Chapter_10 经济发展 economic growth. weil 课件
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Chapter 9THE CUTTING EDGE OF TECHNOLOGY Marco SavioliThe cutting edge of technology«Cutting edge technology»: new techniques that are just moving out of development and into production. Cutting edge technologies hold great promise for higher productivity, although they are not guaranteed to work (eg quantum computing, gene therapy, …)With time, technologies that are at the cutting edge become commonplace or even obsoleteThe era of rapid technological progress dates back only250 years in the most advanced countries. Before this period, technological advance was slow and sporadic. Even today, waves of progress alternate with periods of slack technoligical changethe 18th centuryFocus on Europe: not only it is the area for which the best data are available but also it had become the world’stechnology leader by 1700Growth accounting for such an early period poses problems. The avalable data are quite sparse. Land (X) played an important role as an input thenY=AXβL1−βy=A XLβ→LADS→y=A+βX−βLConsidering a geographical area of constant size: X=0A=y+βLthe 18th centuryTo calculate the growth rate of productivity A we need data on the growth rates of income per capita and the size of the populationIn preindustrial economies the share of national income paid to land owners was one-third: β=13Table 9.1 Growth Accounting for Europe,A.D. 500–1700500-1500: the Malthusian model of population fit Europe well1500-1700: growth rate of productivity was five times as high but extremely slow in comparison to what we see in the world todayThe most significant turning point in the history of technological progress, generally dated1760-1830 in Britain, spreading somewhat later to continental Europe and North AmericaBusiness began to mechanize production in ways that would allow the transfer of tasks performed by skilled artisans to machines working faster and tirelesslyTextiles: innovations in the manufacture of textiles, particularly cotton; a wave of new inventions in spinning, weaving, and printing fabric; as a consequence, the use of underwear became common for the first timeEnergy: wind, water, animals, and human muscle had been the only sources of mechanical energy for millenia. The steam engine, in which burning fuel produced steam to drive a piston, represented a revolutionary break with the past. Using the steam engine tapped the vast chemical energy contained in coal deposits as a source of mechanical energyMetallurgy: the widespread replacement of wood coal as a source of fuel in iron smelting, as well as several important technical innovations, drammatically drove down the cost of iron production. By 1825 England, with 2% of the world population, was producing half of the world’s ironFigure 9.1 British Iron Production, 1600–1870Figure 9.2 British Output and Productivity Growth, 1760–1913The industrial revolutionDespite the technological upheavals, the pace of economic growth was quite slow by modern standardsGrowth in productivity and output did not stop or even slow down with the end of the industrial revolution in1830: «second industrial revolution», 1860-1900, withinnovations in industries such as chemicals, electricity, and steelThe technologies introduced during the industrial revolution were revolutionary, but their impact was small because they were initially confined to a few industriesThe industrial revolution was a beginning. The pattern of continual growth that began then was indeed revolutionary in contrast to what had come beforeFigure 9.3 U.S. Output and Productivity Growth, 1870–2007Technological progress since the industrial revolution1890-1971: period of high growth of US total factor productivity.During this period, there were important changes like electriclights, refrigeration, air conditioning, telephone, automobile, air travel, radio, television, and indoor plumbing. Technologiesinvented previously but only then diffusion of themDramatic reduction in the growth rate of productivity starting in the early1970s, throughout all the developed worldEfficiency fell in this period: large increases in the price of oil in 1973 and 1979 threw the industrial economies into chaosRecessions, one in 1974 and another in 1981-1983, left a significant fraction of the capital stock sitting idleStarting in the mid-1990s, change in the trend. Maybe a third industrial revolution centered on computing and ICTThe technology production functionTechnological progress does not occur spontaneously but rather as a result of deliberate effortTechnology production function: the output is new technologies and the inputs are labor and human capital of researchers, along with the capital they useThe best evidence regarding the output of the technology production function is the growth rate of productivity:productivity growth does not give much evidence of along-term rise in the rate of technological progressThe input to technological progress has grown substantially over time, whereas the growth rate of technology has notWe used a simple form of the technology p.f.: A=L AμGeneral-purpose technologiesGeneral-purpose technologies are momentous technological innovations that change the entire nature of the economy. They change the mode of production in many different sectors of the economy and trigger a chain of reaction of complementary inventions that take advantage of the new technological paradigm. Therefore, the period of growth resulting from a single general-purpose technology can go on for several decadesRecent g-p technology:semiconductor(transistor and integrated circuit), basis of modern computersScience and technologyScience: understanding about how the world works, about physical and biological processesTechnology: knowledge of production techniquesFor most of the human history, technological advance was largely unrelated to any scientific understanding of the rules by which the universe operated. Productive technologies were discovered by trial and error. Technological advance opened the way for greaterscientific understanding, by posing puzzles to solve and givingscientists tools for experimentsBut without scientific understanding no technologies of the second industrial revolution(1860-1900): steel, chemicals, electricityIn the 20th century, technological breakthroughs likesemiconductor, laser, and nucelar power on scientific undersanding of how the universe functions. However, advances in physics depend on new pieces of technlogies(particle accelerators)of technological progressIsaac Newton: «If I have seen farther than others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants»Scientific knowledge is cumulative: researchers today begin their investigations where those who came beforethem left off. Same incremental nature for the productive technologies that interest economistsCumulative nature of technological progress+ Researchers today have a larger base of knowledgeon which to build and a larger set of tools-Researcher today might have more difficulty thinkingof new technologies simply because the easiestdiscoveries have already been made: fishing out effect.Further, it takes more effort today for a researcher tolearn everything required to work at the cutting edgeof technological progressA=L Aμdoes not depend on A: + -cancel outBut this assumption is probably not justified. Data show that the input into R&D has risen dramatically, but the pace of technological progress has remained constant or even fallen. Therefore, -winsMany of the key breaktroughs of the 18th and 19th centuries resulted from the labors of lone scientists or inventors, often working in their spare time. By contrast, by the late 20th century, almost all advances were made by large and well-funded research teamstechnology productionA=L Aμmeans that if we doubled the number of researchers doing R&D (and all other inputs into R&D as well), we would double the rate of technological progressThe technology production function should be however characterized by decreasing returns to scaleOnce a piece of knowledge has been created, it can be costlessly shared among any number of people→nonrivalry: if several people are all trying to create the same piece of knowledge, then the efforts of most of them will ultimately be wasted. After the first person has created the knowledge and shared it, the efforts of all of the others who were trying to create that piece of knowledge willhave been in vaintechnology productionParallel efforts to solve a particular technological problem often result in «patent races» in which the winner gets a patent and the loser(s) get nothingWhen R&D is conducted on parallel tracks, the researchers often create parallel solutions to the same problem and develop parallel standardsThe more effort that is devoted to R&D, the more likely is this duplication of effort. Therefore, devoting more effort to R&D will not generate a proportional increase in the pace of technological progressAn improved version of the technology production functionA=L Aμhas two potential problems: negative effect of the level of technology on the growth rate of technology(fishing out effect), decreasing returns to scaleTo incorporate the fishing out effect:A=L AμA−ϕ,0<ϕ<1To incorporate decreasing returns to scale:A=L Aλμ,0<λ<1An improved version of the technology production functionA =1μL AλA−ϕIf the growth rate of technology is constant, A=k, kμ=L AλA−ϕ→LADS→0=λL A−ϕAA=λϕL AWe can use this equation, along with data on technological progress and growth of the R&D labor force, to learn about the parametersλand ϕtechnological progressSummarizing the two modifications to our technological production functionAs the level of technology rises, finding newdiscoveries becomes ever harderAs the effort devoted to R&D increases, theeffectiveness of each new researcher fallsBoth imply that ever-increasing input into R&D will be required to maintain the current speed of technological progressIs such an increase possible, or will technological progress inevitably slow down?technological progressPossible sources of growth in labor devoted to R&D The overall labor force could grow: in the last half-century there has been growth in population andincrease in women labor force participation; developedcountries no more labor force growthThe fraction of the labor force engaged in R&D couldgrow: it has been very important but it is impossible torise above100%New members coud be added to the set of countriesdoing cutting-edge research: today, this countriesaccount for only14% of world populationPlenty of room to expand the number of researchers, but in the very long run, assuming that the world’s population stabilizes, the growth rate of technology will slow downTable 9.2 U.S. Patents and Patents per Million Residents, 2010We can identify cutting edge bylooking at dataon patentsrelative to acountry’spopulation Pharmaceutical s: patenting isimportant;food andtextiles:secrecy andlead time aremore importantCountries thatspecialize intheseindustries havea low rate ofpatentingDifferential technological progressThe pace of technological progress is radically different in various sectors of the economy. Some industries, such ascommunications, have changed beyond recognition over the past century. Other completely new industries have been created,such as television and air travel. In other sectors productiontoday looks the same as it did a century ago (barbers andteachers use the same tools)Changes in the relative prices of goods reflect differential changes in productive technology. Goods where there has been a lot of productivity growht now have become cheapWhen technological progress occurs in a larger sector, the average rate of technological progress rises moreIf fraction of income spent on sectors with rapid technological growth rises, the overall growth rate of technology will also riseTechnological progress in the real world: goods vs servicesProduction methods for goods have been one of the most technologically dynamic areas in the economyThe production processes for many of the services we consume have changed little over the last centuryAs a result, a change has occurred in the relative prices of goods and servicesThe cost disease(William Baumol): shifting of expenditures into services, where productivity growth is slow and relative costs rise, for instance educationTeachers are being replaced with internet technology, music from actual musician to free reproductionFigure 9.5 Price of Computers, 1982–2010ICT isthemostdynamic partof theeconomy today Moreandbettercomputersbutpricesarefalling,spendingstaysconstantFigure 9.6 Investment in Computers as a Percentage of GDP, 1982–2009。
Chapter 6 HUMAN CAPITAL Marco SavioliThe quality of labor that a person supplies can vary enormously. A worker can be weak or strong, ill or healthy, ignorant or educatedPeople who have better labor to supply–those who are particularly smart or who can work tirelessly–are able to earn higher wagesDifferences in the quality of workers are one explanation for differences in income among countriesThe qualities of labor, that go by the collective name human capital, share several important qualities with physical capitalQualities of people that are productive, that ischaracteristics that enable to produce more outputQualities that are produced, investment in humancapital is a major expense for an economyHuman capital earns a return by giving theworker who owns it a higher wageHuman capital depreciatesHuman capital in the form of healthAs a country develops economically, the health of its population improves. This improvement in health is direct evidence that people are leading better livesHealth is something that people value for itself. But health also has a productive sideHealthier people can work harder and longer; they can also think more clearlyHealthier students can learn better. Thus, better health in a country will raise its level of incomeon incomeAs countries develop, their people get biggerThe average height of men in Great Britain rose by 9.1cm between1775 and 1975. These changes are purely attributable to changes in environment becase the genetic makeup has changed very littleThe change in physical stature in many developing countries has paralleled the shift in the developed countries, except that it started later and has processed more rapidlyThe average height of South Korea men in their20s rose 5cm between1962 and 1995on incomeThe principal explanation for these improvements in height is better nutritionHeight serves as a good indicator of malnutrition, particularly malnutrition experienced in utero and during the first years of life. Shortness is a biological adaptation to a low food supply because short people require fewer calories to get byPeople stunted by malnutrition are also less healthy. This is also reflected in lower abilities as a workeron incomeRobert Fogel quantified the contribution of improved nutrition to economic growth in the United Kingdombetween1780 and 1980. Improved nutrition raised output by:bringing people into the labor force otherwise beingtoo weak to work at allallowing the people who were working to work harderIn 1780, the poorest20% of adults in the United Kingdom were so badly nourished that they did not have the energy for 1 hour of manual labor per dayBy 1980, malnutrition completely eliminated. The amount of output per adult had increased by a factor of 1.25on incomeAmong adults who were working, the increase in caloric intake allowed a 56% increase in the amount of labor input that could be providedBetter nutrition raised output by a factor of 1.25×1.56=1.95. Spread over 200 years, this was an increase of 0.33% per yearGiven that the actual growth of income per capita in the UK over this period was1.15% per year, improved nutrition can be seen as having produced slightly less than13of the overall growth in income Furthermore, there is also an effect on mental capacity that should be consideredFigure 6.1 Nutrition versus GDP per CapitaIn developed countriestoday, mostpeople arewellnourishedIn much ofthedevelopingworld,malnutritionis pervasive The levels of nutritionshown hereunderstatethe trueextent ofmalnutritionbecauseaverages donot takeaccount ofinequalitieswithincountriesFigure 6.2 Life Expectancy versus GDP per CapitaDifferences in nutritionareparalleledbydifferencesin healthTo measure the averagelevel ofhealth: lifeexpectancyat birth Most of the poorestcountries inthe worldhave a lifeexpectancybelow60yearsRichestcountries’lifeexpectancyis75-82yearsModeling the interaction of health and incomeBetter nutrition is not only a contributor to, but also a result of, higher income because people in wealthier countries can afford more and better foodAlso for health: people who are richer can afford better inputs into health(e.g. vaccines, clean water and safe working conditions)Among the rich OECD countries, there are an average of 2.2 doctors per thousand people; in the developing countries, the average is0.8; and in sub-Saharan Africa, the average is only0.3Health and income are endogenous variablesFigure 6.3 How Health Interacts with Income ℎ(y)flattensout at highlevels of income because beneficial effects of income on health are more pronounced at lower levels of income Theintersection ofthe 2 curveswill determinetheequilibriumlevels ofincome andhealthHealth and income per capita: two viewsWhat is the primary source of differences in both income and health between rich and poor countries?Specifically, do the forces driving these differences come primarily from the side of health or from the side ofincome?Consider two countries: A and B. Country A is both healthier and richer than Country B →points A and Bplotted in the next figure represent these dataHowever, we cannot observe directlyℎ(y)and y(ℎ)Panel (a): differences rooted in the health environmentPanel (b): differences rooted in the aspects of productionIn the real world, differences in income are explained by differences in bothℎ(y)and y(ℎ); which is more important?Figure 6.4 Health and Income per Capita: Two ViewsFigure 6.5 Effect of an Exogenous Shift in IncomeSuppose that for some exogenousreason(e.g. animprovement inproductivetechnology)workers of anygiven health levelcan now producemore output: yℎshifts to the right Multiplier effect: an initial increasein productivity willproduce a largerincrease in output(BC)Similarly,exogenous healthimprovements(e.g. new vaccineor medicine) shiftℎ(y)upwardHuman capital in the form of educationIn developed economies, intellectual ability is far more important than physical ability in determining a person’s wageInvestment that improves a person’s intellect–in other words, education–has become the most important form of investment in human capitalIn the world, large increase in the number of years of schoolingTable 6.1 Changes in the Level of Education, 1975-2010Changes in the level of educationEducation is an investment in building human capital In addition to the obvious costs of education–teachers’ salaries, buildings, and textbooks–there is a more subtle expense(about half of the cost of education): the opportunity cost that students pay in the form of wages they forgo while getting educated Doubling the figure for government and private spending, the total cost of investment in education was12.4% of US GDP in 2010 (same percentage of US GDP invested in physical capital in 2010)The economic effect of malariaIn 2010, malaria caused some 216 million episodes of illness and 655,000 deaths, burden concentrated in poor, tropical countriesExposition in utero and childhood has the worst effetcs: interference with fetal nutrition and preterm deliveries that lower birth weight which affects cognitive development and damages brain; lethargy resulting from anemia and school absencesOther characteristics(climate lowering agricultural productivity) lead to low income. Similarly, good characteristics(effectiveinstitutions) contribute to the eradication of malaria1940-60 DDT eliminated malaria to 15of the world’s population: natural experiment for examining malaria’s long-run effectsFindings show that childhood malaria has a large impact: in India, eradication raised literacy by 12%; Sri Lanka, +2.4 yearsEducation and wagesHuman capital in the form of education has many similarities to physical capital: both require investment to create, and once created, both have economic valueReturns from education are difficult to obtain because human capital is always attached to its owner: we cannot separate part of a person’s education from the rest of his body and see how much it rents forTo get around this problem,return to education is measured as increase in wages that a worker would receive if he or she had one more year of schoolingFigure 6.6 Effect of Education on WagesEarlier years ofschooling havehigher returnsbecause theseare the yearsin which themost importantskills(readingand writing)are taughtFigure 6.7 Share of Hours Worked byEducation Level, 1940–2008The return to education is generally higher in poor countries than in rich countries because skilled workers are scarcer and thus earn higher relative wages The rate of return to schooling varies significantly from country to country and within a given country over timeFigure 6.8 Ratio of College Wages to High-School WagesCollegepremium:ratio of thewages ofworkers withcollegeeducation tothose with ahigh-schooldegree Technologicalchange hasbeen«skill-biased»; moreeducatedworkers arerelativelymoreproductive:computers donot affect less-educatedworkers’productivityHuman capital’s share of wagesHow much of the payment to labor does represent payment to the human capital that workers possess and how much does represent a payment for «raw labor», that is, what would workers have earned if they did not possess any human capital?Table 6.2 Breakdown of the Population by Schooling and Wagesin Developing CountriesThe sum of thetwo areasrepresents thetotal amount ofwages paid in theeconomyin Advanced CountriesHuman capital’s share of wagesPayments to human capital: developing countries59%, advanced countries68%Because wages are 23of national income, human capital’s share of national income: developing countries40%,advanced countries45%Even in the developing world, the share of national income to human capital is greater than the share earned byphysical capital: workers are in effect«capitalists», they earn a return to their investments in human capitalIf we include both human and physical capital, the share of national income earned by capital is higher than23throughout the world (α>23in the Solow model)Figure 6.11 Average Years of Schoolingversus GDP per CapitaStrongpositiverelationshipQuantitative analysis of the impact of schoolingHow much two countries that differ in their schooling but not in any other aspect of factor accumulation will differ in their levels of income per capita?Assume countries differ in the labor input per worker, ℎY=AKαℎL1−α=ℎ1−αA KαL1−αy SS=ℎ1−αA 1/(1−α)γn+δα(1−α)=ℎA 1/(1−α)γn+δα(1−α)y i SSy j SS=ℎiℎjThe wage that a worker earns is proportional to hisℎBy schooling and return to education, ℎcan be constructedFigure 6.12 Predicted versus Actual GDP per WorkerIfdifferences inschoolingexplainedall of thedifferences inincome,the datapointswould lieon the 45°line Singapore should beless rich,Chinamore richDifferences inpredictedincome aresmallerthan actualdifferencesCopyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Addison-WesleyThe quality of schoolingData on average years of schooling implicitly assume that the quality does not vary among countriesQuality of schooling can be measured byinputs into education: teachers, student-to-teacher ratio, teachers’ years of schooling,textbooks, healthoutput from education: what students know,standardized math and science testsRicher countries have have more schooling but also better schooling: differences in years of schooling undestate true differences in human capitalCopyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Addison-WesleyFigure 6.13 Student Test Scores versus GDP per CapitaUS relatively low test scores for a rich countryChina has extremely high scoresExternalitiesExternality: incidental effect of some economic activity for which no compensation is providedImportant difference with physical capital: investment in human capital generates externalitiesGiving one more education raises not only her own output but the output of those around her as well: educatedfarmers adopt new technologies before, these innovations are then copied by less-educated friends and neighborsTherefore, governments involved in producing HK: left on their own, people do not take into account the full social benefit of an education, socially suboptimal amountAmount a year education raises wage understates effect。
Chapter 10 EFFICIENCY Marco SavioliEfficiencyA natural presumption is that much of the growth in productivity that occurs is the result of changes in technology. This is reasonable for advanced countries Productivity is much lower in poor countries than in rich countries, but many of the most advanced technologies are being used in poor countriesEfficiency: effectiveness with which factors of production and technology are combined to produce output. It is an umbrella concept used to capture anything that accounts for differences in productivity other than differences in technologyDecomposing productivity A into technology and efficiencyA=T×ETechnology T represents knowledge about how factors of production can be combined to produce outputEfficiency E measures how effectively given technology and factors of production are actually usedSuppose that India is G years behind the United States technologically. That is, the level of technology in India in 2009 was the same as the level of technology in US in the year2009 –GT2009,India=T2009−G,USLet g be the growth rate of technology in the UST2009,US=T2009−G,US×1+g GT2009,US=T2009,India×1+g GT2009,India=1+g−GT2009,USA India=T India×E IndiaA US=T US×E USA India A US =T IndiaT US×E IndiaE USE India E US =A IndiaA UST IndiaT USThe ratio of productivity was obtained before, the ratio of technology can be calculated given information on the growth rate of technology g(0.57) and the technology gap measured in years GTable 10.1 Decomposition of Productivity Gap Between India and the United StatesAnalyzing cross-country dataUnless lags in technology are extremely large, mostof the difference in productivity between India and the United States must be the result of a difference in efficiencyGiven the speed with which many advanced technologies such as cell phones and computers have reached India, it is hard to believe that the average technology gap were indeed equal to 30 yearsWith such a technology gap, the difference in efficiency would be the dominant source of the difference in productivity between the two countriesDifferences in efficiency: case studiesThe case that efficiency is an important determinant of output would be greatly strengthened if we could observe efficiency more directlyWe will examine a number of case studies, in which we can isolate efficiencyIf we find that efficiency plays a strong role in these cases, we will have support for the argument that efficiency is important more generallyUnionOne of the best examples of low output as a result of innefficiency, the Soviet economy was relatively good at accumulating factors of production: its rate of investment in physical capital was higher than that of the US, and its workforce was fairly well educatedIn terms of technology, the USSR was at par in areas related to national defense and it lagged behind in areas not viewed as priorities, like consumer goodsThe USSR was a distaster in terms of producing output, in 1995, the year Mikhail Gorbachev took power, GDP per capita was less than one-third the US levelOne cause of the Soviet economy’s inefficiency was central planning, which began with Joseph Stalin’s first «five-year plan» in 1928UnionCentral planners did a poor job of fulfilling the roles that prices play in coordinating activity in a market economy, such as channeling productive inputs to the firms thatvalue them most, giving firms an incentive to producegoods that are in high demand, and equalizing thequantities that are supplied and demandedAs a result, shortages were rampant. Waiting in line to purchase whatever consumer goods were available became an accepted part of life in the Soviet Union, and output was reduced because firms were frequently unable toobtain crucial inputs. Further, the need to meet production quotas often led firms to produce the wrong goodsCentral planning in the Soviet UnionA second source of inefficiency in the Soviet economy wasthe lack of incentives for managers and workersBecause firms had no owners seeking to maximize profits, managers of firms had no incentive to minimize theirproduction costs, much less to implement newtechnologies that would raise productivityBecause so many goods were in short of supply, firms similarly had no incentive to maintain the quality of their output –consumers would snap up whatever the firmsproduced. Plant managers had little leeway to fireunproductive workers or to reward those who did a good job, so absenteism and on-the-job drunkennes wererampantTextiles in 1910In 1910 textile workers in New England earned50% more than similar workers in England, twice as much as workers in France and Germany, 3 times as much as those in Italy and Spain, and more than10 times as much as those in Japan, India, and ChinaNeither differences in technology, in the sense of some countries using more advanced productive methods than others, nor differences in raw materials are able to explain differences in wages among countriesFigure 10.1 Wages and Machines in the Textile Industry, 1910Textiles in 1910Workers in high-wage countries tended up to six times as much machinery as workers in low-wage countries. Each loom in the more-developed countries, though tended by fewer workers, produced more outputDifferences in factory organization and in labor practices are evidently the main explanation. Workers in the poorer countries were capable of tending more machines, but something in the way the economy was organized prevented them from doing so. This«something» is exactly the concept of efficiencyTable 10.2 Productivity in Selected Industries in the Early 1990san industryJapan’s steel and automobile industries were more productive than their US and German counterparts, but food processing in Japan was less than half as productive as in the other countriesGerman productivity was close to that of the US in three of the four industries examined but fell far behind in telecommunications. The differences in productivity at the industry level were much larger than those in aggregate productivityan industryDifferences in the organization of production among the countries is an explanation for these productivitydifferencesJapanese automobile makers work closely with their parts suppliers to streamline procedures and improveproductivity. In germany and the US the relationship ismore antagonistic; suppliers fear that if they improve their productivity, the firms to which they sell their parts willsimply negotiate lower purchase pricesDifferences in productivity within a single industry are even visible within a single country. Health care in the US: same amount of output (health) produced with different amount of inputs and with no variation in technologyFigure 10.2 U.S. Subsurface Coal Mining: Output, Price, and Output per Worker-Hour, 1949–1994Singleindustry ina singlecountryPeriod inwhichproductivity felldramatically: 1969-78 Becausetechnology wasunlikelyto bemovingbackward overthisperiod,productivity↓→efficiency↓1949-1994Between1969 and 1978, output per worker-hour fell by one-half. Over the same period, the total quantity of coal produced hardly changed at allThe real price of coal shot up during the 1970s, mostly asa result of rising oil prices. Increased demand for coalmade coal-mining companies highly profitable. The rise in profits in turn improved the bargaining position of the mine workers’ union because it raised the cost that the union could impose on firms by going on strikeThe union took advantage of its improved bargaining position to change work rules so as to raise the level ofemployment–and thus lowered productivity1949-1994This sort of behavior, in which employers are forced to hire more workers than are required for production, is called featherbedding.The trend in coal productivity reversed itself again in the 1978-94 period, when productivity rose by a factor of 3No burst in technological progress explains this jump in productivity. Rather, the driving factor was a decline in the price of coal, as oil prices fell and competition fromnonunionized open-pit mines in the West increasedSubsurface coal mines faced the choice of improving productivity or closing down altogether, so the bargaining power of the coal miners’ union weakened substantiallyTypes of innefficiencyThere are different ways in which economies can be inefficientIn some cases, resources such as capital and labor are used for doing things that have no economic value, or they remain unusedResources used in production may be channeled into the wrong parts of the economy or to firms that do not use them as well as possibleFinally, various forces may prevent the use of available technologies that yield a higher level of output for the available inputs of factors of productionOne type of inefficiency occurs when resources are diverted from productive to unproductive activities–that is, uses without economic valueFor a society as a whole, the fewer resources used for production, the less produced, and the less consumedFrom the perspective of the individuals who engage in them, unproductive activities can be perfectly rational –people earn more for themselves by engaging in unproductive activitiesSuch an unproductive activity must necessarily involve some redistribution–that is, taking output away form othersCertain unproductive activities, such as theft and smuggling, are illegalIn addition to wasting resources directly(in the case of burglary, using labor to break into houses rather than to produce output), such activities also require further nonproductive spending on the part of those who would rather not see their property taken away (hiring guards or installing alarm systems)In some poor countries, unproductive activities also include kidnapping for ransom, banditry, and even civil war, where the object of conflict is the right to eploit natural resourcesRent seeking: unproductive activities that involve the use of laws or government institutions to bring private benefitsAn economic rent is a payment to a factor of production that is in excess of what is required to elicit the supply of that factorRent seeking usually arises in cases where government policy creates an artificial or contrived rent, such as through licenses or protected monopoliesOne of the reasons that capital cities of many developing countries are so big is that firms locate there to maximize their chances of capturing rents generated by the governmentIn addition to the direct costs expended on rent seeking, a second form of waste occurs when the best and brightest workers choose to enter government service to reap the rewards of briberyThe extent to which people devote their efforts to producing output rather than trying to get a bigger slice of the pie depends on the relative rewards of these two activities, that depend on institutionsA second form of inefficiency results when labor or capital is simply not used at all. Such idle resources may take several formsIn the case of workers, the inefficiency includes both actual unemployment, where a worker has no job, and underemployment, where a worker has a job but spends only a fraction of her work time producing outputCapital can similarly be unemployed(a factory that sits unused) or underemployed(a factory running at less than full capacity)Unemployment of workers and capital often results from macroeconomic instabilityUnderemployment frequently results from institutional arrangements that encourage the hiring of more workers than are needed. State-run enterprises are notorious for their overstaffingUnderemployment of workers entails a transfer of resources from one person to another. The employee who is paid for not working is receiving a subsidy fromsomeone else in the economy. Althoug he may be better off using his labor unproductively than he would be if he were using it productively, society as a whole is worse offMisallocations of factors among sectorsAnother form of innefficiency occurs when resources are used in producing the wrong things. In such a case ofmisallocation the inefficiency will be less obvious than in the case of resources not being used at allA significant form of this innefficiency is misallocationamong sectors of the economyWe consider this problem in a simple setting. Suppose there are two sectors in the economy. In each sector,there is a production function by which capital and labor are transformed into output. Total output of the economy is the sum of the output in the two sectors. The value of the output will be maximized when the marginal product of labor in the two sectors is the sameFigure 10.3 Efficient Allocation of Labor between SectorsFigure 10.4 Overallocation of Labor to Sector 1Misallocations of factors among sectorsAutomatic reaching of optimal allocation of labor between sectors labor will be paid its marginal product as a wageif the marginal product is different in sectors of theeconomy, workers will have a strong incentive to move fromthe sector with low to the sector with high marginal productThis movement of labor will lower the wage in the sector that has high marginal product and will raise it in the sector with low marginal product. The movement of labor will continue until the two marginal products are equalized, and thus the quantity of output is maximized: Adam Smith’s«invisible hand»Factors might not be allocated according to their marginal products: factors may not be able to move between sectors in response to the signal provided by differences in the payments they receive, or the payments received by factors may notreflect their marginal productsBarriers to mobilityIf there are barriers to mobility between sectors, then a gap in wages may persist. The higher these barriers, the larger the gap between marginal products that can be sustained, and thus the larger the degree of inefficiency One type of barrier between sectors is geographic isolation. Because moving from one part of a country to another involves costs, both economic and phychological, interregional wage gaps may persist for a long timeAnother type of barrier arises if a minimum wage is imposed in the high-wage sector. The process by which people move from the low-wage to the high-wage sector will be short-circuited(marginal product= min wage)Wages not equal to marginal productIf workers are not paid their marginal products, then a difference between sectors in the marginal product of labor will not automatically translate into a difference in wages, so workers will not have an incentive to move betweensectorsFamily members who work together on a farm do not receive a formal«wage». Rather, the output of the farm is generally divided equally among the family members.Workers are receiving a payment of their average product higher than the marginal product of labor(in a farm, land is fixed). By contrast, a worker who leaves the farm towork in the industrial sector will receive a wage equal to her marginal productIf there is segmentation or discrimination in the labor market, wages differ from marginal productsFigure 10.5 Overallocation of Labor toFarming When Farmworkers Are PaidTheir Average ProductTheresultingallocationof labor willmean thatthemarginalproduct infarming islower thanthemarginalproduct inindustryEfficiency gains from sectoral reallocationReallocation of factors–from sectors with a low marginal product to other sectors–can be a major source of growthSectoral reallocation out of agricolture and into manufacturing was a component in the growth of Taiwan and South KoreaEase of geographic mobility may be one explanation for the particularly high efficiency of the US economy. Americans are willing to relocate in search of economic advantage–and this willingness is aided by having a large country with a singlelanguage. Europeans have much deeper cultural roots in the places where they were born: less geographic mobilityThe most dramatic example of labor reallocation in the world today is China, where workers are moving both from agriculture to industry and from the impoverished interior of the country to more prosperous coastal regionsfirmsFirms differ in their levels of productivity for any number of reasons: inferior technology, poor organization, bad managementIn a well-functioning economy, resources move from less to more productive firms, raising productivity in the economy. This shift happens naturally when firms compete with each otherA high-productivity firm can make a profit at prices that lead less productive firms to lose money. Less productive firms are thus driven out of business, and the capital and labor they used are absorbed by more productive firmsfirmsMany things can get in the way of this reallocation of resourcesIf low-and high-productivity firms collude to maintain high prices rather than competing with each other, then low-productivity firms will be able to stay in business and thus not free up the factors they are usingSimilarly, many low-productivity firms manage to get government help staying in business, in the form ofsubsidies, favored contracts, trade protectionIn government-owned firms, workers’ wages are not closely related to the amount of output they produce.Workers or other resources may be allocated amongindustries on the basis of managers’ political powerfirmsA firm with a monopoly will restrict production to keepprices high, so it will not hire more workers even if the marginal product of labor is higher than the wage. The marginal product of labor will be higher in monopolizedindustries and firms tend to employ too little laborDifferences in marginal products between firms therefore indicate a misallocation of resourcesAnother indicator is the correlation between firm size and productivity level. Given a fixed degree of variation inproductivity among firms, the economy as a whole will be more efficient to the extent that the larger firms are more productive. In the US the correlation is positive and large;in Western Europe smaller; in Eastern Europe smaller stillFinancial system: banks and other institutions, markets for stocks and bonds, government agenciesmonitoring/regulatingThe financial system directs capital toward its most productive use by evaluating returns from investmentprojects, pooling the savings of many individuals to allow for large investments, monitoring the outcomes ofinvestment projects to make sure that investors areproperly compensated, and spreading the risk of any one project among a large number of individualsThe financial system also allows for more specialization in production. In addition, by channeling investment funds to people who have good investment projects the financialsystem profoundly affects the degree of income inequality and intergenerational economic mobilityVariety of measures to assess the degree of financial development in a country: size of the banking system measured by the value of bank deposits relative to GDP; the degree of development of the stock market is measured at the «turnover ratio» (value of shares traded in a given year divided by the total value)Strong correlation between the degree of financial system development and the level of GDP per capitaDevelopment accounting: link much tighter between financial development and productivity than between financial development and factor accumulation→financial development raises economic efficiencyA number of types of evidence point to causality runningfrom finance to income:good financial system preceded growthbanking deregulation in the US; states that liberalizedtheir markets experienced faster economic growth thansimilar states that did notin countries with well developed financial systems,industries dependent on the financial system are thosethat particularly do wellinvestors most protected under the English legalsystem; differences in legal origin predict differences in financial development as well as economic growthHow can countries improve the functioning of their financial system? Existing evidence is that:Government-owned banks perform more poorly than those that are privately heldCountries that permit foreign banks to compete in their domestic banking systems have more efficient finance than those that do notStrong legal systems that protect the interests of small investors relative to corporate «insiders» lead to more efficient allocation of capitalIt occurs when a technology could feasibly be used–that is, there are no barriers to the transfer of technology such as patents, secrecy, and lack of tacit knowledge–but someone deliberately prevents its useBecause there is no physical or technical obstacle to the use of an intentionally blocked technology, we think of technology blocking as a form of inefficiency rather than as a type of technological backwardnessThe reason for most technology blocking is that a new technology, although beneficial for society as a whole, makes someone worse offJoseph Schumpeter→creative destruction: economic changes brought about by the introduction of a new technology. Those whose livelihoods stand to be destroyed by a new technology will try to block itOften comes from workers, but also from firmsIts success depends on the relative power of those who are hurt by a new technology and those who benefit from itRich countries may be even more prone to technology blocking than poor ones. The reason is that blocking a new technology often requires the assistance of a well-functioning government。