Developm en t E conom i cs
By Debraj Ray, New York University
March 2007. Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Lawrence Blume and Steven D url auf.
1 In tro ducti on
What we know as the developing world is approximately the group of coun t ries classified by th e World Bank as having ―l o w‖ and ―middle‖ income. An e xac t description is unnecessary and not too revealing; suffice it to observe that these countries make up over 5 billion of w orl d population, leaving out the approximately one billion who are part of the ―high‖ income develop ed world. Together, the low and middle income countries generate approximately 6 trillion (2001) dollars of national income, to be contrasted with the 25 trillion generated by hi gh income countries. An index of income that controls for purchasing power would place these latter numbers far closer together (appr o xim at e ly 20 trillion and 26 trillion, according to the World Development Report (2003)) but th e per-capita disparities are large and obvious, and to those encoutering them for the fi rs t time,stil l extr aordi nary.
Dev e lopme n t Economics, a sub jec t that studies the economics of the developing world, has m ad e exce lle n t use of economic theory, e conome t ric methods, sociology, anthropology, p olitical science, biology and demography and has burgeoned into one of the liv elies t areas of rese arc h in all the social sciences. My limited approach in this brief article is one of deliberate sele ction of a few conceptual points that I consider to be central to our thinking ab ou t the sub jec t.Th e reader interested in a more comprehensive overview is advised to look elsewhere (for example,at Dasgupta (1993), Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz (1993), Ray (1998), Bardhan and Ud ry(1999), Mookherjee and Ray (2001), and Sen (1999)).
I begin with a traditional framework of development, one defined by conventional growth th e ory. This approach develops the hypothesis that given certain parameters, say sav- ings or f e r tili t y rates, economies inevitably move t ow ard s some steady state. If these parameters are the same across economies, then in the long run all economies converge to one another. If in reality we see utter lack of such convergence —which we do (see, e.g., Quah (1996) and Pritchett (1997))— then such an absence must be t rac ed to a presumption that the parameters in question are not the same. To the extent that his- tory plays any role at all in this view, it does so b y affec ti ng these parameters — savings, demographics, go v e r nme n t interventionism, ―corruption‖or―cult u re‖.
This view is problematic for reasons that I attempt to clarify below. Indeed, the bulk of m y essay is organized around the opposite presumption: that t wo societies with the sam e fundamentals can evolve along very d iffe r e n t lines —going forward —depending on p as t e x p ec t ations,aspirations or actual h is tor y.
Now, after a p oin t, the distinction b e t we en evolution and parameter is a semantic one. By th ro wi ng enough state variables (―parameters‖)into the mix, one migh t argue that there is no difference at all b e t we en the t wo approaches. Formally, that would be correct, but then ―p arame t e rs‖ would have to be interpreted broadly enough so as to be of little explanatory v alu e.Ahistorical convergence and historically conditioned divergence express t wo fu nd am en tall y diffe r e n t world views, and t here is little that semantic jugglery can do to bring them together.
2 Dev el opm e n t From The V iewp o in t of Co n vergence
Why are some countries poor while others are rich? What explains the success stories of economic development, and how can we learn from the failures? How do we make sense of th e enormous inequalities that we see, both within and across questions? These, among others, are th e―big questions‖ of economic dev e lopme n t.
It is fair to say that the model of econonomic growth pioneered by Robert Solow (1956) has had a fundamental impact on ―big-ques tion‖d e velopmen t economics. For theory, calibration and empirical exercises that begin from this starting point, see, e.g., Lucas (1990), Mankiw, Rome r and Weil (1992), Barro (1991), Parente and Prescott (2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005). Solo w’s pathbreaking work introduced the notion of convergence : countries with a low endo wme n t of capital relative to labor will have a high rate of return to capital (by the ―l a w‖ of diminishing returns). Consequently, a given addition to the capital stock will have a l arge r i m p ac t on per-capita income. It follows that, controlling for parameters such as savings rates and population growth rates, poorer coun t ries will tend to grow faster and hence will catch up,converge to the levels of well-being enjoyed by their richer counterparts. Under t his view, dev el opme n t is largely a matter of getting some economic and demographic parameters r igh t and then settling down to w ait.
To be sure, savings and demography are not the only factors that qualify the argum en t. An yt hin g that systematically affects the marginal addition to per-capita income m u s t b e controlled for, including variables such as in v e stme n t in ―human capital‖ or harder- to-quan tify factors such as ―political climate‖ or ―corruptio n‖. A failure to observe convergence must b e t rac ed to one or another of these ―par am eters‖.
Convergence relies on diminishing returns to ―capital‖. If t his is our assumed s tar tin g
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point, the share of capital in national income does give us rough estimates of the concavity of production in capital. The problem is that the resulting concavity understates observed variation i n cross-country income by orders of magnitude. For in s t ance,Parente and Prescott (2000) calibrate a basic Cobb-Douglas production function by using reasonable estimates of the share of capital income (0.25), but then huge variations in the savings rate do not change world i ncom e by much. For in s t ance, doubling the savings rate leads to a change in steady state income by a factor of 1.25, which is inadequate to explain an observed range of around 20:1 (PPP). Indeed, as Lucas (1990) observes, the discrepancy actually appears in a more primitive way, at the level of the production fun c t ion. For the same simple production function to fi t the data on p er-capita income differences, a poor country would have to have enormously higher rates of return to capital; say, 60 times higher if it is on e-fi ftee n t h as rich. This is implausible. And so begins th e hun t for other factors that migh t explain the difference. What did we not control for, but shou ld ha v e?
This describes the methodological approach. The convergence benchmark must be pitted again s t the empirical evidence on world income distributions, savings rates, or rates of return to capi tal. The t wo will usually fail to agree. Then we look for the parametric differences that will bridge the model to the data.
―Human capital‖ is often used as a first port of call: migh t differences here accoun t for observ e d cross-country variation? The easiest way to slip differences in human capital in t o th e Solow equations is to renormalize labor. Usually, t his exercise does not take us very far. Depending on whether we conduct the Lucas exercise or the Prescott- Parente variant, we would still be predicting that the rate of return to capital is far higher in India than in th e U.S., or that per-capita income differences are only around half as much (or less) as t hey truly are. The rest must be attributed to that familiar black box: ―te chnological diffe r e n ces‖.Th at slot can be filled in a variety of ways: externalities arising from human c ap ital, incomplete diffusion of t ec h nol ogy, excessive go v e r nme n t in t e rv en ti on,with in-coun tr y misallocation of resources, . . . . All of th ese —and more —are interesting candidates, but by now we have wandered far from th e original convergence model, and if at all that model s t ill continues to illuminate, it is by w a y of occasional return to the recalibration exercise, after choosing plausible specifications for each of these p ote n t ial e xplanations.
This model serves as a quick and ready fix on the world, and it organizes a search for p os sibl e explanations. Taken with the appropriate q uan ti t y of salt, and viewed as a fi rs t pass, such an exercise can be immensely useful. Y e t playing t his game too seriously reveals a p articular world-view. It suggests a fundamental belief that the world economy is ultimately a great le veller, and that if the levelling is not taking place we must search for that explanation in p arame ters that are somehow structurally rooted in a socie t y.
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To be sure, the parameters identified in these calibration exercises do go hand in hand with underdevelopment. So do bad nutrition, high mortality rates, or lack of access to sanitati on, safe water and housing. Yet there is no ultimate causal chain: many of these features go hand in hand with low income in self-reinforcing in t e rp la y. By the same token, corruption, c u ltur e,procreation and politics are all up for serious cross-examination: just because ―cultural factors‖(for instance) seems more w eigh t y an ―explanat i on‖does not permit us to assign it the status of a truly exogenous v ari able.
In other words, the convergence predicted by technologically diminishing returns to in- pu ts should not blind us to the possibility of non c onvergen t behavior when all variables are treated as they should be — as variables that potentially make for underdevelopment, but also as v ari ables that are profoundly affected by the dev el opme n t p ro ce ss.
3 Dev el opm e n t from The Vi ewp oi n t of N onco n vergence This leads to a diffe r e n t way of asking the big questions, one that is not grounded in an y presumption of convergence. The starting p oi n t is that t wo economies with th e same fundamentals can move apart along very d iffe r e n t paths. Some of the best- kn o wn economists writing on dev elopme n t in the fi rs t half of the t we n tieth century were in s ti nctiv el y drawn to this view: Young (1928), Nurkse (1953), Leibenstein (1957) and Myrdal (1957) among them.
Historical legacies need not be limited to a nation’s inheritance of capital stock or GDP from its ancestors. Factors as diverse as the distribution of economic or political power, legal s tr ucture,traditions, group reputations, colonial heritage and specific institutional settings may serve as initial conditions —with a long reach. Even the accumulated baggage of un fu lfill e d aspirations or depressed expectations may echo in t o the future. Factors that have r ece iv ed special attention in the literature include historical inequal- ities, the nature of colon ial settlement, the character of early industry and agriculture, and early political i nstitut ions.
3.1 Expectations and Dev elo pmen t
Consider the role of expectations. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Hirschman (1958) (and se v eral others following them) argued that economic d e velopmen t could be th ough t of as a mas siv e coordination failure, in which several investments do not occur simply because oth e r complementary investments are similarly depressed in the same bootstrapped way. Thus on e m igh t conceive of t wo (or more) equilibria under the very same fundamental c onditions,―ran k e d‖ by d iffe r e n t levels of in v estm en t.
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Such ―ran ked equili bria‖ reply on the presence of a complementarity: a particular form of externality in which the taking of an ac t ion by an agen t increases the marginal benefit to other agents from taking the a similar action. In the argum en t above, sector-specific investments lie at the heart of the complementarity: more in v es tmen t in one sector raises the return to i n v e stme n t in some related s ector.
Once complementarities —and their implications for equilibrium multiplicity —enter our w a y of thinking, t hey seem to pop up everywhere. Compleme n t arities play a role in explaining ho w technological inefficiencies persist (David (1985), Arthur (1994)), why financial depth is low (and gro w t h volatile) in developing countries (Acemoglu and Zili- botti (1997)), how investments i n physical and human capital may be depressed (Romer (1986), Lucas (1988)), why c or rup tion ma y be self-sustaining (Kingston (2005), Emer- son (2006)), the growth of cities (Hend e r s on (1988), Krugman (1991)), the suddenness of currency crises (Obstfeld (1994)), or the fertil it y transition (Munshi and Myaux (2006));
I could easily go on. Even the tradi tional Rosenstein-Rodan view of demand comple- me n t arities has been formally resurrected (Mu rph y, Shleifer and Vishny (1989)).
An imp ortan t problem with theories of multiple equilibrium is that they carry an un- cle ar burden of history. Suppose, for instance, that an economy has been in a low-level in v estm en t trap for decades. Nothing in the t heory prevents that very same economy from abru ptl y shooting into the high-level equilibrium today. There is a literature that studies how the p as t migh t weigh on the pr ese n t when a multiple equilibrium model is embedded in real time (s ee, e.g., Adse r`a and Ray (1998) and Frankel and Pauzner (2000)). When we have a b e tter knowledge of such models we will be able to make more sense of some classical issues, such as the debate on balanced versus unbalanced growth. Rosenstein-Rodan argued that a ―big push‖ —a large, balanced infusion of funds —is ideal for catapulting an economy away from a low-le v el equilibrium trap. Hirschman argued, in contrast, that certain ―leadi ng sectors‖ should be gi v e n all the attention, the resulting imbalance in the economy provoking salubrious cycles of pr iv ate in v es tmen t in the c ompleme n t ary sectors. To my knowledge, we still lack good theories to examine such debates in a satisfactory w a y.
3.2 Aspirations, Mindsets and D ev el opm e n t
The aspirations of a socie t y are conditioned by its circumstances and history, but they also determine its future. There is scope, then, for a self-sustaining failure of aspirations and e conomic outcomes, just as there is for ever-progressive growth in them (Appadurai (2004), Ray (2006)).
Typically, the aspirations of an individual are generated and conditioned by the experi- ences of o t hers in her ―cogniti ve neighborhoo d‖. There may be several reasons for th is:
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the use of role models, the importance of relative income, the transmission of informa- tion, or peer-determined setting of internal standards and goals. Such conditioning will affect n ume r ous imp ortan t socio-economic outcomes: the rate of savings, the decision to migrate, f e rtilit y choices, technology adoption, the adherence to norms, the choice of ethnic or religious i den tit y, the work ethic, or the strength of mutual insurance motiv es. As an illustration, consider the notion of an aspirations gap. In a relatively narrow ec onom ic con te x t (though t here is no need to restrict oneself to this) such a gap is simply the difference b e t we en the standard of living that’s aspired to and the standard of living that one already has. The former isn’t exogenous; it will depend on the ambi e n t standards of living am on g peers or near-peers, or perhaps other c omm unities.
The aspirations gap may be filled —or neglected —by deliberate action. Investments in education, health, or income-generating activities are obvious examples. Does history, via the creation of aspirations gaps, harden existing inequalities and generate poverty traps? Or d oe s the existence of a gap spur individuals on ever harder to narrow the distance? As I h a v e argued in Ray (1998, Sec t ions 3.3.2 and 7.2.4) and Ray (2006), the eff ec t could go either way. A small gap may encourage investments, a large gap stifle it. This leads not only t o history-dependence, but also a potential theory of the connections b e t we en income inequality and the rate of gro wth.
These remarks are related to Duflo’s (2006) more general (but less structured) hypoth- esis that―being poor almost certainly affects the way people think and decide‖. This ―mind s et eff ec t‖ can manifest itself in many ways (an aspirations gap being just one of them), and c an lead to poverty traps. For instance, Duflo and Udry (2004) find that cer- tain wi thin-f am i ly insurance opportunities seem to be inexplicably foregone. In broadly similar vein, Udry (1996)finds that men and women in the same household farm land in a way that is not P areto-effic ien t(gains in efficiency are to be had by simply realocating inputs to the w omen’s plots). Th ese observations sugges t a theory of the poor household in which d iff eren t sources of income are treated differently by members of the household, perhaps in the fear that this will affect th reat points in some intrahousehold bargaining game. This in itself is perhaps not unusual, but the evidence suggests that p o v e r t y itself heigh t e n s the salience of such a f rame w ork.
3.3 Markets and Hi st ory-D epende nce
I now move on to other pathways for history-dependence, beginning with the central role of inequality. According to this view, historic inequalities persist (or widen) because each in div idual entity —dynas t y, region, country — is swept along in a self-perpetuating path of occ u pati onal choice, income, consumption, and accumulation. The relatively poor may be limited in their abil it y to in v es t pr o du c t iv el y, both in themselves and in their c hil dren.
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Such investments m igh t include both physical projects such as starting a business, or ―hu m an pro jects‖ such as nutrition, health and education. Or the poor may have ideas that t hey cann ot profitably implement, because implementation requires startup funds that they do not h a ve.Yet, faced with a di ff eren t level of initial inequality, or jolted by a one-time redistribution, t he very same economy may perform very diffe r e n t ly. Now in v estm en t opportunities are a v ailab le widely through the population, and a new outcome emerges with not just lower inequality, bu t higher aggregate income. These are d iffe r e n t steady states, and they could well be driven b y distant histories (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Ljungqvist (1993), Ray and Streufert (1993), P ik e tt y (1997) or Matsuyama (2000)).
The i n te l ligen t layperson would be unimpressed by the originality of this argument. That the p as t systematically preys on the pres en t is hardly rocket science. Y e t theories based on conv ergence would rule such obvious arguments out. Under convergence, the very fact that the poor h a v e limited capital relative to labor allows them to grow f as t e r and (ultimately) to catch up.Economis t s are so used to the convergence mechanism that they sometimes do not app rec iate just how unintuitive it is.
That said, it is time now to cross-examine our in telligen t layperson. For instance, if all individuals have access to a well-functioning capital market, they should be able to make an effi cien t economic choice with no heed to their starting position, and the shadows cas t by past inequalities must disappear (or at leas t dramatically shrink). For past wealth to alter curr e n t in v es t m en ts,imperfections in capital or insurance markets m u s t play a central role.
At the same time, such imperfections aren’t sufficient: the c on c a vi t y of in v es tmen t re- tu rns would still guaran t ee convergence. A first response is that such ―pr oduction func- tions‖ ar e simply not concave. A variety of i n v e stme n t activities have substantial fixed costs: bu s i nes s startups, nutritional or health investments, educational choices, migration decisions, crop adoptions. Indeed, it is hard to see how the presence of such noncon- vexities could not b e s ali e n t for the ultrapoor. Coupled with missing capital markets, it is easy to see that s t e ad y state traps, in which p o v e r t y breeds p o v e r t y,are a natural outcome (se, e.g., Majumdar and Mitra (1982), Galor and Zeira (1993)). Surveys of the econonomic conditions of the p o or (Banerjee and Duflo (2007), Fields (1980)) are eminently c on s i s ten t with this p oin t of view.
A related source of nonconvexity arises from limited liability. A highly indebted economic agen t may have little incentive to in v es t. Similarly, poor agents may enter into contracts with explicit or implicit lower bounds on li abili t y. These bounds can create poverty traps (Mookherjee and Ra y(2002a)).
In v es tmen t activities that go past these minimal t hres h old s are potentially open to ―c on- vexification‖. There are various stopping p oin t s for human capital acquisition, and a
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household can hold financial as se t s which are, in the end, scaled-down claims on oth e r businesses. Under this p oi n t of view, dynasties that make it past the ultrapoor thresholds will e xh ibi t ergodic behavior (as in Loury (1981) and Becker and Tomes (1986)) and so th e prediction is roughly that of a t wo-c lass society: the ultrapoor c au gh t in a poverty trap and the remainder enjoying the benefits of convergence. History would matter in determining the steady-s t ate proportions of the u ltr ap o or.
But t his sort of analysis ignores the endogenous nonconvexities brou gh t about by the pr ice system. For instance, even if there are many di ff eren t education levels, the wage payoff to s u c h level will generally be d e t e rmin e d by the market. There is good reason to argue (see, e.g.,Lju ngqvi s t (1993), Freeman (1996) and Mookherjee and Ray (2002b, 2003)) that the price system will sort individuals into d iffe r e n t occupational choices, and that there will be p e r s i s ten t inequality across dynasties located at each of these occ u pati onal slots. Thus an augmented theory of history dependence m igh t pr e d ic t a particular p roportion of the ultrapoor t rapp ed by physical nonconvexities (low nutrition, ill-health, debt, lack of access to primary education), as well as a persistently unequal dispersion of dynasties across d iffe r e n t occupational choices, induced by the pecuniary externalities of relative p rices.
Note that it is precisely the high-i nequali t y,high-p o v e r t y s t e ad y states that are correlated with low average incomes for socie t y as a whole, and it is certainly possible to build a view of u nderd e v elop m en t from t his basic premise. The ar gume n t can be bolstered by consideration of economy-wide externalities; for instance, in physical and human capital (Romer (1986), Lu c as (1988), Azariadis and Drazen (1990)).
3.4 History, Aggregates and the Interactive W o r l d
Theories such as these m igh t yield a useful model for the interactive world economy. Take, for instance, the notion of aspirations. Just as domestic aspirations drive t he dynamics of accumulation within countries, there is a role, t o o, for national aspirations, dr iv en b y inter-country disparities in consumption and wealth, and its effect on the in t e rn ation al distribution of income. Even the simplest growth framework that exhibits the usual features of convexity in its technology and bud ge t c on s t rain ts could give rise in the end to a w orld distribution that is bipolar. Countries in the middle of that distribution would tend to accumulate faster, be more dynamic and take more risks as they see the possibility of f ull catch-up within a generation or less. One migh t e x p ec t the gr e ates t degree of ―cou ntry m ob ili t y‖ in this range. In contrast, societies that are far away from the economic frontier m a y see economic growth as too limited and too long-term an instrument, leading to a failure, as it were, of ―i nternational aspiration s‖. Groups within these societies may well resort to other methods of potential e conomic
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gain, such as rent-seeking or conflict. (The aggregate i m p ac t of such activities would reinforce the slide, of c ourse.)
Of course, an entirely mechanical t ranspl an tation of the aspirations model to an inter- nat ional context isn’t a good idea. Countries are not individual units: a more complete theory must tak e into accou n t the aspirations of various groups in the differen t countries, and the domestic and international components that drive such aspi ration s.
Next, consider the role of markets. Once again, tentatively view each coun t ry as a s in gle ec onom ic agen t in the framework of Section 3.3. Now the nonconvexities to be consid- ered are at the level of the country as a whole — Y oung’s increasing returns on a grand scale, or economy-wide externalites as in Lucas-Azariadis-Drazen. This reinterpretation is fairly standard, but less obviously, the occupational choice story bears reinterpretation as well. To see this, n ote that the pattern of production and trade in the world economy will be driven by patterns of comparative advantage across countries. But in a dynamic framework, barring nonrepro du c ib le reources such as land or mineral endowments, every endo wme n t is potentially accumulable, so that comparative advantage becomes endoge- nous. Thus we may view countries as settling in t o subsets of occupational slots (broadly conceived), producing an incomplete range of goods and services relative to the world list, and engaging in tr ade.
For instance, suppose that country-level infrastructure is suitable for either high-tech or low-tech production, but not both. If both high-t ec h and low-tech are impor tan t in w orld production and consumption, then some country has to focus on low-tech and another on high-tech. Initial h is t ory will c on s t rain such choices, if for no reason than the fact that e x is t ing infrastructure (and national wealth) determines the selection of future in frastru c t ure. This is n ot to say that no country can break free of those shackles. For instance, as the whole world cli m b s up the income scale, natural nonhomotheticities in demand will push composition more and more in favor of high-quality goods. As this happens, more and more countries will be able to make the transition. But on the whole, if national infrastructure is more or less conducive to some (but not the full) range of goods, the nonconvergence model that we discussed for th e domestic economy m u s t apply to the world economy as w ell.
This raises an obvious question. What is so specific ab ou t―na tional infrastru cture‖? Why is it not possible for the world to ultimately rearrange itself so that every country produces th e same or similar mix of goods, thus guaranteeing convergence? Do curr e n t national ad v antage s somehow mani fes t themselves in future advantages as well, thus ensuring that the w orld economy settles into a p ermanen t state of global i nequali t y? Mi gh t economic un derd e velopmen t across countries, at least in this relative sense, always stay with us?
To properly address such questions we have to drop the tentative assumption that eac h
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country can be viewed as an individual unit. In a more general setting, there are in- di vid uals within countries, and then there is cross-country interaction. The former are sub jec t to th e forces of occupational structure (and possible fixed cos t s), as discussed in Section 3.3. The latter are subject to the specificities, if any, of ―national i nf ras t ructur e‖, determining w h e t her c ou ntries as a whole have to specialize, at least to some degree. The relative importance of within-coun try versus cross-country inequalities will rest, in large part, on considerations such as thes e.
I hav en’t b rough t in international political economy so far (though see below). Yet, as frameworks go, this is not a bad one to start thinking ab ou t the eff ec t s of globalization. It is certainly preferable to a view of the world as a se t of disconnected, autarkic growth models.
3.5 Institutions and Hi st ory
In many developing countries, the early institutions of colonial rule were directly set up for th e purposes of surplus extraction. There would be variation, of course, depending on whether th e areas were sparsely or densely populated to begin with, or whether there was large-sc al e a v ailab ili t y of mineral deposits. Resource deposits certainly favored large-scale extractive in du s tr y (as in parts of South America), while soil and weather conditions migh t encourage p lan tation agriculture, often with the use of slave labor (as in the Caribbean). On the other hand, a hi gh preexisting population density would favor extraction of a d iffe r e n t hue: the setting-up of institutional systems to acquire rents (the British colonial approach in large parts of India).
It has been argued, perhaps most eloquently by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), that ini- tial institutional modes of production and extraction in distant history had far-reaching effects on s u bse qu e n t development. In t heir words, scholars ―h ave begun to explore the possibility th at initial conditions, or factor endowments broadly conceived, could have had profound and enduring im p ac t s on long-run paths of institutional and economic de- v elopme n t . . . ‖. S uc h inequalities may then be inimical to dev e lop m en t in a v ari e t y of ways (such as the mark et b as ed pathways discussed earlier). In contrast, where initial settlements did not go hand in hand with systems of tribute, land gran t s,or large-scale extractive industries (as in se v eral regions of North America), one migh t expect compar- ative equality and a sub s equen t path of dev e lop m en t that is more br oad-base d.
This is consiste n t with the market-based processes considered earlier. But a principal strand of the Sokoloff-Engerman argument, as also the lines of reasoning pursued in Robinson(1998),Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Acemoglu (2006), em p hasiz es p ol itical economy. In the words of Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), ―init ial conditions had lingering effects . . . because go v e r nme n t policies and other in s tituti ons
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tended to reproduce them. Specifically, in those societies that began with extreme in- equali t y, elites were better able to establish a legal framework that insured them dis- pr op or tion ate shares of political power, and to use that greater influence to establish rules, laws, and oth e r go v ernmen t policies that advantaged members of the elite relative to nonmembers c on t rib utin g to persistence over time of the high degree of in e q ualit y . . . In societies that began with greater equality or homogeneity among the population, ho we v er, efforts by elites to institutionalize an unequal distribution of political power were relativ ely unsuccessful . . . ‖
The elite —erswhile collectors of tribute, land-gran t recipients, plan t ation owners and the lik e— may survive long after the initial institutions that spawned t hem are gone. Such surv iv al ma y nevertheless be quite compatible with the maximization of aggregate surplus provided th at the elite are the most effic ien t of the economic citizenry in the generations to come. But of course, t here is absolutely no reason why this should be the case. A new generation of enterpreneurs, economic and political, may be waiting to take over in the wings. It is an open question as to what will happen next, but often, the elite may well engage in policy that has its goal not economic efficiency but the crippling of political opposition. Some evidence of thi s reluctance to let go may be seen in literature that argues that more unequal s oc ieties r e d is tr ibu te less (see Perotti (1994, 1996), and
e nab ou(1996)).
the survey by B′
There are other routes. The elite may be unable to avoid an oppositional showdown.
A theory of bad policy may then have to be replaced by model of social un res t and conflic t generated by initial inequality. While this mechanism is clearly different, the end result is the same. The channeling of resources to ongoing conflict will surely inhibit the
a lez (2007)). accumulation of productive resources (Benhabi
b and Rustichini (1996), Gonz′
There may also b e e ffe cts running through legal systems (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, (1997, 1998)) or the varying nature of d iffe ren t colonial systems (see, e.g., Berto cc h i and Canova (2002)). There may be effects running through the insecurity of p rop e r t y rights of fear of elite expropriation (see, e.g., Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995)).
We do not y e t have a sys t e matic exploration of these mechanisms, nor an accounting of their relative importance. But there is some reduced-form evidence that historical institutions do aff ec t growth in the manner described by Sokoloff and Engerman. The problem in es tab lishin g an empirical assertion of this sort is fairly obvious: good insti- tutions and good ec on omic outcomes may simply be correlated via variables we fail to observe or measure, or any ob s erv e d causality may simply run from outcomes to insti- tutions. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson(2001) propose a novel instru m en t for (bad) institutions: the mortality rate among E urop e an settlers (bishops, sailors and soldiers to be exact). This is a clever idea that exploits the following theory: only areas that could be settled by the Europeans developed egalitarian, br oadbased institutions. In the oth e r
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areas, the same Europeans settled for slavery, d ic t atorship, highly unequal land grants and unbridled extraction instead. (The implied instru m en t is more convincing when the analysis is combined with c on t rols for the general disease en vir onme n t, which could have a direct effect on p erf ormance)
The Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson results, which show that early in s t ituti ons have an eff ec t on c urren t performance, are provocative and interesting.It bears r ei ter ation, though, that IV estimates are suggestive of an institutional impact on development, but one ju s t cannot be sure of what the mechanism is. By relinquishing more immediate in s ti tution al eff ec ts on the grounds of, say, endogeneity, it becomes that much harder to figure out th e structural pathways of influence. This appears to be an endemic problem with large, swee p ing cross-country studies that attempt to detect an institutional effect. Good instruments are hard to find, and when they exist, their eff ec t could be the echo of one or more of a diversity of underlying me c h anisms.
Iyer (2004) and Banerjee and Iyer (2005) consider a somewhat d iff eren t channel of in- flue n c e. Both these paper study the differential i m p ac t of colonial rule within a single country, In dia.I y er studies British annexations of parts of India, and the effect today on public goods provision across annexed and non-annexed parts. There is obvious en- dogeneity in the areas chosen f or annexation (a similar observation applies, in passing, to countries ―select e d‖ for colon iz at ion). Iyer in s tr ume n t s annexation by exploiting the so-called Doctrine of Lapse, under which the British annexed states in which a native ruler died wi thou t a biological heir. Banerjee and Iy e r study the eff ec t of variations in the land revenue systems set up by the British, startin g from the latter half of the eigh tee n t h century. In particular, they d is t ingu is h b et wee n landlord-based institutions, in which large landlords were used to siphon surplus to th e B r itish, and other areas based on rent payments, either directly from the cultivator or via v illage bodies. While these institutions of extraction no longer exist (India has no agri c u ltur al income tax), the authors argue that divided, unequal areas in the past cannot come together for col- lective action. Dispossessed groups are more worried about insecurity of tenure and fear of expropriation than ab ou t the absence of public goods, i n v e stme n t(public or private) or dev elopme n t exp e n dit ure.
3.6 Institutions and the In t er act ive W o r l d
In Section 3.4, we applied market-based theories of occupational choice and p ersiste n t in e qu alit y to the interactive world economy, (tentatively) treating each country as an ec onom ic agent. Recall the main assumption for such an interpretation to be sensible: that c oun tries m ust face in frastru c t ural constraints that limit full diversification. With these constraints in place, there will be p e r s isten t i nequali t y in the world income distri- bution, with coun t ries in―occupational nic hes‖that correspond to their in frastru c t ural
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c h oice s.
Bring to this story the role of institutional origins. Then a particular institutional history may b e more suited to particular subsets of occupations, driving the country in ques- tion into a determinate slot in the world economy. From that p oin t on, the p ersiste n t cros s-c ou n try inequalities generated by the market-based theory will continue to link past institutions to sub s equen t growth. In short, initial institutional differences may be correlated with s u bse qu e n t performance, but the the magnitude of that under- or over- performance is not to be en tirely traced to initial history. Dis t an t history could simply have served as a marker for some c ou ntries to supply a particular range of occupations, goods and services. Toda y’s inequality may well b e driven, not by that far-away history but simply by the world equilibrium path that follows on those initial conditions. If all goods are needed, t here must be banana producers, sugar manufactureres, coffee growers, and high-tech enclaves, but there cannot be too little or too man y of any of th e m.
The ―i neffi cien t political pow er‖ argu me n t used in Section 3.5 can also be tr ansplan t e d to international interactions. It may well be that a large part of such i nterac t ions —protection of international p rop e r t y righ t s, restrictions on t ec h nol ogy tran s f e r, or barriers to trade — is used to deter the entry of developing countries onto a level playing field in which they can s u cces sfully compete with their compatriots in developed countries. It would certainly be naive to d is r e gar d this p oi n t of view altogether.
Looked at t his way t his way, our view of history fits in well with the entire debate on globalization. One m igh t view one side of this debate as emphasizing the c onv e rgence attr ibu te s of globalization: outsourcing, the es t ablishmen t of international p ro d uction standards, t ec h nol ogy transfer, political accountability, responsible macroeconomic poli- cies m a y all be invoked as footsoldiers in the service of conv erge n c e.
On the other side of the battlelines are equally formidable opponents. A skewed playing field c an only keep tipping, so goes the argument. The protection of intellectual property is just a way of maintaining or widening existing gaps in knowledge. Technology t rans- fers are inappropriate because the input mix i s n’t right. Nonconvexities and increasing returns are endemic.
My goal here isn’t to take sides on this debate (though like everyone, I do have an opinion) but to clarify it from a ―nonco nvergence perspectiv e‖ that has so far received more attention within the closed economy. There is a strong parallel between globalization (and those c on t e n ted or discontented with it, to borrow a phrase from Joseph Stiglitz (2002)) and the questions of convergence and divergence in closed e conomies.
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4 Digging Deeper: The Microeconomics of Dev elo pmen t There is no getting away from the big questions, even if t hey cannot be fully answered with the knowledge and tools we have at hand. The issues w e’ve discussed (and our in t uiti v e first-takes on them) determine our world view, the cognitive canvas on which we arrange ou r o verall thoughts. But only the most hard-bitten macro ec onom i s t would feel no trepidation ab out taking these models literally, and applying them withou t hesitation across countries, regions and c u ltu re s.
The microeconomics of d e velopmen t enables us to dig below the macro questions, un- earthi ng insigh t and structure with far more confidence than we can hope to have at the world or cross-country level. From the view p oin t of economic theory, the assumptions made can be mor e carefully motivated and are open to careful testing. From the view- p oin t of empirical an alysis,i t is far easier to find instruments or natural experiments, or to conduct one’s own experi m en ts for that matter. There is, no doubt, the philosophical problems of scaling the results up, of u s in g a well-controlled finding to predict outcomes elsewhere. In the end, the choice b e t we en the fu z zy,imprecise big picture and the small yet carefully delineated canvas is perhaps a matter of taste.
I need hardly add that my selectivity continues unabated: there is an entire h os t of iss u e s, and I can but touch on a f rac t ion of t hem. I focus deliberately on four imp ortan t topics that are both relev an t to my overall theme of history-dependence, and have been the s ub jec t of m uc h r ece n t att e n ti on.
4.1 The Cre di t Mark et
As w e’ve seen, a failure of the credit m ar k e t to function is at the heart of market-base d arguments for di v e rgence.
The fundamental reason for imperfect or missing credit markets is that individuals cannot b e counted upon (for reasons of strategy or luck) to fully repay their loans. If borrowers do not h a v e deep pockets, or if a well-defined system to enforce repa yme n t is missing, then it stands to reason that lenders would be re l uctan t to advance those loans in the fi rs t place. There is little p oin t in asserting that a well-chosen risk-premium will deal with these risks: the premium i ts elf affects the default probability. Therefore some borrowers will be shut out of the market, no matter what rate of interest they are willing to pay. Such a m ar k e t will t yp ic al ly clear b y ration in g access to credit, and not by an adj ustme n t of the rate of interes t.
Three fundamental features characterize di ff eren t theories of imperfect credit markets. There is classical adverse selection, in which borrower (or project) characteristics may sys tematically adjust with the terms of the loan c on t rac t on offer. Stiglitz and W e iss
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(1981) initiate this literature for credit markets, arguing that the higher the interest rate, th e more likely it is that the borrower pool will be contaminated by riskier t yp e s. Then there is the moral hazard problem (see, e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1997)), in which the borrower m u s t exp end effort ex post to increase the chances of project success. Moral hazard also ties in to―debt ov erhang‖, in which existing indebtedness makes it less cred- ible that a borrower will put in sustained effort in the project. Finally, there is the enfor c eme n t problem (see, e.g., E aton and Gersovitz (1981)), in which a borrower may be tempted to engage in strategic defau lt.Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray (2000) survey some of the l ite r atur e.
The poor are particularly affected, not because they are intrinsically less trustworthy, bu t because in the e ven t of a p ro jec t failure, they will not have the deep pockets to pay up. The p o or may well possess collateral — a small plot of land or their labor — but such collateral may b e hard to adequately monetize. A formal-sector bank may be unwilling to ac ce p t a small rur al plot as collateral, much less bonded labor! But other lenders (a rural landlord, for in s t ance)might. It is therefore not surprising to see interlinkages in credit transactions for the poor: a small farmer is likely to borrow from a trader who trades his crop, while a rural tenant is likely to borrow from his landlord. Even when the entire market looks competitive, these niches may create pockets of exploitative local monopoly (Ray and Sengupta (1989), Floro and Yotopoulos (1991), Floro and Ray (1997), Mansuri (1997), Genicot (2000)).
In short, the very f ac t of their limited wealth puts the relatively poor under ad ditional constrain t s in the credit market. This is why im p erfec t capital markets serve as a starting p oin t for many of the models that study mark e t-b as ed hi s tor y-d e p end e n c e.
The direct empirical evidence on the existence of credit constraints is surprisingly sparse, which is obviously not to say that they don’t exist, but to p oin t out that this is an area for future re searc h.Ex is t ing literature in a dev e lop m en t context largely uses the existence of (p resumab ly undesirable) consumption fluctuations in households to infer the lack of p e r fec t fin ancial mark e t s; see Morduch (1994), Townsend (1995) and Deaton (1997).
A direct test for credit constraints yields positive results for Indian firms (Banerjee and Duflo (2004)), though it is unclear how general this finding is (see, e.g., Hurts and Lusardi (2004)). There is a siz eabl e literature which deals with the impact of credit constraints on outcomes such as health (F os ter (1995)), education (Jacoby and Skoufias (1997)) or the acquisition of production inputs such as bullocks (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)). Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Karlan and Zinman (2006) are t wo examples of specific tests for diffe r e n t frictions, such as adverse selec t ion and enforcement. Udry’s seminal (1994) paper on credit and insurance markets in Northern Nigeria may be viewed as singling out enforce me n t as perhaps the mos t imp ortan t binding constraint. The im- portance of enfor c eme n t constraints is, of course, not peculiar to credit or insurance;
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Fafchamps (2004) develops the p oin t for a variety of markets in sub-Saharan Africa. For more specifically on insurance, see Townsend (1993, 1995), Ligon (1998), Fafchamps (2003) and Fafchamps and Lund (2003)). Coate and Ravallion (1996), Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002),Kocherlakota (1996) and Genicot and Ray (2003) develop some of the associated theory with limited enforce me n t.
Finally, there is a literature on microcredit, the lending of relatively small amounts to the v e r y poor; Armendariz and Morduch (2005) is a good starting p oin t.
4.2 Collective Action for Public Go o ds
There is a growing literature on the political economy of development. Unlike some mainstream approaches in political science and political economy, this literature appears to largely eschew voting models. In my view this is not a bad thing. Perhaps the mos t imp ortan t criticism of voting models is that even in vigorous democracies, mos t policies are not subject to referenda among the citizenry at large. Certainly, there are periodic elections, and the sum total of enacted policies — and the package of future p romis es — are then up for voter scrutiny, but nevertheless, there is a large and s ign ifican t gap b e t we en voting and the enactme n t of a particular policy. Between that policy and the voter falls t he shadow of collective ac t ion, lobbies, capture and influence, cynical tradeoffs across special interes t s, and co v e r t or open conflict. For countries with a nondemocratic history, these considerations are expanded by orders of magni tud e.
An imp ortan t literature concerns the determinan t s of collective ac t ion for the provision of pu bli c goods, and how poverty or i nequali t y affects the abili t y to engage in such action. T h e relationship here is complex. There are t wo potential reasons why inequality in a comm un it y ma y enhance collective action. First, the elite in a h igh-in e q ualit y community m igh t largely internalize all the benefits from the resulting public good, and th e refor e pay for it (Olson (1965)). Good examples involve military alliances (Sandler and F or b es(1980)),t ec h nol ogy adoption (F os t e r and Rosenzweig (1995)) or even ―top- down in terv en tion s‖ by local rulers or elites (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2007)). Second, the elite have a low opportunity cost of money, while the poor have a low opp ort uni t y cost of labor; in som e situations, the t wo resources can be usefully combined for collective action (an alliance for viol e n t conflict, as in Esteban and Ray (2007a) is a good example). But there is a variety of situations in which inequality can dampen effective collective action: when all agents s upp ly similar inputs —say effort —and their i m p ac t or cost of provision is nonlinear (Ray, B al and and Dagnielie (2006), Khwaja (2006)), when there are unequally distributed private e n do w men ts (Baland and Platteau (1998), Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov (2006)), or when d iffe r e n t individuals in the same community w an t d iffe r e n t things by virtue of their social differences or inequality (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Banerjee, Mookherjee, Munshi and Ra y(2001),
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Miguel and Gugerty (2005), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)), or when inequalities in we alth erode the informational basis of collec t iv e ac t ion(Esteban and Ray (2006)).
The importance of this area of research cannot be overemphasized. Several of the fun- damental accompaniments of d e velopmen t requires state intervention at a basic level: health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure. This is especially so in poor coun- tries, wh e re privatized health and education are often ruled out by the sheer force of economic nec es sit y. Yet states often are se t upon by numerous claims that compete for their attention. How are these claims resolved? The theory and practice of collective action demands more res earc h.
Moreover, while it can be argued (as I’ve done above) that inequality within a community migh t go either way in affecting that communit y’s ability to obtain public goods, there is no escaping th e f ac t that at the level of the entire socie t y, high inequality serves to fracture and divide. Simp ly put, the very rich w an t state policy that is d iffe ren t from the very poor, and rare is the socie t y that has them in the same camp, and demanding the same things of their government. In t he world of the median voter, one migh t simply resolve these issues by looking at the median v oter’s ideal policy, but even in this rarefied scenario, there are complex issues that deserve our consideration. Political alliances can often redefine the median voter (Levy (2004)) and ev e n without alliances it is unclear
e nab ou (2000)). When we r e tu rn to the ―real w orld‖ just who the median voter is (B′
of collective action, these issues are magnified considerably. For now eac h citizen does not have an end o wme n t of one vote. The real endowments are labor and m on e y. How these commodities combine (or compete) is fundamental to our understanding of p olit ic al economy and — via this channel — our views on p ers i s ten t hi s tor y-d e p end e nce.
4.3 C onfli ct
A more sinister expression of collective action is conflict. In the second half of t he t w en ti e th century and well into the fir s t decade of the t w en t y first, the loss of human life from conflicts in developing countries is immense; the costs are beyond measurement. Even th e narrow economic costs of conflict can be extremely large (Hess (2003)).
That conflict contributes to economic regress is not surprising. But given our focus on h is t ory-dep end e n c e, it is of equal interes t to consider the casual chain running f rom un derd e velopmen t to conflict. That chain has a natural and simple foundation: poverty redu ces the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict. The grabbing of resources, often in an organized w a y, is often a far more lucrative alternative to the steady process of wealth accumulation. It’s certainly quicker. (One m igh t argue that t here is less to gain as well, but this effect is atten tu ate d in unequal s oc ieties.)
This unfortunate observation has s u bs t an tial empirical support. For instance, Migu e l,
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Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) use rainfall as an i nstru m en t for economic growth in 41 African countries and derive a striking negative e ffec t of growth on civil conflic t: a negativ e growth shock of 5 p erce n t age points raises the likelihood of civil conflict b y 50%. See also Dube and Vargas (2007) and Hildalgo, Naidu, Nichter and Richardson (2007),both of which also instru m en t for economic shocks to find s ignific an t effects on conflic tu al outcomes. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Sambanis (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Do and Iy e r(2006) all establish strong correlations between economic adversity and conflict, the las t of these countries establishing this over regions in a single country (Nepal).
Yet conflict is demonstrably wasteful, and if warring parties could sit down at the ne- gotiati ng table, why would societies engage in it? This is a classical question to which there are a n um b er of possible answers. First, t here may be a prisoner’s-dilemma-like quality to conflic tu al incidents, in the sense that one party can precipitate attacks while the other remains passiv e (Leventoglu and Slantchev (2005)). Second, while conflic t generates waste, there is no reas on to believe that every group is thereby made worse off by it. It is entirely possible that a group prefers conflict to a peaceful outcome: the former involves a smaller pie, but it also may in v olv e a larger share of it (Esteban and Ray (2001)). Third, while one should be able to find a system of taxes and transfers that Pareto-dominate the conflict outcome, but for various reasons — lack of commitment, or a sparse informational base for the levying of taxes, dynamics with rapid p ow er shifts —it may not be possible to impl e me n t that system (Fearon (1995), Powell (2004, 2006)). Fourth, it is certainly possible that conflict is over indivisible resources such as political power or religious hegemony. It may then be absurd to imagine that side A compensates side B with suitable transfers in exchange for political power: the lack of credibility involved is only to o apparent. Finally, c on fli c t may be endemic because both parties to it have in c ompl e te information regarding chances of success, though this view has come under increasing c r iticism from political scientists (see, e.g., Fearon (1995)).
The next question of relevance concerns ethnic and social divisions. Migh t the presence of potentially divisive markers (caste, religion, geography, ethnicity on general) exacer- bat e conflictual situations? For instance, Esteban and Ray (2007a) argue noneconomic (―eth n ic‖)markers may play a salien t role in the outbreak of conflict even when socie t y exhibits h igh economic inequality and may look prima facie more ripe for a class w ar.
A standard tool for measuring e t hni c and social divisions is that of fractionalization, rou ghly defined as the probability that t wo individuals drawn at random will come from t wo di s ti nct groups. While fractionalization seems to have a negative effect on economic outcomes such as per-capita GDP (Alesina et al. (2003)), growth (Easterly and Levine (1997)), or go v e r nan ce(Mauro (1995)) its eff ec t on civil conflic t appears to be insignif- ican t (Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003)). Of course, as Horowitz (2000) and others have observed, it is is the presence of large cleavages that is p ote n tially
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conflictual, whereas fractionalization continues to increase with diversity. The solution is to dr op fractionalization altogether. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) adapt Esteban and Ra y’s(1994) measure of polarization to show that measures of ethnic and religious polarization do in dee d ha v e a significan t impact on conflic t (see also Do and Iyer (2006)). Obviously, more research is called for on questions such as these. For instance, it is un- clear how polarization should e n ter an empirical specification: Esteban and Ray (2007b) argue that highly polarized societies m a y actually avoid conflic t via deterrence, though conditional on the outbreak of c onflict,p olarization must vary positively with it.
The c on t inui ng study of conflic t in dev el opme n t demands our h ighes t priority. Certainly, th e s o cial waste of conflict dominates the inefficiency of misallocated resources which so man y mainsteam economists prefer to emphasize. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the m u c h-malign e d (and much-studied) inefficiencies of incomplete information are also of a lower order of magnitude. But mos t of all, it is the chain of cumulative causation that m u s t ultimately d riv e our interes t: from u nderd e velopmen t to conflic t and back again to continuing u nderd e velopmen t. Confli c t is one channel through which history matter s. 4.4 Legal Mat ter s
Contract enforcement, p rop e r t y rights, and expropriation risks: these are a few instances of legal matters that are ce n t ral to development. They bear closely on that much-used catchall p hrase,―institutio nal effects on developmen t‖.For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) as well as the re ce n t survey by Pande and Udry (2007) clearly have the s ecuri t y of property ri gh ts high on the lis t when discussing ―institutio n s‖.La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2002) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez- de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) begin with the premise that common (English commercial) law and civil (French commercial) law afford diffe r e n t degrees of protection and support to in v es t ors, creditors and litigants, and argue that it has had dramatic effects on a variety of indicators across countries: corruption, sto c k-mark et participation, corporate valuation, go v e r nme n t interventionism, judicial efficiency —and presumably, via these, to economic i nd ic ator s.
It is little surprise that the security of property righ t s is generally conducive to invest- me n t,and that long-term in v e stme n t is especially encouraged by such security; see, e.g., Dem se t z(1967). (Short-term effort on land, in contrast, may well be enhanced by inse- curi t y of tenur e.) Depending on the exact form that such righ t s assume, there may be further positive effects — e.g., via access to credit —that arise from the abili t y to mort- gage or sell p rop e r t y(F eder, Onchan, Chalamwong and Hongladarom (1988)). Just as in the case of cross-country regr e ss i ons one is invariably assailed here by standard ques- tions of end oge n ei t y and omitted variables. F or in s t ance,long-gestation investments may provoke — and p erm i t— the es tab lishmen t of p rop e rt y rights, and a high-ability age n t
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migh t use her ab ili t y to both invest and secure her rights. Nevertheless, the evidence on pr op ert y rights is that by and large, they are good for in v estm en t and pr o du c t ion (Besley (1995), Banerj ee et al. (2002), Do and Iyer (2003), Goldstein and Udry (2005)), and even more obviously, p rop e rt y values where these are reasonably well-defined (Alston, Libecap and Schnedider (1996), Lan jou w and Levy (2002)). Instances in which property titling creates better access to credit are,intriguingly enough, somewhat harder to come by (Field and Torero (2004) and Dower and Potamites (2006) are t wo of the rarer examples that do d o cume n t better access, but with some qu alific ati ons).
The very fact that economists have a field day establishing the eff ec t of property rights sugges ts that there is a plethora of situations in which the absence of well-defined rights is the r ule rath e r than the exception. In rural socie t ie s the world over, land rights can be h igh ly ambiguous, and land titles can be missing even when an unambiguous definition of p rop e r t y exis t s.If one adds to this the sizeable proportion of land under tenancy, the eff ec t iv e s ec u rit y for the cultivator becomes more tenuous still (and indeed this complicates matters, because h e r rights may be inversely related to those of the owner!). In nonrural settings, there are substantial uncertainties for those who operate in the informal sector (such as the p e r io di c―cleansing‖ of informal retailers from city sidewalks). If the above studies are to be tak en seriously, there are substantial production losses from such states of in s ecuri t y.
If imperfections of the law are so inimical to the fortunes of cultivators and producers (an d especially for the small and the poor among them), why do we see such institutional ―failures‖ in equilibrium? The Coase-Posner view would presumably have none of this: in their view, le gal systems would invariably develop to maximize social surplus. But of course, t here could b e several reasons for the p ersis t e n ce of ―i neffi cien t institution s‖. When sidepayments are n ot feasible or credible, economic agents often prefer a larger share of a reduced pie to a s maller share of a more effi cien t pie. For instance, domestic businesses which can rely on a trusted network of kin or extended family migh t prefer an ambiguous legal sys t e m,so that it p rev e n t s entry. Or workers migh t prefer i m p erfec t enforceability of a work norm, so that efficiency w ages need to be paid. Borrowers migh t prefer that loan repa ymen t cannot be fully enforced, so th at incentives to repay must be built into the loan contract. And when tenancy is widespread in agriculture, the very design of overall p rop e r t y rights to maximize efficiency can be a h igh ly complex prob lem. The last three examples possess another feature that is worth some emphasis. It is th at ambiguous property rights often have equity effects that don’t go the same way as efficiency-minded economis t s would like them to go (Weitzman (1974), Cohen and W e itzman (1975), Baland and Platteau (1996))). The ambiguity of p rop e r t y rights can serve as in s u ran c e, buffer, or redistributive device. As examples, consider broad access to w a t e r resources or grazin g land, or the efficiency-wage premia that may need to be paid to workers or borr ow ers.
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https://www.doczj.com/doc/949208607.html, 荷兰商学院教学质量顶级是世界公认的，因此很多同学赴荷兰留学申请商学院，那么荷兰有哪些比较著名的商学院呢?申请硕士留学专业又有哪些呢?下面立思辰留学360为大家整理了荷兰四所著名商学院及硕士留学专业，我们一起来看一下。 阿姆斯特丹大学 阿姆斯特丹大学在2014/15年QS世界大学排名中名列全球第50位，欧洲第15位，在荷兰高居第1位;位于荷兰首府阿姆斯特丹，是荷兰最大的综合性大学，同时也是欧洲最具开放性的高等学府。 推荐硕士留学专业：商务经济，商业研究，会计学与控制，国际金融等。 蒂尔堡大学 其前身为一所经济学院，如今已发展成为一所综合性的大学，其中，经济与管理学院是其最大的学院，是荷兰乃至欧洲最好的经济学院之一。欧洲经济金融类排名第一名，在理论计量经济学领域排名世界第七(领先于哈佛大学与牛津大学)。 推荐硕士留学专业：经济学，会计学，金融学，计量经济学及精算，供应链管理等。 格罗宁根大学 互联网留学360介绍，成立1614年，是荷兰第二古老大学。所在城市格罗宁根是一座典型大学城，年轻富有朝气，又美丽宁静，曾被评为荷兰人最喜欢的荷兰城市。在数以千计世界大学中，它位列世界大学150强之列。与此同时它也是欧洲排名前25位大学。德国高等教育发展研究中心报告(CHE)将它评选为全欧最佳大学杰出团体成员之一。
https://www.doczj.com/doc/949208607.html, 推荐硕士专业：国际商务管理，经济学，经济与商业，工商管理，人力资源等。 马斯特里赫特大学 世界排名前120位的马斯特里赫特大学以高度的国际化特色着称，在目前拥有的13000名学生中，国际学生比例占该校总人数的44%，3500余名教职员工中海外教师的比例也占到了30%，该校多数的硕士课程都用英文授课，超过一半以上的硕士学生都不是荷兰本国学生。 推荐硕士专业：国际商务，国际经济研究，经济和金融研究等。
公司培训邀请函 公司培训邀请函一 尊敬的：___您好! 感谢您一直以来为公司的各项工作所做出的巨大努力以及对于我们业务部的工作所给予的关心和支持。 按照公司上级领导的指示，市场营销部将于近期开展一系列培训讲座，恳请您能够在百忙之中能给我部门相关人员进行__场关于项目价格及产品等方面的讲座，具体安排如下： 一. 培训内容：1、竞手分析2、客户定位3、经营理念4、产品架构 二. 培训时间均：__年__月份上午9:00-10:00、10:30-11:30 毕方时间确认：__年__月__日__时__分 __年__月__日__时__分 __年__月__日__时__分 三. 地点：公司会议室 四. 参加人员：市场部全体员工 培训内容一、__________________ 二、__________________ 三、__________________ 五、万望您能不吝赐教，相信有您的大力支持定能使我们市场部的工作有一个飞跃的发展。 顺致商祺 邀请人：公司市场营销部
公司培训邀请函二 在日益激烈的全球化市场竞争冲击下，越来越多的企业深刻地认识到市场营销的重要性，拥有一个先进的市场营销团队已经成为企业成功的必要条件，培训邀请函。 针对各类企业对市场营销团队能力建设的需求，以及各类市场营销从业人员对自身职业发展的要求，国家信息中心中荷项目办公室联合欧洲著名咨询公司荷兰dhv集团，邀请来自欧洲顶级商学院荷兰鹿特丹管理学院(rotterdam school of management，欧洲商学院mba项目排名第六)等欧美商学院具有资深市场营销mba 课程教学经验的教授、副教授，于20XX年10月17日至12月1日共同举办中荷市场营销mba课程专题培训班，邀请函《培训邀请函》。 本次培训将从全球市场分析入手，涵盖企业的战略营销、服务营销、品牌管理和企业形象识别、营销传播工具、促销组合方法、谈判与冲突管理等市场营销重要内容，并通过案例分析深入探讨成功企业市场营销策略的设计、实施和评估，以及如何判断企业面临的主要市场机遇和挑战。 婚礼邀请函宴会邀请函讲座邀请函投标邀请函 校庆邀请函生日邀请函活动邀请函英文邀请函 本次培训分为六个模块，各个模块可单独参加，每个模块仅用4天完成，整体培训内容设计精炼、实用，特别适合工作繁忙、需要在短期内提高自身职业素养的人士。本次培训的详情请参见附件《中荷市场营销mba课程专题培训班招生简章》。 欢迎各类市场营销从业人士和有意在国外商学院攻读mba学位的人士，参与本次市场营销培训，体验最真实的国外商学院mba课程教学氛围，获取最先进的市
1.Personal Information个人信息 Surname姓First/Given Name名?M男?F女Address地址 Zip Code邮政编码Country国家 Birthday出生地Birthplace出生日期 Telephone电话Fax传真 Mobile手机e-mail电子邮箱 Nationality国籍I.D./passport no.身份证/护照号码 2.Employment Information工作信息 Name of Company/Institute公司/机构名称 Position职位Dates Employed入职日期 Telephone电话Fax传真 Mobile手机e-mail电子邮箱 Postal Address通讯地址 Zip Code邮政编码Country国家 Physical Address实际地址 Zip Code邮政编码Country国家 https://www.doczj.com/doc/949208607.html,cation and Training教育背景和培训情况 Give a chronological overview of formal studies/courses followed at technicon,university and other institutions.Provide copies of certificates.请按时间顺序写明大专以上学习情况。请提供相应证书 Educational/Professional Institution学校Course/Training学历Date Qualification毕业日期 Please describe any other relevant management training/responsibilities/achievements/experience. 请介绍其它与管理相关的情况，如接受过的其它管理培训，承担过的管理职责，取得过的业绩及相关的管理经验 4.Working Experience以往工作经历 Please provide a chronological overview of your working experience.请按时间倒序列明工作经历 Name of Company公司名称Position职位Period在职期限
荷兰留学概述及要求 相对于英美澳等国家，留学荷兰市场开辟得较晚。然而其却以独特的优势，在短短几年内迅速升至热门留学国家的行列。2002年中国教育部对荷兰公立院校的学位予以认可，之后留学荷兰进入了一个空前的高潮。 求学高标准就业高质量 荷兰高校整体水平较高，在国际上，荷兰高校以其培养应用型人才的办学理念、实用的课程设置，注重实践的授课方式受到广大国际学生的欢迎。特别是海牙大学、鹿特丹商学院等院校的商科专业世界闻名，学生不仅有到英、美等国交换学习的机会，而且最后一个学期都提供带薪实习的机会。因此，一直以来，留学荷兰高校毕业生的学识水平和动手能力在欧洲享有相当高的口碑，而其经典的商科专业更是受国际学生的追捧。 要用“反签”程序 留学荷兰要采用“反签”程序，即只要被荷兰高校录取，就由学校代其向荷兰移民局递交签证申请，签证率基本上可达到100%.因此，留学荷兰的关键就在于如何获得高校的录取。 积极参加面试获取印象分 荷兰的高校需要申请者提供高质量的申请材料。留学荷兰因为每年的申请人数众多，如果没有足够的吸引力，你的申请函很有可能被淹没。 而学生若参加校方的面试，留学荷兰就能获得和校长或招生主任面对面交流的机会，这是学生表明自己的入学愿望、展现才能的好机会，能极大地增加录取几率。 一般来说，赴留学荷兰入读预科需要雅思5.0分以上，入读本科要求雅思6.0分以上,而申请硕士课程一般需要雅思6.5以上。在这种硬性要求下，学生一定要提早准备语言成绩。
荷兰的商科教育可能不如美国、英国的那么强势，但却有独特的优势，具体体现在以下十点： 一、国际化程度高。这是荷兰MBA课程的最大特点。在荷兰，95%以上的人都能讲英语；在荷兰的商学院中，经济学、企业经营管理学和相关学科均有英语授课的国际专业课程；荷兰商学院的师生来源也体现出国际化特点，以鹿特丹管理学院为例，国际学生占97%，教师也是来自于世界各地。 二、教学质量过硬。坚实的理论知识和丰富的实践经验，奠定了荷兰商科教育在国际商务和管理领域的专业地位。荷兰的商学院虽然数量不多，但质量上乘，全部被列入“全球商学院100强”之列。例如，鹿特丹管理学院、奈耶诺德大学和Nimbas管理学院的MBA项目，分别在《金融时报》的排名中位列全球第22位、第67位和第86位。 三、注重实践教学。荷兰的商学院与大型跨国企业关系密切，除了定期邀请富有实践经验的跨国企业管理人员授课，还为学生提供大量的实习机会，以提高学生的操作能力。有些商学院甚至安排学生到其它国家考察或参加校际交流课程，培养其国际性视野。 四、商贸环境良好。荷兰地处欧洲的门户位置，是欧洲大陆的交通中心、商业中心和金融中心。《经济学人》杂志认为荷兰是全球最适于进行国际贸易和投资的地方。对学习MBA 课程的“未来商界精英”来说，荷兰良好的商贸环境具有相当大的吸引力。 五、价格相较欧美国家经济实惠。荷兰作为发达国家，政府倾力于教育和医疗，对于尚未有经济收入的人群，特别是学生提供各种经济补助，政府最高可返还70%的学杂费。 六、全英语授课。不需要第二语言的学习，国民英语普及度高。在荷兰生活不需要为语言而烦难，只要有雅思成绩的保证，日食住行都可以用英语良好的沟通 七、不需要保证金，资金流动性大。相对家里是经商的或者普通工薪阶层，荷兰是一个很好的选择，作为欧洲的门户，荷兰的自由性也是出名的，不需要出具几十万的存款证明就可以申请学校拿到签证，这不会造成任何经济负担，所支付的也仅仅是学费。 八、中国人相对热门留学国家较少，有利于锻炼语言能力。荷兰华人仅30万，这样间接保证了语言的纯正性，孩子可以得到更多锻炼语言的机会。 九、毕业后提供一年找工作机会，工作竞争压力小。这是全欧盟国家独一无二的优惠政策，拥有全球最自由和最完善的经济体系，荷兰作为一个小国却处在全球经济的领跑位置上，本科毕业即可得到一年的工作时间，有些合作院校甚至直接提供就业机会，是移民的最佳途径。 十、荷兰教育体系完善，专业多样化可供不同需求学生选择。并且提供专转本加速快读等人性化课程。
360教育集团介绍，荷兰有“巨人国”之称：女性平均身高达1.71米，男性平均身高为1.84米。就荷兰人如何成为“世上第一高人”，医学界和人类学界众说纷纭。很少有人知道，在19世纪初，这个低地国家的居民还因为普遍“矮人一头”，而饱受欧洲邻国嘲弄。 荷兰人“高个子基因”分析 以往，接受度最高的解释是，荷兰人在近200年间身高猛涨，归功于营养摄入，即他们食用的是富含卡路里的肉类和奶制品。然而，近些年的数据分析表明，这绝非惟一因素;毕竟，其他欧洲国家也经历了生活水平的提高，但它们的国民身高并没有如此突飞猛进。 英国《卫报》援引荷兰兵役部门的记录指出，过去150年间，荷兰男性的平均身高增加了20厘米(约8英寸)。相比之下，美国男性的平均身高只增加了可怜的6厘米。 为解开这个秘密，英国人口卫生专家赫特·斯达尔普领衔的团队，专门打造了一个数据库。 该数据库名为“生命线”，收录了从1935年至1967年生活在荷兰北部的94500多人的详尽健康资料。通过分类分析，研究者发现了一个一直被忽视的规律：在这幅横跨30年的“快照”中，拥有孩子数量最多的，是高大的男人和身高达到平均水平的女人。 具体来说，生育能力最强的男性，其身高比平均值高7厘米，他们比生育能力最差的男性平均多拥有0.24个子女，而那些生育能力最差的男性，身高比平均水平低了约14厘米。 与其他西方国家相比，个子高些的荷兰女性，同样倾向于养育更多子女。多数人将生育时间推迟到大学毕业后，但她们一旦成功进入婚姻，通常都会拥有一个大家庭。 斯达尔普的团队并未求助于基因检测，但经过审慎观察，他们还是得出结论：优生学机制发挥了重要作用：随着时间的推移，越来越多的荷兰人开始具备“高个子基因”。 相关研究报告已在《英国皇家学会杂志论文集》上发表。“身高的遗传特性是非常强的。个子高一些的父母生育的孩子，一般都会高于矮一些的父母的孩子，”斯达尔普指出，“高一些的个体在下一代会有更多后代，这些后代也会更魁梧，由此，新一代人的平均身高必定会比前一代人的平均身高增加——假设其他外部条件全都相同。” 这并非纯粹的自然选择，荷兰当地的社会观念及文化取向发挥了潜移默化的影响。拿美国的情况作对比——数据表明，在美国，矮于平均身高的男女的生育成功率最高。 斯达尔普指出：“选择伴侣时，身高一般只有很小的作用，这很正常，因为还有很多别的评判特征。”但很显然，在荷兰人的择偶过程中，身高因素所占的“权重”更高些。 荷兰人不仅身高胜人一筹,英文能力也高人一等。据调查显示,在全球 60 个非英语国家中,荷兰英语能力为全球第3且是唯一男女英语能力均等的高英语程度国家.相对于英美澳等国家，留学荷兰市场开辟得较晚。然而其却以独特的优势，在短短几年内迅速升至热门留学国家的行列。2002年中国教育部对荷兰公立院校的学位予以认可，之后留学荷兰进入了一个空前的高潮。
最常用的绩效考核方法及其优缺点汇总 一、相对评价法 相对评价法是在某一团体中确定一个基准，将团体中的个体与基准进行比较，从而评出其在团体中的相对位置的评价。采用标准分数进行评价，实际是表示考察的对象在总体中处于什么位置，所以这种评价是一种相对评价。例如，对某校统考成绩的评价，通常是以该校所在市(县)统考的平均水平作为评价的基准，以该校成绩在一个市(县)中所属的地位来判断。 优点： 适应性强，应用面广，不管这个团体状况如何，都可以进行比较，都能评出个体在集体中的相对位置； 用建立在对评价对象群体测评基础之上的标准进行评价，发现其个别差异，从而对被评个体做出较为客观、公正和确切的判断； 有利于激发评价对象的竞争意识。 缺点： 评选出来的优秀者未必就是真正的高水平、高质量，未被选上的也不一定水平低、质量差，故容易降低客观标准；
评价的结果所反映的只是评价对象在一定范围内的相对位置，不一定反映他们的实际水平； 易忽视教育目标的完成情况； 易导致激烈的、无休止的竞争，从而挫伤一部分人的积极性。 具体方式： （1）序列比较法 序列比较法是对按员工工作成绩的好坏进行排序考核的一种方法。在考核之前，首先要确定考核的模块，但是不确定要达到的工作标准。将相同职务的所有员工在同一考核模块中进行比较，根据他们的工作状况排列顺序，工作较好的排名在前，工作较差的排名在后。最后，将每位员工几个模块的排序数字相加，就是该员工的考核结果。总数越小，绩效考核成绩越好。 （2）相对比较法 相对比较法是对员工进行两两比较，任何两位员工都要进行一次比较。两名员工比较之后，相对较好的员工记“1”，相对较差的员工记“0”。所有的员工相互比较完毕后，将每个人的得分相加，总分越高，绩效考核的成绩越好。 （3）强制比例法 强制比例法是指根据被考核者的业绩，将被考核者按一定的比例分为几类（最好、较好、中等、较差、最差）进行考核的方法。 二、绝对评价法 绝对评价法是在评价对象的集合之外确定一个标准，评价时把评价对象与客观标准进行比较，确定评价对象达到目标基准绝对位置的评价。例如，教学评价的标
哪里留学最便宜 导读：本文是关于哪里留学最便宜，如果觉得很不错，欢迎点评和分享！ 【篇一：哪个国家留学最便宜】 德国 德国是新移**家，教育质量严谨，打工政策宽松，学费也很低廉。学生可根据自身条件选择德语、英语或双语授课。每学期只需交纳约500欧元的注册费等费用，生活费每年7万元人民币左右。 俄罗斯 俄罗斯有众多的世界名牌大学，每年有大量美国学者去俄罗斯名校访问，入读这些着名大学，我国学生只要高中毕业，零语言基础也可申请。费用低，一年总费用五六万元人民币。近年中俄经济贸易发展迅速，毕业后就业前途光明。 日本 日本院校师资雄厚，理念领先，奖学金高，学历国际公认。留学生可享受公费医疗等国民待遇。合法打工，薪酬高。留学成本低廉，学费、生活费每年10万元人民币左右。 马来西亚 马来西亚学习生活环境非常优秀，学生毕业后可转往英国、新西兰、澳大利亚等国继续深造，每年费用约5万元人民币。读语言学校无需经济担保，签证率高，手续便捷。
韩国：留学直通车预科班 高中生毕业后选择赴韩国留学的中国学生可以享受50%的奖学金。 无语言基础的学生申请“一年语言+四年本科”，5年费用在35万左右；更节省费用的一种方式是选择“国内预科+韩国国内四年本科”的方式，通过预科班培训的学生可直接申请韩国庆熙大学、加图立大学、东义大学、建阳大学等大学的专业课。 新加坡：入读公立院校可申请永居 高中生毕业后可选择赴新加坡留学，可以节省50%留学成本。学生无语言基础申请，4年大学费用在35万左右，毕业后可以再考虑继续读研或去西方国家深造。 凡被新加坡公立院校录取的学生均有机会获得新加坡**资金援助，学生只需要和**签署一个毕业后留在新加坡工作3年的协议，在毕业前夕还能够获得由新加坡移民局发出的“永居邀请函”。 荷兰：不需要担保金 去荷兰读书不需要资金担保，荷兰采用返签，所以学生只要能拿到学校的录取通知书，基本可以保证签证通过。荷兰本科学制为3-4年，每年的学费大约在3.5万元左右，生活费用在5万元左右。荷兰学校要求学生必须有雅思成绩，雅思5.0分，安排一年的预科；雅思5.5分，安排半年的预科；雅思6分可以直接入学。 商业管理、物流、金融、农业、园艺等都是荷兰比较强势的专业。学生可根据自己的兴趣及将来的就业前景来选择专业。荷兰最大的大
MSC 24 Strategic Management Course
YOU ARE LOOKING AT … Jeroen Brinkhuis Lecturer & Consultant in Strategy Dr. Jeroen van der Velden Associate Professor in Strategy Co-director Strategy Center
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? Please feel free to ask questions ? Please don’t use mobile phones during class ? Relevant laptop/iPad use during class is recommended ? Please use your name tags/signs ? Warning: Classes can be interactive ? Please be dressed representatively ?Not abiding by these rules usually results in deduction of kudos or in rare cases a permaban. THE RULES OF THE GAME
世界著名商学院排名 世界著名商学院排名情况，详见下文： 美国商学院排名 1 哈佛大学 Harvard University 2 斯坦福大学 Stanford University 3 西北大学凯洛格商学院 Northwestern University (Kellogg) 4 宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院 University of Pennsylvania (Wharton) 5 麻省理工学院商学院 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Sloan) 6 芝加哥大学 University of Chicago (Booth) 7 加州大学伯克利分校商学院 University of California--Berkeley (Haas) 8 达特茅斯学院商学院 Dartmouth College (Tuck) 9 哥伦比亚大学 Columbia University 10 耶鲁大学 Yale University 11 纽约大学商学院 New York University (Stern) 12 杜克大学商学院 Duke University (Fuqua) 13 密西根大学-安娜堡分校商学院 University of Michigan--Ann Arbor (Ross) 14 加州大学洛杉矶分校Anderson商学院 University of California--Los Angeles (Anderson) 15 卡内基梅隆大学商学院 Carnegie Mellon University (Tepper) 16 弗吉尼亚大学商学院 University of Virginia (Darden) 17 康奈尔大学 Cornell University (Johnson)< 18 德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校商学院 University of Texas--Austin (McCombs) 19 乔治城大学 Georgetown University (McDonough)
论文开题报告 BSN荷兰商学院要求每位学员在正式撰写《论文》之前提交一份论文开题报告。该报告是用文字体现的论文的总构想，应使评阅人能从中了解未来报告完成的可行性、内容范围和实施的可能性等主要方面。学员应在开题报告获得批准之后，再进行《论文》的正式撰写工作。 选题是撰写论文的第一步，选题是否妥当，直接关系到论文的质量与成败。 选题要新颖、要创新，要坚持先进性、科学性、实用性及可行性的原则。不可仅仅是对前人工作的总结，或是对前人工作的重复。 选题来源包括：与自己实际工作或科研工作相关的、较为熟悉的问题等等。所选题目不宜过大，越具体越容易收集资料，从某一个方面入手，容易深入开展。 论文开题报告就是要把这些暗含的结论、论证结论的逻辑推理，清楚展现出来。 以下信息由学员填写： 学员姓名： 班级： 学号： 提交日期： 1. 介绍/背景 摩托罗拉公司创立于1928年，是世界财富百强企业之一，拥有全球性的业务和影响力，是全球无线通讯、汽车通讯和宽带通讯领域的领导者。摩托罗拉公司1987年进入中国，先在北京设立办事处，1992年在天津注册成立摩托罗拉（中国）电子有限公司，主要生产寻呼机、手机、对讲机、无线通信设备、半导体、汽车电子等，产品销售到中国和世界其他市场…… 摩托罗拉公司致力于不断的技术开发与创新，一直是全球研发的领导者。摩托罗拉公司在中国的累积研发投资达10亿美元，在北京、天津、上海、南京、成都、长沙和杭州等7个城市建立了研发中心和实验室。摩托罗拉中国研究院已经成为摩托罗拉的全球研发基地之一，也是跨国公司在中国建立的最大的研发机构。摩托罗拉公司在中国的主要研发方向有：软件开发、手机研发、手机配件研
荷兰人身高为什么这么高 很多去荷兰留学的学生对于荷兰人的高个子表示羡慕，那么为何荷兰人的身高为什么会如此高呢？跟着来看看吧!欢迎阅读。 荷兰人“高个子基因”分析 以往，接受度最高的解释是，荷兰人在近200年间身高猛涨，归功于营养摄入，即他们食用的是富含卡路里的肉类和奶制品。然而，近些年的数据分析表明，这绝非惟一因素;毕竟，其他欧洲国家也经历了生活水平的提高，但它们的国民身高并没有如此突飞猛进。 英国《卫报》援引荷兰兵役部门的记录指出，过去150年间，荷兰男性的平均身高增加了20厘米(约8英寸)。相比之下，美国男性的平均身高只增加了可怜的6厘米。 为解开这个秘密，英国人口卫生专家赫特·斯达尔普领衔的团队，专门打造了一个数据库。该数据库名为“生命线”，收录了从1935年至1967年生活在荷兰北部的94500多人的详尽健康资料。通过分类分析，研究者发现了一个一直被忽视的规律：在这幅横跨30年的“快照”中，拥有孩子数量最多的，是高大的男人和身高达到平均水平的女人。 具体来说，生育能力最强的男性，其身高比平均值高7厘米，他们比生育能力最差的男性平均多拥有0.24个子女，而那些生育能力最差的男性，身高比平均水平低了约14厘米。 与其他西方国家相比，个子高些的荷兰女性，同样倾向于养
育子女。多数人将生育时间推迟到大学毕业后，但她们一旦成功进入婚姻，通常都会拥有一个大家庭。 斯达尔普的团队并未求助于基因检测，但经过审慎观察，他们还是得出结论：优生学机制发挥了重要作用：随着时间的推移，越来越多的荷兰人开始具备“高个子基因”。 相关研究报告已在《英国皇家学会杂志论文集》上发表。“身高的遗传特性是非常强的。个子高一些的父母生育的孩子，一般都会高于矮一些的父母的孩子，”斯达尔普指出，“高一些的个体在下一代会有后代，这些后代也会更魁梧，由此，新一代人的平均身高必定会比前一代人的平均身高增加——假设其他外部条件全都相同。” 这并非纯粹的自然选择，荷兰当地的社会观念及文化取向发挥了潜移默化的影响。拿美国的情况作对比——数据表明，在美国，矮于平均身高的男女的生育成功率最高。 斯达尔普指出：“选择伴侣时，身高一般只有很小的作用，这很正常，因为还有很多别的评判特征。”但很显然，在荷兰人的择偶过程中，身高因素所占的“权重”更高些。 荷兰人不仅身高胜人一筹,英文能力也高人一等。据调查显示,在全球 60 个非英语国家中,荷兰英语能力为全球第3且是唯一男女英语能力均等的高英语程度国家.相对于英美澳等国家，留学荷兰市场开辟得较晚。然而其却以独特的优势，在短短几年内迅速升至热门留学国家的行列。2002年中国教育部对荷兰公立院校的学位予以认可，之后留学荷兰进入了一个空前的高潮。 荷兰留学独特的优势
鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学 关键词： 院校简介:鹿特丹大学（伊拉斯谟大学/伊拉斯姆斯大学），全称鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学（荷兰语：Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam，英语：Erasmus University Rotterdam，简称为EUR），位于荷兰王国第二大城市、欧洲第一大港口城市鹿特丹，是享誉世界的著名公立大学。鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学是由荷兰经济学院和鹿特丹医学院等合并组建而成的高校，也是该国惟一一所以荷兰中世纪著名的人文主义思想家德西德里乌斯·伊拉斯谟名字命名的大学。伊拉斯谟几个世纪以来在学术界一直享有声望，是鹿特丹应该永远记住的一个人。 鹿特丹大学在世界大学各类排行榜上一直名列前茅。2007年，鹿特丹大学被《金融时报》（Financial Times）评为欧洲前十的顶尖大学。2014年，鹿特丹大学被泰晤士高等教育世界大学综合排名列为欧洲第20位，世界第73位，其中社会科学为世界第47位，临床与健康为世界第37位。 鹿特丹大学设有鹿特丹管理学院、伊拉斯姆斯经济学院、伊拉斯姆斯法学院、医学与 健康科学学院、社会科学学院、国际社会科学研究所等院所。管理学院、经济学院和医学院在荷兰处于第一的位置。尤其是鹿特丹管理学院是荷兰商学院最高学府，在荷兰被称为欧洲的哈佛，处于绝对第一的位置，位列欧洲研究三强之首，在国际商学院顶级杂志发表论文数量长期欧洲第一 中文名 鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学 外文名 Erasmus University Rotterdam 简称 鹿特丹大学，EUR 校训 …Erasmus University Rotterdam. Main Port of Knowledge.? 创办时间
荷兰鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学世界排名一览 学校简介 鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学是一所世界闻名的以应用实践为教育导向的、荷兰最著名的、拥有雄厚教学及科研实力的综合性大学。鹿特丹大 学最早成立于1913年，至今已培养了大批优秀的政府领导人、高层 管理者和国家高级公务人员，如荷兰前首相Dr.RuudLubbers，世贸 组织总干事Dr.SupachalPanitchakdi等。该校位于著名的现代贸易 港口城市鹿特丹。20世纪早期，工贸行业认为应用型高等教育对迅 速发展的港口以及商业活动很有必要，因此在他们的支持下，由私 人创办了荷兰商学院。1973年，荷兰经济学院和鹿特丹医学院合并 成为鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学。这是荷兰惟一一所以学者名字命名的大学。伊拉斯谟几个世纪以来在学术界一直享有声望，是鹿特丹应该 永远记住的一个人。 鹿特丹大学旨在为科学进步和社会发展贡献力量。为了这一宗旨和考虑到当前的社会需求及发展，在恪守学术界的道德规范和国际 标准的同时，学校为教师及学生提供了一个自由开展培训及研究的 机会。鹿特丹大学一方面将学生培养成为高素质的学者，另一方面 也注重将知识发展和应用相融合的学术教育，并采取跨学科教育的 方法，使研究兼顾基础性与应用性。简而言之，鹿特丹大学是一所 充满生气、面向实践、脚踏实地的国际化大学，这可以从该校的学 科设置中得以反映。 鹿特丹大学通过参加“欧洲苏格拉底教育计划”，和欧洲境内外约200所大学签有协议，使国际学生间的交流变得更加普遍。英语 类课程数目不断增加，管理学院、法学院、医学设置有英语类硕士 专业以及各种暑期班。该校在教育及研究方面实行国际标准的质量 监控。鹿特丹大学的很多专业例如公共管理与商业管理专业已经受 到国际知名机构的认可(如美国公共政策分析与管理学会NASPAA、 欧洲质量改进体系EQUIS)。鹿特丹管理学院的国际MBA专业非常著名，排名居世界前列。
2014国际市场营销复习题 第一章 1.比较国际市场营销与一般市场营销的区别；比较国际市场营销与国际贸易的区别。 . 与市场营销的区别：面临的环境和背景不同；利用资源，获得比较优势的程度不同；市场营销的策略和手段不同；市场营销管理的难度不同；市场营销过程的风险性程度不同 与国际贸易的区别：业务范围不同；交易的主体不同；超越国界的方式不同；实施的过程不同2.分析国际市场营销的发展演变过程。 60年代开始形成；70年代逐步趋于完善，理论体系逐渐形成；80奠定了全球地位 两个重要事件：1、70年代后期，开拓国际市场逐步趋于完善，并发挥着越来越重要作用的。70年代后期，美国的全美商学院大会要求各商学院增加以国际经济为导向的课程，从而开始了对国际市场营销学的系统研究。2、从1982年开始，国际市场营销学在世界范围内受到重视，1982年6月，当时北美及欧洲的著名国际市场营销学者聚集在荷兰商学院，对国际市场营销学所面临的一些理论和实际问题进行了深入而广泛的探讨，从而奠定了国际市场营销学的全球性地位。 3.归纳国际市场的发展变化趋势。 一、国际市场竞争更加激烈的趋势；二、企业之间的并购活动频繁的趋势；三、经济全球化的趋势明显加快；四、区域经济一体化的趋势也明显加快；五、服务贸易迅速增长 4.分析国际化与全球化的联系与区别。 联系：经济全球化是经济国际化发展和延伸到全球范围，是全球范围的国际化。是经济国际化的高级阶段，是经济国际化发展到新的高度的表现，也是经济国际化发展的必然结果。两者间相互促进，共同发展。都是反映生产要素跨国流动的过程，二者均是指整个世界经济运行的一种客观状态。 区别：(1)经济国际化产生的基本条件是与工业经济相适应的;经济全球化则与信息经济相适应。（2）经济国际化时期，国家经济之间为线型联结方式是双边的经济交往。国际经济强调国家主权，国际经济联系的主体主要为国家，两国之间的经济关系实质是国家层面的关系。经济全球化主要体现的是企业内部的交融关系，是企业层面的经济关系。各国的国内市场有双重属性，它既是本国的，又是国际的，以同时作为世界市场的一个直接组成部分存在为重要特征，即通常所说的国内市场的国际化。(3)经济国际化现象在国家与地区问经常出现。经济国际化是从一个国家和地区的角度出发，研究一国或地区经济与世界经济融合的过程和程度。而经济全球化囊括了世界所有国家和地区，经济全球化是从世界所有国家和地区的角度出发，研究全球性经济同题。 第二章 1.分析企业进入国际市场的方式。 一是出口，传统、简单、风险最低。二是合同进入，又称非股权进入。三是对外直接投资，又称股权进入。 2.比较与分析直接出口与间接出口的优缺点及其适用条件。 直接出口的优点：（1）可根据国际市场的情况和变化自由选择国外市场。（2）可缩短商品流通过程，减少流通环节，降低流通费用，提高获利水平。（3）与国外客户直接接触，可以及时掌握国外市场的动向，增强应变能力，提高企业的国际市场竞争力。 直接出口的局限性：（1）对企业的要求很高，即企业必须具备开拓国际市场的资源和能力。国际市场竞争的四大战略资源是资金、人才、信息、技术等，这并不是一般企业都能够轻易具备的。（2）企业要承担国内出口商的功能和作用，以及由此而产生的经营风险。（3）企业要增加较多的费用开支，占用大量的资金，因此，可能会影响企业资金的周转。 间接出口的优点：（1）企业可以方便、迅速地依靠国内出口商在国际市场人才、经验、信息、渠道等方面的优势开展产品的外销业务。（2）企业不必为产品外销作额外投资，不必再办理出口业务，因此，可以节省大量开支，减少企业承担的经营风险。(3)利用得当，间接出口可
运营管理行动学习实践报告 运营管理行动学习实践报告 新形势下企业资金管理 学员姓名：……………………………………………………………… 学号：……………………………………………………………… 班级编号：……………………………………………………………… 提交日期：………………………………………………………………
目录 一、报告概要 (2) 二、企业及个人职责简介 (3) 三、问题的提出 (5) 四、文献概述 (11) 五、研究方法 (13) 六、研究与分析 (14) 七、结论和方案选择 (18) 八、方案的实施 (19) 九、回顾和反思 (22) 十、参考文献 (23)
一、报告概要 民营企业是国民经济的重要组成部分，对社会经济的发展和稳定起着举足轻重的促进作用。随着民营企业集群在我国经济社会发展中的地位和作用越来越突出，已成为推动经济快速增长的重要力量。本文以国美电器现行资金管理存在的问题进行分析研究，并针对本企业在资金管理中存在的资金管理水平低，使用效益差、重视利润指标考核，忽视现金流控制、资金流转的内部控制制度流于形式等方面提出了切实可行的解决方案。只有搞好资金管理这个中心环节，采取科学合理的管理和控制措施，才能提高民营企业的经济效益，使其在市场经济中稳步发展。
二、企业及个人职责简介 2.1企业简介 国美电器控股有限公司（港交所：0493）是香港交易所上市的综合企业公司。公司在百慕大注册，主席为陈晓，创始人为黄光裕。国美电器集团成立于1987年元月一日，是中国最大的以家电及消费电子产品零售为主的全国性连锁企业。国美电器集团在全国280多个城市拥有直营门店1200多家，旗下拥有国美、永乐、大中、黑天鹅等全国性和区域性家电零售品牌，年销售能力1000亿元。2003年、2006年国美电器相继在香港、澳门开业，目前在两地已拥有17家门店，迈出中国家电连锁零售企业国际化第一步；2004年国美电器在香港成功上市；2007年1月，国美电器与中国第三大电器零售企业永乐电器合并，12月，全面托管大中电器；2008年3月，控股三联商社，成为具有国际竞争力的民族连锁零售企业。目前，集团拥有员工（含门店促销员）20万人，每年为国家上缴税收超过20亿元。 在中国企业联合会、中国企业家协会联合发布的2006年度中国企业500强排名中名列第五十三，2007年度中国企业500强排名中名列第三十七。2008年，在世界品牌价值实验室编制的“中国购买者满意度第一品牌”中排名第5位。在18年的发展过程中，国美电器不断总结经验，形成了“商者无域，相融共生”的经营理念；塑造了“谦虚的行业领袖”、“成本控制专家”、“消费行家和服务专家”、“供应链管理专家”的品牌形象；形成了“选、用、育、留并重”的人才战略。如今的国美电器，在连锁化程度、管理水平、经营业绩和企业文化建设等方面已在同行业中遥遥领先，成为中国家电零售业的第一品牌，正向着“成为全球顶尖家电连锁零售企业”的长远战略目标持续快速前进。该企业在中国企业联合会、中国企业家协会联合发布的2006年度中国企业500强排名中名列第五十三，2007年度中国企业500强排名中名列第三十七。2008年，在世界品牌价值实验室编制的“中国购买者满意度第一品牌”中排名第5位。 2.2 企业当前组织架构 国美的组织结构类型：超事业部制 超事业部制又叫做“执行部制”。是在事业部制组织结构的基础上，20世纪70年代美国和日本的一些大公司又出现了一种新的管理组织结构形式。它是在
学校简介 据留学360说，鹿特丹商学院(ROTTERDAM BUSINESS SCHOOL)是鹿特丹应用科学大学(Hogeschool Rotterdam/Rotterdam University of Applied Science)下属的商学院系。鹿特丹大学坐落在世界闻名的第一大港鹿特丹，大学提供70多个课程。包括技术与工程、ICT、化学与生物技术、卫生保健、福利事业、文科、媒体与设计、经济学、建筑学和初级中级教师培训。尽管大学的课程多样，但着重点是课程之间的交互。大学想培养出能联系社会并具有综合和知识与技能、有责任感的学生。大学的教育针对解决国际与跨文化商务方面的问题。 鹿特丹商学院于1966年建校，是荷兰最大的应用科学大学之一，学校提供不同种类的经济类高等教育及培训项目，毕业生能胜任在公司、政府机构和公共服务业等行业的实际工作。就业领域为经济、管理、法律、贸易、工业、政府等部门。学校一直以创新为本，为适应不同的学生群体和日趋国际化的商务社会，设立了一些新的本科与研究生课程。除了四年制的国际商务管理课程以外，学院还提供了专升本课程，专门针对那些已经有相关商务类专业学历和一定的商务类工作经验的申请人。HES鹿特丹商务学院注重培训学生在公司、机构以及公共事务单位管理岗位上，或者作为独立经营者处理实际业务的能力，在教授专业理论知识的同时，非常重视培养学生熟练运用学到的知识。经过培训的毕业生通常在工业和贸易领域以及政府部门担任经济、商务、总务和法律等方面的中高层管理职务。 注意事项 你必须额外准备足够的资金来解决头两星期的费用问题。在荷兰开立银行帐户要十天左右的时间。在你有个人帐户之前，学校不可能把生活费退还给你，你也不可能到银行将汇票兑现。刚刚抵达荷兰两星期的开销又大，像钥匙押金，房租，医疗保险费和临时身份证的申请费都少不了钱，而这些事又不能拖拉，你必须一到荷兰就马上办理。所以，你应该随身携带 2000 欧元左右的现金或旅行支票（Traveler‘s Cheque，如 Tomas Cook），或存有这么多钱的际信用卡（Credit Card，如 Visa Card，Master Card）或国际借记卡（有 Maestro 或 Cirrus 标志的银行卡）。 在中国银行办理生活费时，你可以要求提取最多 2000 欧元等值的现钞，这部分钱将在汇票中扣除。你可以当场就用这笔外汇现金直接购买旅行支票。旅行支票有固定面额，可以在荷兰各大银行兑现，可以逐笔提款，也可以挂失补偿。除了旅行支票，你也可以办理国际信用卡或国际借记卡，将外汇现金存入。在海外使用最方便的信用卡为中国银行的长城国际卡和招商银行的一卡通。国际信用卡有附属卡，你可以使用父母信用卡的附属卡，享受同一提现消费额度。申请国际信用卡需要一定的周期以便银行审核申请人的资信状况。 如果你很快就要出国，等不及完成国际信用卡的申请程序，那么国际借记卡会是一个便捷的选择。最常用的国际借记卡有中行长城借记卡，农行金穗借记卡，和工行牡丹借记卡。国际借记卡具有与国际信用卡类似的服务功能，用美元作为结算货币，能在境外提现消费。其最大的不同在于信用卡可以透支，借记卡则是先存后用，卡里有多少钱就花多少钱。国际借记卡的最大优点在于费用低廉（一般在国外提现每笔只收三美元的手续费），无须担保，可以称作是简化版的国际信用卡。由于身上携带大量现金旅行不安全，这里建议你以支票或卡的形式携汇出境，国际信用卡和国际借记卡又特别值得推荐，因为你可以到达荷兰以后立即在任何 ATM 机上取款。ATM 机一般都是 24 小时开放，不像银行有固定工作时间。到达荷兰以后，在你办理临时身份证时，也要提交中国的信用卡或银行卡复印件，或荷兰的银行帐户的复印件。由于荷兰的银行帐户不能马上取得，有一张国内的信用卡或借记卡，你就能尽快申请身份证了。
一、学院专业设置 学校课程包括语言强化课程，本科课程，专升本课程和硕士及硕士预科课程，其中本科课程包括：国际商务与语言；亚洲商务管理；国际商务与管理研究；硕士课程涉及金融会计专业，咨询及企业管理专业，物流管理专业等 大学预科，法律，纺织与服装，工程技术，管理，环境，会计，计算机科学，建筑，教育，金融，经济学，理科学，旅游，农林类，人文艺术，商科类，设计，社科类，神学院，生物，市场营销，体育，新闻传播，信息科学，医学，语言，中学，自然科学 二、学院简介 鹿特丹商学院（ROTTERDAM BUSINESS SCHOOL）是鹿特丹应用科学大学（Hogeschool Rotterdam/Rotterdam University of Applied Science）下属的商学院系。鹿特丹大学坐落在世界闻名的第一大港鹿特丹，大学提供70多个课程。包括技术与工程、ICT、化学与生物技术、卫生保健、福利事业、文科、媒体与设计、经济学、建筑学和初级中级教师培训。尽管大学的课程多样，但着重点是课程之间的交互。大学想培养出能联系社会并具有综合和知识与技能、有责任感的学生。大学的教育针对解决国际与跨文化商务方面的问题。 三、教育特色 为适应不同的学生群体和日趋国际化的商务社会，开设了一些全球领先的本科与研究生课程，如金融管理学、国际商务、物流管理等。除了四年制的本科外，还提供专升本课程，专门针对那些已经有商务类专业学历和有一定商务类工作经验的申请人。另外，学校每年都会挑选学生到英美等国交换学习，许多专业还提供学生带薪实习的机会。 四、费用 由于荷兰政府对教育极为重视，在教育方面的总投入占国民预算的20%左右，一些教学质量达标的高校能获得荷兰政府的津贴。我们学校是获政府津贴的高校之一，本科学生每年的学费只需3万—4万人民币，在荷兰的生活费大约每年4万—5万人民币，留学的性价比非常高。 五、签证 作为学生，留学荷兰采用“反签”程序，即只要被荷兰高校录取，就由学校代为其向荷兰移民局递交签证申请。通过面试，语言成绩过关，材料准备齐全，收入学通知书及学生入境签证。抵达学校后，学校代表会带领学生去移民厅领取居留证。 六、申请条件