,2000).Pervasive uncertainties and high levels ofrisk associated with businesses in transitional economies can bebuffered by external relationships that can provide access totechnical and managerial expertise that may not readily beavailable through labor markets.Moderating roles of this type are commonly performed by impersonal agents in more highlydeveloped markets;however,transitional economies typicallylack the necessary social and institutional infrastructure for thattype of exchange and companies must rely on informal channels(Li&Atuahene-Gima,2001).Park and Luo(2001)found thatChinese firms pursuing creative strategies sought moreresources from external sources to mitigate the costs and risksassociated with such strategies.This research suggests amoderating role for such relationships in the use of innovativestrategies.Prior research suggests two main types of external relation-ships:(1)those with managers of other firms,and(2)those withofficials of government and financial institutions(Peng&Luo,2000).Relations with managers can be further categorized intotwo:relationships with managers outside the firm's industry(extraindustry relationships)and those with managers within thesame industry(intraindustry relationships)(Geletkanycz&Hambrick,1997).Our focus on these external relationships isnot to deny the importance of other specific managerial rela-tionships such as those with customers and employees.Rather,our focus responds to Peng and Luo's(2000:498)call for theneed to probe deeper into types of managerial relationships inChina and also recognizes the critical importance of governmentand financial relationships for new ventures in China(Park&Luo,2001;Peng&Luo,2000).2.3.Intra and extraindustry relationshipsExtraindustry relationships refer to the degree to which thetop management team has built connections with managers offirms outside its own industry,defined as the high-technologyindustry in which the new venture operates.Intraindustryrelationships refer to the degree to which the top managementteam has built connections with executives of other firmsoperating within the same industry as its own firm.The recentcontribution by Blyler and Coff(2003)has strongly advocatedthe central role of social capital in enabling dynamiccapabilities.However,different aspects of managers'connections to social networks may have opposite effects on thecontent of strategy formulation.Geletkancyz and Hambrick(1997)argued that while intraindustry relationships promoteconformity to industry norms and recipes,extraindustryrelationships provide a broader range of information andevoke strategies that deviate from prevailing practices.Theirresearch highlights an important connection between inter-firmrelationships and internal processes of information acquisitionand learning in strategic decision-making.Extraindustry relationships serve as conduits for newinformation and insights into the environment.Becausemanagers outside the focal new venture's industry operate indifferent competitive and resource environments they possessdifferent experiences and mental models,and have access tonew ideas about different strategies.These relationships informthe managers of the focal venture about potential new strategies,and allow greater speed,flexibility and efficiency in strategyimplementation.Hence,extraindustry relationships are likely toreduce the high cost and potential errors associated with the collection and use of new information in animmature socialinteraction context of a new venture.By eliminating thesetransaction costs,extraindustry relationships increase the typesof new information and insights such that top managers are ableto spot implementation problems in MSI they otherwise wouldhave missed.Intraindustry relationships,in contrast,help firms to acquiredeeper knowledge and understanding of the competitors'strategies.While knowledge of competitors may encouragenew ideas,such knowledge may actually harm the implementation of an innovative strategy in marketing.The logic isthat managers in the same industry are exposed to familiaropportunities and threats,and routines with which to handlethem.Hence,the top management team of the focal new ventureis less likely to discover novel insights and ideas for implementing an innovative strategy in marketing.Intraindustryrelationships provide mental models that are a misfit with thefocal venture's MSI and therefore may jeopardize its effectiveimplementation.H1a.When extraindustry relationships are high,MSI has apositive effect on new product performance.H1b.When intraindustry relationships are high,MSI has anegative effect on new product performance.中国新技术企业在产品开发绩效营销策略创新上的权变价值摘要本研究基于对中国营销策略创新之间的关系对创业行为研究（MSI）与新产品绩效技术为基础的新风险的研究。

4 资源基础观的理论发展

4资源基础观的理论发展A Resource-Based View李玉刚博士 / 教授华东理工大学商学院yugangl@资源基础观要回答的问题⏹同行业不同企业的绩效为何长期不同？⏹对企业内部资源和核心竞争力的分析，现在一般称为资源基础学派（RBS，Resource-based school）或资源基础观点（ RBV，Resource-based View ）Ansoff和Andrew s⏹在战略研究中，对企业内部的优势和劣势的分析和评估作为战略制定的前提⏹Andrew s (1971) : "an internal appraisal of strengths and w eaknesses, led to identification of distinctive competencies."⏹Ansoff (1965) : synergy as "one internally generated by a combination of capabilities or competencies“⏹对企业内部因素的研究并没有深入展开资源基础的早期渊源⏹对企业内部资源和核心竞争力的分析，现在一般称为资源基础学派（RBS，Resource-based school）或资源基础观点（ RBV，Resource-based View ）⏹早期的三个来源⏹与众不同的竞争力理论⏹李嘉图（Ricardo，1817）的经济学⏹彭罗斯的企业成长理论与众不同的竞争力/总经理distinctive competence⏹1911年，在哈佛大学，分析组织中的总经理角色⏹总经理和企业的绩效之间的关系⏹高质量的总经理是企业的优势，低质量的总经理是企业的劣势⏹方法的局限性⏹总经理“高质”的品质和特性模棱两可⏹并不是企业优势的唯一来源与众不同的竞争力/制度性的领导能力distinctive competence⏹社会学家塞尔兹尼克 Selznick⏹制度性的领导者（constitutional leaders）⏹确保企业与众不同的价值和身份——企业与众不同的愿景租金理论⏹李嘉图（David Richardo ）关注“最初的、不可扩大的、不可破坏的天赋因素”的经济结果⏹土地的总供给相对固定，供给弹性低⏹那些拥有无供给弹性的高质量生产要素的人可能获得经济租金（高于正常的经济绩效）⏹企业使用的许多资源是没有供给弹性的，并且这些资源可能成为经济租金的源泉彭罗斯的企业成长理论⏹Penrose(1959) :theory of the growth of the firm ⏹从两方面理解企业⏹企业是一个由个体和群体活动组成的行政结构⏹企业是一组生产资源⏹经理人的任务⏹通过企业已经创造的行政结构，来利用企业控制的生产资源⏹彭罗斯的研究发现⏹企业所控制的生产性资源本质上是异质的⏹将异质的资源拓展到了管理团队、高层管理人员，以及企业家技巧之类的不具备弹性的生产性资源经济学对企业专有资源的关注企业资源理论的原始思想由来已久。

31种组织理论

附：31种组织理论中文对照表1. Adjustment-Cost Theoryof the Firm调整价格理论本身视角：企业各方应不断审视各方关系并调整；营销视角：供应链体系中，应不断审视调整各个营销组织间的关系和营销战略；营销洞见：战略营销资源的使用是与其需求程度和多样化的营销适应性。

例如一个营销组织对灵活性需求较大，该理论建议营销组织应该加强垂直化建设。

2. AgencyTheory代理理论本身视角：企业所有者雇佣职业经理人来经营管理组织；营销视角：企业所有者雇佣职业经理人来经营管理营销组织；营销洞见：信息不对称——逆向选择、道德风险：基于他们自身利益而非所有者利益，跨国营销组织会比国内组织更难以监管。

3. BehavioralTheory ofthe Firm企业行为理论本身视角：企业是由一些联盟和管理角色组成，来解决冲突和避免不确定性；营销视角：企业是由一些营销联盟和营销管理角色组成，来解决冲突和避免不确定性；营销洞见：营销组织是在市场环境的不确定、市场环境并不能完美匹配、各方利益冲突中进行的。

4. BoundedRationalityTheory有限理性理论本身视角：在做出企业决策时，明白并分析所有相关信息是不可能的；营销视角：在制定营销战略决策时，明白并分析所有相关信息是不可能的；营销洞见：由于信息有限、认知有限、时间约束，管理者在做营销战略决策时是有限理性的。

5. Competence-BasedTheory基于竞争力理论营销洞见：内在因素理论，与众不同的竞争力，在竞争中存活，创造未来的竞争优势、核心竞争力：改善现有的或是学习新的。

6. ContingencyTheory权变理论营销洞见：与组织相联系的相关的环境需求匹配程度，没有最好的方法来组织营销组织、每一种组织方式并非同样有效，营销组织需要面对不同的市场环境、各种各样潜在的挑战。

7. EclecticTheory ofInternationalProduction国际生产的折衷理论营销洞见：企业对外直接投资所能够利用的是所有权优势、内部化优势和区位优势，只有当企业同时具备这三种优势时，才完全具备了对外直接投资的条件。

A Resource-Based View of the Firm

A Resource-Based View of the FirmAuthor(s): Birger WernerfeltSource: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1984), pp. 171-180Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ./page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@.John Wiley & Sons is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to StrategicManagement Journal.。

【企业】外文翻译对于一个企业的知识基础型理论

【关键字】企业中文3125字本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：TOW ARD A KNOWLEDGE-BASED THEORY OF THE FIRM出处：School of business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, U.S.A作者ROBERT M. GRANTTOW ARD A KNOWLEDGE-BASED THEORY OF THE FIRMROBERT M. GRANTSchool of business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, U.S.AGiven assumptions about the characteristics of knowledge and the knowledge requirements of production, the firm is conceptualized as an institution for integrating knowledge. The primary contribution of the paper is in exploring the coordination mechanisms through which firms integrate the specialist knowledge of their members. In contrast to earlier literature, knowledge is viewed as residing within the individual, and the primary role of the organization is knowledge application rather than knowledge creation. The resulting theory has implicatious for the basis of organizational capability, the principles of organization design (in particular, the analysis of hierarchy and the distribution of decision-ranking authority), and the determinnants of the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the firm. More generally, the knowledge-based approach sheds new light upon current organizational innovations and trends and has farreaching implications for management practice.FoudationThe foundation for any theory of the firm is a set of initial premises which form the basis for the logical development of propositions concerning the structure, behavior, performance and indeed, the very existence of firms. Developing a knowledge-based theory of the firm raises the issue: What is knowledge? Since this question has intrigued some of the world's greatest thinkers from Plato to Popper without the emergence of a clear consensus, this is not an arena in which I choose to compete. In terms of defining knowledge, all I offer beyond the simple tautology of `that which is known' is the recognition that there are many types of knowledge relevant to the firm.' For the purposes of developing a theory of the firm, my primary task is to establish those characteristics of knowledge which have critical implications for management.The literature on the analysis and management of knowledge points to the following characteristics aspertinent to the utilization of knowledge within the firm to create value.TransferabilityThe resource-based view of the firm recognizes the transferability of a firm's resources and capabilities as a critical determinant of their capacity to confer sustainable competitive advantage(Barney, 1986). With regard to knowledge, the issue of transferability is important, not only between firms, but even more critically, within the firm. The management literature has clearly recognized the epistemological distinction between knowing how and knowing about which is captured by distinctions between subjective vs. objective knowledge, implicit or tacit vs. explicit knowledge, personal vs.prepositional knowledge,and procedural vs. declarative knowledge. My purpose here is not to make fine distinctions between different types of knowledge. I identify knowing how with tacit knowledge, and knowledge about facts and theories with explicit knowledge.The critical distinction between the two lies in transferability and the mechanisms for transfer across individuals, across space, and across time.Explicit knowledge is revealed by its communicanon. This ease of communication is its fundamental property. Indeed information has traditionally been viewed by economists as being a public good-once created it can be consumed by additional users at close to zero marginal cost.Tacit knowledge is revealed through its application. If tacit knowledge cannot be codified and can only be observed through its application and acquired through practice, its transfer between people is slow, costly, and uncertain (Kogut andZander, 1992).Capacity for aggregationThe efficiency with which knowledge can be transferred depends, in part, upon knowledge's potential for aggregation. Knowledge transfer involves both transmission and receipt. Knowledge receipt has been analyzed in terms of the absorptive capacity of the recipient (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). At both individual and organizational levels, knowledge absorption depends upon the recipient's ability to add new knowledge to existing knowledge. This requires additivity between different elements of knowledge. Efficiency of knowledge aggregation is greatly enhanced when knowledge can be expressed in terms of common language. Statistics is a particularly useful language for aggregating (andtransferring) certain types of explicit knowledge-its efficiency in this role is greatly enhanced through advances in information technology. Thus, information on Ford Motor Company's cash balances, its foreign currencyexposure, its inventories of spark plugs and crankshafts is readily transferred from multiple locations within the company and aggregated at a single location. Conversely information about the capabilities of Ford managers, or the quirks of individual machine tools, is idiosyncratic knowledge cannot which cannot be aggregated at a single location. Hayek(1945: 521) refers to this as`knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place,' and Jensen and Meckling (1992) as `specific knowledge.' As these authors have shown, and as we shall explore later in the paper,the ability to transfer and aggregate knowledge is a key determinant of the optimal location of decision-making authority within the firm.AppropriabilityAppropriability refers to the ability of the owner of a resource to receive a return equal to the value created by that resource (Teece, 1987; Levin et n1., 1987). Knowledge, is a resource which is subject to uniquely complex problems of appropriability. Tacit knowledge is not directly appropriable because it cannot be directly transferred: it can be appropriated only through its application to productive activity. Explicit knowledge suffers from two key problems of appropriability: first,as a public or nonrivalroos good, any one who acquires it can resell without losing it (Arcow,1984); second, the mere act of marketing knowledge makes it available to potential buyers(Arcow, 1971: 152). Thus, except for patents and copyrights where knowledge owners are protected by legally established property rights, knowledge is generally inappropriable by means of market transactions. Lack of clear property rights results in ambiguity over the ownership of knowledge.While most explicit knowledge and all tacit knowledge is stored within individuals, much of this knowledge is created within the firm and is firm specific. This creates difficulties over the allocation of the returns to knowledge and achieving optimal investment in new knowledge(Rosen, 1991).Specialization in knowledge acquisitionFundamental to Simon's principle of bounded rationality is recognition that the human brain has limited capacity to acquire, store and process knowledge. The result is that efficiency in know-ledge production (by which I mean the creation of new knowledge, the acquisition of existing knowledge, and storage of knowledge) requires that individuals specialize in particular areas of knowledge. This implies that experts are (almost) invariably specialists, while jacks-of-all-trades are masters-of-none.The knowledge requirements of production Production involves thetransformation of inputs into outputs. Fundamental to a knowledge-based theory of the fine is the assumption that the critical input in production and primary source of value is knowledge. Indeed, if we were to resurrect a single-factor theory of value in the tradition of the classical economists' labor theory of value or the French Physiocrats land-based theory of value, then the only defensible approach would be a knowledge-based theory of value,on the grounds that all human productivity is knowledge dependent, and machines are simply embodiments of knowledge.The exitence of the firmsThe above precepts establish a rationale for the existence of firms. Following Demsetz (1991:171一175), the existence of the firm represents a response to a fundamental asymmetry in the economics of knowledge: knowledge acquisition requires greater specialization than is needed for its utilization. Hence, production requires the coordinated efforts of individual specialists who possess many different types of knowledge. Yet markets are unable to undertake this coordinating role because of their failure in the face of (a)the immobility of tacit knowledge and (b) the risk of expropriation of explicit knowledge by the potential buyer. Hence, firms exist as institutions for producing goods and services because they can create conditions under which multiple individuals can integrate their specialist knowledge. These conditions include propinquity and 'low-powered' incentives designed to foster condition between individual specialists which avoid the problems of opportunism associated with the `high-powered' incentives directly related to knowledge transactions.A possible solution to the inability of markets to contract over transfers of tacit knowledge is to contract over units of workers' time. But ever if units of labor time are suitable proxies for the supply of tacit knowledge, so long as production requires the complex integration of multiple types of knowledge within a system of team production then Rosen(1991)shows that markets must establish an incredibly complex wage structure which sets a separate wage rate for every worker's interaction with every other worker.Note that this view of the role of the firm as a knowledge-integrating institution is somewhat different from that emphasized in the literature Most research into organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991)and the knowledge-based view of the firm (Spender, 1989;Nonaka, 1991, 1994) focuses upon the acquisition and creation of organizionalknowledge. Thus, spender(1989: 185) defines `the organization as, in essence, a body of knowledge about the organization's circumstances, resources, causal mechanisms, objectives, attitudes, policies, and so forth.' My approach is distinguished by two assumptions: first, that knowledge creation is an individual activity; second, that the primary role of firms is in the application of existing knowledge to the production of goods and services.'this dispensing with the concept of organizational knowledge in favor of emphasizing the role of the individual in creating and storing knowledge is consistent with Simon's observation that:`All learning takes place inside individual human heads; an organization learns in only two ways:(a) by the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have knowledge the organization didn't previously have' (Simon,1991: 125). More importantly, however, is the desire to understand the organizational processes through which firms access and utilize the knowledge possessed by their members. The flange inherent in the concept of organizational knowledge is that, by viewing the organization as thentity which creates, stores and deploys knowledge, the organizational processes through whicl individuals engage in these activities may be obscured. Thus, March views organizations a storing `knowledge in their procedures, norms rules, and forms. They accumulate such knowledge over time learning from their members(March, 1991: 73). This learning process involve `encoding inferences from history into routine that guide behavior. The generic term routine,includes the forms, rules, procedures, conventions strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and through which the;operate' (Levitt and March, 1988: 320). Takinl the organization as the unit of analysis not only runs the risk of reification, but, by defining rules procedures, conventions, and nouns as knowledge fails to direct attention to the mechanisms through which this `organizational knowledge' is createc through the interactions of individuals, and offers little guidance as to how managers can influence these processes.My emphasis is on the firm as an institution for knowledge application. This is not to deny the importance of organizational constext in knowledge creation. If production creation requires the integration of each person's knowledge with that of others, even if knowledge acquisition is individualistic, the firm provides necessary incentives and direction. If knowledge is specific to a particular team production process,then knowledge creation cannot be separated from knowledge application-both occur within a commen organizational context. Thus, if the membersof Manchester United soccer team have cumplementary skills, then they need to be tied together by long-term relationships in order to achieve the investment in team-based skills required to maximize team performance. Market contracts are unlikely to achieve the stability of long-term relationships and are likely to give rise to all the problems of opportunism that transactions cost economics predicts are a consequence of small numbers and transaction-specific investments.This rationale for the existence of the firm may be criticized as being a special case of the Coase/Williamson transaction cost theory of the firm. Firms exist because they are able to avoid the costs associated with market transactions; the knowledge-based view simply focuses upon the costs associated with a specific type of transaction-those involving knowledge. Certainly, the above analysis draws upon some familiar concepts of market failure. However, the key distinction is emphasis upon the firm as an organization for managing team production rather than an institution for managing transactions. In common with the arguments of Ghoshal and Moran(1996), the central advantage of firms in the production process is not simply an avoidance of the transactions costs associated with market exchange, but their unique advantages for governing certain types of economic activities from a logic that is very different from that of a market(Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 13). Integrating the knowledge of many different individuals in the process of producing goods and services is such a logic. To develop this argument further, these processes for integrating knowledge need to be specified more clearly.译文：对于一个企业的知识根底型理论ROBERT M. GRANT美国华盛顿乔治镇大学根据知识的特点和产品生产的知识要求，企业被定义为一个整合知识的机构。

mckinsey的成功秘密

Building the Professional Firm:McKinsey & Co.: 1939-1968byAmar V. Bhidé95-010Rev. March 19961995 by Amar V. BhidéAbstractReturns from investments made in a professional firm’s capabilities and resources are not easily appropriable. Firm owners therefore tend to underinvest in crucial intangible assets such as reputations and knowledge. This paper describes and analyzes how the founders of McKinsey & Co. overcame these problems to build one of the world's leading management consulting firms. McKinsey’s unusual success, I argue, derives form a distinctive system, developed over several decades, of professional norms, approach to serving clients, personnel policies, organization, governance and ownership which encourages firm members to identify with the long-term interests of the institution. The gradual development of the system makes it difficult to imitate. The system incorporates difficult-to-codify trade-offs that have evolved through decades of trial and error and are now embedded in the firm’s routines and tacit knowledge. The history and traditions of the firm have also inculcated values that encourage firm members to adhere to policies that they might, for short-term reasons, deviate from. The system’s evolution is not however merely the result of a series of chance events. McKinsey’s founders resorted to considerable trial and error, but it wasn’t ad hoc; the experiments were intended to discover the best means to further a long-term vision and strategy. Moreover, their vision and strategy derived more from a priori faith and personal values than from scientific evidence or financial calculation.Amar BhidéEdited version, Mar. 1996 DraftBuilding the Professional Firm:McKinsey & Co.: 1939-19681A firm's profits, according to the resource-based perspective (Wernerfelt, 1984), derive from strategic assets that rivals cannot easily obtain. For instance, a crucial asset -- "organizational competence" -- comprises many interrelated activities (Milgrom and Roberts, Holmstrom and Milgrom, Teece and Dosi) and evolves slowly over time (Nelson and Winter, Arrow, 1974). Firms that progress in the "wrong" direction cannot easily replicate the competence that successful rivals have developed through years of trial and error (Henderson, 1994). These concepts offer a worthy complement to the traditional product market approach, but as may be expected with a new perspective, the details and empirical evidence are still patchy. For example, what makes a path-dependent competence difficult to imitate? What promotes or retards trial-and-error learning from diffusing across an industry? Why do some firms take the right path and not others?Prior empirical work on these questions has dealt mainly with industrial (and usually capital-intensive) companies. The subject of my study, McKinsey & Co., is a professional service firm. In this setting, the challenge of building capabilities and resources comes with a twist: because the reputations, knowledge, and other intangible assets of a firm are closely tied to individual firm members, the firm's owners cannot fully capture the returns from their investment in such assets. For example, employees can leave with clients their firm had cultivated and the skills and training their firm had paid for. Even if the firm owners do control client relationships and expertise, they may avoid loss through defections, but they cannot fully realize the value of their investments through sale of the enterprise. As a result,1Except when otherwise stated, the data and quotes in this paper are drawn from two Harvard Business School teaching cases -- McKinsey & Company (A): 1956 (Case No. 393-066) and McKinsey & Co. (B) (Case No. 393-067). The cases were based on the author's interviews with several active and former McKinsey partners, two partners' memoirs (privately published, for the exclusive use of the firm's personnel), firm archives from the 1940s and 1950s, and the author's experiences as an associate at McKinsey from 1980 to 1985. Several McKinsey partners reviewed the cases for accuracy but made no effort to influence tone or content. I wish to thank the firm for generously making their time, writings, and records available to me.1they tend to underinvest in these crucial intangible assets.2 Many professional firms, therefore, represent little more than a convenient, often temporary banding of individuals. They invest little in organizational infrastructure, avoid opening many offices, and rely on the knowledge and training provided, as a public good, by universities and research institutions.McKinsey provides an instructive counterexample. The firm's owners have shown an unusual willingness to invest in the organization's infrastructure, reputation, and capabilities. McKinsey has established (as of 1993) 58 offices located in 31 countries. It conducts pro-bono studies that bring its partners into contact with influential members of the community. It invests in building a reputation for management expertise by encouraging its staff to publish articles and books. In its research budgets, McKinsey matches top business schools. McKinsey spends, according to its managing director, more than $50 million annually on knowledge building. Training (also estimated to cost $50 million in 19933) is, according to Business Week, "comprehensive and constant."4 In addition, the firm invests the valuable billable hours of senior professionals in evaluating and providing feedback to its members to improve their skills and build a reputation for quality work. A client impact committee oversees the evaluation of how much difference a consultant's work actually makes to a client and passes its findings on to the promotion and evaluation committees. And just as the magnitude of McKinsey's investment in firm building is noteworthy, so is the firm's longevity. At many consulting firms, discord over what individuals or strategies to invest in and how to divide the returns have led to defections, sale, or2The usual restriction of ownership to active firm members -- because outside investors are especially vulnerable to opportunism by the employees -- also discourages investment. As Fama and Jensen suggest, the inside shareholders who have much of their personal wealth tied up in the firm are apt to avoid risky investments. Moreover, ownership by many active firm members can make it difficult to decide which investments are worthwhile, especially in intangible assets such as reputation, and disagreement about the potential returns may preclude any investment.3"McKinsey Confronts Challenge of its Own: The Burdens of Size," Dana Milbank, Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1993, p. A1.4"The McKinsey Mystique," John A. Byrne, Business Week, September 20, 1993.2dissolution.5 McKinsey, however, has continued to invest in itself while turning over two to three generations of partners in the last 50 years.What makes McKinsey such a maverick? How has it developed what might be called the "meta-capability" of investing in firm assets -- the sina qua non for all other competencies and capabilities? I will argue that:1. No single factor can explain McKinsey's success -- the firm has developed a system to overcome investment disincentives whose every element is crucial. For example, the firm's ownership plan requires partners to sell their shares at book value (which in any successful professional firm is considerably lower than its true economic value) when they retire or leave the firm. Aspiring partners can thus look forward to buying stock at a cheap price and are dissuaded from leaving to start their own firms. But the ownership plan, of course, also has the potential to discourage older partners from making long-term investments. A partner close to retirement, for example, might oppose opening a new office or developing a practice in a new industry: the start-up costs would reduce the partnership's current profits, and the long-term increase in firm value would not be reflected in the share price the partner would receive upon retirement.The disincentive has been neutralized by the other elements of the system, such as the firm's client strategy, personnel policies, governance, and management principles and values. McKinsey has realized the benefits of its ownership plan without paying a serious cost because the system selects individuals who are predisposed to institution building and reinforces their innate preferences. Successful firm members earn attractive incomes that are partly based on their contribution to firm building. The system also encourages individuals to make investments whose financial rewards they may not fully enjoy by providing intangible rewards such as membership in an elite meritocracy and5"Except for a few accounting and law firms," Marvin Bower, a founder of McKinsey & Co., has noted, "almost no professional firm dates back 50 years or more."3what Hirschman calls "voice" in its governance and management.2. The system's gradual development helps explain its uniqueness. Although the founders established the firm's basic goals and broad vision when they launched McKinsey in 1939, it took many decades (see Table 1) to conceive, test, and implement several important elements. The implementation of certain principles, such as giving all partners a voice in firm governance, evolved as the firm grew: initially, all the partners jointly determined all important decisions; later, as the number of partners increased, committees and task forces were used extensively to proposed and analyze new policies. The system also evolved in response to problems and opportunities the founders had not thought about in 1939. For example, the ownership plan was adopted in 1956 after the partners became concerned about maintaining adequate incentives for the next generation. Similarly, the founders had conceived of McKinsey as a national firm. Overseas expansion began in the late 1950s as a result of the increased overseas activity of the firm's clients.Other policies were delayed because implementation was initially infeasible. For example, McKinsey only began recruiting at business schools in 1954, after it had achieved the requisite stature with clients for them to accept fresh graduates instead of consultants with previous industry experience. Similarly, during its European expansion in the 1960s, McKinsey initiated the policy of transferring existing staff to head up the new offices. Previously, when new offices had been added in the United States, McKinsey had brought in outsiders because it lacked sufficient internal talent.It is this gradual development that gives the system its stability and that makes it difficult to imitate. The system incorporates difficult-to-codify trade-offs (such as the emphasis on group solidarity and individual performance) that have evolved through decades of trial and error and are4Table 1McKinsey "System" and Its EvolutionGoalsBuild prestigious firm that will last in perpetuity From inception in 1939 Client StrategyServe large prestigious clients on top management problemsCharge premium feesFocus exclusively on consultingWorldwide clientele served through local offices 1939 goal; took about 10 years to implementFees raised as reputation and clientele improved Avoided audit and accounting from the beginning, but maintained executive recruiting until 1951 Initially East Coast only, national expansion after 1944, European entry in 1959Investment in Knowledge Building andDisseminationFrom inception; first seminars and publications in 1940 Emphasis on "Professionalism"From inception; formal code established in 1974Investment in Training Firmwide daylong sessions from inception; longerspecialized programs added laterOwnership PlanOwnership limited to active firm members Corporation with stock bought and sold at book 5% cap on individual ownership From inceptionAdopted in 195625% cap introduced in 1956, later reduced to 5%Selection and RecruitmentValue intellectual abilities over experienceRecruit from top business schoolsPersonal qualities of leadership, team-building as highly valued as intellectual abilitiesHire "partner" material only Initial aspirations stymied by personnel shortages in WWII Started at Harvard Business School in 1954Origins unknown, formally articulated in 1950s??Advancement and TerminationsPartnership based on "economic self-sufficiency" and leadership abilityPromote from within"Up or out" for junior personnelNo "lifetime" partnership; typically "peak in their 40s"Formally articulated in 1952Rigorously applied in opening European offices after 1959 First version, adopted in 1954; subsequently modified First partner eased out in 1952CompensationCompensate more than industryPerformance-based partnership compensation with high varianceConsiderable weight to "firm-building" activities 1939 policy implemented as firm built clientele and increased billingsFrom inception; criteria and processes first formalized in early 1950s-Do-Firm Governance and Management5Broadbased, consensual decision making"One firm policy"Fact-based and fair personnel decisionsSpirit of partnershipDeemphasis of hierarchy with "Responsibility for dissent" Multi-round secret ballots with "write-in" nominees to elect firm head From inception; implemented through committees and task forces after early 1950sImplemented and evolved as offices addedFormal criteria and processes first adopted in the 1950s From inceptionEspoused from inception; traditions established over time Adopted in 1968. Clee (1939-50) and Bower (1950-67) routinely reelected previouslynow embedded in the firm's routines and tacit knowledge. The history and traditions of the firm have also inculcated values that encourage firm members to adhere to policies -- for example, just serving top managers of large companies -- that they might, for short-term reasons, deviate from.3. The evolution of McKinsey's system owes much to the unusual qualities of its leaders, especially Marvin Bower, who co-founded the firm in 1939 and served as its managing partner between 1950 and 1967. Although luck (good and bad) certainly played a role in McKinsey's development, this is not a story of the selection of the fittest random mutations. Bower and his partners resorted to considerable trial and error, but it wasn't ad hoc; the experiments were intended to discover the best means to further a long-term vision and strategy. Moreover, the vision and strategy derived more from a priori faith and personal values than from scientific evidence or financial calculation. For example, Bower and his partners simply assumed that investments in training were worthwhile; they adopted policies (such as the ownership plan) that reflected Bower's dedication to the firm's longevity rather than financial self-interest. Arguably, few other professional firms took the McKinsey route because individuals with Bower's traits are so rare.Understanding the sustainability and cohesion of the McKinsey system thus requires taking a closer look at the firm's development and its leadership. In the pages that follow, I describe how the formative experiences of the founders shaped their goals and assumptions about building a consulting firm. Next I describe developments from 1939 to 1968. We will see how over these decades McKinsey built its economic base in the United States, formulated and implemented the critical internal, or organizational, elements of its system, and then rapidly took advantage of opportunities to grow6internationally. The overview of the firm's history then serves as a basis for the concluding section of the paper, which discusses the McKinsey system in greater detail, the difficulty of imitating the McKinsey formula, and the implications of the McKinsey story for other firms.Marvin Bower: Formative ExperiencesMarvin Bower and two co-founders started McKinsey & Co. in 1939, to take over the failing East Coast practice of McKinsey, Wellington & Co. McKinsey, Wellington had been formed in 1935 through a merger of James O. McKinsey & Company and Scovell, Wellington & Company. Many of the goals and policies that McKinsey's founders espoused in 1939, including its focus on consulting to top managers, its emphasis on professionalism and training, its client development approach, and its egalitarian, consensual culture were shaped by Bower's educational and family background, his experiences at McKinsey's two antecedent firms, and a brief legal career.Bower had graduated from Brown University in 1925 and Harvard Law School in 1928, when he had first applied for a position at Jones, Day, one of the most prestigious firms in his hometown of Cleveland. Jones, Day turned Bower down because his law school grades weren't high enough. Bower then enrolled at Harvard Business School and finished the first year of the MBA program in the top 5% of students, enabling him to secure the position at Jones, Day he been turned down for.At Jones, Day, Bower had the opportunity to work with Mr. Ginn, the firm's senior partner. "Because I had heard so much about him and the firm he had shaped," Bower recalls, "I made it an immediate objective to learn why it had been so successful. From observation and analysis during my Jones, Day years began the formulation of the program that I later brought with me to McKinsey." Bower was impressed with the firm's professional approach, recruiting standards, and the prominence of its partners in Cleveland's charitable, social, and cultural organizations.The Jones, Day experience also persuaded Bower of the opportunity to create a top-quality management consulting firm. During the Great Depression, bondholders' committees gained control of7Cleveland companies that defaulted on their bonds and asked Jones, Day for assistance. Thanks to Bower's business education, he became secretary of a number of committees; in that role, he studied the potential earning power of distressed companies and proposed recapitalization structures. Viewing his studies as "amateurish and superficial," he saw the need for a firm to handle these problems in the same professional manner in which Jones, Day handled legal problems. Bower was therefore pleased in 1933 when James O. McKinsey ("Mac"6), a certified public accountant and professor at the University of Chicago, asked him to join the New York office of James O. McKinsey & Company (JOM), a firm specializing in accounting and what was then known as "management engineering." Bower believed he could help develop JOM into the kind of firm he had envisioned.James O. McKinsey had founded the firm bearing his name in 1926. Mac had seen an opportunity to advise managers during World War I, when he served in the Army Ordnance Department and dealt with suppliers of war material. Seeking a reputation as a management expert, Mac -- who had already obtained bachelors degrees in pedagogy, law, and philosophy from three different colleges -- became a certified public accountant and received a master of arts degree in 1919. In 1920, he was appointed assistant professor of accounting at the University of Chicago. Mac wrote books, lectured to business groups, and became a junior partner in a firm that provided organizational, accounting, and industrial management advice.Mac's and Bower's backgrounds together shaped the firm that Bower would later launch in several ways. Apparently, Bower was always keen on associating with well-regarded institutions --Brown, Harvard, and Jones, Day -- which likely contributed to his desire to build a prestigious firm. At the same time, he came from a Cleveland family of modest means, and Mac had been raised on a farm in Missouri, which probably fostered a pragmatic and meritocratic orientation -- McKinsey would be6I will use "Mac" to avoid confusion with the firm bearing his name. It is also noteworthy that, unlike the other professional firms of the era, the staff at James O. McKinsey and Company and its successor firms addressed each other by their first names (or abbreviations), regardless of their rank or status. The practice was intended to promote collegiality and a nonhierarchical8prestigious but not genteel.Both men also unquestioningly believed in investing in intellectual capital -- no effort was made at JOM or later to measure the returns on such investments. Mac ran training meetings at JOM like the professor he still was. Mac's "text" was the General Survey Outline -- a checklist that reflected JOM's "integrated" or "top-management" approach. The Outline forced a strategic approach to client studies by requiring consultants to analyze a firm's industry and competitive position before considering anything specific to the organization. The JOM tradition of codifying knowledge and training and the top management approach would later be continued at McKinsey & Co.The JOM experience also shaped Bower's views about what he would not want in his firm. For instance, Bower questioned JOM's policy of conducting an audit practice alongside its consulting practice. He felt that most people could not excel in both accounting and consulting. Bower was also troubled by the conflict of interest in a corporation retaining its auditors to provide management counsel. Bower also was concerned about potential clients' perceptions of JOM, which was often regarded as a firm of "efficiency experts," or worse, "business doctors," whose retention was an admission of "sickness." The perception did not sit well with Bower, who would later invest in building a more respectable image for consultants.In 1934, JOM secured a prestigious study for Marshall Field and Company, the leading department store in the Middle West. Mac and Bower both worked on the study, and they submitted a report recommending concentration on the department store business and the divestiture or liquidation of most other businesses and assets, including the wholesale business, all 18 textile mills, and the Merchandise Mart (then the world's largest office building). The bold report, and the attention it generated, was a forerunner of the work that McKinsey now routinely undertakes. Later that year, the Marshall Field board offered Mac the job of chairman and chief executive, which he accepted.culture.9Mac also decided at that time to merge his firm with Scovell, Wellington & Company, headed by C. Oliver Wellington. The firm had 11 accounting offices, but its management engineering or consulting staffs were confined to Boston, New York, and Springfield. Horace G. ("Guy") Crockett headed the New York consulting practice, and F. Richmomd ("Dick") Fletcher headed the Boston consulting staff. Oliver Wellington and Mac decided to create two partnerships: Scovell, Wellington & Company (SW), accountants, and McKinsey, Wellington & Company (MW), management engineers. Wellington would be managing partner of both firms. Bower was disappointed by the continued association of consulting and accounting practices but Mac "brushed [Bower's] views aside"; the MW partnership agreement was signed in November 1935.Crockett, then 55, became manager of MW's New York office. Bower, 32, served as his deputy. Andrew Thomas ("Tom") Kearney, who had served as Mac's number 2 at JOM, became the manager of the Chicago office. Dick Fletcher continued as manager of the Boston consulting staff. At the time of the merger, the JOM office was located at 52 Wall Street and the SW office, at 115 Broadway. Bower proposed a separate office for MW to achieve at least a physical separation between the consultants and the accountants. Crockett agreed, and MW moved to a new building at Two Wall Street, taking on a lease that would later become a problem.The merged firm inherited a major study from Scovell, Wellington for U.S. Steel. During this period, the standing of management engineers improved, and Bower, who regarded "management engineers" as an inaccurate characterization, adopted the term "management consultants." He urged the staff to be sensitive to the need for eliminating the popular terms "efficiency expert" and "business doctor" and to take the time to discuss the nature of the firm's consulting process with insiders or outsiders who used those terms.The partnerships did not merge harmoniously because the Chicago partners resented Oliver Wellington's autocratic management style. In 1937, Bower, who had adopted from his Jones, Day years10the practice of "putting it down on paper" (a tradition that would continue at McKinsey), tried to get agreement on a memo he wrote on firm objectives, but found the Chicago partners indifferent to his efforts. Partner dissatisfactions were muted, however, because the Steel study and growth in Chicago resulted in satisfactory earnings.In May 1937, Wellington announced that the Steel study, which accounted for about 55% of total MW billings, would soon terminate. In November, James O. McKinsey died unexpectedly, and Marshall Field executives, who harbored resentment against the outsider, helped generate considerable negative publicity for MW. The firm went into a loss position in 1938, when Chicago earnings could not offset New York and Boston losses. The Chicago partners now became alarmed about the Two Wall Street lease.In April 1939, Bower proposed a reorganization that would separate MW from SW, keeping the New York and Chicago offices together as a single firm. Kearney and his Chicago partners, however, believed there was ample work locally and questioned the value of operating multiple offices. Bower then suggested to Crockett that they, along with Fletcher of Boston, form a new partnership that would take over the eastern practice of MW and assume the Two Wall Street lease. The Chicago partners would organize a firm of their own, and Wellington would return to SW.Perhaps because of the personal relationship he had formed with Bower,7 Crockett agreed to start a new firm with Bower rather than return to the security of SW. Kearney and the Chicago partners also favored Bower's plan because it shielded them from the Two Wall Street lease. Differences over the names of the two firms were resolved when Bower suggested McKinsey, Kearney & Company (MK) for the Chicago firm and McKinsey & Co. for the East Coast firm.Guy Crockett became managing partner of the new East Coast firm and continued to serve as7"After four years of working together," Marvin recalls, "Guy and I were very close." Commenting on MW's New York office move in 1935 to a new location, Marvin thought that Guy "welcomed a physical separation from Oliver."11manager of the New York office. Bower, who functioned as deputy to Crockett in both roles, recalls that the two worked "as a team" with complementary strengths and interests. The older man was chiefly interested in "day-to-day operating matters"; Bower's primary interests were "conceptual and long term."In his 1937 memo on firm objectives, Bower had described a long-term vision. He had proposed that MW confine its activities to management consulting; place primary emphasis on solving major management problems; adhere to the highest standards of integrity, professional ethics, and technical excellence; select, train, and advance personnel so that the firm would be self-perpetuating; provide the work-interest, financial reward, and growth opportunities that would attract young men of outstanding qualifications; and continuously increase its stature and influence. The memo served as a starting point for the goals of the new firm.Although Bower took the lead in defining the firm's long-term strategy, he also sought the endorsement of his partners. In 1940, he took responsibility for producing a booklet for prospective clients, entitled Supplementing Successful Management, that described the firm and its practice. It took nearly a year to produce the publication because Bower wanted his three partners to "agree with substantially every word," so that they would gain "genuine agreement" on the kind of firm they wanted to create. Apparently, Mac's dismissal of Bower's objections to the MW merger, Oliver Wellington's autocratic style, and conflicts with the Chicago partners had impressed on Bower the value of consensus building even at the expense of delay.Building a National Practice: 1939-50In the first decade or so, the McKinsey partners focused on building the economic base of the firm: They expanded and upgraded their client base, opened new offices, and raised fees, relying mainly on "doing good work" rather than on any innovative strategy. While Bower also tried to establish norms12。

RBV回顾(资源基础理论的系统梳理)

1.理论基础:李嘉图学派经济学（2）
李嘉图经济租和不同层级肥力土地的经济效果
1.理论基础:李嘉图学派经济学（3）
对这种持久的绩效优势的威胁（租金耗散） a.市场需求向左下方移动； b.某些低成本的方式来提高其土地的肥力，从而
减少拥有较肥沃土地企业的绩效优势。
D1 MC
S p* p** D
AC
MC AC
1.理论基础:李嘉图学派经济学（1）
“原始的、不可扩增的和不可毁灭的源自自然的馈赠”相关的经济结果（Ricardo, 1817） “original, unaugmentable, and indestructible gifts of Nature”；经济租（economic rents ）：某种生产要素的所有者获得的超过诱使这种要素进入生产过程所需的最小支付额的部分。（Hirshleifer，1980）
RBV:缘起、释义与启示
（Origins and Implications）
报告内容
理论溯源
基本架构实证研究研究展望
一、理论溯源
“为什么一些企业的绩效总是胜过其他企业？”（持久卓越绩效从何而来） Why do some firms persistently outperform others?
（一）理论溯源:理论发展（3）
4.Barney, J. 1991. “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage.” Journal of Management 17(1):99-120. 5.Dierickx, I. and K. Cool 1989. “Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage.” Management Science 35:1504-1511. 6.Conner, K. 1991. “An Historical Comparison of Resource-based Logic and Five Schools of Thought within Industrial Organization Economies: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm Here?” Journal of Management 17:121-154 (especially 132 to 150). 7.Peteraf, M.A. 1993. “The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-based View.” Strategic Management Journal 14:179-192. 8.Teece, D. J, G. Pisano and A. Shuen. 1997. “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management.” Strategic Management Journal, 18, 7, 509533.

RBV(资源基础理论)的经典文献及摘要

Theory in RBV♦◆☐a) Penrose, 1959. "Theory of the Growth of the Firm".●Theme:1) The internal resources of a firm - the productive services available to a firm from its own resources, particularly the productive services available from management with experience within the firm.2) As management tries to make the best use of the resources available, a truly 'dynamic' interacting process occurs which encourages continuous growth but limits the rate of growth.●RQ: Assuming that some firms can grow, what principles will govern their growth, and how fast and how long can they grow? Alternatively, assuming that there are opportunities for expansion in an economy, what determines the kind of firm that will take advantage of them and to what extent?●What is a "firm":a) Economics: Price (p) and Output (q) --> Optimal size problem.(Size=output)b) The Firm as an administrative organization (central management)c) The Firm as a collection of productive resources.-- Resources: physical resources and human resources.-- Services yielded by resources-- The size of a firm should be measured with respect to the present value of the total of its resources used for its own productive purposes.●The motivation of the firm:a) The profit motive: The financial and investment decisions of firms are controlled by a desire to increase total long-run profits.b) Growth and profits become equivalent as the criteria for the selection of investment programs.●Inherited Resources and the Direction of Expansion1) Firm Growth: External and Internal inducement / obstacles- Internal obstacles arise when services (in particular the managerial capacity and the technical skills) required for expansion are not available in sufficient amounts within the firm.- Internal inducements arise largely from the existence of a pool of unused productive services, resources, and special knowledge.2) The continuing availability of unused services:强调人与资产的循环互动,相互推动,相互开发.a) So long as any resources are not used fully in current operations, there is an incentive for a firm to find a way of using them more fully.b) No "equilibrium position"Indivisibility of resources: There's always unused servicesIn the process of utilizing unused services, new types of resources will always be added to the firm's collection of resources.c)'Idle' services and 'specialized' services: Specialization leads to higher common multiplies, higher common multiplies leads to greater specialization. -- Specialization --> Diversification --> Specialization......d) New services will also become available from existing resources.Interaction between personnel and material resources: Not only can the personnel of a firm render heterogeneous varieties of services, but also the material resources can be used in different ways, if the people who work with them get different ideas.e) The creation of new productive services. The services that resources will yield depend on the capacities of the men using them, but the development of the capacities of men is partly shaped by the resources men deal with.3) Demand and ResourcesDemand is a necessary condition of entrepreneurial interest in any product, but the original incentive to a great deal of innovation can be found in a firm's desire to use its existing resources more efficiently.4) The Direction of ExpansionNew combinations previously acquired or inherited resources and other resources which must be obtained from the market.♦◆☐b) Wernerfelt, 1984. "A Resource-Based View of the firm".●Theme: to look at firms in terms of resources rather than products; & Sequential entry.●Resource: anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm. Definition: Tangible or intangible assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm.●1. Resource and profitability1) General effect: monopolistic bargaining power, substitution2) First Mover Advantage - Resource position barriers (VS. entry barrier- entry barrier是针对incumbent和potential entrants,未考虑diversifier.)3) Attractive resources (difficult for others to catch up)4) Mergers and Acquisitions: to trade otherwise non-marketable resources and to buy or sell resources in bundles.●2. Dynamic resource management1) The resource-product matrix2) Sequential entry - to develop the resource in one market and then to enter other markets from a position of strength.3) Exploit and develop - a balance between exploitation of existing resources and development of new ones.4) Stepping stones - diversification step must be evaluated in terms of short-term balance effect and long-term function as stepping stones to further expansion.c) Barney, 1986. "Strategic factor markets: expectations, luck and business strategy".●Theme: Above normal economic returns comes from more accurate expectations (originated from unique skills and capabilities) or luck from the strategic factor market.●1. Strategic factor markets: where firms buy and sell the resources necessary to implement their strategies.●2. Expectation and luck in strategic factor market●3. To obtain above normal returns: a) must be consistently better informed concerning the future value of those strategies; b) there are some ways to be better informed1) by analysis of competitive environment: less likely to systematically generate the expectation advantages because the methodologies for collecting this information and the conceptual models for analyzing it are in the public domain.2) by analysis of unique skill and capabilities: to analyze information about the assets a firm already controls but are not available to other firms (special manufacturing know-how, business experience, TMT...).♦◆☐d) Barney, 1991, "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage".●Assumptions: Firms may be heterogeneous and resources may not be perfectly mobile.●Key concepts:-Firm Resource: include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. (or, strengths) controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. (physical capital resources, human capital resources and organizational capital resources)-Sustained Competitive Advantage: 1) compared with current and potential competitors; 2) notduplicable by others; 3) not necessarily survive in Schumpeterian Shocks.●4 attributes of resources to have potential SCA:-Valuable-Rare-Imperfectly imitable: path dependent, causally ambiguity and socially complexity.-Non substitutable: substituted by similar resources or different strategic resources.♦◆☐ePriem and Butler, 2001. "Is the Resource-Based 'View' a useful perspective for strategic management research?"●1. RBV as a Theory? - lawlike generalizationa) Generalized conditionsb) Empirical context (tautology)c) Nomic necessity●2. An elemental fallacy of RBVThe 'value' attribute and environmental side●3. For strategy researcha) Operational validity and implement abilityb) RBV boundaries ( context)c) All-inclusive Resourcesd) The process from resource to SCAe) Static RBV - limitations (hard to evaluate resource, process black box, difficult to practice,...) ●4. Discussion:Formalizing RBV towards a theoryAnswering the How questionIncorporating the temporal component - path dependentIntegrating demand heterogeneity model♦◆☐f) Barney, 2001. 'Is RBV a useful perspective for strategic management research? Yes.' Admitting market-side consideration♦◆☐g) Amit and Schoemaker, 1993. "Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent".●RQ: How to identify, develop and deploy firm-specific Strategic Assets?●Main Contributions: Strategic assets and Strategic Industry Factors●Firm level - Strategic assets: the set off difficult to trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized Resources and Capabilities.●Market level - Strategic Industry Factors: Certain resources and capabilities that have become the prime determinants of economic rents. (ex post)●Problem: how to identify, ex ante, a set of Strategic Assets.●Multidimensional view:1) Industry Analysis: the focus is on rent distribution2) RBV: the focus is internal evolutionary path; trade-off between specialization and robustness3) Behavioral view: uncertainty, complexity, conflict. --> suboptimal♦◆☐f) Dierickx and Cool, 1989. "Asset stock accumulation and Sustainability of competitive advantage". (early dynamic RBV article)●Main points:-Critical resources that are imperfectly imitable are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor market (Barney, 1986). Asset accumulation process: time compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, inter-connectedness, asset erosion and causal ambiguity.-Accumulation of asset stocks: the strategic asset stocks are accumulated by choosing appropriate time paths of flows over a period of time.-Strategic asset stocks: non-tradable, nonimitable and nonsubstitutableEmpirical in RBVA. Topic: Managerial Ability and firm performance♦◆☐Holcomb et. al, 2009. "Making the most of what you have: managerial ability as a source of resource value creation".●This article goes back to Penrose (1959)'s seminal work, investigating the effect of managerial ability on resource productivity, interacting with resource quality. There are 3 main contributions:1. Managerial ability is a potential source of value creation.2. Managerial ability interactive with resource quality influences value creation.3. The process of managerial ability to optimize firm performance -- synchronization of combinations of resource bundles.●Data source: football team.B. Topic: Non-scale free capabilities and diversification♦◆☐Levinthal and Wu, 2010. "Opportunitycosts and non-scale free capabilities: profit maximization, corporate scope, and profit margins".●This study provides an alternative explanation for diversification discount, which relies on an opportunity costs logic to distinguish between non-scale free and scale free capabilities, and also provides a rational explanation for the divergence between total profits and profit margins.1. RBV logic: The fungibility of resource is the basis for the explanation of related diversification. --> Assumption: scale free.2. Opportunity cost of resources --> non-scale free resources3. Market demand and resource allocation - Diversification is also impacted by the market opportunities: when the current industry becomes mature, firms make rational decisions to increase total profit (profit maximization) via diversification. However, firms need to allocate their non-scale free resources to new business, which may lead to lower average returns.4. Diversifying firms are 'good types' (i.e., high capabilities) operating in 'bad' market context. (i.e., generalist firm)C. Topic: Formality and SME performance♦◆☐Terziovski, 2010. "Innovation practice and its performance implications in small and medium enterprises (SEMs) in the manufacturing sector: a resource-based view."●Theory: Schumpeterian's two-phase innovation theory; the benefits of formality (efficiency) and informality (flexibility).●Results: innovation strategy and formal structure are positive predictors of SME performance.D. Mergers and Acquisitions♦◆☐a) Puranam and Srikanth, 2007. "What they know VS. What they do: how acquirers leverage technology acquisitions".●Theme: to reconcile the integration paradox - Leveraging what they know (learning) & Leveraging what they do (disruption).●Main effect: Post acquisition integration (structural integration/structural separation) --> the success of leveraging.●Moderating effect: acquisition experience●Logic: integration mechanism both enhances coordination and harm leveraging technology.●Arguments:1. Structural integration enhances the leveraging of knowledge via coordination effect.2. Structural integration harms the leveraging of capability (ongoing innovations of the acquired firm) via the decrease of autonomy.3. Acquisition experience of acquirer moderates the relationship.4. Some solutions of post acquisition: rich unstructured communication, in the form of frequent face-to-face interactions, acids the disruptive consequences of administrative and cultural integration while also enabling high levels of coordination.♦◆☐b) Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999. 'Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspective on mergers and ac questions: a case survey of synergy realization'.●Arguments: Synergy realization is a function of the similarity and complementarity of two merging businesses (combination potential), the extent of interaction and coordination during the organizational integration process, and the lack of employee resistance the combined entry.♦◆☐c) Haunschild, 1994. "How much is that company worth?: Interorganizational relationship, uncertainty and acquisition premiums."- Network perspective●Arguments:1. Firm managers will look to both their interlock partners and professional firms when deciding how much to pay.2. The impact of interlocks and professional firms on the premium decision will be stronger when managers are uncertain about the value of the Acquisition target.♦◆☐d) Stearns and Allan, 1996. "Economic behavior in institutional environments: the corporate merger wave of the 1980s".-Network and institutional perspective●A model: First, economic and political changes create conditions for merger wave; second, challengers (marginal actors) who lack status and resources exploit these conditions; third, the methods of successful challengers are imitated through the business community.。

资源基础观理论(“资源”文档)共10张

valuable resources at the firm’s disposal. The resource-based view (RBV) is an economic tool used to determine the strategic resources availabl理论为，企业是各种资源的集合体。由于各种不同的原因，企业拥有的资源各不相同，具有异质性，这种异质性决定了企业竞争力的差异。概括地讲，资源基础理论主要包括以下3方面的内容：1.特殊的异质资源，2.资源的不可模仿性，3.特殊资源的获取与管理。
• The resource-based view (RBV) is an economic tool used to determine the strategic resources available to a firm. The fundamental principle of the RBV is that the basis for a competitive advantage of a firm lies primarily in the application of the bundle of valuable resources at the firm’s disposal.
尽管资源基础理论的很多思想可以在马歇尔的著作中找到，学术界还是把潘罗斯（Penrose）1959年出版的《企业成长论》（The theory of the growth of the firm）看作资源基础理论的源头。
成功企业的资源和能力难以被学习和模由于各种不同的原因，企业拥有的资源各不相同，具有异质性，这种异质性决定了企业竞争力的差异。
杨杜从企业成长理论角度研究，主要是运用经济学思想和扩张函数算法分析，指出未充分利用的资源是企业成长的源泉。

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