文献出处：Mehran H. The study on the correlation of Senior Executive Compensation and corporate performance in listed companies [J]. Journal of financial economics, 2016, 2(3): 161-174.
原文
The study on the correlation of Senior Executive Compensation and corporate
performance in listed companies
Mehran H
Abstract
Due to information asymmetry between owners and executives, led to the moral risk and adverse selection problems. How to make the executive is satisfying the interests of the white body at the same time maximize the enterprise value ultimately achieve a win-win situation, become a great concern of many scholars.
This paper from two aspects of theory and the literature reviewed the executive compensation and corporate performance of the related content. Then the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance empirical research. This article mainly from two aspects to analyze the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, is a longitudinal descriptive statistical analysis, samples are divided into general descriptive statistical analysis and descriptive statistical analysis, the second is to collect data, respectively, the university and multivariate linear regression analysis, selection of the top three executive pay means the natural logarithm of executive compensation, return on equity and earnings per share measure of enterprise performance, and to join the company size, financial leverage, ownership concentration, executives shareholding, the proportion of state-owned shares, the proportion of independent directors, the chairman and general manager of situation eight control variables, the size of the board of supervisors.
Keywords: the listed company, executive compensation and corporate performance
Introduction
Modern enterprise mostly adopts share-holding system operation, the emergence of the joint-stock company, led to the separate ownership with the agency. Shareholders as the owner of the enterprise property eventually, but not to participate in enterprise management and decision-making, but the entrusted agent for the management and operation enterprises, formed "by a proxy" relationship. Agent instead of shareholders as the authorized agent of the enterprise, its status or senior management of the enterprise. Considering the agent's risk factor, such as level of morality, ability, together with information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, can produce the agency cost.
Executives as the human capital of enterprise is the most important and scarce, because its mastery of the enterprise management decision-making, the height of the enterprise control rights virtually increased the likelihood they use right to violate the interests of the shareholders. In order to solve this contradiction, shareholders adopted both constraints and incentive mechanism to balance the principal-agent relationship, can excite the work enthusiasms of executives unceasingly, can maximum limit to maximize shareholder wealth. Whether to stand in the Angle of the shareholders or executives, the company's performance is the important measure of executive pay. So, study on executive compensation and corporate performance correlation for an enterprise to formulate salary incentive mechanism and solve the problem of agency costs, it is very necessary.
Literature review
The correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance Murphy (1985) 1964-1981 using the company data, chose the 73 largest manufacturing enterprises of the data of 500 managers as the research sample, using empirical method to test the stock yield, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate earnings growth, the conclusion is: the elasticity value cash incentives for the value of the company is near to 0.11, measured with returns to shareholders of company performance pay was significantly positively related to relationship with the manager. The conclusion and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) of the two scholars research conclusion.
Carpenter and Sanders (2002) through the study concluded that: the senior management team and for board members incentives related relationship, motivation of the senior management team can more effectively improve the business performance.
Phillip and Cyril (2004) by using linear regression and curve correlation analysis method of combining the, general manager of relationship between pay and performance indicators for empirical research, the conclusion is: the general manager, general manager of wages, and payment of remuneration bonuses both are positively correlated with corporate performance.
Kevin (2011) by 2006-2009, 280 companies listed on the nose study draws the following conclusions: executive compensation and corporate performance (measured by return on equity as index) was significantly positive correlation; Affect the executive compensation level of the most significant variable is the size of the company.
The influential factors of executive pay
Cores, j., Holthausen, R.W. and Larkers, D.F (2005) in corporate governance structure as the breakthrough point to study the relationship between general manager compensation and corporate performance, the results show that if the company governance structure is imperfect, the condition of the compensation is the general manager will appear on the high side; General manager compensation and negatively related stake, was positively correlated with the size of the board.
Kin Wai Lee (2005), Pieter Duffhues etc. (2008) after analyzing the influence factors of the company's executive compensation get the following conclusion: the board of directors of the company locates the geographical position, industry, and the size is about pay will have an impact factor; Whether they are of good corporate governance structure will largely affect the corporate performance.
Kim and Hwang (2009) argue that directors only without actual contact with the enterprise are in the true sense of independence. The two scholars to fortune 100 companies in 2005 data from 1996-2005 as a sample for empirical research, get the following conclusion: director independence negatively related with executive pay,
with pay performance sensitivity and in accordance with the performance was a positive correlation decision term chance.
Research hypothesis
Executive compensation and corporate performance
"The ownership and operation separate" on the one hand, make the enterprise economic efficiency was improved, but on the other hand also brought "by a proxy" problem. The principal and agent are in the pursuit of self-interest maximization, but due to the differences between the interests of both the demand, but on the market and the existence of information asymmetry phenomenon, in this case, the agent can make the behavior of the damage the interests of the principal for your own benefit, "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" problem such as will as, thus appeared the agency cost. In order to balance the principal-agent relationship, in turn, reduce agency cost; the owner will need to sign a compensation contract and operators. Compensation contracts, executive compensation and corporate performance, executive compensation determined by business performance, to link executive compensation and corporate performance effectively. In this case, the executive in order to improve their own reward will try my best to company management and company performance can be improved.
Hypothesis 1: executive compensation and corporate performance are related Executive pay and company size
The size of the company has a large influence on executive pay. Compared with the smaller companies, the company size, the greater the division of the thinner, the more people, the more the more complex organization structure, operation and management problems, which makes operators face a greater risk of management and pressure, the ability and quality of senior executives put forward higher requirements. In this case, in order to good operation and management company, senior executives must pay more time and energy, and few businesses to be able to do this kind of ability, therefore, senior executives for more pay and logical.
Hypothesis 2: executive pay scale is related with the company
Executive compensation and the asset-liability ratio
Compensation incentive of listed company's purpose is to reduce agency costs, ownership and operation separate, and keep the reasonable capital structure can reduce agency costs, thereby increasing the interests of the shareholders.Jesen and Michael (1986) put forward the free cash flow, said he thought the enterprises need to pay interest and principal on debt financing, so that the company's free cash flow is reduced, executives waste of corporate resources and reduce the chance of a successful, at the same time, through the debt contract, creditors have the supervision of executive behavior motivation, this agency problem between executives and shareholders and ease. When the company debt levels continue to improve, the creditor supervision executive behavior motive is also a corresponding increase. On the margin, as creditors supervision of external supervision and internal salary incentive mechanism can be substituted, therefore, when the enterprise debt level enhances unceasingly, the external supervision be enhanced, so that you can properly reduce the level of salary incentive, thus make executive pay in a certain extent, be suppressed.
Hypothesis 3: executive compensation is negatively related to the asset-liability ratio
Executive pay and ownership concentration
In general, if the company's ownership concentration is high, the big shareholder control of the executive ability of the stronger the will, they will be susceptible to the stimulation of interests for executives to implement effective supervision, prevent using executive position to improve their pay too much to damage the interests of the shareholders. On the contrary, when the company's equity dispersion, due to the constraints of the supervisory cost and especially when the benefits of less supervision cost, small and medium-sized shareholders motivation will gradually disappear, the supervision of such executives will have larger power, thus they would use the position to raise their pay.Demsetz and Leh (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) through the study found that in the practical work, because shareholders to supervise the management of the cost is high, in fact only the big shareholders have the ability to effectively supervise. When the company the more dispersed ownership, especially
when the benefits of less supervision cost, small shareholder supervision and motivation will be weakens even disappears completely, it will make managers to easily get more power, so that they can in advantage position in negotiations with shareholders to pay for their higher pay.
Hypothesis 4: executive compensation is negatively related to the ownership concentration
Executive compensation and executive shareholding
"The ownership and operation separate" bring the problem of "entrust - agent”. The principal and the agent is "rational economic man", they are all in the pursuit of self-interest maximization, but due to the differences between the interests of both the demand and the market exists the phenomenon of information asymmetry, agents may make the behavior of the damage the interests of the principal for your own benefit, thus formed the agency cost. One of the effective ways to solve the principal-agent problem is equity incentive to executives, let executives holding shares of the company. Executive stock holding company, the more the interests of executives and the company's interests more closely, so both have common interests, enterprise value maximization. Executives in order to realize their own interests will inevitably to do all the management of the company, improve the efficiency of the enterprise, so that executives can get higher pay.
Hypothesis 5: executive compensation and executive shareholding is related Research prospect
First, in terms of executive pay, in addition to consider the disclosure of financial report of listed companies of monetary income, can also consider the effect of non-monetary income and hidden income. Secondly, in terms of business performance, due to the stock market is not mature, share price volatility, stock prices it is difficult to accurately reflect the operating performance of enterprises, this article only selected the return on equity, earnings per share both accounting profit index to measure business performance. With the continuous development of the securities market and perfect, in a follow-up study can use market value indicators (such as Thbins. Q value, economic value added, etc.) To measure business performance. Finally, the influence
of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance factors can also, from the perspective of the other external factors and internal factors on executive compensation and corporate performance relationship of further research.
译文
上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究
Mehran H
摘要
由于所有者与公司高管之间存在信息不对称,导致了风险道德、逆向选择等问题。如何使高管在满足白身利益的同时使企业价值最大化最终达到双赢,成为很多学者关注的问题。
文章首先从理论和文献两个方面回顾了高管薪酬和企业绩效的相关内容。然后对高管薪酬与企业绩效之间的关系进行实证研究。本文主要从两个方面对高管薪酬与企业绩效相关性进行分析，一是纵向描述性统计分析，分为样本总体描述性统计分析和分行业描述性统计分析，二是对收集的数据分别进行单变量和多变量线性回归分析，选取前三名高管薪酬均值的自然对数衡量高管薪酬，净资产收益率和每股收益衡量企业绩效，并加入公司规模、财务杠杆、股权集中度、高管持股比例、国有股比例、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理兼任情况、监事会规模这八个控制变量。
关键词：上市公司，高管薪酬，企业绩效
引言
现代企业大都采用股份制经营,股份制公司的出现,导致了所有权与代理权分离。股东作为企业最终财产的所有者,却不参与企业的管理和经营决策,而是委托代理人为其管理和经营企业,形成了“委托一代理”关系。代理人代替股东作为企业的全权代理人,其地位即企业的高级管理层。考虑到代理人的道德、能力、水平等风险系数,加之股东与高管之间的信息不对称,就会产生代理成本。高管作为企业最重要又稀缺的人力资本,因为其掌握了企业的经营决策权,这种对企业高度
控制的权利无形中增加了他们利用权利侵犯股东利益的可能性。为了解决这个矛盾,股东采取了既约束又激励的机制来平衡这种委托代理关系,既可以不断激发高管的工作积极性,又可以最大限度的使股东财富最大化。无论站在股东还是高管的角度,公司业绩都是衡量高管薪酬的重要标准。所以,对高管薪酬与公司绩效的相关性的研究对于企业制定薪酬激励机制和解决代理成本的问题是很有必要的。文献综述
高管薪酬与企业绩效具有显著相关性
Murphy(1985)利用美国公司1964—1981 年的数据，选择了73 个最大制造企业的500 个经理的数据为研究样本，运用实证的方法来检验股票收益率、高管薪酬和公司业绩增长之间的相互关系，得到的结论是：现金激励对于公司价值的弹性值近似为0.11，用股东回报测量的公司绩效与经理报酬呈显著正相关关系。这个结论与Coughlan 和Schmidt (1985) 这两位学者的研究结论相吻合。
Carpenter 和Sanders(2002)通过研究得出的结论是：对高层管理团队的激励和对董事会成员的激励具有相关关系，对高管团队的激励能够更有效地提高经营绩效。
Phillip 和Cyril(2004)采用线性回归和曲线相关分析相结合的方法，对总经理报酬和业绩指标之间的关系进行实证研究，得到的结论是：总经理报酬中的工资、给付总经理的奖金这两者均与企业绩效呈正相关关系。
Kevin(2011)通过对2006—2009 年280 家在纽交所上市的公司进行研究得出了如下结论：高管薪酬与企业绩效（用净资产收益率作为衡量指标）呈显著的正相关关系；影响到高管薪酬水平最显著的变量是公司规模。
高管薪酬影响因素研究
Cores,J.E, Holthausen, R.W.,和Larkers,D.F (2005)以公司治理结构为切入点来研究总经理薪酬与企业绩效之间的关系，研究结果表明：如果公司的治理结构不完善，则其总经理薪酬会出现偏高的状况；总经理薪酬与股权比例呈负相关关系，与董事会规模呈正相关关系。
Kin Wai Lee(2005) 、Pieter Duffhues 等(2008) 在分析了公司高管薪酬的影响因素后得到如下结论：公司所处地理位置、所在行业以及董事会规模都是对薪酬会产生一定影响的因素；公司治理结构是否良好（完整译文请到百度文库）
英文文献及翻译 文献题目An Overview of Servlet and JSP Technology 文献作者Nagle ,Wiegley 题目翻译Servlet和JSP技术简述 参考人 院 (系) 专业班级 学号
1 A Servlet's Job Servlets are Java programs that run on Web or application servers, acting as a middle layer between requests coming from Web browsers or other HTTP clients and databases or applications on the HTTP server. Their job is to perform the following tasks, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. Figure 1-1Web middleware role 1.1 Read the explicit data sent by the client. The end user normally enters this data in an HTML form on a Web page. However, the data could also come from an applet or a custom HTTP client program. 1.2 Read the implicit HTTP request data sent by the browser. Figure 1-1 shows a single arrow going from the client to the Web server (the layer where servlets and JSP execute), but there are really two varieties of data: the explicit data that the end user enters in a form and the behind-the-scenes HTTP information. Both varieties are critical. The HTTP information includes cookies, information about media types and compression schemes the browser understands, and so on. 1.3 Generate the results. This process may require talking to a database, executing an RMI or EJB call, invoking a Web service, or computing the response directly. Your real data may be in a relational database. Fine. But your database probably doesn't speak HTTP or return results in HTML, so the Web browser can't talk directly to the database. Even if it could, for security reasons, you probably would not want it to. The same argument applies to most other applications.You need the Web middle layer to extract the results inside a document.
企业员工福利外文翻译文献 (文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译) 译文： 西方企业员工福利满意度研究述评 摘要：近年来，西方企业管理学界越来越重视员X-福利满意度理论研究，因为员工的福利满意度会直接影响他们的工作态度、工作行为与企业经营管理工作的效果。本文概述了西方企业员工福利满意度理论研究的现状，并根据组织公平理论和双因素理论，探讨福利管理决策公平与不同类型的福利对员工满意度的影响，最后为我国企业加强福利管理工作提出了若干建议。 关键词：福利；满意度；组织公平；双因素理论 一、企业福利政策的发展趋势 福利是员工薪酬的一个重要组成部分。近年来，越来越多的企业为员工提供良好的福利待遇，以便吸引、激励并留住优秀员工。企业的福利政策出现了以下发展趋势：(1)福利在员工薪酬组合中的比重增大，企业支付的福利费用大幅增加。 (2)员工也必须承担部分福利费用。企业以往为员工免费提供所有福利。目前，许
多员工必须承担部分医疗保险、养老保险费用。(3)企业的福利制度越来越复杂，福利形式越来越多样化，管理人员需要花费更多的时间与精力来从事员工福利制度设计与管理工作。许多企业在制定与实施福利制度时较少考虑员工的反应。例如，有些企业为了降低福利费用，采用灵活的福利制度，或将部分福利管理工作外包给其他公司，而不考虑员工是否满意。许多欧美学者认为，企业管理人员在制定与实施福利制度时必须考虑员工的反应。他们的实证研究表明，员工对福利的满意度会直接影响企业福利制度的效果。 二、员工福利满意度理论研究概述 20世纪60年代以来，西方企业管理学界对员工薪酬理论进行了大量的研究。然而，企业管理学者却较少研究员工福利理论。在现有文献中，欧美学者主要从福利的激励作用、员工对福利计划的理解和偏好、福利与员工薪酬满意度的关系、员工的福利满意度等方面研究员工福利理论。美国学者威盛顿(Barton I。．Weathington)和坦切克(I。ois E．Tetrick)指出，企业管理学界在员工福利这个领域的研究成果存在以下不足：(1)许多学者实际上是研究员工的薪酬满意度或工作满意度，而不是研究员工的福利；(2)大多数学者只研究福利对员工的影响，却忽视各类福利对员工工作态度和工作行为的影响；(3)企业管理理论研究人员主要从企业的角度来研究福利制度，却很少考虑员工对福利的态度。近年来，西方企业管理学界逐渐加强了对员工福利满意度的研究。 I．员工福利满意度的计量 1985年，美国学者赫尼曼(Herbert G．Heneman)和希沃布(Donald P．Schwab)编制了一个由18个计量项目组成的“员工薪酬满意度”量表(pay satisfaction questionnaire，简称PSQ)。他们采用以下四个项目来计量员工的“福利满意度”： (1)员工对整套福利的满意度； (2)员工对企业支付的福利费用数额的满意度； (3)员工对福利价值的满意度； (4)员工对福利类别的满意度。 许多欧美企业管理学者在实证研究中把员工的福利满意度作为薪酬满意度的一个组成成分，采用PSQ量表计量员工的福利满意度。 现在，许多欧美学者对员工的福利满意度进行更深入的研究。不少学者认为员工福利满意度是一个多维概念。美国学者戴恩霍(Carol Danehower)与勒斯特(John A．I．ust)指出，员工的福利满意度应包括员工对企业支付的福利费用与企业为他们提供的整套福利的质量的满意度。他们设计了一个由11个项目组成的员工福利满意度量表(benefit satisfaction ques—tionnaire，简称BSQ)，从上述两个方面来计量员工的福利满意度。他们的一系列实证研究支持员工的福利满意度是一个二维概念的结论。然而，他们也发现BSQ量表中的某些项目不能很好地计量员工对福利质量的满意度。因此，他们对BSQ量表进行了适当的修改，又增加了两个项目，并于1995年对美国某大学的2 815位员工进行了问卷调查。他们的数据分析结果表明，新的BSQ量表中的13个项目分别属于员工对福利质量的满意度、对福利费用的满意度、对福利信息的满意度三个维度。他们根据数据分析结果，指出员工的福利满意度是一个复杂的多维概念。但是，加拿大学者特兰布雷(Michel Tremblay)等人的实证研究结果并不支持戴恩霍和勒斯特的观点。他们发现，员工的福利满意度是一个单维概念。美国学者米塞利(Marcia P．Miceli)和雷恩(Matthew C．Lane)把员工福利满意度分为两类：一类是员工对福利水平的满意度，它受员工感觉中“应该得到”与“实际得到”的福利之差的影响；另一
绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译____________________________________________________________________ ________________________ Performance management-how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means,
外文文献翻译译文 一、外文原文 Corporate Performance Management Abstract Two of the most important duties of a chief executive officer are (1) to formulate strategy and (2) to manage his company’s performance. In this article we examine the second of these tasks and discuss how corporate performance should be modeled and managed. We begin by considering the environment in which a company operates, which includes, besides outside stakeholders, the industry it belongs and the market it supplies, and then proceed to explain how the functioning of a company can be understood by an examination of its business, operational and performance management models. Next we describe the structure recommended by the authors for a corporate planning, control and evaluation system, the most important part of a corporate performance management system. The core component of the planning system is the corporate performance evaluation model, the structure of which is mapped into the planning system’s database, simulation models and budgeting tools’ structures, and also used to shape information contained in the system’s products, besides being the nucleus of the language used by the system’s agents to talk about corporate performance. The ontology of planning, the guiding principles of corporate planning and the history of ”MADE”, the corporate performance management system discussed in this article, are reviewed next, before we proceed to discuss in detail the structural components of the corporate planning and control system introduced before. We conclude the article by listing the main steps which should be followed when implementing a performance planning, control and evaluation system for a company. 1.Introduction Two of the most important corporate tasks for which a chief executive officer is p rimarily responsible are (1) to formulate strategy and (2) to manage the company’s performance. In this article we examine the second of these tasks and discuss how
The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance from stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager). The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), among others, suggest that managers' holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers' stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, only provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on the corporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on the corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev's results. Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents the conclusions of the study.
绩效考核外文文献及翻译 外文文献 1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His or her line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. If you are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits down and talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often as you can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole process to be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; c orporate social responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would then
外文文献原稿和译文 原稿 Performance management - how to appraise employee performance Abstract Performance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the two Introduction Challenges of performance management Reasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected
外文翻译 Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Author: Allen N. Berger Agency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990). A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empirically