Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs.the S&P500
Annual Percentage Change
Year
in Per-Share
Book Value of
Berkshire
(1)
in S&P500
with Dividends
Included
(2)
Relative
Results
(1)-(2)
1965...................................................23.810.013.8 1966...................................................20.3(11.7)32.0 1967...................................................11.030.9(19.9) 1968...................................................19.011.08.0 1969...................................................16.2(8.4)24.6 1970...................................................12.0 3.98.1 1971...................................................16.414.6 1.8 1972...................................................21.718.9 2.8 1973................................................... 4.7(14.8)19.5 1974................................................... 5.5(26.4)31.9 1975...................................................21.937.2(15.3) 1976...................................................59.323.635.7 1977...................................................31.9(7.4)39.3 1978...................................................24.0 6.417.6 1979...................................................35.718.217.5 1980...................................................19.332.3(13.0) 1981...................................................31.4(5.0)36.4 1982...................................................40.021.418.6 1983...................................................32.322.49.9 1984...................................................13.6 6.17.5 1985...................................................48.231.616.6 1986...................................................26.118.67.5 1987...................................................19.5 5.114.4 1988...................................................20.116.6 3.5 1989...................................................44.431.712.7 1990...................................................7.4(3.1)10.5 1991...................................................39.630.59.1 1992...................................................20.37.612.7 1993...................................................14.310.1 4.2 1994...................................................13.9 1.312.6 1995...................................................43.137.6 5.5 1996...................................................31.823.08.8 1997...................................................34.133.4.7 1998...................................................48.328.619.7 1999....................................................521.0(20.5) 2000................................................... 6.5(9.1)15.6 2001...................................................(6.2)(11.9) 5.7 2002...................................................10.0(22.1)32.1 2003...................................................21.028.7(7.7) 2004...................................................10.510.9(.4) 2005................................................... 6.4 4.9 1.5 2006...................................................18.415.8 2.6 2007...................................................11.0 5.5 5.5 2008...................................................(9.6)(37.0)27.4 Compounded Annual Gain–1965-2008.......................20.3%8.9%11.4 Overall Gain–1964-2008..................................362,319%4,276%
Notes:Data are for calendar years with these exceptions:1965and1966,year ended9/30;1967,15months ended 12/31.
Starting in1979,accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market,which was previously the requirement.In this table,Berkshire’s results through1978have been restated to conform to the changed rules.In all other respects,the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P500numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax.If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P500and accrued the appropriate taxes,its results would have lagged the S&P500 in years when that index showed a positive return,but would have exceeded the S&P500in years when the index showed a negative return.Over the years,the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
2
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our decrease in net worth during2008was$11.5billion,which reduced the per-share book value of
both our Class A and Class B stock by9.6%.Over the last44years(that is,since present management took over)
book value has grown from$19to$70,530,a rate of20.3%compounded annually.*
The table on the preceding page,recording both the44-year performance of Berkshire’s book value
and the S&P500index,shows that2008was the worst year for each.The period was devastating as well for
corporate and municipal bonds,real estate and commodities.By yearend,investors of all stripes were bloodied
and confused,much as if they were small birds that had strayed into a badminton game.
As the year progressed,a series of life-threatening problems within many of the world’s great financial
institutions was unveiled.This led to a dysfunctional credit market that in important respects soon turned
non-functional.The watchword throughout the country became the creed I saw on restaurant walls when I was
young:“In God we trust;all others pay cash.”
By the fourth quarter,the credit crisis,coupled with tumbling home and stock prices,had produced a
paralyzing fear that engulfed the country.A freefall in business activity ensued,accelerating at a pace that I have
never before witnessed.The U.S.–and much of the world–became trapped in a vicious negative-feedback
cycle.Fear led to business contraction,and that in turn led to even greater fear.
This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action.In poker terms,the Treasury
and the Fed have gone“all in.”Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently
been dispensed by the barrel.These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome
aftereffects.Their precise nature is anyone’s guess,though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation.
Moreover,major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance,and they will be followed by cities
and states bearing mind-boggling requests.Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political
challenge.They won’t leave willingly.
Whatever the downsides may be,strong and immediate action by government was essential last year if
the financial system was to avoid a total breakdown.Had one occurred,the consequences for every area of our
economy would have been cataclysmic.Like it or not,the inhabitants of Wall Street,Main Street and the various
Side Streets of America were all in the same boat.
Amid this bad news,however,never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in the past.In
the20th Century alone,we dealt with two great wars(one of which we initially appeared to be losing);a dozen or
so panics and recessions;virulent inflation that led to a211?2%prime rate in1980;and the Great Depression of the1930s,when unemployment ranged between15%and25%for many years.America has had no shortage of
challenges.
Without fail,however,we’ve overcome them.In the face of those obstacles–and many others–the
real standard of living for Americans improved nearly seven-fold during the1900s,while the Dow Jones
Industrials rose from66to11,https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,pare the record of this period with the dozens of centuries during which
humans secured only tiny gains,if any,in how they lived.Though the path has not been smooth,our economic
system has worked extraordinarily well over time.It has unleashed human potential as no other system has,and it
will continue to do so.America’s best days lie ahead.
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares.Figures for the B shares are
1/30th of those shown for A.
3
Take a look again at the44-year table on page2.In75%of those years,the S&P stocks recorded a gain.I would guess that a roughly similar percentage of years will be positive in the next44.But neither Charlie Munger,my partner in running Berkshire,nor I can predict the winning and losing years in advance.(In our usual opinionated view,we don’t think anyone else can either.)We’re certain,for example,that the economy will be in shambles throughout2009–and,for that matter,probably well beyond–but that conclusion does not tell us whether the stock market will rise or fall.
In good years and bad,Charlie and I simply focus on four goals:
(1)maintaining Berkshire’s Gibraltar-like financial position,which features huge amounts of
excess liquidity,near-term obligations that are modest,and dozens of sources of earnings
and cash;
(2)widening the“moats”around our operating businesses that give them durable competitive
advantages;
(3)acquiring and developing new and varied streams of earnings;
(4)expanding and nurturing the cadre of outstanding operating managers who,over the years,
have delivered Berkshire exceptional results.
Berkshire in2008
Most of the Berkshire businesses whose results are significantly affected by the economy earned below their potential last year,and that will be true in2009as well.Our retailers were hit particularly hard,as were our operations tied to residential construction.In aggregate,however,our manufacturing,service and retail businesses earned substantial sums and most of them–particularly the larger ones–continue to strengthen their competitive positions.Moreover,we are fortunate that Berkshire’s two most important businesses–our insurance and utility groups–produce earnings that are not correlated to those of the general economy.Both businesses delivered outstanding results in2008and have excellent prospects.
As predicted in last year’s report,the exceptional underwriting profits that our insurance businesses realized in2007were not repeated in2008.Nevertheless,the insurance group delivered an underwriting gain for the sixth consecutive year.This means that our$58.5billion of insurance“float”–money that doesn’t belong to us but that we hold and invest for our own benefit–cost us less than zero.In fact,we were paid$2.8billion to hold our float during2008.Charlie and I find this enjoyable.
Over time,most insurers experience a substantial underwriting loss,which makes their economics far different from ours.Of course,we too will experience underwriting losses in some years.But we have the best group of managers in the insurance business,and in most cases they oversee entrenched and valuable franchises. Considering these strengths,I believe that we will earn an underwriting profit over the years and that our float will therefore cost us nothing.Our insurance operation,the core business of Berkshire,is an economic powerhouse.
Charlie and I are equally enthusiastic about our utility business,which had record earnings last year and is poised for future gains.Dave Sokol and Greg Abel,the managers of this operation,have achieved results unmatched elsewhere in the utility industry.I love it when they come up with new projects because in this capital-intensive business these ventures are often large.Such projects offer Berkshire the opportunity to put out substantial sums at decent returns.
4
Things also went well on the capital-allocation front last year.Berkshire is always a buyer of both businesses and securities,and the disarray in markets gave us a tailwind in our purchases.When investing, pessimism is your friend,euphoria the enemy.
In our insurance portfolios,we made three large investments on terms that would be unavailable in normal markets.These should add about$11?2billion pre-tax to Berkshire’s annual earnings and offer possibilities for capital gains as well.We also closed on our Marmon acquisition(we own64%of the company now and will purchase its remaining stock over the next six years).Additionally,certain of our subsidiaries made “tuck-in”acquisitions that will strengthen their competitive positions and earnings.
That’s the good news.But there’s another less pleasant reality:During2008I did some dumb things in investments.I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt.I will tell you more about these later.Furthermore,I made some errors of omission,sucking my thumb when new facts came in that should have caused me to re-examine my thinking and promptly take action.
Additionally,the market value of the bonds and stocks that we continue to hold suffered a significant decline along with the general market.This does not bother Charlie and me.Indeed,we enjoy such price declines if we have funds available to increase our positions.Long ago,Ben Graham taught me that“Price is what you pay;value is what you get.”Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks,I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down.
Yardsticks
Berkshire has two major areas of value.The first is our investments:stocks,bonds and cash equivalents.At yearend those totaled$122billion(not counting the investments held by our finance and utility operations,which we assign to our second bucket of value).About$58.5billion of that total is funded by our insurance float.
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance.These earnings are delivered by our67non-insurance companies,itemized on page96.We exclude our insurance earnings from this calculation because the value of our insurance operation comes from the investable funds it generates,and we have already included this factor in our first bucket.
In2008,our investments fell from$90,343per share of Berkshire(after minority interest)to$77,793,a decrease that was caused by a decline in market prices,not by net sales of stocks or bonds.Our second segment of value fell from pre-tax earnings of$4,093per Berkshire share to$3,921(again after minority interest).
Both of these performances are unsatisfactory.Over time,we need to make decent gains in each area if we are to increase Berkshire’s intrinsic value at an acceptable rate.Going forward,however,our focus will be on the earnings segment,just as it has been for several decades.We like buying underpriced securities,but we like buying fairly-priced operating businesses even more.
Now,let’s take a look at the four major operating sectors of Berkshire.Each of these has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics.Therefore,lumping them together,as is done in standard financial statements,impedes analysis.So we’ll present them as four separate businesses,which is how Charlie and I view them.
5
Regulated Utility Business
Berkshire has an87.4%(diluted)interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings,which owns a wide variety of utility operations.The largest of these are(1)Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric,whose 3.8million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity;(2)MidAmerican Energy,which serves723,000electric customers,primarily in Iowa;(3)Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power,serving about1.7million electric customers in six western states;and(4)Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about9%of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are its two terrific managers,Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, and my long-time friend,Walter Scott.It’s unimportant how many votes each party has;we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise.Nine years of working with Dave,Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief:Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
Somewhat incongruously,MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S.,HomeServices of America.This company operates through21locally-branded firms that have16,000 https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,st year was a terrible year for home sales,and2009looks no better.We will continue,however,to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
Earnings(in millions)
20082007 U.K.utilities............................................................$339$337 Iowa utility. (425412)
Western utilities (703692)
Pipelines (595473)
HomeServices...........................................................(45)42 Other(net).. (186130)
Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes...........................2,2032,086 Constellation Energy*.....................................................1,092–Interest,other than to Berkshire.............................................(332)(312) Interest on Berkshire junior debt.............................................(111)(108) Income tax..............................................................(1,002)(477) Net earnings.............................................................$1,850$1,189 Earnings applicable to Berkshire**..........................................$1,704$1,114 Debt owed to others.......................................................19,14519,002 Debt owed to Berkshire....................................................1,087821 *Consists of a breakup fee of$175million and a profit on our investment of$917million.
**Includes interest earned by Berkshire(net of related income taxes)of$72in2008and$70in2007.
MidAmerican’s record in operating its regulated electric utilities and natural gas pipelines is truly outstanding.Here’s some backup for that claim.
Our two pipelines,Kern River and Northern Natural,were both acquired in2002.A firm called Mastio regularly ranks pipelines for customer satisfaction.Among the44rated,Kern River came in9th when we purchased it and Northern Natural ranked39th.There was work to do.
In Mastio’s2009report,Kern River ranked1st and Northern Natural3rd.Charlie and I couldn’t be more proud of this performance.It came about because hundreds of people at each operation committed themselves to a new culture and then delivered on their commitment.
Achievements at our electric utilities have been equally impressive.In1995,MidAmerican became the major provider of electricity in Iowa.By judicious planning and a zeal for efficiency,the company has kept electric prices unchanged since our purchase and has promised to hold them steady through2013.
6
MidAmerican has maintained this extraordinary price stability while making Iowa number one among all states in the percentage of its generation capacity that comes from wind.Since our purchase,MidAmerican’s wind-based facilities have grown from zero to almost20%of total capacity.
Similarly,when we purchased PacifiCorp in2006,we moved aggressively to expand wind generation. Wind capacity was then33megawatts.It’s now794,with more coming.(Arriving at PacifiCorp,we found “wind”of a different sort:The company had98committees that met frequently.Now there are28.Meanwhile, we generate and deliver considerably more electricity,doing so with2%fewer employees.)
In2008alone,MidAmerican spent$1.8billion on wind generation at our two operations,and today the company is number one in the nation among regulated utilities in ownership of wind capacity.By the way, compare that$1.8billion to the$1.1billion of pre-tax earnings of PacifiCorp(shown in the table as“Western”) and Iowa.In our utility business,we spend all we earn,and then some,in order to fulfill the needs of our service areas.Indeed,MidAmerican has not paid a dividend since Berkshire bought into the company in early2000.Its earnings have instead been reinvested to develop the utility systems our customers require and deserve.In exchange,we have been allowed to earn a fair return on the huge sums we have invested.It’s a great partnership for all concerned.
************
Our long-avowed goal is to be the“buyer of choice”for businesses–particularly those built and owned by families.The way to achieve this goal is to deserve it.That means we must keep our promises;avoid leveraging up acquired businesses;grant unusual autonomy to our managers;and hold the purchased companies through thick and thin(though we prefer thick and thicker).
Our record matches our rhetoric.Most buyers competing against us,however,follow a different path. For them,acquisitions are“merchandise.”Before the ink dries on their purchase contracts,these operators are contemplating“exit strategies.”We have a decided advantage,therefore,when we encounter sellers who truly care about the future of their businesses.
Some years back our competitors were known as“leveraged-buyout operators.”But LBO became a bad name.So in Orwellian fashion,the buyout firms decided to change their moniker.What they did not change, though,were the essential ingredients of their previous operations,including their cherished fee structures and love of leverage.
Their new label became“private equity,”a name that turns the facts upside-down:A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree’s capital structure compared to that previously existing.A number of these acquirees,purchased only two to three years ago,are now in mortal danger because of the debt piled on them by their private-equity buyers.Much of the bank debt is selling below70￠on the dollar,and the public debt has taken a far greater beating.The private-equity firms,it should be noted,are not rushing in to inject the equity their wards now desperately need.Instead, they’re keeping their remaining funds very private.
In the regulated utility field there are no large family-owned businesses.Here,Berkshire hopes to be the“buyer of choice”of regulators.It is they,rather than selling shareholders,who judge the fitness of purchasers when transactions are proposed.
There is no hiding your history when you stand before these regulators.They can–and do–call their counterparts in other states where you operate and ask how you have behaved in respect to all aspects of the business,including a willingness to commit adequate equity capital.
7
When MidAmerican proposed its purchase of PacifiCorp in2005,regulators in the six new states we would be serving immediately checked our record in Iowa.They also carefully evaluated our financing plans and capabilities.We passed this examination,just as we expect to pass future ones.
There are two reasons for our confidence.First,Dave Sokol and Greg Abel are going to run any businesses with which they are associated in a first-class manner.They don’t know of any other way to operate. Beyond that is the fact that we hope to buy more regulated utilities in the future–and we know that our business behavior in jurisdictions where we are operating today will determine how we are welcomed by new jurisdictions tomorrow.
Insurance
Our insurance group has propelled Berkshire’s growth since we first entered the business in1967.This happy result has not been due to general prosperity in the industry.During the25years ending in2007,return on net worth for insurers averaged8.5%versus14.0%for the Fortune500.Clearly our insurance CEOs have not had the wind at their back.Yet these managers have excelled to a degree Charlie and I never dreamed possible in the early days.Why do I love them?Let me count the ways.
At GEICO,Tony Nicely–now in his48th year at the company after joining it when he was18–continues to gobble up market share while maintaining disciplined underwriting.When Tony became CEO in 1993,GEICO had2.0%of the auto insurance market,a level at which the company had long been stuck.Now we have a7.7%share,up from7.2%in2007.
The combination of new business gains and an improvement in the renewal rate on existing business has moved GEICO into the number three position among auto insurers.In1995,when Berkshire purchased control,GEICO was number seven.Now we trail only State Farm and Allstate.
GEICO grows because it saves money for motorists.No one likes to buy auto insurance.But virtually everyone likes to drive.So,sensibly,drivers look for the lowest-cost insurance consistent with first-class service. Efficiency is the key to low cost,and efficiency is Tony’s specialty.Five years ago the number of policies per employee was299.In2008,the number was439,a huge increase in productivity.
As we view GEICO’s current opportunities,Tony and I feel like two hungry mosquitoes in a nudist camp.Juicy targets are everywhere.First,and most important,our new business in auto insurance is now exploding.Americans are focused on saving money as never before,and they are flocking to GEICO.In January 2009,we set a monthly record–by a wide margin–for growth in policyholders.That record will last exactly28 days:As we go to press,it’s clear February’s gain will be even better.
Beyond this,we are gaining ground in allied https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,st year,our motorcycle policies increased by 23.4%,which raised our market share from about6%to more than7%.Our RV and ATV businesses are also growing rapidly,albeit from a small base.And,finally,we recently began insuring commercial autos,a big market that offers real promise.
GEICO is now saving money for millions of Americans.Go to https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html, or call1-800-847-7536 and see if we can save you money as well.
General Re,our large international reinsurer,also had an outstanding year in2008.Some time back, the company had serious problems(which I totally failed to detect when we purchased it in late1998).By2001, when Joe Brandon took over as CEO,assisted by his partner,Tad Montross,General Re’s culture had further deteriorated,exhibiting a loss of discipline in underwriting,reserving and expenses.After Joe and Tad took charge,these problems were decisively and successfully addressed.Today General Re has regained its luster. Last spring Joe stepped down,and Tad became CEO.Charlie and I are grateful to Joe for righting the ship and are certain that,with Tad,General Re’s future is in the best of hands.
8
Reinsurance is a business of long-term promises,sometimes extending for fifty years or more.This past year has retaught clients a crucial principle:A promise is no better than the person or institution making it. That’s where General Re excels:It is the only reinsurer that is backed by an AAA corporation.Ben Franklin once said,“It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.”That’s no worry for General Re clients.
Our third major insurance operation is Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division,headquartered in Stamford and staffed by only31employees.This may be one of the most remarkable businesses in the world,hard to characterize but easy to admire.
From year to year,Ajit’s business is never the same.It features very large transactions,incredible speed of execution and a willingness to quote on policies that leave others scratching their heads.When there is a huge and unusual risk to be insured,Ajit is almost certain to be called.
Ajit came to Berkshire in1986.Very quickly,I realized that we had acquired an extraordinary talent. So I did the logical thing:I wrote his parents in New Delhi and asked if they had another one like him at home. Of course,I knew the answer before writing.There isn’t anyone like Ajit.
Our smaller insurers are just as outstanding in their own way as the“big three,”regularly delivering valuable float to us at a negative cost.We aggregate their results below under“Other Primary.”For space reasons,we don’t discuss these insurers individually.But be assured that Charlie and I appreciate the contribution of each.
Here is the record for the four legs to our insurance stool.The underwriting profits signify that all four provided funds to Berkshire last year without cost,just as they did in2007.And in both years our underwriting profitability was considerably better than that achieved by the industry.Of course,we ourselves will periodically have a terrible year in insurance.But,overall,I expect us to average an underwriting profit.If so,we will be using free funds of large size for the indefinite future.
Underwriting Profit Yearend Float
(in millions)
Insurance Operations2008200720082007
General Re......................$342$555$21,074$23,009
BH Reinsurance..................1,3241,42724,22123,692
GEICO.........................9161,1138,4547,768
Other Primary...................2102794,7394,229
$2,792$3,374$58,488$58,698 Manufacturing,Service and Retailing Operations
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront.Let’s look,though,at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
Balance Sheet12/31/08(in millions)
Assets
Cash and equivalents.................$2,497 Accounts and notes receivable..........5,047 Inventory..........................7,500 Other current assets (752)
Total current assets...................15,796 Goodwill and other intangibles.........16,515 Fixed assets........................16,338 Other assets........................1,248
$49,897
Liabilities and Equity
Notes payable.......................$2,212 Other current liabilities...............8,087 Total current liabilities................10,299
Deferred taxes......................2,786 Term debt and other liabilities..........6,033 Equity.............................30,779
$49,897 9
Earnings Statement(in millions)
200820072006 Revenues.........................................................$66,099$59,100$52,660 Operating expenses(including depreciation of$1,280in2008,$955in2007and
$823in2006)....................................................61,93755,02649,002 Interest expense. (139127132)
Pre-tax earnings....................................................4,023*3,947*3,526* Income taxes and minority interests.....................................1,7401,5941,395 Net income........................................................$2,283$2,353$2,131
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
This motley group,which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes,earned an impressive 17.9%on average tangible net worth last year.It’s also noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return.Clearly we own some terrific businesses.We purchased many of them,however,at large premiums to net worth–a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on our balance sheet–and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to8.1%.
Though the full-year result was satisfactory,earnings of many of the businesses in this group hit the skids in last year’s fourth quarter.Prospects for2009look worse.Nevertheless,the group retains strong earning power even under today’s conditions and will continue to deliver significant cash to the parent company.Overall, these companies improved their competitive positions last year,partly because our financial strength let us make advantageous tuck-in acquisitions.In contrast,many competitors were treading water(or sinking).
The most noteworthy of these acquisitions was Iscar’s late-November purchase of Tungaloy,a leading Japanese producer of small tools.Charlie and I continue to look with astonishment–and appreciation!–at the accomplishments of Iscar’s management.To secure one manager like Eitan Wertheimer,Jacob Harpaz or Danny Goldman when we acquire a company is a blessing.Getting three is like winning the Triple Crown.Iscar’s growth since our purchase has exceeded our expectations–which were high–and the addition of Tungaloy will move performance to the next level.
MiTek,Benjamin Moore,Acme Brick,Forest River,Marmon and CTB also made one or more acquisitions during the year.CTB,which operates worldwide in the agriculture equipment field,has now picked up six small firms since we purchased it in2002.At that time,we paid$140million for the https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,st year its pre-tax earnings were$89million.Vic Mancinelli,its CEO,followed Berkshire-like operating principles long before our arrival.He focuses on blocking and tackling,day by day doing the little things right and never getting off course.Ten years from now,Vic will be running a much larger operation and,more important,will be earning excellent returns on invested capital.
Finance and Financial Products
I will write here at some length about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any financial commentary,which is summarized in the table at the end of this section.I do this because Clayton’s recent experience may be useful in the public-policy debate about housing and mortgages.But first a little background.
Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home industry,delivering27,499units last year. This came to about34%of the industry’s81,889total.Our share will likely grow in2009,partly because much of the rest of the industry is in acute distress.Industrywide,units sold have steadily declined since they hit a peak of372,843in1998.
10
At that time,much of the industry employed sales practices that were atrocious.Writing about the period somewhat later,I described it as involving“borrowers who shouldn’t have borrowed being financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent.”
To begin with,the need for meaningful down payments was frequently ignored.Sometimes fakery was involved.(“That certainly looks like a$2,000cat to me”says the salesman who will receive a$3,000 commission if the loan goes through.)Moreover,impossible-to-meet monthly payments were being agreed to by borrowers who signed up because they had nothing to lose.The resulting mortgages were usually packaged (“securitized”)and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors.This chain of folly had to end badly,and it did.
Clayton,it should be emphasized,followed far more sensible practices in its own lending throughout that time.Indeed,no purchaser of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of principal or interest.But Clayton was the exception;industry losses were staggering.And the hangover continues to this day.
This1997-2000fiasco should have served as a canary-in-the-coal-mine warning for the far-larger conventional housing market.But investors,government and rating agencies learned exactly nothing from the manufactured-home debacle.Instead,in an eerie rerun of that disaster,the same mistakes were repeated with conventional homes in the2004-07period:Lenders happily made loans that borrowers couldn’t repay out of their incomes,and borrowers just as happily signed up to meet those payments.Both parties counted on“house-price appreciation”to make this otherwise impossible arrangement work.It was Scarlett O’Hara all over again:“I’ll think about it tomorrow.”The consequences of this behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our economy.
Clayton’s198,888borrowers,however,have continued to pay normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses.This is not because these borrowers are unusually creditworthy,a point proved by FICO scores(a standard measure of credit risk).Their median FICO score is644,compared to a national median of723,and about35%are below620,the segment usually designated“sub-prime.”Many disastrous pools of mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with far better credit,as measured by FICO scores.
Yet at yearend,our delinquency rate on loans we have originated was3.6%,up only modestly from 2.9%in2006and2.9%in2004.(In addition to our originated loans,we’ve also bought bulk portfolios of various types from other financial institutions.)Clayton’s foreclosures during2008were3.0%of originated loans compared to3.8%in2006and5.3%in2004.
Why are our borrowers–characteristically people with modest incomes and far-from-great credit scores–performing so well?The answer is elementary,going right back to Lending101.Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage payments would compare with their actual–not hoped-for–income and then decided whether they could live with that commitment.Simply put,they took out a mortgage with the intention of paying it off,whatever the course of home prices.
Just as important is what our borrowers did not do.They did not count on making their loan payments by means of refinancing.They did not sign up for“teaser”rates that upon reset were outsized relative to their income.And they did not assume that they could always sell their home at a profit if their mortgage payments became onerous.Jimmy Stewart would have loved these folks.
Of course,a number of our borrowers will run into trouble.They generally have no more than minor savings to tide them over if adversity hits.The major cause of delinquency or foreclosure is the loss of a job,but death,divorce and medical expenses all cause problems.If unemployment rates rise–as they surely will in 2009–more of Clayton’s borrowers will have troubles,and we will have larger,though still manageable,losses. But our problems will not be driven to any extent by the trend of home prices.
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Commentary about the current housing crisis often ignores the crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur because a house is worth less than its mortgage(so-called“upside-down”loans).Rather,foreclosures take place because borrowers can’t pay the monthly payment that they agreed to pay.Homeowners who have made a meaningful down-payment–derived from savings and not from other borrowing–seldom walk away from a primary residence simply because its value today is less than the mortgage.Instead,they walk when they can’t make the monthly payments.
Home ownership is a wonderful thing.My family and I have enjoyed my present home for50years, with more to come.But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase,not profit or refi possibilities.And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser.
The present housing debacle should teach home buyers,lenders,brokers and government some simple lessons that will ensure stability in the future.Home purchases should involve an honest-to-God down payment of at least10%and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled by the borrower’s income.That income should be carefully verified.
Putting people into homes,though a desirable goal,shouldn’t be our country’s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition.
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Clayton’s lending operation,though not damaged by the performance of its borrowers,is nevertheless threatened by an element of the credit crisis.Funders that have access to any sort of government guarantee–banks with FDIC-insured deposits,large entities with commercial paper now backed by the Federal Reserve,and others who are using imaginative methods(or lobbying skills)to come under the government’s umbrella–have money costs that are minimal.Conversely,highly-rated companies,such as Berkshire,are experiencing borrowing costs that,in relation to Treasury rates,are at record levels.Moreover,funds are abundant for the government-guaranteed borrower but often scarce for others,no matter how creditworthy they may be.
This unprecedented“spread”in the cost of money makes it unprofitable for any lender who doesn’t enjoy government-guaranteed funds to go up against those with a favored https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,ernment is determining the “haves”and“have-nots.”That is why companies are rushing to convert to bank holding companies,not a course feasible for Berkshire.
Though Berkshire’s credit is pristine–we are one of only seven AAA corporations in the country–our cost of borrowing is now far higher than competitors with shaky balance sheets but government backing.At the moment,it is much better to be a financial cripple with a government guarantee than a Gibraltar without one.
Today’s extreme conditions may soon end.At worst,we believe we will find at least a partial solution that will allow us to continue much of Clayton’s lending.Clayton’s earnings,however,will surely suffer if we are forced to compete for long against government-favored lenders.
Pre-Tax Earnings
(in millions)
20082007 Net investment income.......................................$330$272
Life and annuity operation....................................23(60)
Leasing operations (87111)
Manufactured-housing finance(Clayton) (206526)
Other* (141157)
Income before investment and derivatives gains or losses...........$787$1,006
*Includes$92million in2008and$85million in2007of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.
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Tax-Exempt Bond Insurance
Early in2008,we activated Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company(“BHAC”)as an insurer of the
tax-exempt bonds issued by states,cities and other local entities.BHAC insures these securities for issuers both
at the time their bonds are sold to the public(primary transactions)and later,when the bonds are already owned
by investors(secondary transactions).
By yearend2007,the half dozen or so companies that had been the major players in this business had
all fallen into big trouble.The cause of their problems was captured long ago by Mae West:“I was Snow White,
but I drifted.”
The monolines(as the bond insurers are called)initially insured only tax-exempt bonds that were
low-risk.But over the years competition for this business intensified,and rates fell.Faced with the prospect of
stagnating or declining earnings,the monoline managers turned to ever-riskier propositions.Some of these
involved the insuring of residential mortgage obligations.When housing prices plummeted,the monoline
industry quickly became a basket case.
Early in the year,Berkshire offered to assume all of the insurance issued on tax-exempts that was on
the books of the three largest monolines.These companies were all in life-threatening trouble(though they said
otherwise.)We would have charged a11?2%rate to take over the guarantees on about$822billion of bonds.If our offer had been accepted,we would have been required to pay any losses suffered by investors who owned
these bonds–a guarantee stretching for40years in some cases.Ours was not a frivolous proposal:For reasons
we will come to later,it involved substantial risk for Berkshire.
The monolines summarily rejected our offer,in some cases appending an insult or two.In the end,
though,the turndowns proved to be very good news for us,because it became apparent that I had severely
underpriced our offer.
Thereafter,we wrote about$15.6billion of insurance in the secondary market.And here’s the punch
line:About77%of this business was on bonds that were already insured,largely by the three aforementioned
monolines.In these agreements,we have to pay for defaults only if the original insurer is financially unable to do
so.
We wrote this“second-to-pay”insurance for rates averaging3.3%.That’s right;we have been paid far
more for becoming the second to pay than the1.5%we would have earlier charged to be the first to pay.In one
extreme case,we actually agreed to be fourth to pay,nonetheless receiving about three times the1%premium
charged by the monoline that remains first to pay.In other words,three other monolines have to first go broke
before we need to write a check.
Two of the three monolines to which we made our initial bulk offer later raised substantial capital.
This,of course,directly helps us,since it makes it less likely that we will have to pay,at least in the near term,
any claims on our second-to-pay insurance because these two monolines fail.In addition to our book of
secondary business,we have also written$3.7billion of primary business for a premium of$96million.In
primary business,of course,we are first to pay if the issuer gets in trouble.
We have a great many more multiples of capital behind the insurance we write than does any other
monoline.Consequently,our guarantee is far more valuable than theirs.This explains why many sophisticated
investors have bought second-to-pay insurance from us even though they were already insured by another
monoline.BHAC has become not only the insurer of preference,but in many cases the sole insurer acceptable to
bondholders.
Nevertheless,we remain very cautious about the business we write and regard it as far from a sure
thing that this insurance will ultimately be profitable for us.The reason is simple,though I have never seen even
a passing reference to it by any financial analyst,rating agency or monoline CEO.
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The rationale behind very low premium rates for insuring tax-exempts has been that defaults have historically been few.But that record largely reflects the experience of entities that issued uninsured bonds. Insurance of tax-exempt bonds didn’t exist before1971,and even after that most bonds remained uninsured.
A universe of tax-exempts fully covered by insurance would be certain to have a somewhat different loss experience from a group of uninsured,but otherwise similar bonds,the only question being how different. To understand why,let’s go back to1975when New York City was on the edge of bankruptcy.At the time its bonds–virtually all uninsured–were heavily held by the city’s wealthier residents as well as by New York banks and other institutions.These local bondholders deeply desired to solve the city’s fiscal problems.So before long,concessions and cooperation from a host of involved constituencies produced a solution.Without one,it was apparent to all that New York’s citizens and businesses would have experienced widespread and severe financial losses from their bond holdings.
Now,imagine that all of the city’s bonds had instead been insured by Berkshire.Would similar belt-tightening,tax increases,labor concessions,etc.have been forthcoming?Of course not.At a minimum,Berkshire would have been asked to“share”in the required sacrifices.And,considering our deep pockets,the required contribution would most certainly have been substantial.
Local governments are going to face far tougher fiscal problems in the future than they have to date. The pension liabilities I talked about in last year’s report will be a huge contributor to these woes.Many cities and states were surely horrified when they inspected the status of their funding at yearend2008.The gap between assets and a realistic actuarial valuation of present liabilities is simply staggering.
When faced with large revenue shortfalls,communities that have all of their bonds insured will be more prone to develop“solutions”less favorable to bondholders than those communities that have uninsured bonds held by local banks and residents.Losses in the tax-exempt arena,when they come,are also likely to be highly correlated among issuers.If a few communities stiff their creditors and get away with it,the chance that others will follow in their footsteps will grow.What mayor or city council is going to choose pain to local citizens in the form of major tax increases over pain to a far-away bond insurer?
Insuring tax-exempts,therefore,has the look today of a dangerous business–one with similarities,in fact,to the insuring of natural catastrophes.In both cases,a string of loss-free years can be followed by a devastating experience that more than wipes out all earlier profits.We will try,therefore,to proceed carefully in this business,eschewing many classes of bonds that other monolines regularly embrace.
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The type of fallacy involved in projecting loss experience from a universe of non-insured bonds onto a deceptively-similar universe in which many bonds are insured pops up in other areas of finance.“Back-tested”models of many kinds are susceptible to this sort of error.Nevertheless,they are frequently touted in financial markets as guides to future action.(If merely looking up past financial data would tell you what the future holds, the Forbes400would consist of librarians.)
Indeed,the stupefying losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models used by salesmen,rating agencies and investors.These parties looked at loss experience over periods when home prices rose only moderately and speculation in houses was negligible.They then made this experience a yardstick for evaluating future losses.They blissfully ignored the fact that house prices had recently skyrocketed,loan practices had deteriorated and many buyers had opted for houses they couldn’t afford. In short,universe“past”and universe“current”had very different characteristics.But lenders,government and media largely failed to recognize this all-important fact.
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Investors should be skeptical of history-based models.Constructed by a nerdy-sounding priesthood using esoteric terms such as beta,gamma,sigma and the like,these models tend to look impressive.Too often,though,investors forget to examine the assumptions behind the symbols.Our advice:Beware of geeks bearing formulas.
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A final post-script on BHAC:Who,you may wonder,runs this operation?While I help set policy,all of the heavy lifting is done by Ajit and his crew.Sure,they were already generating $24billion of float along with hundreds of millions of underwriting profit annually.But how busy can that keep a 31-person group?Charlie and I decided it was high time for them to start doing a full day’s work.
Investments
Because of accounting rules,we divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two categories.The table below,presenting the first category,itemizes investments that are carried on our balance sheet at market value and that had a yearend value of more than $500million.
12/31/08Shares Company Percentage of Company Owned Cost*Market (in millions)151,610,700American Express Company ....................13.1
$1,287$2,812200,000,000The Coca-Cola Company .......................8.6
1,2999,05484,896,273ConocoPhillips ............................... 5.7
7,0084,39830,009,591Johnson &Johnson ........................... 1.1
1,8471,795130,272,500Kraft Foods Inc...............................8.9
4,3303,4983,947,554POSCO ..................................... 5.2
7681,19191,941,010The Procter &Gamble Company ................. 3.1
6435,68422,111,966Sanofi-Aventis ............................... 1.7
1,8271,40411,262,000Swiss Re .................................... 3.2
773530227,307,000Tesco plc ................................... 2.9
1,3261,19375,145,426U.S.Bancorp ................................ 4.3
2,3371,87919,944,300Wal-Mart Stores,Inc...........................0.5
9421,1181,727,765The Washington Post Company ..................18.4
11674304,392,068Wells Fargo &Company .......................7.26,7028,973
Others ......................................6,0354,870
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market ..........$37,135$49,073*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis;GAAP “cost”differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
In addition,we have holdings in Moody’s and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at “equity value”–our cost plus retained earnings since our purchase,minus the tax that would be paid if those earnings were paid to us as dividends.This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership of an investee company reaches 20%.
We purchased 15%of Moody’s some years ago and have not since bought a share.Moody’s,though,has repurchased its own shares and,by late 2008,those repurchases reduced its outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above 20%.Burlington Northern has also repurchased shares,but our increase to 20%primarily occurred because we continued to buy this stock.
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Unless facts or rules change,you will see these holdings reflected in our balance sheet at“equity accounting”values,whatever their market prices.You will also see our share of their earnings(less applicable taxes)regularly included in our quarterly and annual earnings.
I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission(and maybe more;this one sticks out).Without urging from Charlie or anyone else,I bought a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak.I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year.I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current$40-$50price.But so far I have been dead wrong.Even if prices should rise, moreover,the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.
I made some other already-recognizable errors as well.They were smaller,but unfortunately not that small.During2008,I spent$244million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap to me.At yearend we wrote these holdings down to market:$27million,for an89%loss.Since then,the two stocks have declined even further.The tennis crowd would call my mistakes“unforced errors.”
On the plus side last year,we made purchases totaling$14.5billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley,Goldman Sachs and General Electric.We very much like these commitments,which carry high current yields that,in themselves,make the investments more than satisfactory.But in each of these three purchases,we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus.To fund these large purchases,I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep(primarily Johnson&Johnson,Procter& Gamble and ConocoPhillips).However,I have pledged–to you,the rating agencies and myself–to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash.We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations.When forced to choose,I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.
The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it.This change has not been minor;the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc.A few years ago,it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today’s could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms.When the financial history of this decade is written,it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late1990s and the housing bubble of the early2000s.But the U.S.Treasury bond bubble of late2008may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.
Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long.Holders of these instruments,of course,have felt increasingly comfortable–in fact,almost smug–in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted.They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim“cash is king,”even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.
Approval,though,is not the goal of investing.In fact,approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause;the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.
Derivatives
Derivatives are dangerous.They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our financial system.They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks.They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years.So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator,OFHEO,whose more than100employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions,totally missed their cooking of the books.
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Indeed,recent events demonstrate that certain big-name CEOs(or former CEOs)at major financial institutions were simply incapable of managing a business with a huge,complex book of derivatives.Include Charlie and me in this hapless group:When Berkshire purchased General Re in1998,we knew we could not get our minds around its book of23,218derivatives contracts,made with884counterparties(many of which we had never heard of).So we decided to close up shop.Though we were under no pressure and were operating in benign markets as we exited,it took us five years and more than$400million in losses to largely complete the task.Upon leaving,our feelings about the business mirrored a line in a country song:“I liked you better before I got to know you so well.”
Improved“transparency”–a favorite remedy of politicians,commentators and financial regulators for averting future train wrecks–won’t cure the problems that derivatives pose.I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can’t audit these contracts,and regulators can’t regulate them.When I read the pages of“disclosure”in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments,all I end up knowing is that I don’t know what is going on in their portfolios(and then I reach for some aspirin).
For a case study on regulatory effectiveness,let’s look harder at the Freddie and Fannie example. These giant institutions were created by Congress,which retained control over them,dictating what they could and could not do.To aid its oversight,Congress created OFHEO in1992,admonishing it to make sure the two behemoths were behaving themselves.With that move,Fannie and Freddie became the most intensely-regulated companies of which I am aware,as measured by manpower assigned to the task.
On June15,2003,OFHEO(whose annual reports are available on the Internet)sent its2002report to Congress–specifically to its four bosses in the Senate and House,among them none other than Messrs.Sarbanes and Oxley.The report’s127pages included a self-congratulatory cover-line:“Celebrating10Years of Excellence.”The transmittal letter and report were delivered nine days after the CEO and CFO of Freddie had resigned in disgrace and the COO had been fired.No mention of their departures was made in the letter,even while the report concluded,as it always did,that“Both Enterprises were financially sound and well managed.”
In truth,both enterprises had engaged in massive accounting shenanigans for some time.Finally,in 2006,OFHEO issued a340-page scathing chronicle of the sins of Fannie that,more or less,blamed the fiasco on every party but–you guessed it–Congress and OFHEO.
The Bear Stearns collapse highlights the counterparty problem embedded in derivatives transactions,a time bomb I first discussed in Berkshire’s2002report.On April3,2008,Tim Geithner,then the able president of the New York Fed,explained the need for a rescue:“The sudden discovery by Bear’s derivative counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocation in markets.This would have precipitated a rush by Bear’s counterparties to liquidate the collateral they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already very fragile markets.”This is Fedspeak for“We stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude.”In my opinion,the Fed was right to do so.
A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days with one party getting its cash,the other its securities.Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears,which means credit problems can’t accumulate.This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the integrity of markets.That,in fact,is a reason for NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the settlement period from five days to three days in1995.
Derivatives contracts,in contrast,often go unsettled for years,or even decades,with counterparties building up huge claims against each other.“Paper”assets and liabilities–often hard to quantify–become important parts of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many years.Additionally,a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions.Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well.Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease:It’s not just whom you sleep with,but also whom they are sleeping with.
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Sleeping around,to continue our metaphor,can actually be useful for large derivatives dealers because it assures them government aid if trouble hits.In other words,only companies having problems that can infect the entire neighborhood–I won’t mention names–are certain to become a concern of the state(an outcome,I’m sad to say,that is proper).From this irritating reality comes The First Law of Corporate Survival for ambitious CEOs who pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives books:Modest incompetence simply won’t do;it’s mindboggling screw-ups that are required.
Considering the ruin I’ve pictured,you may wonder why Berkshire is a party to251derivatives contracts(other than those used for operational purposes at MidAmerican and the few left over at Gen Re).The answer is simple:I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception,sometimes dramatically so.I both initiated these positions and monitor them,a set of responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer as well.If we lose money on our derivatives,it will be my fault.
Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make payments to us when contracts are initiated.Berkshire therefore always holds the money,which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk.As of yearend,the payments made to us less losses we have paid–our derivatives“float,”so to speak–totaled$8.1billion.This float is similar to insurance float:If we break even on an underlying transaction,we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time.Our expectation,though it is far from a sure thing,is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.
Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us.Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last year’s fourth quarter,we had to post less than1%of our securities portfolio.(When we post collateral,we deposit it with third parties,meanwhile retaining the investment earnings on the deposited securities.)In our2002annual report,we warned of the lethal threat that posting requirements create,real-life illustrations of which we witnessed last year at a variety of financial institutions(and,for that matter,at Constellation Energy,which was within hours of bankruptcy when MidAmerican arrived to effect a rescue).
Our contracts fall into four major categories.With apologies to those who are not fascinated by financial instruments,I will explain them in excruciating detail.
?We have added modestly to the“equity put”portfolio I described in last year’s report.Some of our contracts come due in15years,others in20.We must make a payment to our counterparty at
maturity if the reference index to which the put is tied is then below what it was at the inception of
the contract.Neither party can elect to settle early;it’s only the price on the final day that counts.
To illustrate,we might sell a$1billion15-year put contract on the S&P500when that index is at,
say,1300.If the index is at1170–down10%–on the day of maturity,we would pay$100million.
If it is above1300,we owe nothing.For us to lose$1billion,the index would have to go to zero.In
the meantime,the sale of the put would have delivered us a premium–perhaps$100million to
$150million–that we would be free to invest as we wish.
Our put contracts total$37.1billion(at current exchange rates)and are spread among four major
indices:the S&P500in the U.S.,the FTSE100in the U.K.,the Euro Stoxx50in Europe,and the
Nikkei225in Japan.Our first contract comes due on September9,2019and our last on January24,
2028.We have received premiums of$4.9billion,money we have invested.We,meanwhile,have
paid nothing,since all expiration dates are far in the future.Nonetheless,we have used Black-
Scholes valuation methods to record a yearend liability of$10billion,an amount that will change
on every reporting date.The two financial items–this estimated loss of$10billion minus the$4.9
billion in premiums we have received–means that we have so far reported a mark-to-market loss
of$5.1billion from these contracts.
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We endorse mark-to-market accounting.I will explain later,however,why I believe the Black-Scholes formula,even though it is the standard for establishing the dollar liability for options, produces strange results when the long-term variety are being valued.
One point about our contracts that is sometimes not understood:For us to lose the full$37.1billion we have at risk,all stocks in all four indices would have to go to zero on their various termination dates.If,however–as an example–all indices fell25%from their value at the inception of each contract,and foreign-exchange rates remained as they are today,we would owe about$9billion, payable between2019and2028.Between the inception of the contract and those dates,we would have held the$4.9billion premium and earned investment income on it.
?The second category we described in last year’s report concerns derivatives requiring us to pay when credit losses occur at companies that are included in various high-yield indices.Our standard contract covers a five-year period and involves100companies.We modestly expanded our position last year in this category.But,of course,the contracts on the books at the end of2007moved one year closer to their maturity.Overall,our contracts now have an average life of21?3years,with the first expiration due to occur on September20,2009and the last on December20,2013.
By yearend we had received premiums of$3.4billion on these contracts and paid losses of$542 https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,ing mark-to-market principles,we also set up a liability for future losses that at yearend totaled$3.0billion.Thus we had to that point recorded a loss of about$100million,derived from our$3.5billion total in paid and estimated future losses minus the$3.4billion of premiums we received.In our quarterly reports,however,the amount of gain or loss has swung wildly from a profit of$327million in the second quarter of2008to a loss of$693million in the fourth quarter of 2008.
Surprisingly,we made payments on these contracts of only$97million last year,far below the estimate I used when I decided to enter into them.This year,however,losses have accelerated sharply with the mushrooming of large bankruptcies.In last year’s letter,I told you I expected these contracts to show a profit at expiration.Now,with the recession deepening at a rapid rate,the possibility of an eventual loss has increased.Whatever the result,I will keep you posted.
?In2008we began to write“credit default swaps”on individual companies.This is simply credit insurance,similar to what we write in BHAC,except that here we bear the credit risk of corporations rather than of tax-exempt issuers.
If,say,the XYZ company goes bankrupt,and we have written a$100million contract,we are obligated to pay an amount that reflects the shrinkage in value of a comparable amount of XYZ’s debt.(If,for example,the company’s bonds are selling for30after default,we would owe$70 million.)For the typical contract,we receive quarterly payments for five years,after which our insurance expires.
At yearend we had written$4billion of contracts covering42corporations,for which we receive annual premiums of$93million.This is the only derivatives business we write that has any counterparty risk;the party that buys the contract from us must be good for the quarterly premiums it will owe us over the five years.We are unlikely to expand this business to any extent because most buyers of this protection now insist that the seller post collateral,and we will not enter into such an arrangement.
?At the request of our customers,we write a few tax-exempt bond insurance contracts that are similar to those written at BHAC,but that are structured as derivatives.The only meaningful difference between the two contracts is that mark-to-market accounting is required for derivatives whereas standard accrual accounting is required at BHAC.
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But this difference can produce some strange results.The bonds covered–in effect,insured–by
these derivatives are largely general obligations of states,and we feel good about them.At yearend,
however,mark-to-market accounting required us to record a loss of$631million on these
derivatives contracts.Had we instead insured the same bonds at the same price in BHAC,and used
the accrual accounting required at insurance companies,we would have recorded a small profit for
the year.The two methods by which we insure the bonds will eventually produce the same
accounting result.In the short term,however,the variance in reported profits can be substantial.
We have told you before that our derivative contracts,subject as they are to mark-to-market accounting,will produce wild swings in the earnings we report.The ups and downs neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me.Indeed,the“downs”can be helpful in that they give us an opportunity to expand a position on favorable terms.I hope this explanation of our dealings will lead you to think similarly.
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The Black-Scholes formula has approached the status of holy writ in finance,and we use it when valuing our equity put options for financial statement purposes.Key inputs to the calculation include a contract’s maturity and strike price,as well as the analyst’s expectations for volatility,interest rates and dividends.
If the formula is applied to extended time periods,however,it can produce absurd results.In fairness, Black and Scholes almost certainly understood this point well.But their devoted followers may be ignoring whatever caveats the two men attached when they first unveiled the formula.
It’s often useful in testing a theory to push it to extremes.So let’s postulate that we sell a100-year$1 billion put option on the S&P500at a strike price of903(the index’s level on12/31/08).Using the implied volatility assumption for long-dated contracts that we do,and combining that with appropriate interest and dividend assumptions,we would find the“proper”Black-Scholes premium for this contract to be$2.5million.
To judge the rationality of that premium,we need to assess whether the S&P will be valued a century from now at less than today.Certainly the dollar will then be worth a small fraction of its present value(at only 2%inflation it will be worth roughly14￠).So that will be a factor pushing the stated value of the index higher. Far more important,however,is that one hundred years of retained earnings will hugely increase the value of most of the companies in the index.In the20th Century,the Dow-Jones Industrial Average increased by about 175-fold,mainly because of this retained-earnings factor.
Considering everything,I believe the probability of a decline in the index over a one-hundred-year period to be far less than1%.But let’s use that figure and also assume that the most likely decline–should one occur–is50%.Under these assumptions,the mathematical expectation of loss on our contract would be$5 million($1billion X1%X50%).
But if we had received our theoretical premium of$2.5million up front,we would have only had to invest it at0.7%compounded annually to cover this loss expectancy.Everything earned above that would have been profit.Would you like to borrow money for100years at a0.7%rate?
Let’s look at my example from a worst-case standpoint.Remember that99%of the time we would pay nothing if my assumptions are correct.But even in the worst case among the remaining1%of possibilities–that is,one assuming a total loss of$1billion–our borrowing cost would come to only6.2%.Clearly,either my assumptions are crazy or the formula is inappropriate.
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The ridiculous premium that Black-Scholes dictates in my extreme example is caused by the inclusion of volatility in the formula and by the fact that volatility is determined by how much stocks have moved around in some past period of days,months or years.This metric is simply irrelevant in estimating the probability-weighted range of values of American business100years from now.(Imagine,if you will,getting a quote every day on a farm from a manic-depressive neighbor and then using the volatility calculated from these changing quotes as an important ingredient in an equation that predicts a probability-weighted range of values for the farm a century from now.)
Though historical volatility is a useful–but far from foolproof–concept in valuing short-term options, its utility diminishes rapidly as the duration of the option lengthens.In my opinion,the valuations that the Black-Scholes formula now place on our long-term put options overstate our liability,though the overstatement will diminish as the contracts approach maturity.
Even so,we will continue to use Black-Scholes when we are estimating our financial-statement liability for long-term equity puts.The formula represents conventional wisdom and any substitute that I might offer would engender extreme skepticism.That would be perfectly understandable:CEOs who have concocted their own valuations for esoteric financial instruments have seldom erred on the side of conservatism.That club of optimists is one that Charlie and I have no desire to join.
The Annual Meeting
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday,May2nd.As always,the doors will open at the Qwest Center at7a.m.,and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at8:30.At9:30we will go directly to the question-and-answer period,which(with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands)will last until3:00.Then,after a short recess,Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at3:15.If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods,please do so while Charlie is talking.
The best reason to exit,of course,is to shop.We will help you do that by filling the194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,st year,the31,000people who came to the meeting did their part,and almost every location racked up record sales.But you can do better.
(A friendly warning:If I find sales are lagging,I lock the exits.)
This year Clayton will showcase its new i-house that includes Shaw flooring,Johns Manville insulation and MiTek fasteners.This innovative“green”home,featuring solar panels and numerous other energy-saving products,is truly a home of the future.Estimated costs for electricity and heating total only about$1per day when the home is sited in an area like Omaha.After purchasing the i-house,you should next consider the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.Make your neighbors jealous.
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country,all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes.In most cases,GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount(usually8%).This special offer is permitted by44of the50jurisdictions in which we operate.(One supplemental point:The discount is not additive if you qualify for another,such as that given certain groups.)Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.For at least50%of you,I believe we can.
On Saturday,at the Omaha airport,we will have the usual array of NetJets aircraft available for your inspection.Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these https://www.doczj.com/doc/1118374699.html,e to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane.And take along–with no fear of a strip search–the Ginsu knives that you’ve purchased at the exhibit of our Quikut subsidiary.
Next,if you have any money left,visit the Bookworm,which will be selling about30books and DVDs.A shipping service will be available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their carrying capacity.
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巴菲特的经典语录 1、如果你是池塘里的一只鸭子，由于暴雨的缘故水面上升，你开始在水中的世界之中上浮，但此时你却以为上浮的是你自己，而不是池塘。 2、人生的志向往往神秘莫测，极少有人能够沿着直线靠近它们，也不会有人在找寻它们的过程中一帆风顺。 3、一个人应当时刻尊重他人，尊重不同的观念。一个人总要尝试去理解对方的立场，站在对方的立场看问题，可以使我们的胸怀更宽广。 4、他是一个天才，但他能够把某些东西解释得如此简易和清晰，以至起码在那一刻，你完全理解了他所说的。 5、实际上，如果没有十足的把握，我不会轻举妄动。 6、只要想到隔天早上会有亿男性需要刮胡子，我每晚都能安然入睡。 7、在生活中，如果你正确选择了你的英雄，你就是幸运点的。我建议你们所有的人，尽你所能的挑出几个英雄。 8、我有一个内部得分牌。如果我做了某些其他人不喜欢但我感觉良好的事，我会很高兴。如果其他人称赞我所做过的事，但我自己却不满意，我不会高兴的。 9、民意测验不能代表思想。 10、如果发生了坏事情，请忽略这件事。 11、如果你不断的跟着风向转、那你就不可能会发财。 12、只要不是过于急于求成，合理投资能使你非常富有。 13、我们知道的是我们不知道。 14、任何不能永远前进的事物都将停滞。 15、如果股市投资人只需相信理论上的投资效益、就好比较一个打桥牌、却告诉他看各家的牌对于桥局没有任何帮助一样。 16、如果某人相信了空头市场即将来临而卖出手中不错的投资，那么这人会发现，通常卖出股票后，所谓的空头市场立即转为多头市场，于是又再次错失良机。 17、钱，在某种程度上，有时会使你的处境有利，但它无法改变你的健康状况或让别人爱你。 18、我只做我完全明白的事。 19、兴趣永远是第一位的，财富随兴趣，而不是兴趣追随财富。可以参考如何找到自己的兴趣呢？ 20、很多事情做起来都会有利可图，但是，你必须坚持只做那些自己能力范围内的事情，我们没有任何办法击倒泰森。 21、投资股票的第一原则：不要赔钱。 22、如果你在错误的路上、奔跑也没有用。 23、任何一位，卷入复杂工作的人都需要同事。 24、如果人生由我们打造，如果我们希望自己的人生生动而真切，那么我们必须接受的事实是，我们在人生的旅途中还会犯这样或那样的错误。既然我们不能消灭错误，那么我们不妨拥抱它，原谅自己犯的错误。最重要的是从中汲取教训。 25、我们的目标是使我们持股合伙人的利润来自于企业，而不是其他共有者的愚蠢行为。
心情不好说说发朋友圈,适合心情不好发的朋友圈 1、如果一个人真的爱你，距离不是一个问题，它只会成为一种滋长爱情的力量。 2、曾经以为，伤心是会流很多眼泪的，原来，真正的伤心，是流不出一滴眼泪。什么事情都会过去，我就是这样活过来的。 3、人人都是自顾不暇的泥菩萨，别指望谁能帮你度过现实这条河。 4、你可能也不爱我，只是刚好遇见我。 5、烟灭酒半杯，往后日子多笑少流泪。 6、再也不幻想，再也不乱想，再也不会想，再也不用想。 7、听到你的消息还是会心头一震，不过这些都不重要了，孤独至少比爱你舒服。 8、所有回不去的良辰美景，都是举世无双的好时光。感谢过去，珍惜现在，憧憬未来。哭给自己听，笑给别人看，这就是所谓的人生。 9、我一直走一直走，直到走到回忆的尽头，才发现时光与你，都没有等我。 10、付出和接受都是种债都无法还清。
11、自以为是刻骨铭心的回忆，别人早已已经忘记了。 12、成熟就是自己吞下苦难、眼泪、委屈、转脸还能给别人一个笑容。 13、我也经常觉得冷可我不会随便抱别人。 14、这世上真的没有感同身受只能冷暖自知。 15、心情不好就少听悲伤的歌。 16、有的时候连自己都不知道自己心里想什么，只知道自己心好累。 17、心情不好的时候，音乐必须大声，这样才听不到心碎的声音。 18、我们就像仙人掌，防备了别人，孤单了自己。 19、不要在流眼泪的时候做任何决定，情绪负面的时候说话越少越好。 20、说出口的伤痛都已平复，绝口不提的才触及心底。 21、不该看的东西就别去看，很多时候我们心情不好是因为我们手贱。 22、说什么待我长发及腰，心情不好全剪了，叫他想一辈子去吧。 23、心情不好的时候，做什么事都那么力不从心。 24、很多人，因为寂寞而错爱了一人，但更多的人，因为错爱一
巴菲特名言经典语录 导读：本文是关于语录大全的文章，如果觉得很不错，欢迎点评和分享！ 1、判断一家企业的价值、一半是靠科学研究、一半是靠艺术上的灵感。 2、在生活中，我不是最爱欢迎的，但也不是最令人讨厌的人。我哪一种人都不属于。 3、如果你能从根本上把问题所在弄清楚并思考它、你永远也不会把事情搞得一团遭！ 4、我从不打算在买入股票的次日就赚钱，我买入股票时，总是会先假设明天交易所就会关门，5年之后才又重新打开，恢复交易。 5、如果你基本从别人那里学习知识，你无需有太多自己的新观点，你只需应用你学到的最好的知识。 6、在股票市场中、唯一能让您被三振出局的是-不断的抢高杀低、耗损资金。 7、要赢得好的声誉需要年，而要毁掉它，分钟就够。如果明白了这一点，你做起事来就会不同了。 8、归根结底，我一直相信我自己的眼睛远胜于其他一切。 9、模糊的正确远胜于精确的错误。 10、人不是天生就具有这种才能的、即始终能知道一切。但是那些努力工作的人有这样的才能。他们寻找和精选世界上被错误定价
的赌注。 11、从巨额的消费中，我不会得到什么快乐，享受本身并不是我对财富渴求的根本原因。对我而言，金钱只不过是一种证明，是我所喜欢的游戏的一个计分牌而已。 12、你真能向一条鱼解释在陆地上行走的感觉吗？对鱼来说，陆地上的一天胜过几千年的空谈。 13、反对把智商当做对良好投资关键、强调要有判断力、原则性和耐心。 14、不需要等到股价跌到谷底才进场买股票、反正你买到的股价一定比它真正的价值还低。 15、兴趣永远是第一位的，财富随兴趣，而不是兴趣追随财富。可以参考如何找到自己的兴趣呢？ 16、生活的关键是，要弄清谁为谁工作。 17、关于两种信息”可以知道的事情和必须知道的事情。你知道的所有事情中，具有重要性的事情只占很少的一部分。 18、实际上，如果没有十足的的把握，我不会轻举妄动。 19、任何不能永远发展的事物，终将消亡。 20、我只做我完全明白的事。 21、不是贪婪，而是嫉妒推动着世界前进。 22、我不拿任何工作与我的工作做交易，并且我的工作中包含着政治生活。 23、在商业不景气时，我们散布谣言说，我们的糖果有着春药
1.手掌就那么大，握不住的东西太多了。 2.怎么可以对淋在雨里的小孩说要乖 3.还以为你不一样呢。 4.再大大咧咧的人也会觉得难过啊，就像下了很大的雨，别人在等伞，而我在等雨停。 5.不等了，也等不到了。 6.哭，是解决不了问题的。可是，就是解决不了才哭啊。 7.我也曾对你心动过，只是赶路要紧，我忘了说 8.都会走的，无一例外 9.我可以恢复出厂设置吗？ 10.我也不想一个人，但是我就擅长一个人待着。
11.要离开的人，你不妨推他一把。 12.一哄就好的人活该受尽委屈。 13.我表达不满的方式是晚一点回消息。 14.今天天气很好，好像也就一般。 15.连不开心都要暗示，你就应该知道他不在意。 16.我不会怪你，但我不会忘记每一次难过的原因。 17.我还以为这次我真能好好谈一个恋爱了呢 18.这场自救的仗我不想打了 19.生活中的糟糕小事都在消磨我对世界的兴趣。 20.心情不好说话就喜欢加句号。
21.下雨了，我说的不是天气。 22.成为遗憾，或许会被记住的久一点。 23.去吹吹风吧，能醒的话，感冒也没关系。 24.不管你承不承认，人确实是经历了一些事情后，就偷偷 换了一种性格。 25.今天还好吗，被人左右情绪了吗。 26.庆幸的是我一直很理性的看待所有的事情，我可悲的是 我是个很感性的人，所以所有的情绪我一样都没有逃过去。 27.不用考虑我，我没有感受，不用对不起，反正下次还是 会对不起。 28.我又把头发剪短了，好像变温柔了，好像过得比以前好，好像又不怎么样，我不清楚。 29.你剥开一个很酸的橘子，而感到后悔了，可对于橘子来说，那是它的一切。 30.这不就是你梦寐以求的长大吗，你怎么不笑了。
巴菲特的经典语录 导读：1、我们的目标是使我们持股合伙人的利润来自于企业，而不是其他共有者的愚蠢行为。 2、我有一个内部得分牌。如果我做了某些其他人不喜欢但我感觉良好的事，我会很高兴。如果其他人称赞我所做过的事，但我自己却不满意，我不会高兴的。 3、恐惧和贪婪：要在别人贪婪的时候恐惧，而在别人恐惧的时候贪婪。 4、正直，勤奋，活力。而且，如果他们不拥有第一品质，其余两个将毁灭你。对此你要深思，这一点千真万确。 5、投资股票的第一原则：不要赔钱。 6、如果说投资有什么秘诀的话那就是要求你选择好最佳的投资时机。 7、民意测验不能代表思想。 8、如果你不断的跟着风向转、那你就不可能会发财。 9、如果某人相信了空头市场即将来临而卖出手中不错的投资，那么这人会发现，通常卖出股票后，所谓的空头市场立即转为多头市场，于是又再次错失良机。 10、如果你能从根本上把问题所在弄清楚并思考它，你永远也不会把事情搞得一团遭！ 11、我建议你们不要去经纪人那里套小道消息，因为他们并不值
得信赖。大多数小道消息也没有什么价值。但是有的主意，比如说我们的主意，却是非常私有化的，这点我和我的老师不一样。 12、在一个人们相信市场有效性的市场里投资，就像与某个被告知看牌没有好处的人在一起打桥牌。 13、投资人必须谨记，你的投资成绩并非像奥运跳水比赛的方式评分，难度高低并不重要，你正确地投资一家简单易懂而竞争力持续的企业所得到的回报，与你辛苦地分析一家变量不断、复杂难懂的企业可以说是不相上下。 14、没有绝对的优势和劣势，这一都取决于你如何对待它，稍稍偏转一下你的方向，逆风就会变成顺风。刻苦努力，坚持不懈，最耀眼的阳光就会跑出到你的身后。你生活的起点并不重要，重要的是最好你抵达了哪里。 15、兴趣永远是第一位的，财富随兴趣，而不是兴趣追随财富。可以参考如何找到自己的兴趣呢？ 16、不要投资一门蠢人都可以做的生意，因为终有一日蠢人都会这样做。 17、任何不能永远前进的事物都将停滞。 18、我不拿任何工作与我的工作做交易，并且我的工作中包含着**生活。 19、一个人应当时刻尊重他人，尊重不同的观念。一个人总要尝试去理解对方的立场，站在对方的立场看问题，可以使我们的胸怀更
心情不好适合发的句子,心情不好朋友圈句子 1、难过的时候别说话，因为一张口眼泪就停不下。 2、原来除了记忆外，什么也不能永久。 3、虽然知道自己是个普通人但还是会希望在特别的人心里能有特别的存在。 4、放开彼此的手，当爱已经无法挽留，终于看透幸福的背后，是一道道伤口。 5、从有你真好到没你也行，这中间的心酸与艰难，你怎么会知道。 6、在最后的时光里我决定不再哭泣，在剩下的路里我也决定放弃。 7、深夜总是那么多无奈。挣不脱从前，怕极了以后。 8、心情不好的时候删东西就有一种快感。 9、有时候，莫名的心情不好，不想和任何人说话，只想一个人静静的发呆。有时候，想一个人躲起来脆弱，不愿别人看到自己的伤口。 10、心情不好，微微抬起头，看看湛蓝的天，看看悠悠的云，也是一种舒心的幸福。 11、某些人，某些事，久而久之就忘了，久而久之就不那么在意了。 12、有人总说：已经晚了。实际上，现在就是最好的时光。对于一个真正有所追求的人来说，生命的每个时期都是年轻的、及时的。13、被特别在乎的人忽略，会很难过，而更难过的是你还要装作你不在乎。 14、你伤我如此之深，我心里却全是你的甜言蜜语。
15、我心情不好没关系，你开心就好。 16、我承认我在发脾气的时候最喜欢说很极端的话。 17、再深的记忆，也有淡忘的一天。 18、这几天我心情不好阿！全世界都烦死人，只有你是死烦人。 19、从相遇到离开，我欠自己良多，不欠你分毫。 20、太多心酸无处诉说，太多难过如何洒脱。 21、曾经无话不说，如今的无话可说。 22、当初我们那么不甘心，最后还不是成了陌生人。 23、人老的唯一好处就是：能失去的东西越来越少了。 24、你看的，你听的，你都相信。我用心说的话你却从不相信。 25、我的难过无人知晓，我的心情无人过问。 26、任何瞬间的心动都不容易，不要怠慢了它。 27、在一瞬间曾经所有的梦都幻灭，剩下回忆湿了我的眼。 28、悉数记忆的流沙，那些逝去的年华，洗尽了我的尘沙。 29、我心情不好的时候你不在你知道我多想你安慰我吗？ 30、时间不是让人忘了痛，它只是让人习惯痛。 31、一个人吃饭也没什么不好，不过是空出来一个座，邀请了寂寞。 32、心情不好的时候，看看大海，大海那么大，足以包容你的一切。没有大海就望望天空吧，望着望着心就不痛了，脖子就会痛了。 33、嗯!生理性心情不好谢谢大哥没打死我。 34、以前觉得，人只要一天不洗澡就会长蛆。。。昨天心情不好没有洗澡就睡了，今天发现也没夸张到长蛆。。。
巴菲特100句投资语录 打工与创业本质上的区别 2、那些最好的买卖，刚开始的时候，从数字上看，几乎都会告诉你不要买。 这应该继格雷厄姆“雪茄烟蒂法”后、巴菲特通过费雪“成长性”对投资活动的又一提升 3、我们之所以取得目前的成就，是因为我们关心的是寻找那些我们可以跨越的一英尺障碍，而不是去拥有什么能飞越七英尺的能力。 这个说的也是能力圈的问题。经常看到人们在讨论本身一头雾水的投资概念，让我常常想起这话。 4、在别人恐惧时我贪婪，在别人贪婪时我恐惧。 逆向思维 5、如果你不愿意拥有一只股票十年，那就不要考虑拥有它十分钟。 这是所谓价值投资者决定买股票时要过的第一关。 6、拥有一只股票，期待它下个早晨就上涨是十分愚蠢的。 7、永远不要问理发师你是否需要理发。 知道老巴为什么认为拜访公司不一定有用了吧？ 8、任何不能永远发展的事物，终将消亡。 9、投资并非一个智商为160的人就一定能击败智商为
130的人的游戏。 大概智商高的人未必知道自己的能力圈边界在哪里，但智商高的人可能往往容易越出自己的能力圈。 10、市场就像上帝一样，帮助那些自己帮助自己的人，但与上帝不一样的地方是，他不会原谅那些不知道自己在做什么的人。 11、就算美联储主席格林斯潘偷偷告诉我他未来二年的货币政策，我也不会改变我的任何一个作为。 独立思考能力 12、我只做我完全明白的事。 追求确定性 13、不同的人理解不同的行业。最重要的事情是知道你自己理解哪些行业，以及什么时候你的投资决策正好在你自己的能力圈内。 每个人投资的能力圈非常重要 14、很多事情做起来都会有利可图，但是，你必须坚持只做那些自己能力范围内的事情，我们没有任何办法击倒泰森。 要充分了解自己，有利于做出正确的判断 15、对你的能力圈来说，最重要的不是能力圈的范围大小，而是你如何能够确定能力圈的边界所在。如果你知道了能力圈的边界所在，你将比那些能力圈虽然比你大5倍却不
心情不好时发朋友圈的伤感心情说说100句 1、爱上等于哀伤。 2、离网络越近，离现实越远。 3、你不安定，注定我不安宁。 4、幻光留不住时光的时间。 5、你说的坚强，始终都学不会。 6、我爱你，爱了整整一个曾经。 7、有心则会累，无心者无所谓。 8、你的心不是能读懂我眼神的料。 9、他说爱你又没说只爱你一个。 10、一切都已结束，一切都将开始。 11、害怕背叛，所以不敢为爱承诺。 12、如果坦白是伤害，情愿选择谎言。 13、相爱的人，刚分开，却又心生思念。 14、女人从来不争气，男人从来不珍惜。 15、听你说他的一举一动我心如刀割。 16、不在恋爱中失败，就在恋爱中变态。 17、我就只有这么一颗心，你看着伤吧。 18、格式化我们的过去，一切重新开始。 19、有时爱情一眨眼，就把回忆当留言。 20、你说的太少或太多，都会让人很惶恐。 21、也许只有可悲，才能填补寂寞的空位。
22、不知道什么时候开始，变得如此狼狈。 23、如果说，你的忧伤是我最痛的伤口。 24、丢失的曼陀罗，我知道，不会太远。 25、我希望有个人懂我，即使我什么也不说。 26、明明说忘记，却总是不经意的想起。 27、我们都只是孩子，何必什么都懂。 28、我们在原地转了无数次，无法解脱。 29、有那么一瞬间，我以为我们会一辈子。 30、曾经的那些勇气，全都变成了回忆。 31、未知的下一秒才更容易让人刻骨铭心。 32、我尽量减少了难过，过平静的生活。 33、心不知下落，我早己找不回单纯的我。 34、宁可高傲的发霉，也不低调的凑合。 35、伤痛复合不了叻，心里永远有伤疤。 36、我捂着心脏，傻傻的痛到撕心裂肺。 37、习惯了伤感，竟然忘了什么是幸福? 38、只希望你能聆听我的世界，仅此而已。 39、看起来百毒不侵，其实早已百毒侵心。 40、给你自由的爱，冻结我们美好的回忆。 41、那种华丽旳颓废，有种令人心惊旳美丽。 42、我假装坚强，只是不想告诉自己我想哭。 43、没有人值得你放弃自己的卑微去讨好。 44、你的笑容，是我今生无法忘记的眷念。 45、明知是陌路，却还追逐，缠绵一生的毒。
巴菲特投资语录巴菲特经典名言 1、一生能够积累多少财富，不取决于你能够赚多少钱，而取决于你如何投资理财，钱找人胜过人找钱，要懂得钱为你工作，而不是你为钱工作。 2、如果你打了半小时牌，仍然不知道谁是菜鸟，那么你就是。 3、你人生的起点并不是那么重要，重要的是你最后抵达了哪里。 4、竞争并不是推动人类前进的动力，嫉妒才是。 5、当有人逼迫你去突破自己，你要感恩他。他是你生命中的贵人,也许你会因此而改变和蜕变。当没有人逼迫你，请自己逼迫自己，因为真正的改变是自己想改变。蜕变的过程是很痛苦的，但每一次的蜕变都会有成长的惊喜。 6、无论你多有天分，也无论你多么努力，有些事情就是需要时间。让九个女人同时怀孕，小孩也不可能在一个月内出生。 7、永远不要问理发师你是否需要理发。 8、当大浪退去时，我们才知道谁在裸泳
9、如何定义朋友呢：他们会向你隐瞒什么？ 10、你们到了我这个年纪的时候就会发现,衡量自己成功的标准就是有多少人在真正关心你、爱你。 11、我们之所以取得目前的成就，是因为我们关心的是寻找那些我们可以跨越的一英尺障碍，而不是去拥有什么能飞越七英尺的能力。 12、形成自己的宏观观点，或是听别人对宏观或市场进行预测，都是在浪费时间。事实上这是危险的，因为这可能会模糊你的视野，让你看不清真正重要的事实。 13、伴侣是人生最大的投资。在选择伴侣上，如果你错了，将让你损失很多，不仅仅是金钱方面。 14、我只做我完全明白的事。 15、关于蜕变的句子： 我见过蚕蜕皮的样子，我以为那是会疼的。而现在，我将孤独的一面翻转，将胸膛向世界敞开，我就知道自己错了，原来蜕变是种温暖的自由当有人逼迫你去突破自己，你要感恩他。他是你生命中的贵人,也许你会因此而改变和蜕变。当没有人逼迫你，请自己逼迫自己，因为真正的改变是自己想改变。蜕变的过程是很痛苦的，但每一次的蜕变都会有成长的惊喜。 16、如果你不愿意拥有一只股票十年，那就不要考虑拥有它十分钟。 17、就算美联储主席格林斯潘偷偷告诉我他未来二年的货币政策，我也不会改变我的任何一个作为。
巴菲特励志名言股神巴菲特财富经典语录 1、一生能够积累多少财富，不取决于你能够赚多少钱，而取决于你如何投资理财，钱找人胜过人找钱，要懂得钱为你工作，而不是你为钱工作。 2、思想枯竭，则巧言生焉！ 3、他是一个天才，但他能够把某些东西解释得如此简易和清晰，以至起码在那一刻，你完全理解了他所说的。 4、在别人恐惧时我贪婪，在别人贪婪时我恐惧。 5、如果你不愿意拥有一只股票十年，那就不要考虑拥有它十分钟。 6、拥有一只股票，期待它下个早晨就上涨是十分愚蠢的。——巴菲特 7、投资对于我来说，既是一种运动，也是一种娱乐。他喜欢通过寻找好的猎物来“捕获稀有的快速移动的大象。” 8、我工作时不思考其他任何东西。我并不试图超过七英尺高的栏杆：我到处找的是我能跨过的一英尺高的栏杆。（现实主义者） 9、投资并非一个智商为160的人就一定能击败智商为130的人的游戏。 10、市场就像上帝一样，帮助那些自己帮助自己的人，但与上帝不一样的地方是，他不会原谅那些不知道自己在做什么的人。 11、如果发生了坏事情，请忽略这件事。——巴菲特励志名言 12、要赢得好的声誉需要20年，而要毁掉它，5分钟就够。如果明白了这一点，你做
起事来就会不同了。 13、不同的人理解不同的行业。最重要的事情是知道你自己理解哪些行业，以及什么时候你的投资决策正好在你自己的能力圈内。 14、我们之所以取得目前的成就，是因为我们关心的是寻找那些我们可以跨越的一英尺障碍，而不是去拥有什么能飞越七英尺的能力。 15、我从来不曾有过自我怀疑。我从来不曾灰心过。 16、我始终知道我会富有。对此我不曾有过一丝一刻的怀疑。 17、归根结底，我一直相信我自己的眼睛远胜于其他一切。 18、我是一个非常现实的人，我知道自己能够做什么，而且我喜欢我的工作。也许成为一个职业棒球大联盟的球星非常不错，但这是不现实的。 19、对于大多数投资者而言，重要的不是他到底知道什么，而是他们是否真正明白自己到底不知道什么。 20、一定要在自己的理解力允许的范围内投资。 21、任何一位，卷入复杂工作的人都需要同事。 22、如果你是池塘里的一只鸭子，由于暴雨的缘故水面上升，你开始在水的世界之中上浮。但此时你却以为上浮的是你自己，而不是池塘。 23、哲学家们告诉我们，做我们所喜欢的，然后成功就会随之而来。 24、开始存钱并及早投资，这是最值得养成的好习惯。 25、一生能够积累多少财富，不取决于你能够赚多少钱，而取决于你如何投资理财，
心情特烦想发个朋友圈_心情不好发朋友圈的句 子短句 心情不好发朋友圈的句子短句 1、突如其来的委屈，连笑都带着僵硬。 2、没有值不值得，只有愿不愿意。 3、一个人最伤心的事情无过于良心的死灭。 4、偶尔被需要，从来不重要。 5、走完同一条街，回到两个世界。 6、青春的抛物线，把将来始于相遇的地点。 7、别在没我的地方哭，我怕没人给你擦眼泪。 8、撕心裂肺的挽留，不过是心有不甘的表现。 9、我还是那么没出息，处处留意你的消息。 10、他依旧是我的软肋，却不再是我的盔甲。 11、我今天只做了两件事，呼吸和想你! 12、曾以为他生性冷淡，直到他对另一个人嘘寒问暖。 13、向日葵也知道，该面向太阳那头的希望。 14、决口不提不是因为忘记，而是因为铭记。
15、能动手尽量别吵吵，能整死尽量别留活口。 16、别对我笑，我怕以后得不到，还忘不掉。 17、有没有这样一个人，无论多么想念，却不曾再见面。 18、自古多情空余恨，此恨绵绵无绝期。 19、人生，是一场盛大的遇见。若你懂得，就请珍惜。 20、我的心好冷，等着你来疼。 21、过去的不再回来，回来的不再完美。 22、从现在起，我将不再期待，只珍惜我所拥有的。 23、是否在你们的生命划过，留下清晰可见的痕迹。 24、我在你眼里找不到出路，我倒在回忆里脱不开身。 25、我的倔强就是，宁愿笑着流泪，也不愿哭着说后悔。 26、你给我一滴眼泪，我就看到了你心中全部的海洋。 27、没有你，就算把世界给我，我还是一无所有。 28、这个不知所措的年龄，似乎一切都不尽人意。 29、最难过的喜欢，就是分开后的喜欢。 30、有时候突然不说话，回过神来才知道，自己在想他。 31、我想给他看最好看的我，可最好看的我却已经死了。 32、有一种单身，只是为了等待一个人。 33、你不会懂我的沉默，又怎么会懂我的难过。
巴菲特经典演讲 引言 耐心的花五分钟读完全文，不会没有收获的。本文为Buffett 在Columbia Business School的讲演。 格雷厄姆与多德追求“价值远超过价格的安全保障”，这种证券分析方法是否已经过时?目前许多撰写教科书的教授认为如此。他们认为，股票市场是有效率的市场；换言之，股票价格已经充分反应了公司一切己知的事实以及整体经济情况：这些理论家认为，市场上没有价格偏低的股票，因为聪明的证券分析师将运用全部的既有资讯，以确保适当的价格。投资者能经年累月地击败市场，纯粹是运气使然。“如果价格完全反应既有的资讯，则这类的投资技巧将不存在。”一位现今教科书的作者如此与写道。 或许如此！但是，我要提供一组投资者的绩效供各位参考，他们长期的表现总是超越史坦普500种股价指数。他们的绩效即使纯属巧合，这项假说至少也值得我们加以审查。审
查的关键事实是，我早就熟识这些赢家，而且长年以来便视他们为超级投资者，最近的认知也有十五年之久。缺少这项条件——换言之，如果我最近才从成千上万的记录中挑选几个名字，并且在今天早上提供给各位——我建议各位立即停止阅读本文。我必须说明，所有的这些记录都经过稽核。我必须再说明，我认识许多上述经理人的客户，他们长年以来所收取的支票确实符合既有的记录。 在进行审查之前，我要各位设想—场全国性的掷铜板大赛。让我们假定，全美国2．25亿的人口在明天早晨起床时都掷出一枚一美元的铜板。早晨太阳升起时，他们都走到门外掷铜板，并猜铜板出现的正面或反面。如果猜对了，他们将从猜错者的手中赢得一美元。每天都有输家遭到淘汰，奖金则不断地累积。经过十个早晨的十次投掷之后，全美国约有2．2万人连续十次猜对掷铜板的结果。每人所赢得的资金约超过1000美元。 现在，这群人可能会开始炫耀自己的战绩，此乃人的天性使然。他们可能保持谦虚的态度，但在鸡尾酒宴会中，他们偶尔会以此技巧吸引异性的注意，并炫耀其投掷铜板的奇异洞
心情不好发朋友圈的说说内心压抑憋屈的心情短语 1.与你无关的事，别问，别想，别多嘴。 2.多少事，从来急;天地转，光阴迫。一万年太久，只争朝夕。 3.有些事藏在心里是莫大的委屈，话到嘴边又觉得无足挂齿不值一提。 4.最怕的不是说出秘密，而是两个人的秘密，你却在第三个人那里听见。 5.放弃并不是心血来潮，各种失望累积在一起，最终在沉默中爆发。没有声音，没有吵闹，就这么静悄悄的放弃了。 6.人都会有心情不好的时候，说不上来的失落，道不明白的难过，理不清楚的交错。 7.活得累是因为心里装了多余的东西，跟吃饱了撑的是一个道理。 8.不要在人前哭，也不要在深夜做任何决定。 9.突如其来的脾气大概是积攒了很久的委屈。 10.这世界上根本不存在“不会做”这回事，当你失去了所有的依靠的时候，自然就什么都会了。 11.无论你活成什么样子，背地里都会有人对你说三道四。一笑了之，给自己一个灿烂的阳光，一片自由的海洋，让自己不断变强，其实就是最好的蔑视。 12.不卑不亢，落落大方，但行好事，莫问前程。 13.想得开，也就那么一回事。想不开，什么都是事。
14.我心里一直有你，只是比例变了而已。 15.爱到收不住，才是真的输。 16.要没点自我安慰的本事，还真活不到现在。 17.去找一个像太阳一样的人，帮你晒晒所有不值一提的迷茫。 18.奉劝各位：除了灾难、病痛，时时刻刻要快乐。 19.幸福如人饮水，冷暖自知，你的幸福，不在别人眼里，而在自己心里。 20.我是一个经常笑的人，可我不是经常开心的人 21.生活没那么多剧情，靠谱的人花样不多却能陪你过平淡生活。 22.有时候，明明心如刀割，却要灿烂的微笑，明明很脆弱，却表现的如此坚强，眼泪在眼里打转，却告诉每个人我很好。 23.世界再大还是遇见你，世界再小还是丢了你。 24.有些人，有些事，该忘就忘了吧，人家从没把你放心里过，你又何必自作多情。 25.有些事，现在看来不过如此，但在当时，真的就是一个人一秒一秒熬过来的。 26.愿我们，都有能力爱自己，有余力爱别人。 27.你真的很奇怪，烟对你不好你喜欢，酒对你不好你喜欢，我对你这么好，你却不喜欢。在我青春岁月里，唯有你最深得我意，也只有你最不识抬举。
股神巴菲特经典名言语录 巴菲特经典名言 1、风险、是来自于你不知道你在做什么。 2、若你不打算持有某只股票达十年、则十分钟也不要持有。《股神巴菲特》 3、投资的秘诀、不是评估某一行业对社会的影响有多大、或它的发展前景有多好、而是一间公司有多强的竞争优势、这优势可以维持多久。产品和服务的优越性持久而深厚、才能给投资者带来优厚的回报。 4、股神巴菲特：财务顾问就是那些比你更需要你的钱的人。 5、美国股神巴菲特：当那些好的企业突然受困于市场逆转、股价不合理的下跌、这就是大好的投资机会来临了。 6、美国股神巴菲特：我最喜欢的持股时间是……永远！ 7、股神巴菲特：要投资成功、就要拼命阅读、不但读有兴趣购入的公司资料、也要阅读其它竞争者的资料。
8、股神巴菲特：金钱并不是很重要的东西、至少它买不到健康与友情。 9、股神巴菲特：如果你认为你可以经常进出股市而致富的话、我不愿意和你合伙做生意、但我希望成为你的股票经纪。 10、在股票市场中、唯一能让您被三振出局的是-不断的抢高杀低、耗损资金。 11、世界上最笨的事情就是-看到股价上扬就决定要投资一档股票。 12、不要以价格决定是否购买股票、而是要取决于这个企业的价值。 13、投资股票的第一原则：不要赔钱。 14、把每支投资的股票都当作一桩生意来做。 15、自认对市场震荡起伏敏感而杀进杀出的投资人、反而不如以不变应万变的投资人容易赚钱。 16、假如观念会过时、那就不足以成为观念。
17、花四毛钱买价值一块钱的东西。 18、如果股市可以用理论去有效分析、我早就变成路边的流浪汉了。 19、如果股市投资人只需相信理论上的投资效益、就好比较一个打桥牌、却告诉他看各家的牌对于桥局没有任何帮助一样。 20、买股票时、应该假设明天开始股市要休市3-5年。 21、短期而言、股市是一个投票机器、长？？期而言、股市是一个体重计。 21、如果你不断的跟着风向转、那你就不可能会发财。 22、判断一家企业的价值、一半是靠科学研究、一半是靠艺术上的灵感。 23、不需要等到股价跌到谷底才进场买股票、反正你买到的股价一定比它真正的价值还低。 24、买股票的时机应该与大多数的投资人想法相反。
关于发在朋友圈表示心情抑郁，很不开心，心情压抑的伤感说说100句 寂寞的人总是会用心的记住他生命中出现过的每一个人，于是我总是意犹未尽地想起你在每个星光陨落的晚上一遍一遍数我的寂寞。这份关于心情抑郁，很不开心，心情压抑的伤感说说希望大家会喜欢。 1、我总是躲在梦与季节的深处，听花与黑夜唱尽梦魇，唱尽繁华，唱断所有记忆的来路。 2、逃避，不一定躲得过;面对，不一定最难过。孤独，不一定不快乐;得到，不一定能长久。失去不一定不再拥有，可能因为某个理由而伤心难过。 3、足够真心的人经得起等待，随口说说的人转身就牵了别人的手。 4、后来我才知道，那些真正要走的人，吝啬得连说再见都觉得是浪费时间。 5、曾经，我想和你分享我的所有秘密，但现在，你成了我心底的秘密。 6、想你的滋味，就象喝了一杯冰冷的水，然后凝成了滴滴热泪。 7、这世上没有真正的公主!除非你老爸家资亿万，能引来一帮图你油水的男生女生常绕在左右虚意奉承，否则，你别指望全世界的人都能宠你若宝!
8、我忘记了哪年哪月的哪一天，我在哪面墙上刻下了一张微笑着，忧伤着，凝望着我的脸。 9、想你的时候有些幸福，幸福得有些难过。幸福对我说，你还太小。 10、人，不怕渺小，只怕卑微;人，可以无傲气，但不可无傲骨，无论别人怎样看你，你要自己看得起自己。 11、在这个城市里，我不断地迷路，不断地坐错车，并一再下错车，常常不知道自己在哪里，要去什么地方。 12、总有一些文字，触动心灵。总有一段心语，痛彻心扉。总有一些句子，你看着看着就哭了。 13、我耗尽了热情，丢失了自己，伤痛处还含着淡淡的甜蜜，原来只是场奇迹。 14、有些歌，深入人心，有时候我不知道我是在听歌，还是在听自己? 15、如果时间不可以令你忘记那些不该记住的人，我们失去的岁月又有什么意义。 16、有些话，说与不说都是伤害;有些人，留与不留都会离开。 17、遗忘是我们不可更改的宿命，所有的一切都像是没有对齐的图纸，从前的一切回不到过去就这样慢慢延伸一点一点的错开来。也许错开了的东西我们真的应该遗忘了。 18、绾青丝，挽情思，任风雨飘摇，人生不惧。浮生一梦醉眼看，海如波，心如皓月，雪如天赐。你自妖娆，我自伴。 19、我不是真的想踩着你的头往上爬，我也没有办法，他踩我，我踩你，踩来踩去大家也就习惯了。真高兴往上爬的人是我，
巴菲特投资语录 导读：经典语录巴菲特投资语录 1、在生活中如果你正确选择了你的英雄你就是幸运的。我建议你们所有人尽你所能地挑选出几个英雄。 2、他是一个天才但他能够把某些东西解释得如此简易和清晰以至起码在那一刻你完全理解了他所说的。 3、按兵不动：有时成功的投资需要按兵不动。 4、我们不会因为想要将企业的获利数字增加一个百分点，便结束比较不赚钱的事业，但同时我们也觉得只因公司非常赚钱便无条件去支持一项完全不具前景的投资的做法不太妥当，亚当·史密斯一定不赞同我第一项的看法，而卡尔·马克斯却又会反对我第二项见解，而采行中庸之道是惟一能让我感到安心的做法。 5、巨大的投资机会来自优秀的公司被不寻常的环境所困，这时会导致这些公司的股票被错误地低估。 6、如果发生了坏事情请忽略这件事。 7、判断一家企业的价值一半是靠科学研究一半是靠艺术上的灵感。 8、在你能力所及的范围内投资。关键不是范围的大小，而是正确认识自己。 9、在别人贪婪的时候我们恐惧，在别人恐惧的时候我们贪婪。 10、任何一位卷入复杂工作的人都需要同事。 11、任何不能永远前进的事物都将停滞。
12、如果发生了核战争，忽略这一事件。 13、就算美联储主席格林斯潘偷偷告诉我他未来两年的货币政策，我也不会改变我的任何一个作为。 14、投资是一项理性的工作，如果你不能理解这一点，最好别搀和。 15、如果你无法左右局面，那么错失一次机会也不是什么坏事。 16、在我从事投资工作的35年里，没有发现人们向价值投资靠拢的迹象。似乎人性中有一些消极因素，把简单的问题复杂化。 17、没有公式能判定股票的真正价值，唯一方法是彻底了解这家公司。 18、如果你加入扑克赌局20分钟还不知道谁是输家，那么你就是输家！ 19、目前的金融课程可能只会帮助你做出庸凡之事。 20、生活的关键是要弄清谁为谁工作。 21、头脑中的东西在未整理分类之前全叫“垃圾”！ 22、如果股市投资人只需相信理论上的投资效益就好比较一个打桥牌却告诉他看各家的牌对于桥局没有任何帮助一样。 23、如果你是池塘里的一只鸭子，由于暴雨的缘故水面上升，你开始在水的世界之中上浮。但此时你却以为上浮的是你自己，而不是池塘。 24、你必须独立思考。我总是感到不可思议为什么高智商的人不动脑子地去模仿别人。我从别人那里从没有讨到什么高招。
心情不好发朋友圈的说说,心情不好时发的朋友圈 1、心情不好，也不想好。 2、你可能也不爱我，只是刚好遇见我。 3、其实我很难过，只是骄傲不让我哭，宁愿坚强转身，也不委屈留下。 4、唯你最深得我心，也只有你最不识抬举。 5、起码我不后悔爱过你，永远也不会忘记你。 6、怀孕时要担心心情不好哭泣会影响宝宝发育，坐月子了还要担心心情不好分泌乳汁对宝贝不好，为什么我总要担心这样的破问题…… 7、心情不好的时候，我只想一个人安安安静的待着。 8、明明不是陌生人，却装旳比陌生人还陌生。 9、有些事情好像在冥冥中早已注定，譬如遇见，比如感觉，比如离开。 10、最近吃的都很少，虽然吃的少会心情不好，不过无所谓啦，少吃起码还能瘦一瘦，毕竟吃的多了心情也没好过。 11、莫名其妙心情不好。差不多见到谁都想打一架。
12、不开心就不要想，对自己好些，因为没有谁会真的在乎你。 13、寂静的夜里，难以入眠。有一种情不自禁的感觉在撩拨着我的心弦。 14、有时候，没有下一次，没有机会重来，没有暂停继续。有时候，错过了现在，就永远永远的没机会了。 15、走过每个场景，都是回忆，你要我怎么忘记。 16、是否你也像我一样，用言不由衷的话语，逼走最爱的人，然后独自心痛。 17、以朋友的名义爱着一个人，连吃醋的资格都没有，有多喜欢，就有多心酸。 18、其实我还好，只是突然回首，看到了个陌生的自己和一条回不去的路。 19、我想我的思念是种病，久久不能痊愈。 20、没有回应，再深的感情也得憋回去。 21、我在努力的变成你喜欢的样子，可是你却告诉我你爱的是她。 22、世界上最残忍的事，不是没遇到爱的人，而是遇到了却是最终错过。 23、你本来很爱一个人，可是，当所有的失望累积到了一个临界
巴菲特经典语录【162句】 126、有人曾经说过，当寻找受雇的职员时，你要从中寻找三种品质——正直、勤奋、活力。 而且，如果他们不拥有第一品质，其余两个将毁灭你。对此你要深思，这一点是千真万确的。如果你雇用了没有第二种品质的某些人，你实际上想要他们既哑又懒。 127、一位所有者或投资者，如果尽量把他自己和那些管理着好业务的经理人结合在一起，也能成就伟业。 128、任何一位，卷入复杂工作的人都需要同事。 129、生活的关键在于要给自己准确定位。 130、如果不能在30岁以前成为百万富翁，我就从奥玛哈的建筑物上跳下去。 131、在马拉松比赛中，你想跑到第一的前提是必须跑完全程。 132、在拖拉机问世的时候做一匹马，或在汽车问世的时候做一名铁匠，都不是一件有趣的事。 133、哲学家们告诉我们，做我们所喜欢的，然后成功就会随之而来。 134、生活的关键是，要弄清谁为谁工作。 135、哈佛的一些大学生问我，我该去为谁工作？我回答，去
为哪个你最仰慕的人工作。两周后，我接到一个来自该校教务长的电话。他说，你对孩子们说了些什么？他们都成了自我雇佣者。 136、在规则之外，要遵循榜样的引导。 137、除了丰富的知识和可靠的判断外，勇气是你所拥有的最宝贵的财富。 138、要想游得快，借助潮汐的力量要比用手划水效果更好。 139、民意测验不能代表思想。 140、传统(的智慧）长，智慧短。 141、永远不要从事那些目前使人痛苦，但从现在起10年后可能会大有改善的事业。如果你今天不欣赏你所从事的事业，可能10年后你仍不会欣赏它。 142、每个人都会深受影响，美国人的心灵将永远不会回到从前。（关于“911”的影响） 143、在生活中，如果你正确选择了你的英雄，你就是幸运的。我建议你们所有人，尽你所能地挑选出几个英雄。 144、如果你是池塘里的一只鸭子，由于暴雨的缘故水面上升，你开始在水的世界之中上浮。但此时你却以为上浮的是你自己，而不是池塘。 145、你真能向一条鱼解释在陆地上行走的感觉吗？对鱼来说，陆上的一天胜过几千年的空谈。 146、当适当的气质与适当的智力结构相结合时，你就会得到
朋友圈说说心情不好短语,心情不好的说说发朋友 1、最荒芜的不是这个世界，而是人心。 2、不要轻易说爱，许下的承诺就是欠下的债！ 3、时间不是让人忘了痛，它只是让人习惯痛。 4、我的硬伤不过是你的名字而已。总是一千次的忘记你，但又一千零一次的想起你。 5、天空下起了绵绵细雨，不知是否太过悲伤，连上帝也忍不住哭泣。 6、终于你只是一个名字而不是一段往事。 7、我们似乎都忘了那段感情，我忘得刻意，你忘得随意。 8、寂寞是听见某个熟悉名字，不小心想起某些故事；孤独是路过我身边的影子，笑着对我说似曾相识。 9、头发越剪越短，穿的越来越简单，睡的也越来越早，在乎的越来越少。 10、我会莫名其妙的心情不好，然后不惜得罪任何人。 11、有时候，没有下一次，没有机会重来，没有暂停继续。有时候，错过了现在，就永远永远的没机会了。
12、我没有朋友又怎样，这之后让我变得更加坚强。 13、一个人自以为刻骨铭心的回忆。别人也许早已经忘记了。 14、一停下来就迷失了方向，心情不好就是自己在这里坐坐，不管什么情绪都不会有人看见！想哭就哭吧！ 15、我说我喜欢猫，可到现在为止，我也没拥有过猫。 16、懂我的人知道我一发笑脸就是心情不好。 17、当初我们那么不甘心，最后还不是成了陌生人。 18、看不见的时候以为忘记了，重逢时只需一眼还是会溃不成军。 19、你的长相，影响了我滴健康成长，我看到你，心情比上坟还要纠结。 20、真正疼的要命的哭泣。不是有太多的情绪。而是面无表情的留下一滴一滴的苦泪。 21、一个人值不值得你穷极一生去喜欢，不是看他能对你有多好，而是看他心情不好的时候能对你有多差。 22、不需要有谁能够看穿我的笑容，因为我知道，那里面藏着一个真实的自己。 23、我想我的思念是种病，久久不能痊愈。 24、每次看到你的背影，我都拼命去追。
13、只有把基本功练扎实后，你的想象力才可能有质的飞跃。如果没有枯燥的磨练做基础，创造力不会为你酿造杰作，只会带来四不像的残次品。 14、不能耐心地听取批评，你就无法接受新事物。 15、相信美好的东西会以其自然的节奏出现在眼前。 16、拥有一只股票，期待它下个早晨就上涨是十分愚蠢的。 17、成功的投资在本质上是内在的独立自主的结果。 18、我建议你们不要去经纪人那里套小道消息，因为他们并不值得信赖。大多数小道消息也没有什么价值。但是有的主意，比如说我们的主意，却是非常私有化的，这点我和我的老师不一样。 19、真正理解养育你的那种文化的特征与复杂性，是非常困难的，更不用提形形**的其他文化了。无论如何，我们的大部分股东都用美元来支付账单。 20、虽然我也靠收入生活，但我迷恋过程要远胜于收入。 21、我工作时不思考其他任何东西。我并不试图超过七英尺高的栏杆：我到处找的是我能跨过的一英尺高的栏杆。 22、在你能力所及的范围内投资。关键不是范围的大小，而是正确认识自己。 23、你人生的起点并不是那么重要，重要的是你最后抵达了哪里。 24、要量力而行。你要发现你生活与投资的优势所在。每当偶尔的机会降临，即你的这种优势有充分的把握，你就全力以赴，孤注一掷。 25、在拖拉机问世的时候做一匹马、或在汽车问世的时候做一名铁匠、都不是一件有趣的事。
26、只有在退潮的时候、你才知道谁一直在光着身子游泳！ 27、在别人恐惧时我贪婪，在别人贪婪时我恐惧。 28、思想枯竭，则巧言生焉！ 29、我不关心宏观的经济形势。在投资领域，你最希望做到的 应该是搞清楚那些重要的，并且是可以搞懂的东西。 30、他反动把智商当做对良好投资关键，强调要有判断力，原 则性和耐心。 31、如果原则过时，它就不是原则。 32、正直，勤奋，活力。而且，如果他们不拥有第一品质，其 余两个将毁灭你。对此你要深思，这一点千真万确。 33、因为我把自己当成是企业的经营者，所以我成为了更优秀 的投资人；而因为我把自己当成是投资人，所以我成为了更优秀的 企业经营者。 34、我们不妨将自己的好运看作让他人也享受幸运的契机，而 非一项权利；将我们的优势看作是取得更加辉煌成就的踏板，而非 摆脱辛勤工作和个人挑战的一块挡箭牌。 35、不熟不做：投资者成功与否，是与他是否真正了解这项投 资的程度成正比的。 36、我不会以我挣来的钱衡量我的生命的价值。其他人也许会 这么做，但我当然不会。 37、当一个经历辉煌的经营阶层遇到一个逐渐没落的夕阳工业，往往是后者占了上风。 38、要去他们要去的地方而不是他们现在所在的地方。 39、如果我们最重要的路线是从北京去深圳，我们没有必要在 南昌下车并进行附带的旅行。