Capital Structure and Firm Performance
1. Introduction
Agency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancialindustries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managersexerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their ownpreferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equalthe lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under theagency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity andincreases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Sincethe seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations ofcapital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financialleverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personallosses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), andthrough pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage canmitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which thefirm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).
A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in loweragency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leveragebecomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt –including higherexpected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress –arising from conflicts between bondholders andshareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two sources of agency costs, wefollow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be nonmonotonic.
Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature(see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesistypically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plussome control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.In the case of the banking industry studied here, there are also regulatory
costs associated with very high leverage.
First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stockmarket prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not netout the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyon d management’scontrol and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that areunrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’sperformance that would be reali zed if agency costs were minimized.
We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance.The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profitefficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiencyevaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the sameexogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that arenot part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similarmeasures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature areindustry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry – such as localmarket conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practicefirm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected toperform if agency costs were minimized.
Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation fromperformance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to takethis reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with theeffects of performance on capital structure.
We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. Wediscuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, theefficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model andestimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a functi on of the2 Stigler’s argument was part of a broader exchange over whether productive efficiency (or X-efficiency) primarily reflectsdifficulties in reconciling the preferences of multiple optimizing agents –what is today called agency costs –versus “true” inefficiency, or failure to optimize (e.g., Stigler 1976, Leibenstein 1978). firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is used to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equationspecifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profi t
efficiency and other variables is used to testthe net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometricallyidentified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.
Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Undervirtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership andcontrol that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduceagency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs bycreating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of theownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with thedependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage)through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above
To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equationexplaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.
Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of qualitydata available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firmsproducing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and otherexogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature findevidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs,including leverage and ownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).
Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and otherinfluences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatoryconstraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are wellabove the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the mar
2. Theories of reverse causality from performance to capital structure
As noted, prior research on agency costs generally does not take into account the possibility of reversecausation from performance to capital structure, which may result in simultaneous-equations bias. We offer twohypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Miller
perfect-markets assumption. It isassumed that various market imperfections (e.g., taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in abalance between those favoring more versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit efficiency move theoptimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down.
Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms choose lower equity ratios than other firms, allelse equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Under thishypothesis, higher profit efficiency generates a higher expected return for a given capital structure, and thehigher efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. This isa joint hypothesis that i) profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns, and ii) thehigher expected returns from high efficiency are substituted for equity capital to manage risks.
The evidence is consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e., that profit efficiency is stronglypositively associated with expected returns in banking. Profit efficiency has been found to be significantlypositively correlated with returns on equity and returns on assets (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997) and otherevidence suggests that profit efficiency is relatively stable over time (e.g., DeYoung 1997), so that a finding ofhigh current profit efficiency tends to yield high future expected returns.
The second part of the hypothesis –that higher expected returns for more efficient banks are substitutedfor equity capital –follows from a standard Altman z-score analysis of firm insolvency (Altman 1968). Highexpected returns and high equity capital ratio can each serve as a buffer against portfolio risks to reduce theprobabilities of incurring the costs of financialdistressbankruptcy, so firms with high expected returns owing tohigh profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. The z-score is the number of standard deviations below theexpected return that the actual return can go before equity is depleted and the firm is insolvent, zi = (μi +ECAPi)/σi, where μi and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the rate of return on assets, andratios for those that were fully owned by a single owner-manager. This may be an improvement in the analysis of agencycosts for small firms, but it does not address our main issues of controlling for differences in exogenous conditions and insetting up individualized firm benchmarks for performance.
ECAPi is the ratio of equity to assets. Based on the first part of the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms with higherefficiency will have higher μi. Based on the second part of the hypothesis, a higher μi allows the firm to have alower ECAPi for a ven z-score, so that more efficient firms may choose lower equity capital ratios.
文章出处：Raposo Clara C. Capital Structure and Firm Performance .Journal of
Finance.Blackwell publishing.2005, (6): 2701-2727.
资本结构与企业绩效
1.概述
代理费用不管在金融还是在非金融行业，都是非常重要的企业治理问题。在专业管理公司中所有权和控制的分离可能导致的开工不足，努力发挥管理人员，选择输入或输出适合他们自己的特长，否则不能实现公司价值的最大化。实际上，外部所有权的代理成本等于职业经理人使自己的效用最大化的价值，而不是等于公司价值。理论表明，资本结构的选择可以帮助减轻这些代理成本。根据代理成本假说，高杠杆或低股本/资产比率降低外部股权的代理成本和通过限制或鼓励管理人员采取行动，增加股东的利益。自从由詹森和麦克林的论文（1976年），资本结构理论的解释，开发了大量文献，指出更大的财务杠杆可能会影响管理人员的薪酬，而且通过减少清算，将导致个人损失的薪金，声誉，特权经理等（格罗斯曼和哈特1982年，威廉姆斯1987年）的代理成本，并通过压力产生的现金流量支付利息费用（詹森1986年）。较高的杠杆可以减轻股东和经理之间关于投资的选择（例如，迈尔斯1977年），承担的风险金额（，詹森和梅克林1976年，威廉姆斯1987年）的条件下，企业破产清算（哈里斯和拉维夫1990年）和股息政策（斯图尔兹1990年）。
这方面的一个模型的可检验的预测是增加杠杆比率能够降低外部股权的代理成本，提高公司绩效，所有其他持有相同。然而，当杠杆变得相对较高，进一步提高将会产生较高的外部债务代理成本：包括破产或财务困境较高的预期成本，债券持有人和股东之间由此产生冲突，我们按照文学，并能计算机构之间的总成本，并且充分利用非单调的关系也很难区分两种来源的经验成本，不管这一理论的重要性，最好是有实证证据，（哈里斯和拉维夫1991年，特曼2000年，迈尔斯和评价2001年）。代理成本假说的检验通常用回归分析的方法，再加上一些控制变量，其他指标性能的措施得出股本比例。至少有三个问题出现在我们的应用程序，我们在以前的研究结果中已报告。银行业案件在这里学习，也有非常高的与杠杆相关的管理费用。
首先，公司业绩的措施通常是从财务报表或股票市场的价格，如行业调整后营业利润或股票的市场回报中取得。这些措施不排除外部市场因素对企业价值差异的影响，但排除了管理层的控制范围，因此不能反映代理成本。因此，这些测试可能会混淆的因素，这些因素无关的代理成本。另外，这些研究一般都没有为每家公司的业绩将实现成本最小化的机构作为一个单独的基准。
我们解决企业之间的生产效率和业绩之间的联系代理成本利润指标的测量效率问题的建议最早是由斯蒂格勒（1976年）提出，利润效率代表了利润，因为
这开发效益的改进效益评估如何关闭企业，是赚取利润最好的做法，在公司面临同样的外部条件。这有控制的管理控制之外的不属于代理成本的一部分因素受益。相比之下，标准财务比率的比较，股市的回报，一般不会采取类似措施控制这些外部因素。即使在文献中使用的措施是产业调整，他们可能不占各公司行业内重大的分歧,例如当地的市场情况,我们能够做的利润效率。此外，一个最佳实践公司在相同的外部条件下，在代理成本最低的情况下，如何合理的预计该公司的代理成本使很重要的。
其次，以前的研究一般不考虑从性能反向因果关系的可能性。如果公司业绩能够影响资本结构的选择，那么没有考虑到这一点可能在同步反向因果关系方程的结果存在偏差。也就是说，企业绩效回归上的杠杆措施可能会混淆与资本结构对性能的影响。
由于采用了我们解决我们的牢固的生产效率和业绩之间的联系代理成本利润指标的测量效率问题的建议最早是由斯蒂格勒（1976年），和利润效率代表了效率的概念细化。第二，以前的研究通常是没有考虑到从性能反向因果关系的可能性资本结构。如果公司业绩影响资本结构的选择，那么没有考虑到这一点可能在同步反向因果关系，方程的结果偏差。也就是说，企业绩效回归上的杠杆措施可能会混淆与资本结构对性能的影响表现在资本结构的影响。
我们解决了从性能反向因果关系资本结构使这个问题。我们下面讨论两个假设为什么公司业绩可能会影响资本结构，效率风险假说和专营权价值假说的选择。我们建构一个两方程模型，并估计它的结构采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）。一个公式指定作为2斯蒂格勒的说法函数利润效率是一个更广泛的交流超过部分是否生产效率（或X -效率），主要反映在协调多个优化剂喜好- 什么是今天所谓的代理成本- 与困难“真正的“低效或失败的优化（例如，斯蒂格勒1976年，莱宾斯坦1978年）。公司的自有资本比率和其他变量是用来测试的代理成本假说，并一式指定作为公司的利润效率和其他变量的函数自有资本比率是用来测试的效率，风险和净效果专营权价值假设。这两个方程计量经济学通过鉴定排除限制与该理论是一致的。
第三，一些，但不是以前的研究都没有考虑到所有制结构。在几乎所有的代理成本理论，所有制结构是重要的，因为它是所有权和控制权，创建代理成本（例如，巴尔内亚，豪根，1985年和Senbet分离）。大股东股票可能降低代理成本，但效果可能在内幕控股。另外，体制外块所有权或控股往往以减轻创造的经理（代理成本相对高效率的监管，Shleifer和Vishny 1986）。所有制变量可以排除偏见的测试结果，因为所有权相关变量可能会在代理成本方程式（性能），并与主要外生变量（杠杆）与因变量通过反向因果关系假设如上所述.
为了解决这个第三个问题，我们包括代理成本方程所有制结构变量解释利润效率和内幕外块持有所有权，以及机构持有。
我们的应用程序来自银行业的数据是因为数据的质量对企业在这个行业提供充足的优势。特别是，我们有详细的生产技术，与同类产品相比大量企业财务数据，以及市场价格和他们在经营本地市场的其他外部条件的资料。此外，在一些研究发现，这种文学的企业之间的效率，这是公认的影响代理成本，包括利用和所有制结构变量联系的证据（伯杰和梅斯特1997年）。
虽然银行是一个管制的行业，银行受代理成本和其他行业行为的其他影响同一类型。在样品中的银行基本上都受到平等的监管限制，我们集中在银行与银行之间的分歧不是其他公司，大部分银行都远高于最低监管资本。
2.从因果关系的理论改变资本结构
如前所述，在以前的研究代理成本一般不考虑从性能反向因果关系的可能性，这可能会导致资本结构方程的结果偏差。我们提供两种反向因果关系对莫迪利亚尼-米勒完善，以市场行为的假设为基础的假说。据推测，不同的市场缺陷（税收，破产成本，不对称信息）在一个有利于股权资本的减少，而且在利润效率差异的最佳移动自有资本比率轻微上升或下降的平衡效果。
根据效率风险假说，更有效的公司比其他公司选择股权比例较低，一切平等的，因为高效率降低破产和财务困难的预期成本。根据这一假说，效率更高的利润产生了一个给定的资本结构，较高的预期回报，高效率的替代品和保护对公司未来的危机在一定程度上为股本。这是一个共同的假设，我）利润效率强烈正相关，预期回报，和ii）从高效率更高的预期回报为股本代替管理风险。
证据是与该假说，即第一部分的利润效率一致，坚持与相关银行的预期收益一致。利润效率已被认为是显著正相关，股本收益率和资产收益（伯杰和梅斯特1997年）和其他证据表明，利润效率是相对稳定的指标（例如，德扬1997年），这有利于找到一个目前高利润往往产生高效率的未来预期收益。
该假说的第二部分即以实现更高效的更高的预期回报作为股本取代从标准的公司破产（奥特曼1968年）分析。高预期回报和高股本资本比率可以作为对每个投资组合风险的缓冲区，以减轻招致破产的财务困境成本的可能性，预计由于高效率，高利润回报使企业能保持较低的股权比例。Z -值是低于预期收益，实际收益可以耗尽之前股票和公司破产，子标准差数=（导率μi+ ECAPi）/σi，其中导率μi和σi是均值和标准差分别对资产的回报率，并为那些完全由单一所有者经理的比率。这可能是在为小企业的代理成本分析方法的改进，但它并不处理外源条件的差异在控制我们的主要问题和建立个性化企业业绩基准。
ECAPi是资产的股权比例。基于效率风险假说的第一部分，高效率的企业将
有较高的导率μi。基于这一假设，更高导率μi使公司可以以一个较低的ECAPi法即Z分的第二部分，让更多的低效率的企业可以选择股权资本比率。
文章出处：约泊桑·克拉拉．资本结构与公司绩效．金融期刊．布莱克威尔出版社．2005，（6）：2701-2727．
中小企业如何进行绩效管理--规章制度 所谓绩效管理，是指各级管理者和员工为了达到组织目标共同参与的绩效计划制定、绩效辅导沟通、绩效考核评价、绩效结果应用、绩效目标提升的持续循环过程，绩效管理的目的是持续提升个人、部门和组织的绩效。 影响绩效的主要因素有员工技能、外部环境、内部条件以及激励效应。员工技能是指员工具备的核心能力，是内在的因素，经过培训和开发是可以提高的;外部环境是指组织和个人面临的不为组织所左右的因素，是客观因素，我们是完全不能控制的;内部条件是指组织和个人开展工作所需的各种资源，也是客观因素，在一定程度上我们能改变内部条件的制约;激励效应是指组织和个人为达成目标而工作的主动性、积极性，激励效应是主观因素。 绩效管理对于中国企业已经不是一个陌生的话题，从以年终分配为目的的绩效考核到以全面提升企业管理水平为目的的绩效管理，很多经营者都希望通过绩效考核能够提高企业整体绩效水平。而如何真正将绩效管理运用到企业的经营中，并起到战略牵引的作用，也是让很多管理者头痛的问题。在绩效管理的实施中，最常见的问题就是流于形式，实际工作没有深入下去，执行不到位，造成推行绩效考核的管理成本大于绩效水平提高的效果;或者绩效考核实施目标不明确，为了分配奖金而考核，大家挖空心思寻找考核的漏洞和可能的机会，而不是将关注点集中在绩效水平的提升上。这里就涉及到绩效考核的战略导向、实施目标和切入点等一系列需要前期明确和处理的问题，在此就中国中小型企业中可能存在的一些现象做研究分析与大家共享。 在绩效考核实际实施和操作过程中，不同企业之间或相同企业在不同阶段，企业具体的战略目标是大相径庭的，这就决定了推进和实施绩效考核的切入点和侧重点也不相同。如果仅仅根据绩效考核理论生搬硬套，多数情况会象一盘好看却不好吃的菜，让人大倒胃口，有时还会造成不同程度的负面影响。 对于中国多数的中小型企业，绩效考核并不是一步到位、在短时间内建立得非常完善、表面十分光鲜就可以解决问题的;而是要从实际出发，从梳理流程、规范管理入手，开始绩效管理的第一步，等到运行时机成熟、数据积累充分之后，再将绩效考核全面推进，做到每个阶段都有明确具体的目标，每个阶段的实施都能对绩效水平的提高产生较大作用。 一、中小企业的现状与现代管理理论的矛盾 以目前中国中小型企业为例，绩效考核的操作和实施并不是一蹙而就、一步到位，建立得非常完善就可以解决问题的。在很多关于绩效考核的介绍中，为大家提供了完备的建立和实施绩效考核的方法及步骤，而从绩效考核的实施操作来看，这相当于为大家提供了一个非常规范的范本，不过这个范本通常隐含了很多假设作为前提条件，比如一般都要求企业的各项规章制度比较完备、管理流程比较清晰，从而设置各种绩效指标将目标层层分解，把企业的战略目标宣灌到各个层级的各个岗位上，从而保持多数员工的工作目标与整体战略目标的一致性，最大限度调动员工的积极性和创造性达到绩效水平的整体提升。显然，是一个完美的设想，但是对于我们多数的中小企业是否真的可以在这个美丽的设想下，实现绩效水平的大幅提升呢? 目前对于很多企业，尤其是中国的中小型企业，多数是由原来几十人、甚至十几个人的小单位或小作坊发展壮大起来的，在改革开发的市场大潮中有勇气、有魄力，做出了一番事业，在多年的经营中积累了大量的经验和竞争优势;同时这些企业最容易出现的弊病就是管理体系的不规范与落后，尤其是相对与现代化企业制度和管理理论而言。 当然，这是一定时期，中国企业发展的历史造成的，从小作坊或小单位发展到几百人、几千人、几万人甚至更大的企业，他们都有过十分辉煌的历史，但原有的经营模式和管
英文文献及翻译 文献题目An Overview of Servlet and JSP Technology 文献作者Nagle ,Wiegley 题目翻译Servlet和JSP技术简述 参考人 院 (系) 专业班级 学号
1 A Servlet's Job Servlets are Java programs that run on Web or application servers, acting as a middle layer between requests coming from Web browsers or other HTTP clients and databases or applications on the HTTP server. Their job is to perform the following tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. Figure 1-1Web middleware role 1.1 Read the explicit data sent by the client. The end user normally enters this data in an HTML form on a Web page. However, the data could also come from an applet or a custom HTTP client program. 1.2 Read the implicit HTTP request data sent by the browser. Figure 1-1 shows a single arrow going from the client to the Web server (the layer where servlets and JSP execute), but there are really two varieties of data: the explicit data that the end user enters in a form and the behind-the-scenes HTTP information. Both varieties are critical. The HTTP information includes cookies, information about media types and compression schemes the browser understands, and so on. 1.3 Generate the results. This process may require talking to a database, executing an RMI or EJB call, invoking a Web service, or computing the response directly. Your real data may be in a relational database. Fine. But your database probably doesn't speak HTTP or return results in HTML, so the Web browser can't talk directly to the database. Even if it could, for security reasons, you probably would not want it to. The same argument applies to most other applications.You need the Web middle layer to extract the results inside a document.
本科毕业论文（设计） 外文翻译 原文： Performance Evaluation, Economic Value Added and Managerial Behaviour 1. Introduction For the past two decades many countries started transforming their economies from traditional protected ones to those of more liberalized, globalised and market driven. This period has also seen the economies becoming more knowledge oriented and Human Resources started assuming more prominence in the growth of the economies and businesses. But this has also posed a greater challenge for companies to acquire and retain talented workforce (especially at the strategic & managerial levels). The knowledge economy also started witnessing the rapid rise of the agency problem- conflict of interest between managers and owners. The managers – in their role as the agents–are expected to act in the best interests of the shareholders (principals). Managers will act in shareholders’ interests only if they have right incentives. So it is very essential to align the interests of the managers and shareholders or at least reduce the difference between them. So we need a measure that on one hand rightly measures the managerial performance so that he managers – with talent and greater mobility- can be suitably compensated (and hence retained) and on the other aligns the interests of the managers and shareholders. For some time now Stock Price was thought to be an ideal measure achieving the above objectives. However stock price has many limitations. We shall discuss the pitfalls of stock price as a performance measure before evaluating some of the traditional performance measures and then introduce Economic Value Added as the right measure of managerial performance 2. Traditional Measures of Managerial Performance
绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译____________________________________________________________________ ________________________ Performance management-how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means,
外文文献原稿和译文 原稿 Performance management - how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected
绩效考核标准Performance assessment standard 序号S/N 项目 ITEM 内容 CONTENT 权重 weight 1 工作态度 Working attitude 1，品德端正，遵纪守法，每月无违反公司的各项管理规定和制度（3）； Possess virtue, following regulations, no violation of company regulations within one month（3）. 2，工作认真负责，积极主动，能吃苦耐劳，服从安排（3）；Reliable and active to work, capable of doing hard job, obedience to work arrangement(3) 3，为公司利益不计个人得失，扎根本职工作，锐意进取，为公司员工树立 良好形象并起到带头作用（3）Take company interest as first priority, make more progress based on your win duty to set an good example to other staff in company(3). 4，热爱公司，维护公司形象，认同公司企业文化，爱岗敬业，乐于助人， 与同事相处融洽，有团队精神和集体荣誉感（3）；Trust company from inside your heart, protect company culture and image, be loyal to company, possess sense of team spirit and collective honor(3). 5，良好的个人形象和素养（3）suitable personnel appearance and cadibre(3)，个人（工序）岗位7S工作做得好（10）do well at implementation of 7S working standard(10)； 6，每月内无任何被投诉记录（经查实的）；受到领导、员工或雇主普遍好 评的（3）No compliance received within one month, get high praise from boss, master and other working staff(3). 28% 2 工作能力 Working capability 8，生产的重点就是平衡产量和质量，不能要求产量忽视了质量，也不能 因质量忽视了产量，达到并超过专业技能或业务水平优秀，完全胜任本职 工作，把质量放到首位；The most important point of production is to keep balance between product quality and quantity. （考核办法：按返工、修复频次和数量核算，找不到责任人，班组长承担 所有罚款，每个罚款?10，再每个扣1分，扣完为止，如果已外发客户因质 量问题退回返工，每个罚款?20 Assessment rules: for each unqualified product, the person who is responsible will be fined 10 NAIRAS and lose 1 point, until all available points are gone. For each unqualified product which is detected by customer, the fine would be 20 NAIRAS. Squad leader will be responsible for the fine if the direct responsible cannot be found ） 20% DISCOVERY INTERNATIONAL FZE 拓展国际自贸区公司
首先，画一下我们通常讲研发管理的范畴：确定如何立项，如何确定产品目标，如何把控项目进度，如何驱动产品一代代完善以及如何调动团队积极性等。 在时间周期上来说，我们归纳为5个关键步骤：选方向、定目标、控进度、带团队和排干扰。相配套的，则是在这五个关键步骤的一些流程和工具的使用。 一、高效研发的5个关键步骤 第一步：立项——定方向 在豌豆荚的整个研发过程中，立项称为ProductBrief或者Project Brief。团队的产品经理会撰写一个1－2页的文档，然后和执行团队进行评审，如果评审通过，立项就成功了。文档一般包含会包含以下内容： 1. 愿景：一句话表达清楚要做什么； 2. 分析市场机会和趋势，决定当前策略； 3. 确定目标用户的特征和核心需求； 4. 现存的解决方案和各自的优劣势； 5. 该项目对豌豆荚的利益点；如果不做该项目，哪些竞争对手会做，对竞争对手的利益点； 6. 需要哪些技术的支持和驱动，哪些技术是豌豆荚的弱项； 7. 人力需求； 8. 项目的紧急程度，是否需要快速推进； 9. 发布策略； 10.核心衡量指标，用来衡量成功的指标。 第二步，OKR 体系——定目标 对一个项目来说，设定目标是非常重要的，因为这决定了如何去做，以及能做到何种程度。豌豆荚采纳的目标管理是从 Google 引进的 OKR 体系（Objectives& Key Results，目标与关键成果），这跟传统的 KPI（Key Performance Indicator，关键绩效考核）稍微有些区别： 1. OKR 首先是沟通工具：豌豆荚共有 300 多人，每个人都要写 OKR。为了便于沟通，所有这些OKR都会放在一个文档里。任何员工都可以看到 CEO 的这个季度最重要的目标是
企业会计准则外文翻译文献 (文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 外文： On February 15, 2006, the Ministry of Finance issued 1 item of basic accounting standards and 38 specific guidelines, the new set of accounting standards system. Standards issued, the community gave wide attention, the securities industry, business circles, academic circles gave height the opinion, think this is the second in 1993 accounting reform after another is of great significance to the accounting reform, marking China's convergence with international financial reporting standards of enterprise accounting standards system formally established, to improve the China's socialist market economic system, improve the level of opening up and accelerate China's integration into the global economy has important significance. Also expressed their concerns and worries, mainly reflected in the following aspects: a fair value is difficult to "fair", and is very likely to become the profit manipulation tools; two is the enterprise may to adjust earnings manipulation debt restructuring, debt restructuring will once again become the darling of the securities market; three is the new standard published may induce "fair" phenomenon, which
绩效考核外文文献及翻译 外文文献 1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His or her line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. If you are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits down and talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often as you can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole process to be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; c orporate social responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would then
1. 原则之一：激励要因人而异 由于不同员工的需求不同，所以，相同的激励政策起到的激励效果也会不尽相同。即便是同一位员工，在不同的时间或环境下，也会有不同的需求。由于激 励取决于内因，是员工的主观感受，所以，激励要因人而异。 在制定和实施激励政策时，首先要调查清楚每个员工真正需要的是什么。将这 些需要整理、归类，然后来制定相应的激励政策帮助员工满足这些需求。 2. 原则之二：奖励适度 奖励和惩罚不适度都会影响激励效果，同时增加激励成本。奖励过重会使员工 产生骄傲和满足的情绪，失去进一步提高自己的欲望；奖励过轻会起不到激励 效果，或者使员工产生不被重视的感觉。惩罚过重会让员工感到不公，或者失 去对公司的认同，甚至产生怠工或破坏的情绪；惩罚过轻会让员工轻视错误的 严重性，从而可能还会犯同样的错误。 3. 原则之三：公平性 公平性是员工管理中一个很重要的原则，员工感到的任何不公的待遇都会影响 他的工作效率和工作情绪，并且影响激励效果。取得同等成绩的员工，一定要 获得同等层次的奖励；同理，犯同等错误的员工，也应受到同等层次的处罚。 如果做不到这一点，管理者宁可不奖励或者不处罚。 管理者在处理员工问题时，一定要有一种公平的心态，不应有任何的偏见和喜好。虽然某些员工可能让你喜欢，有些你不太喜欢，但在工作中，一定要一视 同仁，不能有任何不公的言语和行为。 1. 激励员工从结果均等转移到机会均等，并努力创造公平竞争环境。 举例来说，吴士宏在IBM从一个打扫卫生的人做起，一步一步到销售业务员， 到地区负责人，到中国区总经理，是什么原因呢？除了个人努力，还应该说 IBM良好的企业文化给了一个发展的舞台，那就是每一个人都有无限的发展机会，只要有能力就会有发展的空间，实现自我，这在很多企业是做不到的，这 种体制无疑会给员工莫大的激励作用。 2. 激励要把握最佳时机。 ——需在目标任务下达前激励的，要提前激励。 ——员工遇到困难，有强烈要求愿望时，给予关怀，及时激励。 3. 激励要公平准确、奖罚分明 ——健全、完善绩效考核制度，做到考核尺度相宜、公平合理。 ——克服有亲有疏的人情风。 ——在提薪、晋级、评奖、评优等涉及员工切身利益热点问题上务求做到公平。 4. 推行职工持股计划。
企业如何认识和做好绩效管理 随着集团绩效考评体系一系列举措的出台，同事们开始关注绩效管理，集团领导更是亲力亲为参与绩效考评办法的审定及各项配套体系建设工作。那么，何谓绩效管理？让我们大家一起来回顾这个既古老又新颖的概念，更让我们用睿智的思维去评判我们这个大家庭该如何做好这项管理工作。 什么是绩效管理 1、绩效管理的含义 所谓绩效管理，是指各级管理者和员工为了达到组织目标共同参与的绩效计划制定、绩效辅导沟通、绩效考评评价、绩效结果应用、绩效目标提升的持续循环过程，绩效管理的目的是持续提升个人、部门和组织的绩效。 对于绩效管理的含义，可以从以下三个方面进行理解： （1）绩效管理是一个过程 绩效管理是一个包含若干环节的系统，融入于我们工作的每一天，通过该系统的运行来实现企业的管理目的。绩效管理不但关注结果，更关注管理每一个环节，它是一个过程。 （2）绩效管理注重持续沟通 绩效管理特别强调通过沟通辅导实现员工能力的提高，进而实现绩效改进的目的。绩效管理不是迫使员工工作的“大棒”，也不是引诱员工工作的“胡萝”，而是以人本思想为指导的组织——员工双赢策略。各级管理者都要参与到绩效管理的过程中来，各种方式的沟通辅导贯穿于整个绩效管理系统之中，管理者与员工通过这一平台相互理解、彼此促进。（3）绩效管理的最终目的在于绩效改进 绩效管理旨在通过绩效评价促使员工持续改进工作绩效，评是手段，改进才是最终目的。组织在对员工制定的绩效计划进行跟踪考评，以绩效沟通贯穿全程，通过辅导员工持续改进绩效，从而实现组织战略目标和培育组织核心竞争力。 2、绩效管理的作用 （1）绩效管理能有效推进企业战略目标实施 企业的战略目标逐年以年度目标形式分解为部门目标，再将员工个人目
外文文献翻译译文 一、外文原文 Corporate Performance Management Abstract Two of the most important duties of a chief executive officer are (1) to formulate strategy and (2) to manage his company’s performance. In this article we examine the second of these tasks and discuss how corporate performance should be modeled and managed. We begin by considering the environment in which a company operates, which includes, besides outside stakeholders, the industry it belongs and the market it supplies, and then proceed to explain how the functioning of a company can be understood by an examination of its business, operational and performance management models. Next we describe the structure recommended by the authors for a corporate planning, control and evaluation system, the most important part of a corporate performance management system. The core component of the planning system is the corporate performance evaluation model, the structure of which is mapped into the planning system’s database, simulation models and budgeting tools’ structures, and also used to shape information contained in the system’s products, besides being the nucleus of the language used by the system’s agents to talk about corporate performance. The ontology of planning, the guiding principles of corporate planning and the history of ”MADE”, the corporate performance management system discussed in this article, are reviewed next, before we proceed to discuss in detail the structural components of the corporate planning and control system introduced before. We conclude the article by listing the main steps which should be followed when implementing a performance planning, control and evaluation system for a company. 1.Introduction Two of the most important corporate tasks for which a chief executive officer is p rimarily responsible are (1) to formulate strategy and (2) to manage the company’s performance. In this article we examine the second of these tasks and discuss how